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Full text of "The Afghan War of 1879-80 : being a complete narrative of the capture of Cabul, the siege of Sharpur, the battle of Ahmed Khel, the brilliant march to Candahar, and the defeat of Ayub Khan, with the operations of the Helmund, and the settlement with Abdur Rahman Khan"

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THE  AFGHAN  WAR 


OF 


1879-80, 


BEING  A  COMPLETE  NARRATIVE  OF  THE  CAPTURE  OF  CABUL, 
THE  SIEGE  OF  SHERPUR,  THE  BATTLE  OF  AHMED  KHEL, 
THE  BRILLIANT  MARCH  TO  CANDAHAR,  AND  THE  DEFEAT 
OF  ATUB  KHAN,  WITH  THE  OPERATIONS  ON  THE  HELMUND, 
AND  THE  SETTLEMENT   WITH  ABDUR  RAHMAN  KHAN, 


By  HOWARD  HENSMAN, 
II 

SPECIAL  CORRESPONDENT  OP  THE  PIONBBR  (ALLAHABAD),  AND  THE  DAILY 

NBW8  (LONDON). 


WITH     MAPS. 


SECOND  EDITION. 


HonHon: 

W.    H.   ALLEN  &  CO.,  18,  WATERLOO  PLACE,   S.W. 


PUBLISHERS  TO  THE  INDIA  OFFICE. 

1882. 

[All  right*  retervcd.] 


LONDON: 

PRnrTBD  BT  WOODFALL  AKD  KIRDIB 

MILIOBD  LANS,  8TRAND,  W.C. 


HCNRY  MORSE  CTLIPHCN© 


r.  ., 


gttrtrateb 

TO 

THE   725D   (DUKE   OF   ALBANY'S   OWN) 

AMD 

THE  92nd  (GORDON)  HIGHLANDERS, 

IN  ACKNOWLEDGMENT  OF  THE  GENEROUS  HOSPITALITY 
RECEIVED  AT  THEIR  HANDS 

IN 

AFGHANISTAN. 


577275 


ADVERTISEMENT. 


G^ENEBAL  Sib  F.  Robbbts  writes  in  regard  to  the  letters  now 
republished — 

"  Allow  me  to  congratulate  you  most  cordially  on  the 
admirable  manner  in  which  you  have  placed  before  the  public 
the  account  of  our  march  from  Cabul,  and  the  operations  of 
81st  August  and  1st  September  around  Gandahar.  Nothing 
could  be  more  accurate  or  graphic,  I  thought  your  description 
of  the  fight  at  Gharasia  was  one  that  any  soldier  might  have 
been  proud  of  writing ;  but  your  recent  letters  are,  if  possible, 
even  better.' 


PREFACE 


The  interest  aroused  by  the  massacre  of  onr  ill-fated  Embassy  to 
the  Amir  Yaknb  Ehan,  the  subsequent  capture  of  Gabul,  and  the 
hard- won  successes  of  our  armies  during  the  occupation  of  the 
city,  can  scarcely  yet  have  passed  away ;  and  I  have,  therefore, 
Yentured  to  republish  the  series  of  letters  which,  as  a  special  corre- 
spondent, I  wrote  in  the  field.  They  are  a  simple  diary  of  the 
war ;  and  though  in  this  form  they  may  lack  conciseness,  they 
haye  at'  least  the  merit  of  such  accuracy  as  an  eye-witness  can 
alone  hope  to  attain.  It  was  my  good-fortune  to  be  the  only 
special  correspondent  with  the  gallant  little  army  which  moved  out 
of  Ali  Eheyl  in  September,  1879.  The  Government  of  India  had 
notified  that  "non-combatant  correspondents'*  would  not  be 
allowed  to  join  the  force,  the  history  of  whose  achievements  was 
to  be  left  to  regimental  officers,  who  might  in  their  spare  hours 
supply  information  carefully  viae,  to  such  newspapers  as  chose  to 
accept  it.  So  carelessly  was  this  strange  order  issued,  that  Sir 
Frederick  Koberts  never  received  official  intimation  of  its  exist- 
ence, and  he  welcomed  me  at  Ali  Kheyl  on  the  eve  of  his  departure 
for  Eushi  as,  I  am  sure,  he  would  have  welcomed  any  other 
correspondent  who  had  chosen  to  cross  the  frontier,  and  push  on 
without  escort  and  with  their  own  baggage  animals.  I  make  this 
explanation  in  justice  to  General  Roberts,  upon  whom  the  respon- 
sibility of  excluding  correspondents  has  been  falsely  thrown. 
Regarding  the  letters  now  republished,  Mr.  Frederick  Harrison  in 
the  Fortnightly  Review  has  been  good  enough  to  describe  them  as 


viii  Preface, 

"  admirably  written,  with  very  great  precision  and  knowledge." 
While  not  sympathizing  in  the  least  with  Mr.  Harrison's  criticism 
of  Sir  Frederick  Roberts's  punishment  of  Cabul,  in  support  of 
which  criticism  he  mainly  relied  upon  my  letters,  I  am  grateful 
for  his  estimate  of  my  work.  I  can  scarcely  hope  that  all  my 
critics  will  be  equally  generous. 

I  have  carefully  gone  into  details  where  military  movements  of 
importance  had  to  be  described,  and  the  sketch  maps  can  be  relied 
upon  as  showing  exact  distances  and  positions. 

HOWABD    HeNSMAN, 

Special  Correspondent  of  the  Pioneer,  Allahabad. 
Cabul,  Augusty  1880. 

The  above  was  written  when  all  was  peaceful  in  Afghanistan, 
but  the  disaster  at  Maiwand  once  more  threw  the  Cabul  army  into 
excitement,  and  General  Roberts  had  to  march  to  the  relief  of 
Candahar.  This  now  historical  march  and  the  victory  at  Candahar 
on  September  1st,  are  described  in  detail  in  Part  II.  of  this 
volume. 

H.  H. 

Allahabad,  November  Ist,  1880. 


CONTENTS, 


PART  I. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Massacre    of   Cavagnari — The  Kurram   Field   Force   moves 


PAOE 


UPON  Cabul 1 

^  CHAPTER  IL 

Yakub  Khan  in  the  British  Camp 6 

CHAPTER  III. 
The  Adyance  to  Charasia  and  the  Battle  of  that  Name,  etc.      20 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Capture  of  Shbrpur  Cantonments — The  Affair  of  the  Asmai 

Heights 38 

CHAPTER   V. 
Cabul  Occupied  by  General  Roberts 51 

CHAPTER  VI. 

The   Stores    in   Bala   Hissar  Arsenal — Disastrous   Explo- 
sions, etc 64 


Contents. 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Afghans:  the  Cj 
OF  Cabul,  eto ...      82 


PAGE 

Execution  of  Pbominent  Afghans  :  the  Case  of  the  Eotwal 


CHAPTER  VIII. 
Fighting  in  the  Shdtargardan  Pass,  etc.  .93 

CHAPTER  rx. 
Abdication  of  Yakub  Khan;  his  Abrbst,  kjc.        ...      99 

CHAPTER  X. 

The  British  Abmt  moyes  into  Shebpub;  opening  Communi- 
cation WITH  the  Khtbeb  Fobce,  etc 114 

CHAPTER  XL 
The  Bala  Hissab  Dismantled — Raiding  fob  the  Muedebebs 

OF  Cavagnabi — Execution  of  numebous  Sepoys         .        .    127 

CHAPTER  XII. 
Appboach  of  Winteb — Operations  against  the  Safis,  etc.      .    142 

CHAPTER  Xni. 
Difficulties  as  to  Supplies — Bahadub  Khan's   Contumacy; 

HIS  Villages  Destboyed,  etc 153 

CHAPTER  XIV. 
Yakub  Khan  Dbpobted  to  Indu — ^Affaibs  in  Afghan  Tubk- 

iSTAN — ^Teibal  Uneasiness  about  Cabul,  etc.   .        .        .170 

CHAPTER  XV. 

The  Decembeb  Tboubles — Fobmidable  Stbength  of  Mahomed 
Jan — Repulse  of  General  Dunham  Massy — The  Afghan 
Army  befobe  Cabul 184 


Contents.  xi 


PAOB 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

Thb  FiGH-mfo  AROUKD  Cabul — General  Bobebts   withdraws 

WITHIN  Sherfur,  etc. 198 

CHAPTER  XVn. 
The  SnsGE  of  Sherpur — ^Musa  Jan  proclaimed  Amir  bt  the 

Afghan  Leader,  etc. 218 

CHAPTER  XVm. 
The  Siege  of  Sherpur  (continiied) — Mahomed  Jan  dbliyers 
HIS   Attack  —  Its   Failure  —  Reinforcements   from   the 
Ehtbeb  Line,  etc 239 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

Dispersion  of  Afghan  Army — General  Roberts  Re-occupies 

Cabul — Uniyersalitt  of  the  late  Jehad — ^A  Looted  City    259 

CHAPTER  XX. 
Punishment  of  Mir  Butcha  and  his  Kohistanis — ^Asmatullah 
Khan's    Operations   about   Jugdulluck — Deportation  of 
Daoud  Shah 273 

CHAPTER  XXI. 
General  Roberts  proclaims  an  Amnesty — Afghan  Chiefs  at 
Cabul — Message   from   Mahomed  Jan — News  of  Abdur 
Rahman  Khan,  etc 283 

CHAPTER  XXII. 
The    British   Hospital  in  Cabul — "How  we  Live  in  Sher- 
pur"— "How  THEY  Lite  in  Cabul" 297  \ 

CHAPTER  XXIIL 
Shebe  Au's  Efforts  to  raise   an  Army — Gun-making,  etc. 

IN  Cabul~Thb  Ghazi  and  his  Mode  of  Warfare  .        .    320 


PAGE 


xii  Contents. 

CHAPTER  XXIV. 

The  Early  Life  op  Abdur  Eahman  Khan— Prominent  Afghan 

Characters,  etc 339 

CHAPTER  XXV. 

Mr.  Lepbl  Griftin  arrives  at  Sherpur  to  investigate  the 
Political  Situation — The  Malcontent  Chiefs  in  Durbar 
— Explanation  of  British  Policy 355 

CHAPTER  XXVI. 
General  Ross  goes  out  to  meet  General  Stewart — A  Second 

Successful  Battle  at  Charasia 373 

CHAPTER  XXVII. 

General  Stewart  at  Cabul — His  March  from  Candahar — 
The  Battle  op  Ahmed  Khel — Capture  op  Ghazni,  Action 
AT  Urzoo,  etc 388 

CHAPTER  XXVIII. 
"  The  Divine  Figure  from  the  North  " — A  Period  of  Calm 

— The  Kizilbashes,  etc 403 

CHAPTER  XXIX. 
The  Amirship  offered  to  Abdur  Rahman — Cavalry  Action 

at  Padkhao  Shana 415 

CHAPTER  XXX. 
Formal  Recognition  of  Abdur  Rahman  by  the  British — His 

Interviews  with  Mr.  Griffin — A  Settlement  arrived  at    431 

CHAPTER  XXXI. 

News  of  Maiwand  —  General  Roberts  marches  to  relieve 
Candahar — Cabul  evacuated  by  General  Stewart — The 
Setilkment  with  Abduu  Rahman "ASO 


Contents.  ?iii 


PART  II. 
CHAPTER  I. 

PAGE 

The  March  to  Candahar — Arrival  at  Shashgao    .  464 

r— " * 


CHAPTER   11. 

The  March  {continued) — Relief  of  Khelat-i-G-hilzai — Arrival 

AT  RoBAT — End  of  the  March,  etc 477 


CHAPTER   III. 

General  Roberts  in  Candahar — ^Reconnaissance  on  the  Herat 

Road — Battle  of  Candahar  and  Defeat  of  Atub  Khan,  etc.    603 

CHAPTER   IV. 

The  Siege  of  Candahar — Sortie  by  the  Garrison,  etc.  530 

* 

CHAPTER  V. 
The  Operations  on  the  Helmund— The  Disaster  at  Maiwand    645 

Conclusion 558 

Appendix 666 


LIST  OF  MAPS  ILLUSTRATING  ENGAGEMENTS. 


1.  Engaqemsnt  on  Hbiqhts  hbab  Cabul,  Octobbb  6,  1879 

2.  AcnoKS  ABOUKD  Gabul,  Dbcbmbbb  11  TO  14,  1879    . 

3.  Ofbratioks  nkab  Gabxtl,  Dbcjsmbeb  13  Ain>  14,  1879 
4  Thb  Shoe  of  Shsbfdb— Plan  of  thb  Dbfinobs 

5.  Thb  Battle  of  Ahmed  Khel,  Apbil  19,  1880  . 

6.  The  Action  at  Ubzoo,  Apbil  23,  1880 

7.  The  Battle  of  Gandahab,  Sbftembeb  1,  1880  . 

8.  The  Siege  of  Gandahab — Plan  of  the  Defences 

9.  The  Operations  on  the  Helmund,  July,  1880  . 
10.  The  Battle  of  Maiwand,  Jul?  27,  1880   . 


TO  rAOB 
PAOB 

30 

.    188 
.    200 


394 
402 
512 
532 

552 


THE   AFGHAN   WAR 


OP 


1879-80. 


PART  I. 


THE  OCCUPATION  OP  CABUL— THE  BRITISH  BESIEGED 
AT   SHEBPUR— DISPERSAL  OP  THE  TRIBES. 


CHAPTER  I. 

latrodaetion'^The  OaTagntri  Murion — ^Takab  Khan's  Brasion  of  the  Gundamak  Treatj 
— Tnrbnlenoe  of  the  Herat  Regiments — Nakshband  Khan's  Warning— The  Out- 
break— Taknb  Khan*s  Behayionr — Reception  of  the  News  in  India — The  Seizure 
of  ihe^Slmtaigardan,  and  Preparations  for  the  Adyanoe  upon  OabuL 

Thb  Treaty  of  Gkindamak  had  for  its  chief  object  the  direct 
representation  of  the  British  OoTemment  at  the  Conrt  of  the 
Amir  Yakub  Khan,  and,  in  pursuance  of  the  terms  of  the  Treaty^ 
Sir  Leeds  Cavagnari,  E.C.B.,  C.S.I.^  was  received  at  Cabnl,  as 
Resident,  on  July  24th,  1879.  Mr.  William  Jenkyns,  of  the 
Indian  Ciyil  Service,  accompanied  him  as  secretary  to  the  Mission. 
>An  escort  of  twenty-five  sowars  and  fifty  sepoys  of  the  Guides' 
'  €orps  was  the  only  means  of  protection  at  the  Embassy's  com- 
mand, implicit  faith  being  placed  in  the  Amir's  promise  to  guard 
the  lives  of  his  guests.  Lieutenant  Hamilton  was  in  command 
of  the  escort,  and  Dr.  Kelly,  surgeon  of  the  Guides,  was  the 
medical  officer  attached  to  the  Mission.  Including  servants  and 
followers,  there  were  in  all  some  200  souls  gathered  in  the  Resi- 
dency in  the  Bala  Hissar  from  July  24th  until  the  outbreak  of 
the  Herat  regiments  on  the  morning  of  September  8rd.    It  would 


r-'''>'^^''^'''fhe^^Jifgbiin  War,  1879—80. 

be  oat  of  place  to  describe  at  length  the  course  of  events  which 
culminated  in  the  Massacre,  bat  from  the  tone  of  Sir  Loais 
Cavagnari's  letters  there  can  be  no  doabt  the  Amir  was  never 
anxioas  to  carry  oat  to  the  strict  letter  the  terms  of  the  Gan- 
damak  Treaty.  Taking  the  official  diary  sent  weekly  from  Cabal 
to  the  Indian  Government,  it  appears  that  every  outward  honour 
was  paid  to  the  Embassy  upon  its  arrival,  but  that  Yakub  Ehan 
was  so  suspicious  of  his  Ministers  and  Nobles,  that  he  told  off 
men  to  watch  the  Residency.  These  spies  furnished  the  names 
of  all  who  visited  Cavagnari  without  the  Amir*s  knowledge. 
Then  came  rumours  of  petty  chiefs  having  been  punished  for 
their  friendship  to  the  British  during  the  late  campaign,  although 
one  of  the  main  points  of  the  Treaty  was  directed  against  this  very 
contingency.*  The  Amir  always  avoided  reference  to  this  sub- 
ject, and  as  Sir  Louis  Cavagnari  could  not  obtain  direct  evidence 
of  the  amnesty  clauses  being  departed  from,  no  redress  could  be 
obtained.  Apart  from  palace  intrigues,  which  are  always  rife  in 
Cabul,  there  seemed  no  direct  element  of  discord  at  work  in  the 
capital  until  the  troops  from  Herat  reached  Sherpur  Cantonment 
on  August  5th.  These  regiments  had  not  shared  in  the  humilia- 
tion of  the  defeats  suffered  by  the  Cabul  soldiery  at  Ali  Musjid 
and  the  Peiwar  Eotal ;  they  taunted  their  comrades  in  arms  with 
cowardice,  and  boasted  of  their  own  prowess ;  and  their  turbulence 
soon  assumed  a  dangerous  form.  A  ressaldar-major  of  one  of  our 
cavalry  regiments,  Nakshband  E^han,  an  old  and  tried  soldier,  was 
spending  his  furlough  at  his  village  of  Aoshahr,  two  miles  from 
Cabul,  and  he  seems  first  to  have  caught  the  alarm.  When  the 
Herat  regiments  marched,  or  rather  swaggered,  through  the 
streets  of  Cabul,  with  bands  playing,  many  of  the  soldiers  abused 
the  Kafir  elchi  (ambassador)  by  name,  calling  out  to  the  populace, 
"  Why  has  he  come  here  ?"  and  showing  too  clearly  that  their 
passions  were  dangerously  excited.  Nakshband  Ehan  learned 
from  a  fellow-countryman  in  the  ranks  that  the  soldiers  had 
been  ordered  so  to  shout  in  the  streets.     Full  of  this  news,  he 

*  Sirdar  Sher  Ali  Khan  Eandahari,  GoTemor  of  Candahar,  assured  Sir  Donald 
Stewart  that  Yaknb  Khan,  from  the  first,  never  intended  to  pardon  the  chiefs  who  had 
aided  ns.  Such  a  conne  of  policy  wonld  have  seemed  madness  in  the  eyes  of  e?erj 
Afghan,  said  the  Sirdar ;  not  a  man  would  have  understood  it. 


Massacre  of  the  Embassy.  3 

went  to  our  Envoy,  and  warned  him  of  the  coming  storm.  Sir 
Lonis  Cayagnari  was  a  man  notorious  for  his  disregard  of  personal 
danger :  he  was  brave  to  a  fault,  and  this  turbulence  among  the 
Afghan  soldiery  scarcely  shook  his  composure.  **  Never  fear/' 
was  the  answer  to  the  Bessaldar ;  ''  keep  np  yonr  heart,  dogs  that 
bark  don't  bite !"  "  But  these  dogs  do  bite ;  there  is  real  danger," 
urged  Nakshband  Ehan.  The  reply  was  characteristic  of  the  man  : 
he  had  taken  up  his  post  and  nothing  could  break  down  his  deter- 
mination to  remain  at  all  hazards ;  he  quietly  said,  ''  They  can 
only  kill  the  three  or  four  of  us  here,  and  our  death  will  be 
avenged." 

This  is  the  story  as  told  by  the  Ressaldar,  who  can  scarcely  be 
romancing ;  but  no  word  of  the  warning  is  given  by  Cavagnari  in 
his  letters  to  the  Viceroy,  all  of  which  are  full  of  sanguine  hope 
even  as  late  as  August  80th.  His  last  message  was  sent  on  Sep- 
tember 2nd,  and  concluded  with  the  words  "  All  well," — and  this 
within  twelve  hours  of  the  attack  upon  the  Residency.  He  trusted 
altogether  to  Yakub  Khan — for  what  could  an  escort  of  seventy- 
five  men  avail  against  an  army? — and  almost  his  last  written 
words  were :  ''  Notwithstanding  all  people  say  against  him,  I 
personally  believe  Yakub  Khan  will  turn  out  to  be  a  very  good  ally, 
and  that  we  shall  be  able  to  keep  him  to  his  engagements."  This 
blind  trust  in  the  Amir  was  soon  to  be  rudely  broken  down,  for 
Yakub  was  found  wanting  even  in  willingness  to  save  the  lives 
entrusted  to  his  care. 

The  story  of  the  outbreak  in  the  Bala  Hissar,  and  the  massacre 
of  the  Envoy  and  his  followers,  is  written  at  length  in  the  Blue- 
books.  The  tale  is  too  well  known  to  bear  reproduction :  the 
heroic  struggle  against  overwhelming  odds  has,  perhaps,  rarely 
been  equalled,  for  there  were  only  four  British  officers  and  a  hand- 
ful of  native  soldiers  to  meet  an  army.  Yakub  Khan  sat  in  his 
palace,  vacillating  and  sullen,  with  the  noise  of  the  fight  ringing 
in  his  ears,  and  the  roar  of  the  soldiery  and  the  fanatical  populace 
surging  into  his  council-chamber :  but  he  made  no  sign.  There 
were  councillors  who  urged  prompt  chastisement  of  the  mutinous 
sepoys :  there  were  regiments  at  Bala  Hissar  which  might  have 
loyally  obeyed  orders ;  but  the  man  who  had  pledged  himself  to 
preserve  our  Envoy  only  took  the  cunning  precaution  of  sending  out 

B  2 


4  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

Daoad  Shah,  his  commander-in-chief,  to  "  remonstrate  "  with  the 
armed  rabble.  It  was  like  remonstrating  with  a  tiger  when  the 
hunter  lies  at  his  mercy :  like  giving  the  word  "  halt  "  to  the  in- 
coming tide  :  Daond  Shah  was  thrnst  back  by  the  first  men  he 
met,  but  they  used  their  bayonets  tenderly,  and  his  wounds  were 
slight.  And  when  it  was  all  over,  when  the  excited  crowd  roared 
through  the  Bazaar,  with  Cavagnari's  head  held  on  high,  there 
seems  to  have  come  upon  Yakub  that  fear  of  vengeance  which  he 
had  hitherto  thrust  aside.  Forty  years  before  the  body  of  another 
Envoy  had  been  hung  on  the  butcher's  hooks  in  that  same  Bazaar  ; 
treachery  had  scored  a  success  which  promised  to  be  lasting ;  but 
Pollock  had  come  with  a  victorious  army  from  Peshawur,  while 
Nott  fought  his  way  from  the  south,  and  the  Char  Chowk  was 
soon  a  heap  of  ruins.  How  soon  would  the  vengeance  of  an  out- 
raged nation  again  fall  upon  Cabul  ? 

Shortly  after  midnight  of  September  4th  Sir  Frederick  Eoberts, 
who  was  in  Simla,  engaged  on  the  work  of  the  Army  Commis- 
sion, was  called  up  to  receive  a  telegram.  It  was  from  the  Kur- 
ram  Valley,  and  conveyed  the  first  news  of  the  Massacre,  which 
he  then  and  there  hastened  to  carry  to  the  Commander-in-Chief. 
The  shock  was  so  terrible  that  men  were  paralyzed  for  the  moment, 
but  the  next  day  the  machinery  of  Government  was  put  in  motion, 
a  council  of  war  was  called,  and  on  the  afternoon  of  September  5th 
the  following  instructions  were  sent  to  Brigadier-General  Dunham 
Massy,  then  commanding  the  Kurram  Field  Force  at  the  Peiwar 
Kotal*:— 

"  From  the  Quarter  Master  General  in  India  to  Brigadier- 
General  D.  Massy,  commanding  Kurram  Field  Force  ;  dated 
Simla,  5th  September,  1879. 

*'  Move  23rd  Pioneers,  5th  Ghoorkas,  and  Mountain  Train  to 
Shutargardan,  crest  of  pass ;  to  entrench  themselves  there  and 
await  orders.     Ten  days'  supplies." 

In  accordance  with  these  instructions,  Swinley's  Mountain 
Battery  of  six  7-pounder  guns,  escorted  by  the  Pioneers  and 
Ghoorkas,  moved   upon   the   Shutargardan,   which  was  occupied 

*  This  telegram  is  of  some  importance,  as  showing  the  qnickness  with  which  the 
Viceroy  and  the  military  authorities  recognized  the  necessity  of  seizing  the  Shutargardan 
before  the  Cabal  troops  or  the  local  tribesmen  could  occupy  the  Pass  in  strength. 


Seizure  of  tlie  Shutargardan.  5 

without  opposition  on  the  11th  of  September.  Colonel  Carrie,  of 
the  28rd  Pioneers,  commanded  this  small  force.  The  72Qd  High- 
landers and  the  5th  Panjab  Infantry  followed  in  a  few  days  to 
secore  the  road  between  Ali  Eheyl  and  the  Pass,  while  the  7th 
Company  of  Bengal  Sappers  and  Miners  was  ordered  np  from 
Shnlozan  (near  Kurram)  to  improve  the  road  beyond  the  Shutar- 
gardan.  In  the  meantime,  the  following  appointments  had  been 
made : — Colonel  Macgregor  to  be  Chief  of  the  Staff  to  Major- 
Oeneral  Sir  Frederick  Roberts,  Commanding  the  Force ;  Brigadier- 
General  Macpherson,  C.B.,  V.C.,  to  command  the  1st  Infantry 
Brigade ;  Brigadier-General  T.  D.  Baker,  C.B.,  to  command  the 
2nd  lufantry  Brigade;  Brigadier-General  Dunham  Massy,  to 
command  the  Cavalry  Brigade;  and  Brigadier-General  Hugh 
Gough,  C.B.,  Y.C.,  to  be  Boad  Commandant.  On  September  12th 
General  Boberts  arrived  at  Ali  Eheyl.  On  the  18th  General 
Baker  took  command  of  the  troops  in  the  Shutargardan  ;  which 
Pass,  by  the  18th  of  the  month,  was  held  by  the  troops  which  had 
moved  up  originally,  together  with  the  whole  of  the  72nd  High- 
Janders  and  the  7th  Company  of  Sappers  and  Miners.  The  posi- 
tion was  strongly  entrenched  and  every  precaution  taken  against  a 
s^rise  by  the  neighbouring  tribes. 

"  Having  secured  the  Shutargardan,  Sir  Frederick  Boberts  cast 
about  for  means  to  complete  his  transport,  it  being  intended  to 
move  6,000  men  upon  Cabul  with  as  little  delay  as  possible. - 
With  the  usual  carelessness  which  marks  the  operations  of  Indian 
armies,  and  perhaps  with  a  desire  to  curtail  expenditure,  the 
transport  of  the  Eurram  Valley  Field  Force  had,  upon  Cavagnari*s 
departure  for  Cabul,  been  allowed  to  dwindle  down  to  insignificant 
proportions.  There  were  in  the  Valley,  when  the  news  of  the 
Massacre  was  received,  only  1,600  mules,  500  sickly  camels,  and 
800  pack-bullocks.  These  were  just  sufficient  to  enable  the  Com- 
missariat Department  to  ftunish  supplies  to  the  winter  garrison 
of  the  Valley.  Without  loss  of  time  all  the  available  animals  in 
Peshawur  and  near  the  frontier  were  ordered  to  be  sent  to  Ali 
Eheyl,  and  eventually  the  army  was  provided  with  almost  2,000 
mules,  between  700  and  800  camels,  and  upwards  of  600  bullocks.^ 

*  On  October  14th,  at  Oabal,  the  retarns  were  :— Moles,  1,978  \  camels,  675  ;  bul- 
loeb,  604  ;  and  280  yabos  (ponies  purchased  in  Oaboi). 


6  The  Afg/tan  War,   1879—80. 

The  Gajis,  Taris,  and  local  Gbilzais  were  indaced  to  send  in 
animals  with  drivers,  and  this  "  local  carriage  "  was  of  great  ser- 
vice. Padshah  Khan,  the  most  influential  of  the  Ghilzai  chiefs, 
declared  himself  willing  to  aid  ns  in  the  collection  of  supplies,  and 
his  friendship  at  this  critical  moment  was  all-important.  On  the 
14th  of  September  the  Nawab  Sir  Gholam  Hassan  Ehan,  who  had 
started  from  Gandahar  to  join  Cavagnari  at  Cabal,  reached  the 
Shutargardan.  He  had  heard  news  of  the  Massacre  and  had 
turned  ofi*  the  Ghazni  Boad  and  made  for  our  most  advanced  post. 
The  fact  of  his  non-molestation  on  the  road  proved  that  the  Logar 
Valley  was  quiet,  and  this  was  confirmed  by  a  reconnaissance  on 
the  16th,  when  General  Baker  went  as  far  as  the  Shinkai  Kotal, 
half-way  between  Eushi  and  the  Shutargardan.  On  the  22nd 
the  Mangals  to  the  number  of  200  or  300,  raided  upon  a  small 
convoy  carrying  telegraph  stores  near  Karatiga,  east  of  the  Pass, 
killed  six  sepoys  of  the  escort  (originally  only  eleven  men),  and 
twenty-one  coolies  and  linesmen.  They  also  succeeded  in  carrying 
off  eighty -four  mules.  This  showed  that  our  convoys  would  probably 
be  attacked  daily,  and  General  Baker  ordered  that  no  escort  should 
be  less  than  twenty-five  armed  men  to  100  transport  animals. 


CHAPTEB  n. 

Letter  from  the  Amir — Baker's  Advance  to  Knshi— Arrival  of  Takub  Khan  in  the 
British  Camp — ^The  State  of  Cabal — Excitement  along  the  Line  of  Communication 
— Departure  of  the  Last  Convoy  from  All  Kbeyl — ^Narrow  Escape  of  Sir  F. 
Roberts — The  Amir's  Attempt  to  delay  the  Adyance— Durbar  at  Kushi — ^The 
Advance  ordered — Instructions  to  the  Troops. 

The  news  of  the  preparations  at  Ali  Kheyl  and  the  Shutargardan 
reached  Cabul  very  rapidly,  and  a  letter  from  General  Roberts  to 
the  Amir  was  also  safely  received.  In  reply  Yakub  Khan  wrote 
as  follows : — 

"  To  General  Roberts.  I  have  received  your  letter  of  the  7th, 
and  was  much  pleased.  I  fully  understood  what  was  written. 
Complete  confidence  was  restored,  and  a  sense  of  relief  felt  in  the 
friendship  shown  by  the  Viceroy,  as  my  prosperity  found  favour  in 


Yakub  Khans  Anxiety.  7 

his  sight.  I  am  dreadfully  distressed  and  grieved  at  the  recent 
event,  but  there  is  no  fighting  against  God's  will.  I  hope  to  in- 
flict such  punishment  on  the  evil-doers  as  will  be  known  world- 
wide ;  and  to  prove  my  sincerity,  I  have  twice  written  on  this 
subject,  and  the  third  time  by  my  confidential  servant,  Sher 
Mohammad  Ehan.  I  now  write  to  say  that  for  these  eight  days 
I  have  preserved  myself  and  family  by  the  good  offices  of  those 
who  were  friendly  to  me,  partly  by  bribing,  partly  by  coaxing  the 
rebels.  Some  of  the  Cavalry  I  have  dismissed,  and  night  and 
day  am  considering  how  to  put  matters  straight.  Please  Ood,  the 
mutineers  wiU  soon  meet  with  the  punishment  they  deserve,  and 
my  afiairs  will  be  arranged  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  British 
Government.  Certain  persons  of  high  position  in  these  provinces 
have  become  rebellious ;  but  I  am  watching  carefully  and  closely 
every  quarter.  I  have  done  all  I  could  to  ensure  the  Nawab 
Ghulam  Hussain's  safety.  I  trust  to  God  for  the  opportunity  of 
showing  my  sincere  friendship  for  the  British  Government,  and 
for  recovering  my  good  name  before  the  world." 

The  Amir's  anxiety,  or  perhaps  terror  it  should  be  called,  had 
reached  a  climax  at  this  time.  On  the  one  hand  were  the  Sirdars 
who  had  thrown  in  their  lot  with  the  mutinous  troops,  and  were 
trying  to  persuade  him  to  raise  a  jehad,  or  religious  war  ;  and,  on 
the  other.  General  Roberts  and  his  army,  already  on  the  move  from 
Ali  Kheyl.  With  the  idea  that  he  might  save  his  capital  from 
destruction,  or,  as  was  afterwards  suggested,  that  he  might  delay 
our  advance  until  the  tribesmen  had  assembled  at  Cabul,  Yakub 
Ehan  resolved  upon  throwing  himself  into  the  British  camp,  and 
claiming  such  protection  as  we  could  afford.  Before  doing  this 
he  sent  two  members  of  the  Cabul  Durbar  to  Ali  Eheyl,  viz.,  the 
Mustaufi  HabibuUa  Ehan  and  the  Wazir  Shah  Muhammad,  or, 
as  we  should  describe  them,  his  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer 
and  his  Prime  Minister.  They  bore  a  letter  in  which  their  sove- 
reign announced  his  intention  of  flying  from  Cabul  and  placing 
himself  in  General  Boberts's  hands.  Before  this  took  place,  how- 
ever, the  advance  from  the  Shutargardan  had  begun.  General 
Baker  having  pushed  forward  the  troops  at  his  disposal  in  the 
following  order. 

On  24th   September. — ^Four   guns  No.  2   Mountain  Battery. 


8  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

12th  Bengal  Cavalry.     One  company  72nd  Highlanders.     5th 
Ghoorkas. 

On  25tA  ig«p«em6€r.— F-A  Royal  Horse  Artillery.  Seven  com- 
panies 72nd. 

On  26tfe  September. — Two  guns  No.  2  M.  B.  23rd  Pioneers. 
7th  Company  Bengal  Sappers.  Six  companies  6th  Punjab 
Infantry. 

On  27 tA  September. — 14th  Bengal  Lancers. 

On  28tfe  September. — One  squadron  9th  Lancers.  5th  Punjab 
Cavalry.     92nd  Highlanders. 

On  the  27th,  Sir F.  Roberts  had  moved  his  head-quarters  from  Ali 
Kheyl  westwards,  and  on  the  same  day  the  Amir,  with  a  consider- 
able escort,  arrived  at  Kushi.  He  was  received  with  every  mark 
of  respect,  and  a  guard  of  honour,  furnished  by  the  92nd  High- 
landers, was  placed  at  his  tent.  His  camp  was  pitched  at  a  little 
distance  from  the  British  army. 

Having  joined  General  Roberts  at  Ali  Kheyl  on  the  evening  of 
September  26th,  I  may  take  up  the  story  of  the  advance  from  about 
that  period.  I  will  therefore  give  my  letters  as  they  were  published 
at  the  time : — 

Ali  Kheyl,  28*fe  September. 

The  unexpected  news  of  the  arrival  of  the  Amir  Yakub  Khan 
at  Kushi  last  night  has  been  received  with  general  satisfSAction, 
as  a£fairs  are  much  simplified  as  regards  the  military  position. 
There  has  been  much  doubt  all  along  as  to  the  sincerity  of 
Yakub's  protestations,  and  it  was  not  easy  to  determine  the  line 
of  action  when  Cabul  should  be  finally  reached.  But  the  Amir's 
authority  has  plainly  crumbled  to  the  dust  in  his  capital ;  and,  if 
not  a  fugitive,  he  must  have  come  as  a  suppliant  to  us  to  rein- 
state him  on  the  throne,  at  the  same  time  that  we  avenge  the 
Massacre  of  the  Embassy.  It  seems  far  more  probable,  however, 
that  he  is  a  fugitive ;  for  it  is  stated  that  Cabul  is  in  a  state  of 
anarchy,  which  can  only  mean  that  the  populace  have  fraternized 
with  the  mutinous  troops  and  have  driven  out  a  sovereign  who  had 
made  terms  with  the  Kafirs.  If  this  be  really  so,  the  fate  of  the 
city,  in  case  any  opposition  is  shown  when  our  army  moves  for- 
ward, should  be  sealed.  The  only  argument  an  Afghan  understands 
is  direct  and  severe  punishment  for  offences  committed,  and  the 


The  Cabul  Mutineers.  9 

pmuBhment  should  now  be  dealt  oat  without  stint,  even  if  Cabal 
has  to  be  sacked.  Not  a  man  in  the  force  that  is  now  aboat  to 
make  the  final  adyanoe  wonld  feel  other  than  the  keenest  pleasure 
in  seeing  Cabul  bum,  for  it  is  hopeless  to  expect  an  armed  rabble, 
such  as  that  which  now  holds  the  city,  to  show  a  steady  front 
when  General  Boberts's  army  closes  with  them.  They  lack 
leaders  to  direct  their  movements,  and  though  arms  and  ammu- 
nition may  be  plentiful  in  their  midst,  their  organization  is  about 
equal  to  that  of  a  European  mob  suddenly  placed  in  power  after 
a  long  period  of  strict  government.  Their  capacity  for  mischief 
is  as  limited  as  that  of  any  other  rabble,  for  their  future  move- 
ments are  all  dependent  upon  outside  influences.  If  left  to  their 
own  will,  they  would  probably  split  up  into  factions,  of  which  the 
strongest  would  eventually  sweep  away  all  rivals ;  but  when  menaced 
by  a  stronger  power,  they  must  either  dissolve,  or  by  sheer  dogged- 
ness  attempt  to  dispute  possession  of  that  which  they  have  gained. 
The  Cabul  mutineers  are  not  of  a  type  which  ''  die  but  never 
surrender,"  and  although  they  may  risk  a  brush  with  the  British 
forces,  they  will  most  likely  seek  safety  in  flight  before  any  severe 
thrashing  can  be  given  them.  It  will  be  most  aggravating  if  this 
proves  to  be  the  case,  but  until  the  Amir  has  explained  in  detail 
the  course  of  events  from  the  time  of  Sir  Louis  Cavagnari's  death, 
an  exact  estimate  of  the  position  at  Cabul  cannot  be  arrived  at. 
The  conference  which  is  sure  to  take  place  with  Sir  FrederickBoberts 
in  a  day  or  two  will  settle  what  course  is  to  be  taken,  and  it  is  to 
be  hoped  no  undue  tenderness  will  be  shown  in  laying  down  the 
lines  upon  which  the  policy  of  the  next  few  weeks  is  to  be  carried 
forward.  By  Wednesday  at  the  latest  a  completely  equipped  force 
of  over  6,000  men  will  be  at  Eushi,  and  on  the  following  morning 
the  march  will  begin.  Sunday  next  should  see  the  British  troops 
encamped  before  Cabul,  and  then  will  begin  the  punishment  of  a 
city  which  is  only  connected  in  the  saddest  way  with  the  expansion 
of  our  power  in  Asia. 

Sir  Frederick  Boberts  did  not  reach  Earatiga,  his  first  march 
from  here,  yesterday,  without  a  warning  that  the  tribes  are 
determined  to  do  mischief  so  far  as  lies  in  their  power.  The 
warning  was  conveyed  in  the  practical  way  of  his  party  being  fired 
opon  at  Jaji  Thana  in  the  Hazara  Darukht  defile  near  the  end  of 


lo  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

the  journey,  and  I  am  sorry  to  say  Dr.  Townsend  was  hit  in  the 
face,  and  is  reported  to  be  severely  wounded.  As  the  telegraph 
line  has  since  been  cut  we  have  not  been  been  able  to  learn  full 
particulars  of  the  attack,  or  with  what  loss  the  assailants  were 
driven  o£f.  No  other  casualties  occurred  in  General  Roberts's  party, 
but  a  detachment  of  the  8rd  Sikhs,  who  were  sent  down  from  the 
Shutargardan  to  patrol  the  road,  were  not  so  fortunate.  They 
were  attacked  by  a  large  body  of  tribesmen  and  lost  five  men. 
There  has  been  considerable  excitement  all  along  the  line  from 
Thull  to  Shutargardan  during  the  last  forty-eight  hours,  as  reports 
of  intended  attacks  by  Mangals  and  Zaimukhts  have  been  sent  in 
by  friendly  villagers.  The  camps  at  Ali  Kheyl,  the  Peiwar  Kotal, 
Kurram,  &c.,  are  very  weakly  guarded  now,  as  so  many  troops 
have  been  sent  on,  and  this  fact  is  evidently  known  to  the  tribes, 
who  are  bent  upon  mischief.  It  is  impossible  to  foretell  when  an 
attack  wiU  be  made ;  but  so  serious  did  the  chance  seem  yester- 
day, of  large  numbers  of  the  Mangals  coming  down  in  this 
direction,  that  the  67th  Foot,  who  were  to  march  to-day  for 
EAratiga,  have  been  detained.  It  was  fully  expected  that  the 
Peiwar  Eotal  would  have  been  attacked  last  night,  and  as  only 
two  companies  of  the  8th  Begiment  were  there,  the  chance  of 
a  smart  fight  was  looked  upon  as  certain.  But  nothing  came 
of  the  alarm,  so  far  as  I  can  learn,  and  the  post  will  be 
strengthened  by  men  from  Kurram,  as  soon  as  possible.  The 
81st  N.I.  must  now  be  well  on  its  way  to  the  Valley,  and  as 
soon  as  it  arrives,  better  arrangements  can  be  made  to  protect 
the  camps.  The  Mangals  are  said  to  have  asked  permission 
from  a  friendly  tribe  in  the  valley  between  this  and  Peiwar  Kotal 
to  pass  through  their  territory,  and  this  request  can  only  have 
been  made  with  a  view  to  harass  our  communications.  The 
camps  are  so  large — Shaving  hitherto  been  garrisoned  by  consi- 
derable bodies  of  men — that  with  reduced  strength  commandants 
can  scarcely  be  expected  to  guard  every  yard  of  mngar*  that  has 
been  raised  for  defence.  With  the  85th  Foot  and  the  81st  N.L 
available  for  use  from  Kurram  to  the  Shutargardan  all  would  be 
well,  but  the  date  of  their  arrival  here  is  uncertain.  I  do  not 
think,  however,  that  these  petty  annoyances  will  hinder  the  all- 
*  Breastworks  built  with  stones,  greaUj  in  vogue  in  A^hanistan. 


Excitement  among  the  Tribes.  1 1 

important  advance  upon  Cabal,  as  General  Roberts's  army  will  be 
80  equipped  as  to  be  able  to  operate  independently  for  some 
time  to  come.  It  is  too  strong  to  fear  anything  that  may  be  in 
front,  and  once  on  the  move  the  reality  of  our  progress  to  Gabul 
will  present  itself  in  yery  striking  colours  to  the  restless  tribes. 
The  efforts  of  the  moollahs,  who  have  nnquestionably  been  at 
work  for  some  time,  may  bring  about  results  which  will  cause 
much  trouble  to  our  garrisons,  but  beyond  this  there  is  nothing  to 
be  feared.  The  ensuing  winter  will  probably  see  an  expedition 
on  a  large  scale  against  the  Mangals  and  Zaimukhts,  for  when 
once  the  passes  are  closed  between  this  and  Cabal  there  will  be  no 
necessity  for  stationary  camps,  and  six  or  eight  regiments,  with  a 
due  complement  of  artillery,  may  march  into  the  Mangal  and 
Elhost  country,  and  once  for  all  settle  old  scores  with  the  tribes 
that  have  so  troubled  us.  Nearer  Thull  the  road  is  by  no  means 
safe,  another  man  having  been  kiUed  on  the  Kafir  Kotal  between 
our  frontier  station  and  the  first  post  westwards.  The  cowardice 
of  the  assailants  is  so  marked  that  the  post  bags  and  convoys  are 
left  untouched,  though  the  escorts  are  very  small.  There  seems 
at  present  no  plan  in  the  attacks  that  are  made,  though  assem- 
blies of  2,000  or  8,000  men  are  reported  to  have  taken  place 
among  the  more  resolute  sections  of  the  Mangals.  The  Hazara 
Darukht  defile  is  the  favourite  spot  at  which  attacks  are  made, 
the  difficulties  of  the  road  rendering  rapid  passage  impossible. 
The  67th  Foot  march  to-morrow  morning  for  Earatiga,  and  if 
attacked  in  the  usual  place  they  will  doubtless  give  a  very  good 
account  of  themselves.  They  are  escorting  ammunition  and  bag- 
gage, but  even  with  these  encumbrances  they  will  have  strength 
enough  to  handle  very  roughly  any  number  of  assailants. 

Karatiga,  29th  September. 

Early  this  morning  the  final  complements  of  the  Cabul  Field 
Force  left  Ali  Kheyl,  and  they  have  now  reached  this  post,  which 
is  near  the  foot  of  the  Shutargardan.  To-morrow  they  proceed  to 
Eushi,  and  then  thi^  army  which  is  to  march  upon  Cabul  vid  the 
Logar  Valley  win  be  complete.  As  early  as  three  o'clock  this 
morning  the  troops  began  to  turn  out  in  the  upper  and  lower 
camps  at  Ali  Eheyl,  and  as  there  was  a  large  convoy  to  be  mar- 


12  The  Afghan  Wary  1879 — 80, 

shalledy  all  officers  were  basily  engaged  in  patting  things  ship- 
shape. Two  companies  of  the  67th  Foot  were  started  off  at  an 
early  hoar  and  marched  to  Drekila,  to  which  place  half  a  dozen 
elephants,  ander  an  escort  of  two  companies  of  the  2l8t  P.N.I., 
had  been  sent  the  previoas  evening.  Before  daybreak  the  troops 
began  to  move  oat  of  Ali  Kheyl.  They  consisted  of  the  remain- 
der of  the  67th  Foot,  and  the  21st  P.N.I.,  G-3  Battery  R.A., 
two  Gatling  guns,  and  details  of  varioas  native  cavalry  regiments. 
In  all  there  were  about  1,800  men,  and  the  convoy  itself  consisted 
of  about  1,500  laden  animals,  camels,  mules,  bullocks,  and 
ponies.  Besides  the  baggage  of  the  troops  marching,  there  was  a 
large  quantity  of  ammunition  being  sent  up,'  and  it  was  a  matter 
of  no  little  anxiety  to  get  all  well  forward.  General  Macpherson 
was  in  command,  and  among  the  other  officers  going  on  were 
Colonel  Macgregor,  General  Hugh  Gough,  and  Colonel  Heathcote, 
Chief  Transport  Officer.  It  took  about  four  hours  to  start  the 
whole  line,  but  once  on  the  move  little  time  was  lost.  The  road 
lies  up  a  river  bed,  and  the  stream  had  to  be  crossed  and  recrossed 
times  innumerable.  In  many  places  nothing  but  a  mere  track 
over  stones  and  boulders  was  forthcoming,  and  the  pace  was  neces- 
sarily slow.  The  67th  men  marched  in  such  fine  form,  that 
lialts  had  frequently  to  be  called  in  order  to  enable  the  baggage 
animals  to  close  up,  for  it  was  quite  possible  that  an  attack  in 
force  might  be  made  upon  the  convoy  by  the  Mangals.  The  occur- 
rence of  Saturday,  in  which  five  of  the  3rd  Sikhs  were  killed,  and 
Dr.  Townsend,  of  General  Roberts's  staff,  wounded,  has  shown 
that  the  local  tribes  had  come  down  ;  and  it  was  not  unlikely  that 
they  would  attempt  to  cut  so  long  a  line  as  that  which  had  to  be 
formed  between  Ali  Eheyl  and  Karatiga.  Accordingly  General 
Macpherson  so  arranged  the  escort  that  armed  men  were  scattered 
from  end  to  end  of  the  convoy,  in  addition  to  there  being  a  strong 
advanced  guard  of  the  67th,  and  an  equally  strong  body  of  the 
21st  P.N.I.  in  rear.  On  the  troops  from  Ali  Kheyl  reaching 
Drekila — a  post  on  the  road  overlooked  by  some  curiously  shaped 
peaks,  rain- worn  so  as  to  resemble  rudely  an  artificial  fortification, 
with  a  suspicion  of  stunted  minarets  thrown  in — ^the  elephants 
were  started  off,  and  the  main  body  of  the  convoy  followed,  the 
guns  with  their  escort  halting  for  an  hour.     Then  the  whole  line 


Narrow  Escape  of  General  Roberts.  13 

was  again  pat  in  motion,  and  the  Hazara  Darukht  defile  was  made 
for.  This  defile  is  certainly  one  of  the  worst  that  troops  could 
eTer  hope  to  pass  in  the  face  of  an  enemy.  The  road  still  follows 
the  river  bed,  which  is  shat  in  by  steep  hills  clothed  with  fir-trees, 
offering  splendid  coyer.  The  hills  are  so  precipitous  that  it  would 
be  impossible  in  many  places  for  men  to  scale  them,  and  a  hand- 
fid  of  resolute  soldiers  could  check  an  army  with  but  little 
trouble.  It  was  about  Jaji  Thana,  two  or  three  miles  from  Kara- 
tiga,  that  an  attack  was  expected,  and  it  was  there  that  General 
Boberts  had  been  fired  upon,  but  singularly  enough  the  greater 
part  of  the  convoy  had  reached  the  camping  ground  before  a  shot 
was  fired.  Then  a  small  party  of  tribesmen  appeared,  and  though 
they  succeeded  in  scaring  a  few  sowars  they  retired  very  smartly 
when  the  escort  opened  fire.  A  company  of  the  5th  N.I.  doubled 
out  of  the  post  here  when  the  alarm  was  given,  but  their  aid  was 
pot  needed.  The  whole  convoy  at  the  time  I  am  writing  (9  p.m.) 
is  now  safely  encamped  here,  and  early  to-morrow  it  will  move 
on  to  Kushi.  The  battery  of  artillery  was  to  have  made  the  Shu- 
targardan  this  evening,  but  they  arrived  too  late  for  the  march  to 
be  attempted.  To-night  strong  picquets  are  posted  on  the  hills 
which  command  Karatiga  on  three  sides,  and  we  have  made  our- 
selves as  comfortable  as  possible. 

It  is  unlikely,  however,  that  any  attempt  will  be  made  to  harass 
us,  as  the  Mangals  received  a  severe  castigation  on  Saturday. 
The  explanation  of  the  firing  upon  General  Boberts  and  his  staff 
on  that  day  is  very  simple.  A  large  party  of  tribesmen  cut 
the  telegraph  wire  near  Jaji  Thana,  almost  within  sight  of 
Karatiga  fort,  and  then  waited  in  ambush  for  the  party  sent 
out  to  replace  the  wire.  This  party  was  guarded  by  twelve  of 
the  8rd  Sikhs,  and  no  sooner  had  they  reached  the  point  where 
the  line  had  been  cut  than  they  were  fired  upon  from  a  high 
wooded  hill  on  their  right.  One  sepoy  was  killed  at  the  first 
voUey,  and  while  directing  their  fire  to  the  hill  the  men  were 
attacked  in  rear  by  some  Mangals  who  had  previously  crossed 
the  road.  Four  Sikhs  were  killed  in  all,  and  as  the  bills  were 
swarming  with  men,  a  party  of  eighteen  of  the  92nd  High- 
landers, under  Colour-Sergeant  Hector  Macdonald,*  and  forty- 

*  ReceiTod  a  commiauon  for  ibis  and  other  acts  of  braveiy. 


14  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

five  of  the  8rd  Sikhs  were  hurriedly  sent  out.  The  enemy 
were  very  strong,  but  the  Highlanders  got  them  well  within 
range,  and  it  is  calculated  that  at  least  thirty  were  killed  and 
many  more  wounded.  They  were  driven  over  the  hills  in  full 
retreat.  Another  large  party  fired  a  volley  at  General  Boberts 
and  his  party,  of  whom  Dr.  Townsend  was  wounded.  The 
Oeneral  had  only  with  him  the  head-quarters  of  the  Cavalry 
Brigade,  a  squadron  of  the  9th  Lancers  and  the  5th  Punjab 
Cavalry,  as  he  was  riding  hard  to  reach  the  Shutargardan,  but 
very  fortunately  twenty-five  men  of  the  92nd  Highlanders,  who 
had  been  sent  from  Karatiga  to  act  as  his  advance  guard,  joined 
him  near  Jaji  Thana.  These  and  some  dismounted  Lancers  held 
the  Mangals  in  check  until  the  28th  Punjab  Infantry,  on  baggage 
guard  in  rear,  came  up  and  cleared  the  heights.  To-day  there 
was  no  large  gathering,  as  I  have  said,  but  the  narrow  escape  of 
our  General  made  us  extra  vigilant. 

Camp  Kushi,  \%i  October. 

The  whole  of  the  Cabul  Field  Force  has  passed  beyond  the 
Shutargardan,  and  to-morrow  morning  at  eight  o*clock  the  real  ad- 
vance upon  Cabul  begins.  General  Massy  is  now  at  Zerghun  Shahr, 
eight  miles  from  here,  with  the  12th  and  14th  Bengal  Cavalry, 
two  guns  B.H.A.,  two  companies  of  the  72nd  Highlanders,  and 
the  5th  P.N.I.  General  Baker's  and  General  Macpherson's 
brigades  will  join  him,  and  General  Sir  F.  Boberts  and  head- 
quarters, accompanied  by  the  Amir  and  his  retinue,  will  also 
start  for  this  advanced  camp  to-morrow.  The  force  will  then  be 
concentrated,  and  the  three  marches  which  remain  to  be  made 
before  Cabul  comes  in  sight  will  take  place  without  delay. 
Sunday,  the  5th,*  will  see  us  before  the  walls  of  the  city,  but 
whether  serious  opposition  will  be  encountered  is  quite  a  matter 
of  conjecture.  The  latest  news  here  is,  that  the  four  regiments 
sent  by  the  Amir  to  quell  the  rebellion  in  Badakshan  are  returning 
in  hot  haste  to  Cabul,  but  their  feelings  are  not  known*  It  is 
only  reasonable,  however,  to  suppose  that  they  are  anxious  to  share 
in  the  display  of  hearty  enmity  against  the  British,  and  if  this  be 

*  This  expectation  was  a  very  fair  one  at  tho  time,  but  the  inevitable  trant^-rt 
difficulties  occarred  and  the  halt  bad  to  be  called. 


The  Amir  Pleads  for  Delay.  15 

80,  there  will  be  aboat  eleven  regiments  to   be  met,  excluding 
artillery  and  cavalry,  which  do  not  connt  for  much.    At  the  oat- 
side  there  would  be  5,000  regular  infantry;    and  as  our  force 
consists  of  over  6,000  men  of  all  arms,   any   opposition   the 
mutineers  may  make  cannot  be  of   long    duration.      If   they 
obstinately  cling  to  Gabul  and  defend  it  according  to  the  best  of 
their  ability,  the  city  may  perhaps  take  us  some  days  to  capture  ; 
bat  it  would  be  fearful  weakness  on  their  part  to  allow  themselves 
to  be  caged  within  walls  from  which  there  can  be  no  escape.     The 
Amir,  who  is   still  in  camp  here,  had  an  interview  with  Sir  F. 
Boberts  this  evening,  and  pleaded  that  nothing  should  be  done 
hastily,  evidently  fearing  that  his  capital  stood  a  very  fair  chance 
of  being  destroyed.     But  the  present  temper  of  our  policy  runs 
directly  contrary  to  all  delay,  and  it  was  useless  to  urge  that  there 
were  many  waverers  in  Gabul  who  had  not  yet  joined  the  mutineers, 
but  who  were  deterred  by  fear  from  attempting  to  favour  the  cause 
of  others — which  in  this  case  is  the  cause  of  an  Amir  who  has 
thrown  himself  into  the  arms  of  a  late  enemy.     Sir  F.  Roberts 
told  the  Amir  distinctly  that  not  even  a  day's  delay  would  take 
place,  and  that  to-morrow  would  see  the  whole  army  on  the  way 
to  Cabul.     In  deference,  however,  to  the  Amir's  wishes,  a  pro- 
clamation would  be  issued  and  circulated  in  advance,  in  which  all 
liege  subjects  of  the  Amir  would  be  asked  to  declare  themselves, 
and  due  notice  of  punishment  be  gi^en  to   such  as  continued 
rebellious.    At  this  announcement  the  Amir  and  bis  nobles  seemed 
much  pleased,  though  its   value  may  prove  practically  nil.     If 
Cabul  has  not  been  sacked  by  the  mutineers,  but  is  still  held  by 
them,  it  would  be  a  dangerous  matter  for  the  Amir's  adherents  to 
come  out,  as  they  would  inevitably  be  cut  down  as  traitors.     As  a 
test  of  the  disposition  of  the  citizens,  it  may  be  useful  in  deter- 
ring the  soldiers  from  attempting  to  defend  the  place,  as  their 
position  would  be  untenable  were  the  feeling  of  the  people  shown 
to  be  against  them.     From  all  points  of  view  it  is  obviously  to 
the  advantage  of  our  policy  that  Cabul  should  be  quickly  occupied  : 
on  the  one  hand,  to  punish  the  mutineers  severely,  if,  in  the  heat 
of  their  fanaticism,  they  resolve  to  fight;  and,  on  the  other,  to 
prevent  it  being  looted,  if  they  consider  it  safer  to  load  themselves 
with  booty  and  make  for  some  of  the  independent  khanates. 


i6  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

As  a  Bign  of  the  times,  it  mnst  be  noticed  that  Wali  Mahomed 
Elhan*  and  his  Mends,  who  treasure  up  the  traditions  of  Dost 
Mahomed's  rale,  have  left  Cabal  in  order  not  to  be  implicated  in 
any  actions  of  the  rebellious  troops,  and  are  now  at  Zerghnn  Shahr. 
They  form  unquestionably  a  powerful  faction  in  Gabul,  and  it  will 
perhaps  be  a  difficult  matter  to  keep  them  from  intriguing,  if  they 
see  that  Yakub  Khan  is  suspected  of  treachery  by  the  British. 
When  General  Roberts  met  Wali  Mahomed  yesterday,  the  Sirdar 
was  most  profuse  in  his  professions  of  friendship ;  but  it  was  plain 
that  the  friendship  was  dictated  by  self-interest.  The  turn  of  the 
wheel  may,  in  Wali  Mahomed's  own  opinion,  throw  Yakub  Ehan 
out  of  power,  and  a  new  ruler  must  be  cast  about  for.  Such  a 
ruler  would  only  govern  under  the  shadow  of  bur  arms,  and  to 
meet  us  half-way  before  the  crisis  comes  is  a  deep  stroke  of  policy. 
How  far  it  will  succeed  no  one  can  yet  tell,  but  our  faith  in  the 
Amir  so  far  is  not  sufficiently  shaken  to  justify  the  countenancing 
of  a  pretender.  Wali  Mahomed  was  ordered  to  remain  with 
General  Massy  in  the  camp  at  Zerghun  Shahr,  but  to-morrow  he 
and  Yakub  Ehan  may  meet,  and  much  discretion  will  be  needed 
to  keep  up  a  show  of  amicable  relationship  between  them.  The 
story  of  the  Massacre  has  yet  to  be  sifted  in  all  its  details,  and 
Wali  Mahomed  may  be  among  the  witnesses  cited  to  give  evidence. 
With  Yakub  Ehan  and  his  sirdars  in  Eushi,  and  Wali  Mahomed 
and  his  followers  only  eight  miles  away,  the  position  is  a  delicate 
one,  and  it  will  be  interesting  to  watch  its  development. 

From  what  I  can  learn,  the  following  would  seem  to  have  been 
the  order  of  things  at  the  so-called  Durbar  on  September  29th. 
At  11  A.M.  Sir  Frederick  Roberts  and  the  principal  officers  of 
his  divisional  staff  (with  whom  was  General  Hills,  C.B.,  V.C), 
rode  to  that  part  of  the  camp  where  tents  had  been  pitched 
for  the  Amir's  use.  The  veteran  Daoud  Shah  met  the  party, 
and  after  general  hand-shaking  conducted  them  into  the  durbar 
tent  where  the  Ainir  was  waiting.  The  usual  formal  cere- 
monies and  inquiries  were  gone  through,  and  Sir  Frederick 
Roberts  then  left.  At  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  Amir 
with  the  heir-apparent  and  his  sirdars  returned  the  visit.  A 
guard  of  honour  of  the  92nd  Gordon  Highlanders  was  drawn 
*  A  son  of  Doet  Mahomod  Khan,  and  therefore  ancle  of  Yaknb  Khan. 


Yakub  Khatis  Mounted  Highlanders.  17 

np  to  receive  him ;  the  band  played,  and  every  attention  was 
scnipnlonsly  shown.  There  were  many  British  officers  from  the 
varioas  regiments  present,  who  watched  rather  critically  the  dis- 
play of  ceremonial  politeness  which,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
followed.  The  Amir  was  lost  in  admiration  of  his  guard  of 
honour,  and  he  may  well  be  pardoned  for  his  earnest  study  of  the 
men :  the  Gordon  Highlanders  are  in  physique  and  bearing  per- 
fect specimens  of  British  soldiers.  When  the  visit  came  to  an 
end  the  Amir  mounted  his  horse  (one  of  those  presented  to  him 
at  Ghmdamak),  and  rode  to  his  own  camp,  outside  the  British 
lines.  The  band  of  the  Oordon  Highlanders  followed  him  and 
played  before  his  tent,  and  directly  afterwards  he  was  visited  by 
Generals  Baker  and  Hills.  Several  officers  also  strolled  down  to 
the  camp  and  found  much  food  for  amusement  in  the  demeanour 
and  costume  of  the  800  horsemen  who  form  the  escort  of  Yakub 
Ehan.  These  include  such  novelties  as  mounted  Highlanders, 
who  ride  madly  about  camp  on  the  least  provocation.  At  dusk  a 
guard  of  the  72nd  Highlanders,  under  a  British  officer,  was 
mounted  over  the  Amir's  tent,  and  the  same  attention  has  been 
paid  to  him  day  and  night  since.  It  is  a  sign  of  our  loving- 
kindnesB  towards  him,  and  of  our  deep  anxiety  that  his  personal 
safety  should  be  assured.  After  having  come  to  us  as  a  guest,  it 
would  be  the  height  of  inhospitality  not  to  show  him  all  honour, 
whatever  little  accounts  may  have  to  be  settled  hereafter  in  our 
camp  at  Gabul. 
The  following  order  has  been  issued  by  Sir  F.  Koberts : — 
'^  The  Government  of  India  having  decided  that  the  Eurram 
Field  Force  shall  proceed  with  all  possible  despatch  to  Cabul  in 
response  of  His  Highness  the  Amir's  appeal  for  aid,  and  with  the 
object  of  avenging  the  dastardly  murder  of  the  British  Representa- 
tive and  his  escort.  Sir  F.  Roberts  feels  sure  that  the  troops  under 
his  command  will  respond  to  this  call  with  a  determination  to 
prove  themselves  worthy  of  the  sacred  duty  entrusted  to  them, 
and  of  the  high  reputation  they  have  maintained  during  the  recent 
campaign.  The  Major-General  need  address  no  words  of  exhorta- 
tion to  soldiers,  whose  courage  and  fortitude  have  been  so  well 
proved.  The  Afghan  tribes  are  numerous  but  without  organiza- 
tion, the  regular  army  is  undisciplined  and  whatever  may  be  the 


1 8  The  Afghan  Wary  1879—80. 

disparity  in  nambers,  snch  foes  can  never  be  formidable  to  Her 
Majesty's  troops. 

"  The  dictates  of  humanity  require  that  a  distinction  should  be 
made  between  the  peaceable  inhabitants  of  Afghanistan  and  the 
treacherous  murderers  for  whom  a  just  retribution  is  in  store,  and 
Sir  F.  Roberts  desires  to  impress  on  all  ranks  the  necessity  for 
treating  the  inoffensiye  population  with  justice,  forbearance,  and 
clemency.  The  future  comfort  and  well-being  of  the  force  depend 
largely  on  the  friendliness  of  our  relations  with  the  districts  from 
which  our  supplies  must  be  drawn ;  prompt  payment  is  enjoined 
for  all  articles  purchased  by  departments  and  indiyiduals,  and  all 
disputes  must  be  at  once  referred  to  a  political  officer  for  decision, 

''  The  Major-General  confidently  looks  forward  to  the  successful 
accomplishment  of  the  objects  of  the  expedition  and  th^  re- 
establishment  of  order  and  a  settled  government  in  Afghanistan." 

As  regards  the  military  position  here,  it  is  acircely  necessary  to 
enumerate  the  regiments  now  on  the  ground,  as^wltkvthe  exception 
of  those  at  Zerghun  Shahr,  under  Oeneral  Massy,  alT  the  troops 
detailed  for  the  Gabul  Field  Force  are  now  mustered  ready  for 
the  march.  The  march  of  the  67th  Foot,  21st  N.I.,  G-8,  R.A., 
and  the  Gatling  guns  from  Karatiga  to  Kushi  occupied  two  days, 
General  Macpherson  considering  it  wise  to  halt  the  1,500  baggage 
animals  on  the  Shutargardan  last  night  and  give  them  an  extra 
feed,  so  as  to  prepare  them  for  future  hard  work.  This  was  an 
excellent  idea,  for  the  poor  beasts  are  in  the  worst  condition,  and 
good  food  can  alone  make  them  equal  to  the  heavy  loads  they  have 
to  carry.  The  Shutargardan  is  indeed  a  bleak  wilderness  even 
now,  and  the  road  which  descends  to  the  bed  of  the  river  would 
try  the  stamina  of  the  best  pack  animals  in  the  world.  The  thin 
line  of  the  convoy  was,  however,  worked  safely  down,  and  all  day 
it  wound  its  slow  length  along  through  narrow  gorges,  over  the 
stony  river  bed,  up  the  steep  Shinkai  Kotal  (surely  the  most 
desolate  spot  in  all  the  desolation  of  Afghanistan),  and  thence 
along  the  broad  road  traversing  the  open  plain,  which  spreads  out 
in  stony  barrenness  from  the  foot  of  the  mountains.  There  was 
a  large  amount  of  ammunition  being  brought  up,  and  so  jealous 
were  we  of  the  valuable  boxes,  that  special  guards  were  told  off  to 
all  animals  carrying  them.    But  nothing  was  seen  of  any  hostile 


The  Military  Position.  19 

clansmen  until  late  in  the  evening,  when  a  few  shots  were  fired, 
and  some  maranders  snoceeded  in  carrying  off  three  moles.  Tak- 
ing into  consideration  the  length  of  Una  of  tiie  convoy  and  the 
difficnlty  of  the  way,  sach  a  loss  is  most  insignificant,  although 
eT6iy  brnte  that  can  bear  a  load  is  now  of  exceptional  yalue.  It  is 
beUered  that  the  larger  bodies  of  Mangals  and  independent 
Ghilzais  who  had  assembled  on  the  route  have  dispersed  to  their 
homes,  and  only  stray  robbers  are  now  about.  These,  however 
are  capable  of  much  mischief.  A  syce  was  shot  through  the  leg 
yesterday,  and  several  camp  followers  have  been  cut  up. 

This  camp  will  be  broken  up  to-morrow,  as  all  the  troops  are 
mid6r  orders  to  leave  for  Zerghun  Shahr,  and  for  the  next  fortnight 
or  80  no  attempt  will  be  made  to  keep  up  the  line  of  communica- 
tion between  the  advancing  force  and  the  old  Eurram  stations. 
Heliograms  of  course  will  be  sent  by  Captain  Straton's  signallers, 
and  the  post  will  be  carried  as  regularly  as  the  conditions  of  the 
ronner  service  permits,  but  beyond  this  we  shall  be  in  our  own 
little  world,  self-contained,  and  self-supporting.  As  much  local 
carriage  as  possible  has  been  hired,  and  Uie  influence  of  the  Amir 
upon  neighbouring  villages  has  been  freely  exercised.  Grain  paid 
as  tribute  has  also  come  in,  and  this  has  been  handed  over  to  the 
Conmiissariat,  which  has  also  purchased  largely  of  all  who  are 
willing  to  sell.  At  present  all  is  favourable  to  a  rapid  and  success- 
ful advance.  The  days  are  clear  and  warm,  and  a  bright  moon 
renders  night  surprises  impossible.  The  weather  is  so  mild  that 
the  camp-followers  can  live  in  comfort  without  additional  warm 
clothes  being  served  out,  and  the  whole  force  is  very  healthy.  To 
say  that  the  men  are  anxious  to  advance  and  are  all  in  high  spirits 
is  scarcely  necessary.  They  are  too  good  material  to  need  any 
such  praise. 


0  2 


20  The  Afghan  War,   [879 — 80. 


CHAPTER  in. 

The  Karoh  to  Zerghnn  Sbahr— Proclamation  to  the  People  of  Cabal— The  Compositioii 
of  the  ** Avenging  Army" — March  to  Sufed  Sang — Transport  Difficulties — Hoe- 
tility  of  Villagers — ^March  to  Charasia— Cavalry  Reconnaiasanoe— The  Battle  of 
Charasia— Defeat  of  the  Afghans. 

Zbrghun  Shahr,  2nd  October. 

The  camp  at  Enshi  was  all  astir  early  this  morning,  for  it  was  oar 
iBrst  day's  march,  and  the  capacity  of  our  baggage  animals  had 
yet  to  be  tested.  It  is  true  we  had  only  to  march  eight  miles  to 
Zerghuu  Shahr,  where  General  Massy  had  been  in  camp  for 
some  days ;  but  still  there  were  large  quantities  of  stores  and 
ammunition  to  be  moved.  General  Baker's  Brigade  was  the  first 
to  move,  and  at  eight  o'clock  they  followed  in  the  wake  of  ,the 
5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  which  was  ordered  to  cover  their  front  and 
flanks.  The  greatest  anxiety  was  regarding  the  baggage,  but  the 
arrangements  were  well  made  by  the  transport  officers,  and  as 
the  animals  had  an  easy  road  to  follow  the  march  was  a  very 
satisfactory  one. 

With  one  or  two  exceptions  the  line  was  well  kept,  and  the 
baggage  reached  its  destination  pretty  rapidly.  The  5th  P.O. 
advanced  as  if  in  a  country  swarming  with  enemies,  the  advance 
guard  being  thrown  out  a  mile  in  front,  and  flankers  working  on 
either  hand  over  the  stony  hills  which  traversed  the  plain.  Fol- 
lowing the  cavalry  were  F-A,  R.H.A.,  a  small  party  of  signallers, 
the  23rd  Pioneers,  the  72nd  Highlanders,  No.  2  Mountain  Battery, 
5th  P.I.,  one  company  Sappers  and  Miners,  Baggage,  Field 
Hospital,  Engineer  Park,  5th  Ghoorkas  (as  rear-guard),  and  a  few 
troopers  of  the  5th  P.O.  All  the  troops  looked  very  fit,  and  they 
marched  with  an  ilan  that  could  not  be  mistaken.  The  road 
taken  was  over  the  stony  plain  which  extends  for  two  or  three 
miles  on  either  hand,  and  the  march  was  absolutely  without 
incident.  Zerghun  Shahr  was  reached  before  noon,  the  troops 
halting  for  half  an  hour  about  four  miles  out,  and  the  regiments 
filed  off  to  their  camping  grounds  on  the  open  plain.     The  village 


The  March  to  Zerghun  Shahr.  21 

lies  a  few  hundred  yards  to  the  west  of  the  road,  and  is  of  very 
small  dimensions.  A  running  stream  snpplies  the  camp  with 
water,  the  principle  of  the  karez  (the  sinking  of  a  continuous  line 
of  wells,  connected  by  an  underground  channel,  carrying  the 
water  to  a  lower  level)  having  been  largely  applied.  With  the 
exception  of  the  fruit  trees  in  the  village  there  is  no  vegetation 
anywhere  to  be  seen,  and  the  country  is  nearly  a  repetition  of 
that  previously  passed  over ;  bare  hills  looking  down  upon  stony 
plains  which  do  nothing  but  reflect  the  sun's  rays  upon  unlucky 
travellers.  The  desolate  aspect  of  everything  is  most  distressing, 
bat  we  are  hoping  for  better  things  after  another  march. 

To  return  to  the  march  from  Eushi:  General  Macpherson's 
Brigade  left  at  ten  o'clock.  Sir  Frederick  Roberts  and  staff 
starting  about  an  hour  later.  With  them  was  the  Amir  and  his 
Sirdars,  who  could  not  fail  to  be  impressed  with  the  compactness 
and  fitness  for  any  kind  of  work  of  the  soldiers  before  him. 
Every  effort  was  made,  too,  to  keep  the  baggage  animals  well 
together  under  strong  escorts,  so  as  to  show  His  Highness  that 
our  army  was  not  careless  on  the  march,  and  would  not  lay  itself 
open  to  surprise.  When  such  grand  regiments  as  the  67th, 
72ud,  and  92nd  are  on  the  move,  it  is  not  likely  there  will  be  any 
slackness,  for  the  men  are  of  the  old  stamp,  and  know  what 
discipline  and  smartness  mean.  The  Amir  upon  arriving  here 
was  shown  to  his  encamping  ground,  which  is  well  away  from 
that  of  Wall  Mahomed,  meeting  between  the  two  at  the  present 
juncture  being  studiously  avoided.  The  camp  is  overrun  with 
wild-looking  Afghans,  generally  galloping  at  headlong  speed 
without  any  special  object  in  view,  and  but  for  the  sturdiness  of 
our  sentries  these  mangy  horsemen  would  invade  the  privacy  of 
even  head-quarters  and  brigade  camps.  Our  soldiers  bear  them 
DO  goodwill,  and  usually  return  their  look  of  insolent  braggadocio 
with  a  frown  which  expresses  a  good  deal.  Tommy  Atkins  is  on 
the  whole  a  very  honest  sort  of  fellow,  and  his  ire  is  now  roused 
Against  these  swaggering  cowards,  who  were  in  Gabul  when  our 
Embassy  was  attacked,  and  would  not  raise  a  finger  to  aid  the 
handful  of  men  who  perished.  Poor  old  Daoud  Shah  is  perhaps 
entitled  to  some  little  respect ;  but  for  the  others  contempt  is 
^OBt  too  good.    The  Amir  is  our  guest — a  guest  perhaps  upon 


22  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

whom  a  friendly  watch  is  kept  as  a  matter  of  precaution — and  we 
cannot  therefore  give  expression  to  onr  feelings  yery  frankly,  but 
if  the  Gamp  were  canvassed  the  general  opinion  would  be  one  of 
rather  a  strong  kind  as  regards  his  vacillation  and  cowardice  on 
the  8rd  of  September.  However,  he  is  now  in  the  midst  of  an 
army  which  will  soon  be  at  the  gates  of  his  capital,  and  then  he 
will  have  to  sit  down  quietly  until  our  policy  is  duly  shaped — 
this  time  simply  in  accordance  with  our  own  aims,  and  utterly 
regardless  of  his  protestations.  He  is  now  profuse  in  his  thanks 
for  the  proclamation  which  is  to  go  before  us  to  Gabul ;  at  the  same 
time  he  is  doubtful  of  its  effect  upon  the  mutineers.  His  tone 
might  change^  perhaps^  if  he  could  see  any  way  out  of  his  present 
difficulties  other  than  that  to  be  made  by  our  bayonets. 

The  proclamation  alluded  to  was  dated  October  2nd,  and  was 
sent  off  to-day  to  CabuL    It  is  as  follows : — 


"Proclamation  to  the  People  of  Cabul. 

"Be  it  known  to  all  that  the  British  army  is  advancing  on 
Gabul  to  take  possession  of  the  city.  If  it  be  allowed  to  do  so 
peacefully,  well  and  good ;  if  not,  the  city  will  be  seized  by  force. 
Therefore  all  well-disposed  persons  who  have  taken  no  part  in  the 
dastardly  murder  of  the  British  Embassy  or  in  the  plunder  of  the 
Besidency  are  warned,  that  if  they  are  unable  to  prevent  resistance 
being  offered  to  the  entrance  of  the  British  army  and  to  the 
authority  of  His  Highness  the  Amir,  they  should  make  inmie- 
diate  arrangements  for  their  own  safety,  either  by  coming  into  the 
British  Gamp  or  by  such  other  measures  as  may  seem  fit  to  them. 
And  as  the  British  Qovernment  does  not  make  war  on  women  and 
children,  warning  is  given  that  all  women  and  children  should  be 
removed  from  the  city  beyond  the  reach  of  harm.  The  British 
Government  desires  to  treat  all  classes  with  justice,  and  to  respect 
their  religion,  feelings,  and  customs,  while  exaeting  full  retribution 
from  offenders.  Every  effort  will  therefore  be  made  to  prevent 
the  innocent  suffering  with  the  guilty.  But  it  is  necessary  that 
the  utmost  precaution  should  be  taken  against  useless  opposition. 
Therefore,  affcer  the  receipt  of  this  proclamation,  all  persons  found 
armed  in  or  about  Gabul  wiU  be  treated  as  the  enemies  of  the 


3 


Proclamation  to  the  Cabulis. 


23 


Brituh  Goyemment ;  and  farther,  it  mast  be  clearly  nnderstood 
that  if  the  entry  of  the  British  force  is  resisted,  I  cannot  hold 
mjself  responsible  for  any  accidental  mischief  which  may  be  done 
to  persons  and  property,  even  of  well-disposed  people  who  may 
hsTO  neglected  this  warning. 

"  Signed,  &c.,  F.  Robbbts." 

Two  sowars  belonging  to  the  12th  Bengal  Cavalry,  who  were 
spending  their  farloagh  at  Gabnl,  arrived  here  to-day,  and  report 
that  the  mutineers  mean  to  fight.  We  have  just  heard  of  an 
nnsaccessfnl  attack  upon  the  Shatargardan  by  Mangals  and 
Ghilzais.* 

The  force  is  now  concentrated,  for  the  first  time,  for  the  march 
onward  to  Cabal.    It  is  made  up  as  follows: — 


Cabul  Field  Fobob,  Ootobbb  1879. 


Other  WitTiirtt, 

BritlBh 

Offioen. 

BritiBh. 

NatiTe. 

DmaioDal  and  Brigade  Staff       

60 

FA,R.H.A.         

7 

118 



M,B.A. 

7 

187 



Ho.  2  Monntaiii  Battery 

8 

— 

228 

MiLaaoers           

4 

118 



(th  Punjab  GaTalry         

7 



825 

12th  Bengal  Cayalry        

6 

— 

828 

14tk  Bengal  Lancen        ...        

7 

— 

407 

67thBcgiment      

18 

686 

_ 

72nd  Highlanders 

28 

746 



92»i  Higfalanden 

17 

717 

_ 

5th  Punjab  Infantiy        

8 

— 

610 

SlidFioiieen         

6 

_ 

671 

28th  Panjab  Infimtrj      

8 

— 

686 

^Gboorkaa        

7 



574 

7th  Company  Simpers  and  Miners 

8 

2 

98 

Two  QatUng  gnns 

1 

84 

Total      

192 

2,558 

8,867 

There  are  aboat  6,000  '^  followers  "  and  some  8,500  baggage 

*  The  Shutargazdan  was  held  by  the  8rd  Sikhs  and  2l8t  Panjab  Infantiy  with  four 
gam  of  No.  1  Mountain  Batteiy.    Colonel  Ikioney  of  the  8rd  Sikhs  was  in  command. 


24  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

animals.  Foarteen  days'  supplies  are  being  carried,  with  tea  and 
sugar  for  two  months.  Lieutenant-Colonel  B.  L.  Gordon,  R.H.A., 
commands  the  artillery  (twelve  9-pounder  and  six  7-pounder  guns, 
with  two  Gatlings) ;  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  M.  Perkins,  B.E.,  is 
in  command  of  the  Engineers.  The  Cavalry  Brigade  is  of  course 
commanded  by  General  Massy ;  while  the  Infantry  are  brigaded 
as  follows  : — 1st  Brigade  (General  Macpherson),  67th,  92nd  High- 
landers, and  28th  P.I. ;  2nd  Brigade  (General  Baker),  72nd  High- 
landers, 6th  Ghoorkas,  and  5th  P.I.  The  23rd  Pioneers  are  not 
attached  to  any  particular  brigade. 

SuPED  Sang,  Zahidabad,  4tA  October. 

Yesterday  the  march  was  continued,  and  Macpherson 's  Brigade 
with  the  cavalry  reached  Sufed  Sang  in  the  evening,  after  a  march 
of  nearly  fifteen  miles.  The  same  open  plain  was  traversed,  but  there 
were  more  signs  of  cultivation  as  the  Logar  Biver,  which  was  hid- 
<len  from  sight  at  Zerghun  Shahr  by  a  range  of  hills,  was  neared. 
Along  its  banks  are  villages  scattered  at  short  intervals,  and  the 
orchards  of  these  form  a  very  pleasant  relief  to  the  bare  barrenness 
of  the  Ghilzai  Hills  on  our  right.  The  Logar  Biver  is  spanned 
by  a  narrow  bridge  near  Zahidabad  village,  but  it  was  found  im- 
possible to  get  wheeled  guns  across  it,  and  the  ford  adjacent  to  the 
bridge  was  not  so  shallow  as  it  should  have  been,  the  villagers  having 
turned  a  large  volume  of  water  into  the  stream  from  a  neighbour- 
ing irrigation  channel.  This  was  the  first  sign  of  the  latent  hos- 
tility of  the  people  in  the  Logar  Valley,  but  as  the  maliks  (head- 
men) of  Zahidabad  and  the  near  village  of  Sufed  Sang  came  in 
and  paid  their  respects,  we  could  do  nothing  in  the  way  of  pun- 
ishment. The  troops  forded  the  river,  the  baggage  being  sent  by 
way  of  the  bridge.  Some  of  the  men  were  swept  oflF  their  feet  by 
the  force  of  the  current,  but  as  the  stream  was  only  fifty  or  sixty 
yards  in  width,  no  lives  were  lost.  The  Prince  of  Bokhara,  who 
is  a  refugee  at  the  Amir's  Court,  met  General  Boberts  at  Zahida- 
bad. He  had  followed  Yakub  Khan's  example,  and  had  fled  from 
Cabul  in  the  night.  He  reported  that  the  troops  were  being  incited 
to  fight  by  certain  disloyal  Sirdars,  but  that  no  general  rising  of 
the  people  had  taken  place :  the  flight  of  the  Amir  had  prevented 
any  great  tribal  combination  so  fS^r. 


Advance  to  Sufed  Sang.  25 

Our  camping  ground  is  in  the  midst  of  cultivation,  and  we  are 
halted  here  to-day  awaiting  the  arrival  of  General  Baker's  Brigade. 
Yesterday  it  was  found  that  the  carriage  of  the  force  was  quite 
inadequate  to  carry  all  the  stores  and  ammunition,  now  that  the 
whole  army  had  been  concentrated,  and  accordingly  General  Baker 
was  ordered  to  halt  his  brigade  at  Zerghun  Shahr  for  the  night 
and  guard  the  Commissariat  supplies  and  the  Ordnance  park.  This 
he  did  by  forming  a  rude  sort  of  laager,  within  which  the  transport 
npifnaln  were  placed.     He  was  not  molested  during  the  night. 
The  call  upon  the  Transport  of  the  Force  to  do  double  work  was 
answered  with  great  alacrity  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Mark  Heathcote 
and  the  officers  working  under  him.    After  the  heavy  march  of  fifteen 
miles  the  beasts  were  well  fed  and  given  a  few  hours'  rest ;  but  at  one 
o'clock  in  the  morning  all  the  strongest  camels  were  paraded  and 
marched  off  to  Zerghun  Shahr.  There  they  were  loaded  up,  and  with 
as  little  delay  as  possible  began  the  return  journey  to  Sufed  Sang — 
forty-five  miles  in  thirty-six  hours.*    On  the  previous  evening  some 
shots  had  been  fired  near  the  Logar  Bridge,  but  no  mischief  was 
done ;  and  we  took  but  little  notice  of  this  expression  of  enmity, 
except  to  station  strong  picquets  and  warn  the  sentries  to  show 
extra  vigilance.     This  evening,  however,  a  determined  attack  was 
made  upon  the  rear-guard,  the  villagers  of  Kuti  Kheyl  and  other 
hamlets  creeping  up,  under  cover  of  darkness,  and  hiding  themselves 
in  nullahs  and  behind  orchard  walls.     Fortunately  they  were  badly 
armed,  and  although  they  kept  up  a  desultory  fire  at  close  quarters. 
Major  Stockwell  of  the  72nd  Highlanders  drove  them  off  by  firing 
volleys  and  by  throwing  skirmishers  out  to  protect  his  left  flank.  As 
the  rear-guard  crossed  the  river  the  villagers  grew  bolder  and  fol- 
lowed them  up  pretty  closely,  but  no  baggage  was  lost ;  and  a  few 
companies  being  sent  from  camp  to  hold  the  bridge  the  firing  died 
away,  and  now  (10  p.m.)  all  is  again  quiet.     The  halt  to-day  has 
been  of  service  in  enabling  us  to  get  in  a  few  supplies,  but  the 
transport  difficulty  is  a  serious  one,  as  it  is  now  clear  only  one 
infantry  brigade  can  march  daily,  and  the  baggage  animals  must 
be  sent  back  day  by  day  to  bring  up  the  stores  and  reserve  am- 

*  Tbif  will  show  the  difficulties  General  Roberto  had  to  contend  with,  eyen  in  the 
few  marches  from  Koshi  to  Cabal.  The  transport  train  was,  as  usual,  the  weakest 
link  in  the  cbais,  and  eTerything  had  to  be  made  snbserrient  to  it 


26  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

mnnition.  To-morrow  General  Baker's  brigade  will  move  on  to 
Charasia,  and  the  92nd  Highlanders  will  probably  be  added  to  the 
regiments  composing  it.  There  is  news  to-day  from  Oabol  to  the 
effect  that  the  matinotLS  regiments  haTC  not  yet  left,  bat  are  bosy 
looting  the  arsenal  in  the  Bala  Hissar,  wherein  are  stored  many  han- 
dred  rifles^  and  an  enormous  quantity  of  small-arm  ammunition. 

Gamp  Ghabasu,  hth  October. 

The  village  of  Euti  Eheyl  was  chiefly  responsible  for  the  attack 
upon  Genend  Baker's  rear-guard  last  night,  and  we  have  now  a 
number  of  prisoners  in  our  hands  who  were  captured  in  that 
neighbourhood,  and  who  are  said  to  haye  been  concerned  in  the 
skirmish.  This  morning  (Sunday),  before  striking  camp,  a  small 
force  was  sent  out  with  two  mountain  guns.  A  squadron  of  cav- 
alry surrounded  Euti  Eheyl,  and  upon  the  9th  Lancers  finally 
going  in,  several  men  showed  fight.  Three  were  run  through,  one 
just  as  he  was  levelling  his  piece  at  an  officer,  and  five  were  cap- 
tured ;  two  of  whom  were  wounded  on  the  head  with  lance-butts. 
The  maUks  of  the  village  were  also  brought  in,  but  were  released 
after  receiving  a  warning  as  to  their  future  behaviour.  The  five 
prisoners  were  sent  on  with  the  advanced  guard  here,  and  were 
tried  this  afternoon  by  drum-head  court-martial.  One  of  them 
was  a  sepoy  of  the  Amir's,  and  he,  with  two  others,  was  sentenced 
to  death  for  being  in  unlawful  rebellion  against  his  sovereign. 
The  other  two  were  released,  no  doubt  much  to  their  astonish- 
ment. 

As  the  march  to  Gharasia  was  only  a  short  one  of  six  miles 
from  Sufed  Sang,  we  did  not  start  until  ten  o'clock.  Early  in  the 
afternoon  the  encamping  ground  was  reached,  and  tents  were 
pitched  on  the  fallow  fields  which  stretch  to  the  foot  of  the  hills  <m 
either  side.  The  road  followed  a  due  northerly  direction,  through 
a  cultivated  tract  of  country,  for  about  three  miles,  to  some  very 
low  hills  which  traverse  it  at  right  angles,  and  near  which  is  the 
village  of  Ghildukhteran.^  On  crossing  these  hills,  a  long  valley 
lay  stretched  before  us  in  the  shape  of  a  parallelogram ;  and  at 
the  farther  extremity  could  be  seen  the  village  of  Gharasia,  with 
its  orchards  stretching  in  front  of  it,  with  clumps  of  trees  dotted 

*  Forty  daughters. 


Arrival  at  Charasia.  27 

briber  to  ihe  west.  Beyond  was  the  mass  of  hills  which  shnt  in 
Gabnl,  and  hinder  any  view  of  the  city  from  the  yalley.  The 
hills  to  east  and  west  also  close  in ;  and  the  Talley  cannot  be  mach 
more  than  two  miles  across.  It  is  all  under  cultivation  by  means 
of  irrigation  chaimels.  The  hills  oyerlooking  Charasia  are,  first, 
a  low  range  of  a  Ught-coloured  slaty  character,  then  a  higher 
series  of  rocky  heights,  and  in  the  immediate  rear,  forming  the 
sky-line,  is  a  precipitous  range  with  four  or  five  peaks  standing 
out  in  bold  relief.  This  range  runs  sharply  down,  on  the  east,  to 
the  road  which  leads  direct  to  the  old  Gabul  camping  ground  and 
the  Bala  Hissar,  and,  with  another  high  range  sloping  similarly 
down  on  the  other  side  of  the  road,  forms  the  Sang-i-Nawishta 
defile,  which,  if  held  in  strength,  would  be  very  difficult  to  force. 
Through  this  defile  the  Logar  Biver  passes  into  the  Gabul  Valley* 
Our  encamping  ground  is  south  of  the  village,  the  head-quarters 
of  Sir  F.  Roberts  being  a  mile  or  more  from  the  orchards.  The 
ranges  of  hills  east  and  west  of  us  are  very  high  and  steep ;  but 
directly  to  our  left  front  is  only  a  gradual  slope,  over  which  lies  the 
beautiful  Chardeh  Valley,  filled  with  orchards,  and  apparently  rich 
in  cultivation.  A  road  skirting  the  hills  leads  through  the  valley 
into  Gabul.  There  is  a  third  road  among  the  hills  immediately  in 
rear  of  Gharasia. 

A  cavalry  reconnaissance  to-day  did  not  cause  any  of  the  enemy 
to  show  themselves ;  but  perhaps  to-morrow,  when  more  ground 
is  covered,  there  may  be  a  different  result.  Emissaries  from 
Gabul  are  said  to  have  been  in  the  Gharasia  village  yesterday,  and 
the  difficulty  we  have  had  in  getting  supplies  this  afternoon  is  a 
proof  of  tbeir  efforts  to  influence  the  villagers  against  us.  How- 
ever, only  a  few  shots  have  been  fired  at  our  cavalry,  and  we  are 
resting  in  camp,  which  is  protected  by  strong  outlying  picquets. 
To-morrow  morning  1,600  baggage  animals  go  back  to  Sufed  Sang 
to  bring  up  the  rest  of  the  stores,  and  this  delay  will  cause  us  to 
halt  here  a  day.  General  Macpherson,  with  the  67th  Foot,  28th 
N.I.,  three  guns,  and  a  squadron  of  cavalry,  has  been  left  behind 
to  take  charge  of  to-morrow's  convoy.  He  will  draw  in  his  camp 
as  much  as  possible,  as  the  affair  at  Euti  Eheyl  has  shown  how 
badly  disposed  the  villagers  are  towards  us. 

The  Amir  and  Wali  Mahomed  have  come  in  with  us,  but  the 


28  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

former  does  not  seem  to  have — or  will  not  exercise — control  over 
the  villagers  we  have  to  deal  with.  There  is  plainly  much  trim- 
ming of  sails  among  them  as  to  their  immediate  attitude,  but  we 
are  wide-awake  enough  not  to  trust  them  in  any  way.  In  case  of 
any  check,  there  cannot  be  the  least  doubt  that  the  groups  which 
now  watch  us  marching  past  would  shoulder  their  j'fee^aifa  and  turn 
out  to  harass  us  on  all  sides.  The  men  with  us  who  know  the 
local  character  best  are  strong  in  their  assertion  that  until  we 
have  occupied  Gabul  we  shall  be  annoyed  by  these  tribesmen,  who 
are  loth  to  let  long  strings  of  baggage  animals  pass  through  their 
midst  without  trying  to  loot  some  of  the  riches  they  carry.  Even 
to-day  a  kahar  in  charge  of  a  mule-load  of  baggage  was  cut  up. 
He  had  wandered  from  the  road,  and  had  made  no  sign  when  the 
rear-guard  passed.  Half  a  dozen  men  watched  their  opportunity, 
and  when  the  coast  was  clear  they  killed  the  kahar  and  walked  off 
with  the  mule  and  its  burden. 

The  news  that  the  regiments  in  Gabul  looted  the  arsenal  yester- 
day would  seem  to  indicate  that  they  mean  fighting,  and  this  in- 
telligence is  the  best  that  we  have  had  for  a  long  time.  The  only 
way  in  which  they  can  be  punished  lies  in  resistance  when  we 
advance ;  for,  if  they  run  away,  it  will  be  difficult  to  chase  them 
all  over  Afghanistan,  even  if  we  were  disposed  to  do  so.  The 
health  of  the  troops  is  excellent,  although  the  sun  has  laid  up  a 
number  of  men  with  fever.  It  is  of  the  mildest  kind  and  soon 
passes  off. 

Camp  Bbni  Hissar,  7tfe  October. 

We  are  now  encamped  within  a  few  miles  of  the  Bala  Hissar 
and  the  city  of  Cabul,  the  mutinous  troops  having  yesterday  been 
defeated  and  driven  from  the  heights  above  Charasia,  which 
they  had  occupied  with  the  idea  of  barring  our  further  advance. 
The  details  of  the  action  are  as  follows: — At  daybreak  yester- 
day morning  (October  6th)  a  strong  working  party  was  sent 
out  to  improve  the  road  through  the  Sang-i-Nawishta  defile,  but 
before  they  had  gone  two  miles  from  camp  the  cavalry  patrol  in 
advance  reported  that  the  enemy  were  in  great  strength  on  the 
hills,  and  had  guns  in  position  commanding  the  road.  The  work- 
ing party  consisted  of  the  23rd  Pioneers,  under  escort  of  a  wing  of 


The  Battle  of  Charasia.  29 

the  92ud  Highlanders  and  two  gans  of  No.  2  (Swinley's)  Moan- 
tain  Battery  ;  and  npon  the  cavalry  patrols  being  fired  at  and 
flailing  back,  this  party  received  orders  to  halt  and  act  on  the  defen- 
Bive.  As  the  morning  advanced  it  was  seen  that  not  only  was 
the  Sang-i-Nawishta  held  in  force,  but  the  hills  beyond  Gharasia, 
from  the  Chardeh  Valley  to  the  Logar  Kiver,  were  crowned  with 
armed  men.  It  was  plain  that  oar  farther  progress  towards  Cabal 
was  barred,  and  as  there  was  only  one  brigade  available  for  the 
attack  the  position  was  not  an  encouraging  one.  Fortunately  the 
92nd  Highlanders  had  been  detached  from  General  Macpherson's 
brigade  for  the  time  being,  and  this  gave  us  another  British  regi- 
ment to  fall  back  upon.  Sir  Frederick  Boberts  deemed  it  wise  to 
attack  without  delay,  as  to  remain  inactive  before  the  mutinous 
r^ments  now  facing  him  would  probably  encourage  a  general 
tribal  rising,  and  instead  of  10,000  we  should  have  50,000  men  to 
deal  with.  Already  the  hills  to  right  and  left  of  the  camp  had  a 
few  white-clad  men  upon  them,  plainly  sentinels  sent  from  the 
near  village  to  watch  the  progress  of  the  fight  and  aid  in  the  pur- 
suit if  our  army  were  driven  back.  General  Macpherson  had  to 
make  his  way  from  Sufed  Sang  to  Charasia,  and  as  his  baggage 
train  was  seen  stretching  along  the  valley,  the  tribesmen  grew 
bolder  and  opened  a  desultory  fire  upon  the  escort.  This  was  the 
signal  for  many  men  to  join  the  sentinels  I  have  spoken  of,  on 
the  hills,  and  so  numerous  did  the  gathering  become  that  a  squad- 
ron of  cavalry  was  sent  back  to  reinforce  General  Macpherson, 
who  was  further  ordered  to  make  all  possible  haste  to  Charasia. 

In  the  meantime  the  camp  was  astir  with  preparations  for  the 
attack  upon  the  enemy  in  front,  and  the  men  were  full  of  enthu- 
siasm at  the  prospect  of  meeting  face  to  face  the  regiments  which 
had  brought  about  Cavagnari's  murder.  The  following  troops, 
under  the  command  of  Brigadier-General  Baker,  marched  out  of 
camp  towards  the  village  of   Charasia    about    eleven   oclock: — 

Four  guns  of  No.  2  Mountain  Battery,  under  Captain  G. 
Swinley,  R.A. 

Two  Gatling  guns,  under  Captain  A.  Broadfoot. 

7th  Company  of  Sappers  and  Miners,  under  Lieutenant  C. 
Nugent,  R.A. 

72nd  Highlanders,  under  Lieutenant- Colonel  W.  H.  J.  Clarke. 


30  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

Six  companies  of  the  6th  Ghoorkas,  ander  Major  A.  Fitz- 
Hugh. 

200  of  the  5th  Punjab  Infantry,  under  Captain  C.  McK.  Hall. 

This  force  was  strengthened  by  450  of  the  23rd  Pioneers,  with- 
drawn from  the  road  leading  to  the  Sang-i-Nawishta  defile ;  * 
while  at  the  same  time  our  right  attack  was  also  modified.  Major 
White,  of  the  92nd  Highlanders,  assumed  command  in  this  direc- 
tion, the  troops  entrusted  to  his  charge  being  : — 

Three  guns,  G-8,  R.A.,  under  Major  S.  Parry,  R.A, 

Two  squadrons  of  cavalry,  made  up  of  detachments  of  the  9th 
Lancers,  5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  and  12th  Bengal  Cavalry,  com- 
manded by  Major  Hammond,  5th  P.C. 

A  wing  of  the  92nd  Highlanders,  under  Major  Hay. 

100  men  of  the  23rd  Pioneers,  under  Captain  H.  Paterson. 

This  force  was  to  keep  the  enemy  in  play  at  the  Sang-i-Nawishta 
by  rapid  artillery  fire,  and  so  to  distract  their  attention  that  they 
would  give  time  for  our  main  attack  to  be  delivered  on  their  right, 
where  they  had  no  guns  in  position,  and  had  not  a  narrow  gorge 
to  defend.  The  old  tactics  of  turning  their  flank  and  taking  their 
main  line  in  reverse  were  to  be  followed ;  and  knowing  the  Afghan 
inability,  as  a  rule,  to  make  a  counter-attack.  General  Boberts 
weakened  his  right,  so  as  to  concentrate  a  strong  infantry  force  for 
the  outflanking  movement  over  the  hills  overlooking  the  Chardeh 
Valley.  Sirdar  Nek  Mahomed  Khan  (son  of  Dost  Mahomed),  who 
was  in  command  of  the  Afghan  troops,  seemed  to  think  we  should 
make  a  determined  effort  to  force  the  Sang-i-Nawishta  Pass,  and 
he  had  accordingly  posted  on  the  heights  overlooking  the  road 
twelve  guns,  while  three  or  four  Armstrong-pattern  breech-loaders 
were  on  the  plain  below.  The  enemy's  disposition  seemed  to 
indicate  that  if  we  tried  to  force  the  Pass  their  guns  would  have 
held  us  in  check,  while  their  right  was  swung  round  to  take  us  in 
flank,  the  series  of  ridges  which  they  covered  offering  a  good 
manoeuvring  ground  for  such  a  movement,  while  the  undulating 
plain  below,  with  its  belt  of  trees  round  about  Charasia,  would 
have  given  excellent  cover.    The  accompanying  map  will  show  the 

*  It  sboold  be  noted  that  no  cavalry  accompanied  General  Baker.  A  umilar  mistake 
was  made  on  several  other  occasions  later  on.  Dor  infantry  lacked  the  immediate 
sapport  of  cavalry  to  make  defeats  decisive. 


I 


n 


6th  October,  1879. 


Charasia.  3 1 

relatiye  positions,  and  also  make  clear  the  strength  of  the  defend- 
ing force  which  was  able  to  cover  so  much  ground. 

After  leaving  the  camp,  General  Baker  made  for  the  village  of 
Charasia,  which  consisted  of  a  number  of  detached  walled  enclosures 
such  as  are  common  all  over  the  country.    There  were  numerous 
orchards  and  gardens  adjoining  these,  so  that  his  first  movements 
were  well  concealed  from  the  enemy,  whose  attention  up  to  this 
point  was    directed  chiefly  to  Major  White's  movements  on  the 
Gabul  Boad.     Seeing  how  greatly  he  was  outnumbered.  General 
Baker  took  the  precaution  of  occupying  a  strong  walled  enclosure 
on   the   outskirts    of  Charasia,  and  here   he  placed  his  reserve 
ammunition  and  his  field  hospital.     The  temper  of  the  villagers 
was  so  uncertain  that  he  telegraphed  to  General  Roberts  for  ano- 
ther regiment  of  infieintry  to   strengthen  his  reserves,  and  100 
men  of  the  6th  Punjab  Infantry  hurried  out  at  once  and  joined 
the  hospital  and  reserve  ammunition  guard.     The  remainder  of 
the  regiment  were  sent  out  soon  after,  although  this  left  the  camp 
very  weakly  guarded,   only  1,000  cavalry  and  infantry  with  six 
9-pounder  guns  being  left  at  head-quarters.    However,  as  General 
Macpherson  was  coming  up  with  his  brigade,  the  risk  was  well 
worth  running,  as  failure  on  General  Baker's  part  might  have 
meant  disaster  to  the  whole  army.     The  72nd  Highlanders  led 
ttie  way  out  of  Charasia,  and  bullets  soon  began  to  drop  among 
ttieir  ranks  while  the  enemy's  picquets  were  seen  to  be  retiring  up 
the  ridges.     As  the  brigade  pushed  forward  with  the  intention  of 
outflanking  the  main  line  of  hills  lying  between  Chardeh  and 
the  Sang-i-Nawishta,  their  progress  was    checked    by  a   strong 
position  on  their  left  front  on  which  the  Afghans  had  raised  sun-' 
gars,  and  from    which  they  began   to  open   a  heavy  musketry 
fire.     Two  mountain  guns  replied  to  this,  and  the  72nd  extended 
in  skirmishing  order,  one  company  under  Captain  Brooke-Hunt 
turning  off  to  the  left,  while  the  main    body  of  the  regiment 
worked  away  to  the  front,  the  ground  affording  but  slight  cover. 
Captain  Hunt's  company  scaled  a  hill  600  or  600  feet  high,  climb- 
ing over  difficult  rocks,  which  hindered  their  rapid  advance.     The 
enemy  were  exceedingly  numerous  on  their  extreme  right,  another 
and  steeper  hill  enabling  them   to  pour  a  heavy  fire  upon  the 
company.       Two   more   mountain   guns  and  the  Gatlings  were 


32  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

ordered  to  open  fire  upon  this  hill,  and  upon  snch  hodies  of  men 
as  were  visible  on  the  near  ridges ;  but  the  Gatlings  were  in  such 
bad  order,  owing  to  their  defective  make,  that  after  a  few  rounds 
the  drum  ''jammed"  and  they  had  to  be  taken  out  of  action. 
Our  true  attack  had  now  been  recognized  by  Nek  Mahomed  and 
he  hastened  to  reinforce  his  right ;  a  stream  of  men  was  seen 
pouring  along  the  rearmost  ridges  from  the  direction  of  the  Sang- 
i-Nawishta,  and  standards  borne  by  Ghazis  began  to  thicken  on 
our  left.  General  Baker  lost  no  time  in  pushing  forward  part 
of  his  reserves,  in  order  to  force  their  first  position  before  it  could 
be  strongly  reinforced.  The  5th  Ghoorkas,  and  200  men  of  the 
6th  Punjab  Infantry,  doubled  forward,  while  the  enemy's  fire 
increased  in  intensity.  Captain  Hunt's  company  was  strengthened 
by  two  companies  of  the  6th  Ghoorkas,  under  Captain  John  Cook, 
V.C. ;  while  two  more  companies  of  Ghoorkas  and  200  of  the 
6th  P.I.  joined  the  advanced  skirmishers  of  the  72nd  in  the  main 
attack.  The  skirmishing  line  was  thus  extended  so  as  to  outflank 
the  left  of  the  ridge,  which  the  Afghans  still  clung  to  with  great 
obstinacy,  as  it  was  the  key  of  the  position  on  their  right  flank. 
This  was  at  1.80  p.m.,  when  our  troops  had  been  engaged  for  an 
hour  and  a  half  without  having  made  much  impression  upon  the 
enemy.  With  the  strengthening  of  our  advance  success  was  soon 
declared  :  the  hill  on  the  extreme  left,  from  which  a  flanking  fire 
had  been  directed  on  our  skirmishers,  was  carried  in  splendid  style 
by  the  company  of  the  72nd  and  the  two  companies  of  the  5th 
Ghoorkas,  while  the  other  companies  of  the  two  regiments,  by  a 
series  of  gallant  rushes,  turned  the  enemy's  left.  At  two  o'clock 
our  advanced  line  was  enabled  to  direct  a  cross  fire  upon  the  2,000 
men  who  held  the  ridge,  and  who  now  showed  symptoms  of  wavering. 
A  general  advance  was  ordered,  and  the  72nd,  5th  Ghoorkas,  and 
6th  P.I.  were  in  a  few  minutes  in  possession  of  the  Afghan's  first 
line.  But  not  without  loss,  for  the  enemy  were  chiefly  armed  with 
Snider  and  Enfield  rifles,  and  their  fire  was  rapid  and  continuous. 
Fortunately  they  had  so  little  knowledge  of  the  principles  of  mus- 
ketry that  their  bullets  mostly  passed  over  our  men's  heads  as  the 
rush  uphill  was  made.  The  72nd  Highlanders  bore  the  brunt  of 
the  fighting,  and  their  casualties  amounted  to  thirty-six.  They  had 
on  several  occasions  to  cross  open  ground,  and  in  spite  of  the 


Gallantry  of  the  "jind  Regiment.  33 

exposure  they  rushed  forward  with  an  elan  that  could  not  have 
been  surpassed.  Private  MacMahon,  one  of  their  number,  par- 
ticularly distinguished  himself  on  the  left.  Almost  single-handed 
he  scaled  a  hill  on  the  crest  of  which  was  a  mngar  filled  with  men  : 
loading  and  firing  as  he  went,  his  coolness  incited  four  or  five 
Ghoorkas  to  follow  him  ;  and  when  he  finally  leaped  into  the  mm- 
gar  its  defenders  took  to  flight  and  were  shot  down  as  they  ran. 
MacMahon  is  to  be  recommended  by  General  Baker  for  the  Victoria 
Cross,  his  gallantry  having  been  observed  by  the  General  and  his 
Staff  as  well  as  by  the  officers  engaged  in  the  attack.  It  was  such 
mcidents  as  these  which  caused  General  Baker  to  express  his 
great  satisfaction  with  the  behaviour  of  the  troops  under  his  com- 
mand. 

After  their  first  position  had  fallen  into  our  hands,  the  enemy 
laUied  on  some  low  hills  600  yards  in  rear  and  re-opened  fire,  to 
which  our  mountain  guns  replied,  while  our  men  were  resting  on 
their  arms.  A  company  of  the  23rd  Pioneers,  under  Lieutenant 
Chesney,  was  thrown  forward  on  the  right,  while  two  companies  of 
the  92nd,  nnder  Captain  Oxley,  which  Major  White  had  detached 
to  hold  in  check  any  flanking  movement  the  enemy  might  attempt 
on  General  Baker's  right,  also  came  into  action.  The  enemy's 
second  position  was  attacked  by  the  72nd  Highlanders  and  the 
5th  Ghoorkas,  aided  by  the  three  companies  just  mentioned,  and 
at  three  o'clock  the  Afghan  right  had  been  broken  up,  and  their 
regiments  were  flying  towards  the  village  of  Indikee.  The  moun- 
tain guns  fired  shrapnel  into  their  midst,  and  the  Gatling  guns, 
tost  the  few  moments  they  were  able  to  work,  also  did  some 
execution,  while  volleys  from  the  72nd  at  long  ranges  caused  the 
fugitives  to  hasten  their  flight.  Major  Stockwell,  with  a  wing  of 
the  72nd,  followed  them  rapidly  until  he  reached  the  open  ground 
leading  down  into  the  Chardeh  Valley,  when  his  further  advance 
was  stopped  by  General  Baker,  as  the  turning  movement  along  the 
ridge  towards  the  Sang-i-Nawishta  had  to  be  made.  The  want  of 
cavalry  was  here  painfully  apparent,  as  the  retreating  masses  of 
the  Afghans  could  easily  have  been  overtaken,  the  sloping  ground 
between  Indikee  and  the  hills  being  admirably  suited  for  a  pursuit. 
While  Major  Stockwell  had  thus  been  completing  the  defeat  of 
Ae  enemy's  right,  two  companies  of  the  23rd  Pioneers  had  gained 


34  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

a  footing  on  the  main  ridge  itself,  whence  the  enemy  were  rapidly 
retiring  as  they  recognized  that  their  line  would  in  a  few 
minutes  be  taken  in  roTerse.  General  Baker  swung  round  his 
left,  ordered  a  general  advance,  and  at  3.45  p.m.  the  ridge  was  in 
our  hands  without  any  serious  opposition  having  been  met  with. 
Not  that  they  had  not  shown  great  determination  before,  for 
bands  of  ghazis  had  made  good  their  footing  behind  the 
sungars  until  our  bayonets  had  forced  them  down.  The  6th 
Ghoorkas  were  charged  by  a  number  of  these  madmen,  but  they 
met  the  rush  by  a  counter  bayonet  charge  and  cleared  all  before 
them. 

Leaving  General  Baker  with  the  main  body  of  his  force  sweeping 
over  the  high  ridge  in  the  direction  of  the  Sang-i-Nawishta  Gorge, 
I  must  now  turn  to  Major  White's  movements  on  our  right,  where 
had  been  done  one  of  the  most  gallant  feats  of  the  day.  The 
feint  in  this  direction  had  been  turned  into  a  successful  attack, 
resulting  in  the  capture  of  twenty  guns,  although  our  infantry 
numbered  only  a  few  hundreds,  and  our  cavalry  were  unable  to 
act.  Skirting  the  east  of  Charasia,  Major  White  found  the  enemy 
scattered  about  among  the  trees,  and  also  holding  the  hills  to 
right  and  left  of  the  defile.  The  three  guns  of  G-8  were  soon  in 
action,  and  a  few  shells  well  placed,  with  the  fire  of  skirmishers 
thrown  out  among  the  trees  and  gardens,  drove  back  the  more 
venturesome  of  the  enemy  to  the  shelter  of  the  sungars  in  the 
hills,  and  behind  some  boulders  in  the  bed  of  the  Pass.  Our 
guns  were  then  moved  forwai*d  and  made  beautiful  practice,  the 
answering  fire  from  the  enemy's  artillery  being  quite  harmless. 
One  of  our  shells  struck  an  Afghan  field-piece,  dismounted  it, 
and  killed  two  of  the  horses  standing  near,  while  another  struck 
a  standard  in  a  cluster  of  men.  In  fact,  the  108  rounds  fired  by 
G-3  were  of  the  greatest  value  in  preparing  the  way  for  the 
infantry  attack.  This  attack  was  led  personally  by  Major  White, 
who  at  the  head  of  only  fifty  Highlanders  charged  the  first  hiU 
on  the  right,  where  several  hundred  Afghans  were  posted.  Our 
men  went  up  with  a  rush  under  a  severe  musketry  fire,  and  the 
enemy  waited  as  if  to  receive  them  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet. 
With  such  odds  in  their  favour,  and  a  sungar  to  aid  them, 
European  troops  would  have   swept  back  the  handful  of  men 


The  Story  of  "  WhUe's  Hilir  35 

&it&cking  with  scarcely  an  effort ;  bat  Afghan  courage  and  steadi- 
ness are  Tery  limited.  When  the  Highlanders  were  within  five  or 
six  yards  of  the  sungar  the  enemy  turned  and  fled,  and  were  shot 
in  the  back  as  they  made  for  the  next  hill.  The  success  thus 
gained  was  mainly  due  to  Major  White's  personal  gallantry,  one 
striking  instance  of  which  may  be  quoted.  Not  caring  to  expose 
his  men  in  a  particularly  steep  bit  of  ground,  which  was  enfiladed 
by  a  few  A%hans  well  placed  in  rear  of  some  rocks,  he  took  a 
loaded  rifle  from  one  of  the  Highlanders  and  ''stalked"  the 
enemy  single-handed.  By  cautious  climbing  he  reached  the  rocks 
behind  which  they  were  concealed,  and  as  he  showed  himself  they 
jumped  up  and  ran,  no  doubt  in  the  full  belief  that  the  single 
figure  they  saw  was  only  the  leader  of  a-  number  of  others.  One 
man  stayed  to  fire,  but  missed  his  aim,  and  as  he  turned  Major 
White  shot  him  through  the  head.  Unfortunately,  he  had  no 
more  cartridges  with  him,  or  some  of  the  others  would  have 
fallen.  This  hill  is  to  be  called  ''  White's  Hill "  in  memory  of  his 
gallantry.  The  capture  of  this  point  enabled  the  guns  to  be 
advanced  still  further  towards  the  entrance  of  the  Pass,  but  Major 
White  was  not  content.  Having  given  his  men  breathing  time, 
and  being  reinforced  by  another  fifty  men  from  below,  he  again 
went  forward  and  captured  two  lower  hills  on  the  right,  in  the 
same  grand  style,  and  with  only  trifling  loss.  It  was  by  these 
movements  that  he  was  able  to  send  Captain  Oxley  with  two  com-, 
panies  well  to  the  left,  to  co-operate  with  General  Baker's  Brigade. 
Six  Armstrong  guns  fell  into  Major  White's  hands  on  the  open 
ground  below  the  hills ;  and  when  our  turning  movement  in  the 
Chardeh  direction  had  been  completed,  and  the  enemy  began  to 
evacuate  the  main  ridge,  the  cavalry  were  sent  forward,  and  the 
in£uitry  occupied  the  hills  commanding  the  Sang-i-Nawishta  Pass 
on  the  left.  Here  twelve  more  guns  were  captured  in  position, 
while  the  cavalry  found  two  more  abandoned  on  the  road.  The 
twenty  guns  brought  out  from  Sherpur,  therefore,  to  fortify  the 
Pass  have  all  fallen  into  our  hands.  Upon  Major  White  gaining 
the  ridge  to  the  left  he  could  see  no  further  sign  of  the  enemy, 
who  had  stampeded  to  the  Bala  Hissar.  The  cavalry  could  not 
follow  as  the  Pass  narrows,  and  the  narrow  paths  beyond  are  not 
adapted  for  a  body  of  horse  charging.     Our  information  was  to 

B  2 


36  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

the  oontrary,  it  being  stated  that  the  road  opened  into  a  plain, 
and  our  caTalry  being  accordingly  sent  to  the  right  to  cut  off  the 
retreat  of  the  enemy  when  driven  towards  Cabul  by  General 
Baker.  As  events  occurred,  the  two  squadrons  would  have  been 
invaluable  if  they  had  accompanied  the  General.  The  progress  of 
the  brigade  along  the  main  ridge  was  very  slow,  as  the  ground 
was  rugged  and  difficult ;  and  it  was  not  until  nightfall  that  a 
junction  was  effected  with  Major  White.  The  23rd  Pioneers  and 
the  6th  P.I.  moved  down  into  an  open  bit  of  ground  beyond  the 
Pass,  while  the  72nd  Highlanders,  the  Ghoorkas,  and  mountain 
guns  remained  above,  throwing  out  strong  picquets  over  the  range 
of  hills.  Major  White's  force  bivouacked  on  the  ground  they  had 
occupied  when  their  last  movement  was  made. 

It  is  worth  mentioning  that  two  elephants,  three  camels,  and 
200  mules  carrying  stores,  &c.,  were  safely  piloted  over  the 
precipitous  hills  which  were  taken,  and  the  men  were  thus  able  to 
bivouac  in  comfort.  Not  the  least  important  arrangement  of  the 
day  was  that  of  signalling.  Captain  Straton  had  parties  of  men 
with  General  Baker  and  Major  White,  and  a  third  batch  of 
signallers  was  sent  to  a  high  hill  to  watch  the  Chardeh  Valley, 
and  the  movements  of  large  bodies  of  tribesmen,  who  lined  the 
crests  of  the  range  overlooking  the  camp  from  the  west.  Helio- 
grams  were  exchanged  between  these  points  and  the  head-quarters 
camp,  and  General  Roberts  was  kept  fiilly  informed  of  all  that 
was  happening  in  these  directions.  This  focussing  of  all  inform- 
ation upon  a  common  centre  enabled  the  General  to  make  bis 
dispositions  with  accuracy  and  effect  :  without  the  signallers 
dangerous  delays  might  have  occurred.  The  heliographing  was 
so  thoroughly  well  done  that  Sir  F.  Roberts  complimented  Captain 
Straton  personally  on  the  success  of  his  arrangements.  The  only 
drawback  was  a  succession  of  small  sand  storms,  which  swept 
across  the  camp  and  blotted  out  everything  for  the  time  being. 

The  attitude  of  the  tribesmen  in  our  immediate  neighbourhood, 
i.e.,  on  the  ranges  of  hills  east  and  west  of  the  camp,  was  one  of 
expectancy  modified  by  an  earnest  desire  to  harass  our  picquets  by 
spasmodic  firing.  Their  ill-will  was  first  shown  by  firing  upon 
the  signallers  on  the  hill,  and  the  party  had  eventually  to  be  with- 
drawn.    Two  guns  were  sent  down   and  a  few   shells  pitched 


A    Victory:  the  Casualties.  37 

upwards,  which  caused  these  gaerillas  to  withdraw  to  a  safe  dis- 
tance. The  convoy  from  our  last  camp  at  Sufed  Sang,  Zahidabad, 
was  also  fired  npon,  and  General  Macphei*son  had  to  throw  out 
skirmishers  to  protect  his  baggage  animals.  At  least  some  hun- 
dred men  appeared  on  a  high  peak  to  the  east  of  the  camp,  and 
fired  upon  a  picquet  of  the  92nd  who  were  on  a  lower  level .  A 
brisk  fire  was  kept  up  for  some  time,  and  the  enemy  driven  off  to 
higher  ground.*  As  they  re-opened  fire  the  K.H.A.  were 
ordered  to  try  a  shot  at  the  peak.  The  first  shell  dropped  a  little 
short,  but  the  second  burst  on  the  point  occupied,  and  the  next 
instant  it  'was  quite  clear,  its  late  occupants  running  in  disorder 
into  the  valley  beyond.  There  were  several  of  the  Amir's  soldiers 
among  them,  still  wearing  his  uniform.  The  camp  after  this  was 
left  undisturbed  :  tents  were  struck  at  sunset  in  readiness  for  the 
early  morning  march  which  it  had  been  decided  to  make  to  Beni- 
Hissar,  just  beyond  the  Sang-i-Nawishta  Pass. 

The  enemy  are  believed,  in  this  action,  to  have  had  9,000  or 
10,000  men  on  the  ridges,  including  thirteen  regiments  of  regulars. 
They  left  300  dead  on  the  field,  but  their  total  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  must  have  been  much  greater.  Our  loss  was  twenty 
killed  and  sixty-sevenf  wounded,  among  the  latter  being  Lieutenant 
Fergusson,  72nd  Highlanders,  bullet  contusion,  left  leg,  slight; 
Dr.  Duncan,  28rd  Pioneers,  bullet  wound  in  the  chest,  severe ;  and 
Captain  Young,  5th  Punjab  Infantry,  bullet  wound  in  the  left 
thigh,  severe.  Of  the  British  Infantry  regiments  the  72nd  lost 
three  killed  and  thirty-four  wounded ;  and  the  92nd  three  killed 
and  six  wounded.  Among  our  camp  followers  five  dhoolie^bearers 
were  killed  and  four  wounded,  returns  which  show  that  the  kahara 
were  well  under  fire  in  carrying  off  the  injured. 

*  As  I  bare,  perhaps,  scarcely  done  justice  to  tLis  incident  in  my  letter,  I  now  qnote 
tbe  Oenend's  despatch  on  the  subject : — *'  One  party,  bolder  than  the  rest,  caused  so  mooh 
auoyance  to  a  picquet  of  the  92nd  Highlanders,  that  it  became  necessary  to  dislodge 
thoD,  and  tbia  difficult  serrioe  was  performed  in  a  most  gallant  manner  by  a  small  party 
of  the  92nd  under  Lieutenant  R.  A.  Grant  Colour-Sergeant  Hector  Macdonald,  ^ 
■on-commissioned  officer,  whose  excellent  and  skilful  management  of  a  small  detachment 
vben  opposed  to  immensely  superior  numbers  in  the  Hazara-Darokht  defile,  was  meo- 
tiooed  in  my  despatch  of  the  15th  instant,  here  again  distinguished  hi|QSQlf."  Ooloor- 
Serjcant  Macdonald  afterwards  receiTcd  a  commission  in  the  92ndf 

t  Sefen  of  the  wounded  men  afterwards  died. 


38  The  Afghan  War,   1879—80. 


^v 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Effect  of  the  Action  of  Chansia— Advance  to  Beni  Hissar— Oayalry  BecoimaiBaaooe— 
The  Bala  Hissar  Deserted—The  Sherpur  Magasine  Blown  up— Attitude  of  the 
Amir— Operations  of  the  8th  and  9th  of  October— Capture  of  Sherpur  Canton- 
ments—The Affair  of  the  Asmai  Heights— Cavalry  Pursuit  towards  Qhami— The 
Force  moves  to  Siah  Sung — Leaders  of  the  Mutinous  Regiments. 

Camp  Beni  Hissab,  8tA  October. 

Thebe  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  action  at  Charasia  has  broken 
up  the  combinations  against  us,  and  that  Cabul  is  now  at  our 
mercy.  It  cannot  be  too  fully  borne  in  mind  that,  but  for  the 
promptness  with  which  General  Boberts  decided  to  attack,  instead 
of  allowing  the  enemy  to  gather  strength  by  our  own  inaction, 
seriod^  cimsequences  might  have  ensued  to  our  compact  little  army 
ndwwithin  three  or  four  miles  of  the  Bala  Hissar.  Not  that  defeat 
was  to  be  feared  in  any  sense  of  the  term,  but  that  the  slightest  hesi- 
tation or  check  in  our  adyance  would  have  raised  against  us  crowds 
of  enemies  whom  we  should  have  had  to  deal  with  in,  perhaps,  as 
difficult  a  country  as  could  be  fought  over.  It  was  a  bold  bid  for 
all  doubtful  and  wayering  hearts  to  join  them — ^this  moye  of  the 
mutinous  regiments  seyen  or  eight  miles  out  of  Cabul  right  across 
our  path ;  and  if  they  had  been  allowed  to  hold  the  hills  eyen  for 
twenty-four  hours,  there  can  scarcely  be  a  doubt  that  their  numbers 
would  haye  been  doubled,  and  our  loss  in  dislodging  them  propor- 
tionately greater  than  that  which  eyen  now  we  haye  suffered. 

I  haye  described  the  position  of  our  camp  at  Charasia  in  my 
last  letter,  and  from  this  it  would  be  seen  that  our  best  route  to 
Cabul  was  by  way  of  the  Sang-i-Nawishta  defile  on  our  right  front. 
At  daybreak  yesterday  we  moyed  out  of  Charasia  camp,  and  at  the 
mouth  of  the  defile  Sir  F.  Boberts  was  met  by  Major  White,  who 
explained  the  positions  occupied  by  the  enemy,  and  the  action  he 
had  taken  in  dislodging  them.  The  General  congratulated  him 
heartily  on  his  success,  and  then  passed  on  to  where  General 
Baker  had  biyouacked  at  the  northern  end  of  the  defile.  High 
hills  shut  in  the  road  on  either  hand,  the  Logar  Biyer,  here  a 


In  Sight  of  CabuL  39 

deep  stream,  also  nmning  to  the  right  of  the  path,  which  at  times 
is  yery  roogh.  Two  or  three  men  had  hidden  themselves  behind 
rocks  on  the  steep  hillsides  to  the  east,  and  they  now  fired  down 
as  the  troops  filed  along.  Their  shots  were  wide  of  the  mark, 
and  our  men  firing  freely  back  soon  silenced  them.  Bounding  the 
comer  of  the  hiU  on  our  left,  we  came  opon  General  Baker's 
birooacking  ground,  and  here  followed  more  congratulations  ;  Sir 
F.  Boberts  hearing  in  detail  from  his  Brigadier  an  account  of  the 
addon  upon  the  success  of  which  so  much  had  depended.  General 
Baker  with  his  brigade  was  left  to  keep  open  the  Pass  while  the 
l^gg^G  aiid  stores  were  passing  through,  and  he  remained  there 
until  this  morning,  by  which  time  the  ground  at  Charasia  had 
been  cleared. 

In  the  next  three  miles  to  Beni  Hissar  the  road  runs  among 
rich  corn-fields,  irrigated  by  the  diversion  of  the  stream,  and  the 
route  to  the  Bala  Hissar  was  followed  by  our  troops  until  the 
ground  fixed  upon  for  the  camp  was  reached.  This  w^  just  under 
the  walls  of  some  gardens  belonging  to  the  Amir  and  his^Mus- 
tanfi  (Minister  of  Finance),  where  water  was  plentiful  and  trees 
afforded  shade.  While  the  Infantry  were  marching  in.  General 
Massy  went  forward  with  the  cavalry  through  Beni  Hissar  village 
and  into  the  fields  beyond.  The  hills  to  the  left  shut  out  for  a 
mile  a  view  of  Gabul,  but  after  ten  minutes'  riding  the  Gabul  plain 
was  reached,  and  before  us  was  the  Bala  Hissar  and  the  fortified 
ridge  running  upwards  and  commanding  it.  The  heights  were 
crowned  by  a  wall  fifteen  or  twenty  feet  high,  and  the  line  of 
fortification  could  be  seen  following  the  sky-line,  until  the  hill 
dipped  down  to  the  bed  of  the  Gabul  River  to  the  north  of  the 
dty.  Again,  the  ridge  rising  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river  pre- 
sented a  similar  sight,  the  zig-zag  wall  being  apparently  endless. 
Our  videttes  rode  out  well  towards  the  Bala  Hissar,  and,  accom- 
panying them,  I  had  a  good  view  of  the  fortifications,  but  could 
not  see  a  single  soldier  lining  the  walls.  All  was  deserted,  and 
we  knew  that  the  mutineers,  if  they  meant  fighting,  were  not 
foolish  enough  to  allow  themselves  to  be  caught  in  a  trap  such  as 
the  Bala  Hissar  would  have  proved.  The  small  portion  of  the 
dty  diat  could  be  seen  also  lay  as  if  abandoned  by  the  inhabitants, 
and  we  made  up  our  minds  that  the  fortified  camp  at  Sherpur, 


40  .  The  Afghan  War,   1879 — 80. 

lying  over  the  low  Siah  Sung  hills  which  Mocked  our  view  to  the 
north-east,  was  the  position  taken  up  hy  the  enemy  for  a  final 
struggle  with  our  force.  The  plain  on  which  our  cavalry  recon- 
noitred was  all  under  cultivation,  rich  fields  of  clover  and  lucerne 
relieving  the  general  brownness  of  the  land,  the  crops  of  which 
had  been  lately  reaped.  Cultivation  extended  as  far  as  the  eye 
could  reach  on  the  right,  while  on  all  other  sides  high  hills  blocked 
the  view,  the  gigantic  Hindu  Kush  lying  away  in  the  distance  to 
the  north,  keeping  sentinel  over  Afghanistan  as  impassively  as  the 
llimalayas  look  down  upon  Hindustan. 

We  returned  to  camp  to  speculate  upon  the  chances  of  further 
fighting,  and  in  the  afternoon  we  had  to  listen  to  the  many  stories 
brought  in  by  local  friends  of  the  Amir  and  merchants  from 
Gabul,  who  came  to  pay  their  respects  to  Sir  Frederick  Roberts. 
In  the  evening  the  firing  of  heavy  guns  was  heard  in  the  direction 
of  Sherpur,  and  it  was  surmised  that  the  rebels  were  marking 
out  ranges ;  but  when  a  tremendous  explosion  succeeded  it  soon 
became  known  that  the  magazine  at  their  fortified  camp  had 
been  blown  up,  and  it  was  then  concluded  that  they  were  discharg- 
ing guns  before  abandoning  them.  Accordingly  this  morning  we 
are  not  astonished  to  hear  that  Sherpur  Gamp  is  deserted,  and  a 
force  of  cavalry  is  now  going  out  under  General  Massy  in  search 
of  the  enemy.  This  force  I  am  accompanying,  as  it  is  most  prob- 
able some  of  the  fugitives — if  the  regiments  have  really  decamped 
—will  be  overtaken.  To-morrow  we  move  camp  to  the  Siah  Sung 
ridge  directly  overlooking  Gabul. 

The  attitude  of  the  Amir  is  not  altogether  satisfactory,  and  he 
is  plainly  afraid  that  the  soldiery  will  make  a  stand  in  the  city, 
and  that  Gabul  will  be  stormed  and  destroyed  by  our  army.  He 
assured  us  that  we  should  not  meet  with  any  resistance  at  Gharasia, 
and  yet  it  is  now  believed  that  Nek  Mahomed  visited  him  in  our 
camp,  told  him  of  the  force  ready  to  fight,  and  appealed  to  him 
to  desert  the  British  and  head  a  national  rising.  All  Yakub  Khan 
vouchsafed  to  tell  the  General  was  that  the  Bala  Hispar  was 
no  longer  in  the  possession  of  people  whom  he  could  trust,  and 
that  his  own  family  had  been  moved  into  the  city.  He  now  con- 
fidently explains  that  the  mutinous  regiments  have  dispersed,  and 
that  we  have  nothing  more  to  expect  in  the  way  of  opposition. 


A  Cavalry  Expedition  to  Sherpur.  41 

Camp  Siah  Sung,  lOffe  October. 

The  force  of  cavalry  sent  under  General  Massy  on  the  8th 
instant,  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  enemy,  who  was  said  to 
have  abandoned  Sherpur  entrenched  camp  after  blowing  up  the 
magazine  on  the  previous  evening,  was  made  up  as  follows  : — 102 
men  of  the  9th  Lancers,  140  of  thp  5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  260  of  the 
12th  Bengal  Cavalry,  and  220  of  the  14th  Bengal  Lancers, — in 
all  722  lances  and  sabres,  I  acxK)inpanied  this  force,  which  left 
Beni-Hissar  camp  at  eleven  o'clocl^  in  the  morning,  passed  through 
the  village  adjoining,  and  then  took  its  way  across  the  Cabul  plain 
(leaving  the  Bala  Hissar  and  the  city  on  the  left)  to  the  Siah 
Sung  ridge,  on  which  we  ^e  now  encamped.  This  was  eapy  going 
for  the  horses,  who  were  pushed  on  rapidly  until  the  ridge  was 
crested  on  the  extreme  right,  and  a  gradual  descent  led  us  towards 
Sherpur.  Soon  the  level  plain  lying  north  of  Cabul  was  reached, 
and  rich  cultivation  w^s  passed  th|*ough,  the  ground  being  every- 
where intersected  by  watercourses  and  irrigation  channels.  The 
Cabul  river,  at  this  season  a  shallow  streamlet  only  a  few  yards 
broad,  was  crossed,  and  on  our  right,  at  a  few  hundred  yards'  dis- 
tance, was  the  long  line  of  wall,  with  bastions  for  heavy  guns  at 
regular  intervals,  which  marked  the  forti^ed  camp  of  which  we 
had  hear4  so  much.  Our  scouts  found  it  qpite  deserted,  and  their 
first  prize  was  a  heavy  gun  which  had  been  dragged  some  distance 
across  t)ie  fields,  no  doubt  with  the  intention  of  using  it  in  another 
position.  There  were  no  guns  at  the  embrasures  in  the  bastions ; 
but  General  Massy  had  the  good  Inck  to  find  seventy-five  pieces  of 
Tarioqs  calibre  parl^ed  within  the  w^Us.  These  guns  were  in  very 
good  order,  but  little  damage  having  been  done  to  them.  There 
was  not  n^uoh  ammunition  left  with  them,  the  Afghan  troops 
having  carried  off  a  large  quantity ;  while  the  magazine  itself  had 
been  blown  up  to  prevent  the  remainder  falling  into  our  hands. 
The  guns  included  four  English  18-pounders,  one  English  8-inch 
howitzer,  and  two  Afghan  imitations  of  this  weapon ;  and  forty- 
two  bronze  n^ountain  guns  (8-pounders)  with  part  of  their  equip- 
ment. 

This  fortified  camp  of  Sherpur  is  built  at  the  base  of  the  low, 
stony  Bemaru  hiUs,  running  for  about  two  miles  at  a  slight  angle 


42  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

to  the  general  direction  of  the  plain  itself.  It  has  only  three 
sides  fortified,  the  hill  in  rear  being  quite  sufficient  to  shield  it 
from  attack  in  that  quarter,  as  an  open  plain  stretches  away  to 
the  hills  of  the  Eoh-Daman  and  Eohistan.  The  main  wall  is 
about  a  mile  and  a  half  long,  with  three  strongly-guarded  entrance- 
gates,  and  from  each  extremity  the  fortification  is  carried  at  right 
angles  till  it  reaches  the  ridge  in  the  rear.  There  is  a  fourth 
gateway  on  the  western  flank.  The  plan  followed  throughout 
is  a  thick  mud  wall  (25  feet  in  height)  built  with  bastions  for 
guns,  and  a  low  parapet  to  shield  troops  manning  the  outer 
wall.  The  entrance-gates  are  lofty  structures,  with  comfortable 
quarters  on  either  side  for  officers,  and  are  so  wide  that  four 
or  five  men  could  ride  through  them  abreast.  They  are  each 
defended  by  a  curtain  built  in  the  same  way  as  the  outer  wall. 
Inside  the  cantonment  is  an  open  space  quite  clear  of  buildings, 
exactly  answering  to  an  English  barrack-square,  and  on  this 
20,000  men  might  be  paraded  with  room  to  spare.  To  the  right, 
on  the  hillside,  is  the  small  village  of  Bemaru,  with  the  usual 
flat-roofed  houses,  burnt  brown  by  the  sun,  and  with  but  little 
sign  of  life  in  it.  The  novel  feature  in  this  cantonment  is  the 
arrangement  of  the  barrack-rooms.  At  about  20  feet  from  the 
outer  wall,  and  parallel  to  it,  is  built  a  range  of  rooms,  extending 
along  the  three  sides  of  the  place.  Each  room  would  hold  at  a 
pinch  twenty  men,  and  there  are  some  hundreds  of  these  dor- 
mitories, which  are  snug  enough  even  for  a  variable  climate  such 
as  this.  Along  their  front  is  a  narrow  verandah-like  space,  pucca 
brick  pillars  and  arches  supporting  the  flat  mud  roof,  which  rests 
on  strong  beams  and  unhewn  poles.  This  arrangement  has  a 
very  pleasing  effect  when  viewed  from  within  the  cantonment,  the 
regularity  of  the  arches  and  their  supports  grouped  in  threes 
before  each  room,  with  a  wider  span  then  following,  giving  the 
appearance  of  a  long  colonnade.  Broad  staircases  lead  at  certain 
intervals  to  the  roof  of  the  barracks,  which  would  give  a  second 
line  of  musketry  fire  in  resisting  any  attempt  to  storm.  Open 
spaces  are  left  at  rare  intervals  between  the  rooms  to  admit  of  the 
passage  of  men  and  guns  to  the  outer  wall.  Altogether  this 
fortified  camp  could,  if  properly  victualled  and  garrisoned,  be 
defended  for  an    indefinite    period    against    any  force  without 


The  Sherpur  Cantonment.  43 

srtillery.  The  water  snpply  is  from  streams  diverted  from  the 
fields  and  carried  by  low  culverts  underneath  the  walls;  but 
if  this  were  cut  off,  wells,  no  doubt,  could  be  sunk  to  supply  the 
deficiency.  From  the  absence  of  trees  and  the  utter  barrenness 
of  die  space  enclosed  by  the  walls,  with  the  stony  hills  in  the  rear, 
the  place  must  be  insufferably  hot  in  summer,  though  at  this 
time  of  the  year  it  would  be  much  better  than  tents.  When 
our  cavalry  rode  through  the  gates  into  the  middle  of  the  can- 
tonment there  was  no  sign  of  an  enemy,  and  it  must  have 
been  deserted  many  hours  before.  A  few  cartridge  papers  were 
lying  about,  and  the  rude  fireplaces  of  the  men  were  still 
black  with  smoke ;  but  beyond  this  nothing  could  be  seen.  In 
one  or  two  places  an  attempt  had  been  made  to  bum  the  bar- 
racks down,  but  the  fire  had  not  obtained  sufficient  power  over 
the  timbers  for  this  to  be  accomplished.  Doors  and  loose  wood- 
work had  been  looted  by  the  villagers,  who  claimed  to  have  put 
the  fire  out;  but  their  story  was  a  very  questionable  one. 
People  were  passing  freely  through  the  place  as  we  entered,  but 
they  did  not  show  much  interest  in  our  proceedings.  In  the 
north-west  comer  the  wall  had  been  partly  blown  down,  and  the 
ruins  of  the  magazine  were  strewn  in  every  direction. 

It  was  upon  arriving  opposite  Sherpur  Cantonment  that  we 
sighted  the  enemy ;  the  Asmai  Heights  to  the  left,  overlooking  the 
old  Afghan  quarter  of  Gabul,  being  crowded  with  men.  We  were 
8,000  or  4,000  yards  away,  and  at  that  distance  they  did  not  con- 
sider U8  worth  a  shot,  though  their  guns  could  be  distinctly  seen. 
A  halt  was  called,  the  cavalry  forming  up  at  the  farther  end  of 
the  cantonment ;  while  General  Massy  heliographed  back  to  Sir 
F.  Roberts  the  news  of  the  enemy  having  been  found  occupying 
a  position  of  strength.  We  were  told,  in  reply,  that  Oeneral 
Baker  was  leaving  Beni  Hissar  with  infantry  to  attack  the  heights, 
and  we  accordingly  hurried  on,  skirting  the  hills  and  passing 
through  grain-fields  and  meadows,  with  here  and  there  a  country 
villa  in  its  fertile  garden  surrounded  by  huge  walls.  Our  object 
was  to  reach  a  break  in  the  hills  and  to  pass  over  into  the  Ghardeh 
Valley,  so  as  to  cut  off  the  enemy  from  taking  the  road  which 
leads  to  Ohazni,  Bamian,  and  Turkistan.  We  worked  round 
almost  on  the  arc  of  a  circle,  of  which  Gabul  might  be  the  centre. 


44  The  Afghan  War,   1879—80. 

keeping  the  ridge  occupied  by  the  enemy  at  first  on  our  left  rear, 
then  on  our  left,  and,  finally,  on  our  left  front,  when  we  galloped 
through  the  break  we  had  been  making  for,  near  the  village  of 
Aoshahr,  and  faced  round  towards  Cabul  itself.     The  rich  Chardeh 
Valley  was  all  before  us,  and  we  passed  down  into  it,  and  could 
then  see  the  disposition  of  the  men  General  Baker  was  to  attack. 
We  had  learned  that  they  numbered  three  regiments  and  had 
eleven  guns  in  position,  and  this  information  was  fairly  accurate. 
They  had  2,000  regulars,  besides  700  or  800  untrained  men  who 
had  joined  them,  and  had  twelve  guns.     Videttes  were  thrown  out 
right  across  the  plain,  and  a  rapid  reconnaissance  made.     An  old 
ressaldar  of  Fane's  Horse,  who  was  accompanying  us  as  guide, 
stated  that  three  roads  led  from  the  valley  and  united  to  form  the 
chief  road  to  Bamian.     The  5th  P.C.  were  accordingly  sent  well 
on  to  the  right  to  block  the  road  there ;  two  squadrons  were  sent 
back  into  Sherpur  plain  to  watch  a  path  leading  down  from  the 
hills  in  that  direction ;  another  squadron  returned  a  mile  and  a 
half  to  Aoshahr,  so  as  to  prevent  the  fugitives  escaping  along  the 
crest  of  thiB  hills  down  the  dip  we  had  passed  through ;  while  the 
General  and  Staff  remained  in  the  open   with   the  rest  of  thS 
cavalry,  including  the  9th  Lancers.     We  had  mounted  signallers 
with  us,  and  heliographic  communication  was  opened  with  the 
high   Takht-i-Shah  Peak   overlooking  the   Bala   Hissar   Ridge. 
Captain  Straton  thence  signalled  down  that  the  enemy's  working 
parties  had  been  strengthening  their  9ungar  on  the  Asmai  Hill, 
and  that  some  of  General  Baker's  troops  were  on  the  same  side 
qf  the  ridge  as  ourselves.     We  could  see  the  enemy  distinctly  on 
the  hillside,  and  at  its  foot  was  their  camp,  made  up  of  forty  or  fifty 
tents.     These  were  close  to  the  village  of  Dehmazung,  half-hidden 
by  orchards,  and  a  gun  was  slued  round  and  pointed  at  us  as  soon 
as  we  appeared.     The  9th  Lancers  withdrew  1,000  yards  just  as 
the  enemy  fired  a  few  shells  at  our  videttes.     The  shells  buried 
themselves  in  the  soft  ground  and  never  exploded.     We  could  not 
push  farther  forward,  as  deep  watercourses  cut  up  the  fields  at 
every  few  score  yards,  and  the  rows  of  closely  planted  willow-trees 
along  these  would  have  broken  any  cavalry  formation.  In  the  various 
villages,  too,  large  bodies  of  the  enemy  were  gathered,  who  could 
^ave  shot  our  horsemen  down  from  ijfxe  towers  and  walls  without 


The  Affair  of  Asmai  Heights,  45 

at  all  exposing  themselves.  A  narrow  road  to  the  left  led  along 
the  foot  of  the  hills  to  the  enemy's  camp,  hut  only  three  men 
ooold  have  gone  abreast,  and  it  was  commanded  on  the  left  and 
front  by  the  guns,  and  on  the  right  by  the  troops  in  Dehmazung, 
underneath  the  walls  of  which  it  passed.  At  a  quarter  to  four  we 
heard  the  first  gun  fired,  and  from  that  time  to  dark  we  watched 
for  the  infantry  attack  to  develop.  Some  of  the  92nd  Highlanders 
were  seen  to  our  right  centre  among  the  trees  of  a  village  a  mile 
from  Dehmazung,  and  a  small  party  of  the  9th  Lancers  was  sent 
by  General  Massy  to  open  communication  with  them.  These 
found  the  enemy  swarming  in  the  orchards  they  had  to  pass 
through,  and  after  being  fired  upon  from  several  walls  they  had  to 
return.  The  mountain  guns  with  General  Baker,  posted  upon  the 
high  ridge  commanding  the  Bala  Hissar,  were  shelling  the  Asmai 
Heights  lined  by  the  enemy,  whose  guns  returned  the  fire  shot  for 
shot.  Having  twelve  guns  to  General  Baker's  two  mountain  guns, 
they  had  much  the  best  of  it,  though  the  range  was  so  long  that 
little  real  damage  was  done  on  either  side.  The  ridges  upon 
which  this  shell  practice  was  going  on  form  the  defences  of  Gabul 
from  attack  from  the  Bamian  direction.  Bunning  up  from  the 
Bala  Hissar,  and  following  every  dip  and  rise  of  the  hillside,  is  a 
strong  wall  ten  or  twelve  feet  high,  pierced  for  musketry.  This 
wall  is  continued  at  right  angles  along  the  crest  of  the  Sherderwaza 
Bidge  and  down  the  precipitous  hillside  of  the  gorge  through 
which  the  Cabul  River  runs.  It  ends  a  few  yards  from  the  broken 
arches  of  a  bridge  spanning  the  stream — at  this  time  reduced  to 
very  small  dimension^,  by  being  largely  drawn  upon  for  irrigation 
purposes  in  the  Chardeh  Valley — but  begins  at  once  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  river.  A  strong  tower,  with  a  base  of  stones  fifteen 
feet  high,  raised  on  the  solid  rock,  is  the  starting  point  on  this, 
the  northern  side  of  the  river,  and  the  wall  zig-zags  up  just  in 
the  same  way  as  that  in  continuation  of  the  upper  Bala  Hissar. 
The  line  of  fortification  extends  along  the  hill  top,  and  then  turns 
down  for  some  distance  along  a  spur  facing  towards  Sherpur.  On 
the  crest  of  this  ridge  (the  Asmai  Heights),  three  white  standards 
were  flying  near  the  guns  of  the  enemy,  who  had  one  heavy  piece 
on  the  summit,  the  report  of  which  made  the  bark  of  the  moun- 
tain guns  sound  quite  contemptible.    The  line  of  fire  on  both  sides 


46  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

was  at  right  angles  to  the  bed  of  the  Gabul  Biver,  the  shells  flying 
over  the  gorge  and  bursting  on  the  opposing  heights.  From  our 
position  in  the  plain  below  we  coald  watch  the  artillery  and  judge 
pretty  accurately  as  to  the  fall  of  the  shells,  and  it  was  annoying 
to  see  that  as  it  was  "end-on"  firing,  the  enemy  were  receiving  but 
little  injury.  Their  policy  was  plainly  to  hold  on  till  nightfall  and 
to  attempt  to  escape  under  cover  of  darkness ;  and  as  the  sun 
sank  slowly  behind  us,  it  became  obvious  that  unless  the  infantry 
attack  was  soon  delivered,  they  would  succeed  only  too  well.  Our 
chagrin  was  great  that  there  were  not  guns  with  our  cavalry,  as 
we  could  see  men  in  little  clusters  of  60  or  100  lying  under  the 
lee  of  the  rocks  on  our  side  of  the  ridge,  perfectly  sheltered  from 
General  Baker's  shells.  General  Massy  had  applied  for  horse 
artillery  before  leaving  Beni  Hissar ;  but  it  was  reported  that  the 
country  he  would  have  to  pass  over  was  cut  up  by  deep  irrigation 
channels  which  would  hinder  the  guns  from  keeping  up  with  the 
cavalry.  It  was  decided  therefore  not  to  send  out  artillery.  With 
a  couple  of  R.H.A.  guns  we  could  have  made  the  enemy's  camp 
and  the  hillside  quite  untenable,  and  the  2,800  men  gathered 
there  would  either  have  had  to  come  down  into  the  plain,  where 
our  cavalry  would  have  chosen  their  own  ground  to  charge  them,  or 
to  take  refuge  in  Gabul  city,  which  they  could  easily  have  reached. 
An  old  native  officer,  a  Cabuli,  who  saw  service  in  the  Mutiny, 
was  much  struck  with  our  plan  of  cutting  off  the  retreat ;  and 
when  he  saw  the  cavalry  debouch  into  the  Chardeh  plain,  he  said 
in  his  fervent  thankfulness : — ''  God  has  delivered  these  btuiniashes 
into  your  hands  even  as  the  Embassy  was  delivered  into  theirs." 
And  it  certainly  did  seem  as  if  these  three  regiments,  which  were 
said  to  have  been  chief  in  the  attack  upon  the  handful  of  men 
under  Sir  Louis  Cavagnari  in  the  Btja  Hissar,  were  about  to  be 
exterminated.  But  night  fell,  and  still  our  infantry  attack  was 
not  delivered.  General  Massy  ordered  his  vedettes  and  the  chain 
of  cavalry  to  be  maintained  until  it  was  quite  dark,  so  as  to  induce 
the  enemy  to  believe  the  cordon  would  be  maintained  during  the 
night ;  but  he  would  not  run  the  risk,  in  such  an  awkward  coun- 
try, of  his  men  being  shot  down  in  detail.  He  therefore  withdrew 
them  eventually  within  two  or  three  of  the  rude  forts  in  the  plain 
and  waited  for  daylight.    It  seemed  almost  hopeless  to  intercept 


The  Enemy  Escapes  in  the  Darkness,  47 

in  the  darkness  men  who  had  a  valley  six  or  seven  miles  across, 
with  hills  on  either  side,  to  escape  by.  That  they  did  escape  is 
now  a  cause  of  much  heartburning  in  the  force.  If,  like  Joshua, 
we  could  have  made  the  sun  stand  still,  say,  for  only  two  hours, 
the  day  would  have  been  as  grand  a  success  as  the  6th  at  Charasia ; 
as  it  was,  it  can  only  be  looked  upon  as  one  of  great  disappoint- 
ment to  all  concerned. 

The  only  troops  available  for  despatch  with  General  Baker  were 
820  of  the  92nd  Highlanders,  two  companies  of  the  72nd  High- 
landers, and  seven  companies  of  the  28rd  Pioneers.  With  these 
were  two  mountain  guns  and  one  Gatling.  The  road  up  to  the 
ridge  commanding  the  Bala  Hissar  and  the  passage  over  the  Eotal 
down  into  the  Ghardeh  Valley  were  so  difficult,  that  although  this 
force  moved  out  of  Beni  Hissar  at  noon,  it  was  a  quarter  to  four 
before  the  mountain  guns  got  into  action,  and  it  was  some  time 
later  before  the  92nd  Highlanders  reached  the  village  to  the  west 
of  Dehmazung.  The  enemy  were  in  greater  force  than  was  ex- 
pected, and  as  the  92nd  men  were  unsupported,  they  were  ordered 
to  wait  for  reinforcements  before  making  any  attack.  They  were 
directed  to  take  up  a  position  on  a  spur  of  the  Sherderwaza 
Heights,  parallel  to  the  Cabul  Kiver,  and  this  they  did  without 
loss,  although  the  enemy  opened  fire  from  two  breech-loading 
field-pieces  in  their  camp.  The  shells  and  round  shot  were  pitched 
too  high,  and  greatly  amused  our  men.  Marksmen  were  posted  at 
sheltered  points,  and  their  aim  was  so  good  that  the  Afghans  soon 
retired  from  these  two  guns,  leaving  them  in  the  open.  The  two 
companies  of  the  72nd  were  at  this  time  on  the  hillside  nearest 
to  Beni  Hissar,  and  the  28rd  was  in  reserve.  A  gun  in  the  tower 
I  have  mentioned  fired  occasionally,  and  the  Gatling  was  tried  at 
this ;  bat  the  drum  hitched  after  a  few  rounds,  and  the  gun  had 
to  cease  firing.  General  Baker  had  made  up  his  mind  to  attack 
the  instant  his  reinforcements — consisting  of  a  wing  of  the  67th, 
two  companies  of  the  5th  Ghoorkas,  and  four  more  mountain 
guns — arrived.  These,  however,  did  not  reach  him  until  half- 
past  five,  and  it  was  then  quite  hopeless  to  think  of  storming  the 
heights  in  the  dusk.  The  troops  accordingly  bivouacked  where 
they  stood,  and  a  very  cold  night  they  had  of  it.  General  Mac- 
pherson  arrived  at  6.80  a.m.  with  the  remainder  of  the  67th,  the 


48  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

28th  P.N.I,  and  four  horse  artillery  guns  on  elephants.      He 
started  with  some  infantry  and  gans  to  follow  General  Massy. 

There  is  no  doubt  the  enemy  began  evacuating  their  position  as 
soon  as  it  was  dark ;  and  when  a  strong  patrol  crept  into  their 
camp  at  midnight  they  found  all  had  fled.  Guns,  tents,  camp 
equipage,  &c.,  fell  into  our  hands.  Seven  bodies  were  found 
buried  on  the  heights,  and  three  others  were  lying  on  the  rocks. 
Whether  the  fugitives  carried  off  others,  we  have  no  means  of  telling. 
There  were  no  casualties  on  our  side.  General  Baker  sent  informa- 
tion to  General  Massy  of  the  flight  of  the  enemy,  and  the  cavalry 
started  off  on  the  Bamian  Bead  at  6.80  a.m.,  but  only  one  small 
party  of  twenty-one  was  overtaken  on  the  Kotal-i-Takht.  These 
took  refuge  on  a  low  hill  and  fought  desperately,  the  good  luck  of 
surrounding  and  shooting  them  down  falling  to  the  6th  P.G. 
The  single  combat  between  Bahmat  Ali,  a  native  officer,  and  the 
leader  of  the  party,  was  a  pretty  piece  of  business.  The  Afghan 
tried  to  escape  on  a  fast  pony,  but  was  overtaken  by  Bahmat  Ali, 
who,  after  warding  off  two  blows  from  his  opponent's  ttdwar,  got 
well  down  upon  the  man's  head.  Unluckily  his  sword  snapped  at 
the  hilt,  but  the  blow  had  knocked  the  fugitive  off  his  horse,  and 
he  was  pistolled  before  he  could  recover  himself.  It  was  the 
hardest  day's  work  the  cavalry  have  had  for  a  long  time,  over  thirty- 
six  miles  being  covered  in  the  day.  The  men  were  without  food 
both  days  they  were  out,  but  they  behaved  splendidly,  not  a 
grumble  being  heard.  For  instance,  the  9th  Lancers  started 
on  the  morning  of  the  8th,  after  having  received  one  loaf  to  every 
three  men.  They  carried  no  food,  as  only  a  reconnaissance  was 
intended,  and  at  night  some  sheep  were  killed  for  them,  and  they 
tried  to  eat  the  flesh  after  roasting  the  animals  whole.  They  had 
nothing  but  their  swords  to  use  in  cutting  up  the  carcases,  and 
they  found  it  quite  impossible  to  eat  the  flesh ;  so  on  the  8th  they 
went  supperless  to  bed.  On  the  9th  they  were  in  the  saddle  from 
6  A.M.  to  9  P.M.  (when  they  reached  this  camp),  and  the  pursuit 
and  return  were  made  in  such  quick  time  that  again  there 
was  no  chance  of  their  getting  food.  Horses  and  men  of  all  the 
regiments  out  with  General  Massy  were  quite  exhausted  when  they 
at  last  reached  their  quarters  here.  Some  score  of  horses  were  lost  on 
the  road,  having  literally  died  in  harness.    There  was  no  slackness 


Hostile   Villagers.  49 

in  the  pursuit  when  once  it  hegan,  but  the  enemy  had  too  great  a 
start  to  be  overtaken,  and  it  now  seems  probable  they  dispersed  to 
the  hills  and  made  for  their  homes,  many  doubtless  taking  refuge 
in  the  city.  One  piece  of  experience  was  certainly  gained,  and 
that  was  that  the  villagers  about  Gabul  are  hostile  to  us  almost  to 
a  man.  Five  of  them  belonging  to  Aoshahr  were  made  an  ex- 
ample of  by  Colonel  Boss,  of  the  14th  Bengal  Lancers.  They 
treacherously  fired  into  the  Lancers,  after  having  salaamed  to 
them  as  they  passed.  The  ruffians  were  captured  with  their  gans 
Btill  in  their  hands,  and  were  shot  without  further  parley.  It  is  only 
by  such  severity,  and  by  taking  no  prisoners  in  action,  than  any 
impression  can  be  made  upon  the  Afghan  mind.  Such  prisoners 
as  are  brought  in  are  tried  by  a  military  commission,  and  the  great 
majority  are  shot.  There  is  just  a  fear  that  too  much  leniency 
may  be  shown,  as  the  work  is  rather  distasteful  to  British  officers ; 
but  as  we  are  an  ''  avenging  army,"  scruples  must  be  cast  aside. 

The  army  moved  into  this  camp  yesterday  afternoon.  It  was 
only  about  a  four  miles'  march  from  Beni  Hissar,  and  the  72nd 
were  left  in  charge  of  all  stores  that  could  not  be  got  oflf  by  the 
transport  animals  in  the  day.  On  the  night  of  the  8th  there  was 
some  lively  firing  by  small  bodies  of  budrridsheSy  who  tried  to 
shoot  down  men  on  picquet  and  sentry  duty ;  but,  as  is  usual,  the 
bullets  did  no  mischief.  Last  night  there  was  news  of  what 
threatened  to  be  a  better  organized  attack  by  local  villagers  and 
tribesmen.  Mounted  sowars,  it  seems,  were  sent  round  to  the 
tribes  in  this  neighbourhood  asking  them  to  gather  in  force  and  to 
attack  the  camp,  as  much  loot  could  be  got,  and  only  a  few  men 
had  been  left  in  camp.  The  exemplary  severity  we  have  shown  in 
shooting  all  the  men  caught  in  arms  against  us,  deterred  the 
villagers  from  combining  together,  and  no  attack  was  made.  The 
72nd  had  drawn  in  their  camp  well  under  the  walls  of  a  garden 
overlooking  the  ground,  and  had  formed  a  kind  of  laager  with 
flour  bags,  &c.,  but  not  a  shot  was  fired  all  night.  The  72nd  were 
ready  for  any  number  of  assailants,  and  from  behind  their  barri- 
cades of  flour  bags  they  would  have  read  the  Afghans  as  sharp  a 
lesson  as  the  Zulus  received  when  trying  to  storm  the  mealie 
redoubt  at  Borke's  Drift.  The  whole  of  the  stores  were  brought 
in  here  to-day.     The  6th  Ghoorkas  hold  the  ridge  overlooking  the 


50  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

Bala  Hissar,  and  the  5th  Punjab  Cavalry  are  in  the  Sherpur 
Cantonment,  to  prevent  the  barracks  there  being  destroyed  by  the 
local  peasants  for  the  sake  of  the  woodwork  and  other  material. 
In  two  or  three  days  we  shall  probably  move  into  the  Bala  Hissar, 
in  which  five  months'  provisions  are  to  be  stored.  The  city  is 
quiet,  and  the  camp  is  quite  thronged  with  petty  traders,  who  bring 
in  food,  clothing,  &c.,  for  sale,  and  move  freely  among  our  troops. 
Sir  Frederick  Boberts  inspected  the  Sherpur  Camp  and  the 
captured  guns  to-day,  but  no  movement  of  troops  took  place.  In 
a  short  time  a  small  force  under  General  Gough  will  march  back 
to  the  Shutargardan  to  re-open  communications  in  that  direction, 
pending  further  news  of  the  Ehyber  Force,  whose  advance  seems 
to  be  very  slow  owing  to  transport  difficulties. 

Cabul  itself  is  quite  open  to  us  now,  and  we  can  enter  it  when- 
ever we  choose.  The  guns  captured  on  the  Asmai  ridge  were  six 
field-pieces  and  six  mountain  guns.  Two  field-pieces  were  also 
found  in  camp,  and  an  immense  store  of  ammunition.  Thirty 
camels,  four  elephants,  and  several  mules  and  ponies  also  fell  into 
our  hands. 

It  is  now  well  established  that  the  leaders  of  the  mutineers  are 
the  Amir's  most  trusted  friends.  Eushdil  Khan,  who  was  sent 
specially  by  him  to  meet  Cavagnari  at  Shutargardan,  was  a  pro- 
minent leader  both  at  Charasia  and  on  the  heights  yesterday. 
Mahomed  Jan,  a  general  in  Yakub's  army,  and  of  some  importance 
among  the  powerful  Wardak  section  of  the  Southern  Ghilzais,  is 
also  mentioned.  There  is  no  doubt  of  concealed  action  among 
the  Amir's  officers,  and  unluckily  none  of  the  leaders  have  been 
taken.  Sirdar  Nek  Mahomed  Khan  is  really  the  head  of  all.  It 
now  appears  that  only  one  quarter  of  the  magazine  in  the  Bala 
Hissah  was  looted,  and  there  are  now  in  that  fortress  about  twenty- 
six  guns  in  perfect  order  and  several  rockets,  old  presents  of  the 
Indian  Government.  Nawab  E^an,  colonel  of  artillery,  came  in 
yesterday  to  know  what  orders  General  Boberts  had  to  give  about 
them,  and  was  told  they  were  to  remain  there  for  the  present.  No 
one  can  suppose  any  captured  guns  will  be  given  to  the  Amir,  who 
is  still  with  us. 

It  was  rumoured  that  800  sepoys  had  kept  together  in  a  body, 
but  this  story  is  now  said  to  be  fiedse,  all  having  dispersed  except 


The  Political  Situation,  51 

100  who  escorted  their  leader,  Mahomed  Jan,  towards  Turkistan. 
The  three  regiments  at  Ghazni  are  reported  to  be  only  five  miles 
oat  of  that  place,  while  foar  days  ago  our  force  from  Gandahar 
was  at  Makr,  four  long  marches  from  Ghazni.  The  enemy  has 
been  extremely  well  informed  of  all  our  movements,  though  their 
source  of  information  cannot  be  absolutely  fixed  upon.  Regular 
news  was  probably  given  by  some  of  the  Amir's  retainers,  who  see 
all  that  goes  on  in  our  camp. 

The  political  situation  shows  no  development ;  the  Amir  coin- 
ciding in  all  that  is  done,  now  that  the  flight  of  the  mutineers  has 
removed  his  apprehension  of  Gabul  being  sacked.  If  the  attack 
OD  the  8th  had  been  made  earlier  in  the  day,  the  only  outlet  for 
Mahomed  Jan  and  his  2,000  troops  would  have  been  to  Gabul 
itself.*  The  city  would  then  of  course  have  been  taken  by  storm, 
and,  as  Sir  Frederick  Boberts  said  in  his  proclamation,  we  could 
not  have  been  held  responsible  for  the  consequences.  At  present 
the  strictest  orders  prevail  against  any  one  entering  the  city,  which 
perhaps  even  now  may  harbour  many  mutineers. 


GHAPTER  V. 

Yint  to  the  Retideney— Description  of  the  Bala  HisRar— The  Rains  of  the  Residency- 
Probable  Plan  of  the  Attack  and  Defence— Tbe  Amir's  Palace — Formal  Oocupation 
ol  tbe  Bala  Hissar,  and  Proclamation  to  the  People  of  Cabal — ^The  Panishment  of 
the  City — ^Arrest  of  the  Amir*s  Ministers— Text  of  the  Proclamation. 

Gamp  Suh  Suno,  Wth  October. 

To-day  Sir  Frederick  Boberts  and  his  Staff  visited  the  ruins  of 
the  Residency  within  the  walls  of  the  Bala  Hissar.     The  visit  was 

*  General  Mawy's  withdrawal  of  his  patrols  was  severely  criticized,  and  capital  was 
afterwards  made  oot  of  it  by  the  military  aathorities  in  India.  As  ehowinghow  ntterly 
helpless  the  troopers  wonld  have  been  in  tbe  darkness  to  check  an  enemy,  I  may  quote 
mj  own  experience.  On  the  morning  of  the  9ih  I  rode  from  General  Biahsy's  force  to 
join  General  Baker,  taking  an  Afghan  gaide-and  two  so^^urs  as  escort.  Innamerable 
watcreoorsea  had  to  be  jomped,  and  both  sowars  were  left  behind  in  the  ditches.  My 
hone  had  nearly  to  swim  one  stream,  and  tbe  strain  and  toil  of  climbing  ap  the  banks 
were  soeh  that  I  lost  eren  the  felt  numdah  from  onder  my  saddle.  Tbe  willow-tre-s 
Knisf  the  streMD  wera  also  great  ohetadea  to  horaes  and  men,  even  in  daylight. 

E    2 


52  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

made  quietly  and  nnostentationsly,  only  a  sufficient  escort  being 
taken  to  guard  against  such  accidents  as  a  ghazi  running  amuck, 
or  a  handful  of  quondam  rebels  making  an  attack  upon  the  leader 
of  the  army  that  has  punished  them.  There  is  so  much  of 
historical  interest  attaching  to  the  fortress  which  guards  Gabnl, 
and  this  interest  has  been  so  intensified  by  late  events,  that  all  of 
us  who  rode  from  Camp  yesterday  were  full  of  expectation  as  to 
what  we  were  likely  to  see.  Following  for  half  a  mile  the 
Jellalabad  Boad,  lined  on  both  sides  with  closely-planted  trees,  we 
turned  sharply  to  the  left  when  nearing  the  city,  and  were  soon 
underneath  the  walls  of  the  Bala  Hissar  itself.  The  shallow  bed 
of  the  moat  supposed  to  surround  the  city  is  nearly  dry,  and  the 
road  runs  only  a  few  yards  from  the  foot  of  the  rock  against  which 
the  walls  are  reared.  The  masonry  is  crumbling  to  decay,  but 
there  are  still  signs  of  great  stability  in  it,  and  the  natural  features 
of  the  ground  haTe  been  so  utilized  that  a  precipitous  face  of  80 
or  40  feet  is  presented  to  any  enemy.  This  is  on  the  eastern  side 
to  the  right  of  the  entrance-gate,  just  where  Shere  Ali's  palace, 
with  its  zenana,  tops  the  wall.  The  road  rises  some  10  or  12  feet 
to  the  gate  itself,  which  must  once  haye  been  of  enormous  strength, 
as  solid  masonry  20  feet  thick  still  remains.  Here,  again,  there 
is  evidence  of  ruin,  the  inner  supports  having  crumbled  away  and 
the  defensive  position  overhead  lost  its  protecting  parapets.  The 
lower  Bala  Hissar  once  entered,  one  comes  upon  the  usual  narrow 
winding  lanes  and  commonplace  mud  buildings  of  all  eastern 
cities.  The  place  looks  filthy  and  uncared  for,  and  the  doorways 
leading  to  the  courts  of  the  tumble-down  houses  give  a  view  of 
squalor  and  dilapidation  suggestive  of  worse  to  follow.  The  few 
shops  are  miserable  specimens  of  their  kind,  and  their  owners  are 
in  keeping  with  the  general  associations  of  the  place.  There  is 
nothing  better  to  describe  than  dust,  dirt,  and  dreariness,  on  every 
hand ;  and  even  the  small  square,  where  a  few  guns  were  stand- 
ing in  front  of  a  dozen  dirty  tents  used  by  the  gunners,  gave  as 
little  idea  of  the  interior  of  a  fortress  as  a  few  grains  of  sand 
would  of  a  desert.  Six  field-pieces  and  as  many  mountain  guns 
were  parked  in  the  square.  This  was  part  of  the  artillery-quarters, 
and  a  few  gunners  with  a  trumpeter  were  standing  near  the  guns. 
The  men  wore  no  uniform  and  looked  like  unwashed  coolies.  They 


A  Visit  to  the  Bala  Hissar.  53 

salated  as  Sir  Frederick  Eoberts  rode  up,  and  the  trampeter 
welcomed  os  by  blowing  monotonously  for  several  minutes  upon 
his  instrument. 

It  must  be  more  than  thirty-five  years  since  British  infantry 
marched  through  the  filthy  streets  of  this  much-vaunted  citadel ; 
and  our  only  regret  was  that  they  had  now  entered  it  so  peacefully. 
Sir  Frederick  Boberts  was  accompanied  by  the  Mustaufi,  the 
Wazir,  and  Daoud  Shah,  the  Commander-in-Chief.  After  a  few 
minutes'  stay  in  this  square,  we  retraced  our  steps  and  entered  a 
narrow  lane  with  a  high  wall  on  the  right,  shutting  in  the  Amir's 
garden.  On  the  left  were  the  stables  in  which  the  horses  of  the 
Boyal  household  were  tethered  in  the  open  air,  rude  bins  being 
made  in  the  mud  walls  on  a  pattern  which  is  common  where 
A%han  cavalry  are  quartered.  The  lane  led  to  the  high  ground 
on  which  the  buildings  assigned  to  Sir  Louis  Cavagnari  and  his 
companions  stood.  From  this  the  city  could  be  seen  lying  at  our 
feet,  to  the  north. 

Our  first  view  of  the  Residency  was  of  the  rear  wall,  still  intact, 
but  blackened  on  the  top  where  the  smoke  from  the  burning  ruins 
had  swept  across.  At  each  angle  where  the  side  walls  joined  were 
seen  the  loop-holes  from  which  the  fire  of  the  little  force  on  the 
roof  had  been  directed  against  the  overwhelming  numbers  attack- 
ing them.  Every  square  foot  round  these  loop-holes  was  pitted 
with  bullet-marks,  the  balls  having  cut  deeply  into  the  hard  mud 
plaster.  The  western  wall,  which  faced  towards  the  Upper  Bala 
Hissar,  commanding  it,  was  scarred  with  these  marks,  proving 
only  too  well  how  severe  had  been  the  fire  from  the  higher  level 
occupied  by  the  mutineers  in  the  Arsenal.  At  this  end  the 
Residency  was  of  three  stories,  but  the  present  wall  does  not 
indicate  the  height  of  more  than  two,  the  upper  part  having 
collapsed  when  the  fire  obtained  a  mastery  over  the  building.  A 
lane  six  or  eight  feet  wide  runs  between  this  wall  and  the  buildings 
on  the  right  in  which  the  Guides  were  quartered.  Plans  hitherto 
published  have  made  the  Residency  and  these  quarters  one  block ; 
but  this  is  a  mistake  ;  they  were  quite  distinct. 

Riding  along  the  lane  we  came  to  the  southern  end  of  the 
Residency,  built  upon  the  edge  of  the  wall  looking  towards  Btini 
Hissar,  and  here  were  two  graves  marked  by  neatly-piled  stones  in 


54  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

Mussulman  fashion,  each  with  its  head-stone,  but  no  inscription. 
Whether  any  bodies  are  buried  beneath  remains  to  be  seen  ;  it  is 
suspected  these  neat  mounds  may  have  been  raised  as  ''  a  blind." 
The  Eotwal  stated  that  two  sahibs  were  buried  there,  Lieutenant 
Hamilton  and  Mr.  Jenkyns ;  but  this  does  not  coincide  with  the 
story  told  by  Taimus,  a  sowar  of  the  Guides,  who  says  the  bodies 
were  buried  some  distance  to  the  west  of  the  Residency.  Passing 
through  a  narrow  gateway,  half-blocked  with  rubbish,  just  in  rear 
of  these  graves,  we  entered  the  main  court  of  the  Residency,  and 
were  soon  thoroughly  able  to  appreciate  the  fate  of  its  defenders. 
The  southern  end  on  our  right  hand  was  standing  untouched,  and 
consisted  of  rooms  built  on  wooden  pillars  so  as  to  form  a  kind  of 
oblong  pavilion.  The  mud  basement  is  three  or  four  feet  from  the 
ground,  and  the  whole  structure,  except  a  few  partition  walls  and 
the  roof,  is  of  wood,  and,  from  the  dryness  of  the  climate,  very 
inflammable.  It  is  neatly  whitewashed,  and  the  upper  rooms, 
being  open  on  both  sides,  must  be  cool  and  pleasant.  These  were 
Sir  Louis  Cavagnari's  quarters,  and  from  them  the  rich  Cabul 
plain  beneath  can  be  seen  stretching  away  to  the  Tezin  Hills. 
The  courtyard  of  the  Residency  is  about  90  feet  square,  and  at  its 
northern  end,  where  formerly  stood  a  three-storied  building  like  that 
I  have  just  described,  are  nothing  but  the  bare  walls,  blackened 
and  scarred  by  fire,  and  a  huge  heap  of  rubbish,  the  ruins  of  the 
walls  and  roof  which  fell  in  as  the  woodwork  was  destroyed. 
Portions  of  the  partition  walls  still  remain,  jutting  sullenly  out 
from  the  mass  of  debris,  and  these  only  serve  to  make  the  place 
more  desolate.  The  whitewashed  walls  on  the  left  are  here  and 
there  bespattered  with  blood,  and  on  the  raised  basement  on  which 
the  building  stood  are  the  remains  of  a  large  fire,  the  half-charred 
beams  still  resting  among  the  ashes.  The  ruins  are  still  smoulder- 
ing. Whether,  as  suggested,  any  bodies  were  burned  there,  is 
still  an  unsettled  point ;  but  in  one  room  into  which  I  went  there 
can  be  no  doubt  fire  had  been  used  for  such  a  purpose.  The 
ashes  were  in  the  middle  of  the  chamber,  and  near  them  were  two 
skulls  and  a  heap  of  human  bones,  still  fetid.  It  would  seem  as 
if  a  desperate  struggle  had  taken  place  in  this  room,  the  blood- 
stains on  the  floor  and  walls  being  clearly  discernible.  The  skulls 
are  to  be  examined  by  surgeons,  as  it  is  possible  they  may  be 


The  Residency :  Traces  of  the  Mc^sacre.  55 

those  of  Europeans.  The  Residency  was  looted  so  thoroughly, 
that  not  even  a  peg  has  been  left  in  the  walls.  In  Sir  Louis 
Cayagnari's  quarters  the  windows  overlooking  the  Bala  Hissar 
wall  have  been  torn  out  even  to  the  sashes,  and  a  few  bits  of  glass 
on  the  floor  alone  remain  of  them.  The  chintz  hangings  and 
purdahs  have  been  stripped  away,  a  fluttering  bit  of  coloured  rag 
on  a  stray  nail  being  the  only  sign  of  such  cheerfulness  as  these 
once  gave.  Bare  cross-poles  and  rafters,  floors  rough  with  dirt  and 
defiled  with  filth,  staring  white  walls  with  here  and  there  a  buUet- 
mark — such  are  the  once  comfortable  quarters  of  our  Envoy. 
The  view  over  the  Cabul  plain  is  still  as  peaceful  as  when  poor 
Jenkyns  described  it  so  enthusiastically ;  but  all  else  is  changed. 
The  one  consolation  is  that  a  British  army  is  encamped  within 
gunshot  of  the  walls. 

It  is  still  difficult  to  make  out  the  point  at  which  the  mutineers 
obtained  entry  into  the  Besidency  buildings,  unless  it  was  by  a 
hole  in  the  eastern  wall,  a  little  to  the  right  of  a  small  doorway  lead- 
ing to  a  lower  range  of  houses  adjoining.  Bound  this  hole  are 
scores  of  bullet-holes,  and  their  direction  seems  to  show  that  the 
defenders  on  the  roof  fired  down  as  the  men  streamed  in,  in  the 
vain  hope  of  checking  them  before  they  could  rush  forward  and 
set  fire  to  the  woodwork.  Once  the  lower  part  of  the  three- 
storied  building  was  in  flames,  nothing  could  save  the  brave  men 
on  the  roof,  as  all  retreat  was  cut  oflF.  We  viewed  the  scene  of 
desolation  for  some  time  from  the  roof  of  Sir  Louis  Cavagnari's 
quarters ;  and  General  Roberts  gave  orders  that  nothing  should  be 
disturbed  until  careful  sketches  had  been  made  of  the  interior  of 
the  Besidency  and  its  surroundings.  Careful  excavations  for 
bodies  will  also  be  made  among  the  ruins.  It  is  absurd  to  talk  of 
the  Residency  being  a  safe  place  for  a  garrison  ;  it  is  commanded 
completely  from  the  walls  of  the  Arsenal  in  the  Upper  Bala 
Hissar,  and  also  from  the  roofs  of  some  high  houses  to  the  south- 
west. In  addition,  houses  closely  adjoin  it  on  the  eastern  side  ; 
and  an  attacking  party  sapping  the  walls  would  have  perfect  cover 
in  this  direction  the  whole  time  :  this  may  account  for  the  breach 
in  the  walls  through  which  I  have  suggested  the  mutineers  made 
their  rush.  Riding  into  the  quarters  occupied  by  the  Guides' 
escort,  on  the  western  side  of  the  lane,  I  found  but  few  bullet- 


56  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

marks  on  the  walls.  Facing  was  a  high  door  firmly  closed  and 
seemingly  uninjured ;  but  on  going  into  the  Sikh  quarters  on  my 
right,  and  following  a  broad  passage  which  turned  at  right  angles 
towards  the  wall,  a  huge  breach  was  visible.  This  was  where  the 
Afghans  had  blown  in  the  gate  after  Lieutenant  Hamilton's  noble, 
but  ineflfectual,  efforts  to  check  them.  Three  times  he  charged 
out,  killing  many  men  with  his  sword  and  pistol,  but  what  could 
one  hero  do  against  a  mob  of  fanatics  ?  No  doubt  when  it  was 
seen  that  a  breach  was  made  the  Guides  withdrew  to  the  Besidency 
proper,  and  there  made  the  last  stand,  first  in  the  courtyard  guard- 
ing the  doors  and  afterwards  on  the  roof. 

On  returning  we  stayed  for  a  short  time  in  the  Amir's  garden, 
where  fruit  and  tea  were  served  to  us.  Afterwards  we  visited  Shore 
All's  palace  on  the  wall  near  the  gate.  Two  or  three  dark  passages 
had  to  be  traversed  before  a  staircase  was  gained  which  led  to  his 
State  rooms.  Persian  carpets  of  value  were  spread  in  two  rooms, 
in  the  second  of  which  hung  gaudy  glass  chandeliers,  while  on 
the  ground  (as  if  purposely  placed  out  of  harm's  way)  was  a 
collection  of  glassware  of  sorts  showing  all  the  colours  of  the  rain- 
bow. A  few  cheap  prints,  including  one  of  the  Czar  Alexander, 
hung  on  the  walls,  and  on  a  chair  near  was  a  Oraphie  folded  so  as 
to  show  a  portrait  of  Cavagnari.  On  taking  this  up  I  came  across 
a  diary  of  Sir  Louis  Cavagnari' s,  which  seemed  to  have  been  used 
chiefly  for  recording  lists  of  visits  and  visitors.  The  book  was 
handed  over  to  Major  Hastings.  Two  or  three  maps  of  Central 
Asia  were  also  among  the  papers ;  but  it  is  doubtful  to  whom  they 
belonged. 

Camp  Siah  Sung,  12th  October. 

This  morning  the  first  formal  declaration  of  our  occupation  of 
Cabul  was  made  by  the  troops  taking  possession  of  the  Bala 
Hissar,  followed  by  a  durbar,  at  which  the  terms  imposed  upon 
the  city  were  announced.  As  I  have  before  said,  there  was 
nothing  to  hinder  us  marching  into  the  fortress  the  day  after  the 
battle  of  Charasia,  for  our  cavalry  videttes  were  within  200  yards 
of  the  walls,  and  not  a  sentry  could  be  seen  within  the  fortifica- 
tions. They  had  been  abandoned  in  hot  haste  by  the  mutineers, 
who  had  first  of  all  drawn  off  to  the  Sherpur  cantonments  and 


The  Occupation  of  CabuL  57 

thence  betaken  themselves  to  the  Asmai  Heights,  from  which  they 
fled  on  the  evening  of  the  8th.  Bat  there  was  no  occasion  for 
haste :  our  camp  on  the  Siah  Song  Bidge  dominates  the  city,  and 
we  coold  have  shelled  it  at  oar  leisare  if  any  signs  of  discontent, 
or  an  armed  rising,  had  been  observed.  Besides,  in  dealing  with 
Afghans,  there  is  always  the  element  of  treachery  to  be  considered, 
and  it  was  not  impossible  that  mines  might  have  been  laid  ready 
to  be  sprung  if  we  occupied  the  place  precipitately.  The  explosion 
of  the  magazine  at  Sherpur,  on  the  night  of  the  7th,  had  shown 
the  desperate  character  of  the  men  we  were  fighting  against,  and 
it  was  well  to  be  on  our  guard  against  any  surprise.  It  is 
impossible  to  say  what  vast  stores  of  ganpowder  may  be  hidden 
in  the  Upper  Bala  Hissar,  where  the  Arsenal  buildings  are  situated ; 
and  untU  we  have  thoroughly  examined  the  godowns  and  vaults 
within  the  walls  we  are  in  the  position  of  "  playing  with  fire," 
which  may  at  any  moment  pass  beyond  our  control.  Sir  F. 
Roberts's  visit  to  the  ruins  of  the  Besidency  yesterday  went  off  qaietly 
enough,  and  the  fortress  seemed  deserted,  save  for  the  few  Afghan 
residents  in  the  houses  within  the  outer  walls  ;  but  a  few  reckless 
men  may  still  lurk  about  waiting  for  an  opportunity  to  work  serious 
mischief. 

This  morning  all  the  troops  in  camp  paraded  at  eleven  o'clock  and 
marched  down  wiih  bands  playing  to  the  Jellalabad  Boad,  which 
they  at  once  lined  on  either  side.  The  men  were  arrayed  in 
their  gayest  uniforms  ;  and  although  many  were  worn  and  travel- 
stained,  the  general  appearance  of  all  the  regiments  was  very 
smart  and  soldierlike.  At  noon  word  was  brought  to  Sir  F. 
Roberts  that  all  was  ready,  and,  accompanied  by  his  Staff  and 
Brigadier-Generals  Massy,  Macpherson,  Baker,  and  Hugh  Gough, 
and  Major-General  Hills,  he  rode  down  the  Siah  Sung  Bidge,  and 
took  the  road  to  the  Bala  Hissar.  The  cavalry  lined  the  road  for 
the  first  half-mile  nearest  to  camp,  the  lances  of  the  14th  Bengal 
Lancers  glittering  among  the  branches  of  the  trees  until  they 
merged  into  the  line  of  sabres  of  the  12th  Bengal  Cavalry,  who 
looked  none  the  worse  for  their  late  hard  ride  on  the  Bamian  Boad. 
Two  rows  of  crimson  turbans  marked  where  the  6th  Panjab 
Cavalry  were  drawn  up;  while  the  handful  of  9th  Lancei*s, 
gorgeous  as  on  a  parade  at  home,  closed  the  cavalry  array.     First 


58  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

in  the  Infantry  line  were  the  scarlet  coats  of  the  28th  Native 
Infantry,  contrasting  vividly  with  the  dull  khaki  uniform  of  the 
23rd  Pioneers — as  fine  a  fighting  and  working  regiment  as  ever 
drew  batta.  The  mountain  guns  were  next  in  order,  looking  down 
each  other's  muzzles  from  either  side  of  the  road ;  while  flanking 
them  were  the  6th  Punjab  Infantry,  well  known  for  good  service 
on  the  frontier.  The  7th  Company  of  Sappers  and  Miners, 
stalwart  men,  bestrapped  with  spade  and  shovel,  were  then  passed ; 
while  near  them  were  the  two  Gatling  guns,  quite  over- 
powered by  their  neighbours,  the  nine-pounders  of  G-S  Battery  of 
Boyal  Artillery,  which  made  themselves  heard  with  good  effect  at 
Charasia.  The  Highland  regiments,  forming  two  living  walls 
stretching  far  away  towards  the  city,  were  the  great  representatives 
of  British  Infantry;  the  92nd  Gordon  Highlanders,  kilted  and 
gaitered,  resting  on  the  72nd,  more  warmly  clad  in  tartan  trews. 
Nothing  could  exceed  the  splendid  form  in  which  these  regiments 
turned  out,  the  bronzed  and  bearded  faces  of  the  soldiers  showing 
that  but  few  "six-year  men"  were  in  their  ranks.  The  F-A 
Battery  of  Royal  Horse  Artillery  was  drawn  up  in  a  field  just  off 
the  road,  ready  to  fire  the  salute,  and  the  post  of  honour  next  to 
the  gate  was  assigned  to  the  senior  regiment,  the  67th  Foot,  a 
well- set-up  body  of  men,  equal  to  any  amount  of  work.  On  the 
ridge  above  the  fortress  we  could  see  the  dark  figures  of  the  6th 
Ghoorkas,  six  companies  of  which  had  moved  down  and  occupied 
the  Upper  Bala  Hissar.  As  the  General  rode  slowly  down  the 
long  line  of  troops,  the  trumpets  of  the  cavalry  brayed  out  a 
fanfare  and  the  band  of  each  infantry  regiment  played  right 
heartily,  the  men  presenting  arms  with  automatic  precision.  A 
halt  was  called  just  below  the  entrance  to  the  Bala  Hissar ;  and  as 
the  Union  Jack  was  run  up  over  the  gateway  by  some  red-jackets 
of  the  67th,  the  first  gun,  of  the  royal  salute  of  thirty-one,  was 
fired  by  the  Horse  Artillery.  At  the  same  instant  the  opening 
bars  of  the  National  Anthem  were  heard  as  the  bands  struck  up, 
the  shrill  pipes  of  the  Highlanders  ringing  out  above  the  din. 
The  sight  was  a  most  impressive  one,  the  sun  lighting  up  the 
double  line  along  which  4,000  bayonets  sparkled,  and  throwing 
into  bold  relief  the  darker  forms  of  men  and  horses  where  the 
cavalry  were  drawn  up.    In  the  background  were  the  brown  slopes 


A  Durbar  in  the  Bala  Hissar.  59 

of  the  Siah  Sang  Badge,  crowned  by  the  white  lines  of  tents  which 
marked  our  camp,  then  almost  deserted.  Only  a  few  spectators 
from  the  city  clustered  on  the  road  from  the  Lahore  Gate,  and 
watched  the  spectacle,  the  mass  of  the  people  remaining  sullenly 
within  the  walls. 

The  smoke  of  the  first  three  or  four  guns  had  not  cleared  off 
when  the  company  of  the  67th  nearest  the  gate  faced  round,  and 
foUowed  by  their  band,  marched  into  the  Bala  Hissar — the  first 
British  regiment  that  had  entered  its  narrow  streets  since  1842. 
(It  is  worthy  of  record  that  the  "  quick-step  *'  played  by  the  67th 
is  the  same  as  that  of  the  ill-fated  44th  Begiment,  not  a  man  of 
which  escaped  to  tell  the  tale  of  the  disastrous  retreat  from  Cabul 
which  Pollock  avenged.)  Following  the  band.  General  Boberts 
and  his  little  train  of  mounted  men  rode  into  the  fortress,  and 
took  their  way  through  its  narrow  streets  to  the  Amir's  garden 
under  the  walls  of  the  Upper  Bala  Hissar.  At  either  end  of 
this  garden,  which  is  now  merely  a  neglected  wilderness,  are  two 
of  the  ordinary  wooden  native  pavilions,  the  one  to  the  south 
containing  what  is  called  the  ''Audience  Chamber."  This  is 
approached  by  a  flight  of  dirty  wooden  stairs,  and  is  about  twenty 
feet  above  the  ground-level.  The  chamber  is  quite  open  on  the 
side  facing  the  garden,  so  that  a  crowd  below  could  be  addressed 
from  it,  and  it  also  gives  a  good  view  over  the  city,  with  its  back- 
ground oi  high  hills.  The  room  was  soon  filled  with  the  gay 
nniforms  of  the  General  and  his  staff  and  such  ofScers  as  were 
not  on  duty  with  their  regiments,  and  then  the  Durbar  began,  the 
Cabul  Sirdars  crowding  in  at  a  signal,  and  pressing  forward  to  make 
their  salaams  to  their  latest  conqueror.  It  was  intended  that  the 
Amir  should  have  accompanied  General  Boberts  into  the  Bala 
Hissar;  bat  at  the  last  moment  he  pleaded  indisposition,  and 
was  excused.*  His  eldest  son,  the  heir-apparent,  was  sent 
instead.  He  is  a  child  of  five  or  six  years  of  age,  with  a  monkey- 
ish cast  of  face,  which  not  even  the  glitter  and  colour  of  his 
bizarre  coat  and  hat,  gorgeous  in  green  and  gold,  could  soften  or 
render  at  all  prepossessing.  The  youngest  was  of  little  account, 
being  squeezed  against  the  wooden  frameword  of  the  pavilion  by 

*  It  WM  not  made  known  antil  afterwards  that  Yaknb  Kban  had  placed  hiB  reaig- 
Batbn  in  the  hands  of  Sir  P.  Bobertf. 


6o  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

the  greasy  Sirdars,  who  could  not  control  themselves  in  their 
eagerness  to  pay  their  respects.  The  General  was  not  at  all 
cordial  in  his  reception  of  them ;  and  it  was  not  surprising, 
for  a  more  servile  or  repulsive  audience  could  not  have  been 
selected.  Scarcely  a  face  was  visible  that  was  not  stamped  with 
the  marks  of  sensuality,  and  where  age  had  softened  these,  it 
had  replaced  them  by  deeper  lines  of  cunning  and  deception. 
There  was  a  look  of  subdued  malice  in  one  or  two  faces,  min- 
gled with  expectant  fear  of  what  terms  were  about  to  be  imposed 
upon  Cabul.  The  full  figure  of  Daoud  Shah,  the  late  Comman- 
der-in-Chief, stood  out  prominently  from  the  &unnta^-like  crowd 
about  him,  and,  both  in  figure  and  bearing,  he  contrasted 
favourably  with  the  sirdars.  He  was  clothed  simply  in  a  long 
grey  coat,  belted  at  the  waist ;  while  the  perspiring  crowd  of 
his  fellows  boasted  garments  of  silk  and  beautifully-dyed  clothes, 
some  of  the  coats  of  many  colours  being  so  startling  as  to  make 
one  almost  colour-blind.  There  was  one  thin  red  line,  however, 
which  never  moved ;  it  was  that  formed  by  some  twenty  men  of 
the  67th,  who,  with  fixed  bayonets,  were  standing  to  ''  attention  " 
at  the  back  of  the  narrow  room,  stolid  sentinels  at  their  posts. 
Below,  the  rest  of  the  two  companies  were  formed  up,  and  the 
band  played  some  lively  '^troops," — ^the  airs  played  at  the 
trooping  of  the  colours.  When  these  came  to  an  end,  a  little 
space  was  cleared  about  the  General,  who  read  out  the  Proclam- 
ation, by  which  the  punishment  of  Cabul  was  made  known.  It 
was  translated,  sentence  by  sentence,  by  the  munshi  of  Major 
Hastings,  Political  Officer,  and  was  listened  to  in  perfect  silence, 
the  only  token  of  approval  being  given  by  an  old  ressaldar  of 
Hodson's  Horse,  now  enjoying  his  pension  among  his  native 
orchards  of  Cabul.  This  man,  with  his  breast  decorated  with 
medals  earned  by  service  in  India,  cried  out  emphatically  *  ^sha  hash  / ' ' 
when  one  or  two  sentences  meting  out  punishment  to  the  rebels 
were  read,  and  it  was  clear  all  his  sympathy  was  with  us ;  for,  ' 
with  a  true  soldier's  instinct,  he  could  not  forgive  the  cowardice  of 
the  attack  upon  the  Besidency  by  an  armed  rabble,  bent  upon 
taking  the  lives  of  a  few  men  who  were  their  guests.  The  sirdars 
seemed  relieved  when  they  heard  Cabul  was  not  to  be  destroyed, 
and  the  disarmament  of  the  population  and  the  fine  that  had  to 


Sirdars  Placed  under  Arrest.  6i 

be  paid  must  have  appeared  to  them  small  punishment  so  long  as 
their  city  and  fortress  were  left  untouched.  When  the  Proclama- 
tion had  been  read  through,  they  were  summarily  dismissed,  the 
Wazir,  the  Mustaufi^  Yahiya  Khan  (father-in-law  of  the  Amir), 
and  his  brother,  Zakariah  Ehan,  also,  being  asked  to  stay,  as  the 
General  wished  to  speak  to  them.  They  doubtless  thought  they 
were  to  be  consulted  on  questions  of  high  policy,  but  their  chagrin 
was  great  when  they  were  told  they  would  have  to  remain  as 
prisoners  until  their  conduct  had  been  thoroughly  inyestigated. 
They  would  be  confined  in  separate  rooms  with  sentries  over  them, 
and  beyond  one  servant  they  would  be  forbidden  to  communicate 
with  any  of  their  associates.  The  Mustaufi  fell  to  telling  his  beads 
at  once,  and  the  others  appeared  in  a  very  wholesome  state  of  fear. 
It  was  a  startling  surprise  to  them  after  all  the  smoothrsailing  of 
the  past  few  days,  and  they  are  now  at  leisure  to  ponder  over  their 
double-dealings  with  the  British  authority.  This  bit  of  byrplay 
having  been  successfally  got  through.  General  Koberts  left  the 
audience  chamber,  and  in  a  few  minutes  rode  back  to  camp,  the 
67th  cheering  him  right  heartily  as  he  passed  out  of  the  garden. 
The  long  line  of  bayonets,  sabres,  and  lances  was  traversed  at  ^ 
gallop,  and  Siah  Sung  camp  reached  in  a  few  minutes.  The  67th 
moved  into  the  Bala  Hissar  and  encamped  in  the  Amir's  garden, 
and  thus  the  first  day  of  our  triumph  over  Cabul  ended  a^  happily 
as  it  began.  Yakub  Khan's  tent  was  removed  daring  the  day  to 
the  head-quarters*  camp,  a  guard  of  honour  from  the  72nd  High- 
landers keeping  strict  watch  over  it. 

The  following  is  the  fall  te^t  of  the  Proclamation  : — 


Proclamation  to   the    People    of  Gabul  by  MajortGeioibal 
Sir  Frederick  Boberts,  E.C.B.,  V.C. 

Datbp  Bala  Hissar,  Cabxjl,  Vlth  October^  1879. 
"  In  my  Proclamation  of  the  8rd  October,  dated  Zerghun  Shahr, 
1  informed  the  people  of  Cabul  that  a  British  army  was  advancing 
to  take  possession  of  the  city,  and  I  warned  them  against  offering 
any  resistence  to  the  entry  of  the  troops,  and  the  authority  of  His 
H^^ness  the  Amir.      That  warning  has  been  disregarded.     The 


62  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

force  nnder  my  command  has  now  reached  Cahnl,  and  occupied 
the  Bala  Hissar ;  bat  its  advance  has  been  pertinacioasly  opposed, 
and  the  inhabitants  of  the  city  have  taken  a  conspicnons  part  in 
the  opposition  offered.  They  have  therefore  become  rebels  against 
His  Highness  the  Amir,  and  have  added  to  the  guilt  already  in- 
curred by  them  in  abetting  the  murder  of  the  British  Envoy  and 
of  his  companions — a  treacherous  and  cowardly  crime,  which  has 
brought  indelible  disgrace  upon  the  A%han  people.  It  would  be 
but  a  just  and  fitting  reward  for  such  misdeeds  if  the  city  of  Cabul 
were  now  totally  destroyed  and  its  very  name  blotted  out.  But 
the  great  British  Government  is  ever  desirous  to  temper  justice 
with  mercy,  and  I  now  announce  to  the  inhabitants  of  Cabul  that 
the  full  retribution  for  their  offence  will  not  be  exacted,  and  that 
the  city  will  be  spared.  Nevertheless  it  is  necessary  that  they 
should  not  escape  all  penalty,  and  that  the  punishment  inflicted 
should  be  such  as  will  be  felt  and  remembered.  Therefore  such  of 
the  city  buildings  as  now  interfere  with  the  proper  military  occu- 
pation of  the  Bala  Hissar,  and  the  safety  and  comfort  of  the 
British  troops  to  be  quartered  in  it,  will  be  at  once  levelled  with 
the  ground;  and  further  a  heavy  fine,  the  amount  of  which 
will  be  notified  hereafter,  will  be  imposed  upon  the  inhabitants, 
to  be  paid  according  to  their  several  capabilities.  This  punish- 
ment, inflicted  upon  the  whole  city,  will  not,  of  course,  absolve 
from  further  penalties  those  whose  individual  guilt  may  be 
hereafter  proved.  A  full  and  searching  inquiry  will  be  held  into 
the  circumstances  of  the  late  outbreak,  and  all  persons  convicted 
of  bearing  a  part  in  it  will  be  dealt  with  according  to  their 
deserts.  I  further  give  notice  to  all,  that,  in  order  to  provide  for 
the  restoration  and  maintenance  of  order,  the  city  of  Cabul  and 
the  surrounding  country  to  a  distance  of  ten  miles  are  placed 
under  martial  law.  With  the  consent  of  the  Amir,  a  military 
Governor  of  Cabul  will  be  appointed  to  administer  justice,  and  to 
punish  with  a  strong  hand  all  evil-doers.  The  inhabitants  of 
Cabul  and  of  the  neighbouring  villages  are  hereby  warned  to  sub- 
mit to  his  authority.  For  the  future  the  carrying  of  dangerous 
weapons,  whether  swords,  knives,  or  fiirearms,  within  the  streets 
of  Cabul,  or  within  a  distance  of  five  miles  from  the  city  gates,  is 
forbidden.    After  a  week  from  the  date  of  this  Proclamation,  any 


Anotlter  Proclamation  to  the  Cabulis,  63 

person  found  armed  within  these  limits  will  he  liahle  to  the  penalty 
of  death.  Persons  having  in  their  possession  any  articles  what- 
soever which  formerly  belonged  to  members  of  the  British  Em- 
bassy are  required  to  bring  them  forthwith  to  the  British  Gamp. 
Anyone  neglecting  this  warning  will,  if  found  hereafter  in  posses- 
sion of  any  such  articles,  be  subject  to  the  severest  penalties. 
Farther,  all  persons  who  may  have  in  their  .possession  any  fire- 
irms  or  ammunition  formerly  issued  to,  or  seized  by,  the  Afghan 
troops  are  required  to  produce  them.  For  every  country-made 
rifle,  whether  breech  or  muzzle-loading,  a  sum  of  Bs.  8  will  be 
given  on  delivery ;  and  for  every  rifle  of  European  manufacture, 
Rs.  6.  Anyone  found  hereafter  in  possession  of  such  weapons 
will  be  severely  punished.  Finally,  I  notify  that  I  will  give  a 
reward  of  Bs.  50  for  the  surrender  of  any  person,  whether  soldier 
or  civilian,  concerned  in  the  attack  on  the  British  Embassy,  or  for 
sach  information  as  may  lead  directly  to  his  capture.  A  similar 
sum  will  be  given  in  case  of  any  person  who  may  have  fought 
against  the  British  troops,  since  the  Srd  September  last,  and  has 
therefore  become  a  rebel  against  the  Amir.  If  any  such  person 
so  surrendered  or  captured  be  a  captain  or  subaltern  officer  of  the 
Afghan  army,  the  reward  will  be  increased  to  Bs.  76 ;  and  if  a 
field  officer  to  Bs.  120." 

Ciopies  of  this  Proclamation,  printed  in  the  Persian  and  Pakhtu 
character,  will  be  extensively  circulated  in  Northern  Afghanistan. 


64  The  Afghan  W^ar,  1879—80. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Entry  into  Cabal— Description  of  the  City — Its  Commonplace  Peatores — Snllenness 
of  the  People — The  Order  against  Intrigues  with  Afghan  Women — ^Precantions 
fl;gain8t  Panatiebm — ^The  Baxaara — Snbjection  of  the  City — Captnre  of  TwelT« 
Gans  on  the  Gbazni  Road — Explosion  in  the  Bala  Hissar — Death  of  Captain  Shafto 
— Destruction  of  Munitions  of  War — Attack  on  the  Shutargardan — Betum  of 
Captured  Ordnance. 

Camp  Siah  Sung,  \%th  October. 

Gabul  has  beeA  spared,  so  £Eur  as  regards  the  wiping  out  of  its 
name  by  the  destruction  of  the  city ;  bat  to-day  it  has  had  to 
suffer  the  humiliation  of  seeing  our  troops  march  triumphantly 
through  its  streets,  and  to  feel,  for  the  first  time  for  many  years, 
that  its  freedom  has  passed  away.  The  terms  of  the  proclama- 
tion, read  by  Sir  F.  Roberts  in  the  Bala  Hissar  yesterday,  have 
been  made  known  to  the  turbulent  populace ;  and  though  they 
have  not  so  far  thought  fit  to  surrender  their  arms,  they  are  wise 
enough  to  keep  them  all  out  of  sight  for  fear  of  consequences. 
Our  troops  paraded  this  morning  at  ten  o'clock,  and  by  eleven  the 
cavalry  had  begun  to  enter  the  Lahore  Gate  to  clear  the  way  for 
the  General  and  his  Staff.  I  described  very  fully  the  appearance 
of  the  little  army  yesterday  when  the  Bala  Hissar  was  taken 
possession  of,  and  there  is  therefore  no  need  to  dwell  upon  their 
bearing  to-day.  They  were  as  smart  and  fit  as  any  martinet  of 
the  old  school  could  have  wished,  and  their  steady  march  through 
the  narrow  streets  and  bazaars  was  as  imposing  as  the  spectacle 
of  the  previoT;s  day.  A  circuit  of  the  city  had  to  be  made ;  and 
by  the  time  the  cavalry  were  well  on  their  way  back  to  the  start- 
ing-point, the  last  of  the  infantry  filed  i^.  Following  closely  on 
the  heels  of  the  14th  Bengal  Lancers,  the  Major-General  com- 
manding rode  through  the  Lahore  Gate,  and,  turning  off  soon  to 
the  left,  took  the  street  leading  to  the  Chandaul  Bazaar,  the 
Hindu  and  Eizilbash  quarter  of  Gabul.  General  Macpherson,  at 
the  head  of  the  First  Brigade,  led  the  infantry;  and  General 


Cabul  from  Siah  Sung.  65 

Baker,  with  the  Second  Brigade,  closed  the  procession.  Of  coarse, 
the  67th  and  5th  Ghoorkas  were  absent,  as  they  are  now  garri- 
soning the  Bala  Hissar.  There  was  no  artillery  brought  in,  as 
the  streets  are  so  tortaoas  and  the  bazaars  so  narrow,  that  it 
would  have  been  difficult  for  the  guns  to  have  worked  through. 
We  have  not  much  artillery  with  us ;  and,  accustomed  as  the 
Cabul  people  are  to  seeing  large  parks,  our  three  batteries  would 
not  have  impressed  them. 

There  has  been  for  so  many  years  such  a  peculiar  interest 
attaching  to  the  name  of  Cabul,  that  one  naturally  expected  to  be 
struck  with  the  appearance  of  the  city ;  and  it  was  therefore  dis- 
appointing to  find  nothing  in  its  features  remarkable  or  impressive. 
Viewed  from  the  ridge  in  which  we  are  now  encamped,  the  town 
presents  a  mass  of  mud  walls  and  flat  roofs,  with  trees  and  gar- 
dens scattered  among  them,  and  belting  them  on  the  north  and  . 
east  with  rich  verdure.  To  the  west  the  bastions  and  walls  of 
the  Bala  Hissar,  and  the  double  line  of  fortifications  about  the 
Arsenal,  stand  out  in  bold  reUef ;  the  steep  hills  to  the  north  and 
south,  with  the  open  gorge  through  which  the  Cabul  river  runs, 
forming  an  imposing  background.  Apart  from  these  there  are  no 
distinctive  signs  to  distinguish  the  place  from  any  other  Eastern 
city ;  in  fact,  it  lacks  the  tall  buildings,  mosques,  and  minarets 
which  many  a  centre  of  Mahomedan  fanaticism  boasts.  The 
strong  wall  which  once  guarded  it  and  made  it  a  place  of  strength 
has  crumbled  away,  or  been  broken  down,  and  in  its  place  are 
the  wretched  mud  structures  called  houses,  in  which  it  pleases  the 
citizens  to  live.  There  is  one  landmark,  the  tomb  of  Taimur 
Shah  :  its  low  dome  standing  out  in  solitary  state,  and  only  notice- 
able by  reason  of  the  dead  level  of  dreariness  which  surrounds  it. 
The  Cabul  River  is  now  dwarfed  to  a  shallow  streamlet  which  a 
child  could  wade,  and  the  paltry  bridges  of  masonry  which  span 
it  are  half  ruinous,  and  of  a'  style  which  any  Western  engineer 
would  despise.  The  fact  that  there  is  a  river  at  all  is  only  patent 
when  we  come  suddenly  upon  it ;  and  though  it  may  in  flood-time 
Bwirl  along  with  some  attempt  at  dignity,  it  is  now  beneath  con- 
tempt. The  broad  current  which  roars  by  Daka,  and  finally 
swells  the  Indus  above  Attock,  would  be  angered  if  it  could  see  its 
parent  stream  crawling  so  sluggishly  along  that  even  a  dhobie*8sione 

F 


66  The  Afglmn  War,  1879—80. 

might  turn  it  from  its  coarse.  It  is  not  at  Cabul  a  river  to  be 
proud  of,  however  much  it  may  fertilize  the  valleys  through  which 
it  runs.  It  is  practical  and  commonplace,  and  the  latter  epithet 
applies  with  some  little  reserve  to  Cabul  itself.  There  is  not  the 
overwhelming  interest  aroused  as  one  traverses  its  streets  that 
might  be  reasonably  anticipated ;  and  the  picture  of  its  teeming 
life  and  swarming  bazaars  has  certainly  been  overdrawn.  I  do  not 
mean  to  infer  that  its  streets  are  deserted  and  its  stalls  forsaken. 
There  are  23,000  houses  and  some  70,000  people  within  its 
bounds  ;  but  there  is  no  greater  sign  of  active  commerce  than 
Peshawur  and  half  a  dozen  other  cities  of  Northern  India  present 
to  a  stranger.  As  it  is  far  from  civilization,  and  is  the  first  and 
last  stage  between  Central  Asia  and  India,  accordingly  as  the 
current  of  trade  sets  in  either  direction,  it  has  drawn  to  itself 
merchants  of  varied  nationality,  and  become  an  exchange  where 
trafficking  in  Eastern  and  Western  goods  goes  on  side  by  side. 
.  In  one  stall  the  silks  of  Bokhara  and  indigenous  products  of  the 
Khanates  are  packed  side  by  side  with  the  cloths  of  Manchester ; 
while  in  another  Sheffield  cutlery  and  "  Brummagem"  goods  are  the 
near  neighbours  of  the  rudely-made  iron- ware  and  roughly-finished 
jewellery  of  native  artificers.  That  the  bazaars  are  full  of  goods 
of  all  kinds,  from  diamonds  to  dhoties,  and  from  kabobs  to  cab- 
bages, is  quite  true,  but  it  all  seems  petty  trading,  and  the  stalls, 
if  numerous,  are  small  and  insignificant-looking.  The  city  feeds 
as  it  trades — in  its  bazaars  ;  and  the  picturesque  view  of  a  silk- 
merchant's  shop  is  marred  by  its  association  with  the  masses  of 
meat  on  the  butcher's  stall  adjoining,  or  the  incongruous  grouping 
of  the  filthy  goods  of  a  clothesman  near  by.  And  yet  when  once 
the  feeling  of  disappointed  expectations  has  been  overcome,  there 
is  much  to  notice  and  criticise,  both  in  the  people  and  the  place. 
Our  ride  through  was  necessarily  a  hurried  one — it  is  never  good 
policy  to  make  long  halts  when  traversing  for  the  first ,  time  the 
streets  of  a  conquered  city — and  apart  from  the  above  comments, 
which  I  have  set  down,  as  they  are  the  general  impressions  left 
upon  my  mind  after  a  hasty  visit,  I  will  try  to  give  a  rough  sketch 
of  Cabul,  such  as  we  saw  it  to-day.  That  it  was  seen  under 
abnormal  circumstances  should,  of  course,  be  steadily  kept  in 
mind. 


Tfie  Cliandaul  Bazaar.  67 

After  entering  by  the  Lahore  Gate,  wide  enough  to  admit  two 
horsemen  abreast  with  comfort — the  gate  is  nothing  more  than  the 
usual  tall  wooden  framework  let  into  the  dilapidated  mud  wall — 
we  entered  a  dirty,  ill-kept  street,  and  followed  it  for  a  short  dis- 
tance until  it  branched  off  right  and  left,  to  the  Char  Chowk,  or 
chief  bazaar  in  the  Afghan  quarter  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  Chan- 
dftul  on  the  other.  We  took  the  latter  road  to  the  left,  the  dead 
walls  of  the  houses  shutting  in  all  but  the  immediate  view. 
Little  gaps  on  the  left,  where  side  passages  had  been  made,  en- 
abled us  to  see  the  wall  of  the  Bala  Hissar,  in  places  only  forty  or 
fifty  yards  off.  It  looked  strong  and  menacing  when  compared 
with  the  city  itself.  Leaving  the  fortress  behind  we  turned  to 
&e  right,  and  were  soon  in  a  narrow,  but  well-kept,  bazaar.  The 
stalls,  raised  two  or  three  feet  from  the  ground,  were  filled  with 
articles  such  as  one  always  meets  in  native  Indian  cities,  varied 
occasionally  by  heaps  of  grapes,  melons,  apples,  and  fruit  and 
Tegetables  of  the  kind  which  the  gardens  about  produce  so  lavishly. 
This  was  the  Hindu  quarter,  and  the  stall-owners  watched  us  ride 
past  with  every  expression  of  satisfaction,  salaaming  smilingly, 
and  no  doubt  praying  that  the  English  raj  might  now  be  estab- 
lished and  last  for  ever.  These  Hindus  have  had  rough  times  to 
endure  when  their  Afghan  masters  have  played  the  tyrant,  and 
they  now  see  an  era  of  safety  and  rupees  before  them  which  shall 
repay  them  for  all  their  past  sufferings.  The  bazaars  continued 
for  a  considerable  distance,  and  Hindu  faces  with  their  caste 
marks  were  replaced  after  a  time  by  a  new  type,  which  showed 
that  we  were  among  the  Persian  residents,  the  Kizilbashes,*  who 
form  so  large  a  proportion  of  the  population.  They  are,  as  a  rule,  . 
orderly  and  well-disposed,  and,  being  keen  traders^  are  glad  to  see 
Qs  as  Uieir  neighbours.  Traversiog  the  main  street,  of  Ghandaul, 
we  left  the  bazaar  and  came  to  a  better  class  .of  houses,  all,  how- 
ever, gloomy  and  uninviting  to  look  at,  the  high  courtyard  walls 
hindering  any  view  of  the  interior.  There  were  crowds  of  men  and 
boys  at  every  street-comer  and  gateway,  and  at  intervals  we  caught 
sight  of  a  white-robed  figure  veiled  from  head  to  foot,  out  of 
which  a  pair  of  eyes  just  glanced  for  a  moment  to  look  at  the  cav- 
dcade,  and  were  then  hidden  by  a  deft  movement  of  the  hand  or 
*  Literally,  *'  Bed-heads,"  from  the  colour  of  their  torbaos. 

p  2 


68  TJu  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

a  torn  of  the  head.  On  hoase-tops  or  at  narrow  windows  high 
above  the  street,  similar  figures  looked  down,  feminine  curiosity 
proving  too  much  even  for  the  restraint  which  controls  life  in 
the  zenana.  With  such  faint  glimpses  we  could  form  no  idea  of 
the  charms  of  the  women  of  Cabul ;  against  indiscretions  with 
whom,  by  the  bye,  we  have  been  solemnly  warned  in  the  following 
order  issued  by  our  General : — 

''  Sir  F.  Roberts  desires  general  officers  and  officers  command- 
ing corps  to  impress  upon  all  officers  under  their  command  the 
necessity  for  constant  vigilance  in  preventing  irregularities  likely 
to  arouse  the  personal  jealousy  of  the  people  of  Cabul,  who  are, 
of  all  races,  the  most  susceptible  in  all  that  regards  their  women. 
The  deep-seated  animosity  of  the  Afghans  towards  the  English 
has  been  mainly  ascribed  to  indiscretions  committed  during  the 
first  occupation  of  Cabul ;  and  the  Major-General  trusts  that  the 
same  excellent  discipline,  so  long  exhibited  by  the  troops  under 
his  command,  will  remove  the  prejudices  of  past  years,  and  cause 
the  British  name  to  be  as  highly  respected  in  Afghanistan  as  it  is 
throughout  the  civilized  world." 

There  is  another  version  of  this  old  story,  that  the  indiscretion 
was  all  on  the  side  of  the  Afghan  ladies ;  and  it  is  to  be  hoped 
the  order  will  be  translated  into  Persian  for  their  benefit.  Until 
this  is  done,  the  virtue  of  our  brave  soldiers  must  tremble  in  the 
balance,  the  conjugation  of  amo  in  Persian  being  described  as  the 
most  fascinating  step  in  Eastern  philology — when  the  teacher  is 
draped  in  a  yashmak. 

From  Chandaul  we  passed  through  one  of  the  usual  gates,  and, 
crossing  the  Cabul  River  by  a  narrow  masonry  bridge  of  three 
small  arches,  rode  along  a  path  in  the  western  suburbs  of  Deh-i- 
Afghan  skirting  the  bed  of  the  stream.  Several  gardens  filled 
with  fruit  trees,  but  otherwise  much  neglected,  wore  passed,  and 
some  houses  of  sufficient  size  to  warrant  the  belief  that  their 
owners  were  men  of  importance.  The  handsome  villas  Cabul  is 
said  to  be  proud  of  were  certainly  not  to  be  seen.  Re-crossing 
the  river  by  another  bridge  not  far  from  Taimur  Shah's  tomb, 
we  entered  the  Afghan  quarter  of  the  city,  the  route  lying  through 
the  Char  Chowk,  so  called  from  the  four  small  squares  with  drink- 
ing fountains  which  are  found  at  about  equal  distances  along  the 


The  Char  Chowk  Bazaar.  69 

bazaar.  The  place  was  crowded  with  people,  from  gaudily-dressed 
merchants  to  poor,  ill-clad  Hazara  coolies  (the  Hazara  log  are  the 
hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of  water  all  over  Afghanistan),  and 
there  was  mach  diversity  of  costume  and  character.  No  sign  of 
resentment  was  shown  towards  us ;  but  a  sullen  silence  was  main* 
tained,  and  the  villainous  &ces  seen  from  time  to  time  caused 
many  of  us  to  wish  that  a  little  decimation,  or  some  equally 
healthy  operation,  had  been  performed  among  these  ruffians. 
The  side-streets  were  more  crowded  than  in  the  Chandaul  quarter, 
and  a  sharp  look-out  was  kept  for  any  fanatical  attempt  to  run 
amock  among  us.  The  lances  of  the  General's  escort  and  the 
rifles  of  the  orderlies  on  foot  were  ready  for  an  emergency ;  a 
bloodthirsty  little  Ghoorka  among  the  orderlies  having  hitched 
his  kookrie  round  so  as  to  have  it  handy.  But  no  ghazi  or 
bttdmash  appeared  anxious  for  martyrdom,  and  we  wended  our 
way  onwards  peacefully.  Not  an  arm  of  any  kind  was  carried 
by  any  person  in  the  crowd,  and  the  armourers'  shops  were 
quite  empty ;  the  grindstones,  on  which  many  a  chura  and 
tulwar  has  been  sharpened,  were  lying  idle  on  the  ground.  This 
turbulent  populace  has  been  cowed  by  our  prompt  march  upon 
their  city,  and  as  the  Afghans  heard  behind  us  the  shrill  shriek 
of  the  pipers  and  saw  the  Highlanders  in  their  kilts  stepping 
along  in  easy  confidence,  they  must  have  known  their  time  had 
gone  by.  Of  course,  all  trade  was  suspended  while  the  march 
was  going  on,  and  the  stall^keepers  looked  far  from  pleased  at 
oar  intrusion.  There  was  none  of  the  impulsive  salaaming  we 
had  been  received  with  in  Chandaul,  and  many  stood  up  almost 
defiantly  as  if  to  vindicate  their  claim  to  be  considered  the  salt 
of  the  earth.  What  lay  behind  in  the  thickly-packed  houses  on 
either  side  of  the  bazaar  none  of  us  could  say, — General  Hills, 
the  new  Governor,  may  soon  know;  but  we  could  quite  believe 
from  the  scowling  faces  seen  in  the  side-streets  that  fanatical 
hatred  against  us  was-  still  alive,  if  for  the  time  it  was  held  in 
eheck.  When  we  proceed  with  our  work  of  disarmament,  per- 
haps it  may  flash  out ;  and  then  who  knows  that  a  repetition  of 
Pollock's  policy  may  not  follow,  and  the  Char  Chowk  be  blown  to 
the  four  winds  of  heaven. 
The  bazaar  is  covered  in  at  some  height  above  the  stalls,  which 


^o  The  Afgfian  War,  1879—80. 

can  be  numbered  by  the  hundred ;  and  is  very  narrow  and 
cramped.  It  would  be  impossible  to  describe  in  detail  the  ar- 
rangement of  the  shops ;  but  the  most  attractive  were  certainly 
those  of  the  silk  merchants,  whose  goods,  with  their  brilliant 
colours  and  fine  texture,  were  openly  displayed.  Richly-braided 
caps  and  coats ;  boots  elaborately  worked  in  gold  and  silver ; 
cutlery  and  cloths,  both  English  and  native;  sweets,  fruit  on 
every  hand  in  huge  heaps,  grain,  spices,  saddles,  harness  for  mules 
and  camels,  piles  of  blankets  and  felt  numdahs  of  wonderful 
patterns,  and  scores  of  other  articles  that  I  cannot  set  down,  suc- 
ceeded each  other  as  stall  after  stall  was  passed ;  and  a  further 
medley  was  formed  by  the  heaps  of  parched  gram  and  chupaties 
(flat  unleavened  cakes),  plates  of  horrible  stews  and  greasy-looking 
messes  which  were  exposed  for  sale.  Next  a  butcher's  shop 
full  of  meat  curiously  cut  up  and  hung  about  in  admired  dis- 
order, would  be  a  kahoh  stall,  the  keeper  of  which  would  be  cook- 
ing his  dainty  morsels  in  the  open  air,  and  tempting  passengers  to 
try  his  savoury  little  sticks.  In  all  the  small  squares  which  I  have 
before  mentioned  as  giving  the  name  to  the  bazaar,  groups  of  men 
were  lounging  or  squatting  about  the  tank  in  the  middle  of  the 
open  space,  and  here,  doubtless,  much  of  the  bartering  with 
strangers  and  merchants  from  a  distance  is  carried  on.  The 
buildings  in  the  squares  are  more  pretentious  than  elsewhere, 
rising  to  a  height  of  three  or  four  stories,  and  their  fronts  and  chief 
doorways  are  handsomely  ornamented. 

Our  ride  through  was  soon  over,  and  we  arrived  at  the  street 
where  we  had  turned  off  to  Chandaul  in  about  an  hour  and  a  half 
from  the  time  of  entering  the  city.  Only  one  mosque  was  passed 
on  the  way,  just  as  we  were  leaving  the  Char  Chowk,  and  the  voice 
of  a  mooUah,  shrieking  **  Allah-il-UUah/'  and  perhaps  cursing  us 
under  his  breath,  could  be  heard  within  the  courtyard,  rising  over 
all  the  din  made  by  our  horses  as  they  stumbled  over  the  rough 
ground.  Whatever  fanaticism  there  may  be  in  Cabul — and  that  it 
is  highly  fanatical  historical  events  have  only  too  sadly  shown — it 
is  clearly  under  a  cloud  now ;  and  as  long  as  we  remain  in  the 
Bala  Hissar,  with  a  force  ready  for  all  contingencies,  it  can  never 
make  much  headway.  Our  march  through  having  been  happily 
ended.  Sir  F.  Roberts  drew  rein  outside  the  Lahore  Gate,  and 


News  from  Turkistan,  71 

watched  the  infantry  brigades  file  out  with  bands  playing  and 
colours  flying.  Thus  ended  our  second  and  final  triumph  in  the 
humiliation  of  Cabul,  and  now  there  lies  before  us  the  work  of 
detection  and  punishment  of  those  who  shared  in  the  massacre  of 
our  Envoy.  That  there  are  many  in  the  city  all  our  information 
leads  us  to  believe,  and  we  are  not  likely  to  let  them  escape. 

It  is  reported  that  nine  regiments  are  marching  down  from 
Turkistan  to  Gabul,  and  are  even  now  at  Charikar  in  Eohistan, 
Two  squadrons  of  the  12th  Bengal  Cavalry  go  out  to-morrow  to 
reconnoitre  the  road.  Two  fatal  cases  of  cholera  occurred  to-day  ; 
generally,  however,  the  force  is  in  splendid  health.  Too  liberal 
indulgence  in  fruit  may  possibly  have  been  the  cause  of  the 
cholera.  Brigadier-General  Gough  will  start  in  a  few  days,  with 
a  small  force,  for  the  Shutargardan,  whence  he  will  bring  on  sup- 
plies. The  I4th  Bengal  Lancers  have  captured  twelve  guns  (six 
9-pounders  and  six  mule  guns)  on  the  Bamian  Boad,  which  were 
abandoned  by  the  Ghazni  Begiments.  The  horses  had  been  taken 
away.  So  far  we  have  heard  nothing  of  the  Ehyber  Force,  which 
is  supposed  to  co-operate  with  this  division,  and  our  letters  are 
still  sent  to  the  Shutargardan. 

Camp  Siah  Sung,  16tfc  October. 

We  had  begun  to  settle  down  to  a  quiet  life  in  camp  here  after 
our  full-dress  parade  through  the  Bala  Hissar  and  the  city,  and 
after  all  our  late  excitement  a  little  rest  was  very  welcome  ;  but 
we  have  been  suddenly  shaken  into  action  by  such  an  untoward 
event  as  the  explosion  of  the  vast  stores  of  gunpowder  in  the 
Cabul  Arsenal,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  67th  Begiment  and 
the  5th  Ghoorkas,  who  were  garrisoning  the  fortress.  It  was 
announced,  while  we  were  marching  here  from  Eushi,  that  the 
rebels  in  Cabul  had  plundered  the  Arsenal  and  looted  the  maga- 
zine, but  this  was  found  afterwards  to  be  only  partially  true. 
They  had  certainly  carried  off  many  rifles  from  the  Arsenal  and 
several  thousand  rounds  of  ammunition,  but  there  was  still  left 
munitions  of  war  sufficient  to  have  supplied  all  Afghanistan.  A 
systematic  examination,  under  the  direction  of  Captain  Shafto,  of 
the  Ordnance  Department,  was  set  on  foot  immediately  our  troops 
went  into  garrison  in  the  Bala  Hissar,  and  the  result  was  the 
discovery  of  some  millions  of  cartridges,  Enfield  and  Snider,  of 


72  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

English  and  Afghan  make,  and  some  150,000  Ihs.  of  gunpowder, 
besides  valuable  stores,  such  as  could  be  useful  to  an  army  engaged 
in  active  warfare.  Daoud  Shah,  the  late  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  Afghan  army  states,  there  is  at  least  1,000,000  lbs.  of  gun- 
powder hidden  in  the  place.  The  Arsenal  was  little  worthy  of  its 
name ;  there  were  no  regular  workshops,  no  foundry  and  but  little 
machinery,  the  building  being  merely  made  up  of  a  score  or  more 
of  godowns  (sheds)  arranged  under  the  strong  walls  of  the  upper 
part  of  the  Bala  Hissar,  on  the  hill  immediately  overlooking  the 
Residency  and  the  Amir's  pleasure-garden,  where  the  Durbar  was 
held  by  Sir  F.  Roberts.  In  these  godowns  there  was  none  of  that 
care  and  precaution  taken,  such  as  is  insisted  upon  in  English 
arsenals  and  magazines.  The  gunpowder  was  chiefly  stored  in 
huge  earthen  gurrahs  and  dubbers  (such  as  ghee  is  usually  carried 
in),  and  in  many  instances  these  had  been  tilted  over  and  loose 
powder  scattered  on  the  ground.  Bits  of  iron,  stray  caps,  and 
friction  tubes  for  artillery  lay  about  in  dangerous  proximity  to 
these,  and  Captain  Shafto  had  to  display  the  greatest  caution  in 
examining  the  place.  There  was  no  magazine  proper  to  speak  of; 
though  one  godown,  which  was  looked  upon  as  specially  worthy  of 
the  name,  had  in  it  410  jars  of  about  150  lbs.  each,  or  over  twenty- 
seven  tons  of  gunpowder.  This  was  a  little  detached  from  the 
other  godowns,  and  was  looked  after  carefully,  as  the  effect  of  such 
a  quantity  of  powder  exploding  would  be  terrific.  The  Arsenal 
walls  face  to  the  four  points  of  the  compass,  that  on  the  north 
looking  over  the  city,  while  the  eastern  wall  frowns  down  upon  the 
lower  Bala  Hissar,  and  commands  the  whole  of  the  housed  below. 
The  walls  are  of  great  thickness  at  the  base,  arising  out  of  the 
solid  rock,  which  runs  down  precipitously  on  three  sides,  while  to 
the  west  it  rises  gradually  until  it  forms  part  of  the  narrow  spur 
joining  the  fortress  to  the  high  ridge  above.  On  the  eastern  side, 
just  at  the  foot  of  the  rock,  is  built  the  Amir's  pavilion  with  its 
oblong  garden,  some  one  hundred  yards  in  length,  which  I  described 
in  one  of  my  late  letters.  About  this  garden  are  clustered  houses 
of  all  kinds,  and  at  the  base  of  the  rocky  hill  on  the  north  are  also 
dwelling-houses.  The  Guides'  quarters,  the  Residency,  and  some 
high  buildings  are  near  the  south-eastern  comer,  past  which  a 
road  leads,  up  to  the  gate  of  the  Arsenal  in  its  southern  wall. 


Yakub  Khans  Arsenal.  73 

The  outer  walls  of  the  fortress  are  less  than  one  hundred  yards 
away,  facing  over  the  Cabul  plain,  the  strong  bastions  giving  them 
the  appearance  of  great  stability.  The  6th  Ghoorkas  were  in 
tents  near  the  south-west  comer  of  the  Arsenal,  and  had  luckily 
moved  a  little  distance  away  this  morning,  as  the  wall  looked  sus- 
piciously weak.  The  whole  of  the  67th  Foot  were  encamped 
within  the  walls  of  the  Amir's  garden,  and  had  in  their  custody 
the  Mustaufi  and  four  other  prisoners  now  awaiting  trial.  The 
two  Gatling  guns  were  with  the  troops  in  the  Bala  Hissar.  In 
order  that  a  just  idea  may  be  formed  of  the  two  explosions 
which  occurred,  and  the  probability  of  a  third  greater  than  all, 
which  we  are  now  expecting,  I  give  below  a  list  of  the  godowns 
and  their  contents  furnished  to  me  by  Captain  Shafto  two  days 
ago.  He  had  examined  up  to  that  date  seventeei)  godowns,  and 
their  contents  were  : — 

GODOWNB  IN   THE  BaLA  HiSSAB  AbSENAL. 

No.  1. — Copper  sheeting,  punches,  rolling  machines. 

No.  2. — 15  sacks  of  Enfield  copper  pap^,  87  jars  of  powder, 
many  friction  tubes. 

No.  8. — 42  dubbers  of  powder. 

No.  4. — 410  big  jars  of  powder^ 

No.  6.— 190  ditto 

No.  6. — ^Full  of  rope  and  chuU  (nets  for  carrying  guns  and 
straw  on  baggage  animals). 

No.  7. — Hemp,  thread ;  paper,  Bussian  foolscap ;  52  jars  of 
powder,  filled  cartridges,  8  skins  of  loose  powder,  cartridge-boxes. 

No.  8. — Gun  cartridges,  wax  lubricators,  &c.,  103  4iibbers  of 
powder. 

No.  9. — 150  jars  of  powder :  charcoal,  saltpetre,  sulphur,  &c. 

Total :  1,000  jars  of  powder,  each  ISOlbs.  =  150,0001bs. 

Nos.  10,  11,  12. — FiU^  with  rope,  chutZy  mussucks,  shelves 
for  axes  and  spades,  wood  for  tent-pegs  and  timber ;  godown  full 
of  shot  and  shell  and  bullets ;  and  small  room  full  of  plates  of 
lead  piled  up  to  the  roof. 

No.  13. — ^Boxes  of  percussion  caps  and  avast  number  of  Enfield 
cartridges :  boxes  marked  "  Ferozepore,  1857," 

Nos.  14,  15,  16,  17. — Boxes  of  Snider  cartridges,. English  and 


74  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

Afghan  pattern,  about  520,000  from  Dum-Dum  in  perfect  order. 
Also  Enfield  cartridges,  old  iron,  and  lead. 

There  were  therefore  some  millions  of  cartridges  and  nearly  seventy 
tons  of  gunpowder,  besides  stores  of  highly  inflammable  character 
in  these  few  godowns,  and  these  have  nearly  all  been  destroyed. 

The  first  intimation  we,  in  camp  on  Siah  Sung  Bidge,  received 
of  the  explosion  was  a  dull  report,  which  would  not  have  attracted 
much  attention  but  for  a  huge  column  of  smoke  which  rose  from 
the  Bala  Hissar  several  hundred  feet  in  the  air,  and  plainly  showed 
something  was  wrong.  It  was  a  beautiful  sight,  as  the  silvery  column 
with  the  sun  lighting  up  its  soft  edges  slowly  spread  itself  out ;  but 
there  was  little  time  to  admire  it,  for  we  trembled  for  the  fate  of  the 
brave  little  Ghoorkas  who  were  so  near  the  Arsenal.  The  smoke 
settled  over  the  lower  Bala  Hissar  and  the  city,  obscuring  all  the 
buildings ;  and  as  it  slowly  drifted  away  the  Arsenal  became  visible, 
with  its  outer  wall,  &cing  us,  still  standing,  but  lighted  up  from 
inside  by  little  sheets  of  flame  and  sudden  rushes  of  smoke,  which 
proved  that  gunpowder  was  still  exploding.  There  was  then  no  doubt 
that  some  of  the  godowns  Captain  Shafto  was  inspecting  had 
been  blown  up,  and  General  Boberts  at  once  sent  messengers  to 
inquire  into  the  extent  of  the  disaster.  Biding  down  to  the  Bala 
Hissar,  we  were  not  long  in  learning,  so  far  as  was  known,  what 
had  occurred.  The  road  leading  upwards  past  the  Besidency  was 
blocked  by  the  rubbish  of  the  upper  part  of  the  southern  wall  of 
the  Arsenal,  which  had  been  blown  outwards  ;  and  the  explosions, 
which  could  distinctly  be  heard,  were  all  near  the  south-eastern 
bastion,  the  very  point,  it  may  be  added,  from  which  a  murderous 
fire  was  poured  upon  Sir  Louis  Cavagnari  and  his  companions 
by  the  mutineers.  In  the  Amir's  garden  the  tents  of  the  67th 
were  covered  thickly  with  dust,  and  every  pane  of  glass  in  the 
pavilions  had  been  shattered,  though  the  buildings  themselves 
were  quite  intact.  The  men  had  been  marched  out  as  quickly 
as  possible  into  the  square  adjoining,  and  with  faces,  beards, 
and  helmets  grey  with  dust,  they  looked  as  if  some  shadowy 
change  had  came  over  them.  Colonel  Ejiowles,  who  was  in  com- 
mand of  the  regiment,  had  tried  to  send  working  parties  up  to 
the  Arsenal ;  but  they  could  not  force  a  way,  and  he  had  soon  to 


Qreat  Explosions  in  the  Arsenal,  75 

think  of  the  safety  of  his  oym  men,  as  he  learnt  that  only  a 
small  portion  of  the  powder  had  exploded,  and  that  at  any  minute 
the  larger  stores  might  ignite.  The  explosion,  as  heard  in  the 
garden,  was  described  as  a  smart  shock,  mistaken  at  first  for  an 
earthquake :  this  idea  was  soon  dissipated,  as  a  darkness  equal  to 
that  of  the  darkest  night  blotted  out  everything,  and  showers  of 
bullets,  stones,  cartridge-cases,  and  burning  rubbish  fell  into  the 
garden.  Two  or  three  beams  of  timber  were  also  blown  down  ; 
but,  happily,  no  one  was  injured  beyond  a  signaller.  This  man 
was  with  a  sentry  on  the  roof  of  the  pavilion  in  which  the  Mustaufi, 
the  Wazir,  the  Eotwal,  and  two  others  were  confined,  and  he  was 
Been  to  jump  three  or  four  feet  down  to  a  lower  roof  as  the  explo- 
sion occurred.  Nothing  more  was  seen  of  him  until  his  dead  body 
was  found  on  the  stones  below.  The  sentry  escaped  uninjured. 
The  men,  once  the  danger  was  appreciated,  were  quickly  on  the 
alert,  and  the  gates  were  guarded  in  case  of  any  attempt  to  rescue 
the  prisoners.  No  such  attempt  was  made,  and  leaving  all  their 
kits  behind  the  men  filed  out  towards  the  gate.  In  the  by-streets 
I  came  across  two  or  three  Ghoorkas  with  faces  bleeding  from 
wounds  inflicted  by  falling  bullets  and  stones,  but  their  only 
anxiety  seemed  to  be  for  their  comrades  above.  Of  these  I  am 
Borry  to  say  the  subadar-major,  four  havildars,  and  sixteen  men 
are  missing.*  Twelve  were  on  guard  in  the  Arsenal,  and  the  others 
were  counting  out  the  pay  of  the  men  which  had  been  drawn  this 
morning.  They  were  buried  under  a  wall  which  the  force  of  the 
explosion  broke  down.  Anxious  inquiries  were  also  made  for 
Captain  Shafto,  who  had  been  seen  in  a  powder  godown,  but  all 
mquiries  proved  fruitless.  His  pistol,  with  the  stock  blown  off, 
was  found  in  the  Amir's  garden ;  and  as  he  has  not  since  appeared, 
there  can  be  little  doubt  he  was  killed. 

The  order  was  given  for  every  person  to  leave  the  Bala  Hissar 
in  anticipation  of  another  explosion ;  and  after  riding  out  to  see  if 
the  outer  wall  of  the  fortress  had  been  injured,  I  returned  to  watch 
the  people  turning  out.  It  was  a  mixed  throng  of  soldiers,  camp- 
followers  carr^g  the  ammunition  boxes,  and  frightened  inhab- 
itants hurrying  to  the  gate.     The  soldiers  marched  steadily  and 

*  The  casualties  were  prored  to  be  eyentaally  tweWe  killed  and  seven  wounded : 
anong  the  former  wvre  the  sabadar-major  and  the  four  pay-hanldars. 


76  The  Afghan  War,   1879—80.  * 

with  the  unconcern  of  men  equal  to  the  occasion,  a  few  on  fatigue 
duty  working  heartily  in  seeing  the  ammunition  safely  out.  One 
man  was  dragging  a  Gatling  gun  which  rattled  over  the  rough 
stones  and  drowned  many  of  the  other  noises ;  while  others  were 
keeping  back  such  suspicious  Afghans  as  wished  to  return  to  the 
place,  no  doubt  in  the  hope  of  loot.  Women  draped  in  white, 
many  with  children  in  their  arms,  made  hastily  for  the  gateway, 
their  lords  and  masters  carrying  a  few  rezau  (quilted  bed-covers), 
to  make  them  comfortable  hereafter.  The  yashmak  hid  the  faces 
of  these  refugees,  but  they  were  quite  safe  from  molestation,  and 
this  they  seemed  to  know,  as  they  mixed  freely  with  the  throng 
and  passed  out  to  seek  refuge  with  friends  elsewhere.  Dr.  Bourke, 
with  a  strong  party  of  dhoolie-bearers,  was  sent  down  from  camp, 
and  after  trying  to  get  them  up  to  the  Arsenal  past  the  garden,  he 
worked  round  outside  to  the  southern  wall.  A  difficult  path  led 
up  to  the  ramparts,  and  a  few  Ghoorkas  made  this  more  passable 
by  breaking  down  a  portion  of  the  wall.  Drs.  Bourke,  Duke,  and 
Simmonds,  with  two  Em'opean  soldiers  and  some  Ghoorkas,  went 
up  this  way  into  the  fortress  and  succeeded  in  rescuing  five 
wounded  men.  They  approached  to  within  thirty  or  forty  yards 
of  the  burning  godowns,  but  the  explosions  were  so  frequent  that 
they  had  soon  to  withdraw.  No  more  wounded  men  could  be 
found,  and  nothing  was  seen  of  those  who  were  known  to  have 
been  on  guard.  The  place  was  then  deserted  except  for  a  few 
mulemen  who  obstinately  kept  with  their  animals  on  the  walls  as 
far  as  possible  from  the  Arsenal. 

The  67th  formed  up  just  outside  the  Bala  Hissar  gate,  but  by 
order  of  General  Eoberts  they  were  withdrawn  still  farther  away 
on  the  Jellalabad  Boad.  We  then  watched  for  the  next  explo- 
sion, and  it  came  at  a  quarter-to-four.  The  report  was  terrific,  a 
dense  black  column  of  smoke,  fivefold  as  great  as  the  first,  shot 
upwards,  out  of  which  burst  a  few  flashes  as  live  shell  exploded. 
This  time  the  smoke  sank  in  almost  solid  masses  upon  Cabul,  and 
with  it  fell  large  stones,  beams,  and  bullet^  in  profusion.  A  little 
group  of  Afghans  with  two  sowars  and  some  European  officers  and 
^Idiers  were  standing  near  the  Bala  Hissar  gate.  Through  this 
was  blown  a  shower  of  stones  with  terrible  force;  four  men 
(Afghans)  were  killed  on  the  spot,  the  two  sowars  and  a  fifth 


Suspicions  of  Treachery.  ^jy 

Afghan  being  badly  hurt.  This  must  have  been  300  or  400  yards 
from  the  Arsenal.  The  panic  in  the  city  was  very  great,  the  shops 
being  shut  and  the  streets  deserted.  Several  of  the  inhabitants 
are  reported  to  have  been  wounded  by  falling  bullets,  and  this  has 
given  rise  in  iheir  minds  to  the  idea  that  we  have  destroyed  the 
Arsenal  purposely.  When  we  have  examined  what  is  left  of  it, 
perhaps  we  may  take  that  course  in  earnest. 

All  this  evening  we  have  been  watching  from  camp  the  burning 
of  the  Arsenal  and  listening  to  the  constant  explosions  and  the 
incessant  firing  of  cartridges,  the  reports  of  which  as  they  ex- 
ploded singly  or  in  little  groups  from  the  heat  could  be  distinctly 
heard.  As  I  am  writing  now  (2  a.m.)  these  reports  are  still  heard, 
and  vivid  flashes  are  seen  on  the  hillside  :  a  third  explosion  has 
just  occurred,  but  it  was  not  so  great  as  the  others.  The  largest 
store  of  powder  is  supposed  to  be  still  untouched,  but  whether  it 
will  explode  is  doubtful ;  if  it  does,  Cabul  will,  indeed,  be  shaken 
ta  its  foundations.  Nothing  is  known  as  to  the  cause  of  this 
disaster.  Our  regret  is  not  much  for  the  Bala  Hissar,  which 
many  of  us  would  delight  to  see  destroyed,  but  for  the  brave 
fellows  who  are  now  lying  dead  within  its  walls,  scarcely  a  stone's 
throw  from  the  still  smouldering  ashes  of  the  Embassy.  Search 
will  be  made  to-morrow  for  Captain  Shafto's  body. 

Camp  Siah  Sung,  ISth  October. 

There  seems  to  be  a  very  general  opinion  in  camp  that  the 
explosion  at  the  Bala  Hissar  was  not  due  to  any  accident,  but  was 
intentionally  brought  about  by  some  of  the  enemy  who  had  trusted 
to  our  occupying  the  place  in  force.  Captain  Shafto,  who  was 
examining  the  war  material  stored  in  the  godowns  which  have  been 
destroyed,  was  careful  to  a  fault  in  all  his  work  ;  and  it  is  argued 
that  so  great  an  explosion  could  not  have  occurred  unless  prepara- 
tions had  beeu  made  for  it  beforehand.  Further,  it  is  beUeved 
that  the  powder  which  did  the  mischief  was  lodged  in  vaults 
below  the  open  ground  within  the  walls ;  and  of  the  existence  of 
these  vaults  we  were  quite  in  ignorance.  The  mode  in  which  so 
large  a  quantity  of  gunpowder  was  stored  was  safe  enough  under 
ordinary  conditions,  the  large  earthem  jars  and  dubbers  exposing  a 
minimum  of  open  surface— just  at  the  mouth — to  the  action  of 


78  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

any  inflammable  material.  Several  officers,  who  had  just  left 
Captain  Shafto,  state  that  where  he  was  engaged  there  was  not 
sufficient  explosive  material  of  any  kind  to  have  done  more  than 
purely  local  damage  ;  whereas  the  shock  felt  was  terrific.  Informa- 
tion by  the  Amir  and  Daoud  Shah  has  since  been  volunteered  that 
the  place  was  vaulted,  and  that  a.tower,  which  still  stands  un- 
touched, was  full  of  gunpowder.  .  f^ven  as  it  is,  the  three  largest 
godowns  examined  by  Captain  Shafto  have  escaped,  and  as  these 
contain  many  tons  of  powder,  and  were  considered  the  largest 
magazine,  it  is  plain  that  the  loss  of  life,  regrettable  as  it  is, 
might  still  have  been  much  greater.  If  treachery  has  been  at 
work,  there  has  been  some  bungling,  for  the  explosion  of  the  one 
large  godown  filled  with  410  jars,  each  weighing  1501bs.,  would 
have  sufficed  to  have  killed  nearly  every  living  person  within  a 
radius  of  a  quarter  of  a  mile,  or  even  more.  As  it  was,  the 
second  explosion  at  a  quarter-to-four  burst  open  the  outer  gate  of 
the  Bala  Hissar,  and  on  the  road  beyond  several  persons  met  their 
deaths.  The  mud  walls  and  roofs  are  dented  and  broken  by  the 
huge  stones  which  showered  thickly  upon  them  and  were  driven 
down  from  the  Arsenal  with  terrific  force.  Beyond  two  tents 
belonging  to  the  67th  Regiment  being  burnt  in  the  Amir's  garden, 
there  was  not  much  damage  done  to  property  outside  the  Upper 
Bala  Hissar,  the  height  of  the  hill  on  which  it  is  built  diverting 
the  shock  upwards.  It  has  now  been  decided  that  the  Bala  Hissar 
shall  be  destroyed,^  and  Cabul  thus  rendered  a  defenceless  city. 
The  old  respect  which  was  paid  to  it  must  inevitably  disappear 
when  its  citadel  and  defences  are  swept  away ;  and  this  must  put 
a  new  feature  upon  the  political  situation  in  Afghanistan.  What 
the  political  state  now  is  it  is  most  difficult  to  say,  for  the  Amir  still 
remains  in  our  camp,  and  the  numerous  sentries  guarding  his  tent 
seem  to  point  to  his  presence  being  absolutely  required  in  our  midst 
until  we  have  decided  upon  whom  the  blame  of  Sir  Louis  Cavag- 
nari's  death  is  to  rest.  The  trial  of  the  five  sirdars  now  in  custody 
has  not  yet  commenced  ;  but  evidence  is  accumulating,  and  when 
once  the  Commission  begins  to  sit,  witnesses  will  not  be  wanting. 
To  return  to  the  only  excitement  we  have  had  since  the  fight 

*  This  intention  was,  anfortunatelj,  never  carried   ont  owiog  to   the  oatbreak  in 
December. 


Recovering  the  Killed.  79 

on  the  Asmai  Heights  on  the  8th.  Early  yesterday  morning  it 
was  observed  that  the  fire  in  the  Upper  Bala  Hissar  had  died  oat, 
and  that  only  a  smoking  heap  of  rubbish  marked  the  spot  where 
the  explosions  had  occurred.  Half  the  southern  and  western  walls 
of  the  Arsenal  had  been  thrown  outwards  down  the  hillside,  and 
within  was  a  chasm  in  which  cartridges  still  exploded,  though 
only  faintly,  as  if  in  protest  at  being  ignominiously  smothered 
under  crumbling  walls.  It  was  by  means  safe  walking  in  such 
near  proximity  to  half-consumed  boxes  of  cartridges  ;  and  as 
there  was  the  oflT-chance  of  a  jar  of  powder  going  off  at  any 
moment,  the  risk  was  propoi*tionately  increased.  Besides,  there 
might  be  vaults  loaded  with  powder,  and  Sir  F.  Eoberts  vei7 
wisely  ruled  that  the  lives  of  his  soldiers  were  too  valuable  to  be 
endangered  in  such  a  neighbourhood.  It  was,  however,  necessary 
that  search  should  be  made  for  the  poor  fellows  who  had  been 
killed ;  and,  accordingly,  a  number  of  the  city  people  were  im- 
pressed and  made  to  work  upon  the  ruins.  Dry  earth  and  rubbish 
were  thrown  down  upon  the  smouldering  embers,  and  the  three 
godowns  filled  with  powder  were  banked  up  with  mud  and  made 
as  fireproof  as  possible  in  the  time.  Kahars  from  the  ambulance 
corps  were  also  sent  up,  and  in  the  afternoon  they  discovered 
Captain  Shafto's  body  and  the  charred  remains  of  the  Ghoorkas. 
They  had  all  been  buried  under  the  falling  walls.  The  loss  to  the 
regiment  of  the  subadar-major  and  four  pay-havildars  is  very 
serious ;  while  we  all  deplore  poor  Shafto's  death,  as  he  was  a 
universal  favourite.  He  was  buried  with  military  honours  this 
morning  ;  the  67th  furnishing  the  firing  party. 

Yesterday  afternoon  a  strong  wind  swept  across  the  ridge  for 
several  hours,  and  in  the  evening  the  fire  in  the  ruins  broke  out 
afresh  and  blazed  up  till  long  past  midnight.  Small  explosions 
occurred  from  time  to  time,  showing  that  much  powder  was  still 
buried  and  ready  to  ignite.  Fortunately,  the  wind  dropped  about 
ten  o'clock,  or  the  remaining  godowns  might  have  been  burnt 
down.  To-day  valuable  stores  of  poshteens  and  warm  clothing, 
enough  for  many  hundreds  of  men,  were  come  upon,  and  these 
have  been  carried  into  camp  by  fatigue  parties  without  delay. 
They  will  be  of  immense  service,  as  warm  clothing  for  the  fol- 
lowers is  much  needed.     The  troops,  also,  are  not  too  well  pro- 


8o  The  Afghan  War,   1879—80. 

vided  for ;  but  now  European  and  sepoy  alike  can  be  made 
comfortable  for  the  winter.  It  is  already  bitterly  cold  at  night, 
and  it  has  been  decided  to  move  us  all  into  the  Sherpur  Canton- 
ment, where  are  already  barracks  equal  to  accommodating  3,000 
or  4,000  men.  Huts  will  also  be  built  below  the  Bemaru  Ridge, 
which  forms  the  fourth  side  of  the  fortified  parallelogram,  and 
the  Bemaru  village  will  be  cleared  of  its  inhabitants.  All  the 
houses  therein  will  then  be  available  for  our  anny  of  followers, 
who  are  always  the  greatest  sufferers  when  snow  falls  and  frost 
sets  in.  This  ridge  on  which  we  are  now  encamped  is  very  ex- 
posed ;  and  as  the  sun  is  still  powerful  in  the  day,  the  health  of 
the  men  will  be  sure  to  suffer  unless  they  are  protected  against  the 
cold  wind  which  rises  as  the  sun  sets. 

There  is  but  little  news  of  military  moment  just  at  present. 
From  the  Shutargardan  we  hear  of  another  attack  by  8,000  Man- 
gals  and  Ghilzais ;  but  three  companies  of  the  8rd  Sikhs  and 
the  21st  P.N.I,  scattered  them  in  the  most  admirable  manner, 
charging  up  hill  at  the  sungars  and  carrying  them  with  the  bay- 
onet. This  hand-to-hand  fighting  is  far  better  than  pitching  shells 
at  long  ranges,  as  it  teaches  these  ruffians  the  material  our  men 
are  niade  of.  There  were  only  800  sepoys  engaged,  but  they  were 
more  than  enough.  The  gallant  way  in  which  they  took  the 
sungars  and  bayoneted  forty  of  the  defenders  on  the  spot  has 
given  us  all,  from  the  General  downwards,  unqualified  satisfaction. 
There  is  grand  fighting  material  still  to  be  found  in  many  of 
our  native  regiments,  as  Colonel  Money's  two  engagements  on 
the  Shutargardan  have  clearly  proved.  General  Gough,  with  the 
5th  P.C.,  the  5th  P.I.,  and  four  mountain  guns,  left  Cabul 
yesterday  for  the  Shutargardan  to  bring  down  all  the  supplies 
accumulated  there,  and  to  close  the  line  by  way  of  Eotal  for 
the  winter.  Snow  may  now  fall  at  any  time  at  such  an  altitude 
as  the  Shutargardan,  and  it  behoves  us  to  clear  out  the  post  before 
farther  difficulties  are  added  to  what  is  already  a  very  difficult  bit. 
General  Gough  may  be  molested  on  his  march,  as  the  districts  of 
the  Logar  swarm  with  robbers  ;  but  it  is  unlikely  any  organized 
attack  will  be  made  upon  his  party,  whatever  attempt  to  loot  his 
convoy  may  be  attempted  upon  his  return  journey.  As  he  will 
bring  back  the  head-quarters  and  a  squadron  of  the  9th  Lancers,  the 


The  Captured  Artillery, 


8i 


Srd  Sikhs,  and  the  mountain  guns  now  on  the  Shutargardan^ 
he  will  be  able  to  defend  his  charge  without  fear  of  conse- 
quences. If,  as  we  learn  this  afternoon,  the  Mangals  have  occu- 
pied the  heights  in  force,  and  have  cut  off  even  the  grass-supply 
of  Colonel  Money's  little  garrison,  General  Gough's  arrival  may 
be  most  opportune,  and  the  tribesmen  may  receive  another  sharp 
lesson.  Sixty  headmen  of  the  Gajis,  Turis,  Mangals,  and  other 
tribes  between  here  and  the  Shutargardan  have  come  in  at  Sir 
Frederick  Roberts's  request.  The  General  pointed  out  to  them 
how  utterly  useless  resistance  was  to  the  British,  as  exemplified 
in  the  fall  of  Cabul,  and  this  they  acknowledged,  promising  to 
keep  their  followers  in  good  order  and  not  to  molest  us. 

As  we  shall  soon  be  moving  into  our  winter  quarters,  I  send  you 
a  complete  list  of  the  guns  captured  up  to  date  : — 


Obdnanoe  Captuked. 

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214 

82  The  Afghan  War,   1879—80. 


CHAPTER  Vn. 

Execution  of  Five  Prisoners — The  Kotwal  of  Cabul — ^His  Proclamation  to  the  People — 
Nek  Mahomed  and  the  Amir — ^Aghir  Khan's  Grime — The  MooUah  Ehwaja  Naadr 
and  his  Attempt  to  raise  a  Jtkad — Effect  of  the  Executions  upon  theTPeople — 
Preparing  Winter  Quarters — ^Dispersion  of  the  Tribes  at  the  Shutargardan — 
Execution  of  Afghan  Officers — The  Course  of  Justice — Stem  Reprisals  necessary — 
Afghan  Fanaticism — Hostility  of  the  Mass  of  the  People — The  Position  of  the 
Amir — ^Political  Problems. 

Camp  Siah  Sung,  20«ft  October. 

To-day  we  have  had  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  marched  out  to 
execution  in  the  Bala  Hissar  five  prisoners,  more  or  less  directly 
concerned  in  the  events  of  the  last  few  weeks,  whose  guilt  was 
very  clearly  established  in  our  eyes.   As  might  have  been  expected, 
it  has  been  no  easy  matter  to  collect  evidence  in  Cabul,  many 
witnesses  being  afraid  of  after-consequences  if  they  bore  testi- 
mony to    the  conduct  of  men  under  suspicion.     We  have  not 
notified  in  any  way  what  is  to  be  the  duration  of  our  stay  here, 
and  once  our  protection  over  our  well-wishers  is  removed,  their 
fate  may  be  readily  imagined.     There  is  no  one  who  cherishes 
revenge  more  fervently  than  an  Afghan,  and  every  witness  would 
be  marked  down  by  the  kinsmen  of  those  against  whom  he  had 
appeared.     By  a  little  judicious  management,  however,  in  which 
Hyat  Khan,   Assistant  Political  OfiScer,  has  been   chief  agent, 
pretty  full  evidence  has  been  obtained  without  publicity,  and  after 
being  carefully  sifted,  it  has  been  submitted  to  the  Military  Com- 
mission,*  of  which  General  Massy  is  President,  as  the  various 
prisoners  implicated  have  been  brought  up.     Yesterday  this  Com- 
mission had  before  it  five  prisoners,  all  of  whom  it  sentenced  to 
death  by  hanging,  and  to-day  this  sentence  was  carried  out.     The 
terms  of  the  proclamation  issued  by  General  Koberts  from  Zer- 
ghun  Shahr  left  no  outlet  of  escape  for  all  such  persons  as  were 
concerned  in  the  massacre  of  Sir  Louis  Cavagnari  and  his  com- 

*  The  members  of  the  Commission  were  Brigadier  General  Massy  (President),  Major 
Moriarty,  Bengal  Staff  Corps,  and  Captain  Guinness,  72nd  Highlanders. 


The  Case  of  the  Kotwal  of  CabuL  83 

paniong,  or  who  offered  armed  resistance  to  the  British  troops 
adyancing  with  the  Amir  under  their  protection.  Death  was  the 
penalty  incurred  in  either  case ;  assassination  being  the  one 
offence,  and  treason  against  their  lawfal  sovereign  the  second. 
This  dual  mode  of  dealing  with  offenders  was  no  doubt  due  to  the 
inference  that  those  who  chose  to  fight  against  us  must  have  so 
&r  committed  themselves  in  prior  events  as  to  make  them  in 
technical  term  "  accomplices  after  the  act.'*  To  aid  and  defend 
a  murderer  is  to  participate  in  his  crime ;  and  the  leaders  at 
Charasia  and  on  the  Deh-i-Afghan  Heights,  though  nominally 
only  accused  of  high  treason  against  Yakub  Khan,  were  really 
gnilty  of  abetting  the  men  who  had  fired  the  Besidency  and 
slaughtered  its  inmates  in  the  early  days  of  September. 

In  the  attack  upon  our  Embassy  and  in  the  after-tumult  and 
organized  resistance  to  our  troops,  it  was  known  that  the  city 
people  had  borne  a  prominent  part,  and  it  was  therefore  necessary 
that  one  of  their  leaders  should  be  made  to  suffer  for  their  offences. 
Accordingly,  the  Kotwal,  or  chief  magistrate  of  Cabul,  was  arrested 
immediately  after  the  proclamation  of  Sir  F.  Boberts  had  been 
read  in  the  Amir's  garden,  and  he  was  the  chief  personage  among 
the  five  tried  yesterday.  The  evidence  against  this  man,  Mahomed 
Aslam  Khan,  was  that  after  the  Besidency  had  been  stormed,  he 
ordered  and  superintended  the  throwing  of  the  bodies  of  the 
Guides  over  the  Bala  Hissar  wall  into  the  ditch  below,  where  they 
now  lie  in  a  deep  hole  covered  over  with  stones  and  rubbish. 
This  was  his  active  participation  in  the  first  series  of  events,  and 
there  was  no  doubt  the  influence  his  position  gave  him  was  exer- 
cised in  every  way  in  favour  of  the  mutineers,  and  that  he  made 
no  effort  to  control  the  city  rabble.  When  it  became  known  in 
Gabnl  that  our  forces  were  encamped  at  Charasia,  he  showed  him- 
self most  active  in  organizing  measures  to  drive  us  back.  On 
the  night  before  the  fight,  when  all  the  fanatical  passions  of  the 
soldiery  and  the  populace  were  excited  to  the  utmost,  he  issued  a 
proclamation  in  which  all  faithful  Mahomedans  were  called  upon 
to  assemble  and  march  out  to  do  battle  against  the  British.  This 
was  circulated  throughout  the  city  and  neighbourhood,  and  brought 
in  many  recruits ;  while,  to  keep  the  ill-organized  army  up  to  its 
work,  he  gave  Bs.  1,000  to  the  bakers  to  cook  food  for  the  troops. 

o  2 


84  The  Afghan  War,   1879—80. 

This  they  were  to  carry  with  them  to  the  Charasia  Heights.  The 
police  were  further  employed  to  turn  out,  in  the  early  morning  of 
October  6th,  all  faint-hearted  citizens  who  shirked  the  duty  im- 
posed upon  them  of  meeting  our  army.  With  a  boldness  that 
seemed  almost  like  bravado,  Aslam  Ehan  did  not  seek  safety  in 
flight  when  we  encamped  before  Gabul,  but  actually  acted  as  our 
guide,  when  Sir  Frederick  Roberts  visited  the  ruins  of  the  Resi- 
dency. He  explained  very  vividly  all  that  took  place,  and  even 
pointed  out  the  grave  of  the  Guides  below.  His  defence  before 
the  Commission  was,  that  the  bodies  were  thrown  over  the  wall 
by  his  people  without  his  knowledge ;  and  that  in  respect  of  the 
proclamation,  he  issued  it  at  the  instigation  of  Sirdar  Nek  Maho- 
med Khan,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  rebels,  who  said  the  Amir 
had  given  orders  to  that  eflfect.  There  was  just  a  colourable 
excuse  in  this,  as  it  is  now  established  beyond  doubt  that  Nek 
Mahomed  visited  the  Amir  in  our  camp  the  night  before  Charasia. 
The  Amir  was  really  a  puppet  in  the  hands  of  the  men  then  about 
him,  and  it  is  quite  on  the  cards  that  they  authorized  Nek  Maho- 
med to  use  his  name  freely ;  and  that  in  this  way  the  proclamation 
was  published.  The  double  dealing  of  the  Wazir,  the  Mustaufi, 
and  Zakariah  Ehan  and  his  brother,  have  since  come  to  light,  and 
they  are  now  under  arrest  awaiting  trial,  though  sufficient  evidence 
to  hang  them  is  not  yet  forthcoming.  It  is  an  ill-return  on  the 
part  of  the  Amir's  retinue  that  the  freedom  granted  to  them  on 
the  march  to  Cabul  should  have  been  thus  abused.  The  messen- 
gers we  allowed  him  to  receive  and  despatch  in  all  good  faith  seem 
to  have  been  merely  emissaries  of  the  mutineers  preparing  a  trap 
in  which  to  destroy  our  force.  That  Nek  Mahomed  should  be  in 
our  camp  on  the  5th  and  fight  against  us  on  the  6th,  in  command 
of  4,000  or  5,000  troops,  was  the  outcome  of  our  generosity  to- 
wards Yakub  Ehan,  whom  we  treated  as  a  guest  instead  of  a 
prisoner.  He  himself  is  so  weak-minded  and  helpless,  that  one 
hesitates  to  accuse  him  of  direct  treachery.  But  the  case  is  very 
different  with  his  most  trusted  ministers,  who  are  now  in  safe 
custody  in  the  quarter-guards  of  our  British  regiments.  Nek 
Mahomed  is  a  fugitive,  and  it  is  doubtful  if  we  shall  ever  capture 
him,  unless  he  is  ill-advised  enough  to  try  conclusions  with  us  in 
the  winter  months ;  but  if  he  is  ever  caught,  and  can  be  tempted 


Aghir  Klians  Crime.  85 

to  make  a  clean  breast  of  it,  the  truth  of  the  whole  business  in 
which  he  was  the  leading  spirit  will  be  made  clear.  It  is  only 
bare  justice  to  Yakub  Khan  to  give  his  own  version  of  Nek  Maho- 
med's interview  with  him.  The  Amir  states  that  he  entreated 
Nek  Mahomed  to  return  and  order  the  dispersal  of  the  mutinous 
regiments  then  in  the  Bala  Hissar  :  to  forbid  the  city  rabble  from 
showing  any  resistance  to  us ;  and  to  issue  a  warning  against  any 
one  appearing  armed  in  or  near  Cabul.  This  is  the  Amir's  state- 
menty  and  until  Nek  Mahomed  is  forthcoming,  it  must  be  looked 
upon  as  trustworthy. 

The  second  prisoner,  if  lowest  in  rank,  seems  to  have  been 
most  intimately  connected  of  the  batch  with  the  revolting  scenes 
following  the  Massacre  of  the  Embassy.  This  was  Aghir  Khan, 
chowkidar  of  Mundai,  who  was  sworn  to  as  having  carried  the 
head  and  shoulders  of  one  of  the  English  sahibs  from  the  smok- 
ing ruins  of  the  Besidency  to  the  ridge  on  which  stands  the  Upper 
Bala  Hissar,  overlooking  the  city.  This  was  on  the  morning  after 
the  place  had  been  sacked,  and  it  was  generally  believed  that  it 
was  Sir  Louis  Cavagnari's  head  that  was  carried  along.  Aghir 
Khan's  defence  was,  that  he  took  the  head  with  the  intention  of 
preserving  it  until  the  British  should  come  ;  but  that  on  reaching 
the  ridge  the  Kotwal's  people  seized  it,  and  that  he  could  not 
leam  what  afterwards  became  of  it.  His  story  was  quite  unsup- 
ported, and  the  man's  general  demeanour  and  known  character 
were  all  against  him.  A  more  ruffianly-looking  face  could  scarcely 
be  found  in  the  whole  of  Afghanistan,  which  is  very  prolific  of 
such  growths. 

In  this  outbreak  of  fanaticism  in  Cabul,  it  was  quite  impossible 
that  the  mooUahs  could  remain  quiet,  their  known  hatred  to  foreign 
intrusion  being  always  a  dangerous  element  in  local  politics.  One 
of  the  five  prisoners  was  Khwaja  Nazir,  a  priest  of  great  influence, 
who  preached  a  jehady  collected  large  numbers  of  his  most  fanati- 
cal followers,  gave  them  a  standard,  and  sent  them  out  to  Charasia. 
The  fourth  man  tried  was  Saltan  Aziz,  a  Barakzai,  son  of  the 
Nawab  Mahomed  Zaman  Khan,  ex-Governor  of  Khost.  Being 
related  in  blood  to  the  reigning  family,  it  was  all  the  more  signi- 
ficant that  SultanAziz  and  his  father  should  have  fought  at  Charasia, 
after  being  leading  spirits  in  arming  the  mob  which  flocked  into 


86  The  Afglian  War,  1879—80. 

the  Bala  Hissar  on  the  evening  of  the  5th  October.  The  fifth 
and  last  prisoner  was  Eaisruh  Khan,  ex-Oeneral  in  rank  and 
Superintendent  of  Army  Clothing :  he  played  a  similar  part  to 
that  of  Sultan  Aziz.  All  five  prisoners  were  condemned  to  death 
by  the  Commission,  and  this  sentence  was  confirmed  by  the  Major- 
Oeneral  Commanding.  This  morning  they  were  marched  out  of 
camp  at  half-past  nine,  under  escort  of  a  company  of  the  92nd 
Highlanders,  a  fatigue  party  following  with  picks  and  shovels  as 
grave-diggers.  There  was  very  little  ceremony  observed,  and  only 
a  few  Cabulis  from  the  city  looked  on  as  the  men  were  escorted 
towards  the  Bala  Hissar  gate.  Two  sca£folds  had  been  raised,  the . 
Kotwal  being  honoured  with  a  special  rope  outside  the  door  which 
young  Hamilton  so  gallantly  defended,  and  which  was  eventually 
battered  in  by  the  fire  of  the  field-piece  dragged  up  by  the  muti- 
neers. The  other  four  were  hanged  on  a  scaffold  built  in  the  court- 
yard, round  which  the  Guides  had  been  quartered.  With  the  usual 
apathy  of  Mahomedans,  the  men  did  not  seem  to  appreciate  their 
fate,  and  gave  no  trouble  when  told  to  mount  the  scaflFold.  They 
were  buried  in  a  rudely-dug  grave  near  where  they  were  hanged,  and 
the  gallows  still  remain  ready  for  any  other  prisoners  who  may  be 
considered  worthy  of  death.  The  news  of  the  execution  is  said  to  have 
had  a  healthy  effect  upon  the  city,  it  being  now  made  clear  to  the 
populace  that  our  old,  absurd  mode  of  dealing  with  assassins  as 
if  they  were  saints,  has  no  longer  a  place  in  our  policy.  However 
distasteful  the  office  of  hangman  may  be,  it  has  to  be  filled ;  and 
in  the  present  case  our  army  is  but  taking  the  place  of  the  execu- 
tioner by  pressure  of  circumstances.  The  mutineers  had  not  the 
courage  to  defend  the  city  they  had  incriminated  by  their  acts ; 
and  having  spared  the  city,  all  that  remains  for  us  to  do  is  to 
punish  such  of  the  rabble  whose  guilt  is  brought  home  to  them. 

There  have  been  few  changes  in  camp  beyond  a  reduction  in  the 
number  of  regiments  encamped  on  Siah  Sung  Bidge.  The  6th 
Ohoorkas,  23rd  Pioneers,  and  F-A,  B.H.A.,  are  now  in  Sherpur 
cantonments  busily  engaged  in  hutting  themselves.  The  place  is 
so  filthy  that  a  systematic  cleansing  and  fumigating  process  is 
being  instituted  by  Dr.  Porter,  in  chief  medical  charge.  The 
floors  of  the  rooms  are  being  scraped  to  a  depth  of  three  or  four 
inches,  and  new  floors  laid  down,  while  the  wholesome  influence 


More  Executions.  87 

of  whitewash  is  also  being  brought  to  bear  upon  the  walls.  Our 
troops  are  very  healthy  now — no  cholera  has  been  reported  for  a 
week — and  it  would  be  absurd  to  risk  the  chance  of  typhoid  fever 
and  kindred  diseases  by  neglecting  ordinary  sanitary  precautions. 
The  barracks  are  expected  to  prove  very  comfortable  quarters  for 
the  winter,  as  it  seems  plain  we  shall  have  to  stay  here  for  four  or 
five  months.  Since  the  capture  of  the  twelve  guns,  abandoned  so 
hastily  on  the  Ghazni  Bead,  we  have  heard  no  more  of  regiments 
marching  down  upon  Cabul,  and  for  the  present  at  least  the 
enemy  may  be  looked  upon  as  non-existent.  From  the  Shutar- 
gardan,  too,  we  hear  of  the  dispersion  to  their  homes  of  the 
Mangals  and  Ghilzais  who  have  worried  Colonel  Money  so  per- 
sistently, and  perhaps  there  may  now  be  a  chance  of  our  fort- 
night's post  reaching  us.  It  will  be  the  last  from  that  direction, 
as  it  has  been  resolved  to  trust  in  future  to  the  Jellalabad  route. 
What  is  the  reason  of  the  slow  advance  from  the  Ehyber  ?  This 
is  what  every  one  is  asking,  and  the  answer  is  generally  brief 
enough  :  "  Want  of  transport." 

Camp  Siah  Sung,  23rd  October. 

Yesterday  two  ressaldars  of  the  Afghan  cavalry,  who  were 
proved  to  have  been  in  the  Bala  Hissar  during  the  attack  upon 
the  Embassy,  and  to  have  shared  in  the  after-events,  wer6  marched 
out  to  execution  in  the  Bala  Hissar.  When  told  they  were  to 
Buffer  death  ignominiously  by  hanging,  they  showed  no  alarm, 
answering  merely  "It  is  well."  This  indifference  to  death 
stands  these  men  in  good  stead;  for,  if  found  guilty,  they  are 
executed  within  twenty-four  hours,  thus  leaving  them  only  a  very 
short  time  in  which  to  consider  the  awkward  termination  of  their 
careers.  As  a  little  trait  of  character  it  may  be  mentioned  that 
one  of  these  ressaldars,  a  fine  portly  man,  picked  out  the  stone 
firom  his  signet-ring  during  the  night,  his  pride  no  doubt  prompt- 
ing him  to  destroy  the  stone  sooner  than  it  should  fall  into  infidel 
himds.  It  may  be  that  he  found  means  to  convey  it  away  secretly 
to  his  friends;  but  so  close  a  watch  is  kept  upon  condemned 
prisoners  that  this  seems  unlikely.  Ten  o'clock  is  the  hour  at 
which  men  are  generally  hanged  ;  and  now,  daily,  a  little  crowd 


88  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

of  soldiers,  camp-followers,  and  traders  from  the  city  gathers  near 
the  72nd  quarter-guard,  from  which  starts  the  road  down  the  ridge. 
The  soldiers,  in  shirt-sleeves  and  with  the  favourite  short  pipe  in 
their  mouths,  betray  but  faint  curiosity,  looking  upon  the  culprits 
with  hearty  contempt,  and  only  regretful  that  they  have  not  had 
to  meet  them  in  fair  fight.  "  If  we'd  been  the  French,'*  I  heard 
one  man  plaintively  say,  "  there'd  have  been  more  than  two  or 
three."  No  doubt  there  would ;  but  our  mode  of  warfare  with 
men,  compared  with  whom  the  Arabs  of  Algeria  are  gentlemen, 
is  very  different  to  that  followed  by  the  generals  of  Napoleon  III. 
The  few  Afghans  who  watch  the  little  company  of  British  infantry 
marching  down  with  the  prisoners  in  their  midst  are  almost  as 
much  attracted  by  the  bayonets  of  our  men  as  by  the  presence  of 
their  unlucky  countrymen  ;  and  they  soon  turn  back  to  our  tents 
to  mulct  us  in  rupees  by  sharp  bargaining  in  poshteens  (sheep- 
skin coats),  furs,  carpets,  and  Russian  chinaware.  The  two 
ressaldars  stepped  out  boldly  enough  to  keep  pace  with  their 
escort ;  and  whatever  their  feelings  may  have  been,  they  concealed 
them  stolidly  enough.  They  looked  less  brnve  when  standing 
pinioned,  with  the  rope  about  their  necks,  facing  the  ruins  of  the 
Eesidency ;  and  not  one  on-looker  felt  the  least  pity  for  them,  for 
the  shot-marked  walls  on  every  side  call  up  bitter  memories  and 
silence  any  thought  of  mercy.  Our  Black  Assize  is  a  very  small 
one  so  far ;  for  the  majority  of  the  leaders  have  escaped,  and  we 
have  to  content  ourselves  with  the  small  fry.  Even  as  it  is,  men 
are  remanded  from  day  to  day  if  the  evidence  is  at  all  faulty,  and 
the  Military  Commission  are  careful  to  avoid  jumping  to  conclu- 
sions. To-day  a  sepoy  of  the  1st  Herat  Eegiment  was  hanged ; 
and  as  he  was  caught  in  the  city  by  a  Kizilbash,  it  is  expected 
that  more  of  his  companions  are  still  hidden  within  the  walls. 
With  a  temerity  that  showed  his  desperate  case,  this  man  had  his 
rifle  and  ten  cartridges  with  him,  but  he  made  no  show  of  resist- 
ance. The  diflSculty  of  obtaining  evidence  is  gradually  disap- 
pearing, the  Kizilbash  who  handed  the  sepoy  to  General  Hills, 
Military  Governor  of  Cabul,  coming  forward  openly  and  stating 
all  that  he  knew.  It  is  to  these  Eizilbashes  that  we  shall  have 
greatly  to  trust  in  examining  into  the  details  of  the  Massacre,  as 
the  city  people  are  all  against  us.     Being  semi-independent,  and 


General  Roberts's  Policy  Upheld.  89 

forming  a  powerful  section  among  themselves,  the  Eizilhashes 
have  less  to  fear,  than  others,  from  any  measures  of  revenge  that 
may  afterwards  be  taken  against  them;  and  if  we  can  once  get 
them  to  speak  openly,  oar  work  will  be  greatly  simplified.  Of  the 
secret  combination  which  Kushdil  Ehan,  Nek  Mahomed,  and  the 
other  inflnential  chiefs  aboat  the  Amir's  person  promoted,  it  will 
be  far  more  difficult  to  take  np  the  threads ;  bat  there  is  still 
some  hope  of  tracing  the  conspiracy  to  its  source.  As  the  investi- 
gation proceeds,  and  the  various  statements  forthcoming  are  dove- 
tailed into  each  other,  it  will  become  plain  upon  whom  the  chief 
guilt  is  to  rest.  There  are  still  several  prisoners  to  be  tried,  and 
each  day  adds  its  little  quota  of  evidence  against  the  large  class 
of  "  suspects.*' 

There  will  no  doubt  be  exception  taken  to  the  course  Sir  F. 
Roberts  is  pursuing,  and  political  capital  may  be  made  out  of  it  ;* 
but  unless  the  mission  of  the  army  now  before  Cabul  is  to  be  a 
failure,  there  is  no  option  but  to  follow  out  to  the  end  the  lines 
of  policy  laid  down.  The  murder  of  our  Envoy  and  his  escort  was, 
as  the  Proclamation  in  the  Bala  Hissar  of  October  12th  sets 
forth,  "  a  treacherous  and  cowardly  crime,  which  has  brought 
indelible  disgrace  upon  the  Afghan  people,"  and  there  is  but  one 
punishment  for  treachery  and  cowardice  of  this  kind.  If  daily 
executions  are  to  be  the  rule  for  the  next  few  weeks,  they  can  only 
be  those  of  isolated  persons  who  may  fall  into  our  hands ;  and 
their  death  is  a  very  small  atonement  for  the  crime  in  which  so 
many  participated.  The  city  rabble  is  unpunished ;  the  Herat 
regiments  have  escaped ;  and  if  we  are  nominally  in  possession  of 
Northern  Afghanistan,  that  possession  means  very  little  to  the 
ruffians  we  have  to  deal  with.  They  will  pocket  our  rupees  and 
thrive  upon  us  as  long  as  we  remain ;  and  the  instant  we  take 
our  departure,  their  arms,  now  hidden,  will  soon  be  furbished  up 
again  for  future  mischief.  Apart  from  this  view  of  the  case — 
which  is,  of  course,  only  taken  as  regards  the  discontented  and 
fanatical  part  of  the  nation  more  nearly  concerned  in  the  events 
of  the  first  week  in  September — there  are  two  other  considera- 
tions which  have  to  guide  us  in  all  that  we  are  doing.  The 
first  is  that  our  presence  is  not  desired  by  any  Afghan  of 
*  Thu  ezpeetatioD  prored  only  too  well-founded. 


90  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

spirit  in  the  conntry^  and  the  second  and  far  more  serious  is 
that  we  have  on  our  hands  and  are  proclaiming  ourselves  the 
protectors  of  a  sovereign  who  has  scarcely  a  vestige  of  power. 
Of  our  position  towards  the  Amir  Yakub  Khan  I  will  speak 
presently;  but  the  sullen  submission  of  the  people  can  more 
readily  be  disposed  of.  Whatever  despot  has  governed  Afjghanis- 
tan  his  subjects  have  always  preferred  to  suffer  under  his  rule 
than  to  submit  to  ouside  interference ;  and  this  jealousy  of 
foreign  intruders  has  always  been  a  stumbling-block  in  our 
dealings  with  Amirs  in  days  gone  by.  We  have  had  to  cal- 
culate not  only  upon  the  sincerity  of  the  ruler,  but  upon  his 
capacity  for  controlling  the  fanaticism  of  his  subjects.  Up  to 
the  Treaty  of  Gundamak,  we  blindly  believed  that  such  capacity 
could  exist.  Now,  after  being  roughly  undeceived,  we  have  taken 
for  a  time  these  subjects  under  our  immediate  control,  and  we 
find  them  submitting  to  superior  force,  but  yielding  in  no  way 
cordially  to  their  fate.  We  can  trust  them  while  an  army  is 
among  them,  but  our  acts  are  only  looked  upon  as  temporary,  and 
not  the  least  active  assistance  can  be  counted  upon  in  our  search 
after  those  whom  we  have  come  to  punish.  The  people  will  give 
supplies  when  each  village  is  visited  by  a  purchasing  party,  strongly 
escorted  by  our  cavalry ;  but  otherwise  they  would  gladly  let  us 
starve  sooner  than  open  their  grain-stores  for  our  benefit.  The 
few  days  on  which  we  had  to  fight,  every  villager  who  thought  he 
could  do  so  with  safety  to  his  own  skin  pulled  trigger  upon  detached 
parties  of  our  men ;  and  if  the  headmen  are  now  coming  in, 
seeing  Cabul  is  at  our  mercy,  it  is  because  they  dread  a  visita- 
tion from  our  troops.  They  are  as  insincere  in  all  their  pro- 
testations of  friendship  as  forty  years  ago  ;  but  we  put  the  proper 
value  now  upon  their  promises,  and  are  strong  enough  to  punish 
them  if  occasion  arises.  Such  is  the  attitude  relatively  of  our 
army  and  the  people :  the  only  sign  we  give  of  our  supremacy 
being  by  keeping  a  tight  hand  upon  Cabul  itself,  and  by  hanging 
such  of  our  prisoners  as  participated  in  its  crime. 
^  Our  relations  with  the  Amir  are  on  a  very  different  footing, 
though  it  would  puzzle  a  Russian  diplomatist  to  say  what  is  the 
basis  of  our  policy.  It  is  a  mixture  of  suspicion,  forbearance, 
and  contempt.     Once  Yakub  Khan  had  thrown  himself  upon  our 


Relations  with  the  Amir,  91 

protection  and  disowned  the  acts  of  the  mutineers,  his  personal 
safety  was  assured,  and  this,  no  douht,  was  his  first  aim.  But  how 
much  further  did  he  mean  to  go  ?     That  he  heartily  desired  his 
turbulent  regiments  to  be  punished  one  can  well  believe,  and  that 
he   schemed  to  save  Gabul  from  the  fate  it  had  courted  is  quite 
possible ;  but  unless  an  accomplice  in   their  acts,  he  could  not 
have  expected  that  his  most  trusted  ministers  and  kinsmen  would 
be  arrested  and  himself  confined  to  our  camp.     Here  he  must  see 
our  suspicion  peeping  out :  but,  then,  mark  our  forbearance.     In 
our  proclamations  rebellion  against  the  Amir  has  been  cited  as 
worthy  of  death  ;  we  are  living  upon  tribute  grain  collected  as  due 
to  him  ;  the  citizens  of  Cabul  have  been  declared  '*  rebels  against 
His  Highness,"  and  our  Military  Governor  of  the  city  is  **  admin- 
istering justice  and  punishing  with  a  strong  hand  all  evil-doers" 
with  his  **  consent.'*     This  is  one  side  of  the  picture,  and  these 
acts  are  the  direct  outcome  of  our  efibrts  to  re-establish  something 
like  order  after  the  anarchy  which  prevailed  when  we  began  our 
march  upon  the  capital.     There  is  nothing  of  contempt  in  them  ; 
it  is  merely  laying  the  foundation  for  replacing  the  Amir  on  his 
throne  more  securely,  for  the  future.     Our  forbearance  is  further 
shown  by  the  consideration  displayed  towards  his  subjects :  nothing 
is  taken  that  is  not  paid  for — and,  in  most  instances,  exorbitantly 
paid  for — and  there  is  not  the  slightest  afifectation  of  treating  the 
country  through  which  we  pass  as  conquered  territory.  ^  But  there 
is  another  side  of  the  picture  where  new  aspects  appear  and  some 
anomalies  crop  up.     The  Amir's  authority  is  proclaimed  as  justi- 
fication for  many  of  our  acts ;  and  yet  at  the  same  time  we  loot 
his  citadel,  and  seize  upon,  as  spoils  of  war,  all  guns  and  muni- 
tions of  war  which  for  a  few   weeks  only  had   passed  out  of  his 
hands  into  those  of  the  rebels.     Did  he,  by  abandoning  his  capital 
and  its   defences,    lose    all   right  and    interest  in   the  cannon 
which  guarded  them,  in  the  ammunition  collected  for  years   past 
in  the  Bala  Hissar,  and  in  the  very  clothing  prepared  for  his  regi- 
ments?   Apparently  he  did,  for  the  two  hundred  and  fourteen 
guns  now  in  our  camp  are  looked  upon  as  captured  from  an  enemy 
who  used  many  of  them  against  us  ;  the  untold  quantity  of  gun- 
powder which  the  explosion  of  the  16th    untouched    is    to    be 
destroyed ;  and  our  camp-followers  are  masquerading  in  the  warm 


92  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

uniforms  of  Afghan  Highlanders.  This  is  the  feature  of  contempt 
in  our  policy.  Our  war,  unlike  that  of  last  year,  is  against  the 
subjects  of  the  Amir,  and  not  against  the  Amir  himself  ;  and,  so 
far  as  we  have  gone,  we  have  assumed  the  functions  of  the  sove- 
reign in  their  fullest  sense,  using  his  name  only  to  smooth  away 
diflSculties  that  would  otherwise  have  to  be  overcome  by  force. 
This  assumption  has  had  to  be  made  for  the  simple  reason  that 
Yakub  Khan  is  too  weak  and  vacillating  to  exercise  the  authority 
which  we  have  so  ostentatiously  recognized,  and  his  ministers  too 
corrupt  to  be  trusted  near  his  person.  But  beyond  the  immediate 
exercise  of  military  power  in  Cabul  and  its  neighbourhood,  we  can 
do  nothing.  There  is  no  responsible  Government  which  could 
take  out  of  our  hands  the  task  of  hunting  up  the  men  who  have 
been  guilty  of  treachery  and  murder  ;  and  as  our  first  duty  is  to 
our  dead  Envoy  and  not  to  the  living  Amir,  it  follows  that  our 
present  work  is  that  of  judges  and  not  of  king-makers.  That 
work  has  to  be  done,  and  we  are  doing  it  unflinchingly,  and  until  it 
is  completed,  the  Amir  must  be  content  to  accept  his  position  as  a 
sovereign  in  leading  strings.  By  the  time  we  have  dealt  with  all 
the  culprits  that  can  be  captured,  the  cloud  of  suspicion  now  rest- 
ing upon  Yakub  Khan  will  either  have  deepened  or  been  dissipated, 
and  our  second  duty  of  punishing  or  aiding  him  under  his  diffi- 
culties will  then  have  to  be  fulfilled.  The  drift  of  evidence  seems 
now  fairly  in  his  favour,  i.6.,  he  was  not  involved  in  the  work  of 
Nek  Mahomed  and  Kushdil  Khan ;  and  taking  it  as  most  probable 
that  he  will  finally  be  convicted  of  nothing  worse  than  weakness, 
it  will  remain  with  us  to  say  if  he  is  again  worthy  of  our  trust. 
With  his  army  dispersed,  and  his  artillery  (which  goes  for  so  much 
in  the  eyes  of  Asiatic  nations)  in  our  hands,  the  only  semblance  of 
power  he  can  derive  will  be  reflected  from  our  arms — if  we  re- 
instate him  in  good  faith.  And  if  his  weakness  is  held  as  our  jus- 
tification for  reducing  him  to  the  rank  of  a  political  pensioner, 
comfortably  housed  in  India,  are  we  to  fit  out  his  successor  with 
new  war-trappings,  which  may  at  any  moment  be  seized  by  mutin- 
ous regiments  and  turned  against  us  at  the  first  opportunity  ? 
More  unlikely  things  have  occurred  than  this  ;  but  unless  our  army 
carries  back  with  it  to  India  the  trophies  it  now  boasts  of,  there 
will  be  sad  disappointment  in  every  mind. 


Attacks  on  the  Line  of  Communication.  93 

I  have  dwelt  with  great  pertinacity  upon  the  political  side  of 
the  Afghan  qaestion  as  it  is  developing  under  the  walls  of  Cabal, 
because  our  late  successes  may  have  overshadowed  the  great  pro- 
blem which  has  now  to  be  worked  out,  viz.,  what  are  the  future 
relations  between  India  and  Afghanistan  to  be  ?  From  what  I 
have  written,  a  fair  judgment  may  be  formed  as  to  whether  the 
sanguine  view,  that  the  line  of  policy  laid  down  in  the  Treaty  of 
Gundamak  still  remains  good,  can  be  consistently  maintained. 
The  arrest  of  the  Mustaufi,  the  Wazir,  and  their  two  intimate 
friends,  has  raised  the  revolt  in  Cabul  far  above  the  level  of  a 
local  emeute  of  discontented  soldiers. 


CHAPTER  Vm. 


TIm  Line  of  Commanicatioii  with  the  Kumtm  YaUey — Hoetile  Aeiion  of  the  Tribes-^ 
Skinniah  on  the  Surkhai  Kotal— Defeat  of  the  Tribesmen  by  the  Shutaigardan 
Garrison — The  Enemy  Beinforeed — ^The  Ghurrison  Sarroimded — Serious  Complioa- 
tioDS — The  Shntargardan  reliered  by  General  Charles  Qongh. 

Camp  Siah  Sung,  2ith  October. 

Thbre  is  one  great  consolation  for  the  troops  who  did  not  share 
in  the  advance  upon  Cabul,  and  that  is,  they  have  not  been 
allowed  by  the  tribes  in  our  rear  to  rest  in  peace  at  the  stations 
guarding  the  Eurram  line  of  communication.  General  Gordon  at 
Ali  Efaeyl,  and  Colonel  Money  at  the  Shntargardan,  have  had 
their  hands  very  full  indeed  during  the  past  few  weeks ;  Mangals, 
Ghilzais,  and  their  allies  considering  it  a  grand  opportunity  for 
attack.  The  bulk  of  our  army  was  too  far  ahead,  and  had  too 
important  a  mission  to  fulfil,  to  send  back  reinforcements ;  and 
no  doubt  these  mongrel  tribesmen  believed  they  would  have  it  all 
their  own  way.  I  hear  that  they  called  upon  the  Shinwaris  and 
Khugianis  on  the  northern  slopes  of  the  Safed  Koh  to  come  over 
and  join  in  the  rare  chance  that  was  presented  of  cutting  up  our 
troops ;  but  the  ill-timed  zeal  of  the  Mangal  mooUahs  spoiled  the 
whole  arrangement.  They  gave  out  that  we  had  been  defeated  at 
Cabul,  and  further  promised  their  fanatical  followers  that  bullets 


94  The  Afghan  War,   1879—80. 

and  bayonets  should  leave  them  unscathed  for  a  few  days  if  they 
would  only  attack  the  handful  of  infidels  then  left  at  their  mercy. 
Accordingly  Ali  Eheyl  was  attacked,  and  the  result  of  the  fighting 
in  that  neighbourhood  was  the  complete  dispersal  of  the  tribesmen. 
At  one  time  the  situation  seemed  so  fall  of  peril  that  General 
Gordon  made  up  his  mind  to  abandon  the  Shutargardan,  Colonel 
Money  having  informed  him  that  he  was  surrounded  on  all  sides, 
his  forage  cut  off,  and  his  water-supply  threatened.  Such  a  step 
would,  of  course,  have  only  been  resorted  to  in  the  last  extremity, 
for  a  force  retiring  through  the  Hazara  Darukht  defile,  followed  by 
swarms  of  our  enemy,  confident  that  their  success  was  assured, 
might  have  ended  in  a  disaster.  But  there  were  at  the  Shutar- 
gardan  two  splendid  fighting  regiments,  well-officered  and  in 
perfect  trim,  and  their  stubborn  resistance  kept  the  enemy  in 
check  until  it  was  too  late  for  them  to  profit  by  our  difficulties. 
During  the  worst  period  at  the  Shutargardan,  General  Hugh 
Gough,  with  the  5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  6th  Punjab  Infantry,  and 
four  mountain  guns  was  on  his  way  thither  to  bring  down  supplies 
and  close  the  communication,  as  it  was  no  longer  needed ;  and  a 
welcome  flash  from  Captain  Straton's  heliograph  informed  Colonel 
Money  that  help  was  at  hand.  The  Mangals  and  their  allies  seem 
to  have  had  earlier  information,  for  they  had  already  begun  to 
disperse,  though  their  stray  shots  into  camp  kept  the  garrison 
alive,  and  cost  them  something  in  the  way  of  chargers  and  baggage 
animals.  The  abandonment  of  the  post  in  the  face  of  an  enemy 
far  superior  in  number  was  thus  happily  avoided,  as  well  as  the 
ill-effect  it  would  have  had  upon  every  tribesman  ft^m  Thull  to 
Cabul.  It  is  believed  here  that  there  was  a  tendency  to  exag- 
gerate the  danger  at  Ali  Eheyl,  and  that  undue  importance  was 
attached  to  the  attack  there ;  but  we  are  loth  to  think  that  General 
Gordon  would  have  recalled  the  two  regiments  from  the  Shutar- 
gardan merely  to  strengthen  his  own  post.  Such  a  step  might 
have  brought  about  a  really  serious  conflict,  as  it  would  have  been 
too  glaring  an  admission  of  weakness  not  to  have  been  appreciated 
by  the  neighbouring  tribes.  Of  the  earlier  fighting  at  the  Surkhai 
Kotal  on  the  14th,  we  have  now  full  accounts  from  Colonel  Money, 
which  I  give  below. 

On  the  18th  instant  information  was  brought  into  the  camp  at 


Fighting  at  Surkhai  KotaL  95 

Shatargardan  that  the   Machalgu   Ghilzais  were    assembling  in 
force,  and  would  probably  appear  near  Earatiga  and  the  Surkhai 
Kotal,  on  that  side,  for  the  purpose  of  blocking  up  the  road  to  Ali 
Kheyl  and  molesting  our  picquet  on  the  KotaL     That  mischief 
was  on  foot  was  proved  by  the  telegraph  wire  to  Ali  Kheyl  being 
cut  at  nine  o'clock  the  same  evening.     The  next  morning  Colonel 
Money,  in  sending  the  usual  relief  of  90  men  to  the  picquet, 
ordered  Major  Gollis,  commanding  the  21st  P.N.I.,  to  take  two 
companies  of  his  regiment  and  two  guns  of  the  Kohat  Mountain 
Battery,  and  see  what  was  occurring.     He  was  further  to  attack 
and  disperse  any  bodies  of  tribesmen  who  might  have  assembled, 
to  detach  a  party  to  bring  up  ammunition  left  at  Karatiga,  and  to 
repair  the  telegraph  wire.     On  arriving  at  the  Kotal,  Major  Collis 
found  the  picquet  already  engaged  with  a  large  body  of  Ghilzais, 
who  had  attacked  at  daybreak.     His  first  step  was  to  seize  a  hill 
on  the  right  commanding  the  Kotal,  which  the  enemy  had  failed 
to  occupy.    Fifty  sepoys  under  a  native  officer  were  soon  swarming 
up  this,  and  in  the  meantime  Captain  Morgan  opened  fire  with 
the  mountain  guns  upon  mngars  filled  with  men,  on  a  hill  to  the 
east.    The  shells  were  well  pitched,  and  the  enemy  were  so  shaken 
that  when  50  rifles  of  the  21st  P.N.I. ,  under  Captain  Gowan, 
and  a  similar  number  of  the  8rd  Sikhs  under  Lieutenant  Fasken, 
went  in  at  them  with  the  bayonet,  they  abandoned  their  sungarSy 
leaving  several  killed  and  wounded  on  the  ground.    The  tribesmen 
then  attacked  on  the  south  of  the  position,  and  came  under  fire  of 
the  50  men  first  sent  up  to  occupy  the  hill,  commanding  the 
Kotal.     A  company  of  the  21st  P.N.I.,  under  Lieutenant  Young, 
was  detached  to  strengthen  this  point,  and  at  the  same  time  a 
welcome  reinforcement  of  100  of  the   8rd  Sikhs  under  Major 
Griffiths  arrived.     One  company  of  these  doubled  over  the  open, 
and  got  in  rear  of  600  of  the  enemy  whom  Captain  Gowan  and 
Lieutenant  Fasken  were  driving  back,  and  soon  the  hills  to  the 
north  were  all  cleared.     But  on  the  south  there  were  still  2,000 
men  to  be  dealt  with ;  and  as  they  were  showing  a  bold  front. 
Major  Griffiths  judged  that  a  combined  movement  must  be  made 
against  them  as  soon  as  the  two  companies  returned  from  pursuing 
the  600  men  they  had  scattered.     The  advanced  company  of  the 
2l8t  P.N.I,  under  Lieutenant  Young  was  bearing  the  brunt  of 


96  The  Afghan  War,   1879—80. 

the  enemy's  fire,  and  Major  CoUis  was  left  on  the  Kotal  with 
instructions  to  proceed  to  their  relief  along  the  crest  with  his  two 
companies  when  they  returned,  their  right  being  protected  by  100 
of  the  8rd  Sikhs  and  two  guns.  Major  Griffiths  took  the  guns  to 
the  8rd  Sikhs,  but  on  rounding  the  shoulder  of  the  hill  he  found 
that  it  would  be  dangerous  to  wait  any  longer,  as  the  enemy  were 
growing  bolder  every  minute.  The  company  of  the  2l8t  P.N.I. 
under  Lieutenant  Young  accordingly  charged  along  the  ridge  and 
captured  two  standards,  while  the  8rd  Sikhs  under  Lieutenant 
Cook  (with  whom  as  volunteers  were  Captain  Turner,  Political 
Officer ;  Captain  Wat^rfield,  R. A. ;  Captain  Nicholson,  R.E.  ; 
Lieutenant  Fisher,  10th  Hussars ;  Lieutenant  Sherstone,  Aide- 
de-camp  ;  and  Mr.  Josephs,  Superintendent  of  Telegraphs)  came 
to  close  quarters  on  the  slope  below.  The  enemy  retreated 'till 
they  reached  a  spur  running  at  right-angles  to  the  ridge  on  which 
they  had  raised  more  strong  sungara.  The  sepoys  soon  found 
themselves  checked  in  their  rush,  the  21st  getting  into  broken 
ground  commanded  by  the  main  sungar,  while  the  Sikhs  had  to 
halt  at  a  ravine,  the  opposite  side  of  which  was  bare  of  cover  and 
swept  by  the  fire  of  the  Ghazis.  Captain  Waterfield,  having  shot 
down  a  man  with  his  revolver,  was  himself  shot  through  the 
thigh  directly  afterwards,  and  was  pluckily  removed  out  of  danger 
by  Lieutenant  Cook.  The  mountain  guns  were  brought  into 
action  again  over  the  heads  of  the  troops,  as  Major  Collis  was  still 
waiting  for  his  two  companies  to  come  up ;  but  the  enemy  seeing 
so  small  a  number  of  men  opposed  to  them,  charged  out  of  the 
stmgarSy  sword  in  hand,  at  Lieutenant  Young's  company ;  and, 
though  checked  by  a  hot  fire,  secured  a  good  position  from  which 
to  repeat  the  manoeuvre.  Just  in  the  nick  of  time  Major  Collis 
arrived  with  his  two  companies,  and  three  shells  having  been 
dropped  right  into  the  enemy's  advanced  position,  he  led  the  20th 
straight  at  the  sungars  and  cleared  the  ridge  in  fine  style.  The 
enemy  fought  most  pluckily,  hurling  stones  at  our  men  as  they 
went  up  to  the  sungars  and  leaping  out  to  meet  them ;  opposing 
their  short  swords  to  the  sepoys'  bayonets.  Their  numbers  were, 
however,  of  no  avail  against  the  splendid  form  of  our  gallant 
fellows,  and  after  a  short  hand-to-hand  struggle  they  broke  and 
fled  towards  Spegha.     They  were  pursued  for  over  a  mile,  and  the 


Affair  at  the  Shutargardan.  97 

mountain  guns  harassed  them  still  further.  Their  number  was 
calculated  at  between  3,000  and  4,000,  and  they  were  beaten  in 
fair  fight  by  150  of  the  21st  P.N.I,  and  100  of  the  8rd  Sikhs, 
aided  by  two  mountain  guns.  Forty  of  their  dead  were  counted 
on  the  ground,  and  their  total  loss  is  estimated  at  200  killed  and 
wounded ;  while  our  casualties  were  only  two  killed  and  Captain 
Waterfield  and  seven  sepoys  wounded. 

Meanwhile,  a  little  affair  had  been  going  on  at  the  Shutar- 
gardan  itself.  When  Colonel  Money  had  sent  off  Major  Griffiths 
to  reinforce  the  Surkhai  Kotal,  he  took  precautions  for  his  own 
safety  by  ordering  up  two  companies  of  the  2l8t  P.N.I,  with  a 
mountain  gun  to  the  ridge  which  overlooks  the  Shutargardan 
camp.  The  move  was  a  wise  one,  for  the  enemy  were  on  the 
other  side  within  fifty  yards  of  the  crest,  and  were  only  driven 
back  with  difficulty.  They  gathered  together  again  and  made 
a  second  attempt,  but  were  again  unsuccessful.  Their  persistency 
induced  Colonel  Money  to  proceed  with  two  companies  of  the 
8rd  Sikhs  and  the  fourth  mountain  gun  to  the  ridge,  and  he  was 
able  from  this  point  to  watch  the  fight  at  the  Surkhai  Kotal. 
Seeing  that  Major  Griffiths  was  hotly  engaged,  he  sent  Jemadar 
Sher  Mahomed  (the  native  officer  who  did  such  gallant  work  at 
Earatiga  on  the  27th  of  September)  with  a  company  of  the 
8rd  Sikhs  to  make  a  diversion  on  the  enemy's  flank,  and  when  the 
tribesmen  fled,  this  party  doubled  down  upon  them,  and  after  killing 
eight  and  wounding  several  others,  joined  in  the  general  chase. 

It  was  altogether  a  brilliant  skirmish,  this  defeat  of  so  large  a 
body  of  the  enemy  at  the  Surkhai  Kotal ;  and  we  hope  to  give  the 
8rd  Sikhs  an  ovation  when  they  march  in  here  with  General  Hugh 
Gough  in  a  few  days.     The  21st  move  back  to  Ali  Kheyl. 

The  garrison  had,  after  the  skirmish,  to  bear  a  siege  which 
came  about  in  this  way : — On  the  morning  of  the  14th  it  was 
found  that  the  main  body  of  the  enemy  still  held  the  position  they 
had  taken  up  after  being  driven  off  the  Surkhai  Kotal.  A  wing  of 
the  21st  Punjab  Native  Infantry  was  sent  with  orders  to  attack  if 
they  moved  towards  the  Kotal,  and  a  company  of  the  8rd  Sikhs  went 
to  the  Karatiga  Fort  to  bring  up  the  stores  and  ammunition  left 
there.  The  fort  was  found  to  have  been  thoroughly  looted.  AUa- 
haddin,  a  brother  of  Padshah  Khan,  the  Ghilzai  chief,  reported 

H 


98  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

that  the  enemy  had  been  largely  reinforced,  and  said  from  10,000 
to  17,000  men  had  assembled,  the  whole  country  being  in  arms. 
Colonel  Money  therefore  wisely  resolved  to  draw  in  his  defences 
under  cover  of  night.  The  Surkhai  Kotal  was  abandoned  on  the 
15th.  News  of  800  or  400  regular  soldiers  of  the  Amir's  army, 
armed  with  Sniders  and  Enfields,  joining  the  tribes  was  given 
soon  afterwards.  The  enemy  showed  in  such  numbers  south- 
wards of  the  ridge  and  to  the  south  of  the  camp  that  the  outlying 
picquet  was  withdrawn  and  fell  back  upon  the  strong  picquet  posts 
near  the  camp.  On  the  17th  the  enemy  occupied  the  road  from 
Karatiga  to  Kassim  Kheyl,  and  cut  off  the  grass-supply.  Their 
numbers  were  so  great  that  reasonable  anxiety  was  felt  about  an 
attack,  so  our  men  worked  at  strengthening  the  defences,  and 
Captain  Nicholson,  B.E.,  laid  down  wire  entanglements  at  weak 
points  to  check  any  rush.  In  the  evening  Allahaddin  brought  in 
the  jirgah  who  proposed  some  absurd  terms  of  surrender,*  but 
they  were  sent  back  with  a  hint  to  go  to  Cabul  and  settle  terms 
there.  The  garrison  had  only  regimental  ammunition  with  them, 
and  this  had  been  greatly  reduced  by  the  action  of  the  14th.  The 
mountain  guns  also  having  a  small  number  of  rounds.  Colonel 
Money  resolved  to  husband  his  ammunition  and  act  on  the  defen- 
sive, as  he  did  not  know  when  he  might  be  relieved.  On  the  18th 
the  enemy  showed  in  still  greater  force,  and  pushed  to  within  800 
yards  of  our  outpost  picqnets,  and  cut  off  the  water  supply.  On 
both  the  17th  and  18th,  they  had  kept  up  a  incessant  fire  into 
the  camp,  but  with  little  result.  On  the  19th,  when  matters 
looked  very  serious,  the  heliograph  was  seen  flashing  at  Eushi, 
and  Colonel  Money  learnt  that  General  Hugh  Gough  was  there 
with  two  regiments  and  four  guna  Upon  this  he  knew  he  was 
safe,  and  after  sending  skirmishers  down  towards  the  springs  on 
the  Kushi  Boad  he  got  his  guns  into  action  and  shelled  the  enemy's 
line  with  common  shell  and  shrapnel  right  heartily.  The  shells 
soon  silenced  the   opposition  musketry  fire,  and  the  tribesmen 

*  An  officer  wrote  at  the  time : — *'  In  the  evening  the  enemy  lent  in  five  confidential 
men  to  say  that,  of  course,  we  most  now  give  in,  that  two  regiments  could  no^  hold 
out  an  hour,  but  they  were  willing  to  allow  us  to  leave  the  Shutaigardan  and  to  provide 
us  with  carriages  and  hostages ;  we  to  be  at  liberty  to  retire  to  Ali  Kheyl  or  to  Oabul, 
and  for  tliis  consideration  we  were  to  pay  them  two  lakhs.  Poor  Allahaddin  Khan  was 
at  his  wits'  end." 


Quiet  Times.  99 

gradoally  drew  off,  not  a  man  being  left  at  evening.  Their  loss  is 
estimated  at  100  killed  and  wounded.  Oar  casualties  were  seven 
men  wounded.  The  enemy  had  brought  200  of  their  women  to 
witness  the  final  successful  attack,  but  they  were  all  disappointed. 
General  Gough  occupied  the  Shinkai  Kotal  on  the  evening  of  the 
19th  and  reached  the  Shutargardan  next  day  in  a  snow-storm. 
His  arrival  was  the  signal  for  the  dispersion  of  all  tribes. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

Camp  life  ftt  Cabal— Alghan  Costermongera— Cariosity  of  Yillagen— The  Hasaras— 
Sarrender  of  FireannB — City  Traders — The  Purchase  of  Transport  Animals — 
Peaceful  State  of  the  Country — The  Abdication  of  the  Amir— His  Reasons  for  the 
Step— Assumption  of  the  Government  by  the  British — General  Roberts's  Proclama- 
tion— Arrest  of  the  Amir — Progress  of  the  Inquiry  into  the  Massacre — ^The  Murder 
of  Abdul  Karim — Military  Executions — Seizure  of  Treasure. 

Camp  Siah  Sung,  i5th  October. 

OuB  lines  are  cast  in  pleasant  places  just  at  present ;  for,  apart 
from  the  political  puzzle  which  some  of  us  study,  and  which  I 
have  already  tried  to  explain,  there  is  nothing  to  disturb  our 
equanimity.  We  have  a  high  and  dry  encamping  ground,  from 
which  we  can  travel  down  at  our  leisure,  either  citywards,  to  ex- 
plore the  mysteries  of  Cabul  and  ponder  over  the  Bala  Hissar, 
now  rapidly  being  cleared  out ;  or  else  down  into  the  Cabul  plain, 
to  exercise  our  horses  on  the  racecourse,  or  over  the  water- 
channels  which  everywhere  intersect  the  fields.  The  view  on 
every  side  is  an  impressive  one,  for  the  mountains  which  keep 
watch  and  ward  over  Cabul  are  very  picturesque,  rising  abruptly 
from  the  fields  below,  and  seeming  to  shut  us  out  securely  from 
the  petty  world  beyond.  News  of  that  outer  world  has  been  very 
scant  of  late,  and  it  is  with  ill-concealed  impatience  that  many  of 
us  turn  eastward  to  where  the  Ehurd  Cabul  and  Jugdulluck  Hills 
hide  the  long  valley  up  which  the  Ehyber  column  is  crawling  with 
tortoise-slowness.  There  comes  no  heliographic  flash  down  to 
cheer  ns,  and  one  might  as  well  consult  the  impassible  Hindu 
Kush    itself.      But    there    is  a  pleasanter   octlovk  westwards. 

H  2 


ICO  TJie  Afghan  War^   1879—80. 

Through  the  gorge  in  rear  of  the  city  we  catch  a  glimpse  of  the 
Chardeh  Valley,  a  very  Eden  of  fertility,  and  in  the  far  back- 
ground is  the  high  range  of  mountains  forming  the  sky-line 
towards  distant  Turkistan,  over  which  we  have  gorgeous  sunsets 
that  more  than  atone  for  the  chilliness  which  creeps  over  Siah 
Sung  Ridge  as  the  day  closes.  We  have  the  sharp  air  of  the 
early  morning  to  brace  us  for  routine  work  that  must  be  gone 
through,  and  such  genial  warmth  all  day  as  to  make  the  shade 
of  our  tight  little  tents  seem  almost  superfluous.  Whatever  of 
cold  and  discomfort  there  may  be  in  store  for  us,  we  are  comfort- 
able enough  now,  though  perhaps  the  air  bites  shrewdly  at  mid- 
night to  the  sentry  at  his  post.  His  outlook  is  chiefly  for  thieves 
who  may  think  there  is  loot  to  be  got  in  our  camp ;  but  we  seem 
to  have  frightened  the  people  into  honesty,  for  robberies  are  un- 
known. Our  camp  is  thronged  with  petty  traders,  and  in  con- 
venient spots  are  little  bazaars  for  our  soldiers  and  camp-followers, 
to  whom  they  are  a  rare  boon.  Fruit  in  abundance  is  exposed 
most  temptingly :  grapes,  apples,  pears,  and  pomegranates  being 
sold  so  cheaply  that  a  few  pice  will  buy  sufficient  to  satisfy  even 
a  soldier's  appetite;  while  melons  of  a  flavour  and  succulency 
almost  unknown  to  us  poor  dwellers  in  Hindustan  are  piled  to- 
gether in  profusion.  The  usual  curry-stuffs  and  native  delicacies 
are  ranged  alongside  these  edibles ;  and  occasionally  some  delicious 
beetroot  or  a  gigantic  cabbage  nestling  in  a  heap  of  bright-skinned 
onions  tempts  a  khansamah  doing  his  day's  marketing  to  halt  and 
haggle  in  a  lordly  manner  until  a  fair  bargain  is  struck.  The 
Afghan  "  coster  "  is  not  an  easy  personage  to  deal  with,  for  he  has 
learnt  the  value  of  our  rupees,  and  is  determined  to  make  the  most 
of  the  present  opportunity.  In  our  canvas  streets  there  is  all  day 
long  a  busy  stream  of  men  and  boys  eagerly  selling  wares  from  the 
city  and  surrounding  villages,  and  if  so  inclined  we  could  spend 
hours  in  making  casual  purchases.  In  the  early  morning  villagers 
with  their  simple  produce  of  fowls,  ducks,  pigeons,  eggs,  jars  of 
milk  and  clotted  cream — the  latter  particularly  good — come  saun- 
tering in  and  pass  away  their  time  in  intently  gazing  at  our  strange 
freaks  in  the  way  of  early  "tubs"  or  substantial  breakfasts.  Their 
livestock  slung  across  their  shoulders,  or  carelessly  carried  head 
downwards,  appears  quite  a  secondary  consideration,  until  they 


Visitors  in  Camp.  loi 

are  pounced  upon  by  some  bon-vivant,  who  thinks  life  is  not  worth 
living  if  it  is  merely  to  be  sustained  by  commissariat  rations 
— ^now,  alas  !  minus  their  redeeming  feature  of  wholesome  rum. 
Once  the  villager  sees  a  bargain  may  be  made,  he  wakes  up  sud- 
denly to  the  fact  of  having  something  to  sell,  and  in  the  patois  of 
the  country  explains  the  number  of  rupees  or  annas  he  requires. 
That  he  does  not  get  them  need  scarcely  be  said,  as  his  first  prices 
are  exorbitant ;  but  after  some  pantomimic  action,  or  by  calling  in 
the  aid  of  some  Pathan  sepoy  near  at  hand,  terms  are  arranged, 
and  vrith  the  silver  bits  stowed  away  mysteriously  in  his  waistcloth 
the  innocent  native  wends  his  way  to  another  part  of  the  camp, 
there  to  dispose  of  more  of  his  stock.  When  he  has  got  rid  of  his 
little  store  he  does  not,  as  a  conscientious  husbandman  should, 
go  quietly  home,  but  hangs  about  our  tents  with  a  face  full  of 
inquiry  and  amazement.  He  pushes  his  curiosity  at  times  almost 
to  impertinence,  perhaps  with  the  philanthropic  idea  of  giving  us 
a  few  wrinkles  as  to  the  proper  mode  of  living  in  this  part  of  the 
world ;  but  at  the  first  sharp  word  he  "  moves  on  "  a  few  paces, 
and  turns  his  attention  to  some  other  feature  of  our  local  life. 
That  he  is  poor  and  strictly  dishonest  there  can  be  no  reasonable 
doubt ;  but  his  poverty  will  pass  away  if  we  stay  long  at  Cabul, 
and  his  dishonesty  will  be  covered  vrith  the  cloak  of  simplicity  as 
long  as  military  law  prevails.  This  class  of  peasant  who  comes 
into  our  midst  is  not  of  the  usual  bloodthirsty  Afghan  type ;  and 
he  comes  too,  without  arms,  for  our  proclamation  against  carrying 
weapons  is  now  widely  known,  and  whatever  he  may  be  on  his 
native  heath,  when  his  tribe  is  on  the  war-path,  he  looks  in- 
ofiensive  enough  now. 

Among  our  other  visitors  are  the  Hazaras :  the  hewers  of  wood 
and  drawers  of  water,  as  they  have  been  called,  of  all  Afghanistan. 
Their  Mongol  type  of  face,  beardless  and  vrith  the  true  slanting 
eyes  of  their  race,  is  noticeable  at  once  among  the  Jewish-looking 
Afghans  whom  they  serve  so  well.  Sunburnt,  and  with  many 
coats  of  dirt  upon  them,  they  look  the  real  labourers  of  the  land ; 
and  as  their  stalwart  backs  are  generally  bent  under  heavy  loads  of 
firewood  or  huge  sacks  of  forage,  it  can  be  seen  they  are  no  drones. 
They  are  always  very  intent  upon  their  work,  never  loitering  or 
wonder-struck ;  and  in  this  respect  they  resemble  the  Ghoorkas. 


I02  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

They  are  good-hnmonred  and  happy  enough,  and  any  stray  salu- 
tation cast  to  them  is  always  answered  by  a  smile  and  a  nod  of 
their  felt-crowned  heads,  as  if  kindness  were  too  rare  not  to  be 
acknowledged.  Sometimes  their  burdens  are  very  different  from 
those  just  mentioned,  for  they  come  staggering  in  with  a  score  of 
matchlocks  or  Enfield  rifles  on  their  backs  which  their  village 
maliks  have  sent  in  to  be  bought  up  and  destroyed  by  the 
Sirkar.  This  bringing  in  of  arms  has  been  quite  a  feature  of 
camp  life,  it  being  by  no  means  unusual  to  meet  a  file  of  these 
men,  each  laden  with  the  guns  that  are  to  be  given  up.  They  are 
thrown  down,  and  counted  by  soldiers  told  off  for  the  duty,  and 
the  idlers  from  the  city  gather  round  to  stare  at  our  contemptuous 
examination  of  the  weapons.  As  most  of  the  guns  are  loaded  and 
even  doubled-loaded,  it  is  somewhat  risky  to  meddle  with  them ; 
but  curiosity  prompts  us  to  look  down  muzzles  and  cock  triggers 
in  a  most  reckless  way.  The  Sniders  are  safe  enough  to  handle, 
as  the  breech  can  be  opened  and  any  cartridge  withdrawn ;  but 
with  the  others  it  is  different.  Tower-marked  Enfields  rest  side 
by  side  with  the  old  two-grooved  Brunswick  rifle ;  while  Cabul- 
made  smooth-bores  and  imitation  Enfields  are  mixed  with  jhezails 
and  the  ''  Brown  Besses  "  the  Indian  Government  gave  away  so 
lavishly  in  the  days  of  their  foolishness.  We  are  destroying  these 
arms — locks,  stock,  and  barrel — except  in  the  case  of  such  Sniders 
as  seem  really  serviceable.  The  Afghan  Snider  is  by  no  means  a 
badly-made  weapon,  and  the  cartridges  from  the  Bala  EEissar 
Arsenal  are  equally  good.  The  latter  are  of  a  kind  known  as 
solid-drawn,  with  strong  bases,  and  if  recapped  can  be  used  several 
times  with  perfect  safety.  Where  machinery  and  skilled  me- 
chanics are  scarce,  this  is,  of  course,  a  great  consideration.  We 
do  not  find  many  cartridges  delivered  up,  and  it  seems  a  pity  that 
a  small  price  was  not  fixed  upon  powder  and  lead  so  as  to  make 
disarmament  more  complete.  There  are  thousands  of  good  rifles 
still  scattered  over  the  country,  in  the  hands  of  the  Amir's 
soldiers ;  and,  in  the  future,  ammunition  will  be  greatly  in  request, 
now  that  the  Bala  Hissar  has  fallen  into  our  hands.  A  few  swords, 
bayonets,  and  knives,  have  come  in,  but  they  are  of  no  account. 
We  have  received  over  8,000  rifles 'and  guns  of  the  different  kinds 
mentioned,  and  more  will,  perhaps,  be  given  up. 


An  Astute  Class.  103 

Far  removed  from  the  villagers  and  the  Hazaras  are  the  more 
pretentioas  city  traders,  who  bring  poshteens,  furs,  native  cloth, 
chinaware,  old  coins,  Bokhara  silks,  Persian  carpets,  jewellery,  and 
precions  stones  for  sale.  They  are  mostly  Eizilbashes  and  Gabul- 
bom  Hindus,  many  of  whom  have  travelled  far  and  have  seen 
most  of  the  cities  of  Central  and  Western  Asia.  As  traders  they 
are  as  keen  as  Jew  pedlars  :  as  visitors  they  make  themselves  as 
mnch  at  home  as  our  intimate  friends.  To  bargain  with  them  is 
an  exercise  in  chicanery  that  would  quicken  the  wits  of  a  Shylock  : 
to  listen  to  their  soft  flattery  as  they  extol  the  benefits  of  British 
rule  is  to  believe  that  we  are  the  finest  race  in  the  world.  The 
chicanery  is  glossed  over  and  hidden  by  the  soothing  praises  of 
our  benevolence,  and  the  crimson-turbaned  Kizilbash  or  caste- 
marked  Hindu,  who  has  sat  himself  on  our  stool  or  squatted  in 
our  tent  is  enriched  accordingly.  We  buy  furs  that  would  cost 
ns  less  in  Peshawur,  and  silks  that,  perhaps,  have  never  seen  a 
Bokhara  loom,  and  think  we  have  done  well  in  our  bargaining ; 
whereas,  most  likely,  the  worthy  traders  have  netted  excessive 
profits.  It  is  the  old  story  of  our  rupees  filling  the  coffers  of  the 
people  we  have  come  among  as  conquerors,  and  of  our  pride  for- 
bidding us  to  acknowledge  it.  And  yet  we  enjoy  the  chaffering 
with  these  rsiscals,  and  find  an  amusement  in  making  them  turn 
out  their  pockets.  From  one  will  be  produced  a  rare  fox-skin, 
from  another  a  Russian  tea-cup  and  saucer  (made  in  England, 
but  stamped  with  the  Moscow  dealer's  name);  from  a  third  a  little 
packet  of  diamonds  or  turquoises — the  latter  often  of  a  beautiful 
colour,  but  marred  by  flaws.  Then  the  rings  on  the  man's  finger 
are  taken  off  and  examined,  the  owner  fixing  a  price  that  is  almost 
prohibitive  on  each  stone ;  or  a  curiously- worked  belt  and  pouch 
is  unbuckled  at  our  insistance,  and  appraised  in  the  usual  way. 
And  so  on  to  the  end  of  the  chapter.  But  Kizilbash  or  Hindu  is 
more  than  a  match  for  the  Western  Kafir ;  and  one  is  tempted  to 
believe  that  the  Caucasian  is  really  *^  played  out "  as  far  as  astuteness 
in  trading  goes.  Perhaps  we  may  be  more  successful  in  dealing 
with  the  genuine  Afghan  in  the  city  bazaars  which  we  are  now 
beginning  to  visit. 

Besides  the  mercenary  bartering  that  wiles  away  our  leisure, 
there  is  plenty  of  stir  and  excitement  in  our  camp  life.     Maliks 


104  The  Afghan  Wary  1879—80. 

and  chiefs  from  a  distance  are  met  in  little  knots,  seeking  out 
the  political  officers,  or  waiting  npon  the  commissariat  officers  to 
enter  into  contracts  for  food  supply;  gaily-apparalled  horsemen 
come  to  show  off  the  graces  of  their  Turcoman  steeds;  while 
ragged  urchins  on  yahoos,  the  strong  ponies  peculiar  to  the  country, 
ride  here  and  there  in  easy  confidence,  halting  occasionally  to  ex- 
change opinions  on  local  affairs.  Near  the  head-quarters  of  the 
1st  Brigade  is  quite  a  little  horse-fair,  where  General  Macpherson 
passes  in  review  some  hundreds  of  yaboos  daily,  and  purchases 
largely  for  transport  purposes.  The  noisy,  chattering  crowd  is 
densest  here,  and  the  yaboo  fights  are  numerous,  each  pony  choos- 
ing his  nearest  neighbour  as  a  fit  object  of  attack.  Near  by  is  the 
Amir's  tent  with  its  little  cluster  of  attendants'  pals  about  it, 
and  a  sentry  from  a  guard  of  Europeans  stationed  over  them 
pacing  smartly  to  and  fro.  At  times  a  few  prisoners  with  an 
escort  of  sepoys  are  marched  past  on  their  way  to  the  tent  in 
head-quarters,  where  the  military  commission  sits  which  is  to  try 
them;  or  on  '^  execution  days"  a  company  of  Europeans  swing 
past  with  one  or  two  men  in  their  midst,  and  take  the  path 
down  the  ridge  to  the  Bala  Hissar,  where  the  gallows  is  waiting 
ready.  On  the  circular  bit  of  raised  ground,  at  the  western  end 
of  the  head-quarters'  camp  and  overlooking  the  city,  is  a  little 
party  of  signallers  near  a  large  brass  field-piece  captured  at 
Sherpur,  and  now  used  *as  a  time-gun.  The  heliograph  flashes 
up  in  response  to  one  on  the  Bala  Hissar  ridge,  which  is  speaking 
t.o  Eushi,  and  we  know  that  news  is  travelling  to  and  from  the 
Shutargardan.  In  the  evening  one  of  the  bands  plays  on  this 
natural  band-stand,  around  the  flag-staff  which  is  reared  in  the 
centre,  and  with  the  last  strains  of  *'  God  Save  the  Queen"  our 
day  closes,  the  flag  is  furled,  and  we  pass  into  the  warmth  and 
comfort  of  our  snug  little  tents.  Beneath  .all  this  surface  of 
visible  camp-life  is  the  steady  current  of  routine  work  which  goes 
on  unceasingly  and  smoothly,  no  outside  influences  acting  as 
disturbing  agents.  Our  men  are  healthy  and  contented;  their 
wounded  comrades  are  doing  well ;  supplies  are  coming  in 
abundantly  ;  and,  looking  down  upon  Sherpur,  we  see  that  warm 
winter  quarters  are  being  got  ready  ;  so  all,  apart  from  political 
questions,  is  rose-coloured. 


Yakub  Khan  Abdicates.  105 

Camp  Siah  Sung,  28<A  October. 

This  morning  only  did  it  become  publicly  known  that  Yakub 
Ehan  had  abdicated  the  AmirBhip,  the  newspapers  brought  in  by 
the  mail  from  India  giving  all  beyond  General  Boberts  and  his 
inmiediate  advisers  their  first  news  of  the  occurrence.  It  was, 
of  course,  on  account  of  possible  mischief  ensuing  if  the  abdica- 
tion were  made  known  and  the  Government  afterwards  refused  to 
accept  it,  that  secrecy  was  observed  regarding  the  Amir's  act ; 
and,  singularly  enough,  while  people  in  India  and  England  have' 
been  speculating  as  to  the  probable  consequences  of  the  step,  we 
on  the  spot  have  been  in  happy  ignorance  of  the  under-current  of 
events.  The  incidents  of  the  abdication  were  as  follows  :-^ 
October  12  th  was  the  day  appointed  for  the  Proclamation  in  the 
Bala  Hissar,  at  which  the  Amir  had  been  ordered  to  attend.  At 
six  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  that  day  he  left  his  camp  below  the 
Siah  Sung  Bidge,  and  went  with  only  two  servants  to  Major 
Hastings,  Chief  Political  Officer,  and  asked  for  an  immediate  inter- 
view with  General  Boberts.  In  a  few  minutes  he  was  ushered 
into  the  General's  tent,  and  at  his  request  a  private  interview  was 
granted.  Yakub  Khan  was  greatly  excited,  and  he  abruptly 
announced  his  intention  of  resigning  the  Amirship.  His  life, 
he  said,  had  become  so  miserable  that  he  could  no  longer  endure 
it.  Sir  F.  Boberts  at  once  asked  him  to  consider  what  he  was 
saying,  as  abdication  was  a  very  serious  step.  The  Amir  persisted 
in  saying  that  his  mind  was  made  up  ;  he  had  intended  to  resign 
t  at  Kushi,  but  was  persuaded  by  his  Ministers  not  to  do  so.  Now 
he  would  sooner  be  a  grass-cutter  in  the  British  camp  than  remain 
Amir  of  Cab.ul.  He  earnestly  wished  that  his  resignation  should 
be  accepted ;  and,  for  himself,  he  was  ready  to  go  to  India, 
London,  Malta,  or  wherever  the  Viceroy  should  choose  to  send 
him.  General  Boberts  again  requested  him  to  reconsider  the 
matter,  and  placed  a  tent  at  his  disposal  near  head-quarters.  At 
ten  o'clock,  the  hour  fixed  for  falling  in  for  the  procession  to  the 
Bala  Hissar,  the  Amir  again  visited  the  General,  and  announced 
that  his  decision  was  fixed :  he  wished  to  resign  at  once.  Sir  F. 
Boberts  replied  that  he  himself  could  not  accept  the  resignation 
without  having  consulted  the  Viceroy,  and  he  asked  the  Amir  to 


io6  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

let  matters  remain  in  statu  quo  until  an  answer  could  be  received 
from  Simla,  the  British  authorities  in  the  meantime  carrying  on 
the  Government  in  the  Amir*s  name.  Yakub  Khan  agreed  to 
this  without  further  parley,  but  asked  permission  to  absent  himself 
from  the  Bala  Hissar  that  morning,  as  the  excitement  and  trouble 
he  had  undergone  had  made  him  ill.  He  would  order  his  eldest 
son  and  all  the  principal  sirdars  to  attend  and  hear  the  Proclama- 
tion read.  He  was  accordingly  excused,  and  the  same  afternoon 
his  tents  and  those  of  his  personal  attendants  were  moved  to  the 
head-quarters.  He  knew  nothing  of  the  contents  of  the  Procla- 
mation of  October  12th,  and  was  quite  unaware  of  the  intended 
arrest  of  his  Ministers.  Such  were  the  circumstances  attending 
his  abdication. 

Up  to  this  afternoon  it  was  believed  that  the  ex- Amir  was 
acting  in  good  faith,  but  within  the  last  few  hours  we  have  had 
reason  to  change  our  opinion.  Since  the  entrance  into  the  Bala 
Hissar,  on  October  12th,  Yakub  Khan  has  been  living  in  a  large 
tent  close  to  head-quarters,  and  has  had  about  him  a  little  army 
of  servants,  whose  tents  also  have  been  pitched  about  that  of  their 
master.  He  was  reported  to  be  much  happier  in  his  mind  now 
that  his  scheming  Ministers  had  been  removed  from  about  his 
person,  and  once  or  twice  he  had  shown  himself  among  us  in  the 
evening,  walking  with  General  Koberts  up  and  down  the  row  of 
tents  in  which  the  Staff  are  lodged,  and  listening  with  much 
delight  to  the  band  playing  near.  The  restraint  placed  upon  him 
after  he  had  come  voluntarily  into  our  camp  from  among  his  own 
people  on  the  lower  slope  of  the  Bidge,  was  merely  that  a  guard 
of  twenty  European  soldiers  was  stationed  over  his  tents,  while  two 
sentries  paced  before  them  night  and  day.  This  was  his  "  guard  of 
honour"  nominally,  though  if  he  had  tried  to  escape  they  would 
instantly  have  become  his  gaolers.  It  was  most  important  that 
we  should  have  him  with  us  while  we  were  examining  into  the 
guilt  of  the  various  persons  concerned  in  the  Massacre ;  for  if 
once  he  had.been  a  free  agent,  he  would  probably  have  been  made 
an  instrument  of  intrigue  by  such  men  as  the  Mustaufi  and  the 
Wazir.  This  was  proved  by  the  episode  of  Nek  Mahomed's  visit 
to  him  at  Gharasia  the  day  before  the  action  of  the  6th,  the  com- 
mander-in-chief of  the  rebel  army  returning  to  Gabul  and  pro- 


General  Roberts  assumes  the  Government.       107 

claiming  that  the  Amir  had  ordered  all  men  to  resist  the  British 
force.  Thns  was  there  every  reason  to  keep  him  under  fairly  close 
surveillance,  as  the  scattered  units  of  his  disbanded  army  are  still 
capable  of  doing  harm  if  once  gathered  together.  In  my  letter  of 
the  23rd  I  pointed  out  very  fuUy  the  anomalous  position  we  were 
occupying  here :  proclaiming  the  Amir's  authority  on  the  one 
hand,  and  appropriating  all  his  stores  and  munitions  of  war  on 
the  other.  This  was,  of  course,  written  without  knowledge  of 
what  had  occurred  on  the  12th ;  and,  viewed  in  the  new  light 
that  has  now  scattered  the  political  darkness  here,  the  anomaly  at 
once  vanishes.  Yakub  Khan  had  voluntarily  cast  away  all  power 
and  responsibility,  and  the  only  course  remaining  for  Sir  F. 
Roberts  was  to  assume  the  discarded  authority  and  take  every 
means  to  secure  order  in  Gabul.  The  clearing  out  of  the  Bala 
Hissar  and  the  appropriation  of  all  that  it  contained,  except 
Yakub  Khan's  personal  property,  now  stands  out  as  merely  an 
ordinary  taking-over  of  effects  surrendered  to  us,  and  not  the 
spoliation  of  a  sovereign  whose  authority  we  were  re-establishing. 
We  could  not,  in  fact,  have  done  otherwise,  unless  we  had  waited 
for  a  declaration  of  the  ministerial  policy  at  home,  and  the  delay 
might,  perhaps,  have  had  mischievous  results. 

Now  it  is  all  plain-sailing.  We  know  what  our  course  is  to  be, 
and  we  can  follow  it  out  consistently.  Yakub  Khan  as  Amir 
was  merely  a  puppet ;  and  government  through  such  a  medium 
is  always  unsatisfactory.  Now  his  position  is  simplified — and 
simpUfied,  too,  by  his  own  act — ^though  his  future  position  in  life 
not  a  man  in  camp  can  foreshadow.  The  proclamation  accepting 
his  abdication  was  received  here  from  Simla  by  cypher  telegram 
on  the  26th ;  and  to-day  a  translation  of  it  was  issued  to  the 
chief  sirdars  of  Cabul,  who  cannot  mistake  the  meaning  conveyed 
in  the  following  terse  sentences  : — 

"  I,  General  Roberts,  on  behalf  of  the  British  Government,  here- 
by proclaim  that  the  Amir  having  of  his  own  free  will  abdicated, 
has  left  Afghanistan  without  a  Government.  In  consequence  of 
the  shameful  outrage  upon  its  Envoy  and  mite^  the  British  Govern- 
ment has  been  compelled  to  occupy  by  force  of  arms  Cabul,  the 
capital,  and  take  military  possession  of  other  parts  of  Afghanistan. 
The  British  Government  now  commands  that  all  Afghan  authori- 


io8  The  AfgJian  War,  1879—80. 

ties,  chiefs,  and  sirdars  do  continue  their  functions  in  maintaining 
order,  referring  to  me  whenever  necessary.  The  British  Govern- 
ment desires  that  the  people  shall  be  treated  with  justice  and 
benevolence,  and  that  their  religious  feelings  and  customs  be 
respected.  The  services  of  such  sirdars  and  chiefs  as  assist  in 
preserving  order  will  be  duly  recognized  ;  but  all  disturbers  of  the 
peace  and  persons  concerned  in  attacks  upon  the  British  authority 
will  meet  with  condign  punishment.  The  British  Government, 
after  consultation  with  the  principal  sirdars,  tribal  chiefs,  and 
others  representing  the  interests  and  wishes  of  the  various  pro- 
vinces and  cities,  will  declare  its  will  as  to  the  future  permanent 
arrangements  to  be  made  for  the  good  government  of  the  people." 

Judging  from  internal  evidence,  this  Proclamation  bears  the 
stamp  of  the  home  Ministry,  and  it  has  been  hailed  with 
unbounded  satisfaction  by  all  among  us  who  have  been  fearing 
a  repetition  of  the  old  shilly-shally  policy  which  has  had  such 
disastrous  results.  The  Government  has  now  committed  itself  to 
a  distinct  policy  which  can  be  proclaimed  throughout  Afghanistan, 
and  our  duty  now  is  to  wait  until  ''  the  principal  sirdars,  tribal 
chiefs,  and  others  representing  the  interests  and  wishes  of  the 
various  provinces  and  cities,"  have  been  made  aware  of  what  has 
occurred.  Messengers  will  be  sent  with  copies  of  the  Proclama- 
tion to  them  ;  and  they  will  no  doubt  be  invited  to  come  to  Gabul, 
and  hear  the  "  will "  of  the  British  Government.  It  is  no  longer 
a  question  of  the  "  wishes  "  of  the  Viceroy  of  India,  but  a  distinct 
assertion  of  our  newly-acquired  power  in  Afghanistan. 

To-day  has  been  marked,  also,  not  only  by  the  issue  of  the 
Proclamation,  but  by  a  new  change  of  front  on  the  part  of  Yakub 
Ehan.  Whatever  his  fears  or  suspicions  may  be,  or  whatever 
guilty  consciousness  he  may  have  of  participation  in  the  Massacre, 
he  has  withdrawn  so  far  from  his  position  of  the  12th — ^when 
he  said  he  would  willingly  go  wherever  the  Viceroy  might  deport 
him :  to  India,  London,  or  Malta — that  he  has  contemplated  flight 
to  Turkistan.  Such,  at  least,  is  the  information  generally  believed 
to  have  been  received  ;  and  the  action  taken  this  afternoon  proves 
that  he  has  so  far  committed  himself  as  to  jeopardize  his  future 
freedom.  About  five  o'clock  his  tent  was  isolated  by  the  removal  of 
all  those  of  his  servants  pitched  about  it :  his  guard  was  increased 


The  Ex- Amir  under  Guard.  109 

to  forty  British  soldiers,  and  instead  of  two  sentries  there  are  now 
four  pacing  to  and  fro  with  fixed  bayonets.  A  fifth  sentry  is  with- 
in the  tent  itself,  and  the  ex- Amir  is  as  close  a  prisoner  as  he  can 
be  made.  Four  personal  attendants  only  are  now  allowed  to  him, 
and  these,  also,  are  under  guard.  His  food  will  be  examined  carefully 
before  it  is  passed  to  his  servants,  and  every  possible  precaution 
against  outside  information  being  conveyed  to  him  will  be  taken. 

Gamp  Siah  Suno,  80^A  October. 

Since  the  issue  of  the  Proclamation  and  the  close  confinement 
of  Yakub  Khan  to  his  tent  two  days  ago,  there  has  been  no  further 
development  of  the  situation,  and  it  seems  as  if  we  should  quietly 
wait  here  for  the  winter  in  order  to  allow  events  to  develop  them- 
selves vrithout  farther  demonstration  of  our  force.  We  have 
Cabul  city  and  its  guilt  to  deal  with ;  and  though  there  are  few 
outward  signs  of  the  investigation  into  the  circumstances  sur- 
rounding the  Massacre  of  our  Embassy,  there  is  a  steady  stream 
of  work  running  on,  the  results  of  which  have  yet  to  be  declared. 
This  has  been  done  chiefly  by  Colonel  Macgregor,  aided  hitherto 
by  Hyat  Khan,  Assistant  Political  Officer,  who  ferrets  out  persons 
likely  to  give  evidence ;  and  now  that  Dr.  Bellew  (the  third  member 
of  the  Commission)  has  arrived,  still  further  progress  is  being 
made  in  unravelling  the  complicated  web  of  falsehood  which  has 
been  drawn  about  the  occurrence.  Sixty  witnesses  have  been 
examined  privately;  and,  as  each  one  is  quite  in  ignorance  of 
what  has  been  said  before,  the  truth  of  the  various  stories  told 
ean  be  tested  by  the  comparisons  drawn  between  the  testimony  of 
the  friends  and  enemies  of  Yakub  Ehan.  Such  of  his  late  confi- 
dential advisers  and  adherents  as  have  come  under  cross-examina- 
tion have  generally  injured  his  cause  by  affirming  too  much  ;  and 
plausible  stories  have  been  concocted  to  divert  attention  from  his 
shortcoming  in  not  affording  material  aid  to  Sir  Louis  Cavagnari. 
Much,  for  instance,  has  been  made  of  the  little  flash  of  energy  he 
showed  in  sending  Daoud  Shah  and  thirty  men  to  remonstrate 
with  the  mutineers ;  and  it  has  been  asserted  that  the  determined 
attitude  of  the  rabble  was  proved  by  Daoud  Shah  being  bayoneted 
and  all  his  escort  killed.  But  when  this  episode  is  looked  closely 
into,  and  a  little  independent  evidence  is  taken,  it  becomes  appar- 


no  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

ent  that  Daoud  Shah  had  merely  a  few  attendants  with  him,  and 
none  of  these  were  killed ;  while  he  himself  was  by  no  means  so 
maltreated  as  he  would  have  us  believe.  There  is  another  inci- 
denty  too,  which  assumes  a  new  complexion  when  carefully  exam- 
ined. Soon  after  the  Massacre,  Yakub  Ehan  put  to  death  Abdul 
Earim,  a  powerful  Eohistani  chief,  whose  English  proclivities  were 
very  pronounced.  The  explanation  of  this  act,  as  given  by 
Abdullah  Gyaz  (a  confidential  adviser  of  the  ex- Amir,  arrested 
yesterday)  is  that  Yakub  Ehan  sent  that  chief  from  his  palace  to 
remonstrate  with  the  troops,  and  that,  instead  of  carrying  out  his 
orders,  he  gave  direct  encouragement  to  the  mutineers,  and  urged 
them  to  continue  their  attack  on  the  Besidency.  Upon  Abdul 
Earim's  return  to  the  palace,  Abdullah  Gyaz  affirms,  Yakub  Ehan 
was  informed  of  his  treacherous  disobedience,  and,  after  the  Mas- 
sacre had  taken  place,  ordered  that  he  should  be  executed.  This 
story  is  so  utterly  improbable  that  it  is  scarcely  worth  considera- 
tion ;  but  its  falsity  has  been  proved  very  directly,  as  the  name  of 
every  man  of  importance  who  went  near  the  mutinous  troops  has 
been  obtained  from  various  sources,  friendly  and  otherwise,  and 
Abdul  Earim  has  never  before  been  mentioned  in  the  list. 
The  inference  that  suggests  itself  is  that  the  wire-pullers  about 
Yakub  Ehan  were  distrustful  of  Abdul  Earim,  whose  honesty  of 
purpose  and  known  sympathy  with  the  English  rendered  him  a 
dangerous  personage  in  their  eyes,  and  on  the  principle  that  dead 
men  tell  no  tales,  they  induced  the  Amir  to  sanction  his  execution. 
He  probably  knew  too  much,  and  was  put  out  of  the  way  before 
he  had  an  opportunity  of  using  his  knowledge.  In  an  investiga- 
tion, such  as  that  now  going  on,  it  is  only  possible  to  shape  out 
conclusions  by  inference,  for  even  such  witnesses  as  profess  un- 
bounded friendship  towards  us  lie  so  circumstantially  to  serve  their 
own  ends,  that  very  little  reliance  can  be  placed  on  them.  It  is 
not  as  if  a  long  period  had  elapsed  since  the  events  took  place  : 
the  occurrence  must  still  be  fresh  in  the  minds  of  everybody  :  but 
there  is  such  a  tendency  to  intrigue  now  that  our  power  is  estab- 
lished in  Cabul,  that  distrust  is  bred  in  our  minds  in  an  increasing 
ratio  as  the  evidence  accumulates.  There  is  no  bottom  to  the 
well  in  which  Afghan  truth  was  sunk  ages  ago,  and  it  is  disheart- 
ening to  sound  it  now.     The  ex- Amir's  partisans  have  lied  hon- 


Proceedings  of  the  Military  Commission.       1 1 1 

estly  enough  to  shield  their  master,  while  he  was  still  protected  by 
US  ;  bnt  now  that  he  is  a  nonentity,  and  all  semblance  of  power 
has  passed  from  him,  there  may  be  a  change  in  their  attitude. 
They  have  a  certain  rude  idea  of  faithfulness  to  their  salt ;  but 
when  they  see  their  Chief  arrested  without  a  word  of  warning, 
after  being  allowed  to  move  freely  among  us  for  weeks,  their 
fortitude  may  not  be  equal  to  the  emergency,  and  they  may  seek 
to  purchase  their  own  safety  by  voluntary  disclosures.  For  these 
we  must  wait. 

In  the  mean  time  the  smaller  fry  are  being  dealt  with  by  the 
Military  Commission,  under  whose  orders  eleven  prisoners  have 
been  hanged.  The  order  of  procedure  is  that  the  case  against  men 
under  arrest  is  fiiUy  gone  into  by  Colonel  Macgregor,  aided  by  Hyat 
Khan  ;  and  when  the  evidence  and  witnesses  are  ready,  the  pris- 
oners are  "  committed,"  so  to  say,  to  the  Commission,  just  as  in 
ordinary  criminal  inquiries  they  would  be  passed  from  the  Police 
Magistrate  to  the  Assize  Judge.  There  is  no  unseemly  hurry  or 
vindictive  haste  displayed  in  the  inquiry.  All  goes  on  systematic- 
ally and  deliberately ;  and  before  the  Commission  the  men  under 
arrest  are  allowed  to  hear  all  that  has  been  stated  against  them 
and  to  give  such  explanation  as  they  desire.  If  there  then  appears 
new  matter  for  inquiry,  they  are  remanded  from  day  to  day  ;  and 
no  effort  is  spared,  in  common  fairness  to  them,  to  test  the  truth 
of  their  statements.  If  found  guilty,  they  are  condemned  to 
death ;  but  even  then  the  sentence  is  not  carried  out  without 
reference  to  a  third  source  of  authority — that  of  Sir  Frederick 
Roberts  himself.  If  he  approves  the  finding,  he  signs  the  order 
for  execution,  and  the  Provost-Marshal  has  then  to  fulfil  the  duty 
of  his  office  without  delay.  But  if  there  seem  doubtful  points 
strong  enough  to  be  yet  a  third  time  considered,  the  sentence  of 
death  is  held  in  suspense ;  and  even  now  we  have  in  our  quarter- 
guards  men  in  this  stage,  with  the  halter  dangling  before  their 
eyes.  It  will  be  seen  that  nothing  can  be  fairer  than  the  course 
taken  by  Sir  Frederick  Boberts  to  punish  such  as  deserve  death 
for  their  past  actions  in  the  early  weeks  of  September ;  and  in  the 
fiace  of  it  there  is  none  of  that  reckless  blood-spilling  which  we 
may  get  the  credit  for.     In  our  Assize  the  old  line — 

*^  And  wretchei  hang  that  jurymen  may  dine— >" 


112  Tlie  Afghan  War^  1879—80. 

is  unknown :  and  if  there  is  grumbling  occasionally  at  the  pains 
taken  to  convict  prisoners  instead  of  hanging  them  on  mere  sus- 
picion,  it  is  all  the  more  creditable  to  our  Chief  and  his  Commis- 
sioners that  no  attention  is  paid  to  it.  To-day  two  men  were 
marched  off  to  execution  who  richly  deserved  their  fate.  The 
one  was  the  jemadar  of  the  rascally  Kotwal  of  Cabul,  himself 
hanged  on  the  20th.  Like  the  Eotwal,  he  was  most  servile  in 
offering  aid  to  us  after  our  arrival,  and,  on  the  night  of  the  8th, 
acted  as  a  guide  to  some  troops  marching  up  the  Bala  Hissar 
Bidge,  in  connection  with  the  action  against  the  rebels  on  that  day. 
The  second  prisoner  was  a  Mahomedan  resident  of  Cabul,  in 
whose  house  a  box,  marked  ''  Cabul  Embassy,'*  was  found  by  a 
searching  party  of  the  28th  Begiment.  He  could  give  no  explana- 
tion of  how  he  came  by  the  box,  except  the  colourless  one  that  it 
had  been  placed  in  his  rooms  by  an  enemy.  Several  guns  and 
swords  were  also  found  in  his  house  ;  and,  nothing  in  his  favour 
being  forthcoming,  he  was  sent  to  execution.  The  guilt  or  inno- 
cence of  the  confidential  friends  of  Yakub  Khan,  who  are  now 
prisoners,  is  still  a  question  of  doubt ;  but  none  are  arrested  with- 
out justification,  and  their  cases  will  undergo  the  usual  scrutiny. 

There  is  a  probability  that  the  taking  of  Cabul  may  not  be  so 
barren  as  we  first  thought-in  the  matter  of  loot.  The  city  itself 
having  been  respected,  there  was  not  much  to  get  out  of  the  Bala 
Hissar  beyond  warlike  stores  and  ammunition.  But  to-day  the 
news  has  been  made  known  that  a  vast  store  of  treasure  is  hidden 
in  houses  belonging  to  Yakub  Khan,  or  his  near  relatives  living 
within  the  walls.  Our  treasure-chest  has  sunk  very  low  of  ate 
by  reason  of  the  enormous  purchases  made  by  the  Conmiissariat, 
which  has  to  provide  five  months'  stores  for  the  army.  Carriage 
was  so  scarce  when  we  marched  up  from  Ali  Kheyl,  that  only  a 
few  lakhs  were  brought  up,  and  poverty  is  staring  us  in  the  face. 
Such  expedients  as  giving  bills  upon  India  to  Hindu  and  Kizilbash 
merchants  in  Cabul,  or  in  receiving  from  Wali  Mahomed  and  his 
sirdars  many  thousands  of  Bokhara  gold  tlllahz  (worth  Rs.  9  or 
Bs.  10  each),  or  Bussian  five-rouble  pieces  said  to  be  worth  Bs. 
11-8,  though  nobody  really  knows  their  legitimate  market  value — 
such  expedients  could  not  last  long ;  and  as  nothing  has  been  done 
to  exact  the  fine  imposed  upon  the  Cabulis,  it  was  clear  that  specie 


Discovery  of  Treasure.  113 

would  have  to  be  raised  from  some  source  yet  untouched.  It  is 
said  that  Yakub  Ehan,  on  assuming  the  Amirship,  appropriated 
many  lakhs  of  rupees  which  his  father  had  given  to  the  mother  of 
Abdullah  Jan,  Shore  Ali's  favourite  son,  and  these  he  had  cleared 
out  of  the  Bala  Hissar,  and,  with  other  property  of  value,  had 
hidden  in  the  city.  A  little  party  of  British  soldiers  filed  off  to 
the  house  indicated  by  our  informers  this  morning,  and  the  officer 
in  charge  of  our  treasure-chest  (Major  Moriarty)  and  Lieutenant 
Neville  Chamberlain,  Assistant  Political  Officer,  had  soon  their 
eyes  gladdened  by  bags  and  boxes  of  gold  coins,  besides  finding 
on  all  sides  rich  sUks,  brocades,  and  other  portable  property  of 
enormous  value.  About  eight  lakhs  in  gold  were  secured,  and 
native  rumour  affirms  that  before  the  examination  comes  to 
an  end,  a  million  sterling  may  be  unearthed.  Boxes  innumerable 
have  still  to  be  opened,  and  our  spies  are  firm  in  their  assurance 
that  the  value  in  coin  and  precious  stones  alone  is  eighty  lakhs  of 
rupees.  To-morrow  the  examination  of  the  place  will  be  continued, 
and  it  is  hoped  another  good  day*s  find  will  be  the  result.  This 
prize-money,  for  no  doubt  it  will  be  considered  as  such,  if  it  is 
confiscated,  will  be  a  just  reward  for  the  energy  and  dash  our 
commander  and  his  troops  have  shown  in  the  capture  of  Gabul ; 
and  even  if  it  is  found  necessary  to  use  the  money  now  for  our 
immediate  wants,  the  debtor  and  creditor  account  should  be  care- 
folly  kept  in  view  of  future  distribution.  Such  scandals  as  that  of 
Delhi  and  Eirwee  need  not  be  repeated  in  the  case  of  Cabul.* 

*  It  has  since  been  ruled  that  the  treasore  is  not  to  he  considered  prize-money. 
Abdnr  Rahman,  npon  his  accession  to  the  Amirship,  was  giyen  19}  hkkhs  of  rupees,  of 
wich  9}  wiU  appear  in  the  accounts  as  "  refunded  to  the  Afghan  GoTemment.*'  This 
was  the  sum  found  in  Gabul  as  detailed  above. 


114  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 


CHAPTER  X. 

The  Force  moves  into  Sherpur  Cantonments — ^Building  Winter  Quarters — ^The  Sirdar  and 
the  Soldier — A  Trying  Climate — General  Macpherson  starts  for  Jngdnllack — Arrival 
of  Stores  from  the  Shutargarden — ^The  Khyber  line  of  Communication — ^Various 
Routes  to  Jugdulluck— The  Luttabund  Kotal— The  Chinari  Bonte— The  Khnrd 
Cabul  Defile — Its  Difficulties  Exaggerated — General  Macpherson  marches  to  Sei 
Baba — Reception  of  the  Shutargardan  Garrison — Padshah  Khan  dismissed  to  his 
Home— Death  of  AUahaddin. 

Shebpur  Gantonmbnts,  \zi  Novernber. 

The  scattered  camp  on  the  Siah  Sang  Ridge,  though  well  situated 
from  a  military  point  of  view,  and  extremely  healthy  and  dry,  in- 
volved such  heavy  duties  for  the  troops,  that  it  was  resolved  to 
move  into  these  cantonments  sooner  than  was  originally  intended. 
The  reserve  Commissariat  stores  were  aU  sent  here;  and  as  a 
Iftrge  quantity  of  food  had  also  to  be  kept  at  Siah  Sung,  there  was 
double  guard-duty  to  be  done ;  and  this  in  addition  to  such  work 
as  furnishing  a  picquet  on  the  Bala  Hissar  Heights,  a  strong  guard 
in  the  city,  another  over  the  Amir's  tent,  and  a  third  to  watch  the 
excavations  in  the  Residency  and  the  Arsenal  ruins.  Besides  all 
these,  the  European  regiments  had  nearly  every  day  to  send  a 
company  to  guard  prisoners  on  their  way  to  execution,  while  the 
cavalry  were  out  on  escort  duty  with  Commissariat  officers,  buy- 
ing up  food,  forage,  and  firewood.  All  these  multifarious  duties 
resulted,  technically,  in  giving  the  men  only  two  nights  a  week  in 
bed  ;  and  as  after  sunset  the  cold  makes  itself  felt  very  sharply, 
the  work  became  very  trying.  The  5th  Ghoorkas  and  23rd 
Pioneers,  too,  were  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  force,  being 
sent  down  here  to  build  their  winter  quarters,  the  barracks  built 
by  Shere  Ali  not  being  equal  to  accommodating  aU  the  regiments. 
Under  these  circumstances  it  was  thought  best  to  move  everybody 
to  Sherpur — except,  of  course,  such  regiments  as  were  to  move 
out  towards  Jugdulluck  for  the  purpose  of  opening  up  communica- 
tion with  the  Khyber  Force.  We  struck  our  tents  on  Siah  Sung  Ridge 
yesterday  morning  at  nine  o'clock,  and  we  are  here  encamped  on 


The  British  m  Sherpur.  115 

the  caliiTatdd  fields  which  the  three  walls  of  the  cantonment 
enclose.  The  change  is  one  for  the  better,  as  all  duties  are 
lightened,  picquets  only  being  wanted  on  the  Bemaru  Heights, 
which  shut  us  in  on  the  north  side.  A  few  sentries  at  the  five 
large  gates,  and  others  scattered  about  the  camp,  are  all  that  are 
required ;  and  orders  can  be  transmitted  to  regiments  or  brigades 
in  a  few  moments,  as  all  are  within  the  line  of  walls.  Some 
thousands  of  masons,  carpenters,  and  Hazara  coolies  are  busily 
engaged  under  our  Engineer  officers  in  plastering,  whitewashing, 
and  making  generally  comfortable  the  long  rows  of  rooms  once 
intended  for  the  Afghan  army,  while  blocks  of  rooms  are  also 
being  buUt  in  the  open  for  such  regiments  as  have  not  had  quarters 
assigned  to  them  in  Share  Ali's  barracks.  The  foundations  of  a 
pretentious  palace  had  been  begun  by  our  late  enemy  at  the  foot  of 
the  Bemaru  hills,  and  three  sides  of  this  bad  been  raised  some 
six  or  seven  feet  high — good,  solid  masonry,  well  cemented 
together.  Mud  buildings,  with  wooden  firamework,  are  being 
raised  on  both  sides  of  these  walls  by  the  Ghoorkas ;  and  as  they 
work  with  their  customary  earnestness  in  things  great  and  small, 
they  will  soon  be  under  first-rate  shelter.  The  Pioneers  are  build- 
ing their  barracks  a  little  higher  up  the  Ridge  to  the  north-east, 
bat  only  one  company  is  now  engaged  on  them,  the  regiment 
being  away  on  service  with  General  Macpherson,  who  has  started 
eastwards  to  join  hands  with  General  Charles  Gough's  Brigade, 
now  somewhere  near  Gundamak,  on  the  Ehyber  side.  Wood  in 
abundance,  from  the  houses  in  the  Bala  Hissar,  has  been  brought 
in ;  and  in  the  matter  of  doors  and  windows,  Cabul  mt^tm  are 
hard  at  work  all  day,  turning  them  out  by  the  score.  There  is 
much  to  be  done  yet  before  we  are  all  housed  for  the  winter,  and 
the  camp-followers  and  kahars  have  yet  to  be  provided  for,  it  being 
found  impossible  to  clear  out  the  Bemaru  village  for  them,  as  the 
inhabitants  are  more  numerous  than  were  at  first  supposed,  and 
tiiey  would  have  difficulty  in  finding  shelter  in  Cabul  or  the 
villages  about.  Bemaru,  which  is  embraced  within  the  line  of 
fortifications,  will,  therefore,  remain  undisturbed,  for  the  present. 
If  Bemaru  could  be  turned  into  a  large  bazaar  it  would  be  a  great 
gain,  as  the  Cabul  bazaar  is  a  mile  and  a  half  away ;  and  when  snow 
is  on  the  ground,  such  a  distance  cannot  be  travelled  daily  by  our 

I  2 


ii6  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

sepoys  and  followers  without  much  discomfort.  With  native 
troops,  and  even  European  soldiers  accustomed  to  Indian  stations, 
a  bazaar  is  almost  a  necessity,  as  little  additions  to  the  men's 
rations  and  clothing  can  be  picked  up  in  it — all  tending  to  keep 
them  more  contented  and  in  better  health.  It  is  needless  to 
say  that  stringent  rules  will  be  framed  against  the  vending  of 
native  liquors;  but  these  are  most  unpalatable,  as  a  rule,  and 
are  not  likely  to  be  much  in  request.  A  mixture  of  strong  Hol- 
lands gin  and  fusil  oil,  flavoured  with  turpentine,  may  give  you 
some  idea  of  Afghan  arrack,  but  it  must  be  tasted  to  be  fully 
appreciated.  We  have  been  so  long  without  rum,  that  a  few 
strong  stomachs  have  been  found  equal  to  grappling  with  it  when 
largely  diluted  with  water;  but,  as  a  "  dram,"  it  would  choke  off 
a  highly-seasoned  Dutch  skipper.  Then,  as  food  is  good  and 
plentiful,  there  is  not  the  demand  for  strong  liquor  that  there 
might  otherwise  be.  Besides,  hard  work  keeps  the  soldiers  from 
that  idle  lounging  which  is  such  an  incentive  to  drink.  One  little 
incident,  however,  while  I  am  dealing  with  this  matter  of  drink- 
ing, is  worth  mentioning.  Some  casks  of  Commissariat  rum 
were  left,  too  temptingly  unguarded,  near  one  of  the  British 
regiments ;  and  a  toper,  who  had  scarcely  seen  a  dram  since  the 
fight  at  Gharasia,  yielded  to  the  temptation.  As  a  consequence, 
he  was  soon  under  arrest.  In  the  bustle  of  camp-life,  there  is  but 
little  accommodation  for  prisoners  ;  and  the  lucky  Highlander — 
we  have  had  no  ''  lucky  Ghoorka  "  yet  as  at  Jellalabad  last  cam- 
paign— ^was  marched  off  to  the  spot  in  the  ditch  (the  space  between 
the  outer  wall  and  the  line  of  barracks)  where  the  Afghans  await- 
ing trial  are  lodged.  The  man  was  placed  in  a  tent  where  a  sirdar 
(an  Afghan  noble)  was  calmly  reflecting  on  his  kismut  in  being 
delivered  into  our  hands,  and  the  two  prisoners  were  left  to  ''  make 
friends  "  as  best  they  could.  The  sirdar  was  equal  to  the  occasion, 
and  made  first  advances.  Taking  his  snuff-box  from  his  belt,  he 
offered  it  to  the  soldier,  who,  astonished,  even  in  his  drunkenness, 
by  the  politeness  of  his  companion,  half  held  out  bis  hand,  say- 
ing, in  his  maudlin  humour, — **  It's  little  we  ever  take  from  you 

niggers,  and  it's little  you  niggers  ever  give  us."     Having 

thus  satisfied  his  conscience,  he  allowed  the  snuff-box  to  be  nearly 
emptied  into  his  hand;    and  still  grumbling  out  complaints  at 


Condition  of  the  Cantonment.  1 1 7 

our  policy,  proceeded  to  "  take  in  snuflF "  most  ferociously.  The 
sirdar  stared  in  silent  awe  at  the  madman  who  could  take  snuff 
by  the  tolah ;  but  presently  such  an  explosion  of  sneezing  followed, 
that  he  withdrew  to  a  safe  distance.  His  politeness  had  imperilled 
the  safety  of  the  tent.  The  soldier  sneezed  himself  into  such  an 
exhausted  state,  that  he  fell  asleep  where  he  lay,  and  the  sirdar 
watched  over  him  with  unfeigned  interest,  this  new  experience  of 
Kafir  life  having  apparently  reconciled  him  to  his  fate.  I  am 
afraid  this  letter  is  a  strange  jumble  of  trivialities  and  more  serious 
affairs ;  but  such  is  our  life  at  present.  On  one  side  Ghoorkas  mak- 
ing mud-pies  and  laughing  good-humouredly  at  their  own  architec- 
ture ;  on  the  other,  a  gleam  of  bayonets  showing  where  an  Afghan 
prisoner  is  on  his  way  to  the  gallows.  In  one  tent,  the  chaff  and 
anecdote  of  the  mess-table ;  in  the  next,  Yakub  Khan  at  his  prayers. 
It  is  to  be  hoped  we  shall  not  remain  long  under  canvas  here, 
for  the  cold  at  night  is  already  intense.  Nine  degrees  of  frost 
were  registered  last  night,  and  in  the  morning  the  watercourses 
were  all  frozen  over.  It  is  these  watercourses  which  make 
Sherpur  so  uncomfortable  just  now.  The  soil  is  light  and  porous, 
and  has  all  been  under  irrigation  for  vine  and  wheat  culture ;  and 
as  the  channels  are  raised  a  foot  or  so  higher  than  the  fields, 
and  steady  little  streams  are  coursing  along  from  the  higher 
level  of  the  Cabul  river,  the  whole  place  is  damp  and  exces- 
sively cold.  The  water  lies  in  places  only  a  foot  from  the 
surface,  and,  near  the  eastern  end  of  the  cantonments,  bursts 
forth  in  a  spring,  proving  how  saturated  the  subsoil  must  be. 
No  cold  is  so  trying  to  men  living  in  tents,  without  fires  of 
any  kind,  as  that  which  strikes  upward,  and  a  water-proof  sheet 
is  but  a  poor  protection  from  it,  however  much  it  may  neutralize 
the  actual  damp.  At  Siah  Sung  water  was  in  request,  every 
drop  used  having  to  be  carried  up  the  steep  hillsides;  but 
here  we  have  too  much  of  it.  The  channels  are  carried  under 
the  walls  by  low  culverts,  and  some  of  these  will  have  to  be 
filled  up  if  we  are  to  counteract  the  effects  of  past  irrigation. 
This  can  be  done  without  much  trouble  ;  and  the  existing  wells, 
aided  by  a  few  more  that  can  be  sunk  in  a  week,  would  meet  all 
our  drinking  requirements,  while  the  channels  outside  could 
also  be  used  by  die  bhistees  and  followers. 


ii8  The  Afghan  War^  1879—80. 

There  is  sach  a  turmoil  here  with  the  hoilding  and  improve- 
ments going  on  and  the  storing  of  five  months'  supplies  in  the 
Commissariat  godowns,  that  one  almost  forgets  military  moye- 
ments  ;  hut  when  the  Pioneers  iparched  out  this  morning,  we 
were  reminded  that  an  important  step  was  being  taken  towards 
opening  up  the  Gundamak  and  Ehyber  line  of  communications* 
General  Macpherson  commands  the  brigade  which  has  left,  and  he 
has  with  him  the  following  troops  : — 67th  Foot,  28rd  Pioneers, 
28th  Punjab  Native  Infantry,  12th  Bengal  Cavalry,  and  two  guns 
F-A  Battery,  Boyal  Horse  Artillery.  Swinley's  Mountain  Battery 
will  also  join  him  at  Butkhak,  ten  miles  east  of  this,  on  the  Srd, 
and  a  few  days  later  on  he  will  march  for  Jugdulluck.  We  are 
anxiously  awaiting  this  movemenjk,  as  our  postal  arrangements  are 
very  uncertain,  it  being  impossible  to  send  off  bags  while  the 
tribes  are  infesting  the  roads.  I  have  complained  of  the  slowness 
of  the  Khyber  Force ;  but  it  is  only  just  to  General  Charles  Gough 
heading  the  advance  to  say  that  he  has  pushed  on  as  rapidly  as 
General  Bright  would  allow  him.  He  has  had  but  few  troops, 
little  transport,  and  scarcely  any  supplies ;  and  with  E^ugianis 
and  Shinwaris  in  front,  and  fickle  Afridis  behind,  great  caution  had 
to  be  exercised.  A  long  convoy  with  stores,  which  had  accumulated 
at  the  Shutargardan,  came  in  to-day.  Since  the  breaking  up  of 
the  tribal  combination  at  the  Shutargardan  on  October  19th,  all 
has  been  quiet  south  of  Cabul,  and  our  convoys  have  marched 
along  without  molestation.  The  little  exemplary  severity  we 
showed  in  shooting  three  villagers,  who  fired  upon  General  Baker's 
rear-guard  when  near  the  Logar  Bridge  at  Zahidabad  on  October 
4th,  had  the  best  results ;  while  the  fact  of  our  being  in  posses* 
sion  of  Cabul  itself  has  so  far  acted  Uke  a  charm. 


Srd  November. 

The  Shutargardan  route  having  been  finally  closed,  it  has,  of 
course,  become  imperative  to  open  up  the  Gundamak  and  Ehyber 
line  of  communication,  and  General  Macpherson,  with  a  force 
already  detailed,  is  now  engaged  upon  that  work.  From  Cabul  to 
Butkhak  the  road  runs  in  a  due  easterly  direction  through  the 
Cabul  plain,  and  is  so  good  that  cavalry  can  travel  at  a  gallop 


The  Khyber  Line  of  Communication.  119 

over  it.  To  the  south  a  range  of  hills  shuts  out  the  valley 
through  which  the  Logar  river  runs  after  passing  through  the 
Sang-i-Nawishta  defile  ;  and  when  this  range  is  passed  a  swampy 
maidan  is  entered  upon,  which  gradually  changes  into  a  dry,  open 
plain,  overgrown  with  short  tufts  of  coarse  grass.  The  Logar 
river  is  crossed  at  right-angles  by  the  road  which  is  carried  over  a 
stout  masonry  bridge  of  six  arches.  The  river  is  turbid,  but  its 
current  runs  at  about  four  or  five  miles  an  hour  to  its  junction 
with  the  Cabul  stream,  creeping  away  under  the  high  hills  which 
bound  the  view  to  the  north,  two  or  three  miles  away.  Irrigation 
channels  are  cut  from  the  Logar,  and  these  serve  as  a  source  of 
fertility  to  the  fields  about  Butkhak,  a  walled  village  prettily  situ- 
ated in  its  orchards,  with  shallow  streams  running  near  the  walls. 
Butkhak  is  to  be  the  first  post  on  the  road,  its  garrison  consisting 
of  forty  rifles,  who  will  be  placed  in  a  square  enclosure  easily 
capable  of  defence.  The  telegraph  wire  has  been  already  laid 
to  this  village  from  Sherpur  cantonments.  The  hills  which  bound 
the  Cabul  plain  to  the  north  and  south  dose  in  near  Butkhak, 
and  to  the  east  sink  down  1,000  feet,  affording  the  only  out-look 
towards  Jugdulluck.  One  can  see  even  from  Cabul  that  this  break 
in  the  continuous  ranges  which  guard  the  plain  must  give  an  out- 
let into  the  Jellalabad  YaUey,  and  it  is  accordingly  in  this  direc- 
tion that  we  shall  unite  our  little  army  with  the  supporting  force 
that  has  marched  out  from  Peshawur  Uirough  the  Ehyber.  The 
ordinary  road  from  Butkhak  to  Jugdulluck,  and  thence  to  Gnnda- 
mak,  is  through  the  Ehurd  Cabul  Pass ;  but  this  has  been  repre- 
sented of  so  formidable  a  kind,  that  alternative  routes  have  been 
sought.  Moreover,  the  Ehurd  Cabul  Road  makes  a  considerable 
detour  to  the  south,  and  thus  adds  many  miles  to  the  distance, 
measured  as  the  crow  flies.  To  satisfy  himself  as  to  the  practica- 
ble nature,  or  otherwise,  of  other  routes,  General  Roberts,  accom- 
panied by  Colonel  Macgregor  and  a  few  members  of  his  Staff,  left 
Sherpur  early  on  Sunday  morning,  and  rode  over  to  Butkhak, 
where  General  Macpherson  was  encamped. 

The  flrst  route  examined  was  that  known  as  the  Luttabund 
Boad,  which  runs  due  east,  in  a  straight  line  from  Butkhak  as  far 
as  Kata  Sung,  28  or  80  miles  distant,  and  then  turns  down  in  a 
southerly  direction  to  Jugdulluck,  five  miles  further  on.  This  would 


I20  The  Afghan  War^  1879—80. 

make  the  whole   dietance   to    be   marched  over  only   85  miles, 
whereas  the  Ehurd  Cabul  Eoad  is  at  least  55  miles  long.    A  re- 
connoitriDg  party  of  six  companies  of  infaDtry,  one  squadron  of 
cavalry,  and  two  mountain  guns,  was  sent  out  from  Butkhak  with 
the  General  towards  the  Luttabund  Kotal,*  and  the  country  was 
thoroughly  examined.     The  road  was  found  to  traverse  open  roll- 
ing hills  for  about  4  miles,  and  then  by  a  gradual  ascent  to  lead 
up  to  the  Kotal.    The  hills  were  not  at  all  precipitous,  and  nowhere 
closed  down  upon  the  road,  which  all  along  permitted  of  flanking 
parties  working  to  right  and  left  without  the  slightest  difficulty. 
In  one  place  only  did  a  ridge  break  the  even  run  of  the  path,  and 
a  few  days'  blasting  would  cut  away  the  obstruction.     The  Kotal 
is  9  miles  distant  from  Butkhak,  and  was  calculated  to  be  8,000 
feet  above   sea-level.     From  the    summit  a   splendid  view   was 
obtained  on  all  sides ;  and  it  would   be  a  perfect  heliographing 
station,  as  not  only  could  Sherpur  and  Cabul  be  distinctly  seen, 
but  also  the  whole  range  of  the  Safed  Koh  and  the  peaks  above 
Lundi  Kotal  in  the  Khyber  range.     In  fact,  it  is  not  too  sanguine 
an  estimate  of  the  position  to  say  that  Cabul,  Ali  Kheyl,  and 
Lundi  Kotal  could  all  be  connected  by  the  heliograph.     Sikaram 
stood  out  prominently  in  the   long  range  of  the  Safed  Koh,  and 
the  various  minor  peaks  could  also  be  observed.     Native  report  had 
said  that  to  the  Kotal  the  road  was  easy  enough,  the  difficulties 
being  on  the  eastern  side,  where  precipitous  descents  had  to  be 
overcome.     So  far,  however,  as  General  Roberts  could  judge,  look- 
ing down  towards  Kata  Sung,  there  was  nothing  that  skilled  road- 
makers  could  not  overcome :  a  short  ravine  with  almost  perpendicu- 
lar sides  seeming  the  chief  difficulty.     It  was  too   late  in  the  day 
to  continue  the  reconnaissance,  and  the  party  accordingly  returned 
to  Butkhak,  well  satisfied  with  their  visit.     On  the  following  day 
the  Chinari  Boad  was  tried.  General  Boberts  taking  a  few  of  the 
12th  Bengal  Cavalry  with  him  ;  while  a  force,  similar  in  strength  to 
that  of  Sunday,  was  sent  round  through  the  Khurd  Cabul.     The 
Luttabund  route  was   again   taken  by  the  General  for  4  miles, 
and  then  a  turn  to  the  south  was  made   and   the  bed  of  a  stream 
followed   for    3    miles  until    the   Chinari    defile   was    reached. 

*  The  word  "  Kotal "  is  applied  nstially  where  the  road  passes  oyer  a  hill,  inbtead  of 
throogh  it ;  "  Pass  "  being  used  in  the  latter  case. 


Alternative  Routes.  121 

This  was  found  to  be  of  a  really  formidable  character,  the  hills 
closing  down  upon  the  stream,  which  wound  along  through  a  gorge 
where  horsemen  could  only  march  in  Indian  file.     High  pinnacle- 
shaped  peaks  jutted  up  on  either  hand,  and  the  scenery  was  of 
the  wildest  nature.     This  defile  was  4  miles  long ;  and  although 
a  few  Kushi  camels  were  being  driyen  along  it  by  their  nomadic 
owners,  it  would  be  quite  impracticable  for  the  passage  of  any- 
thing but   infantry.     The  gorge  ended,  rolling  hills,  rising  here 
and  there  to  round-topped  mounds,  were  crossed  for  5  miles ;  and 
then  the  road  joined  that  from  the  Khurd  Cabul  on  the  south 
about  8  miles  west  of  Tezin.     A  halt  was  called  at  this  junction, 
16  miles  from  Butkhak,  and  in  a  short  time  the  reconnoitring 
party  came  up.     They  had  passed  through  the  Khurd  Cabul  with- 
out seeing  a  single  armed  man,  and  such  yillagers  as  were  met 
were  quite  friendly.     The  General  rode  back  to  Butkhak  by  way 
of  the  Khurd   Cabul,  and   they  saw  all  three  roads,  and  could 
decide  as  to  their  merits.     The  old  descriptions  of  this  famous 
Khurd  Cabul  Boad  had  led  every  one  to  expect  tremendous  diflSoul- 
ties  ;  but  at  this  time  of  the  year  there  are  no  obstacles  sufficiently 
great  to  prevent  horse  artillery  trotting  through.     The  scenery  is 
imposing  enough  and  the  high  pinnacles  of  the  Chinari  gorge  are 
repeated  on  a  grander  scale ;  but  the  Pass  is  never  so  narrow  as  to 
forbid  the  orderly  march  of  an  army  of  all  arms,  and  the  real 
gorge  is  only  2  mUes  long,  or  even  less.     A  rapid  mountain- 
stream  runs  through  it  and  boulders  are  plentiful  but  they  are 
not  so  large  as  to  hinder  progress ;  and  tl^e  heights  above,  though 
formidable-looking,  would  not,  if  crowned  by  an  enemy,  be  an 
absolute  bar  to  an  advance  through.    Besides,  a  path  to  t^he  south- 
west enables  the  heights  to  be  occupied  very  easily,  the  cavalry 
and  mountain  guns  from  Butkhak  taking  this  road  and  crossing 
over  the  height  without  any  check.     The  gorge  at  Ali  Musjid, 
with  precipitous  crags  added,  will  give  a  good  idea  of  this  part  of 
the  road.     There  is,  of  course,  the  objection  to  this  route  that,  in 
the  melting  of  the  snows,  the  river  bed  would  be  covered  by  a 
roaring  torrent  of  ice-cold  water ;  but,  for  present  serrice,  the 
road  can  be  used  without  any  improvements  being  required.  From 
the  juncture  with  the  Chinari  Road  to  Butkhak  is  17  miles ;  and 
after  riding  this  distance  General  Roberts  rested  a  short  time,  and 


122  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

then  started  for  Sherpnr,  which  he  reached  at  dusk.  It  was  a 
hard  day's  ride,  42  miles,  partly  over  bad  groand;  bat  the  yala- 
able  information  gained  as  to  the  fatare  line  of  commnnioation 
with  the  Ehyber  and  Peshawar  was  ample  recompense.  The 
conclnsions  arrived  at  may  be  sammarized  very  briefly  :  the 
Chinari  Bead  is,  once  for  all,  condemned  as  oat  of  the  qaestion  ; 
the  E^ord  Cabal  can  be  ased  for  all  present  emergencies  withoat 
laboar  being  expended  npon  it ;  while  the  direct  Lattaband  roate, 
so  far  as  it  has  been  examined,  is  to  be  made  the  road  of  the  fdtare. 
It  has  followed  from  this  that  General  Macpherson  has  marched 
along  with  his  force  to  Jagdallack  by  the  Ehard  Cabal,  as  it  is  of 
the  first  importance  that  he  shoald  join  hands  with  General 
Charles  Goagh's  force  pashing  onward  from  Gandamak.  He  will 
not  strike  the  Lattaband  Bead  antil  Sei  Baba  is  reached,  5  miles 
west  of  Eata  Sang :  and  on  his  retam  march  he  will  no  doabt  be 
able  to  test  the  trath  of  native  ramoar  as  to  the  difficalties  imme- 
diately to  the  east  of  the  Lattaband  Eotal,  which,  so  far  as  Gene- 
ral Boberts  ooald  see,  have  been  maoh  overrated.  Having  the 
28rd  Pioneers  with  him,  whose  knowledge  of  roads  and  road- 
making  is  exceptionally  good,  General  Macpherson  will  be  able 
to  form  an  exact  estimate  of  this  Lattaband  roate.  If  it  is  pro- 
noanced  practicable,  it  will  save,  as  I  have  said,  folly  20  miles, 
and,  having  no  awkward  defile  in  its  entire  length,  will  be  mach 
safer  for  an  army  to  work  throagh.  Even  if  it  is  rejected,  there 
is  still  the  Ehard  Cabal  open,  the  '^  formidable  *'  featares  of  which 
have  been  torn  down  by  closer  acqoaintanceship. 


6tA  Novemher. 

With  the  exception  of  the  brigade  ander  Brigadier-General 
Macpherson,  which  has  been  detached  on  the  important  work  of 
secaring  oar  winter  line  of  commanication  by  way  of  Gandamak, 
General  Boberts's  force  is  once  more  concentrated,  the  arrival 
yesterday  of  Brigadier-General  Hngh  Goagh  with  the  troops  lately 
at  Eashi  and  on  the  Shntargardan  having  prevented  the  army 
here  from  dwindling  to  too  small  proportions.  At  noon  on  the 
1st  we  had  here  only  the  following  regiments  : — 72nd  and  92nd 
Highlanders,  5th  Ghoorkas,  one  company    28rd  Pioneers,  and 


General  Hugh  Gough  at  Sherpur.  123 

one  company  of  Sappers  and  Miners,  as  our  infantry  force  ;  120 
of  the  9th  Lancers,  and  the  14th  Bengal  Lancers,  as  cavaby ;  two 
guns  F-A,  Boyal  Horse  Artillery  and  G-8  Boyal  Artillery, 
with  tibe  two  Gatling  gnns,  as  artillery.  This  was  a  very  small 
foroe,  and,  if  it  had  remained  onstrengthened,  might  ^have 
giyen  rise  to  a  suspicion  of  weakness  on  our  part ;  hut  between 
Kushi  and  Cabul  was  a  long  line  of  troops,  who  soon  began  to 
arriye  at  their  destination  here.  The  conyoys  they  were  escorting 
from  the  Shutargardan  were  all  safely  on  their  way ;  and  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  1st  two  companies  of  the  5th  Pui^jab  Lifiantry, 
a  squadron  of  the  6th  Punjab  Cavalry,  and  four  guns  of  Swin- 
ley's  Mountain  Battery,  reached  Sherpur  with  the  last  loads.  On 
the  morning  of  the  2nd  this  mountain  battery  started  again  to 
join  the  foroe  at  Butkhak.  On  the  2nd  there  were  no  further 
arrivals  here ;  but  on  the  morning  of  the  8rd  news  was  brought 
in  that  General  Hugh  Gough  had  reached  Beni  Hissar,  and  Gen- 
eral Roberts  rode  out  to  meet  him.  The  troops  which  were  so 
near  at  hand  were  two  squadrons  of  the  9th  Lancers  and  head- 
quarters, two  squadrons  5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  six  companies  of 
the  5th  Punjab  Infantry,  the  8rd  Sikhs,  and  four  guns  of  the 
Eohat  Mountain  Battery  (Captain  Morgan's).  General  Gough 
had  not  followed  the  route  taken  by  the  main  force  when  advancing 
upon  Cabul,  but,  starting  from  Kushi,  had  immediately  crossed 
the  Logar  river,  and  encamped  for  the  first  night  on  the  left  bank 
at  Payo  E^eyl.  His  next  halting-place  was  Bagh  Sultan ;  and 
flience  onward  to  Charasia  he  followed  the  usual  road.  His  march 
was  perfectly  orderly,  none  of  the  villagers  molesting  him,  the 
fidl  of  Cabul  having  checked  any  warlike  tendencies  among  the 
Logaris. 

As  we  rode  out  to  Beni  Hissar  we  found  the  band  of  the  5th 
Ghoorkas  waiting  upon  the  bridge  over  the  Cabul  river  to  wel- 
come the  Srd  Sikhs  and  Captain  Morgan's  battery,  to  whom  all  of 
us  were  anxious  to  give  every  praise  for  their  steady  defence  of 
the  Shutargardan.  At  the  gate  of  the  Bala  Hissar  the  band  of 
the  72nd  was  waiting  with  a  similar  object.  Taking  the  bridle 
road  which  leads  to  Beni  Hissar  through  the  Cabul  plain,  we 
presently  met  a  few  of  the  5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  the  advance  guard 
of  the  little  foroe,  and  immediately  in  rear  of  them  was  Padshah 


124  '^^  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

Ehan  and  a  few  attendants.  The  powerful  Chief  of  the  local 
Ghilzais  was  eager  to  greet  General  Boberts,  and  looked  very 
much  as  if  he  would  kiss  his  stirrup.  He  is  a  man  of  common 
appearance,  with  no  pretence  of  dignity,  and  lacks  the  fine 
features  often  seen  among  the  independent  hill  chiefs.  He  is 
past  middle  age ;  but  is  well-formed,  and  has,  seemingly,  many 
years  of  life  before  him  in  which  to  pursue  the  "  tricky  practices  " 
for  which  he  is  so  celebrated.  At  present  he  is  rather  humbled 
by  the  ill-luck  which  has  come  upon  him  in  the  loss  of  his 
brother,  AUahaddin  Ehan,  whose  arm  was  blown  off  by  a  shell 
from  the  Kohat  Battery  during  the  investment  of  the  Shutargar- 
dan.  AUahaddin  was  left  in  a  dying  state  at  Charasia,  second- 
ary hemorrhage  having  broken  out  some  days  after  his  arm  was 
amputated.  I  may  as  well  state,  once  for  all,  that  he  has  since 
died,  and  that  Padshah  Ehan  to-day  received  his  conge  from  the 
General,  and  was  told  he  might  return  to  his  home  to  bury  his 
brother  and  to  find,  if  possible,  some  letters  which  the  members 
of  his  tribe  have  looted  in  the  Ehurd  Cabul.  After  a  few  words 
with  Padshah  IQian,  General  Roberts  rode  on,  and,  upon  meeting 
his  Brigadier,  fkced  round  again  for  Cabul.  A  halt  was  called 
just  outside  the  Bala  Hissar  gate ;  and,  after  the  9th  Lancers, 
the  5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  and  5th  Punjab  Infantry  had  passed 
on,  the  Mountain  Battery  and  the  3rd  Sikhs  were  formed  up  to 
receive  the  thanks  of  the  General.  The  battery  in  its  equipment 
and  general  turn-out  of  men  and  mules  looked  but  little  worse  for 
wear;  while  the  8rd  Sikhs,  though  dusty  and  travel-stained, 
marched  along  in  excellent  form.  They  are  as  fine  a  set  of  men 
as  could  be  desired,  and  a  red  standard,  captured  from  the  Ghil- 
zais, flying  alongside  their  regimental  colours,  bore  testimony  to 
the  successful  fighting  they  had  gone  through.  They  are  730 
strong,  and  will  be  a  great  addition  to  the  force,  as  there  is  no 
question  of  their  ability  to  meet  an  enemy  of  far  superior  strength 
on  equal  terpas.  The  regiment  is  made  up  chiefly  of  Sikhs,  but 
there  is  also  a  fair  sprinkling  of  Pathans  among  them,  and  all 
have  fought  equally  well  under  very  trying  circumstances.  Having 
halted  them  alongside  the  Mountain  Battery,  General  Boberts 
proceeded  to  compliment  them  on  their  late  exploits.  He  said : 
''  It  always  gives  me  much  pleasure  to  meet  the  3rd  Sikhs  and 


Welcoming  the  Shutargardan  Garrison.        125 

the  Kohat  Monntain  Battery,  and  this  is  more  particularly  the 
case    how,  after   their   gallant  hehaviour  at  the    Shutargardan. 
When  the  force  left  Kushi  for  the  march  upon  Cabul,  there  was 
only  one  point  which  gave  me  anxiety,  and  that  was  the  post  to 
which,  with  the  21st  Punjab  Infantry,  they  had  been  told  off  to 
hold.     The  safety  of  my  right  flank  and  rear  depended  mainly 
upon    the  safety  of  the  Shutargarden ;  for,  if  once    the    latter 
had  Mien,  the  tribes  would  have  attempted  to  hinder  my  march. 
Repeated  attacks  were  made  upon  the  position  you  were  holding  ; 
and  so  confident  were  the  Ghilzais  of  their  success,  that  I  hear 
they  brought   down   their  women  to  witness   your  discomfiture. 
Ton  were   able,  however,  to    beat   them   off  with    heavy  loss, 
though  far  outnumbered ;  and  this  shows  how,  with  the  weapons 
you  are  now  armed,  you  can  hold  your  ground  against  almost 
any  number  of  these  tribesmen.    You  have  set  a  good  example 
to   the  whole  force  by  showing  what   a   few  men   can  do  when 
properly  led;    and    I    do    not    think   I   could   have   chosen   a 
better  spot    on   which    to    thank   you    than   here,  beneath  the 
walls  of   the  Bala  Hissar,  to  the   capture  of  which    you  have, 
indirectly,  so  much  contributed."     General  Boberts  then  alluded 
to  the  excellent  dispositions  made  by  Colonel  Money  in  meeting 
the  attacks  made,  and  complimented  Captain  Morgan  upon  the 
good  practice  of  his  gunners.     He  referred  also  to  the  bravery 
of  Major  Griffiths,  who,  although  wounded  in  the  early  fight  at 
Earatiga,  had  led  his  men  at  the  Surkhai  Eotal  on  the  14th, 
and  worked  bravely  with  them  on  the  following  days  of  the  in- 
vestment.     The    native   officer.   Jemadar    Sher  Mahomed,  3rd 
Sikhs,  who  distinguished  himself  both  at  Earatiga  and  on  the 
Surkhai  Eotal,  was  called  from    the  ranks  and  briefly  praised; 
and,  in  conclusion,  the    General   said   the   Viceroy  had  sent  a 
special   message,  thanking  the  Shutargardan  garrison  for  their 
bravery;  and  if   it  had   not  already  been    made   known  to  the 
sepoys,  he  should  wish  the  message  to  be  published  in  full  orders. 
The  8rd  Sikhs  and  the  Mountain  Battery  then  marched  to  Sher- 
pur  without  further  delay,  no  doubt  well  pleased  with  the  hearty 
reception  given  to  them. 

The  3rd  Sikhs  had  five  prisoners  with  them,  who  were  hanged 
in  the  BisJa  Hissar  this  morning.     Four  of  these  were  the  head- 


126  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

men  of  villages  aboat  the  Shutargardan  who  were  in  oar  pay,  bat 
who,  with  the  treachery  of  their  race,  played  a  double  game.  At 
the  time  they  were  receiving  pay  from  us  to  keep  the  road  safe, 
they  were  proved  to  have  been  active  in  stirring  ap  the  neighboar- 
ing  tribes  to  attack  Colonel  Money.  Their  object  was  either  to 
obtain  large  sams  with  which  to  bay  off  the  Ohilzai  chiefs  assem- 
bled, or  to  share  in  the  loot  if  the  Shutargardan  were  captured. 
They  failed  to  accomplish  either  object,  and  when  with  tsonsam- 
mate  coolness  they  tamed  ap  after  the  tribesmen  had  been 
scattered,  they  were  summarily  arrested.  The  fifth  prisoner  was 
a  villager,  who  was  stopped  by  Major  Ghiffiths  when  out  on  a 
foraging  party.  The  man  thought  that  officer  was  unarmed  as 
he  had  no  sword  with  him  (his  right  arm  was  stiff  from  his  wound 
and  he  had  discarded  his  sword) ;  and  as  the  sepoys  were  some 
distance  away,  the  fellow  put  his  hand  upon  his  tulwar  and  stepped 
forward  as  if  to  cut  down  Major  Griffiths.  The  latter  drew  his 
pistol,  and  his  self-possession  put  an  end  to  the  meditated  attack^ 
two  or  three  Sikhs  overtaking  the  man  as  he  tried  to  escape  to 
the  hills.  The  8rd  Sikhs  have  also  with  them  a  havildar,  who 
deserted  from  one  of  the  regiments  at  Gandahar.  He  was  dis- 
guised as  an  Afghan  villager,  but  was  recognized  on  the  roadside 
by  an  old  companion,  who  addressed  him  by  name,  and  called  out 
"  halt,"  which  order,  with  his  old  respect  for  discipline  still  cling- 
ing to  him,  he  obeyed  at  once.  He  is  to  be  tried  by  court- 
martial. 

All  hands  are  still  busily  engaged  in  preparing  to  meet  the 
hardships  of  a  Gabul  winter,  but  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  adequate 
provision  can  be  made  for  the  followers  unless  some  part  of 
Bemaru  is  cleared  out  for  them.  Private  servants  and  kahars 
are  so  numerous,  that  the  housing  of  them  is  a  serious  question. 
As  a  subsidiary  portion  of  the  force,  but  one  which  could  not  be 
dispensed  with  under  the  conditions  of  Indian  warfare,  it  is  worth 
while  drawing  attention  to  the  kahars  forming  the  ambulance 
corps.  There  are  900  of  these  men  with  General  Boberts,  and  to 
them  is  entrusted  the  charge  of  carrying  off  the  wounded  in  action 
and  conveying  the  sick  in  dandies  and  doolies  on  the  line  of  march. 
They  have  been  drilled  into  good  order  by  Surgeon-Major  Bonrke, 
by  whose  energy  they  have  been  kept  much  better  in  hand  than 


The  Investigation  of  the  Massacre.  127 

IB  asaal  in  campaigns  similar  to  this.  They  correspond  to  the 
bearers  of  the  Army  Hospital  Corps  at  home,  bat  in  camp  they 
are  also  employed  in  any  rough  work  which  may  require  to  be. 
done.  Their  behaviour  on  the  6th  of  October  at  Charasia  was 
extremely  good ;  they  were  constantly  under  fire,  and  their  indif- 
ference to  danger  was  very  marked,  their  belief  in  kismut  supply- 
ing the  place  of  steady  courage.  In  the  Ambulance  Corps  two 
were  kiUed  and  three  wounded ;  while  with  the  regiments  three 
more  were  killed. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

The  Inqniry  into  Taknb  Khan's  Oonduot— Visit  to  the  Ohardeh  Valley^Diamantlement 
of  the  Bala  Hissar — The  Amir's  Palace — A  curious  Picture — A  Sirdar's  House  in 
the  Fortress — General  Baker's  Raid  upon  Indikee— Arrest  of  Sepoys — Seizure  of 
Arms — The  Quilt  of  the  Herat  Regiments — Opening  up  of  Communication  wiUi 
General  Bright — Failure  to  keep  the  Road  Open — The  Execution  of  Forty-nine 
Sepo3rs — ^An  Amnesty  Issued — The  probable  Fate  of  the  Amir — Punishment  of  the 
Shntargardan  Tribes— First  Signs  of  Winter. 

Shbbpub,  7th  November. 

Thb  Commission  which  is  inquiring  into  the  massacre  of  Sir 
Louis  Cayagnari  and  his  escort  may  he  said  to  have  reached  the 
first  stage  of  its  work — the  examination  of  nearly  100  witnesses, 
who  have  spoken  as  to  what  occurred  at  the  Bala  Hissar  and  in 
Cabul  afterwards,  having  been  completed.  This  has  furnished 
materials,  so  to  say,  for  the  brief  against  the  Amir,  who,  from  the 
6th,  may  be  considered  to  have  been  on  his  trial.  Explanations 
will,  of  course,  be  required  of  him  of  such  suspicious  circumstances 
as  point  to  something  beyond  mere  helplessness  and  vacillation, 
and  his  statements  will  be  weighed  against  those  already  in  the 
hands  of  the  Commission.  In  the  present  stage  of  the  inquiry 
great  reticence  is  observed  as  to  what  evidence  has  been  taken, 
and  it  would  be  idle  to  indulge  in  too  free  conjectures.  This 
much  may  be  taken  as  certain,  that  not  the  least  respect  of  persons 
will  be  shown  in  the  decisions  arrived  at  by  the  Commissioners. 
The  hanging  of  such  wretches  as  the  Eotwal  of  Cabul  and  the 
chowkidar  of  Mundai  was  an  example  to  such  small  fry  as  those 


128  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

who  make  up  the  rahble  population  of  Cabul ;  but  higher  game 
may  be  flown  at,  as  the  faithlessness  of  chiefs  and  influential 
leaders  must  be  punished.  The  Mustaufi  and  the  other  Ministers 
under  arrest  have  yet  to  be  dealt  with  ;  and  if  their  complicity 
in  the  treachery  which  we  are  punishing  is  established,  they  will 
have  short  shrift. 

Yesterday  General  Boberts,  taking  his  usual  personal  escort  and 
a  troop  of  the  9th  Lancers,  rode  into  the  Chardeh  Valley  with 
General  Baker.  The  position  of  the  enemy  on  the  Asmai  Heights 
on  the  8th  of  October  was  explained  by  General  Baker,  and  also 
the  disposition  for  the  attack.  The  Cabul  gorge  was  passed 
through,  the  river  crossed,  and  the  road  at  the  foot  of  the  hills 
blocking  Chardeh  from  Charasia  followed.  Walled  homesteads 
and  richly-cultivated  fields  alternated  with  orchards,  on  the  right ; 
and  as  the  road  gradually  ascended,  a  beautiful  view  of  the  whole 
valley  was  obtained.  Even  so  late  in  the  year  as  now  it  will 
answer  the  description  given  of  it  by  a  member  of  the  Embassy : 
"a  mass  of  vegetation.*'  Bows  of  willow-trees  rise  from  the 
sides  of  every  irrigation  channel,  and  orchards  innumerable  are 
scattered  on  all  sides.  The  walled  enclosures,  with  their  small 
towers,  are  dotted  here  and  there,  breaking  the  even  monotony  of 
the  view,  and  whichever  way  one  may  turn,  the  steep  hills  which 
run  out  from  the  Pughman  Range  shut  in  this  fertile  valley.  We 
followed  the  path  from  the  gorge  to  the  village  of  Indikee,  and 
halted  on  the  plain  immediately  in  rear  of  the  heights  which  the 
72nd  Highlanders  and  5th  Ghoorkas  stormed  on  October  6th.  It 
was  across  this  plain  that  the  enemy  fled ;  and,  seeing  how  clear 
it  is  of  all  obstacles,  one  can  well  understand  General  Baker's 
regret  that  he  had  not  cavalry  ready  at  hand  to  cut  up  the  retreat- 
ing Afghans.  *If  the  nature  of  the  ground  had  been  better  known 
to  us,  the  loss  of  Nek  Mahomed's  force  would  have  been  much 
heavier.  Turning  back  from  Indikee,  we  retraced  our  steps 
through  the  narrow,  winding  streets  of  the  village,  perched  on  the 
steep  hillside  with  a  roaring  brook  running  through  it,  and  struck 
the  Bamian  Boad.  This  was  followed  for  three  miles  into  the 
heart  of  the  valley,  where  nothing  but  wheat-fields  and  irrigated 
plots  under  water,  or  lying  fallow  for  the  plough,  was  seen. 
Then  a  bee-line  was  taken  to  the  break  in  the  hills  to  the  east^ 


The  Bala  Hissar  Dismantled.  129 

and  after  a  good  gallop  the  northern  sahurbs  of  Gabul  were 
reached,  and  the  road  to  Sherpur  followed  until  Camp  was  gained. 
Such  villagers  as  we  had  seen  were  quiet  enough  :  and  if  any 
sepoys  were  hidden  away,  they  did  not  think  it  worth  while  to 
risk  a  shot  at  the  General.  Fanaticism  seems  at  present  incapable 
of  producing  a  Ghazi  equal  to  the  fear  of  meeting  certain  death. 

The  dismantlement  of  the  Bala  Hissar  has  made  such  rapid 
progress,  that  within  the  walls  the  houses  are  now  in  ruins,  all 
the  beams  and  wooden  supports,  as  well  as  every  scrap  of  timber 
of  every  kind,  being  in  course  of  removal  to  Sherpur.  We  are 
looking  forward  to  a  severe  winter  ;  and,  however  snug  our  quar- 
ters may  be  in  the  long  ranges  of  barracks  built  here  by  Shere 
Ali,  there  will  be  much  discomfort,  not  to  say  sickness,  if  firewood 
runs  short.  There  are  no  forests  from  which  large  supplies  can  be 
drawn  :  the  hillsides  all  around  being  bare  rock  or  shingly  deposit 
on  which  no  vegetation  can  grow. 

Some  of  the  large  houses  in  the  Bala  Hissar,  though  now 
deserted  and  partially  demolished,  show  signs  of  luxury  and  com- 
fort which  speak  highly  of  the  pains  taken  by  rich  sirdars  to  enjoy 
life  in  their  own  rude  way.  The  palace  in  which  Yakub  IQian 
lived  was  furnished  luxuriously,  no  doubt,  in  his  estimation ; 
thick  Persian  carpets,  bright-coloured  rugs  and  dhurries  covering 
the  floors;  while  English-made  tables,  sideboards,  and  chairs 
were  ranged  side  by  side  with  the  usual  Eastern  pillows,  cushions, 
and  rezais,  which  are  the  delight  of  indolent  loungers.  In  one 
small  room  the  ceiling  was  so  closely  hung  with  glass  chandeliers 
that  to  move  about  was  to  risk  a  small  shower  of  pendants  falling  ; 
while  the  shades  for  the  candles  were  of  such  brilliancy  in  light 
green  and  pink  that  the  effect  in  the  bright  sunshine  was  quite 
dazzling.  "  Pearls  and  barbaric  gold  **  there  were  none  to  be 
seen, — ^they  had  been  removed  for  safe-keeping  to  his  father-in- 
law's  house  in  the  city,  where  the  ladies  of  the  harem  were  also 
lodged, — but  such  gimcracks  as  usually  light  up  the  houses  of  the 
poorest  classes  in  England  were  not  wanting.  Cheap  pictures  in 
common  gilded  frames,  the  kind  turned  out  by  the  thousand  in 
Germany,  all  gaudy  colours  and  painfully  real,  were  hanging  on 
the  walls ;  while  a  few  well-executed  portraits  of  Eussian  oflScers, 
in  fcQl  uniform  and  bedecked  with  orders,  were  found  scattered 

K 


130  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

about.  These  were  all  neatly  framed  in  wood,  and  were  so  well 
got  up  that  most  probably  they  had  been  presents  to  Shore  Ali 
from  the  Embassy,  whose  stay  in  Cabul  gave  rise  to  such  serious 
results.  One  small  picture  was  discoTored,  which  is  certainly  a 
great  curiosity.  It  is  plainly  the  work  of  an  Afghan  artist,  and 
carries  us  back  to  the  disasters  of  1841-42,  when  for  a  time  our 
arms  suffered  so  serious  a  reverse.  The  subject  of  the  drawing  is 
an  Afghan  on  horseback,  in  full  splendour  of  gold-braided  coat 
of  many  colours,  enormous  black  Astrakan  hat  with  its  character- 
istic cone  shape,  small  black  boots  peeping  out  of  the  white 
drapery  of  his  wide-flowing  trouser,  and  the  silver  scabbard  of 
his  sword  dangling  at  his  side.  His  saddle  is  gorgeous  in  red 
and  go]d^  while  the  trappings  of  his  charger  are  bright  with 
elaborate  gilding.  The  horse  is,  in  the  language  of  heraldry, 
rampant^  while  his  rider  sits  proudly  in  the  saddle,  staring  out 
over  the  wide,  wide  world  with  an  expression  of  haughty  contempt, 
which  is  almost  awe-inspiring.  On  the  green  foreground, 
which  represents  the  grassy  sward  of  the  Cabul  plain,  a  dog, 
abnormally  developed  in  some  particulars,  gambols  along,  barking 
joyously  (if  the  protrusion  of  a  crimson  tongue  as  big  as  his  head 
means  anything),  and  thoroughly  enjoying  his  master's  triumph* 
What  that  triumph  is  has  yet  to  be  told  !  On  the  flank  of  the 
horse,  and  so  close  as  to  be  in  danger  of  its  heels,  is  the  figure 
of  a  British  oflScer,  clad  in  the  old  Pandy  uniform,  with  a  musket 
at  the  trail  in  his  hand,  and  crouching  in  the  most  abject  terror. 
His  face,  that  of  a  boy  subaltern,  is  turned  upwards ;  while  his 
eye,  full  of  fear  and  respect,  is  watching  his  Afghan  conqueror 
with  great  intentness.  He  is  at  the  double,  to  keep  up  with  the 
horse,  and  the  artist  has  cleverly  depicted  in  figure  and  expression 
the  humiliation  he  is  undergoing.  Nothing  could  be  finer  than 
the  contrast  between  the  black-bearded  Afghan,  with  his  enormous 
pouting  lips  of  a  purple  tinge,  and  staring  eyes,  and  the  smooth 
boyish  face,  full  of  timidity,  of  the  unlucky  Briton  he  is  leading 
captive.  We  can  afford  to  laugh  at  the  picture,  for  "the 
wheel  has  come  full  circle,"  and  the  subject  now  for  an  artist  to 
draw  would  be  an  English  Lancer,  perifect  in  his  array  as  a  lily 
of  the  field,  leading  captive  at  his  stirrup  a  typical  Afghan  (say 
Yakub  Ehan,  for  example)  with  a  halter  round  his  neck  and  clad 


House  Decoration  in  Cabul.  131 

in  all  the  simplicity  of  a  dhotie.  The  picture  I  have  described 
is  a  standing  cariosity  in  Camp,  and  is  to  be  the  nncleas  of  a 
futore  Cabal  Picture  Gallery. 

In  Cabal  the  better  class  of  houses  all  present  the  same  appear- 
ance outside :  that  of  high  brown  mud  walls,  with  one  or  two 
small  doorways.  Nothing  can  be  more  uninviting  than  these 
sun-baked  walls,  which,  from  the  Mediterranean  eastwards, 
always  mark  the  residence  of  a  Mussulman  population.  But 
within  them  there  is  much  to  atone  for  their  forbidding  exterior. 
Entering  one  of  these  large  houses  in  the  Bala  Hissar  some  days 
ago,  I  found  myself  in  an  inner  courtyard  full  20  yards  square. 
At  either  end  were  sets  of  rooms  with  open  yerandahs  in  front, 
built  of  a  framework  of  wood  fitted  in  with  bricks,  and  then 
carefully  plastered  over.  The  lower  rooms  were  four  or  five  feet 
above  tine  level  of  the  courtyard,  and  broad  flights  of  steps  led 
up  to  them.  Every  bit  of  wood  used  as  supports  or  for  partition 
walls  had  been  carved  and  fretted  with  great  skill,  while  the  inner 
rooms  were  cut  oflF  from  the  glare  outside  by  carved  wooden 
screens,  some  of  the  patterns  being  extremely  pretty.  But  the 
greatest  wealth  of  ornamentation  had  been  lavished  above,  in 
what  were  the  quarters  of  the  women.  A  handsome  wooden 
staircase,  broad  enough  for  four  persons  to  walk  abreast,  led  up 
to  these ;  and  once  on  the  higher  level  the  change  from  the  dull 
brown  below  was  quite  refreshing.  There  was  the  same  repeti- 
tion of  carved  woodwork  and  open  screens ;  but  the  inner  walls 
were  gay  with  frescoes  in  every  colour,  the  plaster  being  covered 
with  native  designs  of  scroll-work,  filled  in  with  birds  of  startling 
plumage  and  flowers  of  hues  to  shame  the  rainbow.  The  ceilings 
and  cornices  were  similarly  adorned,  the  latter  being  set  with 
mirrors  in  long  narrow  strips  of  various  sizes.  The  recesses  for 
lamps  and  the  lintels  of  the  doors  had  all  shared  in  the  general 
ornamentation,  and  to  its  inmates  the  zenana  must  have  seemed 
a  triumph  of  artistic  skill.  All  was  deserted  now,  not  even  a 
door  remaining  on  its  hinges.  The  carved  work  was  smashed 
as  if  some  reckless  soldier  had  thrust  his  rifle  stock  through  it ; 
the  bits  of  mirror  were  starred  with  stray  blows,  and  the  plaster 
had  been  broken  from  the  walls  as  the  woodwork  had  been  torn 
away.     The  wood  from  the  staircases  leading  to  the  roof,  the 

K  2 


132  The  Afghan  Wary  1879—80. 

favourite  evening  gossiping  place  of  the  sirdars,  ladies,  and 
attendants,  had  all  been  carried  away,  and  the  gaping  holes 
through  which  the  sunlight  poured  were  eloquent  of  desolation. 
And  it  is  a  desolation  well  deserved,  for  it  was  in  just  such  a 
house,  with  courtyard  and  pleasant  upper  rooms  (perhaps  not  so 
elaborately  decorated,  the  whitewash  covering  the  beauties  of  the 
frescoes)  that  Gavagnari  was  lodged.  The  Bala  Hissar  may  at 
last  meet  with  the  fate  which  it  deserved,  and  narrowly  escaped, 
when  Pollock  was  master  of  Cabul  in  1842 :  and  soon  not  one 
mud  wall  may  remain  to  stare  its  neighbour  out  of  countenance. 
The  large  godowns  in  the  Upper  Fortress  are  still  full  of  powder 
— nearly  a  million  pounds ;  but,  with  this  exception,  the  place 
has  been  cleared  of  all  its  warlike  stores.  The  excavations  at 
the  Residency  are  still  carried  on,  but  the  remains  of  our  officers 
have  not  been  found.  Two  English  watches  were  unearthed  a 
few  days  aga:  one  had  stopped  at  2.45  p.m.,  and  the  other  at 
8.15  P.M. 

9tA  NoveTnber. 

There  seems  to  be  an  impression  gaining  ground  outside  that 
the  army  here  has  been  rather  tardy  in  its  work  of  vengeance,  and 
has  not  fulfilled  its  mission  in  so  bloodthirsty  a  way  as  might 
have  been  expected.  Much,  however,  has  had  to  be  done  in  the 
clearing  of  the  Shutargardan,  laying  in  stores  for  the  winter,  and 
making  inquiry  quietly  into  the  probable  intention  of  the  scattered 
regiments.  It  would  not  have  been  advisable  to  alarm  such  of 
the  Afghan  sepoys  as  had  left  their  homes  in  Cabul  and  the  villages 
near,  and  we  have,  therefore,  hitherto  only  picked  out  a  few  of 
the  worst  characters  and  hanged  them  as  an  *'  encouragement  to 
the  others."  Seeing  that  no  general  action  was  taken  in  thoroughly 
searching  such  villages  as  were  close  at  hand,  the  disbanded 
Eoldiers  have  returned  in  many  instances  to  their  homes,  and  now 
that  we  have  some  of  the  muster-rolls  of  the  regiments  in  our 
possession,  we  have  suddenly  begun  to  sweep  into  the  net  of  the 
Military  Commission  every  one  against  whom  suspicion  exists. 
Flying  parties  of  cavalry  are  sent  out,  some  with  sealed  orders,  to 
bring  in  such  men  as  have  been  marked  down  by  informers  eager 
to  earn  the  rewards  offered  for  the  apprehension  of  guilty  persons, 


The  Punishment  of  Indikee.  133 

and  yesterday  a  swoop  was  made  into  the  Chardeb  Valley,  only 
two  or  three  miles  from  Camp.  The  village  of  Indikee  and  its 
neighboors  sent  out  most  of  their  armed  men  to  fight  against  us, 
and  for  the  last  month  they  have  been  revelling  in  fancied  security, 
in  the  belief  that  their  misdeeds  were  unknown.  They  have  just 
been  rudely  awakened  from  their  pleasant  dream.  On  Friday 
evening  the  8rd  Sikhs,  5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  and  two  mountain 
guns  of  the  Kohat  Battery  were  warned  for  service  with  General 
Baker  for  the  morrow,  but  their  destination  was  kept  a  secret. 
There  are  so  many  channels  by  which  information  may  leak  out 
that  if  it  had  been  stated  whither  they  were  bound,  some  kind 
friends  of  the  Afghans,  who  are  favourably  received  in  Camp, 
might  have  given  warning  to  the  men  whose  lives  were  in  danger. 
General  Baker  formed  up  the  troops  outside  the  walls  of  the 
cantonments  at  daybreak  yesterday  morning,  and  at  once  moved 
off  through  the  suburbs  of  Cabul  to  the  gorge  through  which  the 
rivers  enters  the  city.  The  road  to  the  left  was  taken  after 
Dehmazung  village  had  been  passed  just  beyond  the  gorge,  and 
the  cavalry  pushing  on  formed  a  cordon  round  Indikee.  In  my 
last  letter  I  described  the  village,  which  General  Roberts  visited 
three  days  ago.  It  is  commanded  from  several  points  on  the  hill- 
side, and  at  one  of  these  the  two  guns  were  posted  ready  to  open 
fire  if  resistance  were  offered.  There  was,  however,  no  thought 
of  fighting :  the  village  was  taken  quite  by  surprise,  and  the 
headmen  came  out  in  fear  and  trembling  as  General  Baker  and 
the  8rd  Sikhs  marched  up.  The  headmen  were  briefly  told  that 
all  sepoys  belonging  to  the  Afghan  army  must  be  brought  out  and 
surrendered.  They  were  given  five  minutes  to  produce  the  men, 
the  threat  of  a  forcible  search,  with,  perhaps,  worse  to  follow, 
giving  point  to  the  request.  In  a  very  few  minutes  they  brought 
forward  thirty  men,  unarmed,  and  with  no  uniform  on  their  backs, 
and  these  were  at  once  made  prisoners.  The  General  had  a  list 
in  which  the  names  of  certain  sepoys  known  to  be  in  Indikee 
were  entered  ;  and,  upon  calling  this  over,  several  were  found  to 
be  missing.  The  maliks  explained  that  twenty-two  sepoys  were 
absent  in  various  directions,  and  promised  faithfully  to  bring  them 
into  Sherpur  when  they  should  return.  This  promise  was  accepted, 
and  the  disarmament  of  the  village  then  began.     The  orders  were 


134  '^^  Afghan  Wary  1879—80. 

that  all  arms,  even  to  the  knives  so  commonly  worn  by  Afghans, 
should  be  laid  at  the  door  of  every  house  before  our  sepoys 
entered.  This  was  done,  the  whole  place  being  divided  into  three 
parts  :  two  companies  of  Sikhs  were  sent  to  each  section  to  collect 
the  weapons.  Wherever  the  arms  were  not  before  the  doors  the 
houses  were  searched,  and  in  such  a  manner  that  but  few  weapons 
could  remain  hidden.  Indikee  having  made  itself  so  particularly 
obnoxious,  was  further  punished  by  a  fine  of  1,300  maunds  of 
grain  and  800  loads  of  bhooaa  being  levied  upon  it.  This  quantity 
of  grain  and  forage  was  ordered  to  be  delivered  in  Sherpur  within 
a  week,  and  two  headmen  were  taken  as  hostages  for  the  due 
fulfilment  of  the  bargain.  In  case  of  their  failing  [to  carry  out 
the  order,  the  village  will  be  burnt  to  the  ground.  Other  villages 
which  had  shared  in  the  guilt  of  Indikee  were  then  visited,  and 
eighteen  more  Afghan  soldiers  taken.  Many  of  these  belong  to 
the  Herat  regiments,  and  answered  to  their  names  when  called 
upon.  They  fell  into  rank  at  the  word  of  command ;  and,  when 
**  right  about  face  *'  was  called  out,  preparatory  to  marching  back 
to  Sherpur,  obeyed  with  alacrity.  All  the  arms  taken  were 
humbly  carried  into  camp  by  the  villagers,  escorted  by  our  sepoys 
and  sowars,  much  to  the  edification  of  such  Cabulis  as  were  met 
upon  the  road.  The  raid  was  altogether  a  very  successful  one  : 
and  if  all  the  towers  in  the  Chardeh  Valley  are  blown  up  as  a 
pendant  to  the  excursion,  the  villagers  will  have  been  taught  a 
severe  lesson.  To-day  the  maliks,  true  to  their  word,  brought 
in  between  twenty  and  thirty  sepoys,  many  of  the  latter  marching 
quietly  in,  and  surrendering  themselves  as  calmly  as  if  they  were 
our  own  soldiers  who  had  overstayed  their  leave  and  expected  a 
slight  punishment.  What  their  fate  is  likely  to  be,  appears  from 
the  result  of  the  sitting  of  the  Military  Commission  to-day. 
Sixteen  prisoners  were  brought  up,  and  eleven  of  these  will  be 
hanged  to-morrow  morning.  Five  poor  wretches,  khalassies 
belonging  to  the  Artillery,  were  released,  as  there  was  nothing  to 
inculpate  them.  We  seem  at  last  to  have  got  hold  of  certain 
sepoys  who  were  concerned  in  the  first  outbreak  in  the  Bala  Hissar. 
They  do  not  attempt  to  conceal  their  names,  or  those  of  the 
regiments  to  which  they  belong,  and  hear  their  sentence  of  death 
as  stoically  as  if  each   man  were  a  Spartan.    It  makes  one  ex- 


Difficulties  on  tfie  Khyber  Line.  135 

asperated  to  see  the  rank  and  file  of  these  wretches  being  marched 
off  to  execution,  while  their  leaders  are  still  at  large,  and  bat  few 
of  the  Cabal  rabble  have  been  brought  to  account.  One  grows 
sick  of  hanging  ten  common  men  a  day ;  and  there  is  already  a 
talk  of  an  amnesty  being  shortly  proclaimed — only  ringleaders  and 
certain  marked  men  being  excepted.  There  will  be  no  difficulty, 
I  imagine,  in  the  future  in  capturing  a  few  score  sepoys  if  the 
executions  have  to  be  begun  over  again,  as  the  muster-rolls  give 
yery  fully  the  names  and  residences  of  the  sepoys.  The  rolls  are 
framed  somewhat  on  the  Indian  pattern,  and  are  fairly  complete. 
One  is  the  crack  regiment,  called  the  '*  Asnider  Regiment,"  atid 
these  men  are  still  at  large  with  good  rifles  in  their  hands. 
Perhaps  they  may  have  courage  enough  to  die  as  soldiers,  fighting 
openly,  rather  than  come  to  an  end  on  the  scaffold. 

We  are  unhappy  in  our  minds  as  to  our  winter  line  of  com- 
munications, our  hopes  of  the  road  to  Gundamak  being  secured 
by  the  meeting  of  General  Macpherson's  and  General  Charles 
Gtough's  forces  having  suddenly  dropped  below  zero.  It  is  difficult 
to  understand  what  has  occurred :  but  the  most  important  step  in 
our  recent  operations  has  certainly  been  neutralized  in  some  way. 
Whether  it  is  divided  authority, — General  Roberts  on  the  Cabul 
side  being  unable  to  give  orders  to  General  Bright  on  the  Gun- 
damak line  so  long  as  the  latter  remains  senior  in  army  rank, — or 
some  local  exigency,  is  not  at  all  clear ;  but  this  much  is  only  too 
plainly  evident,  that  the  force  under  General  Charles  Gough,  after 
joining  hands  with  our  brigade  at  Eata  Sung,  four  miles  west  of 
Jugdulluck,  has  fallen  back  upon  Jugdulluck,  while  General 
Macpherson  has  marched  down  the  Tezin  river  to  the  Lughman 
country.  Consequently  we  have  been  cut  off  again  from  the 
Khyber  Force  for  several  days.  We  are  most  anxious  to  ensure 
the  safety  of  our  postal  and  telegraphic  line  through  the  belt  of 
mountains  which  shuts  us  off  from  our  reinforcements  if  we  chance 
to  need  them.  Besides,  we  are  anxious  to  send  our  sick  and 
wounded  back  to  India  before  the  full  rigour  of  winter  comes  upon 
them  here ;  and,  with  snow  likely  to  fall  early  in  December,  there 
is  not  much  time  to  spare.  General  Macpherson,  on  his  part,  has 
crossed  the  Cabul  river  at  a  point  where,  it  is  said,  a  pile-bridge 
could  be  easily  built,  and  has  explored  the  Lughman  Valley  at 


136  TJie  Afghan  War,   1879—80. 

its  western  end.  Shortness  of  supplies  is  given  as  his  reason  for 
leaving  Eata  Sung.  He  has  found  a  good  road  running  for 
80  or  40  miles  over  nearly  a  hill  country ;  but  whether  it  will  be 
of  service  is  quite  another  matter,  which  may  be  dealt  with  when 
we  have  (me  route  open.  The  troops  with  him  are  needed  here, 
as  one  or  two  local  punitive  expeditions  have  to  be  sent  out ;  and 
he  has  therefore  been  recalled.  The  Luttabimd  route  is  to  be 
adopted  as  the  one  best  calculated  to  be  followed  to  JugduUuck, 
and  the  Pioneers  will  be  left  behind  to  make  it  practicable.  Blast- 
ing powder  is  being  sent  up  to  the  Kotal,  and  the  work  will,  it  is 
thought,  soon  be  accomplished.  In  the  meantime.  General  Hugh 
Gough  has  left  Sherpur  to  arrange  for  all  the  posts  between 
Luttabund  and  Jugdulluck  being  held.  There  was  no  opposition 
to  the  advance  from  Gundamak  beyond  a  few  shots  fired  by  a  knot 
of  men  near  Jugdulluck ;  the  only  damage  they  inflicted  was  the 
wounding  of  one  of  the  Guides*  horses. 

12f  A  November. 

The  last  few  days  have  been  remarkable  for  the  trial  and  execu- 
tion of  no  less  than  forty-nine  prisoners,  nearly  all  of  whom  were 
sepoys  belonging  to  the  Herat  regiments  which  attacked  the 
Residency.  As  already  mentioned.  General  Baker  captured  forty- 
eight  men  in  the  Chardeh  villages  in  his  excursion  of  the  8th ; 
and  others  were  brought  in  by  the  headmen  in  fulfilment  of  their 
promise.  In  all,  eighty-nine  were  tried  by  the  Military  Commission ; 
and  of  these,  eleven,  twenty-eight,  and  ten  were  hanged  on  the 
10th,  11th,  and  12th  instant.  The  remainder  were  released,  as 
they  were  able  to  give  a  fairly  satisfactory  account  of  themselves, 
two  only  being  retained,  as  they  have  promised  to  lead  our  search 
parties  to  villages  where  men  are  still  lying  hidden.  These  two 
men  were  to  have  been  hanged  this  morning,  and  were  only 
reprieved  at  the  last  moment.  Every  opportunity  was  given 
to  these  Afghan  sepoys  to  explain  their  actions,  and  such  lame 
stories  as  were  invented  were  easy  of  disproof.  Their  maliks 
stated  what  men  were  absent  from  the  villages,  and  whether  they 
were  with  their  regiments,  or  away  at  distant  points  during  Sep- 
tember and  October.  The  muster-rolls  in  our  possession  showed 
the  rank  and  regiment  of  the  men,  and  in  no  case  did  the  prisoners 


An  Amnesty  Proclaimed.  137 

deny  their  identity.  Sach  as  were  released  were  either  poor 
wretches  like  ffaxL-khalassieSy  or  sepoys,  who  could  show  that 
they  were  nowhere  near  Cabul  from  September  1st  to  October  8th, 
and  conld  not  consequently  have  shared  in  the  attack  npon  the 
Embassy,  the  battle  of  Charasia,  or  the  fight  on  the  Cabal  Heights. 
These  wholesale  executions  were  mainly  intended  as  a  punishment 
to  such  as  disregarded  the  Proclamation  issued  at  Zerghun  Shahr 
by  General  Roberts  on  October  3rd,  and  it  is  now  thought  an 
example,  severe  enough,  has  been  made.  The  Afghan  army,  or 
such  of  it  as  exists,  must  see  that  we  were  thoroughly  in  earnest 
in  threatening  with  death  all  who  chose  to  appear  as  rebels  against 
the  then  Amir,  in  whose  name  we  were  advancing.  Of  course  the 
instant  men  came  in  and  surrendered,  putting  themselves  at  our 
mercy,  the  task  of  hanging  them  became  a  very  ungracious  one 
— ^if  they  had  only  been  guilty  of  contesting  an  advance.  To-day, 
therefore,  an  amnesty  was  issued,  under  which  all  of  this  latter 
class  were  pardoned  on  condition  of  surrendering  thepr  arms. 
The  following  is  the  full  text  of  the  amnesty : — 


Pboclamation  op  NovEMBEB  12th,  1879. 

"  To  all  whom  it  may  concern.  On  the  12th  of  October  a  Pro- 
clamation was  issued,  in  which  I  offered  a  reward  for  the  sur- 
render of  any  persons  who  bad  fought  against  the  British  troops 
since  the  8rd  of  September,  and  had  thereby  become  rebels  against 
the  Amir  Yakub  Ehan.  I  have  now  received  information  which 
tends  to  show  that  some  at  least  of  those  who  shared  in  the 
opposition  encountered  by  the  British  troops  during  their 
advance  on  Cabul,  were  led  to  do  so  by  a  belief  that  the  Amir 
was  a  prisoner  in  my  camp,  and  bad  called  upon  the  soldiery  and 
people  of  Cabul  to  rise  on  his  behalf.  Such  persons,  although 
enemies  to  the  British  Government,  were  not  rebels  against  their 
own  sovereign,  and  the  great  British  Government  does  not  seek 
for  vengeance  against  enemies  who  no  longer  resist.  It  may  be 
that  few  only  of  those  who  took  up  arms  were  thus  led  away  by 
the  statement  of  evil-minded  men,  but  rather  than  punish  the 
innocent  with  the  guilty,  I  am  willing  to  believe  that  all  were  alike 
deceived.     On  behalf  of  the  British  Government,  therefore,  I 


138  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

proclaim  a  free  and  complete  amnesty  to  all  persons  who  have 
fought  against  the  British  troops  since  the  8rd  of  September, 
provided  that  they  now  give  up  any  arms  in  their  possession  and 
return  to  their  homes.  The  offer  of  reward  for  the  surrender  of 
such  persons  is  now  withdrawn,  and  they  will  not,  for  the  future, 
be  molested  in  any  way  on  account  of  their  opposition  to  the 
British  advance.  But  it  must  be  clearly  understood  that  the 
benefit  of  this  amnesty  does  not  extend  to  any  one,  whether 
soldier  or  civilian,  who  was  concerned,  directly  or  indirectly,  in 
the  attack  upon  the  Residency,  or  who  may  hereafter  be  found 
in  possession  of  any  property  belonging  to  members  of  the 
Embassy*  To  such  persons  no  mercy  will  be  shown.  Further, 
I  hold  out  no  promise  of  pardon  to  those  who,  well  knowing  the 
Amir's  position  in  the  British  camp,  instigated  the  troops  and 
people  of  Cabul  to  take  up  arms  against  the  British  troops.  They 
have  been  guilty  of  wilful  rebellion  against  the  Amir's  authority, 
and  they  will  be  considered  and  treated  as  rebels  wherever  they 
may  be  found.** 

It  was  not  to  be  expected  that  clemency  would  be  extended  to 
such  men  as  joined  in  the  actual  attack  upon  the  Residency,  or  to 
the  leaders,  who  misled  the  sepoys  afterwards,  by  declaring  that 
the  Amir  was  an  unwilling  prisoner  in  our  hands,  and  was  calling, 
from  his  captivity,  upon  all  true  Mussulmans  to  resist  the  British, 
and  to  release  him  from  the  hands  of  his  own  and  his  country's 
enemies.  As  we  have  had  daily  to  watch  the  string  of  men 
passing  along  under  escort  to  tide  Bala  Hissar,  many  a  keen 
regret  has  been  felt  that  leaders  like  Nek  Mahomed  and 
Kushdil  E^han  have  not  been  in  their  ranks.  The  demean- 
our of  the  men  hanged  has,  in  all  cases,  been  one  of  stolid 
indifference:  they  accepted  their  fate  as  a  matter  of  course, 
and,  when  surrounded  by  the  bayonets  of  the  Highlanders, 
tried  to  keep  up  a  semblance  of  soldierly  bearing,  by  marching 
in  time  and  keeping  shoulder  to  shoulder.  But  that  one  re- 
members the  bitter  treachery  we  have  come  to  punish,  and 
can  almost  look  down  from  the  foot  of  the  scaffold  into  the  pit 
in  which  the  bodies  of  our  brave  Guides  are  lying,  one  might 
feel  pity  for  the  wretches  whose  fanaticism  has  put  their  heads 


The  Intrigues  of  Ministers.  139 

into  the  noose.  There  were  no  extra  precautions  taken,  even 
when  twenty-eight  men  had  to  be  hanged ;  a  small  guard  of 
fifty  men  under  a  commissioned  officer  was  told  off  from  one  of 
the  British  regiments,  and  the  prisoners  were  marched  off  in 
the  usual  way.  They  apparently  never  thought  of  attempting 
to  escape;  and  Cabul  is  so  cowed  by  the  military  law  it  is 
now  enjoying,  that  its  rabble  population  has  not  spirit  enough 
left  to  cry  ''  a  rescue.*'  Nothing  can  be  quieter  than  the  city, 
which  has  always  been  so  notorious  for  bloodshed  and  tur- 
bulence: the  shadow  of  the  scaffold  is  over  it,  and  not  one 
among  the  ruffians  who  throng  its  narrow  streets,  and  hide  in  its 
filthy  purlieus,  but  feels  its  influence.  They  have  hitherto  traded 
upon  our  known  weakness — the  worship  of  the  quality  of  mercy, 
— and  it  is  only  now  that  they  understand  the  new  principle  of 
retribution  we  have  introduced  into  our  policy.  Like  Pollock, 
General  Boberts  might  have  destroyed  their  bazaar  and  left  Cabul 
to  its  £Ette  ;  but  whether  we  withdraw  again  or  not,  there  will  be 
the  tale  of  lives  taken  by  our  hangmen  still  to  be  counted  over  in 
the  city  and  the  villages ;  and  who  knows  yet  what  powerful  names 
may  not  top  the  list  ? 

The  work  of  the  Special  Commission  dealing  with  the  Massacre 
and  intrigues  of  the  Ministers  has  so  far  progressed,  that,  in  a 
few  days,  I  believe,  the  report  will  be  ready.  Each  of  the  mem- 
bers— Colonel  Macgregor,  Dr.  Bellew,  and  Hyat  Ehan — ^is  writing 
a  report ;  and  from  the  three  will  be  framed  a  final  one,  to  be 
submitted  to  the  Government,  with  such  recommendations  as 
General  Boberts  and  his  advisers  may  deem  fit  to  make.  The 
chief  interest,  of  course,  attaches  to  the  Amir,  whose  fate  now 
hangs  in  the  balance.  That  he  will  at  least  be  deported  to  India 
seems  beyoncl  doubt.  What  punishment  will  be  meted  out  to  the 
Mustaufi,  the  Wazir,  Yahiya  E^han,  and  Zakariah  Ehan,  cannot 
of  course  be  estimated;  but  if  the  evidence  against  them  of 
inciting  the  rebel  regiments  to  continue  in  arms  is  at  all  clear, 
they  ought  certainly  not  to  be  spared.  They  see  day  by  day  how 
unyielding  we  are  in  carrying  out  the  work  we  have  undertaken ; 
and,  if  guilty,  they  must  uneasily  count  their  beads  while  calcu- 
lating the  chances  of  ultimate  escape.  The  amnesty  is  so  framed 
that  they  do  not  at  present  come  within  its  scope,  and  they  cannot 
tell  the  exact  evidence  which  has  been  forthcoming  as  to  their 


140  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

intrignes.  They  are  closely  guarded,  and  all  access  to  them  will 
he  forbidden  until  their  sentence  is  pronounced.  There  is  one 
prisoner  in  the  row  of  tents  where  our  captives  are  confined  who 
is  to  be  treated  to-morrow  to  the  smart  punishment  of  fifty  lashes, 
and  his  case  is  a  peculiar  one.  When  the  Ghilzais  and  their  allies 
were  investing  the  Shutargardan,  Colonel  Money  received  a  jirgah 
who  proposed  certain  terms  which  I  have  before  characterized  as 
absurd.  The  tribes  proposed,  first,  that  the  force  then  in  Shutar- 
gardan should  retire  to  Ali  Eheyl,  the  Ghilzais  finding  carriage 
for  their  stores  and  giving  hostages  as  a  guarantee  of  good  faith. 
This  was  declined,  and  they  then  made  a  similar  proposition, 
giving  Kushi  as  the  destination  of  the  troops  instead  of  Ali  Kheyl. 
On  this  also  being  rejected,  the  jirgah  said  that  on  promise  of 
payment  of  two  lakhs  of  rupees  they  would  disperse  the  tribes. 
This  was  laughed  at  by  Colonel  Money  and  Dr.  Bellew,  and  the 
jirgah  were  dismissed.  One  Ghilzai  chief,  losing  his  temper, 
said  : — "  Very  well,  to-morrow  morning  we  will  come  and  cut  all 
your  throats.*'  This  part  of  the  programme  did  not  come  off, 
and  this  man  bad  afterwards  the  audacity  to  come  into  Camp 
here,  no  doubt  to  see  how  we  were  progressing.  He  was  recognized 
and  arrested,  and  to-morrow  he  will  be  sent  back  to  his  tribe  well 
scored  with  the  lash.  He  will,  perhaps,  use  greater  discretion  in 
future.  While  on  this  matter  of  the  Shutargardan  investment, 
it  is  worth  mentioning  that  one  section  of  the  tribes  has  been 
punished  in  a  manner  that  may  rather  astonish  their  chiefs. 
When  it  was  believed  that  the  telegraph  line  would  be  perma- 
nently laid  to  Cabul  from  Ali  Eheyl,  large  quantities  of  timber  were 
purchased  from  local  maliks,  one  section  (the  Ahmed  Kheyls,  I 
believe)  supplying  Rs.  6,000  worth.  They  had  been  paid  half 
this  sum  ;  but  as  they  broke  faith  by  joining  the  other  tribesmen 
during  the  late  disturbances.  General  Eoberts  has  sanctioned  the 
confiscation  of  the  Bs.  3,000  still  due  to  them,  This  will  be  a 
heavy  fine,  and  is  a  ready  mode  of  punishing  them.  The  cost  of 
laying  the  line  from  Ali  Kheyl  westwards  to  within  a  few  miles  of 
Dobundi  was  over  Bs.  20,0C0,  and  nearly  all  the  wire  and  posts 
have  been  carried  off  by  the  hillmen — a  costly  experiment  to  us, 
which  it  is  to  be  hoped  will  not  be  repeated. 

We  are  now  rejoicing  in  the  probable  openingof  the  roadfi-om  here 
to  Jugdulluck,  as  arrangements  have  been  made  by  General  Hugh 


Severe  Weather.  141 

Goagh  for  the  garrisoning  of  the  posts.  Oar  quarters  in  barracks 
are  not  quite  ready,  and  such  a  sadden  access  of  cold  as  that  now 
experienced  is  difficult  to  withstand  in  the  light  tents  our  men 
have  to  live  in.  Yesterday  there  were  signs  from  the  early  morn- 
ing that  some  change  was  threatening,  the  sun  being  obscured  by 
a  haze  which,  in  the  eyes  of  the  natives,  meant  snow.  Late  in 
the  afternoon  one  of  the  local  khak-bads,  or  small  dust-storms, 
swept  oyer  Camp,  and  this  was  followed  by  light  rain,  just  sufficient 
to  lay  the  dust.  A  great  fall  of  temperature  occurred,  which 
droTe  us  to  seek  the  warmth  of  poshteens  and  over-coats,  and  just 
before  sunset  sleet  began  to  drift  down.  For  about  an  hour  it  fell, 
not  very  heavily  however,  and  soon  the  whole  cantonment  was 
whitened  over.  The  hills  about  were  all  obscured  by  light  clouds, 
which  closed  down  upon  the  plain,  and  we  began  to  fear  heavy 
snow  would  fall.  Fortunately,  however,  for  our  comfort,  it  cleared 
up  soon  after  six  o'clock ;  but  a  sharp  frost  set  in,  and  the  night 
was  bitterly  cold,  water  freezing  even  in  our  tents.  To-day  the 
sky  was  as  blue  and  clear  as  in  June,  and  the  frozen  sleet  soon 
disappeared  as  the  sun  shone  out.  In  sheltered  places  little 
patches  of  white  are  still  seen,  while  the  Pughman  mountains 
are  covered  with  snow.  An  early  and  severe  winter  is  expected 
from  this  sudden  change,  although  it  is  possible  two  or  three  weeks 
of  bright  genial  sunshine  may  still  be  in  store  for  us  before  the 
real  winter  snow-fall  covers  the  country.  A  flying  column,  made 
up  from  General  Baker's  brigade,  was  to  have  started  for  Ghazni 
on  the  15th,  General  Boberts  in  person  accompanying  it ;  but  it 
is  probable  that  the  expedition  vrill  now  be  postponed.  It  would 
involve  great  hardships  to  march  troops  between  80  and  90  miles 
exposed  to  sleet  and  snow  storms ;  and  as  the  chief  object  of  the 
journey  would  be  to  secure  food  and  forage,  other  means  may, 
perhaps,  be  found  to  gain  the  end  in  view.  The  proclamation  of 
an  amnesty  will  give  confidence  to  villagers  at  a  distance,  who  may 
now  be  tempted  to  bring  in  supplies. 

There  has  not  been  much  excitement  in  Gamp  apart  from  the 
news  of  a  skirmish  at  Doaba,  in  which  the  67th  had,  at  last,  a 
chance  of  distinguishing  themselves.  We  shall  only  gain  parti- 
culars of  this  little  fight,  which  has  cost  us  four  killed  and  five 
wounded,  when  Genend  Macpherson  comes  in  on  the  14th. 


142  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 


CHAPTEE  Xn. 

Winter  Supplies — ^The  Forage  Difficulty — ^Lack  of  Civilized  Appliances  and  Inventions — 
Compressed  Hay — The  Sick  Convoy  for  Indiit— Alleged  Atrocities — ^The  Inquiry 
into  Dr.  Bourke's  Statement— An  Exaggerated  Description  of  the  Charasia  Battie- 
field — General  Macpherson's  Excursion  to  Tagao — Attitude  of  the  Safis — Shore 
Ali's  Military  Road  along  the  Northern  Bank  of  the  Cabul  River — The  Skirmish 
at  Doaba— Narrow  Escape  of  Captain  Poole's  Company— Defeat  of  the  Safis. 

Sherpur,  \iih  November. 

The  fiftll  of  sleet  on  the  eyening  of  the  11th  led  ns  to  believe  that 
severe  weather  might  be  setting  in ;  bat,  to  our  surprise,  the  same 
genial  days  which  delighted  us  before  have  returned ;  and  after 
three  sharp  nights,  in  which  a  cheerful  fire  in  a  walled  building 
would  have  been  very  welcome,  we  are  hoping  that  winter  will 
spare  us  further  inclemency  at  least  for  two  or  three  weeks.  The 
Ghazni  expedition  may,  I  think,  be  looked  upon  as  abandoned  ; 
and  we  are  trusting  to  local  sirdars  to  bring  us  in  the  large  supplies 
of  forage  which  we  were  going  out  to  seek.  Advances  in  hard 
cash  are  made  to  these  men,  so  that  they  may  go  out  with  the 
practical  evidence  of  our  willingness  to  buy  up  all  the  hhoosa  in 
the  country,  and  from  Daoud  Shah  downwards  they  promise  us 
great  things  in  the  way  of  supplies.  As  I  said  in  a  late  letter, 
the  question  of  forage  is  the  most  pressing,  as,  once  the  ground  is 
covered  with  snow,  the  scanty  supply  of  gi'ass  which  now  comes  in 
will  be  entirely  cut  off.  From  Eohistan,  the  Logar  and  Chardeh 
Valleys,  and  the  villages  in  the  Cabul  plain  eastwards  to  Butkhak, 
we  have  drawn  some  thousands  of  maunds ;  *  but  with  the  horses 
of  the  9th  Lancers,  three  native  regiments,  and  two  batteries  of 
Artillery,  as  well  as  the  mules  of  two  mountain  batteries,  to  be  kept 
in  good  condition,  and  all  the  transport  animals  to  be  fed,  the  con- 
sumption is  enormous.  Pressed  hay  would  be  worth  its  weight  in 
silver  if  we  could  only  get  it  here ;  but,  of  course,  we  might  as 
well  long  for  sea-coal  fires.     One  sees  much  written  of  what  ought 

*  One  mannd=40  seer8=80  Ibe. 


The  Carrying  of  Supplies.  143 

to  be  done  by  armies  advancing  from  India  into  Afghanistan,  and 
the  slowness  of  onr  marches  is  sometimes  criticized  very  rabidly  ; 
but  the  critics  seem  to  forget  that  we  have  no  railways  upon  our 
lines  of  communication,  and  that  we  are  asked  to  make  war  in 
almost  as  rude  a  way  as  the  barbaric  hordes  which  swept  to  and 
from  India  centuries  ago.  Barring  our  weapons  and  ammunition 
— and  eyen  here  we  have  been  served  with  Gatling  guns  that  will 
not  work — we  have  but  the  old  means  of  advance :  the  camels, 
mules,  and  ponies,  which  have  been  time-honoured  carriers  since 
the  days  of  Alexander ;  and  we  have  them  in  such  small  numbers, 
that  the  loss  of  even  100  is  a  serious  matter.  We  feed  them  as 
the  old  warriors  fed  their  beasts  of  burden — on  such  com  and 
forage  as  we  can  get ;  but  whereas  they  appropriated  every  maund 
that  was  to  be  found,  and  asked  no  questions,  we  pay  exorbitant 
prices,  dealing  as  traders,  and  not  as  conquerors,  with  the  people. 
Civilization  has  done  this  much,  that  it  has  shown  there  are  ways 
by  which  forage  for  a  month  can  be  carried  in  so  small  a  compass 
that  it  is  but  little  encumbrance ;  but  we  reap  no  benefit  from  the 
discovery,  and  are  thrown  into  a  by-no-means  fertile  country  to  do 
as  best  we  can  with  such  supplies  as  may  be  forthcoming.  The 
very  hackeries  which  ply  along  the  road  from  Jhelum  to  Jumrood 
groan  out  reproaches  against  the  civilization  which  permits  them 
to  linger  out  their  lives  ;  and  every  grass-cutter's  pony,  half  hidden 
by  his  huge  bundle  of  worthless  straw,  or  burnt-up  grass,  kicks 
against  the  absurd  pricks  which  force  him  to  do  as  his  ancestors 
did — fetch  and  carry  bulky  loads  of  which  he  himself  eats  nearly 
half.  We  could  do  mighty  deeds,  and  march  mighty  distances, 
were  it  not  that  our  transport  equipment  is  usually  x — an  unknown 
quantity,  which  can  never  be  relied  upon.  In  the  morning  x  may 
equal  the  equivalent  of  10,000  camels ;  in  the  evening  it  may  be 
9,500 ;  after  six  months'  campaigning  it  may  be  600.  We  have 
not  merely  to  forage  for  the  chargers  of  our  fighting  men — we 
have  to  feed  the  very  animals  which  carry  the  forage,  and  carry  it 
often  in  its  bulkiest  form.  If  we  had  merely  to  do  the  latter,  we 
might  trust  to  the  country,  especially  where  the  local  baggage 
animals  are  used  for  carriage.  A  Cavalry  Brigade  that  could 
carry  its  own  forage — and  such  a  brigade  could  be  created  if 
advantage  were  taken  of  the  principle  which  reduces  bulk  to  one- 


144  The  Afghan  War,   1879 — 80. 

twentieth  or  even  less — would  be  so  powerful  an  aid  to  an 
advancing  force,  that  delays  would  be  almost  unknown.  There 
would  be  no  question,  as  there  is  now,  of  sending  back  regiments 
to  pasturing-grounds ;  there  would  be  the  means  of  sustaining 
them  always  at  hand.  A  pony  that  now  carries  a  load  which  a 
horse  can  eat  in  a  day,  could  carry  food  for  twenty  days.  A 
trooper  could  strap  his  forage  to  his  saddle  as  he  now  does 
his  gram-bag.  We  might  take  many  a  hint  from  the  nomads 
of  Central  Asia — perhaps  the  horsemen  who  can  travel  long 
distances,  and  keep  their  horses  always  equal  to  the  work,  better 
than  any  other  race  in  the  world.  The  Turcoman  carries  with 
him,  in  the  ingenious  shape  of  small  balls  of  food,  such  con- 
centrated nourishment,  that  his  horse  never  flags  in  a  sixty-mile 
ride ;  and  if  he  can  do  this  in  his  own  rude  way,  and  be  inde- 
pendent of  passing  supplies,  we,  with  elaborate  hay-presses  and 
chemical  processes,  might  surely  put  ourselves  at  least  on  his 
level.  I  have  been  led  into  this  dissertation  chiefly  by  reason  of 
the  proposed  splitting  up  of  our  cavalry  brigade.  It  is  said  that 
the  12th  Bengal  Cavalry  will  probably  remain  for  the  winter  in 
the  Jellalabad  Valley,  where  forage  is  fairly  plentiful ;  and  it  is 
also  possible  that  another  cavalry  regiment  will  be  sent  from  our 
camp  here  to  join  them.  We  all  regret  that  the  cavalry  which 
has  been  with  us  during  the  march  upon  Cabul  should  have  to  be 
sent  back  even  for  three  or  four  months  ;  and  yet  what  can  be 
done  ?  150,000  maunds  of  bhoosa  (chopped  straw)  is  the  estimate 
made  by  the  Commissariat  Department  of  the  quantity  of  forage 
required  from  the  1st  of  November  to  the  end  of  March,  and  we 
have  only  gathered  in  between  16,000  and  20,000  maunds.  The 
deficiency  is  so  great  that,  unless  the  sirdars  we  are  now  employing 
as  purchasing  agents  keep  their  pledges,  our  cavalry  must  starve  or 
be  sent  back.  Besides,  we  have  been  busy  in  providing  the  army 
with  several  hundred  yaboos  as  transport  animals.  These  yahoos 
will  have  to  be  fed  during  the  winter,  in  addition  to  the  mules  and 
camels  we  brought  up  with  us  from  Ali  Kheyl :  there  were  not 
many  certainly,  for  we  did  wonders  in  the  way  of  removing  with 
little  carriage.  It  may  seem  trifling,  with  passing  events,  to  grow 
eloquent  upon  so  dry  a  subject  as  hay ;  but  in  warfare,  such  as 
we  are  engaged  in,  cavalry  are  so  indispensable,  that  their  position 


Departure  of  Sick  and  Wounded.  145 

shoald  be  fairly  represented.  We  hear  of  hay-presses  being  made 
for  the  Gandahar  Force,  bat  we  do  not  want  to  be  encumbered 
with  these.  Could  not  the  forage,  ready  compressed,  be  sent  to  us 
without  further  trouble  ? 

The  convoy  of  sick  and  wounded,  which  left  Sherpur  to-day, 
was  made  up  of  fifty-two  Europeans,  seventy-two  native  soldiers 
and  followers,  and  eight  officers.  There  were  also  a  number  of 
time-expired  men,  and  a  sufficient  escort  was  sent  to  take  care  of 
the  convoy  as  far  as  Butkhak,  whence  the  12th  Bengal  Cavalry 
and  the  28th  Native  Infantry  will  be  detailed  to  see  them  through 
the  mountainous  country  lying  between  the  Cabul  plain  and  the 
Jellalabad  Valley.  All  the  elephants  here  have  also  been  sent 
away  to  General  Bright' s  force,  as  we  are  not  likely  to  want  them 
until  the  spring,  and  they  would  have  probably  died  oflf  when  the 
snow  came.  The  convoy  will  do  the  distance  to  Peshawur  by  easy 
marches,  and  every  precaution  will  be  taken  against  possible 
attacks  in  the  Passes  that  have  to  be  gone  through.  The  sick 
have  not  been  sent  away  a  day  too  soon,  as  the  cold  nights  here 
are  very  trying  to  weakly  men.  The  hospital  quarters  in  the  bar- 
racks are  now  ready,  and  are  very  comfortable.  Such  invalids  as 
are  only  suffering  from  slight  ailments  are  now  in  the  rooms,  the 
strong  mud  walls  of  which  set  at  defiance  the  cold  which  pene- 
trated so  easily  the  thin  canvas  of  the  tents. 

Further  examination  of  the  Luttabund  route  has  shown  that  a 
good  road  can  be  made  with  very  little  trouble,  the  difficult  bits 
near  the  Eotal  being  avoided  by  a  slight  diversion.  Scarcely  any 
blasting  will  be  needed,  and  as  this  kind  of  skilled  labour  is 
generally  very  protracted  and  tiresome,  the  saving  of  much 
valuable  time  is  a  great  consideration.  The  Pioneers  will  be 
enabled  to  return  to  Sherpur  to  finish  their  lines  and  to  carry  out 
such  defensive  works  on  the  Bemaru  Heights  as  may  be  thought 
necessary.  These  works  will  probably  be  on  a  large  scale,  so  far 
as  the  general  design  goes ;  but  the  immediate  work  to  be  done 
will  be  the  building  of  block-houses,  or  towers,  where  the  picquets 
can  be  posted  under  shelter  from  the  cold  wind  which  sweeps 
across  the  ridge.  Three  or  four  tents  are  now  pitched  on  the 
heights ;  but  it  is  very  trying,  especially  for  native  troops,  to  do 
sentry-go  in  such  an  exposed  spot.     An  enemy  would  scarcely 

L 


146  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

yentare  to  attack  the  Gamp  from  the  north,  as  they  would  have  to 
cross  a  level,  grassy  plain,  on  which  the  cavalry  would  have  them 
at  their  mercy.  The  long,  shallow  Wazirabad  lake,  bordered  by 
marshy  ground,  shuts  in  this  plain  to  the  north,  a  spur  from  the 
Pughman  range  again  bounding  the  lake  still  further  to  the  north. 
The  maidan  is  now  used  as  a  polo-ground,  or  for  giving  our  horses 
a  gallop  ;  while  the  lake  affords  wild-fowl  shooting  for  sportsmen 
lucky  enough  to  have  guns  and  cartridges. 

There  has  not  been  much  to  excite  us  in  Camp  lately,  except 
two  slight  shocks  of  earthquake  yesterday ;  and  as  the  executions 
have  for  the  present  ceased,  there  seems  falling  upon  us  that  fatal 
period  of  inactivity  which  always  follows  successful  movements 
against  an  enemy  who  runs  away  after  the  first  brush.  But  one 
unpleasant  incident  has  occurred,  and  it  has  been  made  the  most 
of.  We  have  had  a  Court  of  Inquiry,  and  the  subject  thereof  has 
been  nothing  less  than  ''  atrocities.''  In  a  letter  from  the  cor- 
respondent of  the  Civil  and  Military  Gazette  appeared  a  para- 
graph in  which  "  a  noble  corps  "  was  said  to  have  disgraced  itself 
by  burning  alive  the  wounded  Afghans  left  behind  by  their  friends 
on  the  Charasia  Heights.  The  paragraph  implied,  from  the  con- 
text, that  the  72nd  Highlanders  had  been  guilty  of  this  cruelty ; 
but,  on  inquiry  being  made.  Dr.  Bourke,  the  correspondent  of  the 
Lahore  paper,  said  that,  although  he  had  not  named  the  regiment, 
it  was  the  men  of  the  5th  Ohoorkas  who  had  burned  the  Afghan 
wounded.  This  was  the  first  General  Roberts  had  heard  of  any 
such  occurrence,  as  Dr.  Bourke  had  made  no  report  on  the  sub- 
ject, although  he  had  drawn  a  highly-coloured  picture  of  the  scene 
in  his  letters.  The  General  at  once  ordered  a  court  to  assemble 
and  to  take  evidence,  not  merely  to  clear  the  good  name  of  the 
72nd,  but  to  investigate  the  charge  against  the  Ghoorkas.  The 
President  of  the  Court  was  Major  Pratt,  of  the  6th  Punjab 
Infantry.  Being  a  closed  court,  it  has  not,  of  course,  transpired 
what  evidence  was  taken ;  but  I  believe  the  following  are  the  facts 
of  the  cases  of  cruelty  said  to  have  taken  place.  When  the 
heights  were  cleared  by  the  general  rush  of  General  Baker's  troops, 
the  Afghans  left  their  dead  on  the  ground  as  well  as  several  men 
wounded  at  close  quarters.  A  Ghoorka  was  seen  stooping  near 
one  of  the  latter ;  and  when  Dr.  Bourke,  with  the  ambulance. 


An  Ill-founded  Charge,  147 

came  up,  it  was  found  that  the  Afghan,  who  had  heen  shot 
throngh  the  breast  and  almost  disembowelled  by  a  bayonet  thrust 
or  slash  from  a  kookriey  had  had  his  clothes  set  on  fire.  A  box  of 
matches  was  lying  near  the  body.  The  man  was  in  extremis,  and 
was  said  to  be  insensible ;  and  by  Dr.  Bourke's  orders  a  European 
soldier  shot  him  through  the  head.  Another  Afghan  lying  near 
had  also  his  white  clothing  smouldering,  and  he  was  shot  in  a 
similar  way.  This  seems  to  be  the  plain  truth  about  the  aflfair, 
which  has  been  exaggerated  into  the  wholesale  burning  alive  of 
wounded  men.  The  Ohoorkas  know  the  superstitious  dread 
among  Mussulmans  of  any  part  of  their  body  being  destroyed 
after  death ;  and,  on  the  face  of  it,  there  is  the  probability  of  a 
lighted  match  having  been  applied  to  the  clothes  of  men  seemingly 
dead,  in  order  to  send  their  souls  to  perdition.  The  passions  of 
the  Ghoorkas  have  also  been  highly  inflamed  by  a  story  which 
reached  Ali  Kheyl  from  Gabul,  that  a  Ghoorka,  with  the  Guides' 
escort,  was  led  through  the  city  streets  with  his  face  blackened, 
was  horribly  tortured,  and  afterwards  burned  alive.  They  believed 
fervently  in  this  story,  and,  as  I  have  said,  they  may  have  thought 
to  kill  the  Afghans  in  the  next  world  as  well  as  this.  No  one  in 
the  force  would  seek  to  be  an  apologist  for  such  cruel  acts  as 
burning  alive,  deliberately  and  systematically,  the  wounded  men 
of  an  enemy  even  so  cruel  as  are  the  Afghans ;  but  the  reflections 
cast  upon  the  72nd  Highlanders  and  upon  General  Roberts  himself, 
as  letting  such  acts  go  unpunished,  are  as  unjust  as  they  are  absurd. 
The  General  knew  nothing  whatever  of  the  incident  until  his 
attention  was  called  to  it  in  the  newspapers,  and  his  action  then 
was  prompt  enough.  I  understand  that  he  has  now  called  upon  Dr. 
Bourke  to  give  his  reasons  for  not  reporting  the  matter  officially. 

16th  November. 

Yesterday  Sir  Frederick  Roberts  and  Brigadier- General  Baker 
rode  over  to  Butkhak,  where  Brigadier-General  Macpherson  is 
encamped  after  his  late  excursion  in  the  Tagao  country.  There 
have  been  so  many  movements  of  troops  in  the  Cabul  plain  lately, 
that  the  only  escort  the  General  thought  it  necessary  to  take  with 
him  was  six  sowars  of  the  6th  Punjab  Cavalry.  Since  the  first 
brigade  marched  to  Butkhak  on  the  1st  instant,  the  villagers  in  the 

L  2 


148  Tlie  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

plain  and  in  the  lower  Logar  Valley,  which  runs  down  from  the 
8ang-i-Nawishta  defile,  have  seen  small  parties  of  cavalry  con- 
stantly on  the  move  backwards  and  forwards,  and  within  the  last 
few  days  have  watched  the  23rd  Pioneers  encamped  on  the  banks 
of  the  Logar  and  the  long  convoy  of  sick  and  wounded  march 
along  on  the  way  to  India.  There  have  been  so  many  evidences  of  our 
presence,  that  any  unruly  tribesmen  or  disbanded  sepoys  have  wisely 
kept  very  quiet.  The  road  may  be  considered  safe,  even  for  a  solitary 
traveller  ;  the  telegraph  wire  has  hitherto  been  scrupulously  re- 
spected ;  and  our  foraging  parties  have  never  been  molested. 

We  were,  of  course,  anxious  to  learn  some  particulars  of  the 
late  skirmish,  in  which  a  company  of  the  67th  had  come  to  close 
quarters  with  the  Safis  ;  and,  leaving  the  invalid  camp,  we  passed 
up  to  the  head-quarters  of  the  Ist  Brigade  near  the  village  walls. 
Sir  Frederick  Roberts  heard  the  details  of  the  aflfair  from  General 
Macpherson  as  well  as  an  account  of  the  work  done  by  the  Brigade 
in  opening  up  communication  with  the  Khyber  Force.  1  may 
here  incidentally  state  that  Sir  F.  Roberts  has  now  received  the 
local  rank  of  Lieutenant-General,  and  commands  all  the  troops  in 
Eastern  Afghanistan,  Jumrood  being  the  point  in  the  Peshawur 
direction  to  which  his  power  of  control  extends.  Some  severe 
strictures  have  been  passed  upon  those  who  have  hitherto  had 
the  supreme  control  of  the  force  operating  from  Peshawur,  and 
the  answer  given  to  these  is  that  General  Bright's  advanced 
Brigade  was  a  '*  flying  column."  If  that  were  so,  how  was  it  that 
it  took  twenty-four  days  to  **fly  *'  from  Jellalabad  to  Kata  Sung,  a 
distance  of  about  sixty  miles  ?  Surely  its  wings  must  have  been 
clipped  by  Transport  or  Commissariat  scissors,  in  which  case  it 
would  cease  to  be  a  flying  column  at  all,  and  would  drop  down  to 
the  lower  level  of  a  sedate  brigade  moving  two  and  a  half  miles  a 
day,  sleeping  comfortably  in  tents,  and  living  on  the  fat  of  the 
land.  But  in  that  case  there  should  have  been  supplies  sufficient 
to  have  justified  the  stay  of  the  troops  at  Elata  Sung,  and  so  to 
have  secured  the  road.  General  Macpherson  had  of  course  no 
supplies  with  hu  force,  as  everything  is  being  gathered  into 
Sherpur  for  the  winter  ;  and  he  could  not  stay  at  Kata  Sung,  but 
had  to  try  and  find  food  north  of  the  Cabul  river.  Here  accord- 
ingly came  in  the  story  of  the   reconnaissance  northward  into 


Skirmish  with  the  Safis.  149 

Tagao  and  of  the  collision  with  the  Safis.  The  bed  of  the  Cabal 
riyer  lies  about  ten  miles  north  of  Elata  Sung,  Sei  Baba,  and  the 
Luttabund  Kotal,  its  direction  being  due  east  and  west.  From 
the  vast  pile  of  mountains  which  shut  out  the  Cabul  plain 
from  Gundamak  high  spurs  run  down  towards  the  river,  and 
among  these  the  Tezin  stream,  with  two  or  three  small  tributaries, 
finds  its  way.  When  General  Macpherson  found  that  the  force  he 
had  come  to  meet  at  Eata  Sung  had  withdrawn,  he  turned  off  to 
the  north,  and  proceeding  down  the  bed  of  the  Tezin  stream  for 
six  or  seven  miles,  reached  the  banks  of  the  GabuL  He  encamped 
at  Sirobi,  and  on  the  8th,  resolved  to  cross  the  river  to  the  village 
of  Naghloo,  on  the  opposite  bank,  two  miles  higher  up.  The  natives 
had  reported  that  a  good  road  was  in  existence  on  the  northern  side 
of  the  Cabul  from  that  point,  and  that  it  had  been  regularly  used  as 
the  military  convoy  route  between  Cabul  and  Jellalabad.  General 
Macpherson  found,  without  much  diflBcalty,  a  ford  over  the  Cabul, 
which  is  here  a  stream  with  a  strong  current  travelling  very  rapidly 
on  account  of  the  descent  of  4,000  feet,  which  the  river  makes  from 
Cabul  to  Jellalabad.  Like  all  fords,  however,  in  the  Cabul  river, 
this  crossing-place  was  found  to  have  its  dangers,  the  least  divergence 
from  the  narrow  roadway — if  the  word  can  be  used  where  there 
is  no  dry  land — plunging  men  and  horses  into  deep  water.  The 
fatal  experience  of  the  10th  Hussars  at  Jellalabad  last  spring  was 
remembered,  and  ropes  were  stretched  across  the  stream  by  which 
the  men  were  guided.  This  marked  the  road  to  be  taken  and 
minimized  the  danger.  On  the  evening  of  the  8th  half  the  force  had 
crossed  to  Naghloo  without  any  accident,  except  that  Lieutenants 
Forbes  and  Macgregor,  of  the  92nd  Highlanders,  acting  as  orderly 
officers  to  the  General,  were  swept  away  by  the  current.  By  a  little 
hard  swimming  they  managed  to  reach  the  bank  again.  The  troops 
bivouacked  without  tents.  On  the  following  day  a  reconnaissance 
was  made  firom  Naghloo  eastwards,  towards  the  Lughman  country, 
Lieutenant  Manners  Smith,  Assistant  Quartermaster-General, 
going  out  with  a  few  cavalry  to  examine  the  district.  The  orders 
given  to  the  troops  were  not  to  fire  upon  any  of  the  local  tribesmen, 
unless  the  latter  first  opened  fire ;  and  this  order  was  rigorously  car- 
ried out.  Working  down  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Cabul,  a  koUil  was 
^ined  eight  or  ten  miles  from  Camp,  from  which  a  splendid  view  of 


150  Tfie  Afghan  Wary   1879—80. 

the  Loghman  Valley  was  obtained.  There  was  a  track  right 
through  this,  and  this  was  nndoubtedly  the  road  used  by  the  late 
Shere  Ali  for  his  military  convoys.  It  seemed  to  traverse  an  almost 
level  country ;  and  except  that  to  use  it  would  involve  two  bridges 
— one  near  Naghloo  and  the  other  at  Jellalabad, — there  can  be  no 
question  that  it  would  be  far  easier  than  via  Jugdulluck,  Gunda- 
mak,  and  Futtehabad.  The  country,  however,  north  of  the  Cabul 
is  known  to  be  inhabited  by  Safis — converted  Kafirs,  whose 
fanaticism  exceeds  that  of  almost  any  other  Mahomedans. 
Tagao,  in  which  they  live,  boasts  of  several  fertile  valleys, 
watered  by  the  Panjshir,  Tagao,  and  Uzbin  rivers,  and  might 
furnish  supplies  if  the  people  could  be  reduced  to  obedience. 
Their  chief  is  one  Usman  Khan,*  a  noted  robber ;  and  of  the  temper 
of  his  followers  we  have  already  had  an  example.  When  the 
reconnoitring  party  were  looking  into  the  Lughman  Valley,  some 
seventy  Safis,  all  armed  with  JAej^aib  and  swords,  appeared  a  few 
hundred  yards  off,  and  threatened  to  attack  the  troops  if  they 
proceeded  further  into  their  country.  As  they  did  not  open  fire, 
no  notice  was  taken  of  their  threats,  and  Lieutenant  Smith 
returned  to  Naghloo  in  peace.  On  the  next  day,  the  10th,  a 
foraging  party  of  one  company  of  the  67th  Foot,  under  Captain 
Poole,  was  ordered  to  march  up  the  Cabul  river  to  a  village  some 
six  or  seven  miles  to  the  west  of  Naghloo.  This  village  is  in 
close  proximity  to  Doaba,  at  the  junction  of  the  Panjshir  and 
Cabul  rivers.  The  villagers  near  the  Cabul  are  not  Safis ;  and  as 
they  had  expressed  their  willingness  to  sell  grain  and  forage,  only 
a  small  party  of  men  were  sent  out  in  charge  of  about  100  camels 
and  mules.  The  road  taken  was  found  to  be  rather  difficult,  a 
narrow  defile  close  to  the  river  having  to  be  passed  through,  four 
miles  from  Naghloo.  After  passing  through  this,  the  narrow 
camel-track  passed  over  a  small  semicircular  piece  of  open 
ground,  the  hills  falling  away  to  the  north.  At  the  western  end 
wfts  a  second  defile,  with  a  high  ridge  running  up  to  the  right  and 
shutting  out  from  view  the  village  beyond.  When  Captain  Poole 
was  crossing  the  open  with  thirty  men,  some  distance  in  front  of 
the  baggage  animals,  he  met  a  number  of  villagers  hastening 
along  with  their  household  goods  and  cattle.  They  were  evidently 
*  Aft^rwardt  killed  on  tlie  Asmai  Heighti  on  Dooember  litlu 


Gallantry  of  the  6Tth.  151 

panic-stricken  and  shouted  wildly  to  Captain  Poole,  but  as  he  did 
not  nnderstand  their  langaage  he  pushed  on  to  the  second  defile. 
It  appears  that  what  they  really  said  was  that  the  Safis  were  in 
force  over  the  defile,  had  attacked  their  village,  burned  their 
houses,  and  murdered  some  of  the  inhabitants.  Upon  getting 
through  the  second  defile.  Captain  Poole  saw  on  the  slope 
below  some  800  or  1,000  armed  men,  who  immediately  opened 
fire.  The  thirty  men  of  the  67th  returned  the  fire  and  checked 
the  enemy,  who  had  tried  to  rush  forward.  It  was  important  to 
keep  them  back  until  the  baggage  animals  with  their  small  guard 
of  twenty-four  men  could  retrace  their  steps  through  the  first 
defile.  After  firing  for  some  time,  our  men  observed  800  or  400 
Safis  creeping  round  over  the  hill  to  the  north,  with  the  evident 
intention  of  getting  into  the  open  plain  and  cutting  off  all  retreat. 
The  position  of  the  handful  of  men  then  became  so  hazardous, 
that  Captain  Poole  ordered  them  to  fall  back,  and  for  an  hour  and 
a  half  he  faced  towards  the  Safis,  who  advanced  to  within  40 
yards.  It  was  in  the  open  that  our  men  began  to  drop,  although 
one  had  been  shot  dead  in  the  defile.  Cover  was  taken  under  the 
river  bank,  which  was  three  or  four  feet  above  the  level  of  the 
stream ;  and  though  the  enemy  opened  fire  from  the  southern 
bank,  they  could  not  do  much  mischief.  The  steadiness  of  the 
soldiers,  who  used  their  Martinis  with  good  effect,  was  remarkable 
throughout,  one  or  two  incidents  being  worth  recording*  The 
crack  shot  of  the  regiment.  Corporal  WooUey,  was  with  the  com- 
pany, and  his  practice  was  wonderfully  good.  He  was  unfor- 
tunately shot  through  the  leg,  but  still  continued  firing.  One  of 
his  comrades,  on  being  shot  down,  fell  into  the  river,  and 
struggled  hard  to  gain  the  bank.  Two  Safis  ran  down  to  cut  him 
up ;  and  these  men  Corporal  WooUey  shot  before  they  could  make 
their  way  to  the  wounded  man.  The  latter  was  so  exhausted  by 
his  efforts  that  he  fell  back,  and  was  drowned  in  the  stream. 
Corporal  WooUey  also  brought  down  two  standard-bearers.  The 
fighting  was  so  close  tl|at  Captain  Poole  could  not  carry  off  his 
dead  (two  others  were  killed  in  the  open  besides  the  men 
in  the  defile);  and  the  Safis  mutilated  them  in  a  horrible 
way.  Their  eyes  were  gouged  out,  and  faces  cut  to  pieces  by 
sharp  knives,  so  that  the  bodies  could  scarcely  be  identified. 


152  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

While  fighting  across  the  open,  Captain  Poole  was  struck  by  a 
bullet  in  the  calf  of  the  leg,  and  four  other  soldiers  were  wounded. 
One,  who  was  too  badly  hit  to  be  able  to  walk,  was  put  upon  a 
camel,  and  carried  safely  away.  Lieutenant  Garnegy  kept  the  men 
together  after  his  Captain  had  been  hit ;  and  although  eight  men 
and  an  officer  out  of  fifty-six  had  been  either  killed  or  wounded, 
the  others  never  wavered,  A  sowar  had  galloped  back  to  Naghloo 
for  assistance,  and  General  Macpherson  sent  out  at  once  a 
squadron  of  the  12th  Bengal  Cavalry  and  four  mountain  guns  ; 
160  of  the  67th,  and  a  company  of  the  28th  Punjab  Native 
Infantry  following.  The  cavalry  arrived  at  the  trot,  but  the  defile 
was  so  blocked  by  the  baggage  animals,  that  to  get  through  was 
impossible.  The  sowars  dismounted  and  went  up  the  hill  to  use 
their  carbines,  and  the  guns,  also  arriving,  went  up  the  crest  under 
escort  of  the  28th  and  one  company  of  the  67th,  under  Major 
Baker,  and  opened  fire  at  1,000  yards  into  the  mass  of  the  Safis 
below.  The  shells  had  a  wholesome  effect  upon  the  enemy,  and 
valleys  from  the  Martinis  and  Sniders  were  also  fired  at  long 
ranges.  One  man  of  the  28th  was  killed  by  a  stray  bullet.  The 
other  company  of  the  67th,  under  Lieutenant  Atkinson,  went 
along  the  river  bed,  and  the  enemy  then  retreated  behind  a  sungar 
on  the  ridge  to  the  north  of  the  second  defile,  and  covering  their 
right  flank.  The  mountain  gims  came  into  action  again  at  1,700 
yards,  having  been  brought  down  into  the  plain,  and  Major  Baker 
marched  over  the  hills  to  take  the  sungar  in  flank.  Lieutenant 
Atkinson  advancing  at  the  same  time,  the  Safis  fled  towards  the 
Doaba,  the  cavalry  pursuing  them  for  six  miles.  Their  loss  must 
have  been  heavy,  as  they  left  many  of  their  dead  behind ;  seven 
bodies  were  found  in  one  nullah.  The  mutilated  bodies  of  three 
men  of  the  67th  were  recovered :  the  fourth  had  been  swept  down 
the  river.  The  whole  afiair  proves  how  great  a  risk  small  foraging 
parties  run  in  an  unexplored  country,  where  the  temper  of  the 
inhabitants  is  uncertain.  It  is  true  no  resistance  was  expected ;  but 
the  fanaticism  of  the  Safis  is  so  well  known,  that  extra  precautions 
should  have  been  taken.  The  difficult  ground  to  be  traversed  also 
put  a  small  body  of  infantry,  encumbered  with  baggage  animals,  at 
a  great  disadvantage.  That  one-sixth  of  Captain  Poole's  company 
was  put  out  of  action  is  too  significant  to  be  lightly  regarded. 


The  Charges  against  Yakub  Khan.  153 


CHAPTER  Xin. 

The  Report  of  the  Commiaeion  of  Inquiry  upon  the  Massacre — ^The  Suspicion  againit 
the  Amir  Takub  Khan — The  Report  forwarded  to  the  Goyemment  of  India — 
Probable  Deportation  of  the  Amir  to  India — Gatherings  of  Tribesmen  at  Ghasni — 
The  Necessity  of  collecting  Supplies  for  the  Winter — The  Khyber  Line  of  Commu- 
nications— No  Supplies  obtainable  from  Peshawur — Slowness  of  the  Khyber  Adyance 
— Projected  Expedition  to  Gha?ni— The  Reason  of  its  fulling  through — ^The 
Strength  of  the  Army  of  the  Indus — General  Baker's  Excursion  to  the  Maidan 
Valley— The  Chardeh  Valley  in  Winter— Sir  F.  Roberts  joins  General  Baker— The 
Destruction  of  Bahadur  Khan's  Villages  in  the  Darra  Narkh. 

Shbrpub,  18tfe  November. 

One  part  of  the  importi^nt  work  which  the  British  force  came  to 
Cabal  to  fulfil  has  been  done:  the  CJommission  appointed  to 
inquire  into  the  circumstances  of  the  massacre  of  our  Envoy  an^ 
the  after-events,  culminating  in  the  battle  of  Charasia,  has 
completed  its  task,  and  to-day  the  report  was  duly  signed  by 
Colonel  Macgregor,  Dr.  BeUew,  and  Mahomed  Hyat  Khan.  For 
the  past  two  days  Sir  F.  Boberts  has  had  the  report  before  him, 
and  has  telegraphed  a  summary  of  it  to  the  Government  of  India, 
who  will  thus  be  put  in  possession  of  its  main  features  several 
days  before  the  t^xt  of  the  document  can  reach  them.  In  due 
course  the  Goveimment  will,  no  doubt,  furnish  a  connected 
narrative  of  the  events  of  the  early  part  of  September,  and  the 
world  at  l^ge  will  then  be  able  to  judge  on  what  basis  of  proof 
our  suspicions  against  Yakub  Khan  and  his  most  fiavoured 
ministers  have  rested.*  The  Commission  began  examining 
witnesses  on  the  18t}i  of  October ;  so  that  it  is  exactly  a  month 
to-day  sinpe  the  first  step  was  taken  towftrds  compiling  the  mass 
of  evidence  now  understood  to  have  been  recorded,  I  have 
before  pointed  out  very  fully  hqw  difficult  was  the  work  which  lay 
before  t)ie  Commissioners :  theire  was  sc^|*cely  any  clue  to  be  laid 
hold  of  which  would  le^  them  direct  to  their  chief  point — the 
cause  of  the  outbreak  of  the  Herat  regiments ;  and  they  had  to 
*  Contrary  to  expectation,  no  such  narratiTe  has  oTer  been  published. 


154  77/^  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

take  such  witnesses  as  were  forthcoming,  and  to  trust  to  later 
evidence  to  clear  away  the  darkness  in  which  they  were  at  first 
groping.  The  consideration  shown  to  the  Amir  seemed,  to  the 
suspicions  minds  of  the  Cabulis,  a  sign  which  foreboded  his 
future  restoration,  or  that  of  his  near  relatives ;  and  those  who 
were  well  inclined  to  us  shrank  from  declaring  their  partisanship 
too  boldly,  for  fear  of  after-consequences,  when  the  Barakzai 
family  should  again  be  all-powerful  in  the  country.  There  was  a 
slight  dissipation  of  this  feeling  when  the  Proclamation  of 
October  28th  was  issued,  announcing  Yakub  Khan's  voluntary 
abdication,  and  ordering  all  chiefs  in  Afghanistan  to  look  to  the 
Commander  of  the  British  force  at  Cabul  for  their  authority  in 
future ;  but  we  are  known  to  be  so  eccentric  a  people  that  there 
still  lurked  uneasiness  in  many  minds,  and  mouths  were  sealed 
that  might  reasonably  have  been  expected  to  be  open.  The 
actual  presence  of  the  late  sovereign  in  our  Camp — even  though 
he  was  known  to  be  under  a  close  guard — was  too  powerful  an 
influence  to  be  easily  swept  away :  if  he  had  been  hurried  away 
to  India  in  disgrace,  the  atmosphere  of  doubt  and  uncertainty 
would  have  cleared  up.  But  our  ideas  of  justice  are  too  strict  to 
be  warped  by  passionate  anger,  and  it  was  resolved  to  give  Takub 
Khan  as  fair  a  chance  of  defending  himself  as  he  could  possibly 
expect.  That  he  lost  his  personal  liberty  by  listening  to  foolish 
councillors,  who  thought  he  might  gain  something  by  flight,  was 
nothing  to  us.  One  cannot  always  guard  a  man  against  his  own 
stupidity.  Having,  then,  to  keep  Yakub  Khan  with  us,  we  had  to 
do  as  best  we  could  in  gaining  means  of  judging  what  were  his 
relations  with  the  men  who  stood  forth  as  leaders  of  the  rebel 
army,  and  how  far  he  had  sympathized  with  their  plans.  In 
endeavouring  to  trace  out  the  palace  intrigues  which  Nek  Mahomed, 
Kushdil  Khan,  and  others  had  set  on  foot,  the  Commission 
had  often  to  rely  upon  men  themselves  tainted  with  suspicion ; 
and  when  this  was  the  case  the  statements  had  to  be  carefully 
weighed  and  critically  compared  with  facts  which  were  attested 
beyond  doubt.  To  dwell,  as  I  have  dwelt  before,  upon  the  strong 
point  of  an  Afghan,  and  the  strongest  of  a  Barakzai — the 
capacity  for  lying — would  be  merely  to  repeat  an  old  story  :  the 
lies  might  contain  in  them  a  germ  of  truth  shining  out  as  a  silent 


His  Deportation  Probable,  155 

protest  against  the  mass  of  flEiIsehood ;  and  many  of  these  germs 
have,  after  careful  nursing,  borne  such  fruit,  that  very  tangible 
results  have  been  arrived  at.     In  spite  of  the  religious  antipathy 
always  manifested  by  Mussulmans  against  Christians,  increased 
a  thousandfold  when   it  is  thought   a  Mussulman's   life   is  in 
danger  ;  in  the  face  of  a  strong  feeling  against  the  restoration  of 
a  Barakzai  Amir  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  the  feudal  reverence 
shown  towards  the  dynasty  on  the  other ;  in  silent  but  cautious 
calculation  of  those  opposing  influences,  the  Commission  felt  its 
way  forward.      Such    men   as  professed  friendship  for  us  were 
invited  to  tell  us  all  they  knew,  and  that  all  seemed  so  little  that 
it  was  disheartening  to  listen  to  it ;  such  others  as  were  Yakub 
Khan's  faithful  followers  were  asked   to   give  their  version  of 
events,   and  their    garbled  stories   were  just  as    disappointing* 
Towards   the   close  of  the   inquiry,  however,   there  was  more 
tangible  matter  to  be  used  as   a   lever   by  which  to  force  dis- 
closures ;  and  I  believe  that  such  fair  evidence  as  will  fully  justify 
Yakub  Khan's  deportation  to  India  was  obtained.     That  it  will 
justify  more  I  cannot  venture  to  hope,  and  I  must  guard  myself 
against  misconception  by  saying  that  officially  no  sign  has  been 
given  as  to  the   conclusions  of  the    Commission.     There  are 
inferences  which  observant  men  cannot  fail  to  draw  from  little 
episodes   in   a   camp-life  so  limited  as  this,  and  the  rigorous 
attention  paid  to  the  safe-keeping  of  Yakub  Khan  is  but  one  in  a 
string  of  collateral  circumstances  which  have  been  interesting  us 
since  the  Proclamation  in  the  Bala  Hissar  and  the  arrest  of  the 
Wazir  and  his  fellow-ministers.    We  may  be  all  wrong  in  our 
surmises  as  to  what  will  occur :  there  is  only  the  charmed  circle 
of  three,  who  have  had  to  shape  the  conclusions  now  before  the 
Government  of  India,  in  which  speculation  may  be  safe ;  but  we 
believe  in  our  prescience,  and  are  proportionately  happy.     The 
final  decision  on  so  important  a  step  as    the   punishment  of  a 
sovereign  supposed  to  have  been  guilty  of  treachery — ^whether  of 
the  blackest  kind,  or  merely  of  the  nature  arising  from  pusil- 
lanimity and  indecision — must  rest  with  the  highest  authorities ; 
and  if  we  were  tempted  to  chafe  at  our  helplessness  in  having 
the  knowledge  of  all  that  has  transpired  withheld  from  us,  we 
should  be  consoled  at  once  l)y  the  thought  that  it  is  the  voice  of 


156  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

the  GoverDment  alone  which  can  pronounce  the  final  sentence. 
That  the  Commission  will  have  spoken  freely,  and  not  have  shrank 
from  any  startling  conclusions  it  may  haye  heen  driven  to,  I  am 
fully  convinced — they  are  not  the  men  for  half  measures  who  have 
composed  it — and  in  the  full  expectation  that  their  recommenda- 
tions will  he  carried  out,  even  if  the  end  is  more  than  usually 
bitter,  all  of  us  who  have  sojourned  before  Gabul  since  we  camped 
on  Siah  Sung  Bidge,  on  8th  October,  are  content  to  rest  until 
everything  is  made  known. 

The  latest  arrivals  in  Camp  are  Mahomed  Syud,  Governor  of 
Ghazni,  and  Faiz  Mahomed,  the  Afghan  General,  whose  name 
became  so  familiar  when  Sir  Neville  Chamberlain's  Mission  was 
turned  back  in  the  Ehyber.  Faiz  Mahomed  was  then  in  com- 
mand at  Ali  Musjid,  and  his  interwiew  with  Cavagnari  just  below 
the  fortress  is  matter  of  history.  He  does  not  seem  to  have 
shared  in  the  rebellion,  and  his  adherence  to  Yakub  Ehan  was 
never  shaken.  Mahomed  Syud  was  compelled  to  leave  Ghazni,  as 
he  found  himself  powerless  to  control  the  local  moollahs,  who 
have  been  preaching  a  jehad  on  their  own  account,  and  have 
gathered  together  several  thousand  tribesmen  from  the  villages  in 
the  district.  There  are  but  few  trained  sepoys  in  their  ranks,  and, 
although  they  have  made  the  road  between  Ghazni  and  the  more 
northern  districts  very  unsafe,  their  efibrts  are  too  insignificant  to 
be  at  present  seriously  regarded. 

ilst  November, 

"  Nae,  nae  !  I'll  nae  fa'  out  till  I've  washed  ma'  hands  in  th' 
Caspian !  "  These  were  the  words,  not  of  any  veteran  soldier 
looking  forward  to  crossing  bayonets  with  the  Russians,  but  of  a 
plucky  little  drummer  boy,  of  the  92nd  Highlanders,  when  toiling 
painfully  along  the  road  to  Cabul.  The  lad  had  his  heart  in 
the  right  place  at  any  rate  ;  and  if  the  strength  of  an  army  is  to 
be  judged  by  its  marching  powers,  we  have  rare  material  in  our 
ranks.  It  is  a  long  cry  from  Cabul  to  the  Caspian ;  but  the 
drummer  boy  may  have  many  years  of  soldiering  before  him ; 
and  if  ever  the  Gordon  Highlanders  form  up  on  the  shores  of 
Russia's  inland  sea,  to  that  boy  should  belong  the  honour  of  lead- 
ing the  van.    But  we  are  only  at  Cabul,  and  it  now  seems  beyond 


Military  Movements  Hampered.  157 

doubt  that  we  shall  not  advance  any  farther  this  year.  The  win- 
ter has  come  down  upon  us  with  a  suddenness  that  we  little 
expected  from  the  mUdDess  of  the  last  season ;  and  20''  of  frost 
have  warned  us  that  bivouacking  out  would  be  nearly  impossible 
for  well-clad  soldiers,  and  would  be  certain  death  to  hundreds  of 
camp-followers.  The  news  of  the  disturbances  on  the  Ghazni 
Road  may,  perhaps,  call  forth  the  remark,  that  after  Cabul  had 
been  captured,  and  the  country  around  cowed  into  order,  a  rapid 
march  to  Ghazni  should  have  been  ordered.  There  is  much  vir- 
tue in  sudden  and  striking  displays  of  force  in  an  enemy's  country, 
particularly  when  the  enemy  is  disorganized  by  defeat,  and  is 
debating  as  to  the  possibility  of  waging  guerilla  warfare.  But 
there  are  considerations  which  must  override  even  rapidity  of 
action,  and  the  first  of  these  is  the  provision  of  supplies  on  which 
an  army  can  subsist  when  far  removed  from  its  base  of  action. 
Cabul  was  practically  in  our  possession  on  the  9th  of  October, 
though  the  formal  march  into  the  Bala  Hissar  did  not  take  place 
until  three  days  later ;  and  our  cavalry  and  spies  had  shown  us  that 
no  organized  resistance  was  being  prepared  within  many  miles  of 
the  capital.  The  rebel  regiments  had  melted  away ;  the  city 
people  were  cowering  in  abject  submission  ;  and  the  local  tribes 
had  seen  that  their  day  had  not  come  and  were  once  more  in  their 
homesteads,  nursing  their  wrath  and  their  jhezails  until  the 
Kafirs  should  be  delivered  into  their  hands.  Sir.  F.  Roberts  was 
at  this  time  quite  cut  off  from  India,  so  far  as  a  connected  line 
of  communication  went ;  the  Shutargardan  post  was  the  only  link 
between  Cabul  and  Eurram,  and  that  was  beset  by  an  army  of 
hill-men.  From  that  direction  he  might  hope,  by  relieving  the 
garrison,  to  get  one  convoy  through ;  but  beyond  that  point  he 
could  not  go.  The  great  height  of  the  Shutargardan  Pass  pre- 
cluded all  hope  of  keeping  troops  there  during  the  winter.  He 
had  come  from  Ali  Kheyl  with  but  a  few  days'  provisions  ;  and  it 
was  plain  that,  unless  supplies  came  by  way  of  the  Khyber, 
the  army  must  rely  upon  the  country  for  food  for  its  18,000  sol- 
diers and  followers.  That  one  might  have  reasonably  expected  a 
long  string  of  baggage  animals  to  be  moving  westwards  from 
Peshawur  at  the  end  of  October  did  not  seem  so  preposterous  as 
men  with  General  Bright' s  column  would  now  have  us  believe. 


158  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

To  say  that  Peshawnr  was  swept  clean  of  all  transport  animals 
for  Knrram,  is  begging  the  question.  The  Earram  Valley  Force 
was  only  half-equipped  when  it  began  the  advance  upon  Gabul, 
and  northern  India  still  held  many  thousands  of  mules,  donkeys, 
camels,  and  their  kind.  We  hoped  that  some  of  the  energy  our  own 
Commander  had  shown  would  have  been  displayed  in  the  "  Army 
of  the  Indus,"  and  that  a  few  troops  at  least  would  have  kept 
pace  with  us,  or,  say,  have  moved  on  a  parallel  line  five  marches 
in  rear.  If  this  had  been  done,  and  a  well-equipped  brigade  of 
2,500  men  had  been  pushed  forward  to  JugduUuck,  the  massing 
of  12,000  men  in  rear  might  have  been  postponed — for  a  few 
months,  say, — and  some  of  the  transport  (swallowed  up  by  regi- 
ments who  will  never  be  wanted  west  of  Peshawur)  then  liber- 
ated. But  to  look  to  the  Khyber  for  supplies  was  soon  found  to 
be  all  expensive  amusement.  The  troops  would  starve  before  a 
seer  of  atta  or  grain  passed  Jumrood.  We  could  live  from  hand- 
to-mouth  for  a  week  or  two  ;  but  there  were  the  four  months  of 
winter  to  be  thought  of;  and  it  became  merely  a  question  of 
arithmetic  whether  a  brigade  strong  enough  to  march  to  Ghazni 
could  be  spared,  with  all  its  equipment  of  baggage  animals  and 
foUowers,  and  at  the  same  time  four  months'  supplies  could  be 
bought  up  and  swept  into  our  Camp  by  those  left  behind  at  Cabul. 
There  seemed  just  a  chance  of  this  being  done,  if  our  broken 
reed  in  the  Jellalabad  Valley  could  be  propped  fairly  straight  for 
a  few  weeks.  The  work  of  collecting  grain,  forage,  and  all  other 
supplies,  was  begun  in  earnest;  and  we  resigned  ourselves  to 
hard  labour  until  the  troops  from  the  Shutargardan  should  come 
in,  and  our  communications  vid  Jugdulluck  be  well  established. 
Expeditions  to  Kohistan  and  Ohazni  were  looked  upon  as  certain 
of  accomplishment  in  the  near  future.  We  knew  that  Jellalabad 
had  been  occupied  by  the  advanced  brigade  of  General  £right*s 
force  on  October  12th,  and  it  was  only  sixty  miles  from  that  post 
to  the  point  beyond  Jugdulluck,  where  they  would  join  hands  with 
the  Cabul  Army.  The  end  of  October  would  surely  see  them 
within  a  few  marches  of  us.  But  it  had  been  apparent  from  the 
first  that  drag-ropes  were  upon  the  **Army  of  the  Indus," 
and  that  every  tug  forward  made  by  Brigadier  Charles  Gough  was 
responded  to  by  a  double  tug  behind.      The  end  of  the  month 


Supplies  the  Chief  Difficulty.  159 

came ;  the  convoys  from  the  Shutargardan  were  well  on  their  way, 
the  troops  under  Brigadier  Hugh  Gough  had  also  started  ;  and 
the  JugduUuck  route  seemed  about  to  be  opened.  On  1st  Novem- 
ber Brigadier  Macpherson  was  at  Butkhak,  and  four  days  later  he 
shook  hands  with  Oeneral  Bright  at  Eata  Sung.  Then  it  was 
decided  at  head-quarters  here  that  a  force  should  visit  Ghazni. 
The  mass  of  our  supplies  were  being  stored  away  in  Sherpur ; 
General  Macpherson  could  march  his  brigade  back  after  garrisoning 
Luttabund  and  Butkhak ;  Cabul  would  not  be  denuded  of  troops  ; 
and  from  Sherpur  to  Peshawur  the  road  would  be  guarded  by  an 
overwhelming  force.  But  the  programme  went  all  wrong :  the 
broken  reed,  after  being  straightened  for  twenty-four  hours,  failed 
us.  The  Khyber  advanced  brigade  had  no  supplies ;  General 
Macpherson  had  to  cross  into  Tagao  to  feed  his  force ;  and  we, 
in  Sherpur,  saw  the  15th  November — the  day  fixed  for  our  depar- 
ture for  Ghazni — come  and  go,  and  still  the  army  remained  sta- 
tionary. The  weather,  too-— an  element  that  can  never  be  despised 
in  our  calculations  in  a  semi-barren  country  like  Afghanistan — 
had  punished  our  delay  by  declaring  against  us.  Snow  and  sleet 
fell  in  and  around  Cabul,  and  no  man  knew  when  the  next  storm 
might  come.  So  the  Ghazni  expedition  fell  through ;  and  if  the 
ruffians  who  are  now  trying  to  make  capital  out  of  our  failure  to 
visit  the  place,  succeed  in  their  eflforts  to  cry  a  jehad,  the  blame 
for  any  mischief  that  may  ensue  cannot  be  thrown  upon  the  Cabul 
Army,  but  upon  the  short-sighted  policy  which  could  leave  it  to 
its  own  resources,  while  nominally  moving  a  supporting  force  *  in 
a  parallel  line  in  order  to  secure  its  alternative  communications. 
Foreign  military  critics  have  reflected  severely  upon  the  want  of 
skill  shown  in  the  plan  of  the  campaign,  and  have  condemned 
the  rashness  of  the  Shutargardan-Cabul  advance,  without  support 
from  the  Khyber.  But  the  supports  were  said  to  be  there,  and 
General  Roberts  could  not  know  that  they  would  be  steadily  kept 
back,  and  would  be  unable  to  take  up  their  share  of  the  alternative 
road  a  month  after  he  had  captured  the  position  they  were  both 
supposed  to  be  converging  upon.  Supports  which  travel  at  the 
rate  of  two  or  three  miles  a  day  are  worse  than  useless. 

When   it  is  considered  what   the  numerical  strength  of  the 
Khyber  supporting  column  is,  one  cannot  understand  the  timidity 


i6o  TJie  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

of  the  advance.  There  may  have  been  tribes  in  front,  in  flank, 
and  in  rear ;  bat  so  there  were  on  the  Shutargardan  route,  and 
tribes  far  more  capable  of  mischief  than  Afridis  and  Shinwaris. 
Yet  the  menace  at  Badesh  Eheyl,  Ali  Kheyl,  the  Shutargardan, 
and  on  either  flank  at  Charasia,  did  not  check  the  forward  move- 
ment of  an  army  half  the  strength  of  that  supposed  to  have  been 
put  in  motion  from  Peshawur  simultaneously  with  the  advance  from 
the  Eurram  side.  Looking  at  General  Bright's  force  at  the  end 
of  October,  we  find  that,  inclusive  of  troops  at  Nowshera  and 
Peshawur,  he  had  under  his  orders  over  16,000  men,  viz.,  British 
troops :  148  oflScers  and  4,287  men  ;  Native  troops :  147  British 
officers  and  11,796  men.  These  included  five  batteries  of  artillery 
and  one  mountain  battery,  and  six  cavalry  regiments,  three 
British  and  three  Native.  Out  of  the  total,  two  batteries  were  in 
Peshawur;  and  there  mnst  also  be  subtracted  the  following 
regiments,  which  had  not  crossed  the  old  frontier  : — 11th  Bengal 
Lancers  (856),  part  of  the  17th  Bengal  Cavalry  (388),  l-17th 
Foot  (448),  l-25th  (715),  part  of  51st  (209),  1st  Native  Infantry 
(774),  22nd  Native  Infantry  (688),  and  39th  Native  Infantry 
(609).  Deducting  all  these,  there  was  left  a  force  of  11,800  men 
actually  moving  on,  or  garrisoning  the  Peshawur-Qundamak  line  ; 
supports  equal,  it  might  have  been  supposed,  to  any  work  required 
of  them.  That  there  were  conflicting  ideas  as  to  the  object  with 
which  such  a  body  of  troops  had  been  sent  from  India,  must 
have  been  apparent  even  to  a  superficial  observer ;  but  upon  whon 
the  responsibility  of  playiug  with  such  an  army  rests,  no  one  here 
pretends  to  say.  The  local  rank  of  Lieutenant-General,  which  has 
at  last  been  given  to  Sir  F.  Roberts,  brings  these  11,800  men 
under  his  command,  and  their  future  movements  are  likely  to  be 
directed  in  sympathy  with  the  advanced  army  at  Gabul.  For  the 
next  few  months  they  will  probably  be  required  to  do  little  more 
than  keep  the  road ;  but  during  the  winter  their  transport  equip- 
ment and  commissariat  arrangements — defects  in  which  are  said 
to  have  been  the  chief  cause  of  their  tardy  movements — will  have 
to  be  so  far  put  on  a  footing  of  efficiency  that,  if  the  necessity 
arises  in  the  spring  for  the  Gabul  Army  continuing  its  march  west- 
wards, they  will  be  able  to  keep  pace  with  its  movements.  There 
are  good  men  and  tried  soldiers   enough  in   the  IQiyber  Force  to 


Bringing  in  the  Forage.  i6i 

do  all  that  is  required,  if  they  are  allowed  scope  for  their  energies, 
and  are  not  trammelled  and  crippled  at  every  step  by  those 
influences  in  the  background,  which  I  have  already  described  as 
being  **  drag-ropes "  upon  their  freedom  of  action.  General 
Roberts  has  now  in  his  command — that  of  Eastern  Afghanistan 
— ^two  divisions  of  8,000,  and  11,800  men,  respectively:  in  all, 
nearly  20,000  troops,  whose  movements  he  controls  from  his  head- 
quarters at  Sherpur.  Matters  of  detail  on  the  Khyber  side  are 
left,  as  before,  to  local  commanders.  I  have  dwelt  at  length 
upon  the  shortcomings  of  the  Peshawur  column,  not  so  much 
because  very  serious  results  have  followed  its  laggard  advance,  but 
as  showing  how  helpless  the  small  force  here  would  have  been  if, 
in  case  of  a  check,  it  had  looked  for  support  to  "  the  Army  of  the 
Indus." 

General  Macpherson's  brigade  returned  to  Sherpur  cantonments 
yesterday,  having  left  at  Luttabund  300  of  the  23rd  Pioneers  and 
half  the  28th  Punjab  Native  Infantry.  Before  the  brigade 
marched  in,  a  strong  body  of  troops  had  been  warned  for 
service,  their  destination  being  the  district  of  Maidan,  twenty- 
five  miles  distant  on  the  Ghazni  Boad,  where  large  supplies 
of  grain  and  bhoosa  are  said  to  have  been  collected  for  us  by 
the  sirdars  employed  to  purchase  it  on  our  account.  Over 
100,000  maunds  of  blwosa  are  still  wanted  to  complete  our 
winter  supply ;  and  as  the  villagers  have  not  sufficient  carriage  to 
bring  in  their  supplies  so  long  a  distance,  we  must  needs  go  out 
ourselves.  Every  available  baggage  animal  will  be  employed  for 
the  next  week  or  ten  days  in  carrying  in  this  forage ;  and  as  there 
are  rumours  innumerable  of  gatherings  on  the  Ghazni  Boad 
further  south,  it  has  been  determined  to  run  no  risk  with  re- 
ference to  our  valuable  mules  and  yahoos.  A  string  of  between 
2,000  and  8,000  animals  needs  to  be  well  protected,  and  the 
brigade  which  marched  out  this  morning  under  General  Baker 
was  therefore  very  strong.  It  was  made  up  as  follows  : — 500  of 
the  92nd  Highlanders ;  400  of  the  3rd  Sikhs ;  400  of  the  6th 
Punjab  Infantry ;  two  guns,  G-8,  Eoyal  Artillery ;  four  guns 
Eohat  Mountain  Battery;  one  squadron  9th  Lancers,  two 
squadrons  5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  and  two  squadrons  of  the  14th 
Bengal  Lancers.     The  display  of  so  large  a  force  half-way  to 


1 62  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

Ghazni  is  Bure  to  have  an  excellent  effect  npon  the  surrounding 
country.  Sir  F.  Roberts  rides  out  to-morrow  to  join  General 
Baker  at  Maidan. 

A  Divisional  order  was  issued  to-night,  directing  the  public 
reading  of  an  order  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  dismissing 
Subadar  Mahomed  Karim  Khan,  1st  Punjab  Infantry,  from  the 
service  for  having  failed  in  his  duty  to  the  Queen-Empress  on  the 
occasion  of  the  attack  upon  the  Residency.  This  man  is  a 
Logan,  and  was  on  furlough  at  Cabul  in  September.  On  the 
morning  of  the  outbreak  he  was  in  the  Residency,  and  after  the 
lull  following  the  first  collision  of  the  Herat  troops  with  the 
Guides — while  the  Afghans  went  for  their  arms — he  was  sent 
with  a  message  to  the  Amir  by  Sir  Louis  Cavagnari.  This  he 
does  not  seem  to  have  delivered  with  the  spirit  that  might  have 
been  expected  from  a  soldier  in  our  service ;  and  afterwards,  when 
Gholam  Nubbi,  Cavagnari's  chuprasse,  found  money  and  horses 
for  him  to  carry  the  news  of  the  disaster  to  the  British  Camp  at 
Ali  Kheyl,  he  behaved  in  a  dastardly  way.  He  changed  clothes 
with  Gholam  Nubbi  and  started  out,  but  only  went  as  far  as  Beni 
Hissar.  There  he  stayed  for  two  days,  and  then  returned  to 
Cabul,  where  he  hid  himself  for  five  days  in  the  Eizilbash 
quarter.  Afterwards  he  quietly  made  his  way  to  his  own  village ; 
and,  upon  our  troops  appearing  at  Eushi,  came  into  camp  and 
told  some  wonderful  stories  of  what  he  had  done.  These  were 
afterwards  proved  to  be  false,  and  the  Military  Commission  when 
trying  prisoners  found  that  his  conduct  had  been  really  that  of  a 
{)oltroon.  They  recommended  his  dismissal  from  the  service,  and 
he  has  now  been  summarily. discharged,  all  arrears  of  pay  being 
forfeited.  This  is  another  striking  instance  of  the  shifty  and 
untrustworthy  nature  of  our  Pathan  soldiers,  for  Karim  Khan 
was  an  old  native  officer. 


Camp  Maidan,  Ghazni  Road,  ^ith  November. 

The  Lieutenant- General  Commanding  is  now  out  on  a  visit  to 
the  force  under  Brigadier- General  Baker,  which  is  collecting  sup- 
plies of  forage  from  the  villages  along  the  Ghazni  Road.  Leaving 
Brigadier- General  Macpherson  in  command  at  Sherpur^  Sir  F. 


In  the  Ckardeh  Valley.  163 

Boberts,  accompanied  by  his  personal  Staff  and  Colonel  Macgregor, 
Chief  of  the  Staff,  Avith  a  small  escort  of  ten  men  of  the  14th 
Bengal  Lancers,  rode  through  the  Cabal  gorge  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  22nd,  and,  foUowing  the  road  which  traverses  the  Chardeh 
Valley,  made  for  the  village  of  Argandeh,  about  sixteen  miles 
away.  The  Chardeh  Valley,  which  we  passed  through,  gave 
evidence  on  all  sides  of  that  fertility  which  has  earned  for  it  the 
name  of  the  '^  Garden  of  Cabul ;  '*  but  it  is  so  late  in  the  year  that 
only  autumn  tints  mark  the  fields  on  either  side.  Here  and  there 
the  young  wheat  is  shooting  up,  but  the  small  green  blades  are 
scarcely  strong  enough  to  do  more  than  chequer  the  general  area 
of  brownness.  The  long  lines  of  willows  and  poplars  which  line 
the  hundreds  of  watercourses  threading  the  valley,  are  mere 
skeletons  of  trees  ;  their  leaves  rustling  down  in  eddying  circles  as 
the  cold  wind  sweeps  blusteringly  from  the  snowy  tops  of  the  Pugh- 
man  Hills.  The  valley  is  shut  in  on  all  sides  by  high  mountain 
ranges,  the  hills  which  guard  Cabul  from  approach  on  the  west 
seeming  to  rise  perpendicularly  from  the  plain.  The  range  above 
Indikee  village  is  overtopped  by  the  sheer  cliffs  which  dominate 
the  plain  between  Zahidabad  and  Charasia,  and  these  are  already 
covered  with  snow,  which  gleams  out  in  startling  whiteness  above 
the  barren  rocks  in  the  foreground.  Far  away  to  the  north  lies  the 
Hindu  Eush,  with  its  long  undulating  sky-line  similarly  snow- 
laden,  the  lower  intermediate  hiUs  of  Eohistan  being  still  mere 
brown  masses  jostling  each  other  in  grand  confusion.  Looking 
towards  Bamian  the  view  is  bounded  scarcely  ten  miles  away  by 
the  Pughman  spur,  which  boasts  of  several  lofty  peaks  rising  in 
sullen  grandeur  from  the  hills  about  Argandeh.  For  fully  twelve 
miles,  or  about  as  far  as  Eila  Kazi,  the  road  is  an  extremely  good 
one ;  stones,  the  curse  of  Afghanistan,  being  few  and  far  between. 
After  this  the  dry  bed  of  a  snow-fed  stream  has  frequently  to  be 
crossed  or  followed,  and  boulders  are  not  uncommon.  Guns,  how- 
ever, could  be  got  along  without  much  trouble,  and  if  necessary 
a  new  track  on  a  higher  level,  across  the  cultivated  land,  could  be 
laid  out.  The  road  ascends  gradually  the  whole  way,  and  when 
near  Argandeh  a  kotal  is  gained,  about  a  mile  and  a  half  across 
and  two  or  three  miles  long.  It  is  now  a  bare  plain  without  tree 
or  shrub,  but  for  the  most  part  is  under  cultivation,  the  fields  of 

M  2 


164  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

course  lying  fallow  during  the  winter.  To  the  right  or  north  the 
hills  are  rather  precipitous,  and  in  a  sheltered  curve  at  their  base 
the  village  of  Argandeh  lies.  It  is  fully  a  mile  from  the  road, 
and  all  about  it  are  terraced  fields  said  to  yield  magnificent  crops 
of  wheat  and  barley.  The  high  pitch  to  which  irrigation  attains 
in  Afghanistan  is  strikingly  exemplified  in  this  district,  the  wat^r- 
channels  being  so  arranged  that  the  distribution  of  the  water  is 
admirable. 

Sir  Frederick  Boberts  rested  for  the  night  at  Argandeh,  and 
yesterday  morning  rode  on  to  Maidan.  Striking  the  Ghazni  Boad 
a  mile  from  Argand'eh,  we  followed  its  course  over  the  kotal  and 
soon  began  to  descend.  The  hills  on  either  side  were  as  bare  as 
any  in  Afghanistan,  and  the  plain  between  them  was  only  partially 
cultivated.  After  about  four  miles  a  chowki  (watch-tower)  was 
reached  on  a  little  rise,  and  looking  to  the  south  we  saw  the  dis- 
trict of  Maidan  stretching  before  us.  It  is  a  beautiful  vaUey,  land- 
locked on  every  side,  the  Cabul  river  running  through  it  about  a 
mile  from  the  foot  of  the  western  hills.  The  valley  must  be  at 
least  four  miles  across ;  and,  with  the  exception  of  low  rolling 
downs,  covered  with  stones  and  rocks,  for  about  a  mile  on  its  east- 
ern flank  is  as  flat  as  its  name,  Maidan  (open  plain),  implies. 
Twenty  or  thirty  walled  enclosures  and  villages  on  the  banks  of 
the  Cabul  stream  stand  out  from  amid  poplars,  willows,  and  plane 
trees,  which  fringe  the  banks  of  the  sparkling  little  river,  and  for 
many  square  miles  nothing  is  seen  but  endless  corn-fields,  each 
with  its  little  boundary  of  mud,  along  which  the  water  slowly 
wanders  as  it  does  its  work  of  irrigation.  The  road  falls  rapidly 
from  the  chowki,  and  a  few  hundred  yards  below  bifurcates,  the 
main  route  to  Ghazni  going  straight  to  the  south  over  the  rolling 
downs  I  have  mentioned,  and  a  bridle-path  leading  down  to 
the  villages  of  the  plain.  General  Baker's  camp  is  pitched  at 
Naure  Falad,  two  miles  from  the  chowki,  down  in  the  plain 
near  the  first  of  the  fortified  enclosures,  its  rear  being  guarded 
by  a  high  rocky  ridge.  From  the  summit  of  this  a  splendid 
view  of  Maidan  is  obtained,  and  the  extraordinary  fertility  of  the 
valley  fully  appreciated.  To  the  west  the  ridge  runs  sharply 
down  into  the  plain,  and  the  valley  is  there  narrowed  to  half 
a  mile,  but  it  opens  out  again  to  the  north  among  the  hills. 


Contumacy  of  Bahadur  Khan.  1 65 

The  main  road  to  Bamian,  which  strikes  ofif  from  the  Ghazni 
Boad  before  the  chowki  in  the  kotal  is  reached,  runs  across  this 
part  of  the  valley  and  enters  the  Ispekhawk  Pass,  a  few  miles 
farther  on. 

Yesterday  afternoon  a  small  party  of  cavalry  were  fired  upon  in 
the  Darra  Narkh,  a  valley  running  in  the  Bamian  direction,  and 
to-day  Bahadur  Ehan,  who  was  responsible  for  the  action,  and 
who  is  known  to  be  harbouring  Afghan  soldiers^  has  been  visited 
and  punished.  He  had  already  given  much  trouble.  General 
Baker,  since  his  arrival  in  Maidan,  has  found  much  difficulty  in 
inducing  the  maliks  of  the  villages  of  the  district  to  bring  in 
com  and  hhoosa.  They  have  given  the  tribute  grain  and  forage 
readily  enough,  but  have  evaded  furnishing  the  amount  we 
required  in  addition  to  this.  Every  maund  was  paid  for  at  a 
forced  rate,  which,  I  may  state,  was  far  higher  than  the  normal 
prices  ;  but  the  village  headmen  hung  back,  and,  though  profuse 
in  promises,  made  but  little  efifort  to  meet  our  wants.  Several 
of  them  were  very  insolent  in  their  bearing,  and  no  doubt  thought 
to  worry  us  out  by  their  procrastination.  But  General  Baker 
is  not  the  stamp  of  man  to  have  his  orders  disobeyed,  and  by 
confining  some  of  the  mallks  to  the  camp  for  a  few  days,  he 
had  gradually  brought  them  to  their  senses.  One  malik, 
however,  trusting  to  the  obscure  valley  in  which  he  lived,  wherein 
Europeans  had  never  been  known  to  penetrate,  was  obstinate. 
This  was  Bahadur  Ehan,  whose  fort  is  about  eight  miles  from 
the  Maidan  villages,  along  the  branch  road  which  leads  to 
Bamian.  He  not  only  refused  to  sell  any  of  his  huge  store  of 
grain  and  forage,  but  insolently  declined  to  come  into  camp. 
He  was  known  to  have  great  influence  among  the  tribesmen  in 
his  neighbourhood,  and  it  was  reported  that  some  sepoys  of  the 
Ardal  regiments  were  living  under  his  protection.  When  Sir  F. 
Boberts  heard  of  the  contumacy  of  this  maliky  he  agreed  with 
General  Baker  that  it  would  be  well  to  fetch  him  in  by  force, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  arrest  any  sepoys  found  in  his  villages. 
To  accomplish  this  double  object  the  cavalry  were  sent  out  yester- 
day, with  the  result  already  stated,  that  they  were  fired  upon  by  a 
large  body  of  men,  including  some  200  sepoys  armed  with 
Sniders.      It   was   necessary  to  make  an  example  of  Bahadur 


1 66  The  AfgJian  War,  1879-80. 

Khan,  and  at  the  same  time  to  break  np  the  tribal  gathering, 
which,  if  left  alone,  might  grow  to  serious  proportions.  Our 
foraging  parties  would  probably  have  been  roughly  handled  in 
scattered  villages,  all  of  which  boast  of  towers  and  fortified  en- 
closures, if  the  rumour  had  been  allowed  to  circulate  that  our 
cavalry  had  been  driven  back. 

Tents  having  been  struck  at  daybreak,  the  baggage  of  the  force 
was  packed  up  and  placed  within  a  fort  near  the  Cabul  river,  under 
a  guard  of  800  men,  drawn  equally  from  the  92nd  Highlanders, 
8rd  Sikhs,  and  5th  Punjab  Infantry,  with  a  squadron  of  the  14th 
Bengal  Lancers  and  a  troop  of  the  9th  Lancers.  The  two  guns 
of  9-8,  B.H.A.,  were  also  left  behind,  as  the  road  to  the  villages 
was  known  to  be  diflScult  /or  wheeled  guns.  The  troops  which 
marched  out  were  400  of  the  92nd,  800  of  the  8rd  Sikhs,  800  of 
the  5th  N.L,  a  troop  of  the  9th  Lancers,  a  squadron  of  the  14th 
B.L.,  and  four  guns  of  the  Kohat  Mountain  Battery.  General 
Baker  was  in  command  of  this  compact  little  column,  which  was 
not  encumbered  with  transport  animals,  as  a  rapid  march  was 
intended.  Sir  F.  Boberts,  with  Colonel  Macgregor,  also  rode  out 
with  his  personal  escort.  It  was  bitterly  cold  in  the  early  morning, 
and  all  but  the  swiftest  running  streams  were  coated  over  with  ice. 
The  troops  carried  with  them  one  day's  cooked  provisions,  but 
were  otherwise  in  light  marching  order.  A  point  was  made  for  a 
little  to  the  south-west,  where. the  Darra  Narkh  stream  falls  into 
the  Cabul  river,  and  then  a  due  westerly  course  was  followed  up 
the  narrow  valley  through  which  the  former  stream  runs.  The 
usual  mountainous  country  was  seen  on  either  hand,  high  hills 
closing  down  on  the  valley,  and  presenting  treeless  slopes  barren 
of  all  verdure.  The  two  rivers  had  to  be  crossed  by  fords,  and 
the  men  went  through  the  icy-cold  water  as  carelessly  as  if  wading 
a  stream  in  summer.  The  sepoys  stripped  off  their  putties,  and 
made  light  of  the  floating  ice  which  barked  their  shins,  while  the 
Highlanders  in  their  kilts  seemed  rather  to  enjoy  the  bracing  cold. 
The  road  was  fairly  well-defined  and  ran  through  cultivated  fields, 
with  an  occasional  fortified  homestead  or  country  villa  relieving 
the  monotony  of  the  landscape.  Information  was  brought  from 
time  to  time  of  the  movements  of  Bahadur  Ehan,  it  being  at  first 
stated  that  he  had  2,000  or  8,000  men  ready  to  meet  us.    About 


An  Expedition  sent  against  Him.  167 

seven  miles  from  the  camp  the  road  was  commanded  by  a  high 
ridge  on  the  left,  and  beyond  this,  we  were  told,  lay  the  open 
valley  in  which  the  cavalry  had  been  attacked.  This  ridge  was  at 
its  highest  point  800  or  1,000  feet  above  the  roadway,  and  on  the 
previous  evening  had  been  lined  with  men.  Now  it  appeared 
quite  deserted,  and  the  cavalry  swept  round  it  and  waited  in  a 
friendly  village  until  the  infantry  could  come  up.  A  local  malik 
volunteered  the  news  that  Bahadur  IQian  and  his  followers  had 
taken  all  their  movable  property  away  during  the  night  and  had 
fled  to  the  hills.  When  the  Lancers  first  appeared  round  the 
ridge  and  pushed  forward  into  the  horseshoe-shaped  valley,  they 
saw  fifty  or  sixty  men  on  some  low  hills  to  the  north,  a  gunshot  from 
Bahadur  Khan's  chief  fort ;  and  as  these  moved  down  the  slopes, 
it  seemed  probable  that  a  body  of  tribesmen  might  be  lying  hidden 
behind  the  crests.  Possibly  the  Ghilzais  expected  that  only 
cavalry  were  again  about  to  pay  them  a  visit,  and  were  emboldened 
to  come  to  the  lower  levels.  As  soon  as  the  advanced  company  of 
the  Highlanders  appeared  on  the  road,  the  '*  enemy,"  if  fifty  are 
worthy  of  the  name,  drew  o£f  hurriedly  to  the  highest  hill,  a 
couple  of  miles  distant,  and  watched  our  movements.  General 
Baker  directed  one  company  of  the  92nd  to  advance  in  skirmishing 
order,  and  occupy  a  rocky  hill  overlooking  Bahadur  Khan's  fort, 
and  commanding  it  at  700  or  BOO  yards,  and  sent  a  company  of 
Sikhs  round  to  the  north,  with  orders  to  drive  out  any  men  who 
might  be  occupying  the  lower  hills.  It  was  soon  seen  that  the 
place  was  quite  deserted,  and  not  a  shot  was  fired  from  any  of  the 
hills.  The  whole  valley  lay  before  us  dotted  over  with  fortified 
homesteads,  surrounded  by  grain-fields  already  green  with 
sprouting  com.  It  seemed  wonderfully  fertile,  and  extended  over 
many  square  miles ;  other  and  smaller  valleys  penetrating  between 
the  hills  wherever  there  was  a  break  in  their  continuous  line.  The 
exact  extent  of  these  minor  valleys  could  not  be  estimated,  but 
native  report  stated  that  the  fertility  was  equal  to  that  of  the  rich 
plain  stretching  away  to  the  north-west  for  five  or  six  miles. 
When  it  was  seen  that  no  opposition  was  to  be  o£fered,  the  Sikhs 
doubled  down  upon  the  fort  from  the  low  hills  above  it,  and  at 
tiie  same  time  another  company  raced  across  the  fields  from 
tiie  southern  entrance  to  the  vidley,  all  being  anxious  to  be  in 


i68  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

"  at  the  loot/*  It  was  a  pretty  sight  watching  the  sepoya 
doubling  along  and  spreading  out  as  the  fort  and  the  Tillage  near 
it  were  gained.  Clouds  of  dust  with  the  gleam  of  lance-heads 
shining  out  soon  arose  further  to  the  left  in  the  heart  of  the  valley, 
showing  where  the  cavalry  were  galloping  off  to  more  distant  home- 
steads. All  Bahadur  Khan's  villages,  some  ten  in  number,  were 
marked  down  to  be  looted  and  burnt,  and  Sikhs  and  sowars  were 
quickly  engaged  in  the  work.  The  houses  were  found  stored  with 
bhoosa,  straw,  firewood,  and  twigs  for  the  winter  as  well  as  a  small 
quantity  of  com,  and  as  there  was  not  time  to  clear  this  out,  and 
we  could  not  afford  to  leave  a  force  for  the  night  in  such  a 
dangerous  position  so  near  to  the  hills,  orders  were  given  to  fire 
the  villages  and  destroy  the  houses  and  their  contents.  No  better 
men  than  Sikhs  could  be  found  for  such  work,  and  in  a  few 
minutes  Bahadur  Khan's  villages  were  in  flames,  and  volumes  of 
dense  black  smoke  pouring  over  the  valley,  a  high  wind  aiding  the 
fire  with  frantic  earnestness.  The  villagers  had  carried  off  all 
their  portable  property,  not  even  a  charpoy  remaining,  but  the 
Sikhs  ransacked  every  place  for  hidden  treasure,  and  smashed 
down  the  earthen  corn-bins  in  hope  of  gaining  a  prize.  These 
corn-bins  seemed  quite  a  feature  of  every  house.  They  are  three 
or  four  feet  square  and  made  of  sun-dried  clay,  often  fancifully 
ornamented  with  scroll-work.  They  stand  on  a  raised  platform  in 
the  living-room,  and  have  near  the  bottom  a  small  hole  in  which 
a  piece  of  rag  is  stuffed.  This  answers  to  the  tap  of  a  barrel,  for 
when  the  rag  is  withdrawn  the  grain  pours  out,  and  the  daily 
supply  can  be  drawn  just  as  we  would  draw  a  tankard  of  beer  in 
an  English  farm-house.  Indian  com,  from  which  rich  chupaties 
(unleavened  cakes)  are  made,  is  chiefly  stored  in  this  way,  and 
near  the  bins  stand  the  grinding-stones,  at  which  the  women  of 
the  house  prepare  the  flour  for  the  household.  Generally  an 
adjoining  room  is  turned  into  a  kitchen,  the  earthen  floor  being 
skilfully  burrowed  to  form  ovens,  and  round  holes  cut  out  on  which 
to  place  the  dekchies  which  serve  for  Afghan  pots  and  kettles* 
Such  of  the  rooms  as  I  went  into  were  dark  and  dirty  enough, 
small  square  holes  in  the  walls  serving  as  windows,  and  the  roofis 
being  made  up  of  thick  logs  laid  a  foot  apart,  and  covered  over 
with  twigs,  on  which  a  foot  of  mud   had  been  plastered.     The 


His   Villages  Looted  and  Burnt,  [69 

Sikhs  fired  honse  after  house,  and  ever;  room  was  soon  conyerted 
into  a  huge  reverberating  furnace,  the  fire  having  no  means  of 
escape  through  the  roofs,  which  were  very  strong.  Nearly  all  the 
houses  were  two-storied,  with  narrow  wooden  or  mud  stair- 
cases, and  many  a  sepoy  in  his  haste  first  fired  the  lower 
rooms,  stored  with  wood  or  bhoosa,  and  then  rushed  upstairs 
intent  on  loot,  soon  to  be  driven  down  again  by  the  smoke  and 
flames  from  below.  The  search  after  household  goods  was  varied 
by  exciting  chases  after  the  fowls,  ducks,  and  donkeys  of  the 
village.  Sikhs  and  kahara,  who  had  come  up  with  the  dandies 
(stretchers  for  wounded  men),  scrambled  over  housetops,  and 
through  blinding  smoke,  to  capture  the  dearly-prized  moorgie, 
while  below  an  unofiending  donkey  would  be  chased  frantically 
round  awkward  corners  and  over  frozen  watercourses,  where 
pursuers  and  pursued  alike  came  to  grief.  A  donkey  when 
captured  was  laden  with  such  little  loot  as  the  men  thought 
worth  while  carrying  o£f.  Each  fowl  had  its  neck  wrung  on  the 
spot,  was  thrown  into  a  convenient  bit  of  fire  in  some  blazing 
house,  and  having  been  singed  clean  of  its  feathers,  was  cooked 
in  a  few  minutes,  and  eaten  with  infinite  enjoyment.  The 
cavalry  were  fortunate  enough  to  secure  fifty  sheep  and  a  few  oows, 
which  were  driven  to  camp.  After  two  or  three  hours  had  been 
spent  in  firing  the  various  villages  owned  by  Bahadur  Khan,  the 
order  to  fall  in  for  the  homeward  march  was  given,  and  leaving 
the  valley  draped  in  smoke  and  the  fire  still  working  its  will,  the 
troops  filed  ofif  for  Maidan.  They  reached  camp  by  evening, 
having  marched  seventeen  miles  over  difficult  ground  and  through 
half-frozen  streams  without  mishap*  As  the  rear-guard  left,  a 
few  men  appeared  on  the  heights  of  the  north  and  fired  a  few 
shots  at  long  ranges,  but  these  were  merely  in  bravado.*  We 
could  learn  nothing  of  the  body  of  tribesmen  and  the  200  sepoy  s, 
and  it  is  believed  they  have  dispersed.  The  punishment  of 
Bahadur  Khan  will  have  a  great  e£fect  upon  the  whole  district  of 

*  Thii  it  a  pUin  ttatement  of  the  foray  in  the  Darra  Narkh,  and  our  indignation  was 
greatly  aronaed  afterwards  by  seeing  sensational  articles  in  English  papers  describing 
bow  old  men,  women,  and  children  were  tamed  out  to  die  in  the  snow.  There  were  no 
M  men,  women,  and  children  seen,  and  no  snow.  There  were  forty  or  fifty  other 
fiOafea  in  which  they  had  taken  refuge  long  before  we  arriTed. 


170  TJie  AfgJtan  War,  1879—80. 

Maidan,  as  it  will  show  the  maliks  that  they  are  not  safe  from 
our  troops  even  in  their  most  obscure  valleys.  General  Baker 
remains  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Maidan  until  next  week,  all  the 
available  transport  animals  from  Sherpur  being  now  engaged  in 
carrying  to  our  cantonments  the  large  quantities  of  com  and 
hhoosa  collected.  Our  winter  supply  of  forage  seems  likely  to  be 
assured. 


CHAPTER  XrV. 

Deportation  of  ^Taknb  Khan  to  India— Beriew  of  his  Beign — ^The  Scene  on  the  Morning 
of  December  lot — Precantions  along  the  Road  to  Jngdnllnok — Strengthening  of 
the  Posts — ^Tribal  Uneasiness  about  Cabul — Attitude  of  the  Kohistanis—Qeneral 
Baker*s  Brigade  ordered  to  Sherpur— The  State  of  Afghan  Turkistan— Its  Effect 
upon  Eohistan — Gholam  Hyder  and  his  Army — ^The  Extent  of  his  Power — Betum 
of  his  disbanded  Begiments  to  their  Homes  in  Kohistan— Our  Policy  towards  the 
Afghans — Failure  of  the  Attempt  to  conciliate  the  People — Modifications  neoessaiy 
— ^Murder  of  our  Oh>Temor  of  Maidan. 

Sherpub,  let  December. 

Thb  ex- Amir  of  Afghanistan,  Sirdar  Yakub  Khan,  is  now  well 
on  his  way  to  India :  the  order  for  his  deportation  having  been 
carried  out  so  silently  and  quickly  that,  while  I  am  writing,  the 
majority  of  men  in  Sherpur  cantonments  are  ignorant  of  his 
departure.  As  I  ventured  to  predict  in  forwarding  the  news  of 
the  close  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry,  Yakub  Khan's  fate  is 
that  of  an  exile  to  India  ;  but  even  now  we  are  in  the  dark  here  as  to 
whether  he  will  be  treated  as  a  State  prisoner,  and  allowed  to  live 
in  luxurious  comfort,  or  will  be  sent  to  the  Andamans,  to  drag  out 
his  life  as  a  common  malefactor.  If  the  latter,  it  will  be  an 
ignoble  ending  of  a  career  which  in  its  earlier  stages  promised 
such  brilliant  achievements.  Yakub  Khan  was  once  the  first 
soldier  in  Afghanistan,  but  from  the  evil  moment  when  he  confided 
in  the  word  of  his  father,  his  fame  was  at  an  end.  Five  years* 
captivity — and  such  captivity  as  only  Shore  Ali  could  devise — 
broke  his  spirit,  dulled  his  intellect,  and  left  him  the  weak  inca- 
pable  we  treated  with  at  Oundamak,  and  confided  in  so  blindly 
until  the  fatal  week  in  September.     That  under  fairer  auspices  he 


Yakub  Khan  ordered  into  Exile.  171 

might  have  proved  a  strong  ruler,  such  as  the  Afghans  require, 
can  scarely  admit  of  a  doubt ;  that  he  would  have  been  a  Dost 
Mahomed  even  his  most  ardent  admirers  would  hesitate  to  assert. 
The  conditions  of  government  in  a  country  like  Afghanistan 
compel  the  sovereign  either  to  be  a  tyrant  or  the  tool  of  factions : 
Yakub  EJian,  daring  his  few  months  of  power,  was  the  latter. 
His  accession  to  the  throne  took  place  under  circumstances  to  cope 
with  which,  even  in  the  prime  of  his  manhood  before  imprisonment 
had  crippled  him,  would  have  taxed  his  power  to  the  uttermost. 
After  five  years  in  a  dungeon  he  was  suddenly  liberated  by  his 
father,  only  to  find  that  father  in  the  last  stage  of  defeat  and 
despair,  his  kingdom  practically  at  the  mercy  of  a  powerful 
invader,  and  himself  a  panic-stricken  fugitive.  Left  first  as  Shore 
Ali's  regent,  Yakub  Khan  could  do  nothing  beyond  watch,  with 
Oriental  submission  to  fate,  the  advance  of  the  two  invading 
armies  up  the  Jellalabad  and  Eurram  Valleys.  The  help  which 
Shore  Ali  expected  to  receive  from  his  Bussian  friends  over  the 
Oxus  was  not  forthcoming ;  in  a  few  weeks  came  the  news  of  the 
death  of  the  Amir  at  Mazar-i-Sharif,  and  Yakub  found  himself 
in  possession  of  a  kingdom  already  tottering  to  its  fall.  If  he 
had  had  the  energy  of  Dost  Mahomed  he  might  have  organized 
armies,  called  upon  the  semi-barbarous  tribes  still  lying  between 
Cabul  and  India  to  join  his  soldiers  in  a  holy  war,  and  make  a 
supreme  effort  to  check  the  invasion  which  had  driven  his  father 
from  the  capital.  But  that  energy  was  lacking ;  he  made  but  a 
&int-hearted  appeal  to  the  fanaticism  of  the  hill-tribes,  and, 
unsupported  as  this  was  by  any  real  attempt  to  collect  the  scat- 
tered units  of  Shore  Ali's  once-powerful  army,  it  necessarily  failed. 
Nothing  was  left  to  him  but  negotiation ;  and,  thanks  to  the 
clemency  of  the  enemy  to  whom  he  was  opposed,  he  was  granted 
terms  which,  in  his  position,  he  could  scarcely  have  hoped  to  gain. 
He  allied  himself  with  the  most  powerful  State  in  Asia,  and  the 
safety  of  his  kingdom  was  assured  against  all  foreign  aggression. 
If  he  had  been  a  tyrant  to  his  subjects,  and  thoroughly  deter- 
mined to  make  his  will  their  law,  the  reception  in  his  capital  of  an 
Embassy  from  the  Power  with  which  he  was  allied  would  have  been 
fraught  with  no  danger  either  to  himself  or  to  the  Ambassador.  But 
he  bad  not  the  strength  of  tyranny  sufficient  to  control  the  fao- 


172  The  Afghan  War,   1879 — 80. 

tioDs  of  which  he  was  a  mere  tool,  and  it  seems  only  too  probable 
that  he  gradually  drifted  from  his  first  position  of  sincerity  towards 
his  new  allies,  to  that  of  a  timid  spectator  of  intrigues  against 
the  alliance.  His  weakness  and  vacillation  could  not  check  the 
danger  that  was  growing  so  formidable,  and,  when  the  final  out- 
break came,  his  personal  influence  was  even  unequal  to  saving  the 
life  of  the  man  who  had  trusted  so  implicitly  in  his  good  faith. 
That  Yakub  desired  the  death  of  Sir  Louis  Gavagnari  we  do  not 
believe ;  that  he  had  been  led,  insidiously,  by  men  about  him  to 
coincide  in  the  view  that  the  Embassy  should  be  forced  to  leave 
may  be  readily  credited.  And  once  that  Embassy  had  been 
destroyed,  there  is  only  too  much  reason  to  suppose  that  he  was 
inclined  to  parley  with  the  men  who  had  brought  about  its  destruc- 
tion, and  to  listen  to  their  plausible  reasoning  that  what  had  been 
done  was  irrevocable.  The  access  of  personal  fear,  which  drove 
him  to  seek  safety  in  the  British  camp,  no  more  excuses  him  of 
responsibility  for  his  acts  of  omission  or  commission,  than  does  the 
voluntary  surrender  of  a  murderer  condone  the  crime  he  has  com- 
mitted. So  far  as  human  canons  are  concerned,  repentance  can- 
not blot  out  guilt,  however  much  it  may  modify  judgment :  the 
supreme  quality  of  mercy  is  impossible  under  ordinary  conditions 
of  life,  Taking  the  most  pitiful  estimate  of  Yakub  Khan's 
o£fence,  putting  aside,  the  idea  even  of  participation  in  the  views 
of  the  men  who  wished  him  to  break  the  engagements  to  which 
he  stood  pledged,  there  is  the  one  unpardonable  crime  still 
clinging  to  him — ^that  he  stood  by,  and  made  no  sign,  while  the 
lives  of  men  were  sacrificed  which  should  have  been  sacred  to 
him,  even  according  to  the  narrow  creed  of  the  fanatics  who  sur- 
rounded him.  Bis  own  words,  when  refusing  the  help  that  was 
so  dearly  needed,  rise  up  against  him  when  he  appeals  to  our  for- 
bearance !  ''  It  is  not  to  be  done.''  Perhaps,  hereafter,  the  same 
answer  may  be  given  when  we  are  asked  to  preserve  the  integrity 
of  a  country  which  has  always  repaid  friendship  with  falsehood, 
trust  with  treachery. 

From  the  28th  of  October  until  his  departure  for  India  this 
morning,  Yakub  EJiian  had  been  a  close  prisoner  in  our  camp, 
the  tent  in  which  he  was  confined  being  always  strongly  guarded, 
and  no  one  beyond  our  own  officers  being  allowed  access  to  him. 


The  Final  Interviews  at  Sherpur,  1 73 

The  monotony  and  solitude  have  told  upon  him,  of  course,  and 
he  is  now  thinner  and  more  worn  than  when  he  first  took  refuge  with 
General  Baker  at  Eusbi.  Before  the  closing  day  of  the  inquiry 
he  was  contented  and  placid  enough  ;  but  of  late  he  has  displayed 
some  anxiety  as  to  his  probable  fate,  the  irksomeness  of  the 
restraint  under  which  he  was  placed  having,  no  doubt,  largely 
contributed  to  this.  He  could  hear  all  the  busy  life  in  camp  about 
him,  but  was  as  much  shut  out  from  it  as  if  a  prisoner  again  in 
the  Bala  Hissar.  The  bayonets  of  the  sentries  who  quartered  the 
ground  day  and  night  about  his  tent  were  a  barrier  beyond  which 
he  could  not  pass.  The  departure  for  India,  Malta,  or  London, 
which  he  had  expressed  himself  so  willing  to  undertake  nearly  two 
months  ago,  must  have  seemed  to  him  hopeless,  even  so  late  as 
six  o*clock  last  night,  when  Major  Hastings,  Chief  Political 
Officer,  paid  his  usual  visit  to  the  tent,  then  guarded  by  fifty  men 
of  the  72nd  Highlanders.  Major  Hastings  said  nothing  of  the 
orders  which  had  been  received  from  the  Government,  as  it  had 
been  resolved  to  give  as  short  a  notice  as  possible  of  the  intended 
journey,  for  fear  of  complications  on  the  road  to  Peshawur.  Not 
that  it  was  at  all  Ukely  an  efibrt  would  be  made  to  rouse  the  tribes 
to  attempt  a  rescue,  but  that  nothing  was  to  be  gained  by  an  open 
parade  of  the  departure.  At  eight  o'clock  Major  Hastings  sent 
word  to  Yakub  Khan  that  he  intended  paying  him  a  second  visit ; 
and,  accompanied  by  Mr.  H.  M.  Durand,  Political  Secretary  to 
the  Lieutenant-General,  he  again  went  to  the  tent.  Yakub 
Khan  was  a  little  astonished  at  the  unusual  hour  chosen  for  the 
visit ;  but  when  told  that  he  would  have  to  leave  Cabul  for  India 
at  six  o'clock  the  next  morning,  he  kept  his  composure  admirably. 
He  expressed  surprise  that  such  short  notice  should  be  given,  but 
beyond  this  did  not  question  the  arrangements.  He  asked  that 
his  father-in-law,  Yahiya  Khan,  and  two  other  sirdars  now  in 
confinement  should  be  released  and  allowed  to  accompany  him. 
This,  of  course,  could  not  be  granted,  and  he  then  asked  to  what 
place  in  India  he  was  to  be  taken,  and  where  the  Viceroy  was. 
This  was  all  the  concern  he  showed.  The  orders  received  here 
are  to  convey  him  safely  to  Peshawur ;  so  but  little  information 
as  to  his  final  resting-place  could  be  vouchsafed  him.  I  may  here 
incidentally  mention  that  he  will  probably  go  on  to  Umritsar  or 


174  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

Lahore,  where,  perhaps,  the  decision  of  the  Goyernment  will  be 
made  known  to  him. 

All  the  arrangements  for  the  journey  had  been  carefully  made 
beforehand.  There  were,  this  morning,  at  Butkhak,  the  12th 
Punjab  Cavalry,  and  between  that  post  and  Sei  Baba  400  of  the 
72nd  Highlanders,  800  of  the  23rd  Pioneers,  and  a  wing  of  the 
28th  Punjab  Infantry;  while  the  convoy  of  sick  and  wounded, 
with  its  escort,  was  between  Kata  Sung  and  JugduUuck.  The 
escort  from  Sherpur  was  simply  two  squadrons  of  cavalry  drawn 
from  the  9th  Lancers  and  5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Major  Hammond,  of  the  latter  regiment.  Soon  after 
five  o'clock  this  morning  the  little  camp  in  which  the  ex-Arnir 
was  lodged,  not  far  from  head-quarters,  was  all  astir  with  prepara- 
tions for  the  journey.  A  bright  moon  was  shining  overhead  and  a 
few  watch-fires  were  blazing  brightly  among  the  tents,  by  the 
light  of  which  the  mules  and  yahoos  were  loaded  up.  The 
squadron  of  the  5th  Punjab  Cavalry  drew  up  outside  the  gateway 
which  leads  from  the  cantonments  near  the  western  end  of  the 
southern  wall ;  while  the  Lancers  passed  from  their  lines,  opposite 
the  break  in  the  Bemaru  Heights,  to  a  bit  of  open  ground  between 
the  quarters  of  the  72nd  Highlanders  and  Yakub  Khan's  tent. 
The  early  morning  air  was  bitterly  cold,  and  the  usual  hght  mist 
which  settles  nightly  over  the  Cabul  plain  still  hung  about.  The 
camp  was  silent  and  deserted,  every  soldier  being  at  that  hour 
asleep,  except  the  sentries  at  their  posts  and  the  patrols,  stalk- 
ing like  armed  ghosts  from  picquet  to  picquet,  seeking  for  any 
rabid  Eohistani  who  might  have  invaded  the  sanctity  of  our 
lines.  The  Lancers  moved  smartly  round  and  round  in  small 
circles  to  keep  themselves  and  their  horses  from  freezing  as  they 
stood;  and  through  the  dust  and  mist  enveloping  them  their 
lances  shone  out  now  and  again  as  the  steel-heads  caught  a  glint 
from  the  moon.  It  was  a  fantastical  sight,  this  endless  circling 
of  misty  horsemen,  moving  apparently  without  aim  or  object  and 
growing  momentarily  more  and  more  distinct  as  dawn  began  to 
creep  up  over  the  distant  Luttabund  and  Ehurd  Cabul  hills,  and 
struggle  with  the  clear  moonlight  which  had  before  been  supreme. 
In  an  hour  everything  was  ready  for  departure.  Yakub  Khan's 
horses  were  waiting  ready  saddled,  and  the  Lancers  had  ceased 


Departure  of  the  Ex-Amir  for  India.  175 

their  circling,  and  were  formed  up  waiting  for  the  order  to  march. 
Sir  Frederick  Roberts,  Colonel  Macgregor,  Chief  of  the  Staflf,  and 
Major  Hastings  were  present  to  see  the  prisoner  start  on  his  rapid 
journey,  and  at  half-past  six  exactly  Yakub  Khan  rode  off  sur- 
rounded by  Lancers.  He  had  exchanged  salaams  with  the  General 
and  those  about  him,  and,  if  not  positively  elated,  was  seemingly 
quite  content  to  leave  Cabul.  Captain  Turner  was  the  Political 
Officer  to  whose  care  he  was  assigned ;  and  Abdullah  Khan,  son 
of  the  Nawab  Gholam  Hussein,  was  the  native  officer  in  attend- 
ance. His  four  body  servants  and  a  favourite  attendant,  Abdul 
Kayun,  who  had  been  released  at  the  last  moment,  rode  with  the 
escort.  No  notice  was  given  beforehand  to  his  servants;  and 
when  the  royal  cooks  heard  that  they  were  to  start  for  India,  they 
abandoned  their  master  and  took  refuge  in  the  city.  They  were 
afterwards  sought  out  and  sent  on  to  Luttabund,  the  halting- 
place  for  the  night,  as  the  comfort  of  Yakub  Khan  is  to  be 
strictly  considered.  The  news  of  the  departure  soon  spread 
through  Cabul,  and  the  Mussulman  population,  according  to  a 
Hindu  informant,  are  greatly  depressed  and  uneasy.  They  are 
now  conyinced  that  the  Durani  dynasty  is  at  an  end ;  and,  while 
not  regretting  Yakub  personally,  they  mourn  over  the  fall  of  that 
reign  of  turbulence  which  they  could  always  carry  out  in  the  city 
under  a  Barakzai.  Double  marches  are  to  be  made  the  whole 
way  to  Peshawur,  where  Yakub  Khan  is  expected  to  arrive  in  eight 
days.  Part  of  the  Cabul  Field  Force  escort  will  accompany  him 
to  Jugdulluck,  where  the  advanced  Khyber  Brigade  will  assume 
charge,  and  he  will  be  passed  through  the  various  posts  until  the 
Punjab  Frontier  is  reached.*  His  son,  the  so-called  heir-apparent, 
remains  here,  as  well  as  the  members  of  his  harem,  who  will  be 
pensioned  and  properly  cared  for  by  the  British  authorities. 

During  the  past  few  days  reports  have  come  in  of  growing 
uneasiness  among  various  sections  of  the  tribes  about  Cabul,  and 
these  culminated  yesterday  in  the  news  that  the  Kohistanis  had 
actually  risen,  and  were  at  Khoja  Serai,  on  the  Charikar  Boad. 
They  were  said  to  have  cooked  three  days*  food,  and  to  meditate 

*  I  may  here  sUte  that  Takab  Khan  made  the  journey  to  Peshawur  without  incident ; 
the  nqnditj  of  his  movements  preventing  any  tribal  combination  being  formed  with  the 
object  of  attempting  his  rescue. 


176  TJie  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

attacklDg  Sherpur  on  the  last  day  of  the  moon.  From  the 
Luttabund  direction  also  it  was  reported  that  the  Safis  of  Tagao 
and  the  hillmen  west  of  Jugdulluck  were  also  meditating  mischief, 
though  beyond  gathering  together  in  small  bands  they  had  not 
made  open  demonstration  of  hostility.  The  change  in  the  attitude 
of  the  Kohistanis  has  warned  us  that  it  is  idle  to  expect  a  peace- 
ful quiet  among  men  who  have  always  been  unruly  and  turbulent. 
The  sections  which  will  probably  give  us  most  trouble  now  and  in 
the  future  are — the  Wardaks  inhabiting  the  country  about  the 
Ghazni  Road,  who  may  drag  in  the  Logaris,  the  Safis  of  Tagao, 
and  the  Kohistanis.  With  the  two  former  we  have  already  come 
into  collision ;  General  Macpherson  having  ventured  into  Tagao 
in  search  of  supplies,  while  General  Baker  on  a  similar  mission  at 
Maidan  has  had  to  burn  Beni-Badam  in  the  Wardak  country.* 
It  is  probable  that  both  Safis  and  Wardaks  will  seek  hereafter  to 
have  their  revenge;  but  in  the  meantime  we  shall  not  trouble 
them  further,  as  we  have  the  Kohistanis  to  deal  with.  Kohistan 
lies  due  north  of  Cabul  between  the  Pughman,  a  spur  of  the 
Hindu  Kush,  and  Tagao,  and  includes  -the  upper  valley  of  the 
Panjshir  River,  which  stretches  away  north-east  from  CJharikar,  the 
most  important  town  in  the  province.  The  lower  portion  of 
Kohistan  is  known  as  the  Koh-Daman  (Mountain  Skirt),  and  is 
the  district  renowned  for  its  vineyards  and  orchards,  from  which 
Cabul  is  largely  supplied  with  fruit.  It  is  fertilized  by  innumer- 
able streams  running  down  from  the  Pughman  mountains,  and 
uniting  to  form  a  river,  which,  turned  to  the  north  by  ranges 
of  hills  facing  Pughman,  eventually  empties  itself  into  the 
Panjshir  on  the  western  border  of  Tagao.  Looking  northwards 
from  the  Bemaru  Heights  above  Sherpur  cantonments,  one  sees 
nothing  but  a  mass  of  hills  piled  together  in  picturesque  confusion, 

*  (General  Baker  nearly  fell  a  victim  to  Afghan  treachery  at  Beni-Badam.  He  visited 
the  village  with  twenty  or  thirty  troopers  of  the  9th  Lancers,  leaving  his  infantry  on 
the  Ghazni  Road,  2|  miles  away.  The  villagers  brought  out  milk  and  fruit  for  the 
officers,  and  provided  com  and  forage  for  the  horses,  protesting  their  friendship  loudly. 
General  Baker  noticed  that  only  old  men  seemed  in  the  village,  but  did  not  suspect 
treachery  until  suddenly  two  large  bodies  of  armed  men,  with  banners  flying,  were  seen 
rushing  down  the  hill  to  cut  off  his  retreat.  The  troopers  had  to  skirmish  on  foot  with 
their  carbines,  and  after  a  sharp  fight  the  General  managed  to  rejoin  his  infantry  The 
next  day  he  destroyed  the  village. 


Hostile  Attitude  of  Kohistanis,  177 

the  foregroand  being  a  low  range  rnnning  parallel  to  the  narrow 
swampy  lake,  which  borders  the  plain  from  which  Bemaru  rises. 
The  road  from  Gabul  to  Eohistan  passes  close  to  Sherpur  on  the 
east,  crosses  the  grassy  plain,  and  over  the  lake  on  a  raised  cause- 
way at  a  point  where  it  is  very  narrow  and  shallow,  and  thence 
over  a  low  kotal  called  Paen  Minar.  Eoh-Daman  is  then  fairly 
entered  upon,  and  the  route  northwards  is  as  follows : — Paen 
Minar  to  Kila  Ittafal  Khan,  six  miles ;  Ittafal  Khan  to  Ehoja 
Serai,  five  miles ;  Khoja  Serai  to  Istalif,  seven  miles ;  Istalif  to 
Charikar,  v\j&  Isturgehteh,  thirteen  miles ;  or  a  total  from  Paen 
Minar,  four  miles  from  Sherpur,  of  thirty-one  miles.  While  we 
were  encamped  at  Siah  Sung  the  Kohistan  Chiefs  came  in  and 
made  professions  of  friendship,  which  were  gladly  accepted  by 
General  Roberts.  They  remained  with  us  for  several  weeks,  but 
were  plainly  disappointed  that  no  large  subsidy  was  promised  to 
them  for  their  future  good  behaviour.  A  Governor,  Shahbaz 
Khan,  a  Barakzai  sirdar  who  had  intermarried  with  the  Eohistanis, 
was  appointed,  and  was  sent  to  Charikar,  his  mission  being  chiefly 
to  furnish  supplies  for  our  troops,  and  to  prevent  any  Chief 
arrogating  to  himself  power  in  the  province.  No  sooner  do  the 
maliks  seem  to  have  returned  to  their  villages  than  they  began 
to  concert  measures  to  annoy  us.  They  gathered  armed  men 
together,  set  at  nought  Shahbaz  Khan,  and,  as  I  have  said,  have 
'  been  bold  enough  to  declare  their  intention  of  attacking  Sherpur. 
That  they  will  do  this  seems  too  absurd  to  believe,  unless  there  is 
a  general  combination,  but  the  precaution  of  building  breastworks 
on  the  Bemaru  Heights  has  been  taken,  and  yesterday  afternoon  a 
small  party  of  cavalry  were  sent  out  to  reconnoitre  past  Paen 
Minar.  They  saw  no  signs  of  any  gathering,  but  still  there  may 
be  bands  of  men  lurking  about.  We  have  but  a  very  small 
infantry  garrison  in  Sherpur  at  the  present  time,  as  600  of  the 
92nd,  400  of  the  3rd  Sikhs,  and  400  of  the  5th  Punjab  Infantry  are 
out  in  Maidan,  while  the  troops  sent  to  hold  the  road  as  far  as 
Jogdulluck  on  the  occasion  of  Yakub  Khan's  journey  down  are, 
as  already  stated,  very  numerous.  General  Baker  has,  therefore, 
been  warned  to  march  to  Sheipur  with  his  brigade  as  rapidly  as 
his  foraging  arrangements  will  allow. 


178  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

Mh  December. 

The  attitude  of  the  Eohistanis  continnes  far  from  satisfactory, 
though  they  have  not,  as  yet,  been  reckless  enough  to  carry  out 
their  threat  of  attacking  Sherpur.  The  author  of  the  late  dis- 
turbances is  said  to  be  the  mother  of  Yakub  Ehan,  a  woman  well 
advanced  in  years,  but  still  capable,  through  agents,  of  doing 
much  mischief.  She  is  in  Cabul  with  the  harem  of  the  ex- Amir  ; 
and  as  we  do  not  war  against  women,  she  has  had  full  liberty  to 
intrigue  with  discontented  chiefs.  Of  the  gathering  of  hostile 
bands  at  Khoja  Serai,  south  of  Istalif,  we  have  heard  little  of 
late.  The  man  who  will  probably  give  us  most  trouble  is  Mir 
Butcha;  while,  to  show  how  interests  clash  in  this  once  "God- 
governed  country,'*  I  may  state  that  the  nephew  of  Daoud  Shah, 
the  ex-Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Afghan  army,  is  a  prominent 
leader  of  the  malcontents.  His  uncle  is  striving  in  every  way  to 
ingratiate  himself  with  the  British,  and  has  so  far  succeeded, 
that  he  is  freely  made  use  of  by  our  Political  OflScers.  He  has 
several  times  given  valuable  information  and  has  been  of  great 
service  in  aiding  us  in  the  collection  of  supplies.  He  has  warned 
us  of  the  disaffected  nature  of  the  Eohistanis ;  and  though  he 
over-estimates  their  strength  as  opposed  to  our  army,  his  warning 
has  been  partially  justified  by  late  events.  The  southern  part  of 
Eohistan,  the  Eoh-Daman,  is  not  so  turbulent  as  that  further 
north,  about  Charikar,  in  which  ^hahbaz  Ehan  is  supposed  to 
exercise  power.  One  road  from  Northern  Turkistan  passes  over 
the  Hindu  Eush  and  runs  through  Charikar  to  Cabul;  and  this 
near  proximity  to  a  province,  supposed  at  present  to  be  safe  from 
our  army,  has  a  tendency  to  foster  local  disaffection.  In  fact,  the 
state  of  Turkistan  re-acts  upon  all  Eohistan,  and  indirectly  upon 
the  country  about  Cabul ;  and,  in  view  of  further  complications, 
it  is  worth  while  looking  critically  upon  the  present  position  of 
that  important  province. 

The  capture  of  Cabul  and  the  dispersion  of  such  of  the  rebel 
regiments  as  fought  at  Charasia  had  a  great  effect,  at  first,  in  show- 
ing every  province  of  Afghanistan  that  the  impregnability  of  their 
capital  was  a  myth.  Our  arms  having  been  so  successful  in  so 
short  a  time,  checked  the  incipient  state  of  anarchy  into  which  the 


The  Position  of  Gholam  Hyder.  1 79 

whole  country  was  fast  falling,  as  it  seemed  rational  to  suppose  that 
an  army  which  in  a  few  days  had  captured  Gabul  would  be  more 
than  equal  to  the  task  of  visiting  Gharikar,  Bamian,  or  even  Balkh^ 
if  occasion  required  a  further  display  of  force.  But,  as  time 
passed  on,  and  it  began  to  dawn  upon  the  minds  of  men  somewhat 
removed  from  the  captured  city  that  we  were  settling  down  for  the 
winter  in  local  quarters,  the  latent  hostility  to  our  presence  in 
Afghanistan  revived.  In  Turkistan  it  could  scarcely  be  called  a 
revival,  as  it  had  never  died  out.  In  that  province  were  still 
organized  regiments  (well  armed  and  boasting  of  being  in  posses- 
sion of  guns),  whose  sepoys  had  never  suflfered  the  disgrace  of  a 
defeat  at  our  hands.  It  was  not,  therefore,  surprising  that  our 
attempts  to  open  up  communication  with  Gholam  Hyder,  the 
Afghan  Governor  of  the  Northern  districts,  should  have  failed. 
In  the  first  place,  it  was  extremely  diflScult  to  get  trustworthy 
news  of  what  was  going  on  over  the  Eoh-i-6aba  range,  and 
Gholam  Hyder' s  movements  were  absolutely  unknown.  He  was 
believed  to  be  at  Mazar-i- Sharif,  or  Balkh,  and  rumours  then 
reached  us  that  he  had  left  with  Nek  Mahomed  to  seek  aid  from 
the  Russians  over  the  Oxus.  This  news  was  never  confirmed ; 
but  from  incidents  which  occurred  and  were  verified  in  several 
ways,  it  transpired  that,  wherever  Gholam  Hyder  might  be,  his 
power  was  very  limited.  The  troops  on  which  he  relied  for  support 
either  revolted,  as  in  the  case  of  the  regiments  at  Ghori,  a  post 
fifty  miles  south  of  Kunduz,  the  nearest  station  to  Badakshan,  on 
the  Balkh,  Tashkurgan,  Eunduz,  and  Faizabad  Boad,  or  were 
deserted  by  their  Generals,  who  sought  safety  with  the  British. 
The  sepoys  knew  there  was  really  no  Government  in  existence, 
and,  with  arms  in  their  hands,  felt  themselves  masters  of  the 
situation.  Badakshan  was  in  revolt.  Ghori  and  the  district 
between  Balkh  and  Badakshan  could  not  do  better  than  follow  the 
example.  They  did  so,  and  Gholam  Hyder*s  power  was  gradually 
narrowed,  no  attention  being  paid  to  his  commands.  To  make 
his  position  of  Governor  still  more  absurd,  an  Uzbeg  Chief, 
Mahomed  Shah,  appropriated  the  country  about  Sar-i-Pul  and 
Maemena,  distant  only  eighty  miles  to  the  west  and  south-west  of 
Balkh.  The  nominal  Governor  of  Turkistan,  therefore,  found 
himself  at  last  ruling  the  tract  of  country  south  of  the  Oxus,  as 

N  2 


i8o  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

far  as  Tashkurgan  and  Aebak  on  the  east,  and  Akcha  on  the 
west :  southwards,  to  Bamian,  he  governed  as  far  as  men  chose 
to  obey  him,  and  no  further.  From  Aebak  to  Akcha,  in  a 
bee-line,  is  less  than  130  miles  :  from  the  Oxus  through  Baikh  to 
Bamian  is  160  miles.  This  was — and  for  all  we  know  is — the 
extent  of  territory  Gholam  Hyder  governs.  He  is  responsible  to 
no  one  but  himself :  and  as  long  as  he  can  find  money  to  pay  his 
troops,  he  may  rely  upon  exercising  a  certain  influence.  If  we 
had  got  as  far  as  Bamian,  100  miles  from  Cabul,  he  might  still 
have  retained  a  show  of  independence,  Balkh  being  so  near  the 
Oxus  that  to  escape  to  Bokhara  would  have  been  easy  if  our 
troops  had  been  pushed  on,  before  winter  set  in,  towards  the 
northern  frontier.  But  Gholam  Hyder  has  been  left  undisturbed ; 
and  now  that  the  Eohistanis  have  broken  faith  with  us,  his  name 
is  being  freely  used  to  induce  men  to  gather  together.  A  few 
days  ago  it  was  reported  that  he  had  reached  Charikar  with  eight 
guns  and  a  force  of  cavalry ;  but  later  reports  show  this  was  a 
false  rumour  circulated  in  Cabul  to  excite  the  Wardaks  and 
Ghilzais  on  the  Ghazni  Boad  and  in  Logar.  He  may  have  left 
Mazar  i-Sharif ;  but  if,  as  seems  likely,  he  looks  for  Bussian 
gold  to  aid  him  in  keeping  his  hold  upon  Turkistan,  he  would 
scarcely  have  deserted  Balkh  and  the  neighbourhood  for  the 
questionable  glory  of  raising  an  army  of  hill-men  in  Kohistan. 
What  is  far  more  probable  is,  that  the  regiments  which  disbanded 
and  scattered  to  various  villages  are  forming  bands  among  them- 
selves, and  some  of  these  may  think  Charikar  as  good  a  centre 
to  make  for  as  any  other  place.  Turkistan  can  furnish  any 
number  of  these  sepoys;  and  as  the  Bamian  route  to  Cabul 
is  long  and  tiresome,  they  may  prefer  taking  the  road  over  the 
Hindu  Kush  to  Eohistan,  there  to  await  for  further  development 
of  events.  If  the  British  force  menaces  them,  they  can  return 
to  Turkistan  :  if  we  leave  them  alone,  as  we  probably  shall,  they 
will  have  to  find  a  way  of  living  during  the  winter  ;  and  this  to  an 
Afghan  well-armed,  and  with  the  bluster  of  a  bully,  is  not  a 
difficult  task.  From  what  I  have  written  above,  it  will  be 
seen  that  Northern  and  Eastern  Turkistan  is  in  the  state  into 
which  it  might  have  been  expected  to  fall  without  a  strong  hand 
controlling  it  from  Cabul.     Of  Herat  I  know  nothing,  as  it  is 


Affairs  in  Afghan  Turkistan.  i8i 

too  far  remoyed  from  as  for  eyen  ramoors  to  drift  down  to  our 
camp. 

With  this  condition  of  affairs  in  a  province  most  open  to  outside 
inflnence  and  trans-Oxus  intrigue,  it  becomes  of  serious  pioment 
to  consider  what  modification  of  our  policy,  as  set  forth  in  the 
Proclamation  of  October  28th,  is  necessary.     The  Proclamation 
concluded  as  follows  : — "  The  services  of  such  sirdars  and  chiefs 
as  assist  in  preserving  order  wiU  be  duly   recognized;    but  all 
disturbers  of  the  peace ,  and  persons  Goncemed  in  attacks  upon  the 
British    authority,   v/ill  meet   vfith    condign  punishment.     The 
British  Ooveimment,  after  consultation  with  the  principal  sirdars, 
tribal  chiefs,  and  others  representing  the  interests  and  wishes  of 
the  various  provinces  and  cities,  will  declare  its  will  as  to  the 
future  permanent  arrangements  to  be  made  for  the  good  govern 
ment  of  the  people.**    Now  these  stilted  periods  either  mean  a 
great  deal,  or  nothing  at  all.     As  regards  Turkistan  there  are 
within  it  at  the  present  moment  numerous   **  disturbers  of  the 
peace,"  as  there  are  in  Eohistan,  Maidan,  and  Logar ;  and,  to  be 
consistent,  we  must  fulfil  our  pledge  to  punish  them  condignly  ; 
if  not  now,  at  some  future  date.    But  these  disturbers  have  this 
much  in  their  fayour,  that  beyond  the  empty  words  of  the  Pro- 
clamation they  have  had  no  evidence  of  the  British  authority  which 
has  supplanted  that  of  the  Amir.     To  them  it  is  non-existent.     It 
may  flourish  within  20  miles  of  Gabul  and  eastwards  along  the 
Jellalabad  Valley  to  the  Ehyber,  but  it  has  never  shown  itself  north 
of  the  Hindu  Rush :  it  has  left  Balkh  and  Herat  untouched :  it 
has  not  been  felt  at  Bamian  or  Ghazni,  each  within  100  miles  of 
the  7,000  men  encamped   at  Sherpur :   how,  then,  is  it  to  be 
acknowledged  at  more  distant  points  ?  An  authority,  to  be  respected, 
must  be   tangible.     The   British   authority  at  Cabul  is  in   the 
tangible  shape  of  a  conquering  army :  it  is  respected — at  Cabul. 
But  Cabul  is  not  Turkistan,  and  it  is  idle  to  expect  a  Proclamation, 
or  even  a  thousand,  to  cause  provincial  governors,  now  free  from 
all  control,  voluntarily  to  submit  to  an  authority  which  makes, 
apparently,  no   effort   to  reach  them.     ''Consultation  with  the 
principal  sirdars  and  tribal  chiefs  representing  the  various  pro- 
vinces and  cities  of  Afghanistan  "  is  admirable  from  the  view  of 
closet  politicians,  but  how  if  sirdars  and  chiefs  decline  to  con- 


1 82  The  Afghan  War,   1879—80. 

suit  ?  It  may  have  been  intended,  when  the  Proclamation  was 
issaed,  that  a  demonstration  of  force  shoald  be  made  to  bring 
about  the  consultation,  but  that  demonstration  has  never  been 
carried  out — ^probably  as  much  from  political  considerations  as 
military  difficulties.  Sir  Frederick  Roberts  and  his  army  did  their 
first  work  of  capturing  Cabul  with  such  rapidity  that,  with  troops 
pushed  forward  from  Jellalabad  to  garrison  the  captured  city  and 
collect  supplies  for  the  winter,  they  might  have  ventured  into 
Turkistan  with  the  prospect  of  meeting  with  no  opposition ;  and 
there  might  have  been  now,  at  Bamian  and  Balkh,  agents  who  had 
been  installed  by  our  army  and  left  in  the  position  of  governors 
ruling  in  our  name.  This  programme  was  believed  at  one  time  to 
be  on  the  cards,  and  we  calculated  how  many  marches  it  was  to 
Bamian  and  the  Oxus ;  but  with  no  supports  forthcoming  up  to 
the  middle  of  November  (a  flying  column  at  JugduUuck  was  not 
worthy  of  the  name),  and  with  the  usual  stupid  outcry  at  home 
against  even  the  appearance  of  annexation,  the  project  fell  through. 
An  attempt  has  been  made  to  carry  out  the  spirit  of  the  Proclama- 
tion— to  make  ''  permanent  arrangements  for  the  good  government 
of  the  people  " — by  consulting  with  such  sirdars  as  have  deemed 
it  wise  to  join  us.  From  their  number  four  men  have  been  chosen 
as  governors  of  districts ;  but,  so  far,  this  system  has  been  a 
failure.  However  much  they  may  represent  us,  they  are  rejected 
of  the  people ;  and  the  three  who,  to  use  an  official  phrase,  have 
"joined  their  appointments,*'  have  had  a  very  rough  time  of  it. 
These  were  Shahbaz  Khan,  Mahomed  Hasan  Khan,  and  Abdulla 
Khan,  all  sirdars  of  local  influence  about  Cabul,  who  were  posted 
to  Kohistan,  Maidan,  and  Logar,  respectively.  (Turkistan,  so  far, 
has  not  received  its  governor,  Sirdar  Wali  Mahomed,  who  had 
made  many  preparations  for  starting.)  They  were  sent  without 
armed  escorts,  and  have  been  worried  and  threatened  by  mal- 
contents, who  have  resented  their  intrusion  with  menaces  that  can 
scarcely  be  lightly  regarded.  In  one  case,  that  of  Hasan  Khan, 
son  of  Dost  Mahomed  and  half-brother  of  Wali  Mahomed,  assas- 
sination has  been  added  to  threats.  News  was  brought  in  from 
Naure  Falad,  the  village  in  the  Maidan  Valley  which  OenenJ 
Baker's  force  only  left  on  the  1st  instant,  that  a  body  of  men, 
including  some  sepoys  of  the  Ardal  Begiments,  had  attacked  the 


Bahadur  Khans  Revenge.  183 

fort  in  which  Hasan  Khan  was  living,  and  had  murdered  our 
lately-appointed  governor  and  one  of  his  followers.  They  shot  the 
old  man  through  the  head,  and  then  hacked  his  body  to  pieces. 
Hasan  Khan  was  quite  a  favourite  in  our  camp  at  Maidan,  his 
kind  disposition  and  hearty  frankness  being  qualities  very  foreign 
to  the  nature  of  the  ordinary  Afghan  sirdar.  The  men  who 
killed  him  are  said  to  have  come  down  the  Darra  Narkh  from  the 
hills  about  Bahadur  Khan's  villages ;  and  their  action  was  in 
revenge  for  our  burning  of  their  villages.  They  returned  to 
Upper  Maidan  as  soon  as  they  had  murdered  our  representative, 
having,  according  to  their  own  rude  idea,  shown  us  that  they  had 
no  intention  of  accepting  our  authority.  It  is  evident  that  from 
Ohazni  northwards  much  excitement  has  arisen  since  General 
Baker's  departure.  From  Charikar  and  Logar  our  governors  re- 
port that  they  are  looked  upon  with  disfavour,  and  even  hated,  by 
many  maliks ;  and  as  they  also  have  no  escorts,  their  lives  may 
be  considered  in  jeopardy.  When  the  Kohistanis,  a  few  days  ago, 
were  up  in  arms,  Shahbaz  Khan's  position  was  very  ticklish ;  and 
to  relieve  the  pressure  put  upon  him.  Sirdar  Ibrahim  Khan,  an 
elder  brother  of  Yakub  Khan,  was  sent  out  to  bring  back  the 
chiefs  to  the  allegiance  they  had  promised  when  in  our  camp. 
Though  he  succeeded  in  inducing  twenty  or  thirty  of  the  minor 
chiefs  of  Koh-Daman  to  come  in,  he  was  reviled  by  others  as  a 
**Feringhi"  and  "  Kafir,"  and  was  warned  to  return  to  Sherpur, 
or  his  life  would  be  taken.  These  are  the  results  of  the  first 
experiments  of  governing  provinces  through  chiefs  selected  by  us 
as  representing  the  interests  and  wishes  of  the  people. 


184  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

Parade  of  all  Troops  in  Sberpnr — Strengih  of  the  Garrison — ^The  Commenoement  of  the 
December  Operations — General  Macpherson's  Brigade  at  Aoshahr — General  Baker's 
Flank  Blarch  upon  Maidan — ^The  Jehad  preached  by  Mnshk-i-Alam — Strength  of 
Mabomed  Jan's  Force  —The  Plan  of  Operations — Defeat  of  the  Eohistanis  at  Eila 
Earez — General  Macpherson  starts  for  Aiigandeh — General  Massy's  March  ap  the 
Ohardeh  Valley  with  the  Guns  and  Cavalry — First  Sight  of  Mahomed  Jan's  Army — 
Unexpected  Strength  of  the  Afghans — The  Action  of  December  3 1th  in  Chardeh 
— Loss  of  Four  Guns  and  Bepulse  of  the  Cavalry — Defence  of  the  Dehmazung 
Gbrge  by  200  of  the  72nd  Highlanders— Recovery  of  the  Guns  by  Colonel  Macgregor 
— Macpherson's  Arrival  at  Debmazung — ^Attack  on  the  Sherderwaza  Picquet. 

Sherpur,  ^ih  December. 

General  Baeer's  Brigade  returned  to  Sherpur  a  few  days  ago, 
and  the  result  of  his  visit  to  Maidan  is  now  visible  in  the  large 
stacks  of  bhoosa  and  the  bags  of  grain  near  the  Commissariat 
Gate.  Sir  Michael  Kennedy,  Director-General  of  Transport,  with 
a  small  party  of  officers  has  arrived  from  India  on  inspection  duty 
and  is  now  a  guest  of  Sir  Frederick  Boberts.  The  ex- Amir  is  now 
well  on  his  way  to  India,  and  the  troops  sent  to  strengthen  the 
posts  between  Gabul  and  Jugdulluck  have  returned  to  quarters. 
So  far  no  attempt  has  been  made  by  the  tribes  on  the  Peshawur 
Boad  to  rescue  Yakub  Khan,  but  there  is  much  latent  fanaticism 
about  Cabul,  and  the  mooUahs,  who  always  gave  us  so  much 
trouble,  may  seize  upon  the  deportation  of  the  sovereign  as  a 
rallying-cry. 

Yesterday  a  parade  of  all  the  available  troops  in  garrison  was 
held  on  the  large  maidan  which  lies  to  the  north  of  the  Bemaru 
hills,  and  extends  to  the  borders  of  the  narrow  Wazirabad  Lake 
at  the  foot  of  the  southern  Eohistan  hills.  No  better  place  for  a 
review  of  even  20,000  men  could  be  desired,  as  the  ground  is  very 
level,  and  is  covered  with  short  grass,  which  prevents  dust  accu- 
mulating. The  nominal  object  of  the  parade  was  to  present  four 
men  of  the    72nd  Highlanders  with    medals  for  distinguished 


A  Parade  of  Troops. 


185 


Bervioe  at  the  storming  of  the  Peiwar  Eotal  last  December.* 
There  were  4,710  mea  and  twenty  guns  on  the  ground.  The 
guns  were  twelve  9-poander8,  belonging  to  F-A  and  G-3,  and 
eight  7-ponnderB  of  the  Mountain  Batteries.  The  following  table 
shows  only  the  troops  paraded ;  it  was  necessary,  for  the  safety  of 
the  cantonment  and  the  valuable  stores  now  collected  within  its 
walls,  that  a  strong  guard  should  remain  in  Sherpur,  and  100 
men  were  detached  from  each  infantry  regiment  for  this  work. 
In-lying  picquets  were  posted,  signallers  with  heliographic  appa- 
ratus placed  on  the  Bemaru  Heights  and  over  the  Commissariat 
Gate  (that  nearest  the  city),  and,  to  prevent  any  incendiarism 
being  attempted,  orders  were  given  to  refuse  admission  to  all  the 
Hazara  coolies  employed  on  the  quarters  until  the  parade  was 
over.  Our  bhoosa  stacks  and  wood-piles  are  so  nearly  completed 
now,  that  we  cannot  afford  to  let  them  be  burnt  down. 

The  following  is  the  full  strength  of  the  troops  drawn  up  for 
the  Lieutenant- General's  inspection : — 


KuRRAM  Division, 

Cabul  Field  Force. 

1 

Non-commissioned 

Oaacera 

Q 

and  Men. 

Troops. 

1 

0 

1 

TotiJ 

Biitish. 

Native. 

p.A,  Royal  Horse  ArtiUery       

5 

_ 

106 

_ 

111 

G-8.  Royal  Artillery       

6 

— 

107 

— 

118 

No.  1  Mountain  Batteiy 

2 

1 

4 

80 

87 

No.  2  Monntain  Batteiy 

4 

— 

4 

74 

82 

9th  Lancers         

16 

— 

266 

— 

281 

5th  Poigab  Caralry        

8 

11 

— 

842 

861 

14th  Bengal  Laneers      

7 

10 

— 

218 

230 

«7thPoot           

15 

— 

439 

— 

464 

72nd  Highlanders           

18 

— 

663 

— 

671 

92nd  Highlanders           

16 

— 

661 

— 

676 

2Snl  Pioneers      

4 

6 

— 

296 

805 

8id  Sikhs           

8 

10 

— 

626 

643 

6th  Ponjab  Infantry       

4 

11 

— 

603 

618 

5thGhoorkaa      

5 

8 

— 

889 

402 

7th  Company  Sappers 

8 

— 

4     i        69 

76 

Total         

120 

67 

2,043    1   2,490 

4,710 

*  These  were  Sergeant- Instructor  of  Mosketiy  Salmond,  Sergeant  Cox,  Private  Mclreen 
and  Prifate  Bonar. 


1 86  TJu  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

To  these  have  to  be  added  the  Staff,  which  was  made  up  as 
follows : — 

Commanding  Cavalry  Brigade  —  Brigadier-General  Massy  ; 
Brigade-Major — Lieutenant  Brabazon  :  Orderly  Officer — ^Lieu- 
tenant Hearsey. 

Commanding  1st  Infantry  Brigade— Brigadier-General  Mac- 
pherson  ;  Brigade-Major — Captain  Guinness;  Orderly  Officer — 
Captain  Macgregor. 

Commanding  2nd  Infantry  Brigade — Brigadier-General  Baker ; 
Brigade-Major — Captain  Farwell ;  Orderly  Officer — ^Lieutenant 
Kane. 

Commanding  Royal  Artillery — Lieutenant-Colonel  Gordon  ; 
Officiating  Adjutant — Lieutenant  Allsopp. 

The  parade  went  off  very  successfully,  and  seemed  to  impress 
Sirdar  Wali  Mahomed  Khan,  Daoud  Shah  (the  late  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  Afghan  army),  and  other  persons  of  importance 
who  were  present. 

We  mix  work  and  play  a  good  deal  at  Cabul :  for  scarcely  had 
the  parade  ended  than  the  more  serious  business  of  sending  out 
a  brigade  into  the  Chardeh  Valley  was  begun.  In  the  afternoon 
the  following  troops,  under  the  command  of  Brigadier-General 
Macpherson,  left  the  cantonment  and  marched  to  Aoshahr,  five 
miles  due  west  of  Sherpur : — 

6  companies  67th  Foot ; 

7  companies  5th  Ghoorkas  ; 
550  of  the  8rd  Sikhs ; 

4  guns  F-A,  Royal  Horse  Artillery ; 
4  guns  No.  1  Mountain  Battery  ; 

1  squadron  9th  Lancers ; 

2  squadrons  14th  Bengal  Lancers. 

This  movement  is  due  to  the  gatherings  in  Koh-Daman  and 
Maidan.  The  efforts  of  old  Mushk-i-Alam,  the  Ghazni  mooUah, 
to  raise  Sk  jehad  have  been  so  far  successful,  that  Mahomed  Jan 
has  6,000  men  with  him  between  Argandeh  and  Beni-Badam,  on 
the  Ghazni  Bead.  This  would  not  have  been  of  much  consequence 
were  it  not  that  pressure  had  been  brought  to  bear  upon  the  local 
villagers,  who  were  bringing  in  grain  and  bhoosa.     In  the  Logar 


Beginning  of  December  Troubles.  187 

Valley  our  Governor  has  been  defied  and  the  supplies  which  were 
pouring  in  from  that  district  have  almost  entirely  ceased.  We 
still  want  about  15,000  maunds  of  wheat  and  50,000  maunds  of 
bhoosa,  and  as  we  are  anxious  to  get  it  all  in  before  the  snow  falls^ 
it  has  been  determined  to  attack  the  tribal  bands  and  once  more 
open  the  road.  If  our  supplies  were  collected,  we  should  probably 
have  left  Mahomed  Jan  alone  until  he  had  got  a  large  force  to- 
gether, and  then  have  gone  out  to  meet  him.  General  Macpher- 
Bon  has  halted  to-day  at  Aoshahr,  as  a  plan  has  been  carefully 
prepared  by  which  it  is  hoped  Mahomed  Jan's  "  army  "  will  be 
forced  to  fight.  In  the  carrying  out  of  this  plan,  two  separate 
forces  will  be  employed — the  second  brigade,  under  General 
Baker,  being  now  at  Charasia  with  secret  orders.  This  force  is 
made  up  as  follows,  and  is  a  ''  flying  column  "  in  the  true  sense 
of  the  word : — 

450  of  the  92nd  Highlanders ; 
450  of  the  5th  Punjab  Infantry ; 

5  troops  of  the  5th  Punjab  Cavalry ; 

4  guns  of  No.  2  Mountain  Battery ; 

7th   company  Sappers  and  Miners  (detachment  with  gun- 
cotton). 

General  Macpherson  will  to-morrow  march  up  the  Chardeh 
Valley  and  endeavour  to  get  between  the  enemy  and  the  road 
leading  to  the  Unai  Pass,  so  as  to  cut  off  their  retreat  towards 
Bamian.  General  Baker,  moving  in  sympathy  with  the  Chardeh 
Force,  will  leave  Charasia  and  make  a  feint  of  going  up  the  Logar 
Valley.  This  intention  will  be  openly  proclaimed;  but,  after 
leaving  Charasia  a  few  miles  in  rear,  he  will  turn  sharply  to  the 
south-west  and  throw  himself  across  the  Ghazni  Road  below  Beni- 
Badam,  cutting  off  Mahomed  Jan's  retreat  to  Ghazni.  The 
5,000  men  said  to  have  assembled  would  then  be  practically  encom- 
passed about,  and,  being  unable  to  run  away,  they  would  probably 
make  a  stout  resistance.  If  General  Macpherson  can  only  keep 
them  in  play  and  get  well  above  them  in  the  Bamian  direction, 
blinding  them  to  the  movements  of  the  other  column,  we  shall  at 
last  be  able  to  punish  the  Ardal  Pultan  right  smartly.  Our 
information  leads  us  to  expect  that  Mahomed  Jan  will  fight.    He 


1 88  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

certainly  held  on  to  the  heights  above  Cabul,  even  after  we  had 
reached  Beni  Hissar  on  October  7th ;  and,  perhaps,  his  courage 
may  be  equal  to  again  resisting  us.  The  detachment  of  so  many 
men  has,  of  course,  weakened  the  garrison  of  Sherpur,  and  the 
Guides,  Cavalry,  and  Infantry  have  been  ordered  up  from  Jugdul- 
luck  in  consequence.  They  will  probably  arrive  in  a  day  or  two. 
The  Eohistanis  have  not  ventured  to  display  further  hostility  to 
us,  but  Mir  Butcha  still  keeps  about  him  a  gathering  of  discon- 
tented men,  and  may  try  to  join  Mahomed  Jan  at  Maidan.  Amid 
all  this  tribal  disturbance  it  is  satisfactory  to  know  that  the  Ohil- 
zais,  Lughmanis,  Shinwaris,  and  Afridis  on  our  line  of  communi- 
cations with  India  are  still  quiet  :  whether  suspiciously  so,  I  cannot 
say.  Beyond  the  cutting  of  the  telegraph  wire  between  Dakka  and 
Jellalabad  occasionally,  they  seem  to  be  on  their  best  behaviour. 

Wth  December* 

The  strategical  move  of  two  columns  out  of  our  cantonment 
here,  to  disperse  Mahomed  Jan's  force,  has  had  a  most  unexpected 
result.  The  enemy  have  beaten  us  at  our  own  game — has  out- 
mancBUvred  us — and,  instead  of  Mahomed  Jan  being  a  fugitive, 
he  is  calmly  occupying  the  peaks  to  the  south  of  the  Bala  Hissar 
Ridge,  and  his  standards  are  flying  in  sight  of  Cabul  and  all  the 
country  round.  We  have  been  complaining  of  want  of  excite- 
ment here  lately,  but  to^ay  has  given  us  more  than  our  fill.  I 
explained  in  my  last  letter  that  Brigadier  Macpherson  moved  out, 
on  Monday,  to  Kila  Aoshahr,  just  through  the  Cabul  gorge  and  at 
the  eastern  end  of  the  Chardeh  Valley ;  while  Brigadier  Baker, 
on  the  following  day,  marched  to  Charasia,  and  intended  cutting 
off  Mahomed  Jan's  retreat,  on  the  Ghazni  Road,  at  Maidan.  Yes- 
terday the  force  under  General  Macpherson  left  Eila  Aoshahr  at 
dawn ;  four  guns  of  F- A,  Boyal  Horse  Artillery,  with  an  escort  of 
two  squadrons  of  cavalry,  drawn  from  the  9th  Lancers  and  the 
14th  Bengal  Lancers,  remaining  on  the  camping-ground,  with 
orders  to  check  the  retreat  of  the  enemy  if  they  turned  towards 
Cabul.  The  infantry,  with  four  mountain  guns  and  a  squadron 
of  the  14th  Bengal  Lancers,  under  Colonel  Boss,  took  the  Eohistan 
Road,  and  finally  gained  the  Surkh  Eotal — a  ridge  running  down 
from  the  Pughman  Range,  and  dividing  Chardeh  from  the  Koh- 


11th  to  14th. 


Defeat  of  Mir  Butcha.  189 

Daman,  the  celebrated  "fruit  country"  of  Kohistan.  The  chief 
object  of  General  Macpherson  was  to  head  back  Mahomed  Jan, 
who  was  reported  to  be  making  for  Kohistan,  in  order  to  unite  his 
force  with  the  bands  gathered  by  Mir  Butcha  at  Khoja  Serai.  The 
14th  Bengal  Lancers  were  sent  forward  to  reconnoitre  on  the 
Pughman  plain  to  the  north  of  the  kotaly  and  they  soon  found 
themselves  in  the  face  of  several  thousand  men  near  EillEk  Karez. 
The  whole  country  seemed  covered  with  masses  of  armed  tribesmen, 
and  on  every  low  hill  banners  were  flying.  The  infantry  halted  on 
the  Surkh  Kotal  while  the  baggage  came  up,  and  preparations  were 
made  for  dispersing  the  Kohistanis,  who  were  plainly  on  the  way 
to  swell  Mahomed  Jan's  gathering.  As  Macpherson's  force  formed 
up  on  the  kotal^  the  enemy  advanced  very  confidently,  and  our 
cavalry  were  obliged  to  fall  back.  Two  mountain  guns  were  got 
into  action,  and  a  few  shells  broke  up  the  most  advanced  bodies. 
A  sufficient  guard  was  left  over  the  baggage,  and  General  Mac- 
pherson then  attacked  with  the  following  infantry :  four  companies 
67th  Foot ;  six  companies  5th  Ghoorkas ;  three  companies  3rd 
Sikhs — two  mountain  guns  moving  with  them.  The  enemy  broke 
and  fled  in  confusion  as  soon  as  our  rifles  began  to  make  good 
practice.  There  was  one  hill,  defended  by  sungars,  at  which  a  few 
Ghazis  tried  to  make  a  stand ;  but  the  67th  were  not  to  be  denied, 
and  they  raced  up  it  in  fine  form,  driving  out  its  defenders  very 
smartly.  The  5th  Ghoorkas  took  by  a  rush  a  hill  on  the  extreme 
left,  and  the  8rd  Sikhs,  in  assailing  another  hill,  were  equally  suc- 
cessful ;  but  two  fanatics  jumped  over  the  sungars  and  charged 
upon  the  men  nearest  to  them,  sword  in  hand.  They  wounded  two 
sepoys,  and  then  rushed  back  to  their  comrades.  The  guns  shelled 
the  Kohistanis  as  they  streamed  away  up  the  valley,  and  the  cavalry, 
dismounted,  also  fired  at  a  few  hundred  yards  into  them.  The 
watercourses  and  enclosures  prevented  the  Lancers  charging.  The 
Kohistanis,  who  were  commanded  by  Mir  Butcha  in  person,  lost 
heavily ;  many  bodies  were  found  on  the  ground  by  our  men,  and 
many  of  the  dead  were  seen  to  be  carried  off.  Our  casualties  were 
— one  man  67th,  two  Ghoorkas,  and  four  of  the  3rd  Sikhs,  all 
wounded.  Major  Fitz-Hugh,  commanding  the  Ghoorkas,  received 
a  slight  flesh-wound  from  a  bullet  in  the  right  leg.  He  was  not 
80  badly  hurt  as  to  be  incapacitated  from  duty,  though,  at  the 


IQO  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

Lientenant-Generars  request,  he  has  since  remained  in  canton- 
ments. Having  thrashed  Mir  Bntcha,  General  Macpherson 
encamped  for  the  night  at  Mahomed  Surwar  Khan's  Eila,  close  to 
Kila  Karez,  ready  to  deal  with  Mahomed  Jan  on  the  following  day. 
The  presence  of  a  large  force  of  sepoys  and  tribesmen  at  and  near 
Argandeh,  on  the  Ghazni  Boad,  14  miles  from  Sherpur,  was  known 
beyond  doubt  :  and  General  Macpherson' s  aim  was  to  get  between 
them  and  the  Unai  Pass  leading  to  Bamian,  so  as  to  drive  them 
down  towards  Maidan,  where  General  Baker  was  waiting  with  950 
infantry,  five  troops  of  the  5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  and  four  moun- 
tain guns.  There  was  a  chance  that  Mahomed  Jan  would  break 
back  into  the  Chardeh  Valley,  towards  Cabul,  but  it  was  not 
believed  that  he  had  with  him  a  sufficient  number  of  men  to  do 
any  mischief  in  that  direction.  He  had,  however,  double  the  force 
reported  (5,000),  and  was  sufficiently  confident  to  take  the  bold 
step  of  entering  the  valley.  Whether  he  contemplated  an  attack 
upon  Sherpur,  knowing  there  was  nothing  between  him  and  the 
cantonments,  except  a  small  party  of  cavalry  and  four  guns,  is  not 
known ;  but  if  he  had  learnt  the  weakness  of  the  place,  such  an 
attempt  was  highly  probable.  In  any  case,  while  General  Mac- 
pherson marched  from  his  camp  at  the  fort,  where  he  had  passed 
the  night,  and  took  the  path  to  Argandeh  behind  a  range  of  hills 
running  right  across  the  Chardeh  Valley  from  the  Sarkh  Eotal, 
the  enemy,  to  the  number  of  at  least  10,000,  debouched  into  the 
villages  on  the  Cabul  side  of  the  range,  and  waited  there  the  move- 
ments of  our  troops.  They  were  rewarded  for  their  manoeuvre  by 
the  appearance  of  the  Horse  Artillery  guns  and  their  small  escort 
of  cavalry,  making  their  way  to  join  the  infantry  at  Argandeh. 
This  movement  of  our  guns  and  the  after-events,  which  have  been 
extremely  serious,  can  best  be  explained  by  following  the  action  of 
the  cavalry  from  the  evening  of  yesterday. 

The  four  Horse  Artillery  guns,  under  Major  Smith  Windham, 
were,  as  I  have  said,  left  at  Kila  Aoshahr  with  an  escort  of  cavalry. 
They  were  ordered  to  move  this  morning  along  the  Argandeh  Road 
to  rejoin  the  infantry,  and  they  started,  with  this  object  in  view, 
under  the  command  of  Colonel  Gordon,  R.A.  Brigadier  Massy, 
with  another  squadron  of  the  9th  Lancers,  from  Sherpur,  over- 
took them  soon  after  starting,  and  took  command  of  the  whole. 


First  Success  of  Mahomed  Jan.  191 

He  had  then  as  escort  to  the  four  guns  of  F- A,  170  troopers  of  the 
9th  Lancers  (under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Cleland)  and  44  sowars 
of  the  14th  Bengal  Lancers  (under  Captain  Neville),  or  a  total 
strength  of  214  lances.  A  troop  of  the  9th  Lancers  (43  strong), 
under  Captain  Butson,  had  heen  sent  off  hy  General  Massy  to 
open  communication,  if  possible,  with  General  Macpherson.  Gen- 
eral Massy  made  Eila  Kazi  on  the  Ghazni  Road  his  objective  point, 
that  being  about  4  miles  distant  j  and  he  reached  this  without 
incident.  Just  after  it  had  been  passed,  however,  his  advance- 
guard,  which  consisted  of  a  troop  of  the  9th  Lancers  under 
Captain  Gough,  reported  the  enemy  in  sight  on  the  hills  in  front. 
It  soon  became  apparent  that  the  Afghans  had  thrown  themselves 
across  the  Argandeh  Road,  but  as  only  2,000  or  8,000  appeared 
in  sight,  it  was  thought  they  were  fugitives  flying  either  from 
General  Macpherson  or  General  Baker.  As  they  began  streaming 
down  from  the  hills  General  Massy  got  his  guns  into  action  at 
2,900  yards,  which  range,  at  Colonel  Gordon's  suggestion,  was 
changed  to  2,500,  and  2,000  yards,  the  guns  advancing  towards 
the  left  to  make  their  fire  more  effective.  After  a  few  shells  had 
been  fired,  the  enemy  showed  themselves  in  full  force  and  advanced 
in  skirmishing  order  upon  the  guns  and  cavalry.  Their  line  of 
advance  was  fully  two  miles  in  extent,  and  was  of  good  formation. 
There  were  about  4,000  men  thus  extended  in  the  shape  of  a 
crescent,  and  in  rear  of  them  was  an  irregular  body,  numbering 
6,000  more.  Thus  Mahomed  Jan's  force  was  found  to  be  10,000 
strong,  instead  of  5,000.  It  was  admirably  led,  and  boasted 
thirty  or  forty  standards,  mostly  common  red,  white,  or  green 
cloth  floating  at  the  end  of  a  rude  staff  12  or  18  feet  long. 
Though  the  shells  from  the  four  guns  were  pitched  into  the  thick 
of  the  enemy,  no  effect  was  produced  in  the  way  of  breaking  the 
line  of  advance.  It  never  wavered,  but  came  steadily  on  ;  and 
as  General  Massy  had  no  infantry  with  him,  he  was  obliged  to 
retire.  The  guns  changed  position  "  right  back,"  and  re-opened 
fire  at  1,700  yards.  Bullets  from  Snider  and  Enfield  rifles  began 
dropping  among  the  cavalry  and  the  gunners,  but  no  casualties 
of  any  moment  occurred.  Thirty  of  the  9th  Lancers  dismounted 
and  opened  fire  with  their  Martini  carbines,  but  the  enemy  were 
too  numerous  to  be    checked    by  so   small  a  body  of  men — a 


192  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

regiment  of  infantry  was  what  was  required.  While  the  artillery 
was  thus  in  action,  Sir  F.  Iloberts  and  Staff,  with  Sir  Michael 
Kennedy  and  party,  joined  General  Massy,  having  ridden  out  from 
Sherpur  to  watch  the  movements  of  the  brigade.  The  fire  from 
the  steadily-advancing  line  of  the  enemy  was  well  sustained,  and 
to  check  their  forward  movement  and  cover  the  retirement  of  the 
guns  the  cavalry  were  ordered  to  charge. 

When  General  Roberts  sent  instructions  to  General  Massy  to 
order  the  Lancers  to  charge,  as  the  enemy  were  approaching 
dangerously  near  to  the  guns.  Colonel  Cleland,  with  one  squadron 
of  the  9th  Lancers  (126  lances),  was  directly  in  face  of  the 
Afghan  line,  with  the  41  sowars  of  the  14th  Bengal  Lancers  in 
rear,  some  distance  nearer  the  guns.  The  other  troops  of  the 
9th  (44  lances)  under  Captain  Gough,  which  had  been  acting  as 
the  advance-guard,  were  away  on  General  Massy's  right  flank, 
watching  the  Afghans  in  that  direction.  When  the  charge  was 
sounded  Colonel  Cleland  led  his  squadron  straight  at  the  advanc- 
ing masses,  the  14th  Bengal  Lancers  following  in  his  wake,  but 
not  close  up,  as  the  order  to  charge  had  not  reached  them  so 
quickly.  Captain  Gough,  with  his  troop  of  the  9th,  seeing  his 
Colonel  charging,  also  took  his  men  into  action  on  the  enemy's 
left  flank.  Some  220  men  against  10,000  were  odds  that  could 
scarcely  be  expected  to  turn  in  our  favour ;  but  the  Lancers  had 
to  risk  a  heavy  loss  in  the  hope  of  saving  the  guns.  The  three 
bodies  of  men  disappeared  in  a  cloud  of  dust  as  they  headed  for 
the  masses  of  the  enemy,  and  nothing  could  be  seen  for  a  few 
moments  of  the  fight.  Then  riderless  horses  came  galloping 
back,  followed  by  scattered  parties  of  troopers,  evidently  quite  out 
of  hand.  They  had  been  received  with  a  terrific  fire,  which  had 
killed  many  horses  and  men,  and,  upon  trying  to  force  their  way 
through  the  enemy,  had  been  snnounded  and  their  progress 
blocked  by  sheer  weight  of  numbers.  Men  and  horses  went 
down  in  the  m^e,  and,  once  down,  there  was  but  a  faint  chance 
of  being  rescued.  In  one  or  two  instances,  however,  men  were 
dragged  from  under  their  dead  horses,  mounted  on  others,  and  got 
well  away  out  of  the  ruck.*    Even  among  Sir  F.  Roberts's  party 

•  The  Chaplain  of  the  Force,  the  Rev.  —  Adams,  was  recommended  for  the  Victoria 
Cross  for  extricating  one  man,  under  a  heavy  fire. 


Loss  of  General  Massy' s  Guns.  193 

watching  the  fight,  bnllets  fell  thickly,  killing  three  or  four  horses 
under  their  riders  and  wounding  others.  When  the  dust  cleared 
away,  it  was  seen  that  the  cavalry  charge  had  made  no  impression 
npon  the  enemy,  who  were  still  advancing  steadily  across  the  fields, 
waving  their  knives  and  tulwars,  and  carrying  their  banners  more 
proudly  than  ever.  Mounted  men  were  galloping  about  from 
end  to  end  of  their  line,  directing  their  movements  and  keeping 
them  well  together.  The  fire  from  their  Sniders  and  Enfields 
was  deliberate  and  well-directed ;  and  though  any  of  our  English 
regiments  would  with  their  Martinis  have  checked  them  in  a  few 
minutes,  the  broken  ranks  of  the  cavalry  could  not  hope  to  stand 
against  them.  The  9th  Lancers  had  suffered  terribly  in  the 
charge :  sixteen  of  their  troopers,  with  two  officers  (Lieutenants 
Hearsey  and  Bicardo),  had  been  left  on  the  ground,  dead ;  their 
colonel  had  come  out  badly  wounded  by  a  sword-cut,  and  a  shot 
through  the  side ;  Lieutenant  Stewart  Mackenzie  had  been 
d^abled  by  his  horse  rolling  over  him ;  and  seven  troopers  had 
received  wounds  more  or  less  severe.  It  was  Colonel  Cleland's 
squadron  which  was  so  shattered  in  this  charge.  This  squadron 
having  lost  its  officers,  and  being  broken  up  by  the  bad  ground, 
got  out  of  hand ;  but  Captain  Gough's  troop,  being  more  fortunate, 
served 'as  a  rallying  point;  while  the  14th  Bengal  Lancers,  not 
getting  well  into  the  enemy,  as  a  nullah  checked  them,  were  kept 
compactly  together.  The  rally  was  sounded,  and  Colonel 
Macgregor  and  other  officers  of  the  General's  party  collected  the 
Lancers  together,  while  the  guns  advanced  400  or  500  yards,  and 
re-opened  fire.  The  squadron  of  the  14th  Bengal  Lancers  had 
lost  but  one  officer.  Lieutenant  Forbes  (whose  body  is  still 
missing),  and  with  Captain  Gough's  troop  of  the  9th  were  able 
still  to  keep  between  the  guns  and  the  enemy,  now  only  1,000 
yards  off.  A  second  charge  of  these  two  troops,  together  with  all 
the  troopers  who  had  been  collected,  was  ordered,  but  it  was  made 
in  a  half-hearted  way,  the  country  being  of  extraordinary  difficulty 
for  horses,  and  the  enemy  swarming  behind  every  tree  and  the 
banks  of  the  higher  water-channels. 

As  Major  Smith-Windham  was  retiring  with  his  two  guns, 
which  had  been  advanced  after  the  first  charge,  he  found  one  of 
the  other  two  guns   stuck  firmly  in  a  watercourse,  Lieutenant 

o 


194  ^^  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

Hardy  trying  vainly  to  drag  it  out  with  suoh  horses  as  had  got  oyer* 
This  was  found  to  be  beyond  the  strength  of  the  horsesi  abready 
w(mi  out  by  the  severe  work  of  the  morning ;  and  as  the  enemy 
were  closing  around  on  both  sides  the  gun  was  spiked  and 
abandoned.  Lieutenant  Hardy  was  killed  by  a  shot  through  the 
head  while  near  this  gun.  The  other  three  guns  had  been  got 
400  or  600  yards  further  on  to  the  village  of  Baghwana,  but  were 
stopped  by  a  channel  deeper  and  steeper  than  any  yet  crossed. 
Guns,  meui  and  horses  floundered  into  this,  and  the  guns  at  least 
would  not  come  out  again  ;  they,  also,  were  spiked  and  left  in  the 
water  and  mud,  and  drivers  and  gunners  moved  off  with  the 
cavalry,  the  villagers  firing  rapidly  upon  them.  The  long  line  of 
the  enemy  came  straight  on,  passed  through  the  village,  shrieking 
and  waving  their  knives,  and  put  their  faces  towards  the  Nanuchi 
Kotal,  which  leads  from  the  Chardeh  Valley  to  the  Western  gate 
of  our  cantonments.  Sir  F.  Roberts,  with  a  small  escort,  had 
gone  across  country  towards  the  village  of  Dehmazung,  com- 
manding the  western  entrance  to  the  Cabul  gorge.  He  had  sent 
urgent  messages  to  General  Macpherson  to  hasten  down  the 
valley,  and  the  Brigadier  was  soon  engaged  with  2,000  men,  left 
behind  by  Mahomed  Jan  to  keep  him  in  play.  The  cavalry  fight 
had  been  watched  through  telescopes  by  several  officers  with 
General  Macpherson,  who  had  heard  the  artillery  fire.  Sending 
his  baggage  under  a  strong  guard  of  infantry,  and  a  squadron  of 
the  14th  Bengal  Lancers,  under  Colonel  Boss,  by  way  of  the  upper 
road  nearest  Eohistan,  General  Macpherson  marched  through  a 
break  in  the  hiUs  and  debouched  into  the  Chardeh  Valley.  The 
appearance  of  his  troops  away  in  their  rear  seems  to  have 
influenced  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  who  turned  off  from  the 
road  to  Sherpur,  and,  swinging  their  left  flank  round,  made  direct 
for  Dehmazung,  with  the  evident  intention  of  getting  into  the 
city,  and  occupying  the  Bala  Hissar  Heights  above  it.  General 
Boberts,  upon  seeing  the  new  movement,  sent  off  a  message  by 
his  aide-de-camp.  Captain  Pole-Carew,  to  Brigadier  Hugh  Gough, 
commanding  at  Sherpur,  ordering  200  men  of  the  72nd  High- 
landers to  double  out  to  the  gorge. 

After  the  se<K)nd  charge,  in  which  the  9th  Lancers  lost  several 
men  shot  down.  Captain  Gough's  troop  did  rear-guard  work,  dis- 


The  Enemy  held  in  Cfieck.  195 

mounting  and  firing,  so  as  to  hold  the  enemy  a  little  in  check.  Only 
snch  Lancers  as  were  wounded,  or  had  their  horses  disabled,  were 
sent  back  to  Sherpar,  by  way  of  the  Nanuchi  Eotal,  the  rest  escort- 
ing General  Boberts  to  Dehmazong.  Once  the  broken  squadron 
of  the  9th  were  got  together,  they  settled  down  resolutely  to  their 
work  of  keeping  the  enemy  in  play,  and  their  carbines  were  used 
with  good  effect  until  Dehmazung  was  reached.  Here  they  got 
cover,  and,  with  the  sowars  of  the  14th,  opened  a  smart  fire  upon 
Mahomed  Jan's  force  as  it  streamed  up  towards  Cabul.  Alone 
and  unaided  they  could  not  have  hoped  to  stem  the  rush,  and 
matters  were  at  a  crisis  when  Colonel  Brownlow,  with  the  200 
rifles  of  the  72nd  Highlanders,  arrived.  The  Highlanders  were 
in  the  nick  of  time  :  Colonel  Brownlow  doubled  out  a  company  to 
occupy  Dehmazung,  the  9th  cheering  them  lustily  as  they  saw  the 
welcome  relief,  and  soon  from  the  roofs  and  walls  of  the  village 
rapid  volleys  were  being  poured  into  the  A%han  ranks.  The 
enemy  streamed  down  upon  the  village  '^  like  ants  on  a  hill,**  as  a 
Highlander  described  it,  but  Colonel  Brownlow's  admirable 
disposition  of  his  handful  of  Highlanders  soon  checked  the  rush. 
The  men  were  told  not  to  throw  away  a  shot ;  the  Martinis  soon 
blazed  out  in  one  persistent  line  of  fire — ^and  such  a  fire,  that  even 
Ghazis  shrank  from  encountering  it. .  In  less  than  half  an  hour 
the  enemy  were  forced  back,  and  they  then  split  up  into  two 
parts — one  going  on  to  the  south,  to  Indikee  village,  and  thence 
scaling  the  Takht-i-Shah  Peak  and  the  heights  to  the  south  of 
the  Bala  Hissar  fortified'  ridge,  the  other  facing  round  to  the  west, 
as  if  to  get  upon  the  hills  south  of  Eila  Elazi.  Their  entrance  into 
Cabul  had  been  frustrated,  and  all  that  was  left  to  them  was  to 
raise  their  standards  on  the  hills  they  had  occupied  and  flourish 
their  knives  in  defiance  at  distant  Sherpur.  This  they  did,  as  we 
could  see  plainly  enough  through  our  binoculars. 

In  the  meantime  General  Macpherson  had  fallen  upon  a  large 
body  of  Afghans  higher  up  the  valley,  and  with  the  67th  Begiment 
and  the  8rd  Sikhs  had  completely  broken  their  ranks  and  pursued 
them  towards  Argandeh.  General  Macpherson  did  not  then  know 
of  the  loss  of  the  guns,  but  in  facing  round  towards  Cabul  he 
came  upon  the  scene  of  the  charge,  and  was  then  able  to  recover 
the  bodies  of  Lieutenants  Hearsey  and  Bicardo  and  of  the  troopers 

o  2 


196  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

killed  in  action.  His  own  loss  was  not  heavy,  Lieutenant  Cook  ot 
the  8rd  Sikhs  being  the  only  officer  wounded.  Sir  F.  Roberts 
remained  at  Dehmazung  until  Macpherson's  force  reached  it,  about 
nightfall ;  and  then,  leaving  the  Brigadier  with  his  men  encainped 
below  the  gorge,  where  Wali  Mahomed  had  a  camp  with  some 
mountain  guns  (he  was  preparing  to  start  for  Turkistan),  the 
Lieutenant-General  returned  to  Sherpur.  He  had  before  received 
the  news  that  the  guns  had  been  pulled  out  of  the  watercourses 
into  which  they  had  fallen,  and  were  on  their  way  to  cantonments. 
How  they  were  recovered,  well  deserves  telling. 

When  Sir  F.  Boberts  trotted  across  to  the  Cabul  gorge,  there 
were  Lancers,  gunners,  and  drivers,  making  their  way  towards 
Sherpur,  and  most  of  them  were  out  of  hand,  their  officers  having 
been  either  put  out  of  action  or  being  missing.  At  the  Nanuchi 
Eotal,  facing  the  western  end  of  Sherpur,  most  of  these  rallied 
about  Colonel  Macgregor,  Captain  Dean  also  having  gathered 
some  stragglers  together.  When  the  enemy  veered  off  towards 
Dehmazung,  Colonel  Macgregor  saw  that  the  village  of  Baghwana, 
near  where  the  guns  were  lying,  was  not  guarded  by  any  of 
Mahomed  Jan's  rear  guard,  and  he  thought  there  might  be  a 
chance  of  recovering  the  guns  without  waiting  for  General  Mac- 
pherson's  advance.  With  a  scratch  lot  of  Lancers  and  Artillery- 
men, he  accordingly  followed  the  upper  Argandeh  Boad;  and, 
beyond  stray  shots  from  villagers  (who,  as  on  October  8th,  blazed 
at  us  whenever  we  were  within  range),  the  party  met  with  no 
opposition.  The  baggage  of  Macphcrson's  brigade  was  met 
making  its  way  to  Sherpur;  and  as  the  enemy  were  then  well  on 
their  way  to  Indikee,  Colonel  Macgregor  took  thirty  men  of  the 
67th,  and  about  the  same  number  of  Sikhs  and  Ghoorkas — sixty 
in  all — and,  extending  them  in  skirmishing  order,  made  for  the 
abandoned  guns.  On  arriving  at  the  village  he  placed  his  men  in 
an  enclosure  well  adapted  for  defence  against  any  numbers ;  and 
such  artillerymen  as  were  with  him  set  to  work  to  get  out  the 
guns.  This  was  done  after  a  long  struggle,  and  then  it  was  found 
that  teams  sufficient  only  to  give  four  horses  per  gun  were  present. 
The  rest  had  galloped  into  Sherpur  with  their  officer,  Major 
Smith- Windham.  With  no  artillery  officer,  but  with  the  Chief  of 
the  Staff,  rests  the  credit  of  recapturing  the  guns.     Colonel  Boss 


Anxiety  at  SJierpur,  197 

was  told  to  bring  them  safely  into  camp  with  the  baggage  escort 
and  the  scratch  gathering  of  mounted  men,  and  this  he  did. 

Oar  losses  in  the  day's  action,  so  far  as  the  R.H.A.  and  the 
cavalry  are  concerned,  are  four  officers  killed,  two  wounded,  and 
twenty-three  men  killed  and  ten  woonded.  The  officers  killed 
and  wounded  were  well  to  the  front  in  the  desperate  charge  their 
squadrons  made  upon  the  unbroken  masses  of  infantry,  and  most 
of  them  were  hit  by  the  volley  which  the  enemy  poured  into 
them  as  they  got  to  close  quarters.  Colonel  Cleland,  in  spite  of 
his  two  wounds,  was  helped  into  the  saddle  and  rode  eight  miles 
to  Sherpur,  fainting  as  he  was  lifted  from  his  horse  into  a  dhoolie 
at  the  gate.  The  bodies  of  those  killed  were  brought  in,  and,  I 
am  sorry  to  say,  they  had  been  fearfully  mutilated.  The  passions 
of  our  men  are  likely  to  be  dangerously  aroused  in  future  fighting 
by  the  remembrance  of  these  mutilations,  which  will  not  bear 
description. 

In  Sherpur,  an  anxious  afternoon  was  passed.  When  stragglers 
from  the  9th  Lancers  and  F-A  battery  rode  in,  wounded,  mud- 
splashed,  and  many  without  lances  or  swords,  it  was  known  that 
a  serious  action  had  taken  place,  and  all  troops  in  the  cantonment 
were  ordered  to  stand  to  their  arms.  Major  Smith- Windham, 
with  half  a  dozen  drivers  of  F-A  battery,  was  the  first  officer  to 
arrive ;  and  when  no  guns  followed  him,  and  he  reported  them 
''  spiked  and  abandoned,"  and  the  enemy  advancing  towards 
Sherpur  in  overwhelming  force,  the  anxiety  of  Brigadier  Hugh 
Gongh  was  greatly  increased.  No  gunner  would  leave  his  guns 
if  there  were  a  chance  of  recovering  them,  and  they  were  given  up 
for  lost.  The  western  wall  of  the  cantonments  was  manned  by 
150  of  the  8rd  Sikhs.  At  its  northern  end,  where  there  is  a  gap 
between  it  and  the  Bemaru  hills  defended  by  a  shelter  trench, 
wire  entanglements  were  laid  down  from  the  foot  of  the  hill  to 
the  end  of  the  wall.  All  the  gates  were  occupied  by  small 
detachments  of  infantry,  and  the  two  remaining  Horse  Artillery 
guns  were  placed  upon  the  Bemam  Heights  facing  towards  the 
Nanuchi  Eotal  leading  to  Chardeh.  If  an  attack  were  really 
about  to  be  made,  it  would  be  sharp  work  defending  the  three 
miles  of  walls  enclosing  the  cantonments,  as  less  than  1,000  men 
were  available  for  the  duty;  but  the  news  that  Mahomed  Jan 


198  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

with  his  10,000  followers  had  turaed  off  towards  the  Cahul  gorge 
dissipated  the  anxiety  felt ;  and  when,  later,  the  fire  of  the  72nd 
Highlanders  was  heard  at  Dehmaznng  and  then  died  away,  every- 
one knew  Sherpnr  was  safe.  It  was  ticklish  work  for  the  time 
being  ;  but  Brigadier  Gongh  made  his  arrangements  quietly, 
and  without  listening  to  any  absurd  suggestions.  As  a  pre- 
cautionary measure,  a  heliogram  was  sent  to  Colonel  Jenkins, 
commanding  the  Guides,  who  had  reached  Luttabund  from  Sei 
Baba  in  the  morning  :  he  was  ordered  to  come  in  with  his  cavalry 
and  infantry,  without  baggage.  At  seven  o'clock  we  heard  he  was 
at  Butkhak,  and  as  I  am  writing  (at  midnight)  his  corps  is  march- 
ing in  over  700  strong — 200  more  will  arrive  to-morrow  with  the 
baggage.  Sir  F.  Boberts,  after  sending  up  200  of  the  72nd  High- 
landers to  reinforce  the  picquet  on  the  Bala  Hissar  Heights,  rode 
into  cantonments,  within  the  walls  of  which  all  is  made  snug  for 
the  night.  The  reinforcement  to  the  picquet  was  caused  by  the 
belief  that  Mahomed  Jan  would  attempt  to  occupy  the  heights 
'commanding  the  Bala  Hissar  and  Cabul,  and  there  is  no  doubt 
this  was  his  intention.  Since  seven  o'clock  the  picquet  has  been 
assailed  on  all  sides,  and  even  now  the  circle  of  fire  shows  where 
the  250  British  soldiers  are  holding  their  own. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

Attempt  to  storm  the  Takht-i-Shah  Peak — Natural  Strength  of  the  Position — ^Heliograms 
exchanged  with  General  Baker— Failure  to  take  the  Peak— Casualties — ^The  New 
Flan  of  Attack — ^The  Action  of  the  13th  of  Deoember — Storming  of  the  Beni 
Hissar  Ridge  by  the  92  Highlanders  and  the  Guides — The  Cavalry  Charges  in  the 
Plain — Death  of  Captain  Butson — ^The  Position  of  Affiurs  at  Nightfall — Reinforce- 
ments from  Kohistan — ^The  Action  of  December  14th — Storming  of  the  Asmai 
Heights — Retreat  of  the  Safis — Captain  Yonsden's  Charge — Counter- Attack  by  the 
Enemy  from  Indikee — Death  of  Captain  Spens,  and  Retirement  from  the  Cnncal 
Hill — Loss  of  Two  Mountain  Guns — ^Withdrawal  of  all  Troops  from  the  Asmai  and 
Sherderwiiia  Heights — ^The  State  of  the  Sherpur  Defences — Total  Oasualtiefl. 

Sherpue,  Vlih  December,  midnight. 
I  LEFT  Mahomed  Jan  and  his  followers  in  possession  of  the  hills 
to  the  south  of  the  Sherderwaza  Heights,  with  a  part  of  General 


Mahomed  Jan  Overlooking  Cabul.  199 

Macpherson's  brigade  on  the  latter^  ready  to  attack  him.  To-day  a 
party  of  560  men,  made  np  in  nearly  equal  proportions  from  the 
67th  Foot,  72nd  Highlanders,  8rd  Sikhs,  and  6th  Ghoorkas,  aided 
by  two  guns  of  Morgan's  mountain  battery,  have  made  that  attack, 
and  have  established  themselves  on  a  lower  hill  between  the 
Sherderwaza  Heights  and  the  high  conical  peak  of  Takht-i-Shah, 
whereon  the  enemy  muster  in  great  force  and  have  sixteen 
standards  flying.  This  peak  is  the  highest  of  the  clump  of 
mountains  south  of  Cabul  and  lying  between  the  city  and  Charasia, 
and  was  the  point  whence  Captain  Straton  tried  to  heliograph  to 
the  Shutargardan  in  the  early  days  of  our  occupation.  It  is  cone- 
shaped,  looked  at  from  Sherpur,  and  on  its  southern  side  joins  a 
ridge  running  southwards  above  the  village  of  Indikee.  The  sides 
fSeuiing  Cabul  are  very  steep,  and  covered  with  huge  boulders 
polished  by  wind  and  rain,  and  of  a  kind  to  check  any  storming 
party.  Perfect  cover  is  afforded  to  men  holding  it,  and  on  the 
summit  is  a  well-built  sungar  of  great  thiclmess,  covering  a 
natural  cavity  in  the  rocks  which  has  been  made  bomb-proof  by 
some  Afghan  engineer,  who  understood  the  strength  of  the  point. 
Fifty  men  could  lie  in  perfect  security  behind  the  sungar  or  in  the 
hole  below  it,  and  could  choose  their  own  time  for  firing  at  an 
advancing  enemy.  Outside  the  mngaVy  and  a  little  lower  down,  is 
a  cave,  wherein  another  strong  body  of  men  could  hide  themselves 
and  act  in  a  similar  way,  while  their  flank  to  the  left  would  be 
guarded  by  a  broken  line  of  rocks  extending  down  to  the  kotal, 
where  the  Bala  Hissar  Ridge  meets  them.  Just  between  the  two 
ranges  is  a  low,  dome-shaped  hill,  blockiug  up  the  otherwise  open 
kotal ;  and  round  this  a  footpath  winds,  leading  to  the  mngar, 
but  so  narrow  as  only  to  admit  of  men  going  up  in  Indian  file. 
The  enemy  occupied  this  morning  the  Takht-i-Shah  Peak  and  the 
line  of  rocks  I  have  mentioned,  and  had  also  a  few  score  of  men  on 
the  lower  hill  in  the  kotal.  Away  on  the  south,  hidden  from  our 
view,  were  some  6,000  or  6,000  men,  waiting  for  an  attack  to 
develop,  in  order  to  reinforce  the  peak.  At  eight  o'clock  our  guns 
opened  fire  from  the  picquet  on  the  ridge.  There  were  then  only 
seven  standards  on  the  peak,  but  during  the  day  nine  others  were 
brought  up ;  and  the  long  ridge,  stretching  downwards  to  Beni 
Hissar,  was  lined  with  men.     These  were,  by  the  contour  of  the 


200  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

ground,  safe  from  our  shells,  and  they  quietly  watched  the  guns 
all  day.  From  eight  o'clock  until  evening  Captain  Morgan  fired 
shell  after  shell  into  the  mngar  and  the  rocks  below.  The  enemy 
were  of  quite  a  different  order  to  those  we  have  hitherto  had  to 
deal  with.  They  stood  up  boldly  to  their  flags,  and  waved  their 
rifles  and  knives  in  derision  at  each  shot.  We  could  not  spare 
more  infantry  for  the  attack,  as  we  had  to  protect  Sherpur,  which, 
we  learnt,  was  to  be  attacked  by  Eohistanis  from  over  the  Paen 
Minar  Kotal,  north  of  the  lake.  The  city,  too,  was  known  to  be 
in  a  ferment,  and  a  demonstration  might  at  any  time  be  made 
from  it  against  our  cantonment.  General  Baker  with  his  flying 
column  was  still  absent,  and  our  object  was  rather  to  hold  the 
main  body  of  Mahomed  Jan's  force  in  check,  than  try  to  disperse 
them  with  560  men.  At  nine  o'clock  heliographic  communication 
was  opened  with  General  Baker,  then  on  the  Argandeh  Kotal. 
He  reported  that  his  rear-guard  had  been  harassed  for  the  last  two 
days,  and  that  the  hills  in  all  directions  were  lined  with  tribesmen. 
He  was  ordered  to  march  without  delay  to  Sherpur,  and  it  was 
hoped  at  first  that  he  would  arrive  in  time  to  assist  General 
Macpherson  in  attacking  the  enemy's  position.  As  he  had  to 
march  fourteen  miles  with  his  rear-guard  engaged  from  time  to 
time,  he  did  not  reach  Sherpur  until  evening,  so  his  troops,  foot- 
sore and  tired,  were  not  available. 

After  several  hours'  shelling  of  the  Takht-i-Shah  Peak,  the  67th, 
the  Highlanders,  Sikhs,  and  Ghoorkas  made  their  attack ;  and,  in 
spite  of  the  stubbornness  with  which  the  Afghans  fought,  estab- 
lished themselves  on  the  low  hill  on  the  kotal.  They  tried  to 
work  upwards  to  the  sungar ;  but  the  fire  of  the  Afghans  was  so 
true  and  sustained,  that  the  attempt  had  to  be  given  up.  Our 
men  also  ran  short  of  ammunition,  and  they  contented  themselves 
finally  with  holding  the  position  captured,  so  as  to  be  able  to 
co-operate  on  the  morrow  with  any  force  sent  out  from  Sherpur 
to  attack  by  way  of  Beni  Hissar  on  the  enemy's  flank.  Our 
casualties  included  Major  Cook,  Y.C,  6th  Ghoorkas,  shot  below 
the  knee ;  Lieutenant  Fasken,  8rd  Sikhs,  bullet  wound  in  both 
thighs ;  and  Lieutenant  Fergusson,  72nd  Highlanders,  seriously 
wounded  in  the  face.  The  enemy  this  evening  still  hold  the 
Takht-i-Shah  Peak  in  strength,  and  large  reinforcements  are  said 


I)- 


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I. 


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Storming  the  Afghan  Position.  201 

to  have  joined  them  from  Logar,  the  Ghilzais  from  that  district 
being  up  in  arms.  It  has  been  decided  to-night  to  send  a  brigade, 
under  Oeneral  Baker,  to  attack  the  peak  from  Beni  Hissar  village 
to-morrow  at  the  same  time  that  Colonel  Money,  of  the  3rd  Sikhs, 
moves  up  another  force  from  the  hill  on  the  kotoX. 


\%i}i  December,  evening. 

To-day  the  Takht-i-Shah  Peak  has  been  carried,  and  a  strong 
picquet  now  holds  it.  The  action  has  been  a  great  success,  but 
there  are  still  large  bodies  of  the  enemy  above  Indikee ;  and  as 
they  may  try  to  regain  the  position.  General  Macpherson  has 
abandoned  Dehmazung  altogether,  and  posted  his  brigade  on  the 
Sherderwaza  Heights.  At  eight  o'clock  this  morning  General 
Baker  left  cantonments  with  the  following  troops : — 

G-3,  Boyal  Artillery,  four  guns ; 
No.  2  Mountain  Battery,  four  guns ; 
92nd  Highlanders  (six  conipanies) ; 
Guides'  Infantry  (seven  companies) ; 
Srd  Sikhs  (wing  of  800  men) ; 
6th  Punjab  Cavalry. 

General  Baker  took  the  road  past  the  Bala  Hissar,  and,  upon 
debouching  into  the  plain  north  of  Beni  Hissar,  found  the  enemy 
posted  in  force  all  along  the  ridge  in  front,  leading  down  from  the 
Takht-i-Shah  Peak.  Beni  Hissar  was  also  full  of  Afghans,  and 
in  the  fields  about  it  were  detached  parties.  These,  seeing  our 
force  advancing,  began  to  stream  towards  the  ridge,  and  the 
original  plan  of  attack  was  so  far  modified  that,  instead  of  work- 
ing round  through  Beni  Hissar  village,  the  Highlanders  and 
Guides  were  sent  straight  across  some  marshy  ground  at  the 
ridge.  The  object  in  view  was  to  cut  the  enemy's  line  in  two,  and 
it  was  attained  most  si^ccessfully.  Our  eight  guns  opened  fire  at 
1,400  yards  upon  the  masses  of  Afghans  on  the  ridge,  and  the 
shells  kept  under  the  musketry  fire  opened  upon  our  infantry. 
The  Srd  Sikhs  protected  General  Baker's  left  flank,  while  the 
cavalry  aided  in  keeping  the  scattered  parties  about  Beni  Hissar 
in  check.    Nothing  could  be  finer  than  the  advance  of  the  92nd 


202  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

and  the  Guides ;  they  reached  the  slope  of  the  hill,  and  opened 
fire  upon  the  enemy,  one  continued  roU  of  musketry  being  heard 
as  they  pushed  upwards.  They  gained  the  crest,  and  the  Afghan 
line  was  severed,  about  2,000  being  left  about  Beni  Hissar  while 
the  assault  was  made  upon  the  peak.  The  rapid  fire  from  our 
breech-loaders  swept  away  such  of  the  enemy  as  stood  firm,  while 
the  bayonet  made  short  work  of  the  ghazis  who  defended  the 
standards.  At  some  points  twenty  and  thirty  bodies  were  found 
lying  piled  together,  shot  through  and  through  by  Martini  and 
Snider  bullets,  showing  how  well  the  yoUeys  had  told.  In  a  very 
short  time  the  majority  opposed  to  the  storming  party  had  broken 
and  fled.  A  few  ghazis  fought  desperately,  but  upwards  went  the 
Highlanders  in  the  same  gallant  style  they  had  shown  at  Gharasia, 
and  under  the  same  leader.  Major  White.  The  Guides,  under 
Colonel  Jenkins,  were  equally  eager,  this  being  their  first  chance 
in  the  campaign,  and  they  shared  with  the  92nd  the  honour  of 
scattering  the  defenders  of  the  ridge.  One  young  Highland  officer 
fell  a  yictim  to  that  uncabulating  courage  which  becomes  rashness 
when  pushed  to  extremes.  Lieutenant  Forbes,  with  only  a  few 
men,  scaled  the  ridge,  and  got  detached  from  the  regiment  which 
was  toiling  up  as  fast  as  the  men  with  their  heavy  load  of  rifles 
and  ammunition  could  climb.  He  was  left  at  last  with  only 
Colour-Sergeant  Drummond,  an  old  twenty-one  years'  man,  and  a 
band  of  ghazis  turned  back  and  attacked  him.  The  Sergeant  was 
shot  down,  and  Lieutenant  Forbes  rushed  forward  to  save  his  body 
from  mutilation.  After  cutting  down  a  ghazi  he  was  overpowered 
and  killed  before  the  Highlanders  could  save  him.  Not  a  man  of 
the  ghazis  who  had  turned  back  escaped :  they  were  shot  and 
bayoneted  on  the  rocks.  As  the  attacking  party  neared  the  Takht- 
i-Shah  Peak  the  Afghans  deserted  it ;  and  when  a  party  of  the 
72nd  Highlanders  and  5th  Ghoorkas  from  the  Bala  Hissar  side 
reached  the  sungar,  they  found  the  flags  still  flying,  but  no  one 
guarding  them.  The  position  had  been  captured  in  about  two 
hours,  and  as  the  mid-day  gun  was  fired  in  Sherpur,  the  heliograph 
flashed  from  the  sungar,  and  the  peak  was  known  to  be  ours. 
Some  of  the  enemy  ventured  too  near  the  Chardeh  plain  in  their 
retreat,  and  a  squadron  of  the  14th  Bengal  Lancers  charged 
among  them,  killing  between  twenty  and  thirty. 


A  Brilliant  Charge.  203 

While  the  Highlanders  and  Guides  were  storming  the  ridge,  an 
attack  had  been  attempted  from  Beni  Hissar  upon  General 
Baker's  left  flank,  but  the  8rd  Sikhs  drove  back  the  enemy,  who 
began  to  move  round  towards  Siah  Sung,  and  eventually  cdlected 
in  force  upon  these  hills.  They  were  shelled  by  our  guns,  and 
the  6th  Punjab  Cavalry  were  reinforced  by  two  squadrons  of  the 
9th  Lancers,  a  squadron  of  the  14th  Bengal  Lancers,  and  the 
Guides'  Cavalry.  Wherever  the  ground  was  good,  our  sowars  and 
Lancers  charged  and  did  great  execution.  The  Afghans  fought 
bravely,  forming  up  to  receive  the  cavalry  with  a  steadiness  that 
trained  infantry  would  not  have  surpassed,  and  reserving  their  fire 
until  the  horses  were  close  upon  them.  One  brilliant  charge  by 
the  9th  Lancers  cost  that  regiment  one  officer  killed  and  two 
wounded,  besides  the  loss  of  several  troopers.  Captain  Butson 
and  Captain  Chisholme,  at  the  head  of  their  respective  squadrons, 
swept  down  upon  500  or  600  men,  taking  them  on  the  right  and 
left  flank.  Captain  Butson  turned  in  his  saddle  as  he  faced  the 
enemy,  and  cried  out : — '*  Now,  men,  at  them  for  the  honour  of 
the  old  9th,"  and  the  next  moment  he  fell  dead,  shot  through  the 
heart.  He  was  in  command  of  the  regiment,  the  afiiair  of  the 
11th  having  sadly  thinned  the  ranks  of  the  officers,  and  his  death 
is  universally  regretted.  Captain  Chisholme  was  shot  through 
the  leg,  the  flash  of  the  rifle  burning  his  clothes,  so  steadily  had 
the  Afghan  in  front  of  him  waited  before  discharging  his  piece. 
Lieutenant  Trower  was  also  slightly  wounded,  while  the  Sergeant- 
Major  and  three  troopers  were  killed  and  seven  wounded.  The 
Lancers  rode  through  and  through  the  Afghans  opposed  to  them, 
and  scattered  them  all  over  the  plain.  The  5th  Punjab  Cavalry 
also  made  a  successful  charge,  and  the  Guides  twice  got  well 
among  the  fugitives.  Their  second  charge  was  upon  a  body  of 
Kohistanis,  who  had  crossed  the  plain  east  of  Bemaru  and  made 
for  Siah  Sung  with  the  intention  of  joining  Mahomed  Jan.  They 
were  shelled  from  the  eastern  end  of  the  Bemaru  Heights ;  and, 
upon  seeing  General  Baker's  force  engaged,  halted  irresolutely 
near  Siah  Sung.  They  tried  to  retrace  their  steps,  but  were 
suddenly  charged  down  upon  by  the  Guides,  who  had  waited  for 
them  behind  the  northern  slopes  of  Siah  Sung.  Sixty  are  said  to 
have  been  killed  in  this  charge  alone,  the  Guides  chasing  them  as 


204  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

far  as  the  Logar  river,  where  the  swampy  ground  checked  the 
cavalry.  Altogether  the  day's  fighting  has  been  a  wonderfal 
success ;  and  though  our  casualties  are  eleven  killed  and  forty- 
three  wounded,  the  enemy's  loss  in  killed  alone  must  have  been 
between  200  and  300.  160  of  the  5th  Punjab  Infantry,  sent  out  to 
reinforce  General  Baker,  came  upon  a  large  party  of  Afghans 
marching  down  the  Bala  Hissar  Bead.  They  were  at  first  mis- 
taken for  Highlanders ;  but  when  they  fired  a  volley  at  the  officer 
who  rode  up  to  speak  to  them,  the  mistake  was  soon  apparent. 
The  Punjabees  at  once  extended  themselves  in  skirmishing  order 
among  the  willow  plantations  on  each  side  of  the  road,  and  opened 
a  rapid  fire.  The  Afghans  faced  about  and  made  for  the  Bala 
Hissar,  but  a  company  of  the  5th  cut  off  half  their  number,  and 
in  a  hand-to-hand  fight  killed  forty.  These  men,  who  are  believed 
to  have  been  from  the  city,  were  really  run  to  earth,  and  were  so 
exhausted  that  they  could  scarcely  use  their  knives. 

One  feature  of  the  day's  fighting  has  been  the  attitude  of  the 
villagers  about  Cabul.  A  straggler  from  the  92nd  Highlanders 
was  found  cut  up  between  Sherpur  and  the  Cabul  river ;  officers 
riding  alone  have  been  fired  at,  and  pelted  with  stones ;  and  two 
villages  on  either  side  of  the  road  to  Beni  Hissar  opened  a  heavy 
fire  upon  our  troops.  General  Baker  halted  on  his  way  back  to 
cantonments  to  burn  these  villages  as  a  reward  for  their  treachery. 
The  lives  of  the  men  in  one  were  spared  on  condition  that  they 
fired  the  other,  the  gates  of  which  could  not  be  forced  open  by 
our  guns.  The  defenders  were  shot  as  they  tried  to  escape  from 
the  ruins.  From  the  Bala  Hissar  and  near  the  city  shots  were 
fired,  and  the  flanking  parties  of  the  92nd,  in  their  homeward 
march,  came  upon  200  or  800  men  in  the  willow  plantations,  who 
fled  towards  the  city  walls.  A  convoy  of  wounded  sent  from  the 
Sherderwaza  Heights  to  Sherpur  had  also  a  narrow  escape,  the 
bravery  of  the  non-commissioned  officer  in  charge  of  the  escort 
alone  preventing  a  catastrophe  on  a  small  scale.  After  General 
Baker  had  captured  the  Takht-i-Shah  Peak,  a  number  of  dhoolies, 
containing  officers  and  men  wounded  on  the  11th  and  12  th  on 
the  Sherderwaza  Heights,  were  sent  down  the  hill  to  Sherpur. 
Sergeant  Cox,  with  twenty  men  of  the  72nd,  was  in  charge  of  the 
dhooliee,  and  among  the  wounded  were  Major  Cook,  Y.C,  6th 


splendid  Behaviour  of  a  Non-commissioned  Officer.  205 

Ghoorkas ;  Lieutenant  Fergnsson,  72nd  Highlanders ;  and  Lien- 
tenant  Fasken,  8rd  Sikhs.  Upon  arriving  at  the  foot  of  the  hill, 
the  road  leading  under  the  southern  wall  of  the  Bala  Hissar  was 
followed,  and  it  was  soon  seen  that  parties  of  armed  men  were 
lining  the  parapets.  Sergeant  Gox,  fearing  to  draw  the  fire  hy 
striking  across  the  fields  towards  Beni  Hissar,  where  Oeneral 
Baker  was  shelling  some  villages,  put  on  a  bold  face,  and  marched 
on  steadily.  This  had  the  best  effect,  as  not  a  shot  was  fired  from 
the  walls.  Ten  Highlanders  were  at  the  head  of  the  dhoolies,  and 
ten  in  rear.  Just  as  the  little  party  got  near  the  Bala  Hissar 
gate  a  large  body  of  Afghans  sprang  out  from  among  the  willows 
lining  eiUier  side  of  the  road,  and,  drawing  their  knives,  came 
straight  upon  the  advance-guard.  The  road  from  Beni  Hissar 
joins  the  road  to  Sherpur  just  at  this  point,  and  seeing  that  it 
would  be  impossible  to  cut  through  the  enemy,  or  to  retreat  the 
way  he  had  come  (as  in  the  latter  case  the  men  on  the  walls 
would  probably  open  fire).  Sergeant  Cox  pushed  on,  ordering  his 
men  to  reserve  their  fire.  His  object  was  to  get  the  dhooliea 
fairly  on  the  Beni  Hissar  Boad  on  his  right,  and  then  to  ML  back 
until  help  should  come  from  that  qtiarter.  The  manoeuvre  suc- 
ceeded admirably.  Waiting  until  he  was  within  twenty  yards  of 
the  Afghans,  he  ordered  the  ten  men  with  him  to  fire  a  volley. 
This  was  too  much  for  the  enemy,  who  broke  and  took  cover  in  the 
trees.  The  dhoolie-hesixerB  thought  all  was  over,  and  those  carry- 
ing Major  Cook  dropped  their  dhoolie  in  the  middle  of  the  road. 
They  were  about  to  run,  when  Sergeant  Cox  threatened  to  shoot 
them  down  unless  they  did  their  duty.  They  soon  recovered 
courage,  and  while  rapid  volleys  from  the  advance-guard  kept  the 
Afghans  in  check,  all  the  dhoolies  were  got  safely  upon  the  Beni 
Hissar  Bead,  and  finally  reached  General  Baker's  force  in  safety. 
Sergeant  Cox  managed  the  whole  business  splendidly,  and  under 
such  leadership  the  men  were  cool  and  collected,  skirmishing  and 
retiring  without  being  touched  by  the  scattered  fire  directed  at 
them.  After  waiting  an  hour,  the  escort  was  strengthened  by 
some  cavalry,  and  the  little  convoy  of  wounded  reached  cantonments 
in  safety.  The  position  in  which  Sergeant  Cox  was  placed  was  a 
most  dangerous  one,  as  the  least  hesitation  or  want  of  decision 
would  have  been  fatal:   the  Afghans  were,  indeed,  so  sure  of 


2o6  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

suocess,  that  they  did  not  fire  at  first,  but  trusted  to  cutting  up 
the  guard  at  close  quarters  with  their  knives.  The  three  officers, 
whose  lives  were  saved  by  Sergeant  Cox's  steadiness,  reported  the 
incident  to  Colonel  Money,  who  had  sent  the  dlioolies  down  the  hill. 
Sergeant  Cox  was  one  of  the  men  decorated  with  the  distinguished 
service  medal  on  December  8th  for  gallantry  at  the  Peiwar  Eotal. 
General  Baker's  force  is  now  safely  in  quarters  again.  Oeneral  Mac- 
pherson  has  sent  back  to  Sherpur  the  72nd  Highlanders  and  the 
8rd  Sikhs,  and,  with  the  67th  Foot  and  the  5th  Ghoorkas,  holds 
the  Bala  Hissar  Heights  and  the  Takht-i-Shah  Peak.  The  enemy 
are  still  in  force  above  Indikee  and  at  Dehmazung,  which  com- 
mands the  Cabul  gorge,  and  the  road  into  the  city  has  been 
abandoned.  They  may  try  to  work  round  in  that  direction — ^that 
is,  if  to-day's  defeat  has  not  disheartened  them.  This  evening  a 
party  of  Eohistanis  have  come  over  the  Surkh  Eotal,  and  are 
bivouacking  on  a  hill  a  mile  and  a  half  west  of  Sherpur.  These 
are  the  reinforcements  sent  by  Mir  Butcha,  who  has  no  doubt 
heard  of  the  success  of  Mahomed  Jan  on  the  11th.  The  casualties 
to-day  were  eleven  killed  (two  officers)  and  forty-three  wounded. 
Of  these  the  92nd  lost  one  officer  and  two  men  killed  and  nineteen 
wounded.    The  Guides  had  three  killed  and  eight  wounded. 


ISth  December. 

Yesterday  the  severest  fighting  we  have  yet  gone  through  took 
place  on  the  Asmai  Heights  above  Deh-i-Afghan,  and  a  lower 
conical  hill  adjoining  them  on  the  north.  The  enemy  have 
been  so  largely  reinforced,  that  their  numbers  are  estimated  at 
40,000,  and  they  have  shown  a  recklessness  in  sacrificing  life 
which  has  hitherto  been  considered  quite  foreign  to  the  Afghan 
character.  There  must  be  many  ghazis  in  their  ranks  from  what 
we  have  seen  to-day,  and  these  fanatics  always  show  a  contempt 
for  danger  which  makes  them  formidable  enemies.  They  sacrifice 
their  lives,  satisfied  if,  before  death,  they  have  killed  a  Eafir,  and 
so  secured  a  future  reward.  Our  own  losses  have  been  heavy,  and 
for  the  first  time  our  men  have  had  to  retire  before  the  enemy, 
who  are  wonderfully  elated  at  their  success.  It  is  true  it  was  but 
an  isolated  case  of  a  handful  of  men  having  to  meet  5,000 ;  but 


io,ooo  Men  above  Sherpur.  207 

with  the  eyacnation  of  the  position  oar  men  were  holding,  we 
lost  two  mountain  gans,  which  Mahomed  Jan  is  sure  to  make  the 
most  of  as  trophies,  if  he  does  not  tarn  them  against  as.  To  give 
in  detail  the  incidents  of  yesterday : — ^Between  seven  and  eight 
o'clock  in  the  morning  some  thousands  of  men  were  seen  gathering 
on  the  slopes  above  Deh-i- Afghan,  a  suburb  of  Gabul  lying  north- 
west of  the  city  upon  a  low  eminence,  which  overlooks  Timour's 
tomb.  The  evacuation  of  Dehmazung  had,  of  course,  given  free 
passage  to  such  of  the  enemy  as  wished  to  pass  into  Cabul  and  the 
Bala  Hissar,  and  these  now  poured  out  by  way  of  Deh-i- Afghan 
and  manned  the  heights.  The  usual  standards  were  carried,  and 
in  a  very  short  time  the  sky-line  was  alive  with  men,  until  there 
must  have  been  8,000  or  10,000  looking  down  upon  Sherpur  and 
within  range  of  our  guns.  The  array  extended  upwards  from  the 
suburbs,  along  the  crest  of  the  Asmai  Bidge,  down  the  dip  to  the 
north,  and  over  the  conical  hill  I  have  mentioned ;  while,  again, 
further  to  the  north,  was  a  higher  lumpy  hill,  on  which  were  a 
number  of  Eohistanis,  who  had  bivouacked  there  the  previous 
night.  General  Baker  was  ordered  to  clear  the  hills,  and  for  this 
purpose  he  took  out  the  following  troops : — 

Four  guns  G-3,  Royal  Artillery ; 

Four  guns  No.  2  Mountain  Battery  ; 

14th  Bengal  Lancers ; 

72nd  Highlanders  (225  men)  ; 

92nd  Highlanders  (45  men  under  Captain  Gordon,  who  fell 
in  with  the  72nd,  as  the  six  companies  of  the  latter  were  so 
weak) ; 

Guides'  Infantry  (460  sepoys) ; 

5th  Punjab  Infantry  (470  sepoys). 

This  gave  a  total  of  1,200  bayonets  and  eight  guns.  The  cavalry 
were  employed  in  the  open  to  keep  in  check,  or  cut  up,  stray 
bodies  of  tiie  enemy.  General  Baker  left  cantonments  by  the 
head-quarters'  gate  in  the  western  wall,  and  made  straight  towards 
a  mound  near  Kila  Buland,  a  mile  and  a  half  away,  facing  the 
conical  hill,  on  either  side  of  which  were  roads  leading  into  the 
Chardeh  Valley  beyond.  He  got  his  guns  into  action  at  once,  in 
order  to  clear  the  way  for  the  infantry  attack,  and  sent  his  cavalry 


2o8  The  Afghan  War^  1879—80. 

ronnd  on  his  right  flank  towards  the  Chardeh  Valley  to  recon- 
noitre in  that  direction.  The  Gnides*  Cavalry  were  ordered  out 
to  reinforce  the  14th  Bengal  Lancers,  and  were  fired  at  several 
times  from  walled  enclosures  just  over  the  Nanuchi  Kotal.  The 
mountain  guns  drew  off  to  a  low  ridge  on  which  stood  the  ruins 
of  a  fort,  Kila  Buland,  and  shelled  such  bodies  of  men  as  were 
visible  in  the  direction  the  cavalry  had  taken.  The  party  told 
off  to  take  the  heights  were  the  Highlanders,  under  Colonel 
Brownlow,  and  Guides'  Infantry,  the  6th  Punjabees  being  held 
in  reserve  near  the  guns.  The  low,  conical  hill  was  captured 
without  much  trouble,  but  there  then  remained  for  Colonel  Jenkins, 
commanding  the  attack,  the  difficult  task  of  taking  the  Asmai 
Heights,  every  foot  of  the  crest  bearing  an  Afghan  firing  from 
behind  the  excellent  cover  given  by  rocks  and  boulders.  Bising 
up  from  the  captured  conical  hill  was  a  steep  hillside,  with  here 
and  there  shelving  rocks  hiding  men  from  the  view  of  those  above, 
and  up  this  rugged  ground  our  soldiers  went  steadily  and  rapidly, 
utilizing  every  bit  of  cover,  and  answering  from  time  to  time  the 
heavy  fire  they  were  met  with.  The  guns  shelled  two  strong 
sungars  which  had  been  built  on  the  northern  and  southern  points 
of  the  crest ;  and  made  such  practice,  that  the  enemy  began  to 
move  downwards  towards  Cabul.  They  clustered  in  masses  above 
Deh-i-Afghan,  where  the  shells  of  G-3  could  not  reach  them, 
and  afforded  so  tempting  a  mark,  that  Sir  F.  Boberts,  who  was 
watching  the  attack  from  the  signalling  station  on  the  roof  of 
the  officers*  quarters  in  the  western  gate,  ordered  two  Horse 
Artillery  guns  out  to  open  fire  from  under  the  cantonment  walls. 
A  wing  of  the  8rd  Sikhs  and  some  cavalry  went  out  as  escort,  and 
extended  themselves  into  the  fields  beyond.  The  shrapnel  fired 
from  these  two  guns  made  the  hillside  almost  untenable;  but 
still  in  the  sungars  on  the  crest  a  few  determined  ghazis  resisted 
the  advance  of  the  Highlanders  and  Guides.  Our  men  fought  up, 
however,  and  the  sungar  on  the  northern  point  was  taken  with  a 
rush.  The  banners  waving  above  it  were  obstinately  defended  by 
ghazis,  who  were  killed  to  a  man.  Colonel  Jenkins  then  worked 
his  way  under  a  heavy  fire  along  the  crest,  which  has  a  total  length 
of  a  quarter  of  a  mile ;  and  there  only  remained  the  southern 
sungary  built  on  the  peak  of  the  hill,  to  be  taken.  In  this  sungar, 


"  The  Fight  for  the  Standard''  209 

which  was  unusually  strong,  were  forty  or  fifty  men  who,  by  their 
fire,  checked  the  advance  for  some  time.  Major  Stockwell,  with  a 
few  Highlanders,  passed  through  a  gap  in  the  wall  which  runs 
down  the  ridge,  and  galled  the  Ghazis  by  a  cross  fire.  Private 
Gillon,  of  the  72nd,  climbed  up  the  wall,  and,  creeping  along  the 
top,  pulled  out  a  standard  from  among  the  stones  of  the  sungar. 
There  was  an  open  bit  of  ground  between  our  front  attacking 
party  and  the  sungar  walls,  and  this  was  swept  by  such  a  fire  that 
even  the  bravest  might  have  hesitated  to  cross  it.  Such  of  us  who 
were  watching  the  fight  saw  that  the  stubborn  defence  would  cost 
us  some  valuable  lives ;  but  presently,  when  the  Drummer  was 
seen  on  the  walls,  there  was  a  rush  of  Highlanders  and  Guides — 
one  plucky  Highlander,  Lance-Corporal  Seller,  72nd,  leading  full 
20  yards  in  front,  with  a  Guide  quite  close  behind  him.  As  the 
mngar  was  neared,  most  of  its  defenders  cleared  out  on  the  oppo- 
site side,  but  a  few  Ghazis  stood  to  their  post ;  one  fanatic  jump- 
ing, knife  in  hand,  on  the  low  stone  walls.  The  bayonet  made 
short  work  of  such  of  his  companions  as  had  remained.  Lance- 
Gorporal  Seller  had  a  tough  fight  for  the  last  standard  on  the 
sungar.  As  he  got  up  to  the  wall  he  pulled  the  flag  out  and,  at 
the  same  moment,  a  Ghazi  cut  down  at  his  head  vidth  a  long  knife. 
Seller  parried  the  blow  with  the  standard,  and  then  the  Ghazi 
jumped  over  and  closed  with  him.  They  rolled  over  together,  and 
another  Highlander  bayoneted  the  Afghan.  Seller  was  cut  over  the 
arm,  and  is  now  in  hospital.  He  certainly  deserves  the  highest 
reward  for  his  gallant  conduct:  the  "V.C*  has  been  given  for 
much  less.  The  sungar  was  filled  with  dead  men,  fifteen  bodies 
being  counted  in  a  heap  as  if  a  shell  had  burst  among  them.  Our 
loss  had  been  heavy,  as  much  hand-to-hand  fighting  at  difficult 
points  had  taken  place ;  many  of  the  Guides  were  cut  and  slashed  by 
the  knives  and  tulwars  of  the  Ghazis ;  while  the  ranks  ef  the  72nd 
Highlanders  were  thinned  by  numerous  casualties,  mostly  of  a 
dangerous  kind.  Lieutenant  Egerton,  who  only  joined  the  regi- 
ment a  few  weeks  ago,  was  shot  through  the  neck  on  the  crest  of 
the  hill.  He  showed  courage  that  even  an  old  soldier  might  have 
envied,  being  always  well  to  the  front  in  the  attack.  Lieutenant 
Frederick  Battye,  of  the  Guides,  was  also  shot  through  the  neck 
at  about  the  same  time. 


210  The  Afghan  Wary  1879—80. 

Colonel  Jenkins  was  now  holding  the  whole  crest  of  the  Asmai 
Heights ;  bat  on  the  slope  towards  the  city  were  many  thoasands 
of  the  enemy.  The  two  gnns  of  F-A  Battery  shelled  them  at 
1,700  yards,  and  the  mountain  gnns,  with  General  Macpherson, 
were  also  turned  upon  them.  A  wing  of  the  8rd  Sikhs  were 
extended  in  skirmishing  order  across  the  fields  towards  Deh-i- 
Afghan,  and  with  their  Sniders  were  easily  able  to  reach  the  men 
pouring  down  into  Gabul.  Deh-i- Afghan,  however,  held  many  of 
the  enemy ;  and  from  the  house-tops,  walls,  and  orchards  about, 
the  8rd  Sikhs  were  fired  upon.  The  watercourse  gave  our 
sepoys  good  cover,  but  still  there  were  one  or  two  casualties;  and 
General  Roberts  resolved  to  sack  and  burn  Deh-i- Afghan.  The 
two  guns  of  F-A  began  to  shell  it  vigorously,  and  two  more  guns 
of  the  same  battery  were  brought  out  and  joined  in  the  work. 
Shell  after  shell  was  pitched  among  the  houses,  and  the  defenders 
of  them  drew  off  before  such  a  fire.  Some  1,500,  supposed  to  be 
Safis  from  Tagao,  went  through  the  city  and  made  for  the  Gabul 
plain  so  as  to  reach  Deh-i-Sabz,  to  the  north  of  Butkhak.  Some 
of  them  ventured  too  near  the  King's  Garden,  outside  Sherpur, 
where  the  5th  Punjab  Gavalry  are  quartered,  and  Captain  Yousden 
charged  out  upon  them  and  killed  thirty.  He  had  only  twelve 
sowars  with  him,  and  of  these  two  were  killed  and  four  wounded  ; 
Captain  Yousden  killed  five  Afghans  with  his  own  hand.*  The 
main  body  got  well  away  beneath  Siah  Sung ;  and  although  some 
Lancers  were  sent  in  pursuit,  and  two  Horse  Artillery  guns  went 
out  under  escort  of  a  party  of  the  92nd  Highlanders,  the  Safis 
could  not  be  overtaken.  They  ran  at  a  sling-trot  for  miles,  just 
like  wolves  in  a  pack,  and  had  plainly  had  enough  of  fighting  for 
the  day.  We  had  thus,  apparently,  disposed  of  the  body  of  the 
enemy  (those  who  had  manned  the  heights  fi-om  the  city) ;  but 
there  were  many  more  to  take  their  place,  and  General  Baker, 
with  his  1,200  bayonets,  had  yet  to  learn  the  full  strength  that 
was  against  him. 

About  midday  the  signallers  with  General  Macpherson  helio- 

graphed   down  that  a  vast   body    with    many  standards    were 

streaming  out  from  Indikee  into  the  Chardeh  Yalley,  and  were 

taking  a  northerly  direction,  which  would  bring  them  under  the 

*  For  this  he  wat  strongly  recommended  for  the  Victoria  Cross. 


Increasing  Strength  of  the  Enemy ,  2 1 1 

bill  occupied  by  Colonel  Jenkins.  The  movement  was  well  made, 
and  eventually  developed  into  an  attack  upon  the  conical  bill 
wbicb  tbe  Guides  and  Higblanders  first  stormed.  Tbis  bill  was 
beld  by  tbirty-tbree  men  of  tbe  72nd  Higblanders,  a  small  party 
of  Gnides  under  a  Subadar,  tbe  wbole  being  under  tbe  command 
of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Clark,  72nd.  Wbile  tbe  upper  bill  was 
being  taken,  parties  of  tbe  enemy's  infantry  and  cavalry  were  seen 
coming  across  Cbardeb  from  tbe  direction  of  Eila  Eazi,  as  if  to 
take  Colonel  Jenkins  in  flank,  and  tbe  conical  bill  was  strengtbened 
by  Swinley*s  Mountain  Battery,  witb  an  escort  of  100  men  of 
tbe  5tb  Punjabees,  under  command  of  Lieutenant  Wilson,  of  tbe 
lOtb  Hussars,  serving  for  tbe  day  as  a  volunteer.  Tbis  gave 
Colonel  Clark  about  200  rifles,  witb  wbicb  to  bold  tbe  bill.  Tbe 
mountain  guns  opened  fire  upon  tbe  body  of  Afgbans  in  tbe 
plain,  wbo  broke  up  and  dispersed  out  of  range.  In  tbe  mean- 
time tbe  enemy  from  Lidikee — ^to  tbe  number  of  fully  15,000  or 
20,000 ;  tbey  covered  tbe  plain  for  miles — ^bad  marcbed  out  as  if 
going  to  Ella  Kazi,  or  Argandeb.  Tbeir  array  was  orderly 
enougb ;  and  wben  tbey  bad  all  reacbed  tbe  plain,  tbey  suddenly 
faced  about  and  came  down  in  tbe  sbape  of  a  crescent  upon  tbe 
beigbts  we  were  bolding.  Tbeir  rigbt  flank  bad  for  its  object  tbe 
scaling  of  a  ridge  extending  down  from  tbe  soutbern  sungar  on 
tbe  Deb-i-A%ban  bill;  tbeir  centre,  tbe  assault  of  tbe  low 
conical  bill,  wbicb  was  General  Baker's  weakest  point ;  and  tbeir 
left  flank  swept  round  upon  tbe  lumpy  bill  to  tbe  nortb  of  Colonel 
Clark's  position,  and  commanding  it.  Tbey  seemed  to  our  bandful 
of  men  to  be  myriads  as  tbey  came  steadily  on ;  and  altbougb 
volleys  were  fired  from  tbe  conical  bill,  and  tbe  mountain  guns 
sbelled  tbem  at  sbort  ranges,  tbey  never  faltered.  Tbey  were 
literally  mowed  down ;  but  as  one  Gbazi  fell,  anotber  sprang  to 
tbe  front,  and  tbeir  standards  were  at  last  placed  on  a  little  mound 
witbin  150  yards  of  our  bayonets.  Tbeir  left  flank  bad  gained 
tbe  lumpy  bill  wbicb  we  bad  left  alone,  not  baving  men  enougb 
to  occupy  it,  and  a  cross  fire  was  opened  upon  Colonel  Clark's 
party.  Tbere  was  a  bit  of  open  ground  between  tbe  mound  on 
wbicb  tbeir  standards  were  placed  and  tbe  rocks  in  rear,  under 
wbicb  tbeir  main  body  bad  clustered  in  face  of  our  fire ;  but  across 
this  small  space  numbers  rushed  with  reckless  audacity  until; 

p  2 


212  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

behind  their  advanced  standards,  several  hundred  men  were 
hidden.  Colonel  Clark  thought  that  at  all  risks  they  mast  be 
driven  from  this  moand,  as  they  might  make  a  rush  in  over- 
whelming numbers :  and  Captain  Spens  volunteered  to  make  the 
attempt.  Taking  with  him  five  of  the  72nd  Highlanders  and  a 
few  Guides,  he  made  for  a  bit  of  rising  ground  below  the  mound 
and  reached  it  safely.  His  fire  could  not  dislodge  the  Ghazis, 
who  suddenly  rushed  out  upon  the  little  party.  Captain  Spcns 
was  attacked  by  four  or  five  men :  he  cut  down  one,  but  in  a 
second  he  was  overpowered  and  hacked  almost  to  pieces.  There 
followed  in  rear  of  the  Ghazis,  who  had  sprung  out,  a  dense  mass 
of  Afghans,  who  swarmed  up  to  the  thin  line  of  defenders,  who 
could  scarcely  hope  to  stop  them.  The  mountain  guns  were  on 
Colonel  Clark's  left,  and  their  guard  of  5th  Punjabees  had  been, 
perhaps  too  sanguinely,  sent  forward  to  repel  the  attack.  Our 
men  lost  heart  as  they  saw  four  or  five  thousand  men  nearly  upon 
them ;  and  when  Captain  Hall,  with  a  reinforcement  of  150  more 
of  the  5th  Punjab  Infantry,  got  near  the  crest  of  the  hill,  he 
found  such  of  its  defenders  as  had  not  been  shot  down  retiring 
in  disorder.  To  rally  them  was  impossible  at  that  point,  and 
they  fell  back  down  the  hillside.  The  fire  of  the  enemy  at  such 
close  quarters  cost  us  a  score  of  wounded,  and  the  mules  of  one 
mountain  gun  being  shot,  it  had  to  be  abandoned  where  it  stood. 
A  second  gun  was  being  carried  safely  downwards  when  the  mule 
carrying  it  was  also  knocked  over.  The  handspike  in  the  muzzle 
used  for  lifting  it  was  broken,  but  the  gunners  rolled  it  for  some 
yards  down  the  hill  until  the  Afghans  were  close  upon  them, 
when  it  also  had  to  be  left.  Two  guns  were  thus  lost,  but 
fortunately  there  was  but  little  ammunition  left  behind.  At  the 
foot  of  the  hill  our  men  rallied,  and  re-opened  fire,  which  checked 
the  rush  of  the  enemy.  The  8rd  Sikhs  doubled  across  the 
fields  from  near  Deh-i-Afghan  and  reinforced  General  Baker, 
driving  back  such  Afghans  as  had  ventured  down  the  slope 
towards  the  village  where  the  guns  of  G-8  were  placed.  These 
guns  were  withdrawn  to  a  safe  distance  ;  but,  although  the 
enemy  in  half  an  hour  had  10,000  men  on  and  about  the 
conical  hill,  they  did  not  venture  down  to  attack.  Our  cavalry 
were  ready  in  the  plain  to  charge  down  upon  them  if  they  gained 


Concentration  of  the  British  Forces.  213 

the  fields  ;  but  they  had  qnite  a  different  intention.  As  I  have 
said,  their  right  flank  were  scaling  a  spur  running  down  from  the 
southern  sujigar  to  the  Chardeh  plain,  and  they  hoped  to  cut  off 
Colonel  Jenkins  and  his  party.  This  soon  became  evident,  as  a 
long  string  of  standard  bearers  began  to  climb  up  towards  the 
northern  sungar,  following  exactly  the  path  taken  by  our  storming 
party  in  the  morning.  From  over  the  crest  of  the  hill  came  the 
rattle  of  musketry ;  and  estimating  the  difficulty  of  holding  the 
crest  all  night,  and  so  weakening  the  defences  of  Sherpur,  General 
Roberts  sent  word  to  Colonel  Jenkins  to  evacuate  the  position. 

The  enemy  has  shown  such  unexpected  strength — 40,000  men 
in  all  are  believed  to  have  been  present  in  Chardeh  Valley  and  in 
the  hills  above  Deh-i- Afghan — that  it  was  running  considerable  risk 
to  keep  our  garrison  in  cantonments  short  of  a  man ;  accordingly 
at  the  same  time  that  Colonel  Jenkins  was  ordered  to  retire,  a  mes- 
sage was  sent  by  heliograph  to  General  Macpherson  to  hasten  back 
to  Sherpur  with  all  his  force.  He  was  to  take  the  road  above  the 
Deh-i- Afghan  suburb.  General  Baker  was  ordered  to  hold  on  to 
the  village  he  had  occupied  since  the  morning  until  all  the  troops 
from  the  heights  were  within  the  walls.  Meanwhile  Colonel 
Jenkins  had  met  the  attack  up  the  spur  from  Chardeh.  Major 
Stockwell,  72nd,  was  sent  down  a  few  score  yards  with  a  small 
escort,  who  kept  up  a  hot  fire  upon  the  advancing  masses.  A  few 
Ghazis,  with  their  standards,  got  from  point  to  point  ;  but  they 
were  still  at  a  respectable  distance  when  the  order  to  evacuate  the 
hill  was  received.  Major  Stockwell  withdrew  his  men  from  the 
little  sungar  they  had  built,  and  retired  leisurely,  so  as  to  give  the 
Afghans  no  idea  that  the  crest  also  was  to  be  evacuated.  Captain 
Gordon,  of  the  92nd,  was  shot  through  the  right  shoulder  while 
this  movement  was  being  made.  Five  minutes  after  our  men  had 
left  their  sungar  a  banner  was  planted  upon  it,  showing  how 
rapidly  the  Ghazis  rushed  up  the  hill.  Major  Stockwell's  party 
having  been  safely  withdrawn,  the  retirement  down  the  hill  facing 
Sherpur  was  begun.  The  enemy,  who  were  nearly  at  the 
northern  sungar,  led  by  a  Ghazi  with  a  green  flag,  were  kept  in 
check  by  volleys  fired  by  covering  parties  thrown  out  on  Colonel 
Jenkins's  left  flank.  There  was  not  the  least  appearance  of  un- 
due haste,  the  Highlanders  forming  up  quietly  to  cover  the  Guides 


214  ^'^^  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

scrambling  down^  and  the  Goides  then  doing  the  same  in  their 
torn  for  the  Highlanders.  The  hillside  was  so  exposed  that  oar 
casualties  were  rather  severe,  among  the  killed  being  Lieatenant 
6bisford  of  the  72nd.  Not  a  man  was  left  behind,  however,  all 
the  wounded  and  dead  being  brought  in.  All  anxiety  about 
Colonel  Jenkins's  force  being  now  at  an  end,  there  only  remained 
General  Macpherson's  brigade  to  come  in.  Two  companies  of  the 
92nd  Highlanders  were  marched  out  to  cover  them  across  the  plain, 
and  to  help  General  Baker's  rear-guard  in  its  final  retirement ; 
but  they  were  not  wanted.  Presently  shots  were  heard  in  Deh-i- 
Afghan,  and  then  the  baggage  of  the  brigade  was  seen  entering 
the  fields  under  a  strong  guard.  The  67th  Foot,  5th  Ghoorkas, 
and  8rd  Sikhs  followed  with  the  mountain  battery,  and,  before  long, 
entered  the  head-quarters'  gate.  In  coming  through  the  Gabul 
gorge.  General  Macpherson  had  been  able  to  help  the  Highlanders 
and  Guides  by  his  fire.  He  sent  two  companies  of  the  67th, 
under  Colonel  Enowles,  to  hold  a  knoll  half-way  up  the  slope 
from  Deh-i-Afghan  to  the  southern  sungar.  Bodies  of  the  enemy 
tried  to  rush  down  the  hill  to  overtake  Colonel  Jenkins  and  even 
to  harass  the  brigade  under  General  Macpherson  ;  but  the  steady 
shooting  of  the  67th  conld  not  be  faced,  and  the  most  adventurous 
Ghazis  being  shot  down,  the  rest  withdrew  to  the  crest.  Colonel 
Knowles  handled  his  men  with  a  coolness  that  could  not  have 
been  excelled.  General  Baker  then  retired  slowly,  his  rear-guard, 
under  Major  Pratt,  5th  Punjab  Infantry,  by  a  brisk  fusillade  for 
about  ten  minutes,  stopping  the  few  Ghazis  who  came  down  from 
the  conical  peak.  By  dusk  everyone  was  in  cantonments,  and  we 
could  count  our  casualties.  They  were  unusually  heavy  for  Afghan 
fighting,  but  have  given  us  valuable  experience,  as  we  no  longer 
despise  our  enemy.  That  Afghans  when  in  overwhelming  ntun- 
bers  will  fight  and  rush  blindly  on,  regardless  of  loss  of  life,  has 
been  fully  exemplified,  and  we  shall  no  longer  send  flying  colunms 
over  the  hUls  and  break  up  our  army  into  three  weak  parts. 
With  Generals  Baker  and  Macpherson  both  out  of  Sherpur,  an 
attack  upon  cantonments  might  have  resulted  in  a  disaster.  Now 
that  our  force  is  once  more  concentrated,  Sherpur  may  be  looked 
upon  as  safe. 
When  all  our  troops  were  once  more  in  quarters,  we  had  to 


General  Roberts  Retires  within  Sherpur.       215 

think  about  onr  defences,  though  it  was  highly  improbable  that 
Mahomed  Jan  would  try  a  night  attack.  Our  men  were  quite 
fagged  out  with  all  the  hill-climbing  they  had  done  to  so  little 
purpose ;  but  the  majority  of  them  had  to  turn  out  to  do  picquet 
duty,  and  keep  a  sharp  look-out  on  the  walls.  Shelter  trenches 
were  hastily  thrown  up  at  our  weakest  points  on  the  Bemaru 
Heights ;  the  gates  in  the  walls  were  barricaded  with  gun  carriages 
belonging  to  the  guns  captured  on  October  8th ;  and  we  waited 
patiently  and  a  little  anxiously,  it  must  be  confessed,  for  a  night 
alarm.  Every  regiment  was  told  off  to  particular  points,  and  a 
reserve — made  up  of  a  wing  of  the  67th,  a  wing  of  the  72nd,  and 
the  whole  of  the  92nd — were  ready  to  fall  in  below  the  gap  in 
the  Bemaru  Hills  in  the  centre  of  the  cantonments.  We  did 
not  fear  any  attempt  to  scale  the  walls ;  but  at  either  end  of  the 
heights  which  shut  us  in  on  the  north  were  open  gaps ;  Shore 
All's  line  of  wall,  intended  to  include  the  Bemaru  Hills  within  the 
fortified  square,  never  having  been  completed.  At  the  eastern  end 
of  Sherpur,  the  28th  Punjab  Infantry  have  built  a  line  of  huts  ex- 
tending from  near  the  corner  bastion  towards  Bemaru  village ;  and 
as  the  ground  beyond  it  is  covered  with  walled  enclosures,  towers, 
and  orchards,  excellent  cover  would  be  given  to  an  attacking  force 
which  might  gather  under  cover  of  darkness,  and  make  a  rush  to 
get  in.  On  the  14th,  abattis  had  been  laid,  the  orchards  near 
giving  plenty  of  wood,  and  above  Bemaru  village  were  strong 
picquet  posts  and  trenches  which  commanded  the  road  leading 
from  Kohistan.  Two  guns  of  G-3  were  at  this  point,  but  they 
were  withdrawn,  as  to  remove  them  in  face  of  a  detemiined 
attack  would  have  been  nearly  impossible,  the  ground  towards 
camp  being  very  steep  and  much  broken  up.  Wire  entanglements, 
made  with  telegraph  wire  and  tent-pegs,  were  laid  down,  wherever 
there  was  open  ground  over  the  walls,  and  extra  vigilance  was 
shown  by  sentries.  The  blQck-houses  on  the  crest  of  the  Bemaru 
Heights  were  also  filled  with  our  men,  ready  to  reinforce  any 
points  assailed.  But  the  night  passed  quietly,  the  soldiers  being 
undisturbed  even  by  stray  shots.  The  enemy  were,  perhaps,  as 
tired  as  ourselves,  and  were  holding  high  revel  in  the  city  and  the 
Bala  Hissar,  where  no  doubt  they  found  many  friends  to  welcome 
them.  Our  garrison  at  Butkhak,  consisting  of  some  fifty  rifles, 
and  the  whole  of  the  12th  Bengal  Cavalry,  arrived  safely  at  Sher- 


2i6  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

pur  daring  the  night,  it  being  deemed  unwise  to  leave  them  so  far 
away  from  cantonments.  As  they  also  had  to  be  supplied  with 
food  from  our  godowns,  and  we  could  not  spare  a  force  to  escort 
convoys  across  the  Cabul  plain,  it  was  necessary  they  should  be 
brought  in.     This  withdrawal  has  cut  us  off  from  Luttabund. 

To-day  (the  15th)  has  been  one  of  almost  absolute  quiet. 
Beyond  cavalry  parties  patrolling  outside  Sherpur,  our  men  have 
not  been  sent  out,  although  the  Afghans  crowded  out  upon  the 
slopes  above  Deh-i- Afghan,  inviting  us  to  come  out  and  attack 
them.  There  can  be  no  good  object  attained,  however,  in  again 
storming  the  heights,  as  we  cannot  weaken  the  garrison  by  telling 
off  a  couple  of  regiments  and  a  mountain  battery  to  hold  the  hills 
when  captured.  We  had  not,  either,  ammunition  to  throw  away ; 
there  are  only  about  800  rounds  per  rifle  of  Snider  and  Martini- 
Henri,  and  we  are  as  yet  uncertain  when  reinforcements  from 
Gundamak,  bringing  a  further  supply,  will  reach  us.  Luckily  the 
telegraph  remained  open  until  five  o'clock  this  morning,  so  frill 
particulars  of  our  condition  were  sent  down  the  line.  General 
Charles  Gough  has  been  ordered  to  bring  in  his  brigade  as  quickly 
as  possible,  and  he  is  now  concentrating  them  at  JugduUuck. 
Colonel  Hudson,  commanding  at  Luttabund,  has  been  ordered  to 
hold  on  with  the  800  Pioneers  and  the  28th  Punjab  Lifantry, 
until  General  Gough  reaches  him.  He  will  then  come  on  to 
Sherpur.  With  the  arrival  of  the  brigade  we  shall  be  able,  not 
merely  to  hold  Shei-pur  in  comfort,  but  also  to  send  out  2,000  or 
3,000  men  to  attack  Mahomed  Jan  in  whatever  position  he  may 
take  up.  With  more  ammunition  for  our  batteries,  we  can  shell 
Deh-i- Afghan,  the  Bala  Hissar,  and  even  Cabul  itself  if  occasion 
requires.  At  present  we  cannot  afford  to  waste  shells ;  as  in  the 
case  of  any  check  to  General  Gough's  brigade,  we  should  have  to 
rely  upon  our  own  strength  until  more  troops  could  be  sent  for- 
ward from  Jellalabad,  and  further  down  the  Khyber  line.  We 
must  make  our  calculations  on  this  basis  until  we  hear  of  the 
brigade  from  Jugdulluck  being  at  Luttabund  or  Butkhak,  which 
they  should  reach  by  the  19th  or  20th  at  the  latest.  AsmatuUah 
Khan,  of  Lughman,  with  his  powerful  section  of  Ghilzais,  is 
reported  to  be  anxious  to  join  Mahomed  Jan  with  10,000  or 
15,000  men,  and  he  may  try  to  intercept  the  force  moving  from 
Gundamak.     As  he  would  leave  his  villages  west  of  the  Darunta 


Casualties  in  the  British  Forces. 


217 


cliff  at  the  mercy  of  a  flying  colamn  from  Jellalabad,  he  may, 
perhaps,  hesitate  before  taking  such  a  step.  The  Safis  of  Tagao, 
who  returned  to  their  homes  yesterday  afternoon,  before  our 
reverse,  will  soon  learn  that  Cabal  is  still  in  the  possession  of 
Mahomed  Jan,  and  they  also  may  try  to  block  the  Luttabund  Bead. 
Oar  losses  in  yesterday's  action  were  very  severe,  and  among 
oar  woanded  are  many  dangeroas  cases.  The  proportion,  usually, 
of  severe  wounds  is  one-third  out  of  the  total  wounded,  but  nearly 
every  case  now  in  hospital  is  "  severe."  The  list  of  casualties 
from  the  10th  to  the  18th  and  on  the  14th  is  as  follows : — 


Casualties  from  10th  to  13th  December. 

* 

British. 

Rogiment. 

Kativma 

TotaL 

Offictrs. 

Men. 

K. 

w. 

K. 

w. 

K. 

w. 

F-A,  Royal  Horse  ArtiUery      ... 

1 

— 

— 

1 



— 

2 

No.  2  Mountain  Battery 

— 

— 

— 

— 



2 

2 

9th  Lancen       

3 

4 

21 

16 



— 

44 

6th  Punjab  Cavalry 

.• 

— 

— 

— 

,  — 

8 

— 

3 

14th  Bengal  Lancers 

1 

— 

— 

— 

7 

4 

12 

67th  Foot 

..         ... 

— 

— 

— 

2 

— 

— 

2 

72nd  Highlanders 

— 

1 

— 

5 

— 

— 

6 

92nd  Highlanders 

... 

1 

— 

2 

21 

— 

— 

24 

3rd  Sikhs 

— 

2 

— 

— 

4 

10 

16 

Corps  of  Onidcs 

— 

— 

— 

— 

.    3* 

9 

12 

5th  Panjab  Infantry 

.. 

— 

— 

— 

— 

1 

10 

n 

fithahoorkas    ... 



— 

2 

— 

— 

1 

10 

13 

Total 

6 

^ 

23 

45 

19 

45 

147 

Casualties  on  14th  December. 


No.  2  Moantain  Battery 
5th  Pnigab  Cavalry 
14th  Bengal  Lancers 
67  th  Foot 
72nd  Highlanders 
92nd  Highlanders 
3rd  Sikhs 
Gaides'  Infantry 
5th  Panjab  Infantry 
5th  Ghoorkas    ... 

Total 


K. 

w. 

K. 

w. 

K. 

1 

w. 
6 
8 

7 
8 

z 

_ 

z 



— 

— 

— 

5 
16 

— 

5 

5 

5 

84 

,2 

1 

15t 

— 

— 

— 

1 

— 

3 

""" 

5 

4 
5 



1 





13 

27 

41 



— 



— 

1 

13 

14 

— 

— 

— 

— 

3 

2 

5 

2 

3 

15 

24 

18 

66 

128 

Missing. 


t  One  missing. 


2i8  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

The  total  loss  in  the  five  days*  fighting  is,  therefore,  eight 
British  ofiScers  killed  and  12  wounded ;  38  British  soldiers  killed 
and  69  wounded ;  87  Native  soldiers  killed  and  111  wounded ;  or 
a  total  of  275  casualties,  viz.,  88  killed  and  192  wounded. 

The  oflScers  killed  on  the  14th  were  Captain  Spens  and  Lieu- 
tenant Gaisford,  72nd  Highlanders :  those  wounded  were  Captain 
Gordon,  92nd  Highlanders;  Lieutenant  Egerton,  72nd;  and 
Lieutenant  Frederick  Battye,  Guides'  Infantry. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

The  Defences  of  Sherpor  Strengthened — Continued  Inactivity  of  the  Enemy — State  of 
the  WallB  and  Trenches — Mounting  of  Captured  Guns — ^The  Rcseire — The  State  of 
Cabul — Attflu;ks  upon  the  Hindu  and  Kizilbash  Quarters — Threat  to  assemble 
100,000  Afghans — Reflections  upon  Past  Events — Neglect  of  Military  Precautions 
— Non-destruction  of  Forts  and  Villages — Review  of  the  Fighting — City  Rumours 
— ^Musa  Jan  proclaimed  Ajnir — Seizure  of  Treasure  by  Mahomed  Jan — Demonstra 
tion  by  the  Enemy  on  December  17th — The  Distribution  of  Commands  in  Sberpui 
— Immunity  from  Night  Attacks — Steadiness  of  the  Troops — ^The  Attack  of 
December  18th — Heliograms  exchanged  with  Luttabund — The  First  Fall  of  Snow  at 
Cabul. 

Sherpur,  \ht\i  December,  night. 

To-DAY*s  respite  from  fighting  has  been  of  the  greatest  value  to 
us.  The  shelter  trenches  thrown  up  in  the  darkness  have,  in 
many  instances,  been  found  to  be  defective,  accordingly  Colonel 
Perkins  and  the  engineers  with  the  force  have  laid  out  new  lines, 
and  the  northern  and  eastern  defences  are  now  quite  strong  enough 
to  assure  our  safety  in  those  directions.  The  northern  end  of  the 
western  wall  was  partly  blown  down  when  the  mutineers  fired  their 
magazine  the  day  after  Charasia ;  the  breach  in  it  has  been  closed 
with  earth  and  rubbish  ;  and  the  corner  bastion,  looking  towards 
the  lake,  has  been  made  thoroughly  defensible.  From  this  bastion 
to  the  foot  of  the  Bemaru  Heights  is  an  open  space,  about  100 
yards  across.  The  trees  beyond  it,  which  shaded  our  cemetery, 
have  been  cut  down,  and  a  strong  entrenchment  thrown  across, 
with  wire  entanglements,  20  yards  in  front.  Here,  again,  Afghan 
ammunition  waggons  have  been  of  great  use.    They  are  placed 


The  Siege  of  Sherpur.  219 

sideways^  one  wheel  facing  oatwards,  and  the  other  forming  the 
inner  side,  over  which  the  defenders  can  fire.  A  deep  trench  has 
been  dag  along  the  enter  face,  and  the  earth  thrown  np  between 
the  wheels,  so  as  to  giye  stability  to  the  barrier.  This  has  made 
a  formidable  obstacle,  which  could  not  be  readily  taken  when 
defended  by  breech-loaders.  From  the  end  abatting  on  the  steep 
slope  of  the  heights  a  trench  and  parapet  run  up  to  the  block- 
house on  the  crest.  An  abattis  has  been  made  of  the  branches 
of  trees  30  yards  in  front  of  this,  faced  again  by  wire  entangle- 
ments, and  two  18-pounders  from  among  the  captured  guns  are 
placed  on  a  platform  cut  in  the  slope  and  commanding  the  ground 
in  front  of  the  lower  barrier  of  ammunition  waggons.  The  fire 
from  the  block-house  and  the  trench  on  the.  hillside  would 
take  in  enfilade  any  force  making  a  front  attack.  Along  the 
crest  of  the  Bemaru  Heights  is  a  line  of  earthen  breastworks 
extending  to  the  break  in  the  bills  above  the  Ghoorka 
quarters  on  the  foundations  of  Shere  Ali's  intended  palace. 
It  was  in  this  ^*  gorge,"  as  it  is  now  called,  that  our  troops  in 
1841-42  had  much  severe  fighting,  their  old  **  Brown  Besses  " 
being  unequal  to  carrying  from  slope  to  slope.  From  the  camp, 
paths  lead  up  a  gentle  slope  through  the  gap.  The  northern  side, 
&cing  Eohistan,  is  much  steeper,  and  the  centre  is  cut  up  by  deep 
nullahs  formed  by  the  streams  which  rush  down  when  the  snow 
melts.  Immediately  below,  at  the  foot  of  the  hills,  cultivation 
begins  and  reaches  out  half  a  mile  to  the  open  Toaidan,  where 
we  held  our  review  on  the  8th  instant.  On  either  side  of  the 
gorge  are  flanking  trenches  with  abattis,  while  wire  entanglements 
have  been  laid  across  the  paths  below.  Two  block-houses  look 
down  upon  the  nullahs  from  either  side  of  the  gap  ;  while  right 
in  the  mouth  is  a  third,  built  very  strongly,  and  loop-holed  for 
musketry.  A  Oatling  gun  is  placed  near  this  defence,  and  guns 
could  also  move  up  in  case  of  attack.  The  eastern  Bemaru  hill 
is  also  entrenched,  and  has  a  block-house  in  the  centre,  and  another 
at  the  northern  point,  which  was,  at  first,  very  weak.  The  village 
of  Bemaro,  with  strong  towers  and  walls,  lies  at  the  bottom  of  the 
hill ;  and  the  ground  is  so  rugged  and  steep,  that  men  could 
creep  up  almost  without  being  seen.  Flanking  trenches,  wire 
entanglements,  and  abattis  have  here,  again,  given  strength  to  the 


220  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

defences.  Bemaru  village  itself  is  now  occapied  by  the  Guides  ; 
the  quarters  of  the  23rd  Pioneers,  and  the  mnle  and  yahoo  linos 
being  just  below.  There  now  remains  the  eastern  line  of  defence ; 
which,  even  now,  is  not  completed,  and  has  given  us  much  anxiety. 
I  have  already  mentioned  that  the  huts  of  the  28th  Punjab  Infan- 
try have  been  built  between  the  end  of  the  cantonment  wall  and 
Bemaru  ;  and  I  may  add  that  every  means  of  rapidly  strengthen- 
ing the  place  has  been  taken.  Shelter-trenches  and  positions  for 
guns  have  been  made,  and  the  orchards  outside  have  been  cut  down 
wherever  they  gave  shelter.  The  bit  of  country  outside  cantonments 
in  this  direction  is  very  fertile,  being  irrigated  from  a  wide  canal,  and 
some  dozen  villages  and  forts  are  clustered  together  on  its  banks. 
The  walls  bounding  the  orchards  and  gardens  as  well  as  the  near 
forts  would,  if  time  permitted,  be  razed  to  the  ground ;  and  until 
this  is  done,  there  will  be  a  chance  of  strong  bodies  of  the  enemy 
annoying  us  thence.  Until  we  know  Mahomed  Jan*s  tactics,  and 
whether  he  really  means  to  attempt  an  assault,  we  cannot  do  more 
than  strengthen  the  actual  lines  of  defence,  leaving  the  walls  and 
towers  in  the  fields  to  be  destroyed  hereafter.  Regarding  the  walls 
of  Sherpur  itself,  they  are  in  a  thorough  state  of  defence ;  such 
openings  as  had  been  cut  in  them  for  the  convenience  of  soldiers 
and  followers  having  been  blocked  up  with  arm  chests  filled  with 
stones  and  rubbish.  The  outer  wall  is  about  twenty  feet  high, 
with  numerous  flanking  bastions,  and  is  pierced  for  musketry  at 
every  six  feet.  The  actual  parapet  is  six  feet  high,  giving  perfect 
shelter  to  soldiers  manning  the  walls ;  and  our  men,  preferring 
to  fire  over  the  top,  have  cut  resting-places  with  their  bayonets 
for  their  rifles.  No  bullet  can  penetrate  more  than  a  few  inches 
into  the  sun-dried  mud,  which  is  really  so  hard  that  9-pounders 
could  not  breach  it.  The  blocks  of  mud  solidify  so  thoroughly 
after  a  time,  that  they  will  turn  the  edge  of  a  pick,  as  we  have 
found  in  improving  our  quarters  in  the  long  line  of  barracks.  A 
dry  ditch,  twenty  feet  in  width,  follows  the  line  of  walls,  which, 
in  an  early  letter,  I  described  as  three  sides  of  a  parallelogram. 
The  barracks  form  the  inner  line  of  defence,  a  low  parapet  on  the 
roof  overlooking  the   dry  ditch  below. 

There  are  four  high  gateways  in  the  walls  ;  one  facing  west- 
wards, known  as  the  '^  Head-quarters*  Gate,'*  and  three  in  the 


Dispositions  for  its  Defence.  221 

southern  wall  facing  Cabal.  The  middle  one  of  these  is  the 
'*  Commissariat  Gate/'  and  abuts  on  the  road  leading  through 
the  old  cantonment  over  the  Cabul  river  to  the  Bala  Hissar.  All 
the  Commissariat  godowns  are  in  the  barracks  and  verandah  to 
right  and  left  of  this  gate.  A  line  drawn  at  right  angles  from  these 
across  the  cantonment  would  strike  the  gap  in  the  Bemaru  hills ; 
and  in  anticipation  of  our  having  to  draw  in  our  defences,  the 
engineers  are  preparing  an  inner  line  of  entrenchments  stretching 
between  these  two  parts.  Our  food  supply,  firewood,  and  bhoosa, 
would  be  enclosed  within  it,  and  our  men  would  be  far  less  har- 
assed. We  should  probably  continue  to  hold  the  north-eastern 
Bemaru  hill  as  an  outwork ;  but  to  do  this  we  should  have  to 
destroy  very  thoroughly  Bemaru  village,  the  huts  of  the  28th 
Punjab  Infantry,  and  the  barracks  and  wall  at  the  eastern  part  of 
Sherpur.  There  seems  but  little  probability  of  our  having  to  do 
this,  as  the  reinforcements  will  lighten  our  work,  give  an  ample 
garrison,  and  also  permit  of  a  brigade  moving  out  to  meet  the 
enemy.  We  are  mounting  one  of  the  8-inch  howitzers,  captured 
here,  in  a  bastion  of  the  western  wall,  whence  we  can  shell  Deh-i- 
Afghan  and  the  road  leading  from  the  Cabul  gorge.  We  have 
plenty  of  loose  powder  for  this  howitzer,  and  any  number  of 
empty  shells  left  behind  by  the  mutineers.  Some  of  Shore  All's 
mountain  guns  are  also  being  got  ready  for  use.  Our  own  bat- 
teries are  kept  free  to  move  from  point  to  point  as  required,  special 
stations  being  told  off  for  them  at  night.  Morgan's  mountain 
battery  is  the  artillery  reserve :  the  infantry  and  cavalry  reserve  is 
made  up  of  the  whole  of  the  92nd  Highlanders,  a  wing  of  the 
67th,  a  wing  of  the  72nd,  and  six  squadrons  chosen  from  among 
the  9th  Lancers,  5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  Guides'  Cavalry,  12th  Ben- 
gal Cavalry,  and  the  14th  Bengal  Lancers.  The  remainder  of 
the  troopers  and  sowars  are  dismounted,  and  used  as  infantry  to 
man  the  defences.  The  reserve,  in  case  of  a  night  attack,  is  to 
form  up  in  the  open  ground  in  the  middle  of  cantonments  below 
the  Bemaru  gorge.  We  have  thus  made  all  our  preparations,  and 
shall  probably  pursue  a  waiting  policy,  leaving  Mahomed  Jan  to 
his  occupation  of  Cabul  city  and  the  Bala  Hissar  until  General 
Charles  Gough  arrives.  What  that  occupation  is  likely  to  be,  we 
are  already  learning :    the  houses  of  all  known  friends  of  the 


222  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

British  are  being  looted  and  destroyed^  and  the  Hindu  and  Kizil- 
bash  quarters  are  also  being  attacked.  Constant  firing  is  heard 
from  the  city,  and  the  Eizilbashes  are  resisting  the  attacks  to  the 
best  of  their  ability.  Against  such  numbers,  however,  they  can- 
not make  a  stand,  however  bravely  they  may  fight.  Several  of 
them  have  sought  refuge  with  us,  and  we  have  also,  as  our  guests, 
Sirdar  Wall  Mahomed  Khan,  young  Ahmed  Ali,  and  their  per- 
sonal retainers.  Daoud  Shah  has  been  put  under  arrest  '^  as  a 
matter  of  precaution,"  and  the  Mustaufi  is  also  again  in  con- 
finement, as  well  as  other  Afghan  sirdars,  whose  honesty  is  a 
doubtful  quality.  Hazara  coolies  and  city  people,  employed 
hitherto  as  labourers,  masons,  and  carpenters,  have  also  been 
turned  out  of  Sherpur,  as  they  are  now  only  a  drag  upon  us, 
and  might  also  be  bearers  of  information  to  the  enemy. 

This  evening  large  bodies  of  men  with  standards  appeared  on 
the  road  above  Deh-i- Afghan  until  the  slope  of  the  hill  was  com- 
pletely covered.  Beyond  waving  their  knives  and  tulwars,  and 
shouting  defiance,  they  did  nothing  to  annoy  or  irritate  us. 
General  Roberts  at  first  ordered  some  guns  out  to  shell  them,  but 
changed  his  mind,  and  declined  to  waste  ammunition  upon  them. 
In  the  evening  they  returned  to  the  city,  but  kept  two  large  signal 
fires  burning  on  the  heights.  They  are  said  to  expect  reinforcements 
from  Eohistan,  Turkistan,  and  the  Shutargardan  district ;  but  we 
have  no  news  of  these  being  on  the  move.  They  boast  of  being 
able  to  get  100,000  men  together  in  a  week,  and  have  sent  to 
Ghazni  for  guns.  At  present  they  have  not  been  able  to  rig  up 
the  two  mountain  guns  they  captured,  or  to  use  two  others  taken 
in  Wali  Mahomed's  camp  above  Dehmazung.  If  they  were  to 
sh^U  Sherpur  they  might  cause  us  some  loss,  as  our  cavalry  are 
picqueted  in  the  open. 

While  I  am  writing  (on  the  evening  of  the  15th)  we  are  expect- 
ing a  night  attack ;  but  we  are  quite  ready  for  it,  every  post  being 
fully  manned.  The  Mohurrum  has  now  begun,  and  fanaticism  is 
sure  to  run  high  among  the  Ghazis  and  followers  of  Mushk^i- 
Alam,  but  it  will  scarcely  prompt  them  to  attack  so  strong  a 
position  as  we  have  now  made.  Orders  have  been  issued  that,  in 
the  event  of  any  of  the  enemy  getting  within  cantonment  walls, 
they  are  to  be  bayoneted.    Shooting  is  forbidden^  as  in  camp  our 


Inactivity  of  Mahomed  Jan,  223 

bxiUets  would  probably  be  more  dangerons  to  onr  own  troops  than 
to  scattered  parties  of  Afghans.  Every  man  is  resting  on  his 
arms  ready  for  an  emergency. 

16tfc  December. 

The  second  night  has  passed  without  any  demonstration  by 
Mahomed  Jan  against  Sherpur ;  and  while  the  fire-eaters  in  our 
force  are  longing  for  an  attack^  in  order  that  the  Afghans  may 
learn  how  mud  walls  and  entrenchments  can  be  defended  by  men 
with  breech-loaders  in  their  hands,  most  of  us  are  glad  that  our 
soldiers  have  had  time  to  rest,  and  haye  not  been  obliged  to  stand 
out  all  night  in  the  bitter  cold.  Four  blankets  per  man  have  been 
served  out ;  and,  wrapped  in  these,  the  soldiers  have  been  able  to 
keep  themselves  fairly  comfortable,  while  sleeping  in  the  trenches 
and  bastions.  The  sentries  are  on  the  alert,  and  have,  of  course, 
had  to  endure  cold  and  discomfort ;  but  the  great  body  of  men 
have  rested  quietly.  To-day  also,  no  attack  has  been  attempted ; 
and  while  we  are  settling  down  to  the  new  conditions  imposed 
upon  us — for  we  are  now  practically  in  a  state  of  siege: — our  spirits 
are  as  high  as  ever.  We  chafe  under  the  delay  which  must 
necessarily  ensue  before  we  can  once  more  disperse  the  enemy ; 
but  we  hope  that  the  troops  from  Jugdulluck  and  Gundamak  will 
soon  put  us  in  a  position  both  to  hold  Sherpur  and  to  have  a  few 
thousand  men  outside,  dealing  with  the  Ghazis.  There  can  be 
no  doubt  we  have  been  lulled  during  the  past  two  months  into 
Calse  security.  Our  only  anxiety  hitherto  has  been  to  find  an 
enemy  to  fight ;  and  the  opinions  I  have  expressed  in  former 
letters  as  to  the  Afghan  weakness  for  running  away  have  been 
simply  those  held  by  every  one  here.  When  we  sent  our  brigades 
out  to  fight,  they  found  no  one  to  C&ce  them ;  and  we  were  una- 
ware that  such  a  powerful  combination  as  that  now  against  us 
was  possible.  After  the  dispersion  of  the  remnants  of  Takub 
Khan's  mutinous  army,  there  was  such  an  appearance  of  peace, 
at  least  for  many  months,  that  the  ordinary  military  precautions 
were  not  taken.  Our  hands  were  full  with  laying  in  supplies  for 
the  winter  and  getting  the  troops  into  barracks.  Sherpur,  with 
its  three  sides  already  fortified,  and  ample  accommodation  in  its 
long  lines  of  rooms,  was  ready  to  our  hand,  and  we  occupied  it 


224  ^'^^  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

at  once,  although  the  strength  of  our  army  was  scarcely  adequate 
to  defending  it*  and  keeping  our  communications  open.  The 
original  plan  of  placing  two  or  three  regiments  in  the  Bala  Hissar 
was  certainly  a  good  one  ;  but  the  explosions  in  the  fortress,  and 
the  dread  that  it  might  still  contain  mines  unknown  to  us,  deterred 
General  Eoberts  from  carrying  out  his  first  intention. 

Further,  when  Sherpur  was  occupied,  the  sense  of  security  then 
prevailing  led  us  to  spare  the  forts  and  villages  in  its  vicinity. 
Even  the  old  walls  and  isolated  towers  in  the  fields  about  were  left 
untouched.  We  make  war  so  humanely  that,  even  in  a  country 
like  Afghanistan,  we  are  loth  to  let  military  exigencies  override  all 
other  considerations.  That  we  shall  suffer  for  it  How  in  loss  of 
life  is  beyond  question ;  for,  at  several  points  about  the  walls, 
cover  is  given  to  an  attacking  party,  who  can  get  within  400  or 
500  yards  of  our  bastions.  On  the  eastern  and  southern  sides 
this  is  particularly  the  case.  Outside  Bemaru,  as  I  have  said,  are 
forts,  villages,  and  orchards ;  while,  between  the  three  gates  facing 
towards  Cabul,  the  ground  is  similarly  occupied.  Fort  Mahomed 
Sharif,  so  well  known  in  the  dreary  days  of  1841—42,  still  stands 
intact  within  700  yards  of  the  "  72nd  Gateway,*'  and  about  it 
are  high  walls  and  walled  enclosures,  which  are  sure  to  be  occu- 
pied by  sharp-shooters.  Outside  Deh-i- Afghan  also  are  orchards 
and  gardens,  each  with  its  strong  open  walls,  and  in  the  fields  are 
ruinous  walls,  with  an  occasional  tower,  which  we  cx)uld  easily 
have  destroyed  if  we  had  foreseen  that  an  investment  was  hanging 
over  us.  It  is  easy  to  be  wise  after  the  event ;  but  there  can  now 
be  but  one  view  as  to  the  defects  of  Sherpur.  To  defend  it,  simply, 
is  now  comparatively  easy,  even  with  the  6,000  men  we  have 
within  its  walls;  but  beyond  defence,  we  can  do  nothing.  It 
covers  such  an  enormous  area  of  ground,  that  when  all  our  picquets 
and  sentries  have  been  placed,  we  have  no  one  to  spare ;  and 
though  we  have  dismounted  nearly  the  whole  of  our  cayalry,  there 
are  not  even  1,000  men  available  for  outside  work.  If  it  were 
half  the  size,  we  should  be  as  comfortable  as  in  an  Indian  canton- 
ment ;  or  if  we  had  10,000  men  here,  and  three  or  four  more 
batteries  of  artillery,  we  could  break  up  Mahomed  Jan's  army 
without  difficulty.  But  neither  of  these  conditions  exists,  and  we 
*  This  was  the  view  taken  by  Colonel  Blacgregor,  Chief  of  the  Staff. 


Tfie  Situation  Reviewed.  225 

are  quietly  accepting  the  humiliation  of  inyestment,  and  witness- 
ing the  looting  of  Cabal  and  the  Bala  Hissar  without  being  able 
to  strike  a  blow  against  the  enemy.  The  suddenness  of  the  whole 
business  is  the  most  remarkable  feature^  and  we  now  see  to  what 
imminent  danger  Sherpur  was  exposed  when  Generals  Macpherson 
and  Baker  were  sent  out  to  force  the  fighting  in  Maidan.  In  the 
first  week  of  December  native  rumours  of  40,000  or  50,000  men 
gathering  together  to  attack  Cabul  were  freely  circulated  in  the 
city,  but  little  attention  was  paid  to  them.  Later,  there  was 
the  plain  evidence  of  our  cavalry  scouts  that  4,000  or  5,000  men 
were  between  Maidan  and  Argandeh,  and  to  cut  them  off  was  the 
object  of  General  Macpherson's  march  into  the  Chardeh  Valley, 
and  of  the  detour  made  by  General  Baker  from  Gharasia  to 
Maidan.  General  Macpherson,  in  carrying  out  his  flank  march  to 
get  between  Mahomed  Jan  and  Bamian,  came  unexpectedly  upon 
Mir  Butcha  and  his  Eohistanis ;  and  he  had  first  to  deal  with 
them  before  turning  his  attention  to  the  Ardal  Pultan  and  their 
friends  from  Wardak  and  Ghazni.  His  defeat  of  Mir  Butcha,  on 
December  10th,  was  of  great  value,  as  preventing  the  Eohistanis 
from  joining  the  other  force ;  but  on  the  11th  there  followed  the 
defeat  of  our  cavalry  and  the  temporary  loss  of  two  guns.  That 
afternoon  was  really  most  pregnant  with  danger  to  the  canton- 
ment. Two  brigades  were  miles  away  from  the  walls,  and  between 
the  nearest  men  of  General  Macpherson's  brigade  and  Sherpur 
were  10,000  of  the  enemy*  If  they  had  streamed  over  the 
Nanuchi  Kotal,  near  where  the  action  of  the  14th  was  fought,  and 
had  shown  the  same  determination  in  assaulting  our  lines  as  they 
had  done  in  resisting  the  cavalry  and  guns,  we  must  have  lost 
Sherpur  long  before  help  could  have  come  from  the  two  Brigadiers. 
That  the  enemy  streamed  off  to  the  Cabul  gorge,  with  the  inten- 
tion of  seizing  the  Bala  Hissar  and  the  city,  was  the  saving  of  our 
cantonments.  Two  hundred  rifles  of  the  72nd  checked  them  at 
Dehmazung,  and  they  contented  themselves  with  occupying  the 
hills  to  the  south  of  the  Bala  Hissar  Heights,  and  waiting  for 
reinforcements.  We  kept  them  in  play,  on  the  12th,  with  600 
men,  who  partly  captured  their  position;  and  by  that  time 
General  Baker  had  reached  Sherpur.  On  the  18th  our  success 
was  unqualified ;  we  stormed  and  occupied  the  enemy's  position, 

Q 


2  26  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

and  oar  cavalry  in  the  Cabal  plain  cat  to  pieces  sach  fagitives  as 
left  the  hills.  That  evening  we  believed  we  had  seen  the  enemy's 
fall  strength  and  had  broken  it ;  bat  after  the  action  on  the  Asmai 
Heights,  and  the  retreat  of  oar  troops  to  cantonments,  we  were 
andeceived.  It  became  apparent  that  there  were  between  80,000 
and  40,000  men,  qaite  safficient  to  keep  as  within  oar  walls,  as 
with  sach  nambers  many  points  conld  be  threatened  at  the  same 
time.  It  came  to  this :  that  we  mast  be  content  to  let  them 
occapy  Cabal,  the  Bala  Hissar,  and  whatever  other  points  they 
chose,  while  we  watched  them  carefally  from  Sherpor,  ready  to 
repel  attack,  or  to  clear  them  oat  of  forts  and  villages  dangeroasly 
near  oar  walls.  They  have  liberty  to  roam  whithersoever  they 
will ;  while  we  are  so  namerically  weak,  except  for  cavalry  recon- 
naissances, that  we  mast  accept  the  asaal  conditions  of  a 
beleagaered  garrison.  We  have  accepted  it,  cheerfally  enoagh,  I 
ventare  to  say ;  and  when  we  again  go  oat  to  clear  Cabal  and  the 
Bala  Hissar,  we  shall  do  it  with  all  the  more  zest  after  being 
penned  up  in  Sherpar  by  sheer  weight  of  nambers. 

To-day  there  has  not  been  much  done  beyond  hard  work  at  the 
entrenchments,  at  which  the  men  labour  heartily,  as  they  know 
the  importance  of  having  continuous  lines  of  defence.  .Our  curiosity 
is  fed  by  rumours  from  the  city,  from  which  we  gain  a  certain 
amount  of  trustworthy  news ;  though  our  spies,-  as  a  rule,  are  the 
most  treacherous-lookiug  ruffians  we  have  seen  for  a  long  time. 
Our  intelligence  department  has  such  bad  tools  to  work  with,  that 
scarcely  any  information  proves  correct ;  for  an  Afghan  is  a  greater 
adept  at  fabrication  than  any  other  Asiatic.  We  cannot  trtt^tthem: 
they  go  and  come,  and  bring  strange  tales,  and  fill  our  minds  with 
the  idea  that  40,000  Ghazis  mean  to  fight  to  the  death,  so  as  to 
capture  Sherpur ;  and  then  nothing  comes  of  it.  We  hear  to-day 
of  scaling-ladders  being  made,  and  of  an  assault  to  be  delivered 
simultaneously  at  seven  points ;  but  when  or  how  it  will  be  made 
not  even  the  most  pronounced  liar  among  the  spies  ventures  to 
say.  Two  or  three  bankers  from  the  city  have  been  in  Sherpur 
to-day,  and  from  them  we  have  learnt  that  Mahomed  Jan  and  his 
followers  are  bursting  with  pride  at  finding  themselves  in  pos- 
session of  Cabul,  and  holding  the  British  army  in  check.  There 
is  BO  much   confidence  among   them,  that,  no  doubt  at    the 


Cabul  under  Mahomed  Jan.  227 

instigation  of  Taknb  Ehan's  mother,  they  have  proclaimed  young 
Mnsa  Jan,  Yakub's  son,  Amir,  This  is  to  give  a  semblance  of 
order  and  patriotism  to  their  movements,  we  suppose;  and, 
perhaps,  their  leaders  hereafter  may  be  bold  enough  to  proflfer 
negotiation.  They  will  be  the  mouthpiece  of  their  new  Amir,  and 
Sir  F.  Roberts  will  be  nothing  more  than  the  representative  of 
the  British,  who  will  be  told,  as  in  olden  times,  that  they  are 
not  wanted  in  the  country.  Further,  they  have  found  that  no 
Governor  of  Cabul  now  exists,  General  Hills,  our  nominee,  having, 
of  course,  left  the  kotwali  for  the  safer  quarters  of  Sherpur.  The 
fanatics  have  therefore  nominated  Mushk-i-Alam,  the  old  moollah, 
to  be  Governor,  and,  with  all  his  ninety  years  heavy  upon  him,  he 
sits  dispensing  justice  and  encouraging  the  moollaha  to  work  upon 
the  religious  feelings  of  soldiers.  Whether  he  expects  long  to 
enjoy  his  dignity  does  not  appear ;  but,  apart  from  his  great  age, 
there  is  the  contingency  of  Cabul  once  more  falling  into  our  hands. 
His  jehad  has  certainly  been  a  wonderful  success,  and  it  is  long 
since  so  large  a  number  of  armed  men  have  been  assembled  in 
and  about  Cabul.  They  are  likely  to  experience  the  same  difficulty 
we  have  always  felt — supplies.  Each  villager  carries  with  him 
chupoHes  and  dried  mulberries  sufficient  for  three  or  four  days' 
consumption ;  but  their  food-bags  now  want  replenishing.  With 
her  usual  energy,  Yakub's  mother  is  said  to  have  given  her  jewels 
and  money  to  the  "  troops  *' — if  they  deserve  the  name — and  they 
have  now  ample  funds  to  carry  them  on  for  a  short  time.  The 
citizens  also  have  been  called  upon  to  show  their  patriotism.  By 
beat  of  tom-tom  it  has  been  proclaimed  that  all  surplus  grain  and 
other  food  must  be  given  up,  each  family  only  retaining  enough 
for  its  own  consumption.  The  bunniahs  and  others  will  be  heavy 
losers  by  this  enactment ;  but  as  death  is  threatened  in  case  of 
disobedience,  there  is  no  option  but  to  obey.  They  will  find 
Mahomed  Jan's  short  rule  far  different  from  ours,  under  which 
they  amassed  rupees  by  thousands,  and  fleeced  the  strangers 
handsomely.  The  wholesale  looting  that  has  gone  on  during  the 
last  two  days  has  given  the  enemy  vast  stores  of  treasure ;  and 
one  report  states  that  Yahiya  Khan's  house,  which  we  only  par- 
tially cleared  out,  has  proved  a  mine  of  wealth  to  them.  The 
usual  result  has  followed:   they  have  begun  to  quarrel  among 

Q  2 


228  Tlie  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

themselves.  Every  Afghan  is  not  a  Ghazi ;  and  to  the  mind  of 
the  village  tribesman,  far  away  from  his  home,  it  seems  folly  to 
risk  further  fighting,  while  such  plunder  has  been  already  obtained. 
The  Ghazis  would  at  all  costs  try  to  storm  Sherpor,  and  repeat 
the  victory  of  1841-2,  but  their  fanaticism  has  not  extended  far, 
and  it  will  have  to  rise  to  fever-heat  before  it  will  face  an  assault. 
We  have  not  much  to  fear  in  that  direction ;  but  still  with  our 
small  stock  of  ammunition,  it  would  be  better,  perhaps,  if  it  did 
not  take  place.  If  made  at  night,  our  men  would  probably  blaze 
away  70  or  100  rounds ;  and  if  our  reinforcements  were  checked, 
we  might  seriously  feel  the  want  of  ammunition. 

To-day  the  sky  has  been  overcast  and  the  hills  obscured  with 
mist,  so  we  have  been  unable  to  communicate  by  heliograph  with 
Luttabund.  We  believe  the  garrison  there  to  be  quite  safe,  as 
news  of  any  attack  in  that  quarter  would  reach  us  very  soon. 
Colonel  Hudson  knows  that  we  are  invested,  and  he  will  have 
taken  every  precaution  to  ensure  his  own  safety.  There  seems  no 
disturbance  among  the  Tezin  Ghilzais  as  yet,  and  the  Safis  of 
Tagao  have  not  yet  returned  to  their  friends  in  Cabul.  Their 
losses  must  have  been  heavy  on  the  18th  and  14th.  The  Kohis- 
tanis  who  got  away  from  the  cavalry  on  the  18th  did  not  all  escape 
to  their  homes.  While  the  fight  was  going  on  near  Cabul,  the 
12th  Bengal  Cavaliy  at  Butkhak  were  ordered  to  patrol  the  plain 
between  that  post  and  the  Logar  river.  Towards  evening  they 
came  across  eight  men  who  were  at  once  made  prisoners.  They 
were  all  armed  and  well  mounted,  and,  upon  being  questioned, 
said  they  were  friends  of  Wali  Mahomed,  on  their  way  to  Tezin, 
to  bring  the  Ghilzais  down  to  aid  the  British.  This  statement 
was  telegraphed  to  Sherpur,  but  Wali  Mahomed  knew  nothing  of 
the  men ;  and  as  they  had  the  accoutrements  of  a  Guide  sowar  on 
one  horse,  and  three  new  Snider  rifles,  with  400  rounds  of  am- 
munition, they  were  ordered  to  be  shot.  When  told  they  were 
to  die,  they  half-admitted  that  they  were  not  friends  of  Wali 
Mahomed.  Their  leader  was  a  young  Eohistani,  who  met  his 
death  bravely  enough  :  the  second  was  a  petty  sirdar,  who,  in  fear 
and  trembling,  begged  for  his  life ;  and  the  third  was  a  village 
priest,  who  tried  to  induce  the  Mahomedan  sowar  told  off  to 
execute  him  to  let  him  go.     ''  You  are  a  Mahomedan/'  he  said. 


A  ''Demonstration''  229 

"  and  I  am  one  of  your  holy  men.  You  cannot  shoot  me !  Let 
me  get  past  the  sentry,  and  I  can  escape.'*  The  sowar's  answer 
was  characteristic  of  our  men  :  **  You  have  been  fighting  against 
the  Sircar,  and  it  is  your  kiitmut  now  to  be  shot.  You  must  fulfil 
your  kismtU.**  The  moollah  saw  that  his  prayers  were  of  no  avail, 
and  as  he  was  walking  out,  he  added  half-apologetically : — **I 
tried  to  persuade  these  others  not  to  fight,  but  they  would  come 
down  to  Cabul,  and  they  brought  me  with  them."  This  was 
admission  enough,  even  if  it  were  not  the  whole  truth.  It  is  the 
moollah  usually  who  persuades  the  tribes  to  turn  out,  not  the 
tribesmen  who  have  to  persuade  the  priest  to  come  with  them. 
The  four  other  prisoners  were  servants  of  the  three  men  named  : 
as  they  were  all  bearing  arms  they  also  were  shot. 

nth  December. 

To-day  the  enemy  seem  to  have  awakened  to  a  sense  of  their 
responsibility  as  an  investing  force.  Having  made  their  perma- 
nent (?)  political  arrangements  for  the  good  government  of  Cabul 
and  Afghanistan,  they  have  begun  to  turn  their  attention  to  the 
stranger  within  their  gates.  They  fondly  imagine  that  a  parade 
of  their  strength  may  overawe  us,  and  strike  terror  to  our  souls  : 
quite  forgetting  that  it  can  only  be  for  a  short  time  that  we  shall 
be  the  attacked,  and  not  the  attackers.  About  ten  o*clock  this 
morning  they  poured  out  of  the  eastern  and  western  gates  of 
Cabul,  with  banners  flying  and  tom-tonis  beating,  and  drew  up  in 
dense  masses  upon  the  Siah  Sung  Heights  on  the  one  side  and  the 
slopes  of  the  Asmai  hill  above  Deh-i- Afghan  on  the  other.  Horse- 
men were  seen  galloping  about  in  their  midst,  and  trying  to  keep 
them  together  in  military  order ;  but  their  efforts  were,  as  a  rule, 
of  no  avail,  only  the  men  of  the  Ardal  Pultun  marching  at  all 
like  soldiers.  The  men  in  that  regiment  (Guards)  still  carry  their 
Sniders,  and  dress  in  a  soldierlike  manner,  their  cross-belts  and 
pouches  giving  them  the  appearance  of  regular  sepoys.  At  eleven 
o'clock  the  A%han8  assembled  must  have  numbered  fully  20,000, 
and  it  was  believed  that  they  meditated  an  attack  on  the  eastern 
and  western  walls  of  Sherpur.  The  alarm  was  accordingly 
sounded  in  cantonments,  all  work  at  the  trenches  was  stopped,  the 
Reserve  formed  up  at  its  appointed  place  below  the  Bemaru  gorge, 


230  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

and  every  man  went  to  his  post.  It  was  a  bleak  December  day ; 
the  snn  was  obscured,  a  cold  wind  sweeping  down  from  the  Pngh- 
man  hills,  and  heavy  clouds  louring  as  if  threatening  snow.  Our 
men  in  the  trenches  and  on  the  walls  were  all  dad  in  their  over- 
coats, and  dreary  work  they  found  it  waiting  for  an  enemy  who 
never  came.  The  hundreds  of  scaling-ladders  we  had  heard  so 
much  about  were  not  visible,  and  the  thousands  of  men  who 
crowded  upon  Siah  Sung  were  only  valorous  enough  to  wave  their 
knives  and  scream  out  curses  which  never  reached  our  ears.  After 
several  hours  of  this  unsatisfactory  waiting,  the  order  was  given 
to  shell  the  enemy,  most  of  whom  were  out  of  rifle-range.  G-8 
and  two  guns  of  F-A  opened  upon  Siah  Sung,  and  their  practice 
was  excellent.  G-8  got  the  range  exactly,  and  two  or  three  shells 
burst  right  in  the  thick  of  the  masses  upon  the  ridge.  The  effect 
was  instantly  seen  :  ^'  they  jist  ran  like  skelpit  bairns,**  as  a 
Highlander  remarked.  The  dead  and  wounded  were  dragged 
away  by  the  heels,  and  in  an  hour  the  heights  were  clear,  except 
of  such  small  parties  as  disdained  to  run  away.  A  few  marksmen 
of  the  67th,  with  their  Martinis,  knocked  over  one  or  two  of  these 
at  1,700  yards,  and  this  long  range  shooting  caused  the  Afghans 
to  disperse,  some  going  to  the  Bala  Hissar,  and  others  running 
down  to  the  villages  below  Siah  Sung.  On  our  eastern  wall  the 
8-inch  howitzer,  placed  in  position  on  one  of  the  bastions,  was 
fired  for  the  first  time,  and  its  huge  shells,  dropping  into  and 
over  Deh-i-Afghan,  scattered  the  crowds  there  assembled.  The 
terrific  report  of  the  howitzer,  and  the  bursting  of  its  heavy  shells, 
did  much  to  alarm  the  enemy,  who  have  hitherto  only  had 
7-pounders  and  9-pounders  fired  against  them.  There  was  some 
difficulty  at  first  in  getting  the  range  and  fixing  fuses  in  the 
shells,  which  are  of  Afghan  make ;  but  our  gunners  soon  over- 
came this,  and  the  howitzer  is  now  in  perfect  working  order.  It 
will  be  very  useful  in  shelling  such  villages  near  Deh-i-Afghan  as 
may  be  occupied  by  sharpshooters. 

The  only  attempt  to  open  fire  upon  the  cantonment  walls  was 
made  by  a  small  body  of  the  enemy,  who  took  possession  of  the 
small  walled  garden,  where  the  5th  Punjab  Cavalry  was  quartered 
before  the  investment.  This  garden  lies  to  the  right  of  the  road 
leading  to  the  city,  and  is  about  700  yards  from  the  *^  72nd  Gate- 


Skirmishing.  231 

way.**  It  is  all  that  remains  of  the  old  "  King's  Garden "  of 
1889-42.  The  walls  are  about  ten  feet  high,  and  within  them 
are  numerous  large  trees,  up  which  some  of  the  more  daring 
Afghans  climbed.  Their  best  shots  aimed  at  our  men  lining  the 
walls ;  but  although  their  bullets  struck  the  parapet  from  time  to 
time,  or  dropped  £Gir  over  into  the  open  space  where  our  tents 
used  to  stand,  no  harm  was  done.  Two  mountain  guns  of 
Swinley's  battery  were  placed  in  the  bastion,  fifty  yards  to  the 
west  of  the  ''  72nd  Gateway,"  and  these  shelled  the  garden,  while  a 
few  marksmen  fired  at  such  Afghans  as  exposed  themselves.  In 
the  afternoon  two  companies  of  the  5th  Punjab  Infantry  were 
ordered  out  to  clear  the  garden.  Colonel  Brownlow,  of  the  72nd, 
who  has  charge  of  the  wall  from  the  gateway  to  the  south-western 
bastion,  rode  out  with  them.  They  doubled  across  the  open, 
covered  by  the  fire  from  the  gate  and  bastions,  and  got  well  round 
to  the  westward  of  the  garden.  The  enemy  fired  a  few  shots,  and 
then  rushed  out  at  the  opposite  side,  making  for  Mahomed  Sharif's 
fort  on  the  other  side  of  the  road.  One  was  shot  and  bayoneted ; 
and  on  our  side  a  sepoy  of  the  6th  was  slightly  wounded  by  a 
bullet  in  the  leg.  The  garden  was  thoroughly  searched,  but  none 
of  the  enemy  could  be  found,  so  our  men  returned  to  Sherpur, 
two  companies  of  the  72nd  being  ready  inside  to  cover  their 
retirement  if  they  had  been  followed  up.  Beyond  one  or  two 
dropping  shots,  ihey  were  allowed  to  march  back  unmolested. 
While  this  was  going  on,  the  Bala  Hissar  was  seen  to  be  crowded 
with  armed  men,  and  word  was  brought  in  that  the  mooUahs  were 
haranguing  them,  and  urging  them  to  attack  in  eai*nest.  Their 
exhortations  had  some  efiect,  as  several  thousand  men  took  the 
road  which  would  have  brought  them  across  the  Cabul  river  and 
well  vrithin  range  of  our  rifles ;  but  their  courage  or  fanaticism 
was  not  equal  to  the  demand  made  upon  it,  and  they  eventually 
turned  off  and  went  into  the  city.  A  few  are  reported  to  have 
gone  to  some  villages  outside  Bemaru  and  the  eastern  wall  of 
Sherpur ;  but  whether  they  vrill  remain  there  all  night  is  doubtful. 
There  is  no  organized  plan  of  attack  among  them ;  and  unless 
more  determination  is  shovm  than  that  displayed  to-day,  our 
investment  is  likely  to  be  of  a  very  mild  kind.  The  numerical 
strength  opposed  against  us  seems  also  to  have  decreased,  and 


232  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

our  spies  report  that  many  villagers  have  returned  home  with 
their  dead  and  wounded,  taking  also  with  them  such  loot  as  they 
can  carry.  The  boasted  reinforcements  to  swell  their  ranks  to 
100,000  men  are  not  forthcoming ;  and  beyond  the  annoyance  of 
being  confined  within  cantonments,  we  do  not  suffer  much  from 
Mahomed  Jan's  successes.  The  wells  we  have  sunk  since  our 
water-supply  was  cut  off  give  us  good  water;  and  except  the 
cavalry,  whose  lines  are  in  the  open,  we  are  all  snug  under  cover 
in  our  barracks,  so  that  stray  bullets  cannot  do  us  harm.  For 
the  better  purposes  of  defence  the  cantonment  has  been  divided 
into  sections,  and  each  of  these  is  in  charge  of  an  officer.  From 
the  head-quarters'  gate  northwards  to  the  end  of  the  wall,  and 
thence  along  the  heights  to  the  Bemaru  gorge,  Major-General 
Hills  has  charge  ;  Brigadier-General  Hugh  Gough  takes  from  the 
gorge  and  along  the  line  of  entrenchments  to  Bemaru  village ; 
Colonel  Jenkins,  of  the  Guides,  has  the  eastern  wall,  from  Bemaru 
to  the  comer  bastion  looking  towards  Butkhak ;  Brigadier-General 
Macpherson  the  southern  wall,  from  that  bastion  to  the  72nd 
Gate ;  Colonel  Brownlow  from  the  gate  to  the  comer  bastion  on 
the  south-west,  facing  Deh-i- Afghan ;  and  Colonel  Hogg  from 
that  bastion  to  the  head-quartiers.  Major  Hanna  is  Brigadier- 
General  Gough' s  orderly  officer.  The  Reserve  is  under  Brigadier- 
General  Baker,  and  at  night  all  the  men  belonging  to  it  sleep  on 
the  hillside  below  Bemaru  gorge.  During  the  day  the  position 
of  the  infantry  is  as  follows : — From  the  head-quarters'  gate  to  the 
western  foot  of  the  heights,  the  6th  Punjab  Infantry ;  below  the 
heights  to  the  west  of  the  gorge,  the  8rd  Sikhs  and  6th  Ghoorkas ; 
east  of  the  gorge,  the  wing  of  the  23rd  Pioneers ;  in  Bemaru 
village,  the  Guides'  Cavalry  and  Infantry ;  near  the  eastern 
wall,  100  men  of  the  28th  Punjab  Infantry  and  part  of  the 
67th  Foot ;  in  the  barracks,  on  the  south,  the  remainder  of  the 
67th,  the  92nd,  and  the  72nd;  and  in  the  westem  wall  the 
Sappers  and  Miners.  Dismounted  cavalry  are  also  employed  at  a 
few  of  the  bastions  and  near  the  gorge.  The  guns  are  moved 
from  point  to  point  as  their  fire  is  wanted.  To-day  parties  of 
cavalry  were  out,  reconnoitring  towards  Kohistan,  in  the  direction 
of  the  Surkh  Eotal ;  but  beyond  seeing  a  few  score  men  moving 
about,  they  reported  nothing  unusual.     They  did  not  come  under 


Awaiting  Reinforcements.  233 

fire  of  the  enemy.  Our  cavalry  yidettes  take  up  a  position  on 
two  low  hills,  a  mile  beyond  the  north-western  bastion,  whence 
they  can  watch  the  Aliabad  and  Nanuchi  Eotals  leading  from 
Ghardeh  Valley,  and  also  warn  us  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy 
along  the  road  at  the  foot  of  the  Asmai  hill  from  Deh-i- Afghan. 
No  large  bodies  of  Afghans  could  move  from  this  direction  with- 
out the  garrison  having  timely  warning  of  their  approach. 

Again  to-day  we  had  no  heliographio  communication  with 
Luttabund,  and  the  position  of  General  Charles  Gougb's  brigade 
is  quite  unknown  to  us.  We  are  calculating  that  he  will  be  here 
by  the  20th ;  but  this  is  a  sanguine  estimate,  as  the  troops  on 
the  Ehyber  side  are  still  weak  in  their  transport  arrangements. 
He  may  be  unable  for  a  few  days  to  concentrate  his  troops  at  Jug- 
dulluck  preparatory  to  starting  for  Gabul ;  but  the  exigency  is  so 
great,  that  we  may  reasonably  hope  great  energy  will  be  shown  in 
pushing  on  when  once  a  start  is  made.  He  is  to  bring  with  him 
the  9th  Foot,  the  2nd  and  4th  Ghoorkas,  and  a  mountain  battery  ; 
and  if  the  baggage  is  limited  to  the  merest  necessaries,  the  march 
should  be  a  rapid  one.  It  is  a  heavy  blow  to  our  prestige  to  be 
forced  into  Sherpur  after  having  ruled  Cabul  for  two  months ; 
and  the  sooner  the  present  humiliating  state  of  affairs  is  changed, 
the  better  will  it  be  for  our  future  control  of  the  country.  Our 
men  are  equal  to  bearing  the  exposure  of  night  work  well  enough 
under  the  influence  of  excitement ;  but  when  the  reaction  comes, 
there  will  be  a  long  list  of  hospital  cases,  for,  even  with  four 
blankets  and  an  overcoat,  a  soldier  cannot  but  feel  the  effects  of 
sleeping  out  in  the  open  air.  To-day  has  been  the  coldest  we  have 
yet  experienced,  and  the  wind  is  very  trying  to  the  sentries,  who 
have  to  stand  motionless  at  their  posts,  watching  for  the  enemy. 
If  snow  falls,  the  discomfort  will  be  increased,  and  the  men  in 
the  trenches  and  bastions  will  have  to  bear  great  hardships. 

18tA  December. 

Night  attacks,  which  would  cause  us  much  trouble  and  seriously 
harass  our  troops,  do  not  seem  to  be  advisable  in  the  eyes  of 
the  Afghans.  Not  even  the  Ghazis,  who  showed  such  courage  on 
the  14th,  can  persuade  their  friends  to  venture  forth  at  night ;  and 


234  ^'^  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

as  the  moon  nightly  gives  more  and  mcMre  light,  we  feel  less  anxioas 
as  we  'Uum  in/'  fcdly  dressed,  at  ten  o'cloek.  Not  that  we 
relax  our  vigilance  in  the  least :  there  is  too  much  at  stake  for 
this  ;  but  that  we  sleep  sounder,  now  that  for  three  nights  we  have 
been  left  undisturbed.  A  sentry  occasionally  fires  a  shot;  but 
no  sooner  does  the  report  ring  out,  than  an  officer  visits  the  post 
and  personally  sees  if  there  are  signs  of  danger.  In  the  Reserve 
below  the  gorge  the  officers  of  each  regiment  watch  for  an  hour 
in  turn ;  and  thus,  in  addition  to  the  sentries,  there  are  always 
eyes  and  ears  ready  to  detect  anything  unusual.  Tents  have 
been  pitched  for  some  of  the  men  to  sleep  in ;  but  the  majority 
roll  themselves  up  in  their  blankets  and  waterproof  sheets,  and 
rest  as  cheerfully  as  if  within  four  walls.  The  officers  on  duty 
on  the  walls  sleep  among  their  men,  and  are  called  whenever 
suspicion  is  excited  by  moving  objects  outside,  so  that  a  night 
surprise  is  impossible.  The  officers  in  charge  of  sections  visit 
their  walls  and  trenches  nightly,  to  see  that  all  arrangements  are 
properly  carried  out ;  and  General  Boberts  and  his  Staff  sometimes 
make  the  entire  round  of  cantonments.  If  an  enemy  were  be- 
sieging us  in  a  civilized  manner,  and  pushing  forward  parallels 
and  entrenchments,  we  could  not  be  more  vigilant;  and  it  is 
satisfactory  in  the  extreme  to  see  the  soldierlike  bearing  of  all  the 
troops  engaged  in  the  weary  work  of  keeping  watch  and  ward  over 
nearly  five  miles  of  defences.  British  and  native  are  fully  alive 
to  the  serious  duties  they  have  to  fulfil ;  and  down  even  to  the 
dismounted  Lancer,  with  his  carbine  ready  for  use,  doing  the 
unwonted  task  of  sentry-go  in  the  trenches,  there  is  not  a  man 
who  has  not  accepted  cheerfully  the  hardships  imposed  upon 
him. 

It  was  understood  that  to-day  an  attack  would  be  made  in 
earnest.  The  moollahs  had  been  at  their  prayers  in  the  early 
morning,  and  had  blessed  innumerable  flimsy  standards  which 
were  to  be  planted  on  our  walls  when  their  victorious  followers 
had  driven  us  from  our  defences.  There  certainly  was  more 
appearance  of  resolution  in  the  movements  of  the  enemy  than  has 
hitherto  been  the  case.  The  small  party  in  the  villages  beyond 
the  eastern  wall  had  cleared  out  during  the  night,  and  a  demon- 
stration in  force  was  made  from  the  south-western  direction.    Our 


A  Resolute  Attack  Repulsed.  235 

cayalry  yidettes  on  Slab  Sang  and  the  hills  near  the  north-west 
bastion  gave  us  warning  of  the  approach  of  several  thousand  men, 
who  moved  out  with  their  standards  from  the  Jellalabad  gate  and 
Deh-i- Afghan,  and  took  up  positions  in  the  gardens  and  enclosures 
which  cover  the  plain  to  the  north  of  the  city.    I  have  said  that 
good  cover  for  an  attacking  force  still  remains  in  front  of  the 
southern  wall  and  the  south-west  bastions,  and  this  was  made  use  of 
by  Mahomed  Jan,  to  push  his  men  well  towards  Sherpur.     The 
alarm  was  sounded  in  cantonments  at  eleven  o'clock,  as  on  the 
previous  day,  and  in  a  quarter  of  an  hour  we  were  ready  for  the 
attack.    A  hot  fire  was  begun  from  behind  walls,  watercourses, 
and  towers,  upon  the  soldiers  lining  the  walls  of  Sherpur,  and  we 
answered  it  with  our  guns.     Shells  were  dropped  into  the  gardens 
where  the  enemy  were  in  most  force,,  six  guns  of  G-8  and  F-A 
being  taken  out  at  the  north-west  comer  of  the  cantonment,  and 
making  good  practice  at  1,500  and  2,000  yards.    Orders  were 
given  for  no  small-arm  ammunition  to  be  wasted,  and  small  volleys 
only  were  fired  upon  the  men  fully  exposing  themselves.    A  few 
Ghazis  worked  from  wall  to  wall,  until  within  400  yards  of  the 
comer  bastion  nearest  Deh-i- Afghan,  but  they  could  do  nothing 
beyond  planting  their  standards,  for  at  that  distance  our  marks- 
men, with  their  Martinis,  could  scarcely  fail  to  hit  even  so  small 
an  object  as  a  man's  head.    Afghans  are  good  skirmishers,  and  in 
the  art  of  taking  cover  they  are  almost  unequalled ;  but  there  was 
an  open  space  between  their  advanced  standards  and  the  walls, 
whidi  even  a  Ghazi  would  not  venture  to  cross.    All  that  we  could 
see  were  the  flashes  from  their  rifles  and  jhezails  from  loopholes 
in  the  enclosures  and  towers,  or  from  behind  trees,  ditches,  and 
stones.    Our  shells  were  so  effective,  that  two  or  three  bursting 
in  a  garden  were  enough  to  drive  its  defenders  to  seek  other 
protection  ;  and  as  they  passed  from  wall  to  wall,  they  were  shot 
down  by  our  rifle-fire,  which  never  grew  wild  or  irregular.    Eight 
picked  men  out  of  the  72nd  Highlanders  firing  a  volley  at  a  signal 
from  their  officer  accounted  for  six  men  out  of  ten  who  were 
trying  to  reach  a  small  isolated  tower  only  400  yards  from  the 
south-west  bastion ;  and  their  comrades  near  were  so  disheartened 
that  they  left  their  standards,  and  crawled  back  several  hundred 
yards.     Solitary  Ghazis,  walking  in  sheer  bravado  out  of  cover, 


236  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 8a 

were  killed  at  longer  ranges,  and  all  heart  seemed  to  die  out  of 
the  attacking  party,  who  could  make  no  headway  against  such  a 
deadly  fire.  For  the  greater  part  of  the  day  the  enemy's  fire 
from  the  villages  continued,  and  bullets  came  singing  over  the 
walls  into  cantonments,  making  it  dangerous  for  any  one  to  venture 
beyond  the  shelter  of  the  barracks.  Spent  bullets  dropped  a  few 
yards  over  the  roofs,  and  Lieutenant  Sunderland,  of  the  72nd, 
was  struck  on  the  foot  and  slightly  wounded  by  one  of  these.  A 
bhistee  near  head-quarters  was  hit  in  the  chest,  and  General 
Yaughan's  horse  was  wounded  while  standing  picqueted  near  the 
same  spot.  Every  tree  and  every  yard  of  wall  outside  Deh-i- 
Afghan  and  Murad  Ehana,  the  northern  part  of  Cabul,  seemed  to 
hide  skirmishers ;  and  the  rattle  of  musketry  for  several  hours 
told  of  the  continuous  fire  they  were  keeping  up.  Not  a  man  on 
Sherpur  walls  was  hit,  though  narrow  escapes  were  numerous. 
General  Boberts,  with  several  members  of  his  Staff,  was  watching 
the  movements  of  the  enemy  from  the  roof  of  the  head-quarters' 
gate  when  a  bullet  passed  just  over  the  parapet  and  struck  the 
wall  behind.  The  heliograph  instrument  on  the  same  roof  was 
also  hit.  The  Union  Jack  was  flying  just  below,  and  it  was 
believed  that  this  was  taken  as  a  target,  as  the  shooting  was  so 
accurate.  A  score  of  Mahomed  Jan's  nondescript  cavalry  galloped 
along  the  road  below  the  Asmai  hill,  as  if  to  cut  off  our  videttes, 
but  a  few  shells  checked  them ;  while  a  small  body  of  infantry, 
which  tried  to  work  round  in  the  same  dii-ection,  were  kept  back 
by  a  few  shots  from  the  sowars'  carbines,  aided  by  a  cross  fire 
from  twelve  picked  shots  of  the  5th  Punjab  Inf&ntry,  snugly 
ensconced  in  the  fields,  behind  a  little  sungar  600  yards  from  the 
guns.  These  twelve  men — six  Afridis  and  six  Dogras — also 
prevented  any  stragglers  from  firing  at  the  guns ;  and  the  coolness 
with  which  they  kept  their  post  and  fired  upon  200  or  800  Afghans 
who  tried  to  dislodge  them  was  admirable.  In  the  afternoon  the 
67th  Foot  moved  out  along  the  fields  in  front  of  the  southern 
walls,  and  skirmished  along  the  enemy's  right  flank,  so  as  to  draw 
their  fire,  and  make  them  show  their  real  strength.  They  were 
also  to  examine  the  ground,  and  see  if  it  were  possible  for  cavalry 
to  work  across.  They  lined  such  walls  as  gave  cover  and  drew  a 
smart  fire  upon  themselves,  which  they  returned  rather  too  freely 


Further  Movements  of  the  Enenty.  237 

considering  that  ammnnition  is  so  valnable.  There  was  not  time 
for  them  to  clear  the  gardens  and  forts,  so  at  sunset  they  returned 
to  their  quarters,  their  withdrawal  being  the  signal  for  the  enemy 
to  follow  their  old  tactics  of  creeping  forward  again  to  the  positions 
they  had  evacuated.  The  fire  from  the  bastions  was  again  effec- 
tive in  covering  the  retirement,  and  the  regiment  reached  canton- 
ments without  any  casualties.  The  King's  Garden  had  been 
occupied  since  the  morning  by  two  companies  of  the  6th  Punjab 
InfiEUitry,  Colonel  Williams  (commanding  6th  Punjab  Cavalry) 
having  reported  that  it  was  easily  defensible  by  infantry.  The 
Punjabees  were  withdrawn  at  the  same  time  as  the  67th  retired ; 
two  companies  of  the  8rd  Sikhs,  who  had  gone  out  to  strengthen 
the  right  flank  of  the  67th,  keeping  the  enemy  back  while  the 
garden  was  evacuated.  No  sooner  had  the  sepoys  withdrawn 
than  the  garden  was  filled  with  Afghans,  who  fired  the  quarters 
of  the  sowars,  and  amused  themselves  by  shrieking  and  howling 
about  the  place,  as  if  they  had  gained  a  great  success.  The  6th 
Punjab  Cavalry  have  had  all  their  trouble  for  nothing :  they  had 
made  themselves  comfortable  for  the  winter,  and  had  got  in  lihooza 
and  firewood ;  and  this  is  now  either  burnt  or  carried  away.  In 
a  village  near  Mahomed  Sharif  s  Fort  are  large  stores  of  forage, 
and  this,  also,  will  probably  be  looted. 

To-day  the  sun  shone  out  for  a  short  time,  and  we  were  able  to 
heliograph  to  Luttabund,  although  the  mist  over  the  hills  beyond 
Butkhak  was  very  dense.  A  message  was  received  from  Colonel 
Hudson,  commanding  at  Luttabund,  reporting  all  well ;  he  had 
not  been  attacked ;  Gough's  brigade  had  not  been  seen,  and  it 
was  supposed  he  was  still  at  JugduUuck.  General  Roberts  signalled 
back,  ordering  the  brigade  to  advance  instantly,  even  if  they  had 
to  leave  their  tents  behind  for  want  of  transport ;  but  whether  the 
signallers  at  Luttabund  could  read  our  message,  is  not  certain,  as 
no  answering  flashes  came  back,  heavy  clouds  obscuring  the  sun 
over  the  distant  kotal.  It  was  signalled  twice,  so  that  it  might  be 
understood,  and  we  hitve  but  little  doubt  that  it  was  '*  read  "  cor- 
rectly. It  is  now  plain  that  our  reinforcements  will  not  be  here 
by  the  20th,  and  we  must  wait  patiently  for  another  five  or  six 
days. 
Snow  began  to  fall  at  seven  o'clock  this  evening,  and  it  is  still 


238  The  Afghan  War^  1879—80. 

steadily  snowing  now  (midnight).  At  ten  o'clock  I  Tisited  the 
bastions  held  by  the  72nd  Highlanders,  and  gained  some  idea  of 
the  work  our  men  are  called  upon  to  do.  The  sentries  in  their 
greatcoats  were  simply  white  figures  standing  rigidly  np  like 
ghosts,  the  snow-flakes  sofUy  coyering  them  from  head  to  foot, 
and  freezing  as  they  fell.  Men  on  gaard  in  the  bastions  were 
walking  briskly  to  and  fro  in  their  limited  space  to  keep  them- 
selves warm,  and  at  their  feet  were  their  sleeping  comrades, 
covered  with  their  waterproof  sheets.  A  cold  wind  had  been  blow- 
ing in  the  early  part  of  the  evening,  and  this  had  driven  the  flakes 
into  every  crevice,  and  had  caused  several  inches  of  snow  to  drift 
about  the  feet  of  the  sentries  in  the  parapet.  In  the  ditch  below 
our  horses  were  tethered,  and  our  syces  and  followers  sleeping, 
the  snow  covering  all  alike,  and  whitening  the  ground  as  far  as 
the  eye  could  reach.  Inside  cantonments  was  one  wide  sheet  of 
snowy  brightness,  the  Bemaru  Heights  rising  up  in  the  background 
and  looming  through  the  snowflakes  like  a  snowy  barrier  blocking 
us  from  the  outer  world.  It  was  bitterly  cold  on  these  heights, 
over  which  a  cold  wind  nearly  always  blows ;  and  we  knew  that, 
hidden  from  our  view,  were  2,000  or  8,000  men  sleeping  at  their 
posts,  with  snow  about  them,  every  man  ready  to  answer  the 
first  call  of  his  officer,  stalking  about  among  the  sentries.  Picquet 
duty  under  such  conditions  is  a  real  hardship ;  but  with  Balaclava 
caps  and  warm  gloves  frost-bite  is  guarded  against,  and  with  the 
early  morning  comes  hot  soup  and  cocoa,  which  cheers  the  men, 
and  gives  them  heart  to  face  the  cold.  By  order  of  the  General, 
the  Commissariat  serve  out,  night  and  morning,  tinned  soups  and 
cocoa  to  all  European  soldiers ;  and  it  is  fortunate  that  a  large 
supply  of  these  stimulants — for  such,  indeed,  they  are  in  a  climate 
like  this — reached  us  a  few  weeks  ago.  The  small  tins  are  easily 
carried  by  the  men,  and  all  that  is  wanted  is  a  cup  of  hot  water  to 
give  a  ** drink"  with  which  rum  cannot  hope  to  compete.  The 
sepoys  and  sowars  of  the  native  regiments  are  not  forgotten,  addi- 
tional comforts  being  served  out  to  them ;  and  they  are  cheery  as 
their  English  comrades,  though  the  snow  is  far  more  trying  to 
men  from  a  tropical  climate. 

Our  wounded  generally  are  doing  well,  though  one  trooper  of 
tiie  9th  Lancers,  who  was  injured  by  his  horse  being  killed  in  a 


An  Afghan  Fort  Destroyed.  239 

charge,  has  died.  Colonel  Gleland,  the  Colonel  of  the  same 
regiment,  who  was  wounded  in  the  disastrous  kSbxc  of  the  llth, 
is  pronounced  out  of  danger;  while  Lieutenant  Egerton,  shot 
through  the  neck  on  the  14th,  is  walking  about  again,  though  stUl 
on  the  sick  list.  I  am  sorry  to  say  that  Major  Cook,  V.C.,  6th 
Ghoorkas,  is  dying,  mortification  having  set  in  from  the  wound  he 
received  below  the  knee  on  the  Bala  Hissar  Heights.  His  brother, 
Lieutenant  Cook,  of  the  8rd  Sikhs,  who  was  wounded  in  Chardeh, 
is  rapidly  recovering. 


CHAPTER  XVm. 


The  Kege  of  Sherpnr  contmned— General  Baker's  Attack  upon  Kila  Mir  Akhor— De« 
fltroctioQ  of  the  Fort — Telegraphic  and  HeUographic  Arrangements  in  Sherpnr — 
News  from  Lnttabnnd — Despatch  of  a  Convoy  to  Colonel  Hudson — Movements  of 
the  Bnemy  at  the  Bntkhak  Road — ^Want  of  Ifilitary  Knowledge  among  the  Afghans 
— DisBensions  in  their  Eanks— Mahomed  Jan  offers  Termt— Heavy  0ans  got  into 
Position  in  Sherpur — ^Bombardment  of  Kila  Mahomed  Sharif — ^Failure  to  dislodge 
the  Bnemy — Arrival  of  General  Charles  Gongh's  Brigade  at  Sei  Baba — Night  March 
of  the  12th  Bengal  Cavalry  to  Lnttabnnd — Occupation  of  Villages  East  of  Sherpur 
by  the  Enemy — ^Trustworthy  News  of  a  contemplated  Attack— The  Preparations 
to  resist  an  Assault— The  Attack  of  December  28rd— Bepulse  of  the  First  Attack 
on  the  Eastern  Trenches — ^The  Attack  renewed — Dispersion  of  the  Enemy — 
Cavalry  Pursuit — ^Deaths  of  Captain  Dundas,  Y.C.,  and  Lieutenant  Nugent,  B.E. — 
General  Charies  Gbugh  at  the  Logar  Bridge— Return  of  Casualties. 

Shebpub,  19th  December. 
The  enemy  daring  the  night  occupied  two  strong  forts  a  few 
handred  yards  beyond  the  eastern  wall,  and  were  in  such  numbers 
that  their  fire  annoyed  ns  in  that  direction.  Near  the  28th  NJ. 
lines  is  a  high  walled  enclosure,  in  which  sick  and  wounded  sepoys 
are  placed ;  and  in  front  of  this  again,  outside  the  lines,  is  a 
small  fort  in  which  fifty  men,  of  the  67th  Foot,  under  Captain 
Smith,  had  been  stationed  during  the  night  as  an  advanced  post. 
The  fort  nearest  to  them  in  possession  of  the  enemy  is  known  as 
Kila  Mir  Akhor,  named  after  the  Afghan  Master  of  the  Horse,  and 
to-day  General  Baker  was  ordered  to  destroy  this.  He  took  with 
him  400  of  the  67th,  under  Major  Eingsley,  400  of  the  8rd  Sikhs 


240  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

under  Colonel  Money,  the  6th  Punjab  Cavalry,  two  mountain  guns 
of  Swinley*s  Battery,  and  a  party  of  Sappers  and  Miners.  These 
moved  out  about  eight  o'clock ;  but  the  morning  was  so  misty  after 
last  night's  fall  of  snow,  that  nothing  could  be  seen  twenty  yards 
away.  A  wall  of  mist  shut  out  the  view  on  every  side,  and  it 
was  difiScult  to  feel  the  enemy  and  to  test  their  strength.  Just 
as  the  guns  were  being  got  into  a<3tion,  a  terrific  fire  from  the  two 
forts  held  by  the  Afghans  was  opened  upon  General  Baker,  and 
several  men  fell  wounded.  Lieutenant  Montenaro,  of  the  Moun- 
tain Battery,  was  laying  a  gun  when  a  bullet  struck  him  in  the 
chest  and  lodged  in  the  spine,  inflicting  a  mortal  wound.  General 
Baker  moved  back  the  67th  in  rear  of  the  fort  occupied  by  Captain 
Smith,  to  act  as  a  reserve,  and  extended  the  8rd  Sikhs  in  skir- 
mishing order  through  the  orchards  to  open  fire  upon  Eila  Mir 
Akhor.  The  guns  tried  to  get  round  on  the  left,  but  found  no 
position  to  suit  them  in  the  orchards,  and  it  was  then  reported 
that  the  fort  was  commanded  from  the  south-eastern  bastion.  They 
were  moved  into  this  bastion,  and,  aided  by  two  guns  of  F-A, 
shelled  the  place  for  some  time.  Covered  by  this  fire,  the  67th 
advanced  to  see  if  the  fort  were  still  held,  as  the  fire  from  it  bad 
slackened.  As  they  were  not  fired  upon,  the  Sappers,  under  Lieu- 
tenants Nugent  and  Murdoch,  pushed  on  with  powder  bags  and 
got  within  the  walls,  which  were  surrounded  by  Major  Eingsley 
and  his  men.  The  towers  were  mined  and  blown  up,  and  the 
buildings  set  on  fire.  The  enemy  still  held  the  further  fort,  which 
was  of  great  strength,  with  walls  80  feet  high,  and  beyond  some 
skirmishers  of  the  67th  checking  the  fire  from  its  towers,  it  was 
left  untouched.  The  enemy  were  crowded  within  it,  and  were 
reinforced  by  men  from  the  Siah  Sung  Heights.  Our  cavalry  and 
a  company  of  the  67th  kept  a  sharp  look-out  on  General  Baker's 
left  flank  in  the  Eohistan  direction,  while  the  towers  and  bastions 
were  being  blown  up,  and  Kila  Mir  Akhor  having  been  destroyed, 
the  force  returned  to  cantonments.  This  kind  of  work  is  full  of 
danger,  as  the  Afghans  make  good  shooting  from  loop-holes  and 
behind  orchard  walls ;  and  in  this  skirmish  we  had  six  of  the 
67th  and  six  of  the  8rd  Sikhs  wounded,  besides  Lieutenant  Mon- 
tenaro fatally  hit. 

There  was  again  to-day  constant  firing  at  the  walls  by  detached 


Arrangements  within  Sherpur.  241 

parties  of  the  enemy,  and  several  casualties  occurred — horses, 
ponies,  and  camp-followers  being  hit.  Our  men  do  not  answer 
the  fire,  except  when  certain  of  their  aim,  as  one  rifle  discharged 
from  the  walls  is  the  signal  for  twenty  answering  shots.  The 
bullets  go  wide  of  their  mark  and  drop  into  cantonments,  doing, 
as  I  have  said,  some  damage.  A  trooper  of  the  9th  Lancers, 
while  in  the  open,  was  badly  hit  in  the  chest ;  and  one  of  the  8rd 
Sikhs,  while  on  the  Bemaru  Heights,  was  also  struck.  The  bullet 
was  from  a  Snider  rifle,  and  must  have  travelled  1,600  or  1,700 
yards.  The  Ardal  Pultun  was  running  short  of  Snider  ammu- 
nition, and  the  irregulars  with  them  are  equally  short  of  lead. 
Slugs  made  of  telegraph  wire,  revolver  bullets,  and,  in  some 
oases,  even  cartridges  have  been  picked  up  within  the  walls.  They 
were  probably  fired  fromEnfields,  smooth-bores,  OTJhezails.  They 
would  make  an  ugly  wound  at  short  ranges,  but  they  are  mostly 
spent  by  the  time  they  reach  us. 

Though  we  are  cut  off  entirely  from  the  outer  world,  our  internal 
means  of  communication  are  perfect.  The  heliograph  works 
from  the  head-quarters*  gateway  to  the  eastern  end  of  Bemaru, 
and  telegraph  offices  have  been  opened  about  cantonments  by  Mr. 
Luke  and  Mr.  Kirk  in  charge  of  the  line.  There  is  plenty  of  wire 
left  even  after  so  many  hundreds  yards  have  been  used  for  entangle- 
ments, and  branch  lines  have  been  laid  from  the  chief  office  to  the 
more  distant  quarters.  General  Roberts  is  thus  kept  informed  of 
all  that  is  going  on,  and  much  orderly  work  is  saved  by  these 
means.  Orders  can  be  transmitted  to  General  Macpherson  and 
Colonel  Jenkins  in  a  few  seconds,  and  troops  warned  for  duty 
without  the  least  delay.  At  night,  lamps  are  used  for  heliographic 
signalling  from  the  gateways  and  the  heights  whereon  there  are 
no  telegraph  offices ;  and  though  the  light  draws  fire  occasionally, 
the  signallers  have  not  yet  been  hit.  Such  of  the  cavalry  as  were 
picqueted  in  the  open  have  been  moved  nearer  to  the  line  of 
barracks,  so  as  to  be  out  of  fire,  and  there  is  now  an  open  maidan 
where,  a  month  ago,  our  tents  covered  the  ground.  The  ordnance 
stores  have  also  been  moved  to  a  safer  spot  than  that  formerly 
occupied,  in  rear  of  General  Baker's  garden,  and  the  office  tents 
and  post-office  near  head-quarters  have  been  repitched  on  safer 
ground.     There  have  been  so  many  bullets  singing  about  that 


242  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

away  from  the  shelter  of  the  walls  there  was  positive  danger  in 
walking  from  point  to  point.  On  the  northern  line,  the  Bemara 
Heights,  no  shots  have  been  fired,  as  the  enemy  cannot  get  within 
range  without  laying  themselves  open  to  being  cut  off  in  the  plain 
beyond  by  our  cavahry. 

We  have  heard  from  Luttabund  to-day  that  none  of  the  special 
messengers,  conveying  letters  and  telegrams,  has  reached  there 
since  the  15th.  We  are  afraid  after  this  to  entrust  important 
letters  to  the  messengers,  who  may  have  taken  them  to  the  enemy, 
or  been  captured  on  the  road  to  Luttabund.  Beyond  keeping  a 
diary  of  events,  such  as  I  am  now  writing,  nothing  can  be  done ; 
and  it  is  hardly  likely  that  beyond  the  mere  fact  of  being  invested 
and  of  stray  shooting  at  the  walls  there  will  be  anything  left  to 
chronicle  for  a  few  days. 

Major  Cook,  Y.G.,  as  good  a  soldier  as  ever  served,  and  a 
universal  favourite  in  the  force,  died  this  evening.  Lieutenant 
Montenaro  still  lives,  but  paralysis  has  declared  itself,  and  his 
death  must  be  a  matter  of  a  few  hours.  Our  loss  of  officers  is 
painfully  great,  and  the  total  casualties  of  all  ranks  since  Decem- 
ber 10th  must  now  be  nearly  800.  The  9tb  Lancers  have  been 
the  worst  sufferers :  they  have  lost  three  officers  killed  and  four 
wounded,  and  twenty-one  men  killed  and  seventeen  wounded,  or 
forty-eight  casualties  in  their  ranks.  The  5th  Punjab  Cavalry  is 
the  only  regiment  whose  officers  have  escaped  scot-free  during  the 
five  days'  fighting,  from  the  10th  to  the  14th. 

20^^  December. 

Waiting  for  the  attack  has  grown  so  terribly  monotonous,  that 
we  daily  curse  the  tactics  pursued  by  Mahomed  Jan,  who  only 
sends  out  200  or  800  sharp-shooters  to  blaze  away  their  ammuni- 
tion at  our  sentries.  It  has  become  so  apparent  that  no  real 
assault  is  likely  soon  to  take  place,  that  we  are  half-inclined  to  go 
out  and  deal  with  the  enemy.  But,  fortunately  for  them,  they 
are  in  Cabul,  and  street  fighting  with  our  small  force  would  be 
almost  a  useless  sacrifice  of  life*  We  could  bum  the  city  down 
certainly;  but  there  are  political  considerations  which  tie  our 
hands,  as  to  destroy  Cabul  means  much  more  than  burning  so  many 


The  Investment  Ineffective.  243 

thousand  bouses.  We  have  still  no  news  of  General  Gough's  brigade^ 
although  the  20th  has  come  and  gone^  and  now  even  the  most 
sanguine  among  us  do  not  expect  the  investment  to  be  at  an  end 
till  Christmas  Day.  Our  little  garrison  at  Luttabund  has  had  a 
small  fight  of  its  own,  but  has  come  well  out  of  the  scrimmage, 
having  killed  fifty  of  the  assailants.  Mahomed  Jan  is  afraid  to 
split  up  his  force,  or  he  would  before  this  have  detached  5,000  or 
6,000  men  to  hold  Butkhak,  and  advance  thence  to  carry  the 
Luttabund  Kotal.  It  is  the  presence  of  our  troops  at  Luttabund 
and  Jugdulluck  which  has  no  doubt  kept  the  Tezin  Ghilzais  in 
check ;  and  as  Asmatullah  Khan  seems  to  be  quietly  waiting  in 
the  Lughman  Valley  for  further  news  of  Afghan  successes,  the 
march  of  our  reinforcements  should  be  made  without  a  shot  being 
fired — at  least  as  far  as  Luttabund.  A  small  convoy  of  yahooSy  in 
charge  of  their  Hazara  drivers,  carrying  food  to  Colonel  Hudson, 
was  sent  from  Sherpur  last  night,  and  reached  Luttabund  safely. 
Another  will  be  sent  to  night ;  but  as  parties  of  the  enemy  have 
been  seen  taking  the  road  to  Butkhak,  it  is  not  unlikely  that  it 
will  be  intercepted.  The  Hazaras  are  veiy  plucky ;  they  go  out 
willingly  for  a  small  reward,  and  we  are  now  using  a  few  of  them 
to  carry  letters  and  despatches.  They  paiss  out  of  the  north-west 
comer,  make  for  the  border  of  the  lake,  and  thence  work  along 
the  northern  edge  of  the  plain  between  Sherpur  and  Butkhak, 
avoiding  the  latter  place  as  much  as  possible.  We  are  anxious  as 
to  the  safety  of  the  bridge  over  the  Logar  river,  halfway  to 
Butkhak.  It  is  believed  at  present  to  be  intact ;  and  unless  it  is 
very  thoroughly  blown  up,  its  strong  masonry  piers  and  arches 
can  be  easily  repaired.  Luckily,  we  are  not  fighting  an  enemy 
with  many  resources.  There  is  no  one  from  Mahomed  Jan  down- 
wards who  understands,  in  the  first  place,  how  to  make  an  invest- 
ment really  worthy  of  the  name.  To  deal  with  walls  such  as  we 
have  to  defend,  the  only  mode  to  harass  the  garrison  successfully 
is  to  concentrate  an  enfilading  fire  so  as  to  sweep  the  parapet.  We 
have  not  had  time  to  make  traverses  of  sand-bags  on  the  bastions 
or  walls ;  and  our  men  would  sufier  greatly  if  the  bullets,  instead 
of  passing  harmlessly  over  the  parapet  at  right-angles,  were 
directed  so  as  to  rake  it  from  gate  to  gate.  If  the  enemy  threw 
up  earthworks  during  the  night  at  some  distance  from  the  comer 

B  2 


244  ^^^^  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

bastions,  and  fired  in  a  line  parallel  to  the  ditch^  they  could  not 
&il  to  do  some  mischief.  As  it  is,  not  a  man  on  the  walls  has 
yet  been  wounded,  and  our  answering  volleys,  when  fired,  have 
always  been  effective.  Four  men  out  in  the  open  were  shot  down 
by  one  volley  from  the  marksmen  at  the  south-west  bastion,  the 
range  being  450  yards.  A  Martini  rifle,  resting  in  a  neatly- 
cut  channel  on  the  parapet,  is,  in  the  hands  of  cool,  collected 
soldiers,  a  most  deadly  weapon  at  these  short  ranges  ;  and  as  no 
one  is  allowed  to  fire  without  an  oflBicer*s  permission,  the  shooting 
is  nearly  always  good.  One  of  the  many  rumours  from  the  city 
was  that  powder-bags  were  to  be  brought  to  blow  in  the  gates. 
In  only  one  case,  at  head-quarters,  has  an  attempt  been  made  by 
us  to  permanently  close  the  gateways.  There  is  a  strong  guard 
at  each,  and  the  open  space  is  usually  blockaded  with  Afghan 
ammunition  waggons,  strong  a&a^^ia  outside  being  so  arranged  as  to 
check  a  rush.  On  either  side  of  the  waggons,  which  can  be  easily 
drawn  away  when  troops  are  sent  out,  are  low  walls  built  up  of 
flour-bags,  from  behind  which  ten  or  twelve  men  can  command  the 
entrance  if  it  comes  to  close  fighting.  At  the  head-quarters*  gate 
strong  doors  have  been  placed  on  hinges  let  into  the  wooden  sup- 
ports to  the  mud  wall  on  either  side,  and  gun  carriages  are  closely 
jammed  against  these.  Twelve  picked  men  are  on  duty  day  and 
night  on  the  wall  commanding  the  entrance,  and  their  orders  are 
to  reserve  their  fire  until  the  enemy  with  their  powder-bags  are 
within  twenty  yards  of  the  gateway.  A  strong  wooden  platform, 
with  a  parapet  of  sand-bags,  stretches  from  wall  to  wall  six  feet 
above  the  gun-carriages,  and  this  post  is  entrusted  to  the  care  of 
the  thirty  Ghoorkas  who  came  up  with  Sir  Michael  Kennedy  as 
escort.  Even  if  the  door  were  blown  in,  the  ghazis  at  the  head 
of  a  storming  party  would  have  to  face  a  heavy  fire  from  above, 
which  they  could  not  return  while  clambering  over  the  barricade. 
This  gateway  would  probably  be  the  one  first  assailed,  as  the 
Afghans  know  quite  well  that  General  Koberts  and  his  Staff  have 
their  quarters  within  it. 

Some  of  our  spies  state  that  the  men  now  holding  Cabul  have 
seriously  contemplated  an  assault ;  but  that  their  ranks  are  split  up 
by  quarrels  as  to  the  right  of  tribal  sections  to  appoint  a  new  Amir. 
Old  Mushk-i-Alam  still  continues  to  prophesy  that  a  repetition  of 


The  Enemy  Offers  Terms.  245 

the  victory  of  1841-42  is  sure  to  come  to  pass ;  and,  as  a  first  step 
towards  this,  Mahomed  Jan  has  had  the  coohiess  to  ''open  negotia- 
tions." One  would  he  inclined  to  look  upon  his  self-assnrance  as 
ludicrous,  were  it  not  that  he  has  the  gratification  of  seeing  us 
shut  up  in  Sherpur,  as  if  at  his  mercy.  The  propositions  offered 
are  of  such  a  ''  mixed  "  order  that  they  seem,  at  first  sight, 
scarcely  serious.  One  is  that  we  should  at  once  retire  to  India, 
after  having  entered  into  an  agreement  to  send  Yakuh  Khan  hack 
to  Cabul  in  the  state  befitting  an  Amir ;  and  we  are  to  leave  two 
British  oflScers  of  distinction  as  hostages  for  the  faithful  carrying 
out  of  our  contract.  Another  is  made  on  behalf  of  the  Eohistanis, 
who  offer  to  accept  Wali  Mahomed  as  Amir,  if  we  will  march  away 
without  concerning  ourselves  further  with  Afghan  matters.  The 
leaders,  who  have  been  bold  enough  to  make  these  proposals, 
think,  perhaps,  that  we  are  as  weak  as  our  unfortunate  army 
thirty-eight  years  ago,  and  that  by  frightening  us  into  concessions 
they  will  be  able  to  cut  us  up  in  detail  as  we  toil  back  to  Peshawur. 
As  all  the  advantages  of  arms,  equipment,  and  ample  supplies  are 
now  on  our  side,  we  only  laugh  at  the  terms  so  considerately 
offered.  **  We  have  a  lakh  of  men  :  they  are  like  dogs  eager  to 
rush  on  their  prey !  We  cannot  much  longer  control  them  !*'  is 
said  to  have  been  one  of  the  messages  sent  to  shake  our  faith  in 
our  own  strength  ;  but  such  absurd  vapouring  is  taken  at  its  real 
value,  and  contemptuously  passed  over.  Yet  a  few  days,  and  we 
shall  have  6,000  men  hammering  at  the  gates  of  Cabul ;  and 
unless  our  soldiers  belie  themselves,  there  will  be  a  great  revenge 
taken  for  the  humiliation  our  army  has  had  to  endure.  The  idea 
of  creating  a  new  Amir  has  turned  the  heads  of  our  foes  to  an 
extent  that  is  absurd  when  it  is  remembered  that  they  are  merely 
in  Cabul  on  sufferance  for  a  few  days  until  our  reinforcements 
come  up.  The  Eohistanis,  who  have  nominated  Wali  Mahomed, 
are  at  loggerheads  with  the  Ghilzais  from  Logar  and  Wardak,  who 
i^-ish  to  put  Yakub  Khan's  son,  young  Musa  Jan,  on  the  throne. 
They  are  politicians  enough  to  know  that  Yakub  himself  will 
never  be  sent  back  as  ruler  of  Afghanistan,  and  nothing  would 
suit  them  better  than  to  have  an  infant  as  Amir,  and  their  own 
chiefs  as  a  Council  of  Kegency.  Such  a  government  would  be  on 
lines  which  would  give  full   scope  to  ambitious  men,  and  the 


246  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

conntry  would  be  plundered  for  the  benefit  of  the  Ghilzais  and 
their  friends.  In  this  wrangling  about  the  Amirship,  the  more 
warlike  work,  ready  at  hand,  is  forgotten,  though  the  more 
fanatical  have  held  councils  of  war  and  told  oflF  leaders  to  various 
sections  which  are  to  assault  Sherpur  at  a  given  signal.  There  is, 
however,  but  little  attention  paid  by  the  rank  and  file  to  the 
commands  of  their  leaders;  and  though  when  a  ghazi  rushes 
upon  his  death,  a  handful  of  desperate  men  will  follow  him,  the 
great  majority  hang  back  when  they  see  the  task  before  them. 

The  firing  into  cantonments  to-day  was  of  the  usual  desultory 
kind,  and  our  mountain  guns  pitched  a  few  shells  into  such 
gardens  as  contained  fairly  large  bodies  of  men.  Two  High- 
landers were  wounded  whUe  on  picquet  duty  at  the  line  of  en- 
trenchment from  the  commissariat  godowns  to  the  Bemaru  gorge. 
Kila  Mahomed  Sharif,  so  well  known  during  the  disastrous  winter 
of  1841,  still  stands  near  the  site  of  our  old  cantonments  between 
Sherpur  and  the  Cabul  river,  overlooking  the  road  from  the  Bala 
Hissar.  From  this  fort,  which  is  only  700  yards  from  the  72nd 
Gateway,  men  fired  at  the  southern  wall  all  day,  while  others 
could  be  seen,  with  rifles  slung  across  their  backs,  superiutending 
the  carrying  away  of  the  bhoosa  stored  by  the  5th  Punjab  Cavalry 
in  a  village  near  for  winter  consumption.  Hazara  coolies  were 
made  to  do  this  work,  and  also  to  dismantle  the  cavalry  quarters 
in  the  "King's  Garden,"  which,  as  before  stated,  we  have 
abandoned.  This  morning  three  18-pounders  and  an  8-inch 
howitzer,  part  of  the  siege  train  given  to  Shore  Ali  by  the  Indian 
Government,  ^ere  got  into  position  on  the  bastions  east  and  west 
of  the  72nd  Gateway,  and  to-morrow  these  will  open  upon  Kila 
Mahomed  Sharif  and  the  villages  in  rear.  We  want  40-pounder8 
at  least  to  batter  down  the  thick  walls  of  the  fort ;  but  still  the 
lieavy  guns  now  ready  to  be  fired  will  probably  have  a  good  effect 
upon  the  enemy.  Eound  shot  will  be  used  for  these  18-pounders, 
and  bits  of  ii'on,  bullets,  &c.,  have  been  sewn  up  in  canvas  to 
Kcrvc  as  canister  if  the  enemy  make  any  demonstration  in  force. 
There  was  no  diflBiculty  in  getting  the  guns  and  howitzer  up  the 
bastions,  twenty  or  thirty  men  at  the  drag-ropes  moving  them 
easily  into  position.  It  is  strange  that  guns  which  were  given  to 
Shere  Ali  as  a  reward  for  his  fidelity  to  the  British  should  now  be 


A  Troublesome  Fort  Bombarded.         '    247 

turned  against  the  Afghans,  who  have  shown  themselves  unahle  to 
appreciate  the  value  of  an  alliance  with  India.  Now  that  the  siege 
train  has  returned  to  our  possession  we  shall,  perhaps,  he  less 
confiding  in  handing  over  munitions  of  war  to  a  nation  which  has 
treated  us  so  treacherously. 

Beyond  throwing  out  our  usual  cavalry  videttes,  we  have  done 
nothing  to-day  to  show  the  enemy  we  are  on  the  alert.  The 
cavalry  have  heen  terribly  hard  worked  since  the  10th,  and  horses 
and  men  have  suffered  in  consequence.  At  one  period  the  saddles 
were  never  taken  ofif  the  horses  of  the  5th  Punjab  Cavalry  for 
sixty  hours,  and  the  other  regiments  have  been  nearly  in  the  same 
condition.  Lieutenant  Montenaro  died  this  evening  from  the 
eflfect  of  the  wound  received  yesterday.  This  makes  the  tenth 
officer  we  have  lost  in  as  many  days,  and  there  are  still  eleven 
others  under  treatment  for  wounds. 

21«^  December. 
The  three  18-pounders  and  the  howitzer  opened  fire  about  tea 
o'clock  this  morning  upon  Eila  Mahomed  Sharif,  and  fired  round- 
shot  and  shell  at  its  walls  and  the  village  in  rear,  where  the  enemy 
mustered  in  strength.  The  bombardment  was  so  far  successful 
that  the  fire  from  the  fort  at  our  walls  ceased ;  but  the  thick  walls 
were  too  strong  to  be  battered  down  by  anything  under  a  40- 
pounder ;  unless,  indeed,  our  guns  had  been  kept  playing  upon  it  for 
two  or  three  days.  After  three  or  four  hours'  incessant  firing, 
a  party  of  the  5th  Punjabees  went  out,  accompanied  by  Major 
Hanna,  of  the  Quartermaster-General's  Department,  to  examine 
the  place,  and  see  if  the  enemy  had  really  withdrawn.  It  was 
soon  found  that  they  were  only  hiding  themselves  from  the  shot 
and  shell ;  and  when  the  Punjabees  got  in  the  open,  the  Afghans 
rushed  back  to  their  positions  and  re-opened  fire.  They  used  the 
holes  made  in  the  walls  by  the  round-shot  as  loop-holes,  and  it 
must  be  confessed  they  were  admirably  adapted  for  the  purpose. 
All  day  long  bullets  have  been  dropping  over  the  walls,  and  five 
soldiers  and  several  camp-followers  have  been  wounded.  The 
tactics  of  the  enemy  are  annoying,  as  they  withdraw  at  the  first 
sign  of  our  men  moving  out,  and  return  again  as  soon  as  we  retire. 
Two  or  three  of  their  marksmen  are  daily  posted  to  the  same 


248  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

points,  and  blaze  away  steadily  at  any  one  incautiously  peeping  over 
the  parapet.  Our  men  quietly  sit  down  inside,  smoke  their  pipes, 
and  laugh  at  the  bullets.  A  few  watch  the  movements  of  the 
sharp-shooters ;  and  as  soon  as  they  show  in  the  open,  a  volley 
from  four  or  five  Martinis  is  fired,  generally  killing  one  or  two  men. 
One  of  the  Afghan  modes  of  skirmishing  is  for  a  few  men  to  get 
in  rear  of  a  waU,  cut  holes  through  the  bottom  a  few  inches  above 
the  ground,  dig  another  grave-like  hole  in  which  to  lie  down  flat, 
and  then  to  fire  their  pieces  from  their  loop-hole.  The  efiect  is 
very  singular :  the  flashes  seem  to  leap  out  of  the  ground  itself, 
and  when  a  score  of  men  are  firing,  the  bottom  of  the  wall  bristles 
with  flame.  This  manner  of  firing  gives  greater  steadiness  of 
aim,  and  is  far  safer  than  resting  the  rifle  on  the  wall-top,  or 
thrusting  it  through  a  slit  cut  half-way  up.  This  afternoon  the 
enemy  showed  in  large  numbers  in  the  orchards  about  Deh-i- 
Afghan,  and  were  plainly  trying  to  skirmish  round  towards  the 
north-west  gap  between  the  walls  and  the  Bemaru  Heights. 
General  Hills  commanding  at  that  corner  sent  out  a  party  of  the 
5th  Punjab  Infantry  and  8rd  Sikhs  to  occupy  some  low  hills  half 
a  mile  from  the  north-west  bastion ;  and  these  were  enough  to 
intimidate  the  enemy,  although  we  never  fired  a  shot  from  our 
rifles.  The  guns  shelled  the  orchards,  and,  at  dusk,  the  usual 
retirement  of  the  Afghans  to  the  city  followed.  The  Sikhs  and 
the  Punjabees  were  then  withdrawn  to  their  lines,  and  all  made 
snug  for  the  night.  We  have  materially  lessened  the  number  of 
men  on  the  walls  and  bastions  to-day,  as  the  duties  are  so  severe, 
but  everything  is  held  in  readiness  to  repulse  an  assault  at  a  few 
minutes'  notice.  As  the  Martini  ammunition  is  rather  short, 
Sniders  are  served  out  to  the  Europeans  behind  the  parapets  at 
night.  We  have  plenty  of  Snider  cartridges,  as  a  large  quantity 
was  captured  in  the  Bala  Hissar. 

To-day  heliograms  were  exchanged  with  Luttabund,  and  news 
was  received  from  General  Hugh  Gough,  who  is  at  Sei  Baba  with 
1,400  men  and  four  mountain  guns.  He  will  reach  here  on 
the  24th  at  the  latest,  and  then  we  shall  be  able  to  turn  the 
tables  on  Mahomed  Jan  and  his  30,000  or  40,000  men.  Our 
second  convoy  of  yaboos  to  Luttabund  was  cut  o£f,  only  four 
ponies  out  of  fifty  reaching  Colonel  Hudson  safely.     The  villagers 


Major  Cook,   V.C.  249 

en  route  are  believed  to  have  killed  the  Hazara  men  in  charge. 
The  12th  Bengal  Cavalry  start  to-night  for  Butkhak,  whence  they 
will  join  General  Gough*8  force.  This  is  the  first  sign  of  the 
approaching  termination  of  the  siege. 

The  Lieutenant-General  commanding  has  published  the  follow- 
ing Divisional  Order,  expressing  regret  at  the  death  of  Major 
Cook,  V.C,  5th  Ghoorkas: — **  It  is  with  deep  regret  the  Lieu- 
tenant-General announces  to  the  Cabul  Field  Force  the  death,  from 
a  wound  received  on  the  12th  of  December,  of  Major  John  Cook, 
V.C,  5th  Ghoorkas,  While  yet  a  young  officer.  Major  Cook 
served  at  Umbeyla  in  1868,  where  he  distinguished  himself;  and 
in  the  Black  Mountain  campaign  in  1868.  Joining  the  Kurram 
Field  Force  on  its  formation.  Major  Cook  was  present  at  the  cap- 
ture of  the  Peiwar  Eotal :  his  conduct  on  that  occasion  earning 
for  him  the  admiration  of  the  whole  force,  and  the  Victoria  Cross. 
In  the  return  in  the  Monghyr  Pass,  he  again  brought  himself 
prominently  to  notice  by  his  cool  and  gallant  bearing.  In  the 
capture  of  the  heights  at  Sang-i-Nawishta,  Major  Cook  again 
distinguished  himself ;  and  in  the  attack  on  the  Takht-i-Shah 
Peak,  on  the  12th  December,  he  ended  a  noble  career  in  a  manner 
worthy  even  of  his  great  name  for  bravery.  By  Major  Cook's 
death  Her  Majesty  has  lost  the  services  of  an  officer  who  would, 
had  he  been  spared,  have  risen  to  the  highest  honours  of  his 
profession,  and  Sir  F.  Eoberts  feels  sure  the  whole  Cabul  Field 
Force  wiU  share  in  the  pain  his  loss  has  occasioned  him." 

22nd  December. 

We  have  been  left  almost  undisturbed  to-day,  and  it  has  been 
hard  to  believe  we  are  really  in  a  state  of  siege.  Scarcely  a  shot  was 
fired  at  the  walls  until  the  evening ;  but  our  spies  bring  in  news 
that  Mahomed  Jan  is  reserving  his  strength  for  an  attack,  which 
shall  be  final.  He  has  heard,  no  doubt,  of  General  Gough's 
approach,  and  is  wise  enough  to  know  that  his  opportunity  is  fast 
slipping  away.  The  advance-guard  of  our  reinforcements  is  now 
at  Luttabund ;  and  the  fact  of  the  12th  Bengal  Cavalry  going 
out  from  Sherpur  last  night  must  have  shown  him  that  we  are 
once  more  equal  to  sending  troops  down  our  old  line  of  communi- 


250  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

cation.  The  12th  Bengal  Cavalry  had  a  fearful  jonrney  outwards. 
On  passing  Kila  Mahomed  Sharif,  on  their  way  to  the  Cabul 
bridge,  they  were  fired  upon  by  a  picquet,  and,  the  alarm  being 
given,  the  enemy  turned  out  and  blocked  the  way.  The  cavalry 
turned  oflf  from  the  road,  and  struck  the  river  lower  down.  The 
water  was  not  very  deep,  but  the  banks  were  steep  and  slippery, 
and  men  and  horses  fell  backwards  as  they  tried  to  climb  up  the 
further  bank.  It  cost  two  hours  to  ford  the  river,  the  last  squad- 
ron having  to  dismount  in  the  stream,  crawl  up  the  bank,  and  drag 
their  horses  after  them.  The  sowars  were  wet  through,  and  two 
or  three  horses  were  drowned.  Once  over,  the  road  to  Butkhak 
was  taken,  and  from  every  village  on  the  road  turned  out  a  few 
men,  who  fired  upon  the  horsemen.  They,  perhaps,  mistook  them 
for  another  convoy  of  yaboos.  The  dismounted  men  had  to  be 
left  to  return  to  Sherpur,  under  cover  of  the  darkness.  Upon 
nearing  Butkhak,  a  patrol  was  sent  out ;  and  as  it  was  then  near 
daybreak,  they  could  see  men  moving  about  the  village.  The 
place  was  occupied  by  several  hundred  Afghans,  who  opened  fire 
upon  the  cavalry.  The  latter  could  not  stay  to  fight ;  and  Major 
Green,  in  command,  knowing  how  impossible  it  was  to  return  to 
cantonments,  resolved  to  push  on  to  Luttabund.  One  sowar  was 
shot  dead  and  three  others  wounded  ;  and  the  enemy  followed  so 
closely  that  a  squadron  was  dismounted  and  ordered  to  skirmish 
out  with  their  carbines.  This  gave  time  for  all  stragglers  to  be 
got  together  again,  and  in  a  short  time  the  skirmishers  were 
recalled  and  the  whole  regiment  trotted  ofi*  to  Luttabund. 
Twelve  men  were  missing,  but  ten  have  since  reported  them- 
selves at  Sherpur.  They  disguised  themselves  by  altering  their 
uniform,  and  then  hid  away  in  nullahs  until  evening,  when  they 
crept  out  and  made  a  wide  detour  to  the  north  until  they  reached 
the  open  plain  between  the  Wazirabad  Lake  and  the  Bemaru 
Hills.  Their  horses  and  accoutrements  were  lost.  The  enemy 
have  occupied  the  village  of  Khoja  Durwesh,  about  three  miles  to 
the  east  of  Sherpur,  and  are  reported  to  be  collecting  in  force  in 
the  forts  between  Bemaru  and  this  village.  They  are  probably 
Kohistanis,  who  have  taken  the  precaution  of  securing  their  line 
of  retreat  in  case  of  defeat. 

Sunjub,  a  trustworthy  retainer  of  Ibrahim  Elian,  a  ressaldar 


Malwmed  Jan  Finally  Delivers  his  Attack.     251 

of  native  cavalry  in  our  service,  has  come  in  from  Cabul  and 
reported  that  Mahomed  Jan  and  the  other  chiefs  have  at  last  made 
up  their  minds  to  assault  Sherpur.  The  fighting  men  in  Oabul 
have  been  told  off  to  various  sections  of  attack,  and  the  signal  for 
the  assault  is  to  be  the  kindling  of  a  beacon  fire  of  damp  gun- 
powder, oil,  &c.,  on  the  Asmai  hill.  Forty-five  scaling-ladders 
have  been  given  to  2,000  men  stationed  in  the  King's  Garden,  and 
Kila  Mahomed  Sharif,  and  a  demonstration  with  these  is  to  be 
made  against  the  southern  wall  near  its  western  end.  This  is  to 
be  a  false  attack.  The  real  assault  is  to  be  delivered  upon  the 
Bemaru  village  and  the  eastern  trenches ;  but  in  case  of  this 
assault  succeeding,  an  attempt,  in  earnest,  is  to  be  made  to  scale 
the  wall  near  the  72nd  Gateway.  We  have  made  our  dispositions 
accordingly,  and  the  Reserve  will  assemble  below  the  Bemaru 
gorge,  at  four  o'clock  to-morrow  morning.  The  Asmai  hill  will 
be  watched  by  many  eyes,  and  when  the  beacon  light  is  seen  we 
shall  all  be  ready  at  our  posts.  A  message  has  been  sent  to 
General  Charles  Gough,  ordering  him  to  march  to  Sherpur  to- 
morrow instead  of  halting  at  Butkhak. 

23?*d  December. 
After  eight  days'  investment  Mahomed  Jan  has  at  last  made  his 
attack  upon  Sherpur,  and  has  been  beaten  off  with  ridiculous 
ease,  though  nearly  20,000  men  must  have  been  sent  to  take  part 
in  the  assault.  Our  casualties  have  been  very  small,  and  but  for 
an  unfortunate  accident,  by  which  two  engineer  oflScers  were  killed 
by  the  premature  explosion  of  a  mine,  the  day  has  been  one  of 
perfect  success.  The  tribal  combination  may  be  looked  upon  as 
broken  up,  for  Kohistanis,  Logaris,  and  Wardaks  are  reported  on 
their  way,  in  haste,  homewards,  and  our  reinforcements  are 
encamped  within  five  miles  of  Sherpur.  The  news  brought  in  last 
evening  turned  out  correct  to  the  letter.  From  four  o'clock  this 
morning  nearly  all  eyes  were  turned  upon  the  Asmai  Peak,  and 
even  before  the  signal  light  appeared,  sharp  firing  was  heard  near 
the  King's  Garden  and  the  Fort  of  Mahomed  Sharif.  Our  sentries 
on  the  walls  in  that  direction  had  been  strengthened,  but  they  did 
not  answer  the  fire,  as  it  was  desirable  to  get  the  enemy  well 
within  range  by  encouraging  them  in  the  belief  that  we  were  not 


252  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

on  the  alert.  Our  men  fell  silently  into  their  places ;  two  moun- 
tain guns  had  been  placed  below  the  block-house  on  the  eastern 
end  of  the  Bemaru  Heights,  the  reserves  were  standing  to  their 
arms,  and  the  oflBicers  in  charge  of  the  sections  of  defence  were 
all  at  their  posts.  At  half-past  five  there  was  seen  on  the  Asmai 
Height  a  little  flash  of  fire,  which  in  a  moment  grew  to  a  bright 
glare,  and  streamed  up  into  the  air  until  it  must  have  been  seen  by 
all  the  country  round.  For  a  few  moments  it  burned  brightly,  as 
if  fed  with  oil  or  inflammable  matter,  and  then  died  away.  As  it 
flashed  out,  a  continuous  fire  was  opened  below  the  bastions  on 
either  side  of  the  72nd  Gateway,  the  flashes  from  the  rifles  and 
matchlocks  showing  that  a  large  body  of  men  had  crept  up  within 
200  yards.  The  bullets  whistled  harmlessly  over  the  walls  and 
barracks,  our  men  still  remaining  quiet ;  as,  in  the  semi-darkness 
and  with  the  mist  still  hanging  over  the  fields,  nothing  could  be 
seen  distinctly  100  yards  away.  We  were  waiting  for  the  develop- 
ment of  the  real  attack,  and  shortly  before  six  o'clock  it  came. 
From  beyond  Bemaru  and  the  eastern  trenches  and  walls  came  a 
roar  of  voices  so  loud  and  menacing  that  it  seemed  as  if  an  army 
50,000  strong  were  charging  down  upon  our  thin  line  of  men. 
Led  by  their  ghazis,  the  main  body  of  Afghans  hidden  in  the 
villages  and  orchards  on  the  eastern  side  of  Sherpur,  had  rushed 
out  in  one  dense  mob  and  filled  the  air  with  their  cry  of  ^'AUah-il- 
Allah  !  "  The  roar  surged  forward  as  their  line  advanced,  but  it 
was  answered  by  such  a  roll  of  musketry  that  it  was  drowned  for 
an  instant,  and  then  merged  into  the  general  din,  which  told  us 
that  our  men  with  Martinis  and  Sniders  were  holding  their  own 
against  the  attacking  force.  For  ten  minutes  the  roar  was 
continuous,  and  then  the  musketry  fire  dwindled  down  to 
occasional  volleys  and  scattered  shots  from  the  south-eastern 
bastion  to  the  Bemaru  Heights,  where  the  mountain  guns  were  wait- 
ing for  daylight  before  opening  fire.  The  eastern  defences  were  in 
charge  of  Brigadier-General  Hugh  Gough  at  the  eastern  end  of 
the  heights,  and  Colonel  Jenkins  of  the  Guides  from  the  trenches 
on  the  slopes  of  the  hill  to  the  comer  bastion  facing  Siah  Sung. 
The  troops  defending  the  position  were  the  Guides'  Infantry  in  the 
trenches  about  Bemaru,  100  men  of  the  28th  P.I.  in  the  native 
hospital,  and  67th  Foot.     The    latter  were    reinforced  by   two 


Its  sudden  Collapse.  253 

companies  of  the  92nd  Highlanders  from  the  Reserve.      When 
the  attack  was  made,  it  was  still  so  dark  and  misty  that  little  could 
be  seen  in  front  of  the  trenches,  and  the  orders  were  to  reserve 
fire  until  the  advancing  masses  of  Afghans  could  be  clearly  made 
out.     Then  the  men  of  the  28th  were  the  first  to  open  fire,  and  they 
fired  volley  after  volley  at  such  long   ranges  that  they  effectually 
scared  away  even  the  ghazis  from  their  neighbourhood.     That  the 
fire  was  not  otherwise  effisctive  was  proved  by  -only  one  dead  body 
being  found  afterwards  in  front  of  their  lines.      General  Hugh 
Gough  from  the  hillside,  hearing  such  a  tremendous  fusillade 
below,  fired  star-shells,  which  burst  in  the  air  and  showed  the 
attacking  force  in  the  fields  and  orchards  nearly  1,000  yards  away. 
The  Afghans  opened  fire  in  turn,  but  their  shooting  was  wild  and 
ineffective,  though  the  bullets  dropped  dangerously  about  canton- 
ments.    The  native  hospital  seemed  the  point  towards  which  the 
enemy  worked,  taking  it  perhaps  as  a  landmark  to  guide  them ; 
but  their  right  flank  was  directed  towards  Bemaru  and  the  trenches 
on  the  slopes  of  the  hill.     The  Guides  joined  in  the  fusillade,  and 
the  attack  was  broken  while  yet  the  advanced  ghazis  were  600  or 
600  yards  away.     Sniders  at  that  distance  told  with  precision,  and 
to   make  headway  against  them  was  impossible.     The  bullets 
searched  every  yard  of  open  ground,  and  made  even  the  orchards 
almost  untenable.     To  the  right  of  the  sepoys  of  the  28th  were 
the  67th  and  the  92nd  Highlanders,  waiting  with  characteristic 
discipline  the  order  to  fire.     Through  the  mist  at  last  appeared  a 
dense  mass  of  men  waving  swords  and  knives,  shouting  their  war- 
cry,  and  firing  incessantly  as  they  advanced.     The  order  came  at 
last  for  our  soldiers  to  open  fire,  and  the  Afghans  were  then  so 
close  that  the  volleys  told  with  murderous  effect.      Some  of  the 
ghazis  were  shot  within  80  yards  of  our  rifles,  so  patiently  was 
the  attack  awaited ;  while  thirty  bodies  were  counted  afterwards 
well  within  200  yards'  range.    The  attack  collapsed  as  suddenly  as  it 
had  begun,  the  Afghans  saw  what  execution  men  in  trenches  and 
behind  parapets  can  do  with  breech-loaders  in  their  hands,  and 
they  took  cover  behind  walls  and  trees,  from  whence  they  expended 
thousands  of  cartridges,  doing  us  but  little  damage.     Our  ammu- 
nition was  too  precious  to  be  needlessly  wasted,  and  only  when 
clusters  of  men  got  within  range  were  volleys  fired  to  scatter  them. 


254  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

As  day  broke  the  two  mountain  gans,  with  an  18-pounder  and  two 
of  F-A  Battery  in  the  comer  bastion,  shelled  the  villages  and 
orchards,  and  it  was  believed  that  the  ghazis  were  too  disheartened 
to  try  a  second  assault.  About  eleven  o'clock,  however,  after  five 
hours'  skirmishing,  they  succeeded  in  getting  a  few  thousand  of 
their  more  desperate  followers  together,  and  tried  again  to  assault 
our  lines.  They  were  driven  back  more  quickly  than  on  the  first 
occasion ;  and  could,  indeed,  scarcely  be  said  to  have  advanced 
100  yards  in  their  rude  formation  of  attack.  Shortly  after  this 
they  began  to  waver  and  to  slacken  their  fire,  and  when  their 
scouts  reported,  as  no  doubt  was  the  case,  that  a  new  force  was 
crossing  the  Logar  river,  they  became  a  demoralised  mob  bent 
upon  seeking  safety  at  the  earliest  opportunity. 

General  Charles  Gough  had  left  Luttabund  in  the  early  morn- 
ing, and  upon  arriving  at  Butkhak  had  been  able  to  communicate 
by  heliograph  with  General  Koberts.  The  heliograph  flashing 
away  to  the  east  in  the  Cabul  plain  must  have  warned  Mahomed 
Jan  of  the  near  approach  of  our  reinforcements,  and  the  clouds  of 
dust  rising  between  Butkhak  and  the  Logar  river  showed  him  that 
troops  were  moving  onwards,  and  would  perhaps  take  him  in  rear. 
In  any  case  the  villages  east  of  Sherpur  were,  in  two  or  three 
hours,  nearly  empty  of  men ;  the  plain  beyond  was  covered  with 
Afghans  streaming  towards  Siah  Sung  and  Cabul.  The  Eohistani 
section,  to  the  number  of  fully  6,000,  went  away  to  the  north, 
homewards,  taking  their  women,  whom  they  had  brought  down, 
to  witness  their  triumph,  with  them.  It  was  now  our  turn  to 
attack  instead  of  being  attacked.  The  guns  shelled  the  fields 
wherever  parties  of  men  were  within  range ;  two  guns  of  F-A  and 
an  18-pounder  making  grand  practice  at  so  close  a  range  as  800 
yards ;  and  the  cavalry  were  sent  out  by  way  of  the  Bemaru  gorge 
to  cut  up  the  fugitives.  First  of  all  went  the  5th  P.C.  with  four 
guns  of  G-8,  R.A.,  which  shelled  the  villages  near  Bemaru.  By 
one  o'clock  the  enemy  were  completely  broken.  The  6th  P.C.  were 
fortunate  to  get  among  a  detached  body  on  the  north  side  of  the 
lake.  When  their  first  charge  was  over,  thirty  Afghans  were  lying 
dead  on  the  plain.  The  9th  Lancers  joined  them,  and  soon  our 
horsemen  were  charging  over  the  Siah  Sung  slopes.  The  main 
body  of  the  enemy  had  got  well  away  to  the  city,  but  all  stragglers 


Engineer  Officers  Killed.  255 

were  hnnted  down  in  the  nullahs  in  which  they  took  shelter,  and 
then  despatched.  Two  or  three  lancers  or  sowars  were  told  oflF  to 
each  straggler,  and  the  men,  dismounting,  used  their  carbines 
when  the  unlucky  Afghan  had  been  hemmed  in.  Following  in  the 
wake  of  the  9th  Lancers  and  the  6th  Punjab  Cavalry  came  the 
Sappers,  with  every  engineer  oflBicer  in  camp,  their  orders  being  to 
blow  up  and  bum  all  the  villages  and  forts  lately  occupied  by  the 
enemy.  The  cavalry  had  cleared  the  fields  and  open  ground  of 
all  Afghans,  but  in  the  villages  some  fanatics  remained,  and  these, 
fastening  themselves  up  securely  in  houses  or  towers,  were  blown 
up  by  the  mines  laid  by  the  engineers.  Lieutenant  Murdoch  had 
a  very  narrow  escape.  Entering  a  fortified  village  he  kicked  open 
the  door  of  a  house,  and  was  greeted  with  a  volley  from  three  or 
four  men  inside.  He  was  wounded  in  the  neck,  but  not  danger- 
ously, and  as  the  Afghans  refused  to  surrender,  the  blasting  charge 
was  laid  near  the  house,  and  they  were  killed  when  the  mine  was 
fired.  A  sad  accident  occurred  in  another  fort.  Captain  Dundas, 
V.C.,  and  Lieutenant  Nugent,  Boyal  Engineers,  had  constructed 
three  mines  which  were  to  destroy  the  walls  and  towers ;  and  all 
being  ready  they  went  back  to  light  the  fuses.  The  sappers  were 
drawn  up  outside  under  their  European  non-commissioned  officer, 
and  noticed  that  two  of  the  mines  exploded  almost  instantly.  Their 
officers  were  still  within  the  walls,  and  when  the  dust  and  smoke 
cleared  away,  they  were  still  missing.  Search  was  made,  and 
the  bodies  of  Captain  Dundas  and  Lieutenant  Nugent  were  found 
lying  under  the  debris.  Both  officers  were  dead.  It  is  con- 
jectured that  the  time-fuses,  instead  of  burning  slowly,  flared  up 
like  a  train  of  powder,  and  that  the  mines  exploded  a  few  seconds 
after  the  fuses  were  lighted.  We  have  thus  lost  two  good  officers 
by  an  accident  which  might  have  been  prevented  if  the  equipment 
of  the  Sappers  had  not  been  cut  down  by  the  parsimony  of  the 
Qovemment.  So  few  fuses  were  sent  up  from  India  when  the 
force  advanced  upon  Cabul  that  the  engineers  had  to  make  others, 
and  these  were  of  course  defective.  It  was  two  of  these  which 
were  being  used  when  the  explosion  occurred.  While  the  cavalry 
were  covering  the  operations  of  the  Sappers^  several  thousand  men 
marched  from  the  Bala  Hissar  and  opened  fire  upon  the  9th 
Lancers  and  the  6th  Punjab  Cavalry  on  Siah  Sung.    Several  men 


256  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

were  hit,  and  Captain  Gambier,  of  the  5th  Punjab  Cavah-y,  was 
wounded  by  a  bullet  passing  through  his  thigh.  The  Cavalry 
withdrew  under  the  heavy  fire  directed  against  them,  and  for  a  few 
hours  the  Afghans  remained  on  the  heights  with  banners  planted. 
They  retired  to  the  city  at  nightfall,  and  all  the  villages  between 
Sherpur  and  Cabul  are  now  quite  deserted. 

While  the  attack  was  being  made  on  the  eastern  defences, 
three  or  four  thousand  men  had  kept  up  an  incessant  fire  at  the 
southern  wall,  and  such  a  rain  of  bullets  fell  about  the  Commis- 
sariat and  72nd  Gates  that  many  of  our  camp-followers  in  canton- 
ments were  wounded.  Kila  Mahomed  Sharif  and  the  KiDg's 
Garden  were  full  of  Afghans,  and  two  18-pounders  and  two 
mountain  guns  shelled  them  until  late  in  the  afternoon,  while  the 
marksmen  behind  the  walls  shot  down  such  men  as  retreated 
across  the  open.  Dead  bodies  were  seen  lying  in  the  fields, 
and  two  or  three  scaling-ladders,  so  heavy  that  six  men  would 
have  been  needed  to  carry  them,  were  scattered  about  on  the 
ground  less  than  a  thousand  yards  away.  When  the  Afghans  on 
the  southern  side  saw  our  cavalry  sweeping  over  Siah  Sung, 
they  began  to  retire  hastily  to  the  city,  and  as  they  crossed  the 
road  1,000  yards  away  from  our  bastions,  they  were  fired  at  from 
the  72nd  Gateway,  and  many  were  seen  to  fall  even  at  that 
distance.  The  men  who  stopped  to  carry  o£f  the  dead  behaved  in 
the  coolest  way,  one  Afghan  returning  again  and  again  to  drag  off 
the  bodies  of  his  comrades.  Earlier  in  the  day  four  men  were 
killed  by  a  volley  at  600  yards,  and  two  or  three  who  escaped  tried 
to  face  the  bullets  which  swept  the  ground  about  their  dead. 
Finding  it  was  certain  death  to  appear  in  the  open,  they  crawled 
behind  a  wall,  and  with  a  long  crooked  stick  dragged  their  dead 
away.  Several  of  the  best  marksmen  of  Mahomed  Jan,  who  had 
come  daily  to  the  same  posts  and  fired  persistently  at  the  ram- 
parts, were  shot  to-day,  our  men  having  at  last  got  the  exact 
ranges.  The  waste  of  ammunition  on  the  part  of  the  enemy 
was  enormous  ;  they  knew  perhaps  that  it  was  their  last  chance, 
and  they  fired  round  after  round  all  day  long. 

From  the  ladders  found  in  the  fields  there  can  be  no  doubt 
the  feint  on  the  southern  side  of  Sherpur  would  have  become  a 
real  attack  if  the  eastern  line  of  defences  had  been  forced ;  but 


End  of  the  Siege.  257 

the  scaling  ladders  were  only  high  enough  to  reach  half-way  up 
the  wall,  and  the  assaulting  party  could  never  have  gained  the 
parapet.  We  should  have  been  well  satisfied  if  they  had  come 
on,  as  their  punishment  would  have  been  fearfully  severe.  On 
the  south-west  and  west  no  attack  was  made:  a  few  hundred 
men  from  Deh-i-Afghan  occupied  our  vidette-hill  towards  the 
lake,  and  planted  a  white  standard  on  the  crest,  but  they  never 
fired  a  shot,  and  a  few  shells  in  the  evening  warned  them  to 
retire,  which  they  did  about  five  o'clock.  A  few  standards  were 
also  placed  in  the  fields  to  the  west,  but  the  ghazis  with  them  hid 
themselves  behind  little  aungara  they  had  thrown  up,  and  did  not 
annoy  us  at  all.  The  northern  line  of  trenches  along  Bemaru 
Heights  were  never  assailed,  the  steep  hillside  facing  Eohistan  being 
clear  of  cover ;  and  though,  once,  it  was  expected  that  the  gorge 
would  be  attacked,  and  guns  were  ordered  up  to  the  trenches 
there,  the  appearance  of  the  6th  P.O.  on  the  maida/n  below 
checked  such  of  the  enemy  as  were  working  round  from  the 
village  north  of  Bemaru.  In  fact,  after  the  first  unsuccessful 
attack,  the  enemy  did  not  know  what  to  do,  and  though  their 
leaders  on  horseback  galloped  about  and  harangued  them,  they 
could  never  be  got  together  in  a  cohesive  body.  Several  of  the 
horsemen  were  shot,  and  we  are  hoping  that  Mir  Butcha,  the 
Eohistani  Chief,  is  among  the  number.  At  any  rate,  a  horseman 
who  was  most  energetic  was  struck  by  a  volley,  and  immediately 
he  fell  from  his  horse  200  or  300  men  rushed  from  a  village  near, 
placed  him  on  a  charpoy,  and  went  straight  away  across  the 
maidan  over  the  Paen  Minar  Eotal,  which  is  on  the  southern  road 
to  Eohistan.  The  man  must  have  been  a  chief  of  distinction  to 
be  thus  guarded,  for  his  escort  never  looked  back  upon  Sherpur, 
but  hurried  their  chief  away  as  fast  as  the  bearers  of  the  charpoy 
could  walk. 

To  night  we  are  resting  on  our  arms,  but  all  is  quiet  in  the 
fields  about  Sherpur,  and  we  look  upon  the  investment  as  at  an 
end.  The  brigade  under  General  Charles  *  Gough  is  halted  to- 
night on  the  Jellalabad  Boad  at  the  Logar  river,  and  is  holding 
the  bridge,  which  after  all  was  never  destroyed  by  Mahomed  Jan. 
Oar  reinforcements  will  march  in  to-morrow,  but  it  is  scarcely 
likely  there  will  be  any  more  fighting,  as  spies  from  the  city  report 


258 


The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 


that  the  tribesmen  are  in  full  retreat.  Very  glad,  indeed,  are  we 
to  be  once  more  free  after  nine  days'  close  confinement  at  Sherpor. 
As  a  soldier  remarked  on  the  walls  when  the  Lientenant-G^neral 
was  making  his  rounds  : — '^  Well,  I  should  think  this  is  the  first 
time  in  his  life  that  General  Roberts  has  been  confined  to 
barracks !  "  The  confinement  has  harassed  men  and  officers  so 
much  that  we  dread  the  re-action  :  the  excitement  is  oyer  now, 
and  the  exposure  night  after  night  in  snow  and  slush  must  have 
broken  down  the  health  of  many.  The  worst  cases  in  hospital 
even  now  are  men  sufifering  from  pneumonia  :  the  wounded  are 
doing  well,  though  some  of  the  wounds  are  very  severe^  Snow 
has  begun  to  fall  again,  and  winter  has  now  set  in  thoroughly. 

The  casualties  to-day,  including  followers,  are  thirty-two  in 
number.  General  Hugh  Gough  was  knocked  over  by  a  Snider 
bullet,  which  must  have  been  nearly  spent.  It  cut  through  his 
posbteen  in  the  right  breast,  but  was  caught  in  the  folds  of  a 
woollen  vest,  and  fell  at  his  feet  as  he  shook  himself  together 
again.    The  returns  for  to-day  are  as  follows  : — 


Casualties  on  23rd  December. 


RegimentB. 

British. 

Native 

TotaL 

Officerf. 

Men. 

Royal  Engineers            

FA,  Royal  Horse  Artillery     ... 

a-3,  Royal  Artillery     

No.  1  Mountain  Battery 
No.  2  Mountain  Battery 

dth'Lancers       

6th  Puigab  Cavalry      

67th  Foot          

92nd  Highlanders        

23rd  Pioneers 

Guides*  Infantry           

Sappers  and  Miners      

8rd  Sikhs          

5th  Punjab  Infantry    

28th  Punjab  Infantry 

E. 

1 
1 

w. 

1 

1 

K. 

1 

w. 

1 

1 

1 
1 

6 

K. 

1 
1 

w. 

1 
7 

3 

2 
0 

1 

2 

1 
1 

1 
1 
1 
8 
1 
6 
1 
3 
1 
2 
2 
1 

Total      

2 

2 

1 

9 

2 

16 

32 

Of  our  followers  one  was  killed  and  six  wounded.    The  total 


Cabul  Re-Occupied.  259 

casualties  daring  the  siege  and  on  the  day  of  the  final  attack  were 
eighteen  killed  and  sixty-eight  wounded  (including  seven  followers 
killed  and  twenty-two  wounded). 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

The  Be-Oocapation  of  Cabul — Signs  of  Mahomed  Jan*8  Oocupation — Complete  Dispersion 
of  Idahomed  Jan's  Army — General  Hill's  Betom  to  the  City — Christmas  in  Sherpur 
— Universal  Character  of  the  late  Jthad — Necessity  for  reinforcing  the  Army  of 
Oocupation — G-eneral  Baker's  Expedition  to  Baba  Each  Ear — ^Examination  of  the 
Bala  Hissar — ^Demolition  of  Forts  and  Villages  abont  Sherpur — Cabal  Beyisited — 
A  New  Military  Boad — ^The  Destmction  of  Shops  by  Mahomed  Jan^s  Force — Despon- 
dency of  the  Hindus  and  Eizilbashes — State  of  the  Char  Chowk  Bazaar — A  Picture 
of  Desolation — ^The  Eotwali — ^Wali  Mahomed's  Losses — Ill-treatment  of  Women. 

24*A  December. 
Our  expectations  have  been  fully  realized ;  the  enemy  which  held 
us  in  check  since  December  14th  has  disappeared^  and  our  troops 
are  once  more  in  Cabul,  which  shows  terrible  marks  of  Mahomed 
Jan's  occupation.  Every  house  belonging  to  Sirdars  known  to 
favour  the  British  has  been  looted,  and  in  the  bazaars  all  the 
shops  are  gutted  except  those  of  the  Mahomedans.  Doors  and 
windows  broken  in,  walls  knocked  down,  all  woodwork  destroyed, 
floors  dug  up,  and  property  carried  off:  these  are  the  signs 
of  the  Beign  of  Terror  lately  instituted  among  the  Kizil- 
bashes  and  Hindus.  The  search  for  treasure  was  carried  out  in 
a  systematic  way,  and  the  loot  now  in  possession  of  Kohistanis, 
Ghilzais,  and  other  tribesmen  must  be  worth  many  lakhs.  Two 
lakhs  of  treasure  belonging  to  Hashim  Ehan  alone,  are  said  to 
havQ  been  seized,  while  the  Hindus  complain  of  being  utterly 
ruined.  We  shall  have  to  inquire  further  into  this  when  things 
are  once  more  firmly  settled,  but  at  present  we  have  enough  to  do 
in  pursuing  the  enemy,  and  arresting  such  local  Afghans  as  joined 
their  ranks.  These  men  now  hide  their  arms,  and  appear  in  all 
the  beautiful  simplicity  of  peaceful  citizens,  but  the  subterfuge  is 
too  easily  detected  for  them  to  escape  punishment.  We  were 
not  sure    early  this  morning  that    Mahomed  Jan's    host  had 

B  2 


4 
26o  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

yanished;  altboagh,  as  the  night  had  passed  quietly,  there  was 
every  reason  to  believe  the  siege  was  at  an  end.  Our  first  move- 
ment was  to  occupy  Kila  Mahomed  ShariflF,  and  Colonel  Brownlow 
sent  out  a  party  of  the  72nd  Highlanders  to  the  fort  at  dawn. 
They  found  it  quite  deserted,  and  the  other  forts  and  villages  near 
were  also  without  occupants.  Two  or  three  wounded  men  were 
lying  within  the  walls,  and  the  bodies  of  some  thirty  Afghans 
were  scattered  about  near  the  loop-holes,  or  in  the  open  where  our 
bullets  had  struck  them  down.  This  was  on  the  southern  face, 
near  the  72nd  and  Commissariat  gateways,  so  that  the  false  attack 
in  this  direction  must  have  cost  the  enemy  many  lives.  Afghans 
do  not,  as  a  rule,  leave  their  dead  behind,  and  doubtless  there 
were  carried  away  double  the  number  found.  Scaling-ladders 
covered  with  blood  were  lying  in  the  fields  and  forts,  and  heaps  of 
powder  and  some  hundreds  of  ball-cartridges  were  discovered. 
Unlimited  ammunition  must  have  been  served  out  to  each  man,  and 
as  an  examination  shows  that  all  the  powder  and  caps  in  the  Bala 
Hissar  have  been  carried  off,  or  destroyed,  it  is  clear  that  every 
tribesman  filled  his  pouch  with  an  ample  supply  before  making 
the  attack.  Those  who  have  got  safely  away  will  have  powder 
enough  to  last  them  for  two  or  three  years,  as  many  tons  were  left 
by  us  in  the  magazine.  But  for  their  losses,  which  are  calculated 
at  2,000  or  8,000  killed  and  wounded  since  December  10th,  the 
army  of  Mahomed  Jan  may  consider  their  sojourn  in  Cabul 
during  the  Mohurrum  a  grand  success,  temporary  though  it  was. 
They  blockaded  the  British  army,  caused  it  a  loss  of  between  800 
and  400,  and  proclaimed  a  new  Amir,  whom  they  have  still  with 
them.  Young  Musa  Jan  has  been  carried  off  by  Mushk-i-Alam, 
who  may,  if  he  chooses,  establish  the  new  sovereign  at  Ghazni, 
and  invite  all  Afghanistan  to  rally  about  him.  The  old  moollah  is 
reported  to  have  fled  with  the  lad  last  night,  while  Mahomed  Jan 
remained  in  Cabul  until  eight  o'clock  this  morning.  He  then  saw 
that  his  army  had  deserted  him,  and  he  followed  the  example  of 
Mushk-i-Alam,  and  took  to  the  hills.  Strong  parties  of  cavalry 
have  been  out  all  day  in  the  Chardeh  Valley  and  round  by 
Charasia,  but  beyond  a  few  men  on  the  snow-covered  hills  no  one 
was  met  with.  It  was  difficult  work  pursuing,  as  snow  was  fiEdling 
steadily.    The  80,000  men  have  dissolved,  and,  with  their  loot, 


Flight  of  the  Tribesmen.  261 

are  taking  mountain  roads,  where  they  are  safe  from  pursuit.  The 
villages  contain  many  men  who  fought  against  us,  and  hereafter 
we  shall  visit  them  with  our  fljring  column.  On  the  11th,  12th, 
and  18th  every  fortified  enclosure  our  men  passed  was  barred 
against  them,  and  the  occupants  fired  at  stragglers  and  turned  out 
to  harass  rear-guards.  The  Mahomedan  population  of  Cabul 
joined  Mahomed  Jan  almost  to  a  man,  thinking  the  British  rale 
was  at  an  end,  and  now  these  citizens,  whose  homes  we  spared 
when  we  came  among  them  in  the  flush  of  success,  are  hurrying 
away  in  anticipation  of  the  reprisals  we  shall  inflict.  The  time 
has  gone  by  for  weak  sentimentality :  military  law  alone  should 
now  guide  Sir  F.  Boberts  in  his  dealings  with  the  people,  for  it 
has  been  proved  beyond  question  that  to  act  humanely  is  merely 
to  encourage  the  Afghans  in  their  belief  that  we  are  unequal  to 
controlling  them.  Instead  of  leaving  an  indelible  mark  upon 
Cabul,  we  have  enriched  it  by  our  purchases  of  winter  supplies, 
and  have  poured  lakhs  of  rupees  into  the  purses  of  the  very  men 
who  had  nothing  to  expect  but  the  fate  of  a  conquered  race. 

The  Hindus  and  Kizilbashes  who  relied  upon  us  for  protection 
may  well  revile  us,  since  we  have  left  them  to  their  fate ;  while  the 
Mahomedans  who  have  looted  their  homes,  insulted  their  women, 
and  terrorized  over  them  for  ten  days,  are  now  laughing  at  our 
inability  to  follow  them  to  their  distant  villages.  The  unlucky 
Hazaras,  who  have  worked  so  well  for  us,  were  hunted  down,  beaten, 
and  reviled  wherever  they  showed  their  faces  in  the  streets  ;  and 
were  told  jeeringly  to  call  for  help  upon  the  British  locked  up 
in  Sherpur.  Our  humiliation  is  so  great  that  to  risk  a  repetition 
of  it  would  be  ruinous.  We  must  show  that  the  investment  of 
Sherpur  can  never  again  occur,  and  to  do  this  10,000  troops  must 
hold  Cabul,  and  our  line  of  communication  with  India  be  so  per- 
manently established  that  even  100,000  tribesmen  cannot  break  it. 
An  immediate  declaration  of  policy  should  be  made :  to  wait 
quietly  for  **  events  to  develop  "  may  be  disastrous.  We  must 
create  events,  not  allow  others  to  turn  the  current  of  them  in 
whichever  direction  they  please.  If  we  are  to  hold  Cabul — and  this 
is  now  ten  times  more  imperious  even  than  it  was  before,  for  to 
retire  would  be  to  acknowledge  that  we  have  failed  in  our  occu- 
pation,  and  dare  not  risk  another  reverse — we  must  hold  it  by  our 


262  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

bayonets  and  not  by  oar  rupees.  Half-measures  will  only  imperil 
oar  safety:  to  pat  trast  in  A^han  canning  and  be  guided  by 
Afghan  insincerity  is  only  to  risk  the  lives  of  our  soldiers.  Those 
soldiers  have  done  all  that  soldiers  can  do,  and  they  may  well  look 
to  their  commanders  to  make  success  once  obtained  sure  and  stable. 
We  lost  less  than  100  men  in  capturing  Cabul ;  we  have  lost 
nearly  four  times  that  number  in  fifteen  days'  fighting,  after  we 
had  occupied  the  place  for  two  months.  There  must  be  no  longer 
a  state  of  false  security ;  for  it  is  not  improbable  that  the  jehad 
will  be  revived  before  the  winter  is  over,  and  the  mooUahs  may 
again  influence  the  religious  fanaticism  of  the  people  against  us. 

To-day  General  Hills,  our  Governor  of  the  City,  once  more 
visited  the  kotwali,  guarded  by  the  5th  P.I.,  while  the  sepoys  were 
busy  all  day  in  searching  the  Mahomedan  quarter,  and  in  arresting 
such  citizens  as  they  could  find  remaining.  One  hundred  Punjabees 
garrison  the  kotwali  for  the  night,  and  the  Kizilbashes  and 
Hindus  are  once  more  plucking  up  courage.  The  Bala  Hissar  has 
been  examined,  and  not  an  Afghan  found  in  it,  and  in  two  or  three 
days  the  9th  Foot,  and  the  2nd  and  4th  Ghoorkas,  which  arrived 
at  Sherpur  this  morning  with  General  Charles  Gough,  vrill  be 
quartered  in  the  fortress.  Butkhak  is  also  to  be  re-garrisoned  with 
100  of  the  9th  and  the  whole  of  the  12th  B.C.,  and  in  a  short 
time  we  shall  be  once  more  holding  a  strong  line  of  communication 
with  Peshawur.  Our  most  urgent  want  is  ammunition.  The  rein- 
forcements have  only  brought  about  200  rounds  per  man,  and  our 
own  supply  cannot  be  much  more  than  250  rounds,  taking  the 
regiments  all  through. 

Among  our  political  prisoners  now  is  Yakub  Ehan's  mother, 
who  was  chiefly  instrumental  in  raising  the  jehad.  She  will  be 
closely  watched  for  the  future,  and  as  she  is  a  woman  of  great 
resource,  it  may  be  advisable  to  deport  her  to  India.  The  camp 
has  also  received  with  due  hospitality  forty  or  fifty  ladies,  the  wives 
and  other  relatives  of  Sirdars  among  us,  as  guests. 


27th  December. 
After  all  the  excitement  of  our  ten  days'  siege  it  is  a  great  relief 
now  to  pass  beyond  the  walls  of  Sherpur,  even  though  the  roads 


Christmas  in  Sherpur.  263 

and  fields  about  are  ankle-deep  in  mild  and  half- melted  snow. 
Not  a  shot  now  diatarbs  our  peaeefol  quiet^  and  the  only  unusual 
sound  is  the  dull  report  of  a  mine  exploding  where  our  engineers 
are  busy  demolishing  forts  and  walls  which  only  four  days  ago 
sheltered  our  enemy.  Our  Christmas  has  been  of  the  sober, 
thoughtful  kind.  We  have  so  lately  been  released  from  the  painful 
constraint  of  constant  vigilance  and  hard  fighting,  that  our  spirits 
could  not  rise  very  high  in  the  scale  of  festivity  ;  and  our  losses 
have  so  sobered  us  that  it  would  seem  almost  sacrilegious  to 
^'  feast  and  make  merry  "  with  the  death  of  so  many  comrades  still 
firesh  in  our  memory  and  with  the  hospitals  full  of  wounded  men, 
Rufierers  in  the  actions  fought  since  the  10th.  Besides,  every  one 
is  worn  out  with  watching,  and  it  will  be  some  time  before  officers 
and  men  can  once  more  take  life  placidly,  and  enjoy  heartily  such 
little  pleasures  as  are  forthcoming.  Christmas  day  was  one  of 
rest  for  all  of  us,  for  our  cavalry  reconnaissances  had  shown  that 
the  enemy  had  dispersed  far  out  of  our  reach ;  and  as  the  snow 
lay  six  inches  deep  on  the  ground,  there  was  little  chance  of  our 
troopers  overtaking  even  such  small  bands  as  might  have  followed 
the  main  roads  to  Logar,  Ghazni,  or  Kohistan.  On  the  24th  the 
horses  had  to  be  led  back  by  the  troopers  from  Charasia,  the  snow 
having  '^balled"  their  feet  and  made  riding  dangerous,  and  there 
was  nothing  to  be  gained  by  sending  them  out  again  on  a  similar 
errand.  We  were  not  all  convinced  that  none  of  Mahomed  Jan's 
followers  were  lurking  about,  and  strong  guards  were  still  held 
ready  at  night,  to  repel  any  sudden  attack.  But  the  precaution 
might  have  been  neglected ;  for  never  before  has  an  **  army  " 
80,000  strong  melted  so  rapidly  away.  The  tribesmen  must  have 
travelled  quickly  during  the  night  of  the  28rd  after  we  had  beaten 
them  from  our  walls,  and  now  the  country  about  for  miles  seems 
deserted  of  its  inhabitants.  Such  villages  as  are  passed  have  their 
doors  barred  and  bolted,  and  not  even  a  ghazi  turns  out  to  throw 
away  his  life.  The  snow-covered  hills,  which  now  shut  us  in  on  all 
sides,  stand  out  in  pure  whiteness  and  make  no  sign.  They 
have  seen  the  scattered  thousands  who  held  high  revel  in  Cabul 
pass  away  in  hot  haste ;  but  the  snow  has  blotted  out  their  foot- 
prints, and  the  trail  is  lost.  By-and-by  we  shall  take  it  up  anew,  and 
search  out  our  enemy  in  his  secluded  villages  and  forts,  for  a  force 


264  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

is  eyen  now  toiling  oyer  the  snow  in  Eohistan,  and  will  in  a  few 
days  be  at  Mir  Butcha's  gates.  Logar  also  may  see  another 
column  marching  upon  its  villages,  bat  more  distant  Wardak  and 
Ghazni  are  probably  safe  until  the  spring ;  that  is,  if  Mahomed 
Jan  and  his  powerful  friend,  the  moollah  Mushk-i-Alam,  do  not 
keep  their  promise  of  returning  to  Cabul  at  the  festival  of  Nauroz, 
March  21st.  They  have  had  such  an  unexpected  success,  and 
have  secured  such  valuable  loot,  that,  in  spite  of  their  losses,  they 
may  be  tempted  again  to  repeat  the  experiment  of  coming  boldly 
to  meet  our  army,  instead  of  waiting  in  their  homes  for  an  attack. 
The  fuller  we  examine  into  Hie  jehad,  the  more  clear  it  becomes 
that  the  late  combination  more  nearly  approached  a  general  move- 
ment among  all  sections  than  any  that  has  yet  been  attempted. 
In  the  short  period  during  which  it  existed,  nearly  every  available 
fighting  man  in  North-Eastern  Afghanistan  flocked  to  the  banners 
consecrated  by  Mushk-i-Alam ;  and  if  the  success  of  the  jehad 
had  been  a  little  longer-lived — say  by  the  interception  of  our  re- 
inforcements— ^there  would  have  been  streams  of  men  setting  in 
for  Cabul  from  Turkistan,  Badakshan,  and  the  Shutargardan 
district,  which  would  have  made  Mahomed  Jan  the  leader  of  that 
"  lakh  of  men  "  of  which  he  boasted.  Every  chief  of  importance 
among  the  wide-spread  Ghilzais  and  the  more  compact  Eohistanis 
and  Safis  was  up  in  arms,  and  the  fighting  at  Jugdulluck  showed 
that  AsmatuUah  Ehan  and  his  Lughmanis  were  at  one  with  their 
friends  besieging  Sherpur.  Even  Padshah  Khan,  whose  virtues 
short-sighted  politicians  have  extolled,  brought  a  contingent  to 
Cabul,  and  fought  against  us  with  desperate  hatred,  although  ho 
had  greatly  smoothed  our  path  during  the  first  march  from  Ali 
Khel.  With  Mahomed  Jan  were  also  Mir  Butcha  and  several 
other  Kohistani  chiefs — Usman  Khan,  the  Safi  leader  of  Tagao  ; 
Gholam  Hyder  Khan  (Logari),  and  Aslam  Khan,  Colonel  of 
Artillery,  both  of  whom  fought  at  Charasia ;  and  several  minor 
Ghilzai  leaders,  who  had  each  brought  their  following  of  500  or 
1,000  men.  The  countenance  Mahomed  Jan  and  Mushk-i-Alam 
received  from  Yakub  Khan's  mother  and  wife  gave  them  a  status 
which  they  did  not  fail  to  use  to  the  best  of  their  advantage ;  and 
while,  perhaps,  half  their  followers  were  freebooters,  intent  upon 
looting  Hindus  and  Kizilbashes,  they  made  it  appear  in  their 


Prospects  of  a  New  Jehad,  265 

attempt  to  negotiate  with  Sir  Frederick  Boberts  that  they  were 
the  patriotic  leaders  of  a  moTement  which  had  for  its  object  not 
80  much  the  ejectment  of  the  British  army,  as  the  reyival  of  the 
Amirship.  Singularly  enough,  the  removal  of  Yakab  Khan  was 
made  a  pretext  for  their  occupation  of  Cabul,  and  this  in  the  feice 
of  their  callousness  as  to  his  &te  when  he  was  a  prisoner  in  our 
camp.  Yakub's  mother,  working  through  Mushk-i-Alam  and  his 
mooUahs,  turned  the  full  tide  of  religious  enthusiasm  aroused  by 
the  jehad  into  channels  which  should  serve  to  place  either  her 
exiled  son  or  her  grandson  on  the  throne,  and  the  proclamation  of 
Musa  Jan  as  Amir  was  a  bold  step,  which  may  yet  give  us  much 
trouble  to  nullify.  Musa  Jan  is  in  the  hands  of  Mushk-i-Alam, 
who  may  renew  his  jehad.  By  setting  up  the  child  in  state  at 
Ghazni,  and  formulating  decrees  and  proclamations  in  his  name, 
he  may  give  the  people  a  pretext  for  denying  the  existence  of 
British  authority  further  than  the  few  acres  commanded  by  our 
guns  about  Cabul :  and  taking  religion  again  as  a  rallying  cry,  he 
may  by  Naaroz  be  ready  with  another  30,000  men  to  try  con- 
clusions with  us  again.  The  late  army  which  besieged  us  does  not 
exist,  save  in  scattered  units.  The  feeling  which  drew  it  together 
is  still  alive ;  for  fanaticism  only  slumbers  in  this  country,  and  has 
sometimes  so  rapid  an  awakening  that  it  must  be  constantly  watched. 
The  ten  days'  success  of  Mahomed  Jan  vnR  be  quoted  as  proving 
that,  under  more  favourable  conditions,  it  might  be  extended  in- 
definitely ;  and  unless,  by  our  preparations,  we  show  that  the 
conditions  in  future,  instead  of  being  more  favourable,  become 
steadily  less  and  less  attractive  to  men  who  may  be  called  upon 
to  join  a  new  jehad,  the  British  army  of  occupation  may  be  again 
isolated.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  no  false  measure  of  economy  will 
prevent  the  strength  of  the  force  here  being  so  raised  that  from 
8,000  to  4,000  men  will  always  be  available  for  outside  work, 
after  Sherpur  or  whatever  lines  we  may  occupy  have  been  strongly 
garrisoned.  Our  reinforcements  number  only  1,400  men,  and 
Luttabund  is  still  left  without  a  garrison  ;  while  100  of  the  9th 
Foot  and  the  whole  of  the  12th  Bengal  Cavalry  have  been  sent  to 
Butkhak  to  hold  that  post.  We  may  seem  strong  enough  now 
when  we  have  not  an  enemy  within  twenty  miles  ;  but  so  we 
seemed  equally  safe  three  weeks  ago,  when  we  disbelieved  in  the 


266  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

possibUity  of  80,000  Afghans  ever  collecting  together.  If  our 
experience  is  to  go  for  nothing  we  shall  reyert  to  the  old  order  of 
things,  perhaps  allowing  the  other  division  to  garrison  Lnttabund 
and  Sei  Baba ;  bat  if  we  are  to  convince  the  late  leaders  of  the 
Je/tad  that  a  second  can  only  be  a  ridiculous  failure,  we  shall 
have  the  whole  of  Generals  Charles  Gough  and  Arbuthnot's 
brigades  west  of  JugduUuck.*  There  may  arise  some  difficulty  in 
regard  to  winter  supplies;  but  if  the  policy,  now  begun,  of  re- 
quisitioning the  villages  belonging  to  hostile  chiefs  be  carried  out 
to  its  full  extent,  our  reinforcements  can  live  comfortably.  Be- 
sides, the  Eyber  transport  should  at  once  be  so  remodelled  that 
it  vrill  not  be  frittered  away  for  want  of  due  supervision,  and  then, 
surely,  supplies  can  be  sent  from  Peshawur  as  far  as  Jugdulluck, 
Luttabund,  or  even  Cabul  itself.  If  we  have  to  face  the  possibility 
of  a  second  siege  of  Sherpur,  and  of  another  blow  at  our  prestige 
by  tribes  of  Asiatics,  we  may  as  well  face  it  with  our  eyes  open 
and  our  powder  dry.  This  same  question  of  powder  may  in- 
volve us  in  difficulties  yet,  for  we  want  ammunition  badly  ;  and  if 
it  has  to  be  brought  up  from  Peshawur,  it  vrill  take  three  weeks 
to  reach  here.  As  we  are  sending  flying  columns  out  again,  the 
troops  comprising  which  may  get  rid  of  100  rounds  per  man  in  a 
few  days,  the  prospect  does  not  seem  so  bright  of  our  250  rounds 
each  lasting  very  long.  If  Mahomed  Jan  had  persistently  at- 
tacked our  force  in  the  manner  he  at  last  did  on  December  28rd, 
we  should  now  be  left  with  about  seventy  rounds  in  each  man's 
pouch.  Fortunately  for  us,  Mahomed  Jan  is  not  a  military  genius. 
I  have  spoken  of  the  flying  columns  we  are  sending  out.  The 
first  of  these  left  Sherpur  this  morning,  bound  for  Baba  Euch  Ear, 
where  the  villages  belonging  to  Mir  Buteha  are  said  to  lie.  This 
is  about  twenty-four  miles  away  on  the  Charikar  Road,  through 
the  heart  of  the  Eoh-Daman,  and  it  is  not  improbable  that  our 
force  may  meet  with  opposition.  This  is  the  first  time  we  have 
interfered  with  the  Eohistanis  since  1841,  and  they  have  a  belief 
in  their  own  powers  among  their  native  hills,  which  may  cause 
them  to  fight  bravely  in  defence  of  their  villages.  They  have  an 
unlimited  supply  of  ammunition  taken  from  the  Bala  Hissar, 
and  this  to  tribesmen  is  half  the  battle.  The  country  is  quite 
*  The  plan  here  suggested  vas  afterwards  cairied  oat 


Expedition  against  Mir  Butcha.  267 

nnknown  to  us,  and,  with  the  snow  lying  thick  on  the  hills,  our 
men  are  sure  to  suffer  great  hardships.     General  Baker's  column  • 
is  made  up  as  follows : — 

Hazara  Mountain  Battery  (four  guns) ; 

Guides'  Cavalry  (200  sabres)  ; 

67th  Foot  (500  men) ; 

Guides'  Infantry  (400) ; 

2nd  Ghoorkas  (400) ; 

5th  PuDJabees  (400) ; 

Sappers  and  Miners  (1^  company). 

The  2nd  Ghoorkas  were  too  weak  to  muster  400  bayonets  for  ser« 
vice,  so  the  4th  Ghoorkas  were  called  upon  to  make  up  the  num- 
ber. The  Sappers  take  with  them  materials  for  demolishing  forts 
and  villages ;  and  it  is  intended  to  loot  the  place  thoroughly,  so 
15  per  cent,  of  the  transport  animals  in  Sherpur  accompany  the 
column  in  addition  to  their  own  complement  of  mules  and  yahoos. 
•  200  rounds  of  ammunition  per  man  and  five  days'  rations  are 
carried  for  the  men.  Two  survey  ofl&cers  accompany  the  column, 
and  three  parties  of  signallers  under  Captain  Straton.  The  sig- 
nalling branch  of  the  service  has  come,  deservedly,  to  be  looked 
upon  as  playing  a  most  important  part  in  every  operation  under- 
taken. The  column  is  strong  enough  both  to  punish  Mir  Butcha 
and  to  collect  supplies ;  but  there  is  a  strong  opinion  in  camp  that 
before  any  reprisals  were  begun  our  communications  with  Jug- 
dulluck  should  have  been  secured.  We  have  had  no  news  from 
Jugdulluck  since  the  20th,  and  we  are  in  doubt  as  to  the  safety  of 
our  despatches.  The  news  of  Mahomed  Jan's  flight  should  cause 
the  local  Ghilzais  to  settle  down  peacefully  again  ;  and  as  more 
troops  move  up  from  Gundamak  and  Jellalabad,  the  line  will 
doubtless  be  re-opened  in  ten  days.  When  General  Baker  returns 
from  Kohistan,  another  column  is  to  be  sent  to  the  Logar  Valley, 
and  more  supplies  collected ;  this  time,  perhaps,  without  the  ex- 
penditure of  two  or  three  lakhs  of  rupees. 

A  report  has  been  spread  that  the  Bala  Hissar  has  been 
mined,  and  for  the  present  no  garrison  will  be  placed  within  its 
walls.  The  Engineers  are  busy  examining  the  fortress,  and  when 
ihey  have  decided  as  to   its  safety,   General  Charles  Gough's 


268  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

brigade  will  be  moved  into  it  for  the  winter.  Gangs  of  Hazara 
coolies  are  employed  demolishing  the  walls  of  villages  and  forts 
about  Sherpar,  and  also  in  clearing  away  detached  walls  in  the 
fields^  the  remains  of  old  fortified  enclosures.  One  of  the  guns 
given  by  us  to  Wali  Mahomed,  when  it  was  expected  he  would  go 
to  Turkistan  as  Governor,  has  been  brought  in  ;  but  the  two  guns 
of  Swinley*s  Battery,  lost  on  the  14th,  are  still  missing. 


29/A  December. 

I  have  visited  the  city  of  Gabul,  which  is  now  again  in  our 
hands,  and  have  seen  the  havoc  made  in  its  bazaars  by  the  army 
of  Mahomed  Jan  and  the  fanatical  followers  of  Mushk-i-Alam.  The 
city  is  considered  safe  again  for  visitors,  though  officers  visiting 
it  have  to  go  in  pairs,  and  carry  arms.  This  is  a  precaution 
against  any  stray  ghazis  who  may  still  be  in  hiding  within  its 
walls.  My  guard  was  simply  four  Sikhs,  and  with  this  small 
escort  I  was  able  to  examine  the  place  thoroughly,  without  molesta- 
tion. The  Mussulman  population  still  remaining  is  in  a  whole- 
some state  of  fear,  and  as  our  search-parties  go  from  house  to 
house  seeking  men  who  played  us  false,  there  is  a  tendency 
among  the  citizens  to  draw  off  to  obscure  nooks  and  comers. 
Passing  out  by  the  head-quarters'  gate  in  the  western  wall,  I 
followed  the  muddy  footpath  across  the  fields  to  Deh-i- Afghan, 
the  walls  and  ditches  about  which  yet  show  signs  of  the  late 
fighting,  in  the  presence  of  cartridge-cases  thrown  away  after 
being  fired  by  the  Afghans.  In  the  gardens  about  the  suburb 
the  trees  are  cut  and  *' blazed''  where  our  shells  exploded,  but 
the  damage  really  is  very  slight.  We  had  not  sufficent  ammuni- 
tion to  waste  shells  on  these  enclosures,  and  two  or  three  doses  of 
shrapnel  or  common  shell  were  generally  enough  to  silence  the 
lire  of  the  enemy  in  any  given  orchard.  Climbing  up  the  path  to 
Deh-i-Afghan,  which  stands  on  a  low  rounded  hill  at  the  foot  of 
the  Asmai  Heights,  and  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Cabul  river,  I 
came  across  a  few  disconsolate-looking  Hindus  and  Kizilbashes 
on  their  way  to  Sherpur,  to  relate  their  woes  and  file  their  bill  of 
damages  against  ''the  great  British  Government,"  which  had 
promised  to  protect  them.     Besides   these   unlucky  men   were 


Demolition,  a  Military  Necessity,  269 

strings  of  Hazara  coolies,  staggering  under  their  heavy  loads  of 

wood  or  bhoosa,  and  to  all-seeming  as  happy  as  ever  in  their  rags 

and  wretchedness.    All  the  doors  and  windows  of  the  houses  were 

barred  and  locked,  and  but  few  Mussolman  faces  could  be  seen. 

Here  and  there  were  knots  of  men  discassing,  with  subdaed  looks, 

the  late  events.     The  gossipers  were  profase   in   salaams,    but 

moved  off  as  our  little  party   moved   onwards.     Deh-i- Afghan 

was  shelled,    on  the  14th,  by  six  guns  for  about  an  hour,  and 

during  the  siege  an  8-inch  howitzer  occasionally  pitched  a  shell 

into  the  crowds  which  always  gathered  within  and  about  it.     I 

therefore  expected  to  see  some  great  damage  done  to  the  houses. 

But  beyond  a  hole  in  a  wall  or  roof,  or  the  branches  of  trees  cut 

off  in  iJie  courtyards,  there  was  nothing  to  show  that  our  shells 

had  fallen  within  its  walls.     Most  of  the  houses  are  so  strongly 

made,  the  walls  being  four  or  five  feet  thick  at  the  base,    and 

firmly  built  up  of  stone  and  mud  cement,  that  to  breach  them 

would  require  a  40-pounder,  and  we  have  no  guns  here  of  this 

calibre.    The  streets  of  Deh-i- Afghan  were  so  deserted  that  it  was 

quite  a  relief  to  leave  them  behind,  especially  as  the  whole  place 

seemed  to  smell  of  the  shambles — due,  perhaps,  to  the  bodies  of 

men  killed  in  action  being  buried  in  shallow  graves.    At  the  foot 

of  the  Asmai  Heights,  where  the  road  turns  off  to  the  Cabul  gorge, 

a  company  of  the  8rd  Sikhs  was  halted,  while  Captain  Nicholson, 

B.E.,  was  deciding  the  direction  a  new  military  road  should  take 

from  Sherpur  to  Dehmazung.     General  Hills,  Governor  of  the 

City,  with  a  number  of  "friendly"  Cabulis,  explained  to  them 

what  houses  were  to  be  pulled  down,  and  in  a  few  days  we  shall 

have  some  500  or  600  men  busy  in  demolishing  the  place.     As 

yet  we  have  not  destroyed  a  house  in  Cabul,  and  our  merciful 

policy  as  only  encouraged  its    turbulent   ruffians   to   turn   and 

harass  us  at  the  first  opportunity.     Military  considerations  alone 

should  be  now  allowed  to  prevail,  and  any  course  decided  upon 

as  contributing  to  the  safety  of  Sherpur  should  be  carried  out 

unswervingly.      We  have  seen  how  great   was    the    protection 

afforded  by  Deh-i- Afghan  to   the  enemy,  as  enabling  them  to 

collect  beneath  its  walls  in  perfect  security,  in  occupying  or  in 

retiring  from  the  Asmai  hill,  and  this  protection  should  now  be 

swept  away,  even  if  every  wall  and  house  between  the  foot  of  the 


270  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

hill  and  the  Cabnl  riyer  has  to  be  polled  down.  General  Macpher- 
son's  retirement  from  above  the  Bala  Hissar  on  the  evening  of  the 
14th  had  to  be  made  by  way  of  Deh-i- Afghan,  and  his  troops  were 
under  fire  the  whole  time  in  getting  from  the  Cabal  gorge  to  the 
fields  beyond,  where  our  troops  from  Sherpur  were  waiting  to 
cover  their  retirement.  Our  anxiety,  so  long  as  a  man  remained 
within  the  shadow  of  Deh-i- Afghan,  was  at  the  time  veiy  great. 

From  Deh-i-Afghan  across  a  bridge  which  spans  the  Gabul 
river,  and  thence  by  a  winding  path  among  high  walls  and  sombre- 
looking  dwellings,  to  the  Chandaul  quarter,  is  only  a  few  minutes' 
walk.  The  melting  snow  had  made  the  narrow,  ill-paved  streets 
almost  impassable  in  places,  and  we  had  io  splash  through  mud 
and  slush  to  make  any  progress  at  all.  As  this  end  of  the  city 
was  entered  there  were  a  few  more  signs  of  life,  and  one  or  two 
bhops  were  open,  but  few  wares  were  displayed.  All  these  shops 
belonged  to  Mahomedans;  they  had  escaped  looting,  and  their 
happy  owners  were  now  placidly  returning  to  their  every-day  life, 
though,  perchance,  during  the  Mohurrum  they  ruffled  it  with  the 
best,  and  swaggered  about,  threatening  death  to  all  Kafirs. 
They  know  our  weakness  for  sparing  a  fallen  foe,  and  they  trade 
upon  it  systematically.  They  will  take  our  rupees  to-day,  and  be 
all  subserviency  or  sullen  independence — ^not  so  much  the  latter  now 
— and  will  cut  our  throats  and  hack  our  bodies  to  pieces  to-morrow 
as  part  of  the  beautiful  programme  drawn  up  by  a  far-seeing  Provi- 
dence. Passing  by  these  few  shops  tenanted  by  Mahomedans,  I 
soon  came  to  those  owned  by  Hindus,  and  here  the  wreck  was 
great.  Like  all  Eastern  bazaars,  those  of  Cabul  consist  of  rows 
of  little  stalls  raised  three  or  four  feet  above  the  street  level.  The 
rear  and  side  walls  are  built  of  mud  and  sun-dried  bricks,  while  the 
front  is  all  open,  except  where  the  rude  wooden  shutters  are  put 
up  at  nightfall,  and  the  little  door  securely  padlocked.  But  few 
of  the  shopkeepers  live  ^*  on  the  premises ; "  they  have  houses  in 
the  back-streets,  where  their  wives  and  families  are  secluded ;  so 
that,  when  the  day's  work  or  trading  is  over,  the  bazaars  are 
deserted,  except  by  wanderers  or  strangers  in  search  of  their 
night's  resting-place.  These  little  stalls  have  been  gutted; 
nothing  is  leffc  except  the  bare  walls.  Every  scrap  of  woodwork 
has  been  carried  away,  and  the  floors  have  been  dug  up  in  search 


Cabul  as  left  by  the  Tribesmen.  271 

of  hidden  treaBore.  The  walls  in  several  places  are  broken 
down,  and  their  mins  lie  across  the  street ;  while  in  one  or  two 
instances  the  very  poles  of  the  roofs  have  been  purloined,  and  the 
snow  and  mist  have  wantoned  through  the  nice  snug  comers 
where  Bokhara  silks,  Manchester  cottons,  or  Sheffield  cntlery 
lay  stored  away*  A  description  of  one  stall  will  serve  for  all. 
Scarcely  a  Hindu  shop  has  been  left  untouched,  and  Defile- 
ment has  followed  upon  Devastation,  until  the  twin-sisters 
have  made  the  havoc  complete.  The  wretched  shopkeepers 
sit  among  the  ruins  in  helpless  misery,  and  are  already 
debating  whether  it  would  not  be  better  to  pack  up  their 
household  goods  and  mOve  for  Hindustan  rather  than  wait  for  a 
second  irruption  of  the  hungry  horde  of  tribesmen  who  are  now 
hurrying  away  to  their  homes  laden  with  the  loot  of  Cabul. 
These  Hindus  make  the  most  of  their  losses  unquestionably, 
in  the  hope  of  obtaining  compensation  from  the  British;  yet 
there  can  be  no  doubt  they  have  been  robbed  of  a  large  amount  of 
property.  The  Shore  Bazaar  is  nearly  all  wrecked,  and  one 
part  of  the  Char  Chowk,  the  large  covered-in  bazaar  of  Cabul,  has 
been  cleared  out  even  to  the  nails  in  the  walls.  The  practice 
of  burying  articles  of  value  is  so  common  among  Cabulis,  and 
indeed  among  Asiatics  generally,  that  part  of  the  strong  masonry 
of  which  the  main  walls  of  the  Char  Chowk  are  built  up  has  been 
broken  down,  and  huge  holes  and  gaps  left  to  show  the  earnestness 
of  the  search.  Such  shops  as  have  been  spared  in  the  heart 
of  the  city  are  still  closed,  for  their  owners  do  not  care  to 
display  their  goods  too  soon,  as  they  have  to  bear  the  inquisi- 
torial questions  of  their  less  fortunate  neighbours.  A  more 
wretched  picture  of  desolation  than  Cabul  presented  as  I  rode 
through  it  cannot  be  imagined.  All  the  life  and  turmoil  had  died 
out  of  it,  and  the  only  persons  who  seemed  to  take  advantage 
of  the  general  stagnation  were  the  women,  many  of  whom  were 
flitting  about  in  their  long  white  robes  as  if  free  from  all  restraint. 
The  kotwali  had  been  made  the  temporary  head-quarters  of 
Mahomed  Jan,  who  had  garrisoned  it  with  a  few  hundred  reso- 
lute men.  Their  first  act  had  been  to  destroy  and  defile  the 
room  where  General  Hills  sat  as  Governor  of  the  City ;  and  they 
had  done  this  very   completely,  even   the  roof  and  floor  being 


2^2  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

torn  ap.  Loop-holes  had  been  knocked  into  the  walls  of  every 
room,  both  aboYe  and  below,  as  if  in  anticipation  of  a  stand  being 
made  if  it  came  to  street-fighting.  The  kotwali  is  a  high  sqnare 
building ;  an  open  courtyard,  with  two  tiers  of  rooms  round  it, 
and  a  parapet  aboye  all  whence  the  neighbouring  roofs  and 
streets  can  be  commanded  by  musketry  fire.  It  is  so  closely 
hemmed  in  by  buildings,  however,  that  it  would  not  be  a  good 
position  to  defend.  The  entrance  is  from  the  middle  of  the 
Char  Chowk  Bazaar,  and  it  is  the  centre  round  which  all  Cabul 
circulates  when  any  excitement  arouses  the  people.  When  I 
yisited  it  in  my  ramble  through  the  city  I  found  100  Sikhs  and 
Qhoorkas  garrisoning  it,  and  ready  to  turn  out  at  a  moment's 
notice  if  an  alarm  of  '^ghazis"  were  raised.  Speaking  to 
a  friendly  Cabuli,  he  assui*ed  me  that  lakhs  of  property  had 
been  looted ;  he  himself  had  had  five  houses  cleared  out,  while 
sirdars  in  our  camp  had  been  treated  in  a  similar  way.  Wali 
Mahomed  especially  had  been  a  sufferer,  and  the  ladies  of  his 
zenana  had  been  subjected  to  great  indignities.  BeUeving  that 
they  had  ornaments  of  value  hidden  upon  their  persons,  they  were 
stripped  of  every  stitch  of  clothing,  and  turned  out  in  fdl  the 
shame  of  nakedness  into  the  streets.  Questioned  as  to  the  number 
of  Mahomed  Jan's  followers,  the  Cabuli  said  there  were  fully  30,000 
men,  and  this  coincided  with  estimates  given  by  our  spies  and 
others  who  have  been  examined  since.  Padshah  Khan,  the  man 
whom  we  trusted  so  implicitly  on  our  march  from  the  Shutargar- 
dan,  was  among  the  leaders,  and  brought  a  small  contingent  to 
swell  the  army  of  fanatics.  The  systematic  way  in  which  the 
looting  was  carried  on  will  appear  from  the  statement  that,  when 
a  man  defended  his  house  against  a  small  band  of  marauders, 
they  retired  for  the  time,  and  then  returned,  as  a  Hindu  put  it, 
"  10,000  strong."  It  was  useless  to  oflFer  opposition  to  such 
numbers,  though  I  believe  many  of  the  Kizilbashes,  by  pro- 
fessing to  be  good  Mahomedans,  saved  their  property.  There 
were  not  many  inoflfensive  shopkeepers  killed,  eight  or  ten  at 
the  highest  estimate :  but  the  fear  and  terror  in  which  they  lived 
hidden  away  in  cellars  and  holes  made  their  life  during  the 
Mohurrum  scarcely  worth  the  living.  I  left  Cabul,  feeling  that  it 
was,  indeed,  a  hapless  city.     The  industrious  classes,  who  had 


Tlie  Military  Commission  Re-Assembles.        273 

been  our  friends  and  had  rejoiced  at  oar  coming,  had  been  despoiled 
under  our  eyes ;  while  those  who  had  cursed  us  in  their  hearts, 
and  longed  to  drive  us  out,  were  once  more  cowed  after  a  short 
triumph,  and  were  calculating  how  many  of  their  number  would 
shortly  grace  the  gallows.  The  Military  Commission  under  the 
presidency  of  Brigadier-General  Massy  has  again  been  ordered  to 
assemble.  This  time,  it  is  to  be  hoped  a  few  men  of  importance 
may  be  executed — always  provided  that  we  can  find  them.  The 
members  of  the  Commission  are  General  Massy,  Major  Morgan, 
(of  the  9th  Foot),  and  Major  Stewart  (of  the  5th  Punjab 
Cavalry). 

The  remains  of  Captain  Spens  were  found  to-day  by  Dr.  Duke, 
about  ten  yards  from  the  spot  where  he  was  cut  down.  General 
Boberts,  with  a  small  force,  visited  Chardeh  Valley  to-day,  to 
examine  the  ground  where  the  cavalry  and  guns  came  to  grief  on 
the  11th.  One  mountain  gun  of  Swinley's  Battery,  lost  on  the 
14th,  has  been  found.  It  was  lying  in  a  ^heel  (a  shallow  pool)  a 
few  miles  up  Chardeh  Valley,  where  it  had  been  abandoned  by  the 
enemy  in  their  flight. 


CHAPTEB  XX. 

The  ProbabUities  of  fche  Reviral  of  the  J^Md — Insincerity  of  Native  Chiefs — The  Need 
of  further  Reinforcements — The  Difficulties  of  Warfare  in  Afghanistan — Return  of 
General  Baker  from  Baba  Kuch  Kar — Recovery  of  the  Bodies  of  Lieutenants 
Hardie  and  Forbes — Review  of  the  Jehad — The  Attitude  of  the  Tribes  on  the  Line 
of  Communications — Asmatullah  Khan's  Position — Failure  to  check  our  Rein- 
forcements— The  Importance  of  the  Luttabund  Post — Attack  upon  Jugdulluck— 
Repulse  of  the  Lnghmanis— Deportation  of  Daoud  Shah  to  India — Military  Execu- 
tions. 

Ist  January^  1880. 

The  New  Year  has  come  upon  us  so  suddenly  that  we  have  had 
no  time  to  cast  vain  regrets  upon  worn-out  months,  which  have 
witnessed  the  making  of  important  pages  of  history,  and  given  us 
a  new  starting-point  in  our  relations  with  Afghanistan.  A  month 
ago  we  were  dying  of  weary  inactivity,  but  this  feeling  was  swept 
away  by  the  stirring  events  of  the  Mohurrum,  and  we  have  not 

T 


274  '^f^  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

yet  sunk  back  into  our  old  state  of  lassitude.  Our  losses  have 
been  so  heavy,  that  it  behoves  us  to  take  precautions  to  prevent  a 
repetition  of  the  late  investment ;  and  we  are  bestirring  ourselves 
right  heartily  to  give  the  ghazi-Zo^  a  reception  worthy  of  their 
impetuous  nature,  if  they  keep  their  promise  to  return  in  March. 
Musa  Jan,  Yakub  Khan's  son,  is  now  with  Mushk-i-Alam  (that 
unsavoury  moollah,  whose  title  means  "  Scent  of  the  Universe  " ) 
at  Bad  Mushk,  twelve  miles  from  Ghazni ;  and  when  the  jehad  is 
revived,  all  true  Afghans  will  be  called  upon  to  rally  round  their 
rightful  sovereign.  The  waverers  will  be  wrought  upon  by  pro- 
mises of  endless  loot ;  the  fanatical  by  opportunities  of  future 
bliss  after  they  have  died  as  ghazis ;  and  the  mass  of  the  tribes- 
men by  an  appeal  to  their  warlike  instincts  which  lead  them  to 
fight  for  the  sake  of  bloodshed.  It  was  a  grave  mistake  which 
left  Musa  Jan,  with  the  women  of  Yakub  Khan's  household,  in 
Gabul ;  for  now  a  status  is  given  to  the  leaders  of  the  up-rising 
which  they  lacked  before.  We  have  Wali  Mahomed  with  us  still  ; 
and  if  we  so  far  modify  our  policy  as  to  make  him  Governor  of 
Gabul  and  the  districts  about, — and  all  things  are  possible  in  the 
see-saw  of  politics, — we  could  make  a  counter-appeal  and  declare 
Musa  Jan  to  be  merely  a  puppet  in  the  hands  of  mischief-makers. 
Whether  this  appeal  would  be  disregarded,  one  cannot  say ;  but 
if  it  were  backed  by  a  strong  display  of  force,  say  12,000  men 
holding  Sherpur  and  every  post  down  to  Jellalabad  well  garrisoned, 
it  might  have  some  effect.  No  faith  can  be  put  in  Afghan  pro- 
mises;  we  have  learned  that  by  the  falling  away  of  Padshah 
Khan,  if  we  did  not  already  know  it  from  past  experience ;  and 
our  safety  from  constant  attack  must  lie  in  the  completeness  of 
our  own  preparations,  rather  than  in  contracts  made  with  sirdars 
who  will  only  serve  us  so  long  as  fair  weather  lasts.  Padshah 
Khan  is  said  to  have  remained  faithful  at  least  until  the  14th  of 
December.  When  he  learned  that  the  British  had  been  obliged 
to  withdraw  within  the  walls  of  Sherpur,  and  had  lost  two 
mountain  guns  in  the  day's  fighting,  he  may  have  thought  that 
a  disaster  was  impending,  and  so  joined  Mahomed  Jan  with  as 
many  Ghilzais  as  he  could  collect  together.  He  now  affirms 
that  he  was  more  a  spectator  than  an  active  participator  in  the 
siege ;  and  that  this  was  so  evident  to  the  other  chiefs  that,  after 


The  Collection  of  Supplies.  275 

assigiung  him  a  post  in  the  fore-front  of  the  attack,  they  withdrew 
him  from  his  command  at  the  last  moment,  so  great  was  their 
mistmst  of  his  sincerity. 

The  Ehyber  Force  will  relieve  us  of  all  garrison  work  at  Lutta- 
bond,  which  sets  free  800  men  and  two  guns  for  dnty  here ;  so 
that  with  the  1,400  men  General  Charles  Gongh  brought  with 
him  we  shall  be  over  2,000  stronger.  Bat  oar  losses  have  been 
heavy,  and  there  are  now  800  men  on  the  sick  list,  many  of  whom 
mast  be  sent  back  to  India.  The  present  campaign  cannot  be 
brotight  to  a  successfol  conclnsion  without  a  much  greater  display 
of  force  than  we  have  hitherto  made ;  and  I  believe  every  effort  is 
now  being  put  forth  to  collect  further  supplies,  so  that,  if  neces- 
sary, 15,000  or  20,000  men  could  be  fed  during  February  and 
March  preparatory  to  our  resuming  the  offensive  in  the  spring. 
The  warning  of  Sir  Henry  Durand,  in  his  criticism  of  the  old 
war,  must  have  recurred  to  our  leaders  when  contemplating  a  new 
accession  of  strength  to  the  force  now  here.  .  He  wrote : — 
''  Everything  in  the  expedition  was  a  matter  of  the  greatest  un- 
certainty, even  to  the  feeding  of  the  troops ;  for  Afghanistan 
merited  the  character  given  to  Spain  by  Henry  IV.  of  France  : 
'  Invade  with  a  large  force,  and  you  are  destroyed  by  starvation ; 
invade  with  a  small  one,  and  you  are  overwhelmed  by  a  hostile 
people.' "  We  have  tried  the  latter  alternative,  and,  after  being 
shut  in  by  60,000  Afghans  (for  such  it  is  now  said  was  the 
numerical  strength  of  Mahomed  Jan's  following),  we  have  no 
wish  to  repeat  the  experiment.  To  avoid  it,  we  must  have  a  large 
and  handy  force  ready  to  cope  with  the  enemy  before  he  can  reach 
Cabul ;  and  here  the  starvation  difficulty  crops  up.  After  paying 
fjEtbulously  high  prices  for  everything — from  a  sheep  to  an  onion 
— we  had  laid  in  stores  sufficient  for  the  consumption  of  our 
original  division  until  the  spring ;  but  these  will  not  suffice  when 
they  are  drawn  upon  by  the  troops  which  have  since  joined  us 
(9th  Foot,  Guides,  2nd  and  4th  Ghoorkas,  Hazara  Mountain 
Battery,  and  Sappers),  apart  from  any  others  that  may  yet  come 
up.  The  Ehyber  transport  is  not  strong  enough  for  much  reliance 
to  be  placed  upon  it  in  the  matter  of  bringing  up  supplies  from 
Peshawar,  and  we  shall  probably  have  to  requisition  the  country 
and  force  the  people  to  sell  their  hidden  stores  at  our  own  prices, 

T  2 


276  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

We  cannot  starve,  and  the  military  exigencies  of  the  position 
render  it  imperative  that  we  should  have  Sherpur  not  only 
well  garrisoned,  but  a  movable  force  of  sufficient  strength  to  dis- 
perse all  Cabul  gatherings,  and  regiments  stationed  along  our 
line  of  communication,  equal  either  to  punishing  chiefs  like 
Asmatullah,  or  moving  westward  to  Cabul  if  a  second  jehad 
brings  about  another  great  combination  of  the  people.  Our 
latest  reinforcement,  which  arrived  here  on  the  24th,  under 
General  Gough,  is  now  garrisoning  the  Bala  Hissar ;  while  the 
Guides  have  been  attached  to  General  Macpherson's  Brigade,  and 
will  remain  in  cantonments.  They  have  done  good  service  since 
their  arrival,  and  well  deserve  to  be  attached  to  the  army  which 
captured  Cabul  single-handed. 

General  Baker  returned  yesterday  from  his  excursion  to  Baba 
Euch  E^r,  where  he  destroyed  the  forts  and  villages  belonging 
to  Mir  Butcha.  This  place  was  demolished  by  Sale  on  the  8th  of 
October,  1840.  It  was  considered  at  that  time  a  stronghold  which 
would  have  given  an  army  without  a  battering-train  much  trouble ; 
but  now  the  fortified  enclosures  were  less  formidable.  They  were 
not  defended,  Mir  Butcha  and  his  retainers  have  fled  northward 
to  Charikar  when  he  saw  how  quickly  we  were  following  him  after 
his  retreat  from  Sherpur  on  the  8rd  December.  No  opposition 
on  the  road  to,  or  from,  Baba  Euch  Ear  was  offered  to  General 
Baker,  who  was  only  away  five  days.  The  snow-covered  roads  and 
hills  were  very  trying  to  the  soldiers  and  followers ;  and  it  was 
conclusively  proved  that  camping  out  in  this  weather  is  likely  to 
ROW  the  seeds  of  much  sickness  among  our  men.  The  country 
visited  was  not  Eohistan  proper,  which  lies  north  of  Istalif,  but 
the  Eoh-Daman  (**  Skirt  of  the  Hills  ").  The  valleys  were  found 
to  be  marvellously  fertile,  the  orchards  and  vineyards  on  the  hill- 
slopes  stretching  away  on  either  side  for  miles.  Cabul  is  said  to 
draw  most  of  its  delicious  fruit  from  the  Eoh-Daman,  the  fertility 
of  which  we  had  every  opportunity  of  observing.  In  the  spring 
the  district  must  be  the  most  beautiful  spot  in  Afghanistan, 
the  Chardeh  Valley  sinking  into  insignificance  before  it.  Great 
difficulty  would  be  experienced  by  an  army  marching  through  in 
the  face  of  determined  opposition.  Sunken  roads,  irrigated  tracts, 
walled  fields,  and  innumerable  watercourses  form  such  a  network 


Destruction  of  Mir  Butchers  Villages.  277 

of  obsirnction,  that  if  the  forts  and  Tillages,  with  their  acres  of 
orchards  and  vineyards,  were  defended,  progress  would  be 
laborious  and  dangerous  in  the  extreme.  For  miles  there  is 
admirable  coyer  for  skirmishers  to  harass  an  army  with  all  its 
impedimenta  of  baggage  and  followers  ;  and  every  fort  would  have 
to  be  stormed,  as  mountain  guns  would  make  no  impression  on 
the  mud  walls.  General  Baker  not  only  looted  and  levelled  to 
the  ground  all  forts  and  villages  owned  by  Mir  Butcha,  but  cut 
down  his  vineyards,  and  set  the  Ghoorkas  to  work  to  ''  ring''  all 
the  fruit  trees.  This  will  be  a  heavy  loss  to  the  villages,  which 
mainly  derive  their  local  influence  from  the  return  yielded  by  their 
orchards  and  vineyards.  Baba  Euch  Ear  is  a  little  over  twenty 
miles  from  Sherpur ;  and  from  it  Istalif  could  be  seen,  with  its 
white  walls  gleaming  out  on  the  hillsides,  surrounded  by  orchards 
extending  as  far  as  the  eye  could  reach.  Istalif  is  about  ten 
miles  further  north,  and  the  country  between  is  all  under  culti 
vation.  Arrangements  were  made  with  local  headmen  to  bring  in 
supplies,  and  large  quantities  of  grain  and  bhoosa  are  expected  to 
reach  us  from  the  Eoh-Daman. 

The  quickness  with  which  we  resumed  the  offensive  after  being 
besieged  in  Sherpur  has  favourably  impressed  all  the  country 
about.  Such  chiefs  as  were  hostile  to  us  now  see  that  they  are 
not  safe  from  reprisals;  and  within  easy  marches  of  Sherpur 
many  villages  which  turned  out  their  fighting  men  during  the 
jehad,  are  now  being  punished.  One  village  in  Chardeh  was  said 
to  contain  the  bodies  of  Lieutenants  Hardie  and  Forbes,  who 
fell  in  the  cavalry  action  on  the  11th  of  December.  On  our 
troops  visiting  it,  the  maliks  denied  that  the  bodies  had  been 
seen.  Two  of  the  headmen  were  tied  up  and  flogged,  but  still 
refused  to  speak;  but  upon  a  third  being  seized,  he  offered  to 
show  the  officers'  graves.  The  bodies  were  exhumed,  and  were 
found  to  be  unmutilated.  The  village  has  been  destroyed  on 
account  of  the  contumacy  of  the  maliks,  and  also  because  our 
troops  were  fired  upon  from  its  walls  when  the  guns  were  lost. 
Several  other  missing  bodies  of  Lancers  have  been  found;  and 
on  New  Year's  Day  an  impressive  funeral  of  the  bodies  of  Captain 
Spans,  Lieutenant  Hardie,  Lieutenant  Forbes,  and  a  non-com- 
missioned officer  took  place  at  the  foot  of  the  north- western  slope 


278  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

of  the  Bemaru  Heights.  We  have  lost  twelve  officers  killed  and 
fourteen  wounded  since  December  10th,  which  shows  the  severity 
of  the  fighting ;  while  of  the  rank  and  file  and  camp-followers, 
ninety-eight  have  been  killed  and  238  wounded. 

^th  J<muary. 

One  feature  of  the  late  investment  of  Sherpur  cantonment 
which  deserves  considerable  attention  is  the  part  played  by  the 
powerful  Ghilzai  tribes  between  Oabul  and  Jellalabad.  Their 
attitude,  from  the  14th  of  December,  was  the  same  as  that  taken 
up  in  the  war  of  1841-42,  and  they  no  doubt  looked  for  a  similar 
result.  It  might  have  been  foretold  with  absolute  certainty  that 
once  a  British  army  was  besieged  at  Cabul,  the  tribesmen  on  the 
route  to  India  would  rise  to  a  man  and  try  to  block  the  road  along 
which  reinforcements  must  pass.  The  jehad  which  Mushk-i- 
Alam  headed  had  its  origin  far  from  the  rocky  barrier  which  shuts 
in  the  Cabul  plain  on  the  east :  its  birth  was  at  Ghazni,  and  its 
growth  extended  on  the  north  to  Eohistan,  and  on  the  south  to 
Logar,  the  two  districts  which  furnished  at  the  outset  its  principal 
strength.  The  Safis  of  Tagao  were  drawn  within  its  influence 
by  their  close  neighbourhood  to  Eohistan ;  but  the  Ohilzais  of 
Tezin  and  the  valleys  about,  as  well  as  the  more  distant  Lugh* 
manis,  held  aloof  at  first  by  reason  of  their  position  between 
the  two  British  forces.  If  Mahomed  Jan  had  failed  in  his  march 
upon  Cabul,  and  had  been  driven  back  upon  the  Ghazni  Bead,  we 
should  probably  have  heard  little  of  the  hostility  of  the  tribes 
westward  of  Butkhak ;  the  preaching  of  the  mooUahs,  which  had 
for  weeks  before  fallen  upon  the  ears  of  the  Ghilzais  as  the  pre- 
diction of  a  great  triumph  over  the  Kaffir  army,  would  have  borne 
no  fruit  beyond  an  occasional  raid  upon  our  convoys.  The  local 
clans  would  have  felt  that,  if  a  powerful  combination,  such  as  that 
which  had  gathered  about  the  Ghazni  priest,  had  failed  to  drive 
back  the  British  army,  they  themselves  were  powerless  to  do  so. 
But  once  the  vast  host  of  60,000  men  had  occupied  Cabul  and 
the  Bala  EUssar,  and  had  made  it  impossible  for  the  garrison  of 
Sherpur  to  move  beyond  its  defences,  the  Ghilzais  felt  that  the 
appeal  to  their  fanaticism  was  a  safe  lead  to  follow,  and  they 
began  to  muster  in  strength.    The  messengers  from  Mahomed 


Asmatullah  Khan's  Operations.  279 

Jan  were  welcomed,  and  our  evacuation  of  Butkhak  proved  that 
his  promise  to  surround  and  cut  to  pieces  the  small  army  which 
had  captured  Gabul  was  not  widely  removed  from  the  possible,  as 
our  leaders  were  concentrating  their  force  to  resist  an  attack.  If 
we  had  not  needed  every  man  at  Sherpur,  why  should  we  hurry 
away  from  our  first  outpost  under  cover  of  darkness  ?  This  was 
the  argument  which  went  home  to  the  hearts  of  the  men  in  the 
hills  about  Ehurd  Cabul  and  Tezin ;  and  all  the  local  chiefs,  with 
one  exception,  turned  out  their  fighting  men,  and  thought  of  the 
slaughter  of  our  army  in  the  terrible  defile  of  1842.  Padshah 
£han,  in  his  villages  nearer  the  Shutargardan,  was  carried  away 
by  the  same  reasoning;  and,  with  customary  treachery,  he 
hastened  to  Gabul  to  fight  against  the  men  he  had  pledged 
himself  to  support.  His  contingent  was  more  needed  there  than 
that  of  the  chiefs  along  our  line  of  communications,  who  had  a 
similar  mission  to  perfoim  to  that  so  successfully  carried  out 
nearly  forty  years  ago — to  block  all  outlets  of  escape ;  and  in 
addition,  to  drive  back  our  reinforcements  to  Jellalabad.  In  the 
first  flush  of  success  it  may  have  occurred  to  Mahomed  Jan  that 
he  was  destined  to  become  a  second  Akhbar  Khan,  and  that  a 
siege  of  Jellalabad  would  follow  the  annihilation  of  the  force  at 
Cabul.  To  carry  out  the  programme  with  success*  it  was  needful 
that  all  posts  west  of  Jellalabad  should  be  swept  away ;  and  this 
work  he  entrusted  to  Asmatullah  Ehan,  of  Lughman,  a  chief, 
perhaps,  more  powerful  than  any  other  single  tribal  leader  in 
North-Eastem  Afghanistan.  Asmatullah  accepted  the  part 
assigned  to  him,  and  the  Lughmanis  were  soon  actively  at  work : 
the  telegraph  line  west  of  Gundamak  was  destroyed,  and  then,  in 
full  confidence,  the  troops  at  JugduUuck  were  attacked.  But 
though  it  was  easy  enough  in  theory  to  lay  down  plans  on  the  old 
lines,  the  Lughmanis  found  that,  with  superior  weapons,  our 
soldiers  were  able  without  difficulty  to  hold  their  own  against 
twentyfold  odds.  The  road  might  be  made  unsafe,  and  all  con- 
voys stopped ;  but  when  it  came  to  turning  out  enemies  snugly 
entrenched,  and  armed  with  breech-loaders,  it  was  a  very  different 
Btory.  While  Mahomed  Jan  fondly  imagined  that  for  two  or  three 
months  the  Ghilzais  would  hold  the  Passes,  and  check  the  move- 
ment of  a  relieving  force,  Asmatullah  Khan  was  not  equal  to 


28o  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

keeping  back  the  stream  of  men  which  set  westwards  from  Gan- 
damak,  and  could  not  even  dispossess  the  solitary  native  regiment 
which  held  Jagdulluck  when  the  small  brigade  under  General 
Charles  Gough  had  started  for  Sherpur.  The  Ghilzais  of  Tezin 
had  also  found  themselves  non-plussed  by  the  abandonment  of  the 
old  route  of  the  Ehurd  Cabul,  which  was  no  longer  followed  either 
to  or  from  Sherpur.  Although  MaizuUah  Khan  and  every  local 
chief,  with  the  exception  of  Mahomed  Shah  Khan,  of  Hisarak, 
were  in  arms,  their  tactics  were  so  faulty  that,  beyond  menacing 
Luttabund,  they  did  nothing  to  harass  our  reinforcements.  The 
mere  fact  of  our  being  able  to  hold  the  Luttabund  Kotal  was  so 
strong  an  evidence  that  the  end  had  not  yet  come,  that  they 
hesitated  to  occupy  the  road  between  that  post  and  the  Jugdulluck 
defile,  fearing  that  they  might  be  caught  between  two  fires. 
Then  was  demonstrated  the  full  value  of  the  decision  arrived  at  by 
Sir  F.  Boberts — to  hold  Luttabund  at  all  hazards  until  its  garrison 
could  be  picked  up  by  the  column  moving  to  his  relief.  The  flash 
of  the  heliograph  from  Sherpur  to  the  kotal  where  Colonel  Hud- 
son, with  less  than  1,000  men,  was  watching  for  the  reinforce- 
ments from  our  eastern  posts,  told  the  tribes  that  the  force  in 
Sherpur,  though  beleaguered  by  an  army  larger  than  Cabul  had 
ever  seen,  was  still  linked  to  its  supports,  and  was  by  no  means 
in  the  straits  Mahomed  Jan  had  promised.  Sitting  on  the  hills 
about  Luttabund,  the  Ghilzais  were  too  faint-hearted  to  attack  in 
earnest,  and  Mahomed  Jan  was  not  General  enough  to  detach  one- 
fifth  of  his  force  to  sweep  away  the  handful  of  men  forming  our 
solitary  outpost.  Forty  Sikhs  of  the  23rd  Pioneers  were  enough 
to  scatter  the  bands  which  gathered  about  Luttabund ;  and  so 
little  did  the  followers  of  Maizullah  Khan  prove  worthy  of  the 
trust  confided  to  them  by  Mahomed  Jan,  that  from  Jugdulluck  to 
Butkhak  scarcely  a  shot  was  fired  upon  General  Charles  Gough' s 
brigade.  Mahomed  Jan,  holding  Cabul  and  the  Bala  Hissar  in 
his  grasp,  must  have  felt  that  his  plans  were  falling  to  pieces 
when  the  Ghilzais  were  unequal  to  breaking  up  the  force  passing 
through  their  midst;  and  once  our  reinforcements  had  entered 
upon  the  Cabul  plain,  those  plans  ceased  to  exist.  In  desperation 
the  assault  upon  Sherpur  was  decided  upon,  and  its  failure  was 
the  signal  for  the  collapse  of  the  jehad.     Twenty-four  hours  after 


His  Demonstration  against  yugdtilluck.        281 

the  signal  light  blazed  upon  the  summit  of  the  Asmai  hill,  not 
1,000  men  of  the  50,000  who  had  held  Cabul  could  be  found 
within  ten  miles  of  the  city. 

I  have  tried  to  explain  the  course  of  action  taken  by  the 
Ghilzais  of  Lughman  and  the  Passes,  and  they  have  always  been 
a  bugbear  when  an  adyance  upon  Cabul  was  made  from  Gun- 
damak.  It  has  been  clearly  proved  that  they  lack  organization, 
and  have  not  the  resolute  courage  to  attack  entrenched  positions 
held  by  even  small  bodies  of  our  men.  Asmatullah  Khan, 
it  is  true,  made  a  demonstration  against  Jugdulluck  on  the  29th 
of  December,  six  days  after  Mahomed  Jan's  flight ;  but  he  was 
beaten  back  with  a  loss,  on  our  side,  of  one  officer  (Lieutenant 
Wright,  ll-9th  Battery),  and  a  native  gunner  killed,  and  one  man 
of  the  61st  Begiment  slightly  wounded.  This  was  after  eight 
hours'  fighting,  and  proves  how  paltry  a  force  Lughman  can  send 
out.  As  this  was  probably  Asmatullah  Khan's  last  attempt  before 
withdrawing  to  Lughman  again,  I  will  give  Colonel  Norman's 
(24th  Punjab  Infantry)  account  of  the  affair.  Writing  on  the 
evening  of  the  29th,  he  said: — *'AtlO  a.m.  to-day  a  party  I 
had  sent  out  to  reconnoitre  on  the  hills  to  the  south  was  attacked 
in  force  by  Asmatullah  Khan.  The  party  held  its  own  until 
reinforced ;  but  as  the  enemy  were  in  great  strength,  I  had  to 
send  out  nearly  all  my  men.  One  hundred  and  sixty  of  the  29th 
were  on  the  koial^  and  holding  points  on  the  Pass  to  cover  the 
advance  of  the  45th  Sikhs,  then  marching  up  to  join  me.  About 
noon  I  received  a  telegi-am,  saying  that  three  companies  of  the 
5l8t  Foot,  860  men  of  the  45th  Sikhs,  and  four  guns  of  ll-9th 
Battery,  were  on  the  way  up.  I  accordingly  waited  for  the  arrival 
of  these  troops,  to  enable  me  to  act  more  vigorously ;  but  it  was 
4  P.M.  before  they  arrived,  and  before  this  I  had  driven  the  enemy 
back.  The  reinforcements,  directly  they  had  arrived,  took  up  a  posi- 
tion in  prolongation  of  my  right,  to  enfilade  the  enemy.  Just  as 
ll-9th  Battery  came  into  action,  I  regret  to  say  that  Lieutenant 
Wright  was  killed  by  a  rifle  bullet.  The  enemy  had  completely 
retired  before  sunset.  The  practice  of  Anderson's  guns  (Hazara 
Mountain  Battery)  was  splendid.  Asmatullah  Khan  has  most  of 
the  Lughman  chiefs  with  him,  and  the  Governor  of  Jellalabad 
Mahomed  Hasan  Khan."      Colonel  Norman  also  reported  that 


282  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

with  the  force  at  his  command,  he  could  not  hope  thoroughly  to 
disperse  the  Lnghmanis,  who  retired  from  one  range  of  hills  to 
another.  These  are  the  usual  tactics  of  Afghan  guerilla  warfare, 
the  tribesmen  returning  as  soon  as  the  pursuit  is  over.  The 
punishment  of  AsmatuUah  Ehan  will  be  directed  from  another 
quarter.  A  flying  column  from  Jellalabad  will  enter  his  country 
and  deyastate  it,  dispersing  any  force  he  may  attempt  to  keep 
together.  The  news  of  this  proposed  expedition  has  doubtless 
hastened  his  steps  back  to  his  own  fertile  valley.  The  Ghilzais  ^ 
south  of  Jugdulluck  will  also  be  visited  by  a  flying  column  from 
Oundamak^  which  will  penetrate  as  far  as  Hisarak,  and  punish 
MaizuUah  Ehan  and  the  o£her  chiefs  who  joined  him.  Each  of 
these  columns  will  be  made  up  of  1,500  infantry,  four  mountain 
guns,  and  a  squadron  of  cavalry,  and  they  are  to  be  kept  always 
ready  to  move  out  at  short  notice,  apart  from  the  regular  garrison 
of  Jellalabad  and  Gundamak.* 

Another  prisoner  of  some  importance  has  been  deported  to 
India  :  Daoud  Shah,  the  ex- Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Amir's 
army,  was  sent  down  the  line  a  few  days  ago.  His  honesty,  which 
for  a  long  time  many  of  us  believed  in,  seems  to  have  been  tried, 
and  found  wanting.  The  story  that  a  letter  was  intercepted,  in- 
criminating him  in  the  rising,  is  untrue  ;  but  that  communications 
of  some  kind  passed  between  him  and  the  hostile  chiefs  is  said  to 
have  been  pretty  conclusively  established.  The  exact  relations 
between  him  and  Mahomed  Jan  may  never  be  known  ;  but  they 
were  probably  on  the  basis  that,  if  Daoud  Shah  would  desert  the 
British,  a  high  command  should  be  his  under  the  new  Amir, 
Musa  Jan.  His  military  experience  would  also  have  been  in- 
valuable in  directing  such  an  army  as  that  within  Cabul,  and  his 
knowledge  of  our  cantonment  and  its  weak  points  would  have 
made  him  a  leader  whom  the  tribesmen  would  have  confidently 
followed. 

The  Military  Commission  has  had  before  it  many  of  the  prisoners 
taken  after  December  2drd,  and  five  men  condemned  to  death 
were  hanged  yesterday.  Four  of  these  were  villagers  of  Baghwana, 
near  which  place  the  four  Horse  Artillery  guns   were   lost   on 

*  I  may  here  state  that  both  these  expeditions  were  afterwards  carried  oat,  and  their 
object  attained. 


General  Roberts  Proclaims  an  Amnesty.        283 

December  11th.  Captain  Guinness,  of  the  72nd  Highlanders, 
has  taken  the  place  of  Major  Morgan,  9th  foot,  on  the  Commis- 
sion, which,  it  will  be  remembered,  originally  consisted  at  Siah 
Snng  Camp  of  General  Massy,  Major  Moriarty,  and  Captain 
Guinness.    Very  few  prisoners  are  now  left  for  trial. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

An  Amnesty  issued — Influences  affecting  the  People  during  the  Jthad — Inyitation  to 
the  Chiefs  to  visit  Sherpur — Leaders  exempted  from  the  Amnesty — ^The  Malcontent 
Chiefs  at  Ghazni — Durbar  of  January  9th — Principal  Chiefs  present — Padshah 
Khan — Address  by  Sir  Frederick  Roberts — Loyal  Chiefs  rewarded— Arrangements 
for  goTeming  Kohistan — Migration  of  Hindu  Merchants  to  India — Reasons  for  the 
Movement — Mahomed  Jan's  Plans — Proposal  to  Recall  Yakub  Khan — Reasons  for 
such  a  Course  being  impossible — Improvement  in  the  Intelligence  Department — 
News  of  Abdur  Rahman  Khan — Additional  Fortifications  about  Cabul  and  Sherpur. 

lih  January,  1880. 

An  amnesty  has  been  issued  by  General  Roberts,  dated  December 
26th,  which  is  so  framed  that  it  should  convince  even  the  most 
sceptical  tribesmen  that  we  are  anxious  to  conciliate  them  rather 
by  fiedr  dealing  than  by  force  of  arms.  Only  five  leaders  are 
exempted  from  the  pardon  which  is  freely  offered  to  all  tribes  who 
will  send  in  their  representatives  to  our  cantonments.  The  losses 
which  the  Kohistanis  and  other  clans  suffered  by  the  jeliad  were  so 
heavy  that  the  pride  of  having  been  able  to  coop  up  the  British 
army  within  Sherpur,  must  be  mixed  with  a  feeling  that  the 
temporary  victory  was  dearly  bought,  and  that  to  repeat  it  would 
involve  still  further  loss  of  life.  In  the  proclamation  it  is  assumed 
that  the  mass  of  ignorant  people  were  misled  by  the  represen- 
tation of  certain ''  seditious  men,"  and  rose  in  rebellion  against  us ; 
and  our  pardon  is  granted  on  the  further  assumption  that  this 
ignorance  was  generally  shared  in  by  the  coalition  of  tribes- 
men. This  is  a  very  lenient  view  to  take  of  what  was  really  an 
outburst  of  religious  fanaticism,  in  which  even  chiefs  who  were 
friendly  to  us  shared ;  but  it  is  a  stroke  of  policy  which  may,  for 
a  time  at  least,  win  over  to  us  most  of  the  leaders  of  the  tribes. 


284  Ttie  Afghan  War,  1879  —  80. 

Before  carrying  fire  and  sword  into  their  villages,  we  invite  them 
to  come  in  and  say  what  it  is  they  really  want,  and  we  guarantee 
their  personal  safety,  even  though  they  lately  stood  arrayed  against 
us.  This  is  not  the  usual  treatment  accorded  to  rebels  ;  but  it  is 
felt,  perhaps,  that,  with  our  half-hearted  declarations  of  policy 
regarding  Afghanistan,  it  would  be  unwise  to  punish,  with  the 
severity  rebellion  merits,  the  people  who  have  given  us  so  much 
trouble.  If  we  had  formally  annexed  the  country,  we  might  cer- 
tainly punish  with  death  men  who  rose  in  arms  against  our 
authority;  but  all  we  have  done  is  to  declare  that,  at  some 
unknown  date,  we  shall  ''  make  known  our  will  as  to  the  future 
permanent  arrangements  to  be  made  for  the  good  government  of 
the  people."  Where  our  arms  were  felt,  there  our  authority  was 
known  and  respected ;  but  in  the  districts  beyond,  our  power  was 
only  nominal.  To  refuse  to  obey  it  was  rebellion  only  in  name, 
under  such  circumstances ;  and,  moreover,  the  abdication  of  the 
Amir  Yakub  Eiian  was  looked  upon  by  his  late  subjects  as  rather 
compulsory  than  otherwise.  The  ignorant  people,  whom  we  are 
now  so  ready  to  forgive,  argued  that,  if  the  abdication  was  volun- 
tary, a  successor  would  instantly  have  been  placed  on  the  throne ; 
whereas  time  had  gone  by,  and  nothing  had  been  done  to  show 
that  our  military  occupation  of  the  capital  and  the  districts  between 
Gabul  and  Peshawur  was  not  to  be  permanent.  An  appeal  to 
their  loyalty  to  the  Barakzai  dynasty,  and  a  further  appeal  to  their 
hatred  of  Kaffirs,  were  quite  enough  to  call  them  to  arms ;  and 
they  believed  themselves  strong  enough  either  to  drive  us  pell-mell 
from  Cabul,  or  to  impose  terms  of  their  own  making.  They  did 
not  succeed  in  either;  and  if  we  followed  their  own  savage  custom, 
we  should  kill  every  man  we  could  lay  hands  upon  who  had  joined 
in  the  attack  upon  our  army.  But,  instead  of  these  bloodthirsty 
reprisals,  the  tribesmen  find  pursuing  them  messengers  bearing 
offers  of  pardon  if  they  will  merely  visit  Sherpur  and  make  their 
obeisance  to  the  British  General.  They  are  not  asked  to  submit 
to  any  conditions ;  their  safety  is  assured ;  and  all  that  is  required 
of  them  is  that  they  will  frankly  say  what  their  opinions  are  upon 
the  present  state  of  Afghan  politics,  and  what  suggestions  they 
have  to  make  to  guide  us  in  dealing  with  the  people.  Some  of  the 
tribal  chiefs  are  either  in  Sherpur^  or  on  their  way  thither;  and 


A  Clear  Unaerstanaing  Necessary.  285 

we  shall  soon  have  an  opportunity  of  hearing  what  their  wishes — 
if  they  have  any — really  are.  But,  whatever  views  are  put  for- 
ward, and  whatever  points  may  be  yielded  by  men  who  are  in  their 
hearts  most  hostile  to  us,  it  will  not  be  enough  to  take  shallow 
promises  as  trustworthy  in  the  future.  With  all  the  cunning 
astuteness  of  AjTghans,  the  tribal  leaders  will  come  in  and  will  try 
to  outwit  us,  as  they  have  always  tried  before.  If  we  accept  their 
promises  and  leave  them  to  be  carried  out  by  themselves,  they 
may  be  looked  upon  as  a  dead  letter.  Rather  would  it  be  better 
to  listen  to  all  that  they  have  to  urge  in  favour  of  a  new  order  of 
things :  Eohistanis,  Wardaks,  Logaris,  Ghilzais  of  all  sections 
giving  their  views  freely ;  and  then  to  dismiss  them  to  their  homes, 
warning  them  that  they  must  rest  peacefully  until  the  will  of  the 
British  Government  is  made  known  to  them.  Let  a  fixed  date  be 
declared  on  which  that  will  shall  be  publicly  proclaimed;  and 
whether  the  decision  is  that  Afghanistan  is  to  be  annexed,  to  be 
split  up  into  provinces,  or  left  to  fall  to  pieces  by  internal  disorder 
after  our  return  to  India,  let  it  be  clearly  understood  that,  so  long 
as  a  British  General  remains  at  Cabul,  his  orders  are  the  law  that 
is  alone  to  be  regarded.  These  orders,  also,  must  be  enforced, 
when  necessary,  by  our  soldiers,  and  something  more  must  be  done 
than  sending  some  sirdar,  alone  and  unprotected,  into  tribal 
districts,  to  carry  out  our  wishes.  The  only  fear  is  that  the 
amnesty  may  be  looked  upon  as  a  sign  of  weakness  on  our  part, 
meaning  that  we  dread  another  uprising ;  but  if,  along  with  our 
philanthropic  forgiveness,  we  mix  the  leaven  of  military  prepara- 
tions on  a  large  scale,  the  eyes  of  the  people  will  be  opened  to 
our  real  resources  and  the  power  we  have  at  hand  to  crush  rebel- 
lion. It  must  never  occur  to  us  again  to  be  shut  up  in  Sherpur 
for  nine  days ;  such  investments  are  fatal  to  our  prestige,  both 
here  and  elsewhere.  The  memorandum  of  a  Military  Secretary  in 
India,  who  can  seek  to  reassure  the  country  by  the  absurd  state- 
ment that  2,500  men  can  garrison  a  cantonment  with  over  four 
miles  of  walls  and  trenches  to  man,  must  not  be  allowed  to  weigh 
against  the  ugly  facts  we  have  had  to  face.  With  more  than  5,000 
men  available  for  duty,  the  work  was  so  terrible  and  severe,  the 
constant  watch  by  day  and  night  so  trying,  that  over  800  sick  and 
wounded  are  now  in  our  hospitals.     With  these  5,000  we  could 


286  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

repulse  assaults,  but  could  not  move  outside  to  give  battle  to  the 
enemy  who  flaunted  their  standards  on  Siah  Sung  Heights,  and 
planted  others  within  250  yards  of  our  bastions.  Never  was 
there  a  case  in  which  the  motto  ''  fore- warned  is  fore-armed  "  was 
more  applicable  than  now :  our  warning  has  been  a  rude  one,  and 
has  cost  us  many  lives ;  but  it  has  done  this  service — ^that  it  has 
shown  us  how  to  guard  against  another  such  shock.  Ten  thousand 
men  in  Sherpur  and  the  Bala  Hissar  can  laugh  at  even  60,000 
tribesmen ;  for,  with  such  a  force  at  our  disposal,  we  could  always 
spare  8,000  or  4,000  infantry  to  fight  beyond  the  walls ;  and  our 
past  experience  has  shown  that  we  have  nothing  to  fear  with 
brigades  of  this  strength.  It  is  only  when  we  invite  attack  by 
weakness  that  hands-ful  of  our  men  are  overwhelmed  by  sheer 
weight  of  numbers.  If  we  are  to  continue  in  the  country,  and 
operations  are  to  be  extended  in  the  spring  to  Ghazni,  Gharikar,  or 
Balkh,  not  less  than  10,000  men  should  be  garrisoned  in  and  about 
Cabul  by  the  end  of  March.  Our  power  now  extends  just  as  far 
as  our  rifles  can  shoot ;  for  we  can  no  more  rely  upon  the  fidelity 
of  Chiefs  who  come  into  Sherpur,  than  Macnaghten  could  upon 
the  promises  of  Akhbar  Khan.  Every  man's  hand  would  be 
against  us,  if  we  again  were  encompassed  about  in  these  canton- 
ments. 

In  the  meantime,  the  proclamation  of  an  amnesty  has  brought 
in  most  of  the  Eohistani  chiefs  (even  those  of  Istalif  and  Cha- 
rikar)  and  the  nearer  Lughman  maliks.  The  latter  were  friendly 
enough  to  us  before  December  14th;  but  aver  that  they  were 
forced  to  join  Mahomed  Jan,  who  threatened  to  harry  their  vil- 
lages if  they  refused  to  turn  out  their  armed  men.  The  Eohis- 
tanis  have  seen  Mir  Butcha's  villages  and  forts  destroyed  within  a 
week  from  the  dispersion  of  the  investing  force;  and,  true  to 
their  old  policy,  they  have  come  in  and  are  as  peaceable  as  when 
first  they  were  entertained  on  Siah  Sung.  Padshah  Khan  has 
suddenly  grown  very  anxious  to  be  on  good  terms  with  us  again, 
and  his  son  and  uncle  are  already  here.  He  himself  will  shortly 
put  in  an  appearance,  and  his  explanations  will  be  interesting  to 
listen  to.  He  forfeited  the  subsidy  promised  to  him  for  the  aid 
he  gave  us,  on  our  march  from  Ali  Kheyl,  by  his  tribe  sharing  in 
the  attack  upon  the  Shutargardan ;  and  he  is  astute  enough  to 


The  Exempted  from  the  Amnesty.  287 

know  that  now  he  has  no  claim  upon  our  consideration.    When 
General  Roberts  has  interviewed  the  chiefs  of  the  various  sections, 
he  will  be  able  to  comprehend,  in  its  true  light,  the  reason  of  the 
late  jehad,  and  what  it  is  that  the  tribal  leaders  require.    Upon 
this  he  may  make  his  calculations  for  a  future  campaign  if  they 
again  prefer  an  appeal  to  arms  to  a  peaceful  understanding.    It 
must  not   be  forgotten  that  the   five    men    exempted  from  the 
amnesty  are  still  at  large,  and  are  supposed  to  be  planning  a 
revival  of  the  jehad ;  and  doubtless  every  chief  who  now  comes  in 
and  accepts  the  pardon  offered  to  him  will  make  a  mental  reserva- 
tion to  be  guided  by  the  course  of  events  at  Ghazni  as  well  as  at 
Cabul.     The  five  leaders  are  Mahomed  Jan ;  Mushk-i-Alam,  of 
Charkh;    Mir  Butcha,  the  Kohistani  chief,  now  said  to  be  at 
Charikar ;  Samander  Ehan,  of  Logar ;  and  Tahir  Ehan,  son  of 
Mahomed  Sharif  Khan,  the  sirdar  kept  as  a  prisoner  at  Dehra 
Dun.     Tahir  Ehan  was  for  a  long  time  in  our  camp  with  his 
brother,  Hashim  Ehan,  and  was  generally  supposed  to  be  a  harm- 
less youngster.    As  he  was  instrumental  in  carrying  off  Musa 
Jan,  and  is  active  in  keeping  alive  the  dying  jehad  at  Ghazni,  he 
has  suddenly  become  a  personage  important  enough  to  be  severely 
punished  if  he  is  caught.    Mahomed  Jan  is  all-powerful  among 
the  Wardak  men,  the  most  restless   and  impetuous  clan  near 
Cabul.    He  would  have  been  their  chief  upon  the  death  of  his 
father,  but  that  he  was  a  General  in  the  Amir's  service,  and 
could  not  fulfil  both  duties.     His  brother  was  elected  chief,  but 
has  since  died,  and  the  Wardaks  look  upon  Mahomed  Jan  as  their 
leader.     The  malcontents  at  Ghazni  have  also  been  joined  by  the 
ex-Governor  of  Jellalabad.     This  man,  Mahomed  Hasan  Ehan, 
finding  his  friend,  Asmatullah  Ehan,  with  his  Lughmanis,  was 
coming  to  grief  at  JugduUuck,  doubted  him,  and,  following  by- 
paths through  the  hills  north  of  Luttabund,  reached  Deh-i-Sabz  in 
safety.     He  thotght  the  Safis  too  weak  to  stay  with,  and  passed 
thence  through  the  Eoh-Daman  over  the  Surkh  Eotal  until  he 
gained  the  Ghazni  Bead  below  Argandeh.     Once  on  the  southern 
road,  he  was  safe ;  and  by  this  time  he  is  probably  aiding  Mahomed 
Jan  to  get  together  a  new  army. 


288  The  Afgfmn  War,  1879—80. 

9<A  January. 

The  policy  of  conciliation  which  we  have  so  magnanimously 
adopted  after  the  ineffectual  attempt  of  the  tribesmen  to  drive  us 
from  our  cantonments  has  been  declared  in  open  Durbar  to-day, 
to  some  200  Sirdars,  Chiefs,  and  maliks.  The  effect  of  the 
amnesty,  issued  on  December  26th,  has  been  in  the  main  so 
successful,  that  many  Kohistanis,  Logaris,  and  Ghilzais  have 
come  into  Sherpur  and  made  their  peace  with  Sir  F.  Roberts — 
temporarily  it  may  be,  for  but  little  reliance  is  to  be  placed  upon 
the  promises  of  Afghans  ;  but  still  openly,  and  with  no  seeming 
reservation.  What  their  course  of  behaviour  may  be  hereafter,  in 
case  the  Ghazni  malcontents  are  able  to  raise  a  second  jehad  of 
importance,  we  cannot  tell ;  but  they  have  been  given  clearly  to 
understand  that  our  forbearance  does  not  arise  from  any  fear  of 
our  own  strength  to  crush  them,  but  simply  because  we  desire 
rather  to  live  on  peacable  terms  with  the  people,  than  to  be  con- 
tinually harrying  them  for  their  misdeeds.  It  is  almost  too  much 
to  ask  any  tribesman  to  refrain  from  joining  in  a  movement  which 
promises  him  plenty  of  bloodshed  and  unlimited  loot ;  but  by  first 
thrashing  him  and  then  treating  him  with  generous  forgiveness, 
we  may  convince  him  that  it  is  more  to  his  interest  to  be  on 
friendly  terms  with  us  than  to  risk  his  life  and  property  by  setting 
our  arms  at  defiance.  The  Durbar  to-day  was  hold  chiefly  for  the 
purpose  of  presenting  such  of  the  Kohistani  chiefs  as  had  remained 
friendly  to  us  with  substantial  rewards,  and  of  declaring  to  the 
others  what  our  present  policy  is  likely  to  be.  The  Logari  and 
Ghilzai  chiefs  had  also  a  chance  of  observing  how  we  reward  our 
friends,  and  of  being  assured  that  an  offer  of  pardon  to  such  as 
have  chosen  to  accept  it  was  not  an  empty  promise,  merely  to 
entice  them  into  Sherpur. 

A  large  tent  was  pitched  near  head-quarters,  and  in  this  were 
assembled  the  chiefs  who  were  to  make  their  salaam  to  General 
Roberts.  They  were  marshalled  in  due  order  by  Mahomed  Hyat 
Khan,  Assistant  Political  Officer,  and  knelt  down  in  the  fashion  in 
vogue  among  Orientals  when  serious  business  has  to  be  gone 
through.  A  little  square  was  left  vacant  in  the  middle  of  the 
tent,  and  in  this  stood  four  of  the  72nd  Highlanders  with  fixed 


Rewarding  the  Friendly  Chieftains.  289 

bayonets^  the  only  sentries  among  the  closely-packed  Sirdars  and 
maliks,  many  of  whom  were  fighting  against  our  troops  but  a  few 
days  ago.  Sir  P.  Eoberts  entered,  when  all  had  been  duly 
arranged,  and  the  kneeling  figures  rose  as  with  one  accord,  and 
made  obeisance  with  that  courteous  humility  which  seems  to 
convey  so  much,  and  yet,  in  reality,  means  so  little.  There  was 
no  parade  of  any  kind  in  the  Durbar:  General  Boberts  was 
attended  only  by  an  Aide-de-Camp,  Captain  Carew,  and  Major 
Hastings,  Chief  Political  Officer.  His  native  orderlies  were  of 
course  at  hand  in  cose  of  a  fanatic  appearing.  The  salaaming 
having  come  to  an  end.  General  Roberts  seated  himself  to  receive 
the  Sirdars  as  they  were  presented  separately  by  Mahomed  Hyat 
Khan.  Sirdar  Wali  Mahomed  Khan  was  placed  on  the  General's 
left  hand,  and  from  time  to  time  explained  the  status  and  charac- 
teristics of  the  more  notable  Chiefs.  In  addition  to  Wali  Mahomed 
there  were  many  other  members  of  the  Barakzai  family  present, 
the  chief  of  whom  were  Sirdars  Ibrahim  Khan  (brother  of  Shore 
Ali),  Ahmed  Ali  Jan,  Mahomed  Hashim  Khan,  Abdulla  Khan, 
and  Mahomed  Yusuf  Khan.  One  by  one  the  Chiefs  were  pre- 
sented, and  the  formal  ceremony  of  the  Durbar  proceeded.  Many 
of  the  Sirdars,  and  even  some  of  the  tribal  chiefs,  so  far  con- 
formed to  English  custom  as  to  shake  hands  with  the  General. 
It  was  a  picturesque  scene ;  the  dense  mass  of  kneeling  figures, 
clad  in  richly-coloured  chogas,  or  with  long- flowing  garments 
shaped  like  the  old  Boman  toga.  The  wild  and,  in  many  cases, 
handsome  faces  of  the  tribal  leaders  lighted  up  with  interest  and 
expectation  as  their  fellows  stepped  out  and  bowed  meekly  before 
the  representative  of  that  British  Government  they  had  lately 
fought  against.  One  incident  was  the  presentation  of  Padshah 
Khan  to  General  Boberts.  As  his  name  was  called  out,  there  was 
something  like  a  titter  all  round — for  even  Afghans  have  a  sense 
of  humour,  and  they  could  not  help  appreciating  the  shamefaced- 
ness  of  this  Ghilzai  chief,  who,  after  aiding  the  British  to  reach 
Gabul,  had  striven  to  drive  them  out,  and  had  then  accepted  the 
forgiveness  so  freely  offered.  Padshah  Khan  came  forward  in  his 
usual  cringing  way,  and  on  his  sunburnt  cheeks  just  a  tinge  of  colour 
mounted,  the  nearest  approach  to  a  blush  that  he  could  raise. 
Even  General  Boberts  joined  in  the  general  smile  which  spread 


290  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

from  face  to  face  at  the  eyident  discomfort  of  the  €hief ;  while  the 
latter^  recovering  his  self-possession,  went  back  to  his  place  smiling 
also,  as  if  a  great  weight  had  been  lifted  from  his  mind.  He 
must  wonder  at  our  generosity,  and,  perhaps,  be  doubtful  as  to 
how  far  it  may  extend,  in  the  future ;  but,  so  far,  he  is  grateful 
for  our  forbearance,  as  his  villages  have  not  shared  the  fate  of  those 
of  Mir  Butcha.  The  Logari  and  Ghilzai  Chiefs  having  salaamed* 
there  were  presented  en  masse  some  thirty-four  Jagri  and  Besud 
Hazara  Chiefs  and  maliks.  These  men  have  remained  true  to 
their  promises ;  and  as  their  country  bounds  Ghazni  on  the  west, 
and  also  marches  with  the  Wardak  districts,  they  are  likely  to  be 
useful  allies.  Being  of  the  Shiah  sect  of  Mahomedans,  they  have 
nothing  in  common  with  the  Afghan  Sunis,  and  we  shall  be  able 
to  employ  them  in  harassing  Mahomed  Jan's  army  if  that  leader 
collects  a  force  at  Ghazni.  With  a  column  marching  up  from 
Candahar,  and  our  own  army  moving  down  the  Ghazni  Boad  from 
Cabul,  the  insurgents  would  be  held  in  check  westwards  by  the 
Hazsras,  and  their  only  road  for  retreat  would  be  eastwards 
towards  Kbost  and  the  Shutargardan  districts.  Saftar  Ali  Khan, 
head  of  the  Jagri  Hazaras,  was  unable  to  attend  owing  to  sick- 
ness ;  but  his  son,  Ahmed  Ali  Khan,  was  present  to  receive  the 
handsome  khilluts  bestowed  upon  his  father  and  himself.  The 
presentations  being  over,  Sir  Frederick  Eoberts  read  the  following 
address  to  the  Eohistanis,  which  was  translated  into  Persian  by 
Mahomed  Hyat  Khan : — 

''61BDAB8  ABfD  Maliks, 

« I  am  Teiy  glad  to  see  tbat  so  many  of  the  Kohistan  nuUth  hare  taken  advan- 
tage of  the  amnesty  published  on  the  26th  of  December  last,  and  hare  come  to  Oabnl 
to  pay  their  respects  to  the  British  GoTemmont,  and  to  express  their  regrets  for  having 
taken  a  part  in  the  recent  disturbances.  I  trust  that  those  maliki  who  are  still  holding 
aloof,  will  follow  the  good'  example  that  has  been  set  them,  and  will  soon  make  their 
appearance  at  CabuL  I  told  you,  when  you  yisited  me  in  my  camp  at  Sah  Sung,  after 
the  arriTal  of  the  British  troops  at  Cabul,  that  the  British  (Government  had  nothing  but 
goodwill  towards  the  people  of  Afghanistan  ;  that  it  is  their  desire  to  respect  your 
lives,  your  property,  and  your  religion,  and  to  molest  no  one  who  would  live  at  peace 
with  them.  You  have  had  ample  proof  of  the  truth  of  what  I  told  you.  At  the  iniCi- 
gation  of  ill-advised  men  you  came  from  your  homes  in  Kohistan  to  attack  the  Britiah 
troops  at  Sherpur.  All  that  you  succeeded  in  doing  was  to  plunder  your  own  oountiy- 
men  who  live  in  the  city  of  Cabul.  Ton  did  the  British  troops  but  little  injury,  and  in 
a  few  days  you  were  beaten  o^  and  had  to  return  to  your  homes  with  the  loss  of  sevexal 
hundred  killed  and  wounded.    You  brou^t  this  punishment  upon  younelf,  and 


A  Speech  to  the  Sirdars  and  Maliks.         291 

not  blame  the  British  Qorenunent  What  that  QoTomment  did  was  to  offer  a  pardon 
to  all  who  would  come  in — exoept  the  vntHkh  who,  it  is  beliered^  was  the  main  cause  of 
your  being  led  astray.  It  was  neoessaiy  he  should  be  punished ;  but,  in  doing  so,  every 
eare  was  taken  that  no  one  else  should  suffer  injury.  The  British  troops  marched 
through  your  oountry  as  far  as  Baba  Kuch  Kar,  treating  you  all  as  friends,  and  paying 
liberally  for  ererjthing  in  the  shape  of  food  and  forage  you  were  able,  or  willing,  to 
provide.  I  hope  the  lesson  will  not  be  lost  upon  you,  and  that  you  will  not  misunder- ' 
stand  the  generosity  and  forbearance  with  which  you  have  been  treated.  It  is  a  great 
pleasure  to  me  to  find  that  so  many  of  the  more  intelligent  and  well-informed  of  the 
people  of  Afghanistan  took  no  part  in  the  recent  disturbances.  First  and  foremost  I 
would  name  Sirdars  Wali  Mahomed  Khan,  Ibrahim  Khan,  Hashim  Khan,  Abdulla 
Khan,  Mahomed  Tusuf  Khan,  Mahomed  Karim  Khan,  Shahbaz  Khan,  Ahmed  Ali  Jan, 
Mahomed  Sirwur  Khan,  Ataullah  Khan,  Anitoollah  Khan  Habibulla  Khan  (the  Mustaufi), 
Malik  Hamid  Khan,  and  Khan  Mahomed  Khan.  Then  several  of  your  own  chiefs 
remained  with  me  throughout.  General  Pais  Mahomed  Khan,  the  son  of  Naik  Aminulla 
Khan,  of  Logar,  the  family  of  the  Mustaufi  Sirdar  Habibulla  Khan,  of  Wardak,  the 
Kizilbashes,  and  many  other  influential  men  in  the  city  of  Cabul  refrained  from  joining 
the  disturbers  of  peace  and  order  ;  and  I  am  glad  to  have  this  opportunity  of  thanking 
them  on  the  part  of  the  British  Government  for  the  good  service  they  thereby  performed. 
I  am  now  about  to  give  khiUuta  to  those  Kohistanis  who  remained  at  Sherpur  with  me ; 
after  which  you  are  at  liberty  to  return  to  your  homes.  I  am  sending  back  with  you  to 
Kohistan  Sirdar  Shahbaz  Khan,  whom  you  have  yourselves  asked  for  as  your  Governor. 
He  wiU  settle  your  disputes,  and  preserve  order  in  the  oountry.  Also  that  I  may  be 
fully  informed  by  yourselves  of  all  that  passes,  and  of  all  that  you  may  wish  to  repre- 
sent hereafter,  I  invite  you  to  select  certain  of  your  number  who  will  remain  here  and 
act  as  a  medium  of  communication  between  us.  They  will  be  treated  with  consideration, 
and  will  have  free  access  to  me.  The  rest  of  you  may  return  to  your  homei^  and  for  your 
own  sake  remember  all  that  has  passed." 

Sir  Frederick  Boberts  then  presented  the  khiUuts,  which  con- 
sisted of  handsome  chogas  and  a  certain  number  of  rupees,  to  the 
Chiefs  who  had  remained  with  us,  or  faithfully  kept  their  promises. 
Those  who  had  merely  come  in  answer  to  the  amnesty  were,  of 
course,  not  rewarded.  Besides  the  Sirdars  mentioned  in  the 
speech,  who  were  rewarded  for  their  loyalty  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment, there  were  eleven  Eohistani  Chiefs,  twelve  Logaris  (includ- 
ing Faiz  Mahomed  Khan,  of  Ali  Musjid  celebrity),  and  thirty-four 
Jagri  and  Besud  Hazara  Khans  and  maliks.  With  the  distribution 
of  khilluts  the  Durbar  closed,  and  the  Chiefs  were  free  to  depart. 

In  the  meantime,  our  indecision  has  re-acted  upon  a  section  of 
the  citizens  of  Cabul,  who  dread  another  occupation  by  tribesmen. 
The  Hindu  merchants  are  beginning  to  move  out  with  their 
families  and  goods,  and  are  taking  the  road  to  Peshawur.  I  have 
had  many  chances  of  learning  their  feeling  from  one  of  their 

TJ  2 


292  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

number,  an  intelligent  banker,  well  versed  in  local  politics.  His 
explanation  of  the  migration  is  that  the  Hindus  trusted  in  the 
British,  and  looked  to  them  for  protection — which  was  promised. 
But  when  the  rising  took  place,  the  British  had  enough  to  do  to 
hold  Sherpur,  and  consequently  they  were  left  at  the  mercy  of  the 
rabble  about  Mahomed  Jan.  They  will  not  risk  a  second  occupa- 
tion, being  convinced  that  it  will  take  place,  as  we  have  not 
really  received  any  considerable  reinforcements.  "  Besides, " 
they  add,  **no  man  can  say  what  you  will  do  next,  whether  you 
will  go  back  to  India,  or  occupy  Cabul  for  ever.  We  have  waited 
for  you  to  say  what  is  to  happen,  and  nothing  has  come  of  it 
except  loss  to  ourselves  and  insult  to  our  women.  We  will  still 
wait,  but  this  time  in  Peshawur,  where  we  shall  be  safe.  If  the 
Sirkar  takes  over  Cabul,  then  we  will  return."  And  so  they  are 
taking  their  departure,  and  Cabul  is  losing  many  of  its  best 
citizens;  industrious,  peace-loving  men,  whom  we  cannot  easily 
replace.  It  is  a  comment  upon  our  "  waiting-npon-Providence  " 
policy  which  is  not  at  all  pleasant.  Besides,  if  these  Hindus 
carry  to  India  the  idea  that  we  cannot  protect  them  in  Cabul,  and 
spread  this  report  throughout  Hindustan,  the  e£fect  upon  the 
minds  of  our  own  subjects  east  of  the  Indus  may  be  very  serious. 
Prestige  is  such  a  delicate  plant  in  Eastern  soil,  that  it  should  be 
carefully  guarded.  Our  military  preparations  in  and  about  Cabul 
— ^the  building  of  strong  stone  towers  on  the  Bala  Hissar  Heights 
and  the  Asmai  Hill,  the  cutting  of  military  roads  to  the  Cabul 
gorge,  the  re- occupation  of  the  Bala  Hissar,  the  clearing  of .  the 
country  about  Sherpur  of  forts  and  walls — do  not  convey  much  to 
these  Hindus.  "  You  want  more  men  if  you  are  to  hold  Cabul, 
and  keep  out  your  enemy.  What  are  10,000  to  50,000  ?  There 
must  be  20,000  here  to  guard  Sherpur  and  the  city."  They  are 
men  of  peace,  and  their  criticism  of  military  matters  is  weak  ;  but 
they  shrewdly  enough  ask  if,  after  sickness  and  wounds,  our  fight- 
ing men  are  more  numerous  now  than  two  months,  ago.  It  may 
be  a  small  matter,  after  all,  that  these  terror-stricken  Hindus 
turn  their  faces  eastwards  ;  but  it  should  be  remembered  that,  all 
through  the  troublous  times  of  the  Durani  dynasty,  their  fore- 
fathers, and  they  themselves,  have  remained  in  Cabul,  and  they 
are  only  leaving  the  city  now,  because  they  do  not  believe  in  the 


Message  from  Mahomed  Jan.  293 

power  of  the  British  to  hold  it  against  another  army  of  50,000 
Afghans. 

Oar  news  from  Ghazni  still  shows  that  there  is  energy  left  in 
Mahomed  Jan,  and  that  he  has  held  his  own  against  the  Jagri  and 
Besud  Hazaras,  who  have  tried  to  drive  him  from  the  neighbourhood. 
His  latest  plan  to  collect  a  new  army  is  very  ingenious.  He  has 
placed  Musa  Jan  solemnly  before  his  followers,  and  made  the 
child  repeat  after  him  an  oath  upon  the  Koran,  by  which  all  true 
Mahomedans  who  join  in  another  attack  upon  Sherpur  shall  be 
exempt  from  taxation  for  three  years.  The  bait  is  a  tempting  one 
to  indigent  tribesmen  ;  but  some  of  the  more  wary  may  refuse  the 
oflFer,  as  they  must  see  how  unlikely  it  is  that  our  army  will  ever 
be  expelled  by  force. 

There  is  not  much  cantonment  news.  The  force  has  just  ex- 
perienced a  heavy  loss  in  the  death,  from  pneumonia,  of  Dr.  Porter, 
principal  medical  officer  of  the  division.  Dr.  Porter  was  so  uni- 
versal a  favourite,  both  with  his  own  medical  officers  and  with 
every  soldier  in  the  Cabul  army  of  occupation,  that  his  loss  is  a 
matter  of  personal  sorrow  to  all  of  us.  His  high  professional 
ability  gave  him  a  prominent  place  in  the  first  rank  of  army 
surgeons. 

Vli)i  January. 

The  malcontents  at  Ghazni  have  at  last  given  us  an  idea  of  the 
terms  to  which  they  would  be  willing  to  agree :  these  being 
nothing  short  of  the  recall  of  Yakub  Khan,  and  his  replacement 
on  the  throne.  It  is  difficult,  in  the  present  state  of  a£fairs,  to 
gain  accurate  news  from  Ghazni,  but  from  letters  which  have 
been  received,  it  would  seem  that  a  secret  council  of  chiefs  was 
held  at  that  place  a  few  days  ago,  and  it  was  decided  to  send  Sir 
Frederick  Boberts  a  kind  of  diplomatic  message.  The  purport 
of  this  message  was  that  Mahomed  Jan  and  his  adherents  would 
fight  to  the  end  unless  the  ex-Amir  was  instantly  sent  back 
from  India,  and  once  more  given  charge  of  Afghanistan  as 
supreme  ruler.  Young  Tahir  Khan  is  the  originator  of  this  new 
scheme,  but  it  is  uncertain  how  far  it  is  shared  in  by  Mushk-i- 
Alam.  It  is  pretty  certain  that  the  latter  was  sorely  displeased 
by  \nA  jehad  being  perverted  into  a  raid  upon  the  city  of  Cabul ; 


294  ^^  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

and  on  this  point  he  quarrelled  with  Mahomed  Jan,  even  before 
the  investment  of  Sherpnr  was  at  an  end.  This  quarrel  was  partly 
instrumental  in  causing  the  rapid  dispersion  of  the  tribal  gather- 
ing ;  factions  being  formed,  and  discussion  running  very  high. 
The  more  fanatical  sided  with  the  moollah ;  while  the  disorderly 
element  supported  Mahomed  Jan.  The  letter  conyeying  the 
decision  of  the  Ghazni  council  has  duly  reached  us,  and  we  are 
rather  amused  at  the  coolness  of  the  proposal.  The  removal  of 
Yakub  Khan  is  in  the  eyes  of  many  people  a  very  inadequate 
punishment  for  his  culpable  weakness  in  allowing  an  Envoy  to  be 
slaughtered,  and  we  should  be  stultifying  ourselves  if  we  were 
even  seriously  to  think  of  **  giving  him  another  chance."  If  he 
were  a  strong  and  capable  ruler,  able  to  carry  out  the  terms  of  an 
alliance  with  us ;  a  leader  who  had  been  captured  in  opposing  our 
armies,  and  had  been  deposed  after  defeat,  there  might  then  enter 
into  our  calculations  such  a  possibility  as  making  him  Amir  once 
more.  In  the  old  war  we  so  far  sacrificed  our  pride  as  to  send 
back  Dost  Mahomed  to  Cabul  after  he  had  been  deported  to  India ; 
but  Dost  Mahomed  was  a  ruler  worthy  of  respect,  and  a  soldier 
who  could  keep  his  unruly  subjects  fairly  well  in  hand.  One  can 
almost  imagine  that  a  few  fanatics  are  hugging  the  belief  that,  as 
the  Dost  was  reinstated,  so  will  Yakub  Khan  be  again  placed  in 
power;  but  such  a  consummation  can  never  occur.  It  is  doubtful 
whether  Mushk-i-Alam  has  accepted  the  decision  of  the  council. 
Our  first  information  was  to  the  effect  that  the  SLrch-mooUah  had 
gone  to  Ghazni  and  harangued  a  large  meeting  of  the  malcontents ; 
but  it  has  since  been  reported  that  he  was  not  present  at  the  con- 
sultation. Mahomed  Jan's  movements,  too,  are  diflScult  to  follow. 
One  day  he  is  said  to  be  among  his  kinsmen  at  Wardak ;  the  next 
that  he  is  stirring  up  the  Zurmut  people  east  of  Ghazni ;  and 
then  come  all  sorts  of  absurd  rumours  about  his  being  on  the  way 
to  Kohistan  to  see  what  Mir  Butcha  is  doing. 

Our  intelligence  department  is  growing  at  last  to  be  something 
more  than  a  name.  Before  the  events  of  the  11th  and  28rd 
December,  the  only  reports  that  were  received  as  trustworthy  were 
those  given  by  paid  spies  and  followers  of  the  sirdars — followers 
who  are,  as  a  rule,  of  the  purest  type  of  rufl&anism.  One  always 
looks  upon  a  sirdar  as  a  past-master  in  the  art  of  deception,  who 


News  of  Abdur  Rahman.  295 

would  sacrifice  the  British  at  any  moment  if  he  could  do  so  with 
impanitj  ;  and  the  hangers-on  of  these  chiefs  are  not  a  whit  better 
than  their  masters.  The  action  of  the  11th  in  the  Chardeh  Valley 
proved  to  demonstration  that  no  trust  could  be  placed  in  the 
reports  given  by  the  sirdars :  there  were  found  to  be  10,000  or 
16,000  men  within  ten  miles  of  Sherpur,  whereas  we  had  only 
heard  of  5,000  being  at  Argandeh.  Now  there  has  been  estab- 
lished  a  regular  system  of  patrols,  and  a  certain  number  of 
Eizilbash  horsemen  are  stationed  at  various  points  on  the  Argandeh 
Kotal,  Surkh  Eotal,  the  Kohistan  Boad  northwards  over  the  Paen 
Minar  Eotal,  and  about  Charasia.  They  are  under  the  command 
of  one  responsible  native  leader  in  Sherpur,  who  again  is  directly 
controlled  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Lockhart,  the  Quartermaster- 
General  of  the  division.  As  these  horsemen  are  paid,  not  by 
results,  but  for  regular  service  on  patrol  work,  they  are  likely  to 
be  more  trustworthy  than  the  highly-paid  spies  hitherto  employed. 
If  the  system  could  be  a  little  more  extended  on  the  lines  I  have 
before  pointed  out  in  previous  letters — ^viz.,  regular  establishment 
— ^it  might  be  a  great  aid  to  us  in  the  guerilla  warfare  we  are 
engaged  in. 

Important  news  has  been  received  that  Abdur  Bahman  Ehan 
has  left  Tashkend,  and  is  now  probably  in  Turkistan.  If  his 
residence  among  the  Bussians  has  not  thoroughly  converted  him 
to  their  views,  he  might  b6  a  useful  man  for  us  to  take  up.  He  is 
ambitious,  and,  if  we  can  trust  Mr.  Schuyler's  estimate  of  him, 
has  some  ability  which  might  now  be  turned  to  good  use.  What 
his  influence  would  be  now  in  the  country  after  so  many  years  of 
absence  we  cannot  tell ;  but  to-day,  in  mentioning  his  name  to  an 
old  Gabuli,  and  saying  that  he  was  possibly  already  in  Turkistan, 
my  listener's  face  lighted  up  with  pleasure,  and  he  eagerly  asked  if 
he  would  return  to  Gabul.  There  are  so  many  possibilities  to  be 
weighed  in  calculating  the  chances  of  settling  affairs  here  on  a 
fairly  safe  basis,  that  Abdur  Bahman's  claims  may  come  to  be 
considered.  Unless,  as  I  have  said,  he  has  been  Bussianised,  he 
might  fall  in  with  our  views,  and,  at  least  as  a  provincial  governor, 
be  trusted  with  authority. 

In  the  meantime  we  are  making  preparations  to  hold  Gabul  ad 
well  as  Sheipur  in  case  of  an  attempted  repetition  of  the  events  of 


296  The  Afglian  War,  1879 — 80. 

December  11th  to  23rd.  General  Charles  Gongh's  brigade  in  the 
Bala  Hissar  is  busy  at  work,  cutting  a  broad  road  from  the  Shah 
Shehr  Gtite  (that  facing  Siah  Sung)  to  the  gate  overlooking  the 
city  near  Chandaul.  The  broken  places  in  the  walls  have  been 
built  up,  and  improvements  made  by  the  Engineers,  so  as  to  give 
shelter  to  the  garrison  if  an  attack  were  attempted  from  the  city. 
The  Sherderwaza  Heights  immediately  above  the  Bala  Hissar  are 
also  to  be  held  in  future  by  one  battalion  (say  500  or  600  men), 
stationed  in  three  strong  towers,  now  in  course  of  construction. 
The  first  and  strongest  of  these  is  on  the  spur  above  the  Arsenal ; 
a  steep  point  completely  commanding  the  Upper  Bala  Hissar 
already  being  crowned  with  strong  walls,  the  basement  of  the 
tower.  The  crest  of  the  Sherderwaza  Heights  already  boasts  of  a 
strong  wall,  part  of  the  Afghan  fortifications ;  and  this  position  is 
naturally  so  strong,  the  hillside  sloping  down  almost  perpen- 
dicularly towards  Chardeh  Valley,  that  with  the  two  towers  now 
being  built  it  could  defy  assault  from  any  force  destitute  of  artillery. 
The  ridge  running  down  westwards  to  the  Cabul  gorge  would  also 
be  held  if  an  enemy  menaced  the  city,  and  on  the  Asmai  Heights 
on  the  northern  side  a  strong  fort  is  to  be  built.  The  military 
roads  converging  upon  Dehmazung  from  Sherpur  cantonments 
unite  in  Deh-i- Afghan  and  pass  by  the  foot  of  the  Asmai  Hill, 
whence  they  are  to  be  continued  in  one  broad  road  until  the  main 
Bamian  Road  through  Chardeh  Valley  is  gained.  The  towers 
above  mentioned  are  to  be  provisioned  and  watered,  always,  for 
ten  days,  and  are  to  contain  small-arm  ammunition  equal  to  the 
requirements  of  a  battalion  for  that  period,  calculated  on  the  basis 
of  serious  fighting.  A  road  broad  enough  for  guns  will  also  be 
made  about  Cabul  itself  from  Deh-i- Afghan  to  the  Bala  Hissar, 
in  addition  to  a  circular  road  about  Sherpur  cantonments.  Another 
road  is  to  be  cut  from  Bemaru  village  to  the  Siah  Sung  Heights, 
with  a  bridge  spanning  the  Cabul  river ;  and  yet  another  from  the 
67th  Gateway  (near  the  south-eastern  bastion)  direct  to  the  Bala 
Hissar,  this  also  crossing  the  river  by  a  new  pile  bridge.  These 
two  roads  will  ensure  communication  between  Sherpur  and  the 
fortress  without  our  troops  having  to  pass  near  the  city  walls ; 
and  will  give  us  alternative  bridges  over  the  Cabul,  whereas  we 
formerly  had  only  one  bridge,  that  O&^the  city  road  from  Sherpur. 


Military  Precautions.  297 

With  regard  to  the  cantonment  itself^  the  clear  space  for  1,000 
yards  about  the  walls  is  already  partly  made,  although  the  debris 
of  forts  and  villages  destroyed  requires  much  levelling  before  it 
can  be  said  that  all  cover  has  been  swept  away.  The  blocks  of 
solid  mud  and  the  loose  rubbish  could  be  utilized  by  skirmishers 
advancing  to  attack,  and  until  this  accumulation  of  ruins  has  been 
thoroughly  levelled,  our  rifle-fire  will  not  have  a  fair  chance.  On 
the  eastern  point  of  the  Bemaru  Heights  a  very  strong  tower  is 
now  being  rapidly  built,  and  the  hill  about  it  is  to  be  scarped  for 
ten  yards,  so  that  to  assault  it  from  outside  cantonments  would  be 
impossible.  At  the  north-west  comer,  below  the  western  end  of 
Bemaru  Heights,  the  line  of  trenches  with  their  parapet  of  gun- 
carriage  wheels  (described  in  one  of  my  letters  written  during  the 
biege)  will  also  be  strengthened  by  a  broad  and  deep  wet  ditch. 


CHAPTER  XXn. 

Fhilanthropic  Work  in  Cabol — Dr.  Owen's  Hospital— Prejndioefl  gradaaUj  Oreroome— 
The  Attendance  of  Women— The  Hospital  Wrecked  by  Fanatics— The  Place  Re- 
established— A  Visit  to  the  Wards — €k»titnde  of  the  Patients — Treatment  of  Men 
Wounded  in  Action — Confidenoe  in  the  Surgeon's  Skill — life  in  Sherpnr — Freedom 
of  CriUdsm  upon  Current  Events — The  Sherpur  Club— Amusements  of  the  Gfarrison 
—The  First  Theatre— The  Pleasures  of  Skating  and  Sliding— A  Snow  Fight  on 
Bemaru  Heights — "How  they  Lire  in  Cabul" — ^Zenana  Life — Prevalence  of  In- 
trigues—Shopping—A Cabul  Interior— A  Lady's  Dress — Oabuli  Children — Character 
of  the  Citizens  of  Cabal — The  Sirdar — Ambition  and  Sensuality— A  Sirdar's 
House— The  Rites  of  Hospitality— The  Cabul  Trader— His  Manner  of  doing 
Business. 

22nd  January,  1880. 

As  there  seems  to  be  an  impression  gaining  gronnd,  at  least  in 
England,  that  oar  army  of  occapation  have  adopted  the  Russian 
plan  of  settling  a  country — the  institution  of  a  Reign  of  Terror — 
it  may  be  worth  while  to  describe  fully  the  means  which  we  have 
taken  for  drawing  the  people  towards  us.  After  the  capture  of 
Cabul  in  October,  it  was  found  that  there  was  a  vast  amount  of 
disease  and  suffering  among  the  poorer  inhabitants  of  the  city, 
and  that  native  surgery  never  attempted  to  cope  with  these,  except 


298  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

in  the  rndest  way.  With  the  benevolence  which  generally  charac- 
terizes our  commanders  in  the  fields  Sir  F.  Boberts  ordered  a 
charitable  dispensary  and  hospital  to  be  opened  in  Cabal ;  and 
Dr.  Owen,  Staff  Surgeon,  was  placed  in  charge  of  the  institution. 
The  KotwaFs  house,  vacant  by  reason  of  the  execution  of  that 
official  for  complicity  in  the  Massacre,  was  turned  into  a  hospital, 
and  work  was  begun  at  once.  The  rooms  were  cleaned  and  put 
in  order,  wards  for  men  and  women  arranged,  the  tottering  walls 
shaken  by  earthquakes  made  safe  and  sound,  and  then  patients 
were  invited  to  attend.  On  November  2l8t,  Dr.  Owen  was  first 
**  consulted,"  twelve  wretched  beings,  suffering  from  various  ail- 
ments, coming  to  him  for  treatment.  They  were  carefully  treated, 
and  although,  on  account  of  the  scarcity  of  English  drugs  in 
camp,  no  elaborate  prescriptions  could  be  made  up,  the  best  bazaar 
medicines  were  freely  given.  The  news  of  the  Sircar's  latest 
eccentricity  soon  began  to  spread  throughout  Gabul,  and  for  several 
days  the  place  was  visited  by  little  crowds  of  persons,  who  were 
eiUier  sick,  or  had  sick  friends  who  needed  treatment.  With  the 
suspicion  always  at  work  in  Afghan  minds,  that  every  act  of  the 
stranger  has  some  obscure  tendency  to  harm  them,  the  citizens 
were  full  of  mistrust.  They  could  not  appreciate  the  generosity 
of  their  conquerors,  and  argued  that  it  was  absurd  to  suppose  that 
men  who  had  come  to  destroy  Cabul  would  sink  their  ideas  of 
vengeance,  and,  instead  of  taking  life,  would  save  life  and  make  it 
worth  living.  Gradually  their  ideas  changed ;  they  believed  in  the 
disinterestedness  of  the  English  hakeem  (who,  by  the  way,  was 
more  than  once  mistaken  for  Sir  Louis  Gavagnari,  risen  to  life 
again.  Dr.  Owen  slightly  resembling  our  dead  Envoy).  The 
number  of  patients  increased;  but,  with  customary  jealousy,  no 
women  were  permitted  to  seek  relief:  there  might  be  a  plot  to 
invade  the  sanctity  of  the  Afghan  household.  But  attentions  of 
this  sort  were  not  thrust  upon  the  citizens,  and  some  women  also 
were  found  waiting  at  the  hospital  doors.  A  room  was  set  apart 
for  them  in  which  they  could  wait  without  fear  of  being  molested ; 
a  middle-aged  woman,  a  Gabuli,  acted  as  matron,  and  re-assured 
them,  when  their  fears  overcame  their  desire  to  be  made  whole.  \ 
By  the  11th  of  December  the  daily  attendance  had  risen  to  118, 
of  whom  fully  two-thirds  were  women,  and  Dr.  Owen's  services 


The  British  Hospital  in  CabuL  299 

were  sought  after  by  well-to-do  citizens^  in  whose  zenanaz  were 
sick  wives  or  favourite  concubines  pining  under  mysterious  aiknents. 
Just  when  attendances  were  daily  growing  more  numerous,  came 
the  rush  of  Mahomed  Jan's  host  upon  CabuL  The  city  was 
occupied,  and  in  the  stupid  madness  which  prompted  the  ghazis 
to  destroy  all  marks  of  our  occupation,  the  dispensary  was  looted 
and  partly  wrecked.  Fortunately,  the  few  cases  of  instruments, 
which  Dr.  Owen  had  to  leave  behind,  were  taken  away  by  one  of 
the  attendants  and  buried  in  a  neighbouring  house.  But  the 
bottles  of  medicines  still  on  the  shelves  were  broken ;  chairs, 
tables,  and  partitions  smashed  to  pieces ;  and  even  doors  and 
windows  pulled  out.  This  was  in  the  outer  courtyard  of  the  late 
EotwaPs  house ;  the  rooms  grouped  about  the  inner  yard  were  not 
much  interfered  with,  as  they  bore  but  few  signs  of  the  stranger's 
hand.  When  on  Christmas  Day,  Dr.  Owen  once  more  visited  Xhe 
place,  nothing  but  empty  rooms  greeted  him,  and  these  so  filthy, 
that  they  could  scarcely  be  entered.  However,  those  in  the  outer 
courtyard  were  soon  cleaned,  and  on  the  following  morning 
patients  were  again  found  waiting  at  the  doors.  There  were  only 
eighteen  on  that  particular  day ;  but  as  peaceful  times  were  more 
assured,  the  list  soon  grew  to  its  old  proportions ;  and  yesterday, 
when  I  visited  the  hospital,  there  were  207  patients  on  \!ti<6  books. 
The  disease  most  prevalent  in  Cabul  is  ophthalmia,  caused  by  dirt 
and  exposure  ;  while  cataract  and  other  serious  affections  of  the 
eye  are  also  only  too  common.  The  type  is  very  much  the  same 
as  that  found  in  Egypt ;  and  partial,  or  complete,  blindness  from 
neglect  follows  almost  as  a  matter  of  course.  Luckily  for  the 
Cabnlis,  Dr.  Owen  is  a  skilled  oculist,  and  already  his  operations 
are  bruited  about  the  city  as  marvels  that  cannot  be  easily  under- 
stood by  the  people. 

My  visit  yesterday  was  made  with  Dr.  Owen  a  little  before  noon; 
a  sharp  walk  from  cantonments,  past  the  ruins  of  the  forts  of 
Mahomed  Sharif  and  Mahomed  Khan  and  over  the  Cabul  river, 
bringing  us  in  a  quarter  of  an  hour  to  the  western  skirts  of  the 
city,  not  far  from  the  Bala  Hissar.  Through  a  narrow,  winding 
lane,  so  filthy  and  muddy  that  a  Cologne  slum  could  not  com- 
pare with  it,  and  then  into  the  Char  Chowk  Bazaar,  just  where 
it  tapers  off  towards  the  Peshawur  Gate :  along  this  for  a  few 


300  The  Afghaii  War,  1879 — 80. 

yards,  and  over  a  doorway  on  tbe  right,  a  wooden  board  catches 
the  eye,  with  the  words  **  Charitable  Dispensary,"  painted  upon  it, 
with  the  Persian  translation  below.  As  we  passed  throngh  the 
doorway  into  an  open  courtyard,  where  thirty  or  forty  wretched 
poshfeen-clad  men  were  squatting  under  a  rude  verandah,  a 
Ghoorka  guard  of  four  men  stood  to  attention  on  the  sunny  side 
of  the  yard.  The  squatting  figures  rose  up  and  made  their  salaam 
abjectly,  as  poverty  ever  does  ;  they  were  the  poorest  of  the  poor 
— Hazara  coolies,  Mahomedan  beggars,  lepers,  the  blind,  the  halt, 
the  maimed — all  whom  wretchedness  and  disease  have  cast  out  as 
a  hideous  fringe  upon  healthful  life.  Apart  from  the  general 
crowd  were  solitary  men,  whose  appearance  showed  them  to  belong 
to  the  shopkeeping  class — an  influential  section  in  the  busy  life 
of  Cabul.  Two  or  three  women,  veiled  from  head  to  foot,  re- 
sembling nothing  so  much  as  Sisters  of  Charity,  followed  us  in, 
and,  with  faces  carefully  covered  by  their  ^aaAmafe^,  passed  quickly 
into  a  closed  room,  the  door  of  which  opening  for  an  instant 
showed  other  white-robed  figures  grouped  together.  There  are 
three  rooms  on  the  right  of  the  courtyard — a  small  one,  in  which 
stores  are  kept  and  an  attendant  lives  ;  a  second,  which  serves  as 
dispensary,  surgery  and  consulting-room  ;  and  a  third,  the  zenana, 
the  room  in  which  the  women  wait  in  quiet  seclusion.  Around 
the  inner  yard,  which  is  reached  by  an  open  passage,  are  the 
wards  proper  of  the  hospital,  wherein  surgical  cases,  or  those 
involving  nursing  and  supervision,  are  treated.  The  rooms  are 
warm  and  comfortable,  and  the  terraced  roof  is  well  adapted  for 
convalescent  patients,  who  can  ''sun''  themselves  in  comfort, 
that  process  which  does  so  much  to  restore  strength  after  a  weary 
illness.  A  room  on  the  roof  is  being  fitted  up  for  operations,  as 
it  is  light  and  airy,  and  the  operator  will  not  be  liable  to  be  dis- 
turbed by  the  curious  crowd  which  often  collects  now  in  the  outer 
courtyard.  Among  the  in-patients  the  most  noticeable  was  a  man 
suffering  from  severe  bullet  wound  in  the  leg.  He  had  been  shot 
by  us  during  the  investment  of  Sherpur,  and  now,  to  his  surprise, 
found  himself  being  treated  kindly,  and  cured  of  a  wound  that,  if 
untended,  would  have  caused  his  death.  He  seemed  very  grateful 
for  the  attention  paid  to  him :  to  be  given  comfortable  quarters, 
food,  and  a  skilful  surgeon  by  the  Sircar  against  whom  he  had 


Female  Patienis.  301 

fought,  was  so  nnexpected,  that  his  mind  had  not  quite  grasped 
the  whole  idea.  No  doubt,  in  time,  he  will  see  that  it  was  done 
with  no  more  evil  intent  than  to  prove  that  we  bear  no  malice,  and 
are  only  anxions  to  conciliate  tlie  people.  Other  wounded  men 
have  also  been  treated,  and  notice  has  been  sent  round  to  all  the 
villages  about  that  any  one  su£fering  from  hurts  received  in  the 
fighting  will  be  admitted  freely  into  the  hospital,  and,  when  cured, 
will  be  allowed  to  depart  without  molestation.  Our  **  Beign  of 
Terror"  must  surely  be  of  the  mildest  when  our  benevolence 
plays  so  chief  a  part  in  our  policy. 

After  seeing  the  wards  in  which  the  patients  were  lying  covered 
with  blankets,  and  with  their  feet  thrust  towards  the  middle  of 
the  room,  where  was  placed  a  wooden  frame  guarding  a  pan  of  live 
charcoal,  the  heat  of  which  is  retained  by  thick,  wadded  quilts 
placed  over  the  frame,  we  returned  to  the  dispensary  where  the 
**  out  patients  "  are  dealt  with.  Place  anx  dames :  the  women 
were  first  treated,  two  native  doctors  (one  a  Gabuli  educated  in  the 
Punjab)  taking  their  tickets  and  dispensing  medicine,  while  Dr. 
Owen  rapidly  examined  them.  There  were  many  eye-cases, 
ophthalmia  being  most  frequent,  and  the  eagerness  with  which 
the  women  press^  forward  showed  their  faith  in  their  newly- 
found  friend.  They  were  nearly  all  old,  wrinkled,  and  hideous ; 
but  their  veils  were  as  carefully  drawn  until  they  were  face  to  face 
with  the  surgeon,  as  if  they  had  been  still  youthful  and  attractive. 
Two  or  three  children  were  also  brought.  One  bright-eyed  little 
fellow,  with  a  fractured  arm,  which  had  been  set  a  few  days  before, 
crying  out  with  pain  until  it  was  found  that  the  sling  in  which  the 
limb  was  carried  had  been  carelessly  tied  by  his  helpless  mother, 
who  had  not  understood  the  instructions  given  to  her.  In  a  few 
minutes  all  was  set  right  again,  and  the  brave  little  man  bore  the 
pain  without  a  murmur.  When  the  worst  cases  had  been  seen, 
Dr.  Owen  went  out  to  visit  one  or  two  patients  in  the  city,  leaving 
the  native  doctors  to  deal  with  such  trifling  ailments  as  were 
sought  to  be  relieved.  Medicines  are  given  gratuitously ;  and 
though  patients  with  diseases  of  years'  standing  expect  to  be 
cured  in  a  few  days,  everything  done  to  relieve  their  suffering  is 
gratefully  accepted,  and  belief  in  the  hakeerrCs  skill  is  a  cardinal 
article  of  faith  among  all  of  them,  as  only  one  death  has  occurred 


302  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

since  the  hospital  was  opened.  Dr.  Owen  is  now  freely  admitted 
even  to  honses  where  Afghan  exclnsiveness  is  most  severe,  and 
thus  imperceptibly  an  influence  is  being  gained  over  the  minds  of 
the  people  which  cannot  fail  to  do  great  good.  The  jealousy  of 
Mahpmedans  where  their  women  are  concerned  is  quite  disarmed 
when  they  see  how  entirely  devoted  the  English  surgeon  is  to  his 
profession,  and  how  little  it  affects  him  whether  his  patients  are 
street  beggars,  in  the  lowest  depths  of  misery,  or  ladies  of  the 
zenana,  surrounded  with  every  comfort.  .  , 

I  have  described  one  phase  of  our  rule  in  Cabul,  and  it  will  be 
seen  from  it  whether  our  policy,  however  defective  it  may  be  in  its 
indistinct  outlines  and  indefinite  aims,  deserves  the  title  of 
''Russian."  When  wounded  ghazis  are  in  our  ''charitable 
hospital/'  our  vengeance  must  surely  be  of  the  most  harmless  kind. 
We  have  troubled  waters  enough  in  Afghanistan,  but  we  have  also 
our  pool  of  Siloam. 


I  give  here  two  articles  written  a  few  weeks  later,  descriptive  of 
our  life  in  Sherpur,  and  also  of  native  life  in  Cabul : — 

"  How  WB  Live  m  SmERPim." 

We  are  a  self-contained  colony  here,  and  a  self-possessed  one, 
too,  for  the  matter  of  that,  but  we  are  by  no  means  self-satisfied. 
Every  man  among  us  believes  that  if  his  advice  had  only  been 
asked,  the  Afghan  di£Sculty  would  have  been  settled  months  ago, 
and  we  should  now  be  enjoying  the  delights  of  furlough  in  England, 
or  revelling  in  the  fascinating  gaieties  of  the  cold  season  in  the 
plains.  A  Briton  without  his  grumble  would  be  unworthy  of  his 
country,  and  so  we  growl  and  swear  against  the  Powers  that  be, 
and  ask  why,  in  the  name  of  all  that's  wicked,  the  wire-pullers  in 
India  and  England  do  not  make  up  their  minds  to  settle  the 
matter.  We  are  so  conscious  of  our  own  unrecognized  powers  as 
politicians  and  diplomats,  that  we  laugh  to  scorn  the  idea  that 
affairs  cannot  be  put  on  a  footing  that  would  satisfy  even  the 
staunchest  believers  in  a  scientific  frontier.  The  army  in  the  old 
days  was  merely  «  machine  which,  once  set  in  motion  by  the  hand 
of  a  minister,  ground  out  its  life  for  years  and  years,  without  any- 


''Existence''  in  Sherpur.  303 

thing  more  than  an  occasional  groan  when  its  wheels  were  not 
properly  lubricated.  Bat,  now,  things  are  changed :  every  soldier 
is  not  only  a  fighting  machine,  bat  a  thinking  machine,  digesting 
rumours  and  theories  with  manreUous  voracity,  and  reproducing 
patched  and  piebald  opinions  of  his  own^  which  will  intrude 
themselves  into  prominence.  There  can  be  in  our  ranks  no  '*  mute, 
inglorious  "  Wellingtons-— or  Wolseleys  (for,  in  the  eyes  of  many 
purblind  people,  the  terms  are  synonymous) ;  an  ofiBicer  can  now 
through  many  channels  criticize  and  smash  up  the  strategy  of  a  cam- 
paign, and  calmly  sit  upon  the  heads  of  his  seniors  while  his  com- 
rades applaud  most  heartily.  Even  the  private  soldier  in  the  ranks 
knows  full  well  that  if  he  only  pulls  thie  long  bow  sufficiently  in  a 
letter  home,  some  sympathizing  party  journal  will  accept  his  view 
of  the  situation,  and  upon  it  draw  with  no  uncertain  hand  the 
outlines  of  a  new  policy.  If  the  flood  of  criticism  which  is  now 
surging  about  Sherpur  could  only  be  collected  in  one  stream,  and  be 
poured  upon  the  devoted  heads  of  the  clever  politicians  who  hold 
our  destinies  in  their  hands,  these  gentlemen  would  never  stand 
high  and  dry  again ;  they  would  be  overwhelmed  once  and  for  all. 
A  shower  bath  braces  the  system ;  a  waterspout  drowns  all  upon 
whom  it  falls ;  and  if  there  were  not  a  feeling  that  our  blundering 
along  here,  without  a  guiding  light  to  show  (General  and  soldier 
what  to  do,  were  now  coming  to  an  end,  such  a  phenomenon  as  a 
waterspout  might  arise  in  Sherpur.  But  I  have  before  sketched 
this  phase  of  an  existence  here  :  if  I  said  ''  life,"  my  own  might 
be  endangered  by  the  indignant  army  of  Philistines,  who  only 
*'  exist ; "  and  it  is  useless  to  revive  the  cry  of  ''  Loot,  Love,  and 
Liberty,"  for  not  one  of  these  blessings  is  forthcoming. 

And  yet  from  day  to  day  we  continue  our  being,  and  the  days 
are  not  so  long  as  at  first  sight  might  be  supposed.  We  have  one 
panacea  for  all  the  evils  with  which  we  believe  ourselves  beset :  we 
make  the  best  of  everything.  Given  the  fine,  bright  weather 
which  delighted  us  only  a  few  days  ago,  and  Gymkhana  meets, 
pony  matches,  polo  and  dog-hunting  delight  our  hearts  and 
strengthen  our  digestions.  Given  a  snow-fall  and  a  rapid  thaw, 
when  the  ground  underfoot  is  merely  a  quagmire  :  our  rooms  and 
mess-houses,  snug  and  warm,  seem  to  invite  us  to  a  quiet  rubber 
or  an  earnest  study  of  books  and  papers.    And  then  there  is  our 


304  The  Afgfian  War,  1879—80. 

Clab;  it  is  an  accomplished  fact,  and,  what  is  more,  is  an 
'^  institution."  It  was  conceived  in  the  calm  which  preceded  the 
stirring  events  of  December  lltb  to  24th,  but  its  birth  came  not 
until  a  fortnight  ago.  It  is  not  of  the  imposing  kind  that  was 
first  intended,  but  still  it  sufBces  for  all  our  wants,  and  is  made  a 
rendezvous  by  all  who  care  for  some  other  society  than  the 
fjEimiliars  of  their  own  messes.  From  Bemaru  village,  where  the 
Ouides  are  encamped,  and  the  choice  spirits  of  tiie  Transport 
Department  hold  high  revel  occasionally  on  that  spot  sacred  to  the 
memory  of  that  foolish  virgin  who  died  be-maru  (without  hus- 
band)— from  Bemaru  to  the  quarters  in  the  western  wall  is 
nearly  two  miles ;  and  it  was  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  friends  at 
either  end  of  cantonments  saw  little  of  each  other  when  there  was 
no  gathering-point.  One  might  pay  a  visit  and,  after  tramping 
through  slush  and  snow,  find  one's  friend  absent.  To  accept  an 
invitation  to  dinner  meant  braving  pitfalls  and  watercourses  in 
the  darkness,  or  helplessly  wandering  about  in  the  darkness 
on  the  return  journey,  uncertain  in  what  direction  one's  home 
lay.  But  now  the  Club  is  a  recognized  centre,  about  which, 
in  the  evening,  when  work  is  over  and  dinner  not  yet  on 
the  table,  many  of  us  gather.  The  excuse  is  a  ''nip"  before 
dinner;  the  reason  our  sociable  instincts.  A  witty  IVenchman 
has  said  : — *'  Wherever  three  or  four  Englishmen  are  congregated, 
voiM  un  club  /  "  It  is  so  :  there  is  nothing  to  be  ashamed  of  in 
our  love  of  companionship.  And  our  Club  has  the  charm  of 
novelty,  both  in  situation  and  design.  It  is  the  first  established 
under  the  shadow  of  the  Hindu  Eush,  on  historic  ground ;  and 
its  architecture  is  a  mixture  of  the  nomadic  and  Public  Works 
styles.  We  pitched  a  large  tent :  we  were  nomads ;  we  took 
down  the  canvas  side- walls,  and  built  in  their  place  walls  of  mud 
and  bricks,  pierced  with  windows  and  doors,  and  with  chimneys 
springing  out  above  the  canvas  roof.  The  structure  was  com- 
plete. From  nomads  we  became  clubmen.  Could  civilization 
further  go  ?  And  here  we  meet  and  exchange  views  upon  things  in 
general  and  Afghanistan  in  particular,  subaltern  and  Colonel 
shouldering  each  other  in  true  club  style,  the  mixed  crowd  being 
flavoured  generally  with  a  Brigadier  or  two,  while  the  darlings  of 
the  Staff  air  their  gold-lace  in  a  more  congenial  atmosphere  than 


Amusements.  305 

their  stuffy  quarters,  which  are  office,  diaing,  and  sleeping  rooms 
all  in  one.     Certainly  onr  Club  is  a  saccess. 

In  the  shape  of  indoor  amasements,  Christy  minstrel  bands 
are  springing  up,  and  one  theatre  has  already  had  a  short 
season — three  nights.  The  72nd  Highlanders  have  rigged  up  in 
the  ditch  near  their  quarters  a  number  o{  pals  resting  against  the 
stout  mud  wall,  and  in  this  a  first-class  stage  has  been  built  with 
act-drop,  scenery,  footlights,  and  all  complete.  On  the  opening 
night  the  5th  Ghoorkas,  old  friends  of  the  72nd,  felt  that  their 
patronage  was  indispensable ;  and  when  two  little  "  Ghoorkis  " 
struggled  into  the  pit  and  tried  to  peep  over  the  heads  of  the 
crowd,  a  dozen  eager  hands  hoisted  them  shoulder-high,  and  amid 
great  applause  they  were  carried  to  the  front  and  placed  in  the 
first  row.  Here  they  smiled  their  thanks  as  only  Ghoorkas  can 
smile — from  ear  to  ear — and  when  the  curtain  rose,  they  watched 
the  performance  critically  and  with  unbounded  satisfaction. 

The  severe  weather  that  has  declared  itself  during  the  last  few 
days  has  added  new  sources  of  amusement.  A  week  ago  the 
owners  of  skates  were  disgusted  with  the  non-appearance  of  hard 
frost ;  now  skating  goes  on  nearly  all  day  long,  and  the  science  of 
sliding  is  also  being  cultivated.  Europeans  and  natives  alike  in- 
dulge in  a  '*  slide ;  "  and  to  see  half  a  dozen  Guides  contentedly 
coming  croppers  on  the  ice,  and  rising  again  with  immense  satis- 
faction, only  to  sit  suddenly  down  the  moment  afterwards,  would 
make  Timour  himself  smile  benignantly.  Once  on  the  slide, 
every  man  seems  but  a  child  of  larger  growth,  and  right  gleefully 
the  game  is  kept  up  until  tired  nature  gives  in,  and  various  points 
of  our  bodies  remind  the  most  hardy  that  bruises  are  painful  when 
excitement  dies  out.  With  the  fall  of  snow  on  Monday  came  a 
battle-royal,  which  will  always  live  in  the  annals  of  our  occupation. 
To  tell  the  story  mth  due  solemnity :  at  noon  word  was  brought 
to  the  72nd  Highlanders  that  the  enemy  (the  67th  Foot  and 
92nd  Gordon  Highlanders)  had  occupied  the  strong  fort  on  the 
eastern  end  of  the  Bemaru  Heights.  Without  delay  the  regiment 
fell  in  500  strong,  and,  reinforced  by  the  9th  Lancers  and  some 
artiUerymen,  marched  with  banners  flying  and  drums  beating  to 
the  attack.  (The  banners  were  those  lately  captured  on  the 
Takht-i-Shah  Peak  and  the  Asmai  Heights ;  the  drums  were  various 


3o6  TJie  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

oooking-pots.)  On  nearing  the  enemy's  position,  the  attacking 
force  was  joined  by  a  detachment  of  the  6th  Ghoorkas  under  their 
British  officers;  skirmishers  were  thrown  out,  and  the  bugle 
sounded  the  assault.  The  storming  party  were  headed  by  the 
standard-beurers,  the  cry  of  ''  Ghazis  to  the  front ! "  being 
answered  by  a  rush  of  these  reckless  men  up  the  hillside.  They 
were  met  by  such  a  terrific  fire,  the  air  being  darkened  by 
snowballs,  that  the  assault  seemed  hopeless.  But  amid  the 
din  the  cry  of  their  leader,  **  Ghazis  to  the  front !  "  rang  out — 

**  Ho  !  Ghafifl  to  the  front  I    Ho  !  Ghaab  bear  the  brant 
Of  the  battle  waged  on  snowy  Bemara  I 
Let  not  the  stinging  ball  your  fiery  hearts  appal, 
But  hurl  the  Kafirs  down  1    AUah-hu  1 " 

The  despatch  says: — 

'*  A  desperate  resistance  was  made,  but  a  bugler  with  the  72nd 
succeeded  by  a  nise  in  turning  the  fortunes  of  the  day.  He  crept 
round  in  the  enemy's  rear  and  sounded  the  regimental  call  of 
the  92nd,  followed  by  the  '  cease  fire '  and  '  retreat ; '  the  92nd 
fell  back  and  the  attacking  party  carried  the  position.  Many 
prisoners  were  taken  and  the  usual  atrocities  committed — one 
gallant  Highlander  having  three  men  sitting  on  his  chest  at  once ; 
while  others,  equally  gallant,  were  buried  alive  in  the  snow.  The 
conduct  of  all  concerned  fully  bore  out  the  estimate  previously 
formed  of  the  splendid  fighting  powers  of  our  men,  and  several 
'  y.C.s '  are  to  be  awarded.  The  number  of  wounded  was  un- 
usually great,  but  all  are  now  doing  well.  The  defeat  of  the 
enemy  was  so  complete  that  they  at  once  sued  for  peace,  and  a 
treaty  was  signed  at  the  Club  later  in  the  day  by  the  principal 
leaders.  In  consequence  of  the  ink  being  frozen,  cura9oa  and 
brandy  were  substituted." 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  halting  sketch  here  drawn,  that  with 
all  our  growling  discontent  at  being  left  in  the  dark  as  to  the 
fature,  we  manage  to  smooth  away  the  rough  edges  of  our  life 
which  so  much  gall  us,  and  that  our  petulance  never  grows  into 
sulkiness.  That  we  have  to  fall  back  upon  rough  horse-play 
occasionally  is  not  surprising :  there  is  no  softening  influence  to 
keep  our  spirits  at  an  equable  temperature.  We  are  a  colony  of 
men — chiefly  young  men ;  and  Cabul  society  is  so  very  select  that 


Love  and  War  Disunited,  307 

we  have  not  yet  gained  an  entrance  within  its  sacred  limits.  If 
we  were  to  make  ceremonial  calls  npon  the  zenanas,  we  shoald 
probably  be  confronted  by  some  buck-Afghan,  with  a  knife  in 
his  hand  and  an  oath  in  his  month.  Love  and  war  do  not  go 
hand  in  hand  now  in  Cabal,  although  they  did  forty  years  ago;  so 
we  must  sigh  in  vain  for  a  glimpse  of  that  beauty  which  the 
yashmaks  hide  so  jealously  when  the  Cabul  ladies  flit  by  us  in  the 
narrow  streets  of  the  city.  When  a  more  than  usually  coquettish 
white-clad  figure  passes,  we  turn  hastily  about ;  but  what  can 
be  seen  ? — 

"  Nooglit  bat  the  rippling  linen  wrapping  her  about." 

And  what  is  she  like  in  the  seclusion  of  the  zenana  ?  Ah,  that 
lies  apart  from  our  life  in  Sherpur  ;  but  perhaps  I  may  be  able  to 
partly  answer  the  question.  **How  we  Live  in  Sherpur,'*  can 
only  have  as  its  companion  picture — 

**  How  THEY  Live  in  Cabul.  *' 

It  is  not  an  attractive  life,  that  which  we  have  come  upon  in 
Cabul ;  but  it  has  its  lights  and  shades  and  a  certain  robustness 
of  its  own,  which  is  now  more  than  ever  apparent.  The  reaction 
after  the  excitement  of  the  siege  of  Sherpur  was  terribly  depressing 
for  a  time  in  the  city,  as  every  Mahomedan  citizen  felt  that  a 
heavy  punishment  might  fall  upon  him,  and  in  most  cases  justly. 
But  these  ignorant  fanatics  did  not  know  that  the  Government  of 
England  is  a  limited  monarchy  tempered  by  Exeter  HaU.  Now 
they  have  fully  realized  that  we  were  in  earnest  in  offering  an 
amnesty  to  all  who  would  return  peacefully  to  their  homes,  and 
have  renewed  their  trading  with  a  vigour  which  shows  their 
appreciation  of  our  new  rupees.  As  in  every  Oriental  city,  the 
life  led  by  men  and  by  women  runs  on  very  different  lines ;  the 
concerns  of  the  bazaar  and  the  affairs  of  the  zenana  are  as  distinct 
as  day  and  night ;  the  one  is  all  energy  and  strife,  the  other  dul- 
ness  and  monotony.  Woman  has  no  place  in  the  creed  of  Maho- 
med beyond  the  base  one  of  continuing  the  Mussulman  race ;  she 
is  an  inferior  creature,  to  be  shut  up  and  kept  from  mischief  with- 
in the  four  walls  of  her  master's  harem.  If  she  loves  her  lord — 
or  some  part  of  him,  as  she  generally  shares  his  affection  and 

X  2 


3o8  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

bodily  presence  with  other  wives  or  slaves — she  dutifully  brings 
forth  a  son  to  continue  the  race,  and  then  her  mission  ends.  She 
is  a  piece  of  furniture,  a  belonging  of  the  zenana;  and  if  nature 
has  not  gifbed  her  with  a  love  of  intrigue,  she  must  be  content  to 
vegetate  in  seclusion  until,  in  the  ripeness  of  years,  she  drops  out 
of  life.  She  knows  she  has  nothing  to  expect  beyond  the  grave  ; 
does  not  her  creed  teach  her  that  her  lord  will  lie  in  the  lap  of 
houris  steeped  in  eternal  sensual  bliss  ?  Perhaps  in  her  wildest 
flights  of  imagination,  she  may  gain  hope  from  some  such  mad 
idea  as  that  she  and  her  fellows  will  be  blended  into  one  great 
mass,  from  which  will  spring  millions  of  houris  to  people  the 
heavens,  and  wait  with  open  arms  for  the  souls  of  the  faithful. 
May  not  she,  in  houri  form,  fall  to  the  lot  of  the  man  she  loved 
on  earth,  who  despised  her  as  something  too  trivial  for  much 
consideration  ?  Such  a  belief  may  comfort  her ;  let  us  hope  it 
does. 

But  woman  in  Cabul  has  fewer  restrictions  placed  upon  her 
than  in  other  Oriental  cities,  and  the  semi-freedom  she  enjoys  has 
been  the  theme  upon  which  travellers  in  old  days  delighted  to 
enlarge.  Cabul  is  declared  by  them  to  be  the  city  of  intrigue. 
This  belief  arose  from  the  practice  of  women,  closely  veiled  from 
head  to  foot,  being  allowed  to  pass  unmolested  along  the  publio 
streets,  unattended  and  with  no  restrictions  upon  their  move- 
ments. One  enthusiastic  writer,  speaking  no  doubt  from  experi- 
ence, asserts  that  the  mind  of  an  EngUshman  cannot  imagine  the 
extent  to  which  intrigues  are  carried  on  in  this  forward  city. 
Wife,  daughter,  or  mother,  could,  according  to  his  account,  pass 
from  the  zenana  into  the  narrow  thoroughfares  about,  and  with 
perfect  confidence  visit  any  lover  upon  whom  her  eyeif  had  fallen. 
Every  figure  loses  its  identity  in  the  folds  of  the  white  drapery 
which  completely  envelopes  a  woman  from  head  to  heel,  and  the 
yashmak  covering  the  face  blots  out  the  features  more  thoroughly 
than  a  mask.  Undoubtedly  this  freedom  of  action  does  exist,  in 
appearance  at  least,  still;  white-robed  figures  flit  about  the 
bazaars  and  the  by-streets,  and  no  one  pays  regard  thereto ;  but 
they  are  women  of  low  degree,  with  no  charms  to  guard,  and 
probably  with  but  little  thought  of  pleasure  in  their  minds.  If 
finest  linen,  a  gold  embroidered  boot,  a  coquettish  mincing  step. 


The  Kafir  kept  at  Arms  Length.  309 

attract  the  attention  of  a  Kafir,  the  latter  will  invariahly  find  that 
the  lady  is  attended  by  some  duenna,  or  more  probably  by  two  or 
three  male  domestics,  who  clear  a  way  for  their  mistress  through 
the  motley  crowd.  The  Afghans  are  said  to  be  peculiarly  jealous 
of  their  women :  witness  the  proclamation  issued  to  our  soldiers 
before  Eushi  was  left ! — and  though  love  laughs  at  locksmiths,  it 
seems  incredible  that  any  sirdar  or  well-to-do  citizen  should  allow 
the  inmates  of  his  zenana  liberty  to  wander  about  at  will,  with 
no  eye  to  watch  their  movements.  We  are  rather  at  a  disadvan- 
tage in  Gabul ;  for  a  Kafir  to  explore  the  penetralia  of  the  gloomy 
high-walled  houses  is  next  to  impossible.  We  have  a  Club,  it  is 
true,  but  it  is  not  on  the  deliciously  free  principles  of  the  Orleans  ; 
and  if  we  were  to  institute  five-o'clock  tea,  and  send  out  cards  of 
invitation  to  Madame  Shere  Ali  and  Madame  Yakub  Khan,  and 
harem,  or  any  other  ladies  of  distinction  in  Gabul,  there  would  be 
no  chance  of  the  invitation  being  accepted.  The  ladies  might 
rise  to  the  occasion,  but  their  grim  guardians  would  baulk  their 
intentions  with  a  vengeance.  To  make  calls  of  ceremony  would 
be  equally  impossible,  for  there  are  no  grass- widows  in  Cabul  with 
whom  to  enjoy  a  cosy  tSte-d-t^te.  If,  by  some  lucky  combination 
of  the  stars,  a  Kafir  were  fortunate  enough  to  gain  the  sacred 
ground  of  the  zenana,  its  simple-minded  inmate  would  probably 
lisp  out  in  fluid,  but  passionless,  Persian  : 

^      "  I  do  not  seek  a  lover,  thoa  Chriatiaii  knight  so  gay  ; 
Becanae  an  article  like  that  has  nerer  come  my  way.*' 

In  fact,  a  stranger  in  the  harem  would  be  a  very  indefinite  article 
indeed  in  Cabul,  for  it  is  not  ^ve^ry  one  who  can  hope  for  the  good 
fortune  of  a  McGahan,  who,  in  the  IChanate  of  Khiva,  wandered 
into  a  zenana,  and  was  treated  with  hospitality  and  caresses  by 
its  inmates. 

But  it  may  be  as  well  to  be  more  definite  in  dealing  with  the 
life  of  women  in  Cabul ;  and  I  will  endeavour  to  describe,  in  all 
fairness,  what  I  have  personally  seen.  To  take  the  commonest 
figures  seen  in  the  bazaar :  It  is  not  unusual  for  women  to  do 
their  "  shopping  "  in  public,  though  they  lack  the  confidence  of 
Western  ladies,  who  parade  their  men-kind  on  such  important 
occasions. 


3IO  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

A  Cabal  lady  stops  before  a  stall  in  the  bazaar,  puts  out  a 
small  fair  hand,  richly  ringed,  and  touches  any  article  she  needs : 
generally  a  piece  of  Bokhara  silk  or  English  linen.  The  shop- 
keeper, sitting  cross-legged  among  his  goods,  names  his  price ; 
the  customer  quietly  pulls  the  silk,  say,  towaards  her,  bows  her 
head,  and,  raising  her  yashmak  an  inch,  looks  critically  upon  the 
article.  The  seller  stares  over  her  head  at  the  busy  life  about 
him,  says  not  a  word  till  the  examination  is  at  an  end,  and  finally, 
after  a  little  bartering,  sells  the  silk,  or  throws  it  back  into  its 
place.  In  either  case  he  cannot  have  ^ny  idea  of  the  identity  of 
the  customer,  though  from  her  jewellery  he  may  make  a  shrewd 
guess  as  to  the  length  of  her  purse.  Not  every  woman's  fingers 
are  circled  by  rings,  or  her  yashmak  secured  with  loops  of  gold. 
And  so  the  lady  passes  on,  pausing,  perhaps,  at  other  stalls,  but 
never  for  long.  To  loiter  before  the  goods  which  may  charm  her 
eye  seems  no  part  of  her  business,  even  when  a  more  than  usually 
brilliant  display  of  silk  or  embroidered  shoes  attracts  her.  Her 
walk  is  hurried,  her  time,  perhaps,  is  precious,  and  she  glides 
among  the  crowd  quietly,  and  as  if  shunning  attention,  though  no 
one,  unless  he  be  a  Kafir,  pays  the  least  regard  to  her  presence. 
Finally,  she  turns  off  into  some  side-street,  and  disappears  in  a 
narrow  gateway  leading,  one  supposes,  to  her  home.  The  majority 
of  such  women  shrink  from  any  chance  contact  with  a  Kafir  of  any 
kind  ;  though  such  little  bits  of  comedy  have  been  acted  as  one  of 
our  gallants  peering  into  doors  and  gateways  only  to  find  an  un- 
veiled face  turned  towards  him,  and  that  face  genei-ally  very  plain 
and  unprepossessing.  Such  dames  are  of  an  uncertain  age,  and 
are  not  coy  in  thus  rewarding  attention  or  admiration,  though 
such  reward  never  goes  beyond  unveiling  for  an  instant. 

I  had  occasion  quite  lately  to  visit  the  house  of  a  merchant  in 
Cabul,  a  Mussulman  of  some  little  standing,  and  by  a  lucky 
accident  got  a  glimpse  of  the  home  life  of  such  a  woman  as  I 
have  described  shopping  in  the  bazaar.  My  companion  and  guide 
— who  or  what  he  was  matters  not — led  me  through  tortuous 
streets,  so  filthy,  that  to  tread  them  was  alone  a  trial,  until  at  a 
nail-studded  door  he  stopped  and  knocked  twice  or  thrice  with  the 
large  iron  "  knocker  **  on  its  centre.  All  was  still  and  silent  in- 
side for  a  moment,  and  then  a  picturesque-looking  ruffian,  no  doubt 


Inmates  of  the  Zenana.  311 

the  Afghan  servicg  man  of  the  period,  suddenly  withdrew  a  bolt 
inside,  after  examining  ns  through  the  wicket.  We  stumbled 
along  a  passage  dark  enough  to  make  the  few  holes  about  more 
treacherous  than  holes  ever  were  before,  and  then  suddenly  came  a 
stream  of  light  and  we  were  in  an  open  courtyard.  It  was  com- 
monplace enough :  there  were  no  "  murmuring  fountains,  orange 
trees,  or  shady  nooks,"  such  as  Eastern  travellers  love  to  dwell 
upon ;  simply  a  brown  square  plot  of  ground  with  rooms,  two 
storeys  high,  surrounding  it  on  all  sides.  On  the  left,  facing 
the  south,  were  tbe  quarters  of  the  owner ;  his  reception-room  and 
zenana^  side  by  side ;  with  a  narrow  doorway,  screened  by  a  'pwr- 
dah  (in  Western  phrase,  a  portiire),  leading  from  one  to  the 
other.  The  rooms  were  open  to  the  air  on  the  courtyard  side, 
elaborately-canred  woodwork  in  the  shape  of  sliding  panels  being 
the  only  screen  from  the  sun.  The  interior  was  comfortable 
enough :  the  floors  were  covered  with  carpets,  over  which  was  laid 
clean  white  linen ;  the  walls  were  either  of  carved  wood  or  plaster, 
painted  in  gay  colours.  The  interior  of  the  zenana  I  could  not 
see  while  in  tbe  reception-room,  but  from  it  presently  appeared  a 
bedizened  youngster,  who  made  friends  at  once.  The  sound  of 
whispers  behind  the  purdah  came  clearly  enough  into  the  room ; 
and  I  would  not  be  sure  that  we  wero  not  being  examined  by 
feminine  eyes,  while  our  host  courteously  served  tea  in  beautiful 
little  bowls  that  wotdd  have  delighted  a  china-maniac.  In  an 
inner  room,  divided  from  the  reception-room  by  light  wooden  pil- 
lars, were  carved  recesses,  in  which  was  a  wealth  of  china :  tea- 
pots from  Russia,  bowls  from  Eashgar  and  China,  and  others  of  a 
nondescript  kind,  covered  with  richly-coloured  designs  in  yellow, 
green,  and  chocolate,  the  three  colours  most  in  favour  among 
Cabulis. 

Our  visit  was  a  short  one,  but  as  the  master  of  the  house  led 
the  way  to  the  door,  I  lingered  behind,  and  was  rewarded  by  a 
glimpse  into  the  zenana.  It  differed  but  little  in  appearance  from 
the  other  room ;  the  carpets  were  guiltless  of  any  linen-cover,  the 
walls  were  more  brilliantly  painted,  cushions  and  pillows  were 
scattered  about,  and  the  three  inmates  were  on  tiptoe  of  expecta- 
tion as  we  passed.  Two  faces  I  saw ;  one  old  and  wrinkled,  the 
other  young  and  pleasing.    ''  An  old  wife  and  a  younger  rival " 


312  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

was  the  conclusion  I  arrived  at,  and  their  dress  bore  out  this  idea. 
The  elder  wore  nothing  but  pure  whit© ;  the  younger  was  gorgeous 
in  green  and  crimson  silk.  Just  a  glance,  and  it  jtvas  over :  the 
child  I  have  mentioned  was  being  caressed  by  the  third  wife,  whose 
back  was  towards  her  companions,  and  another  child  was  lying 
asleep  among  the  pillows.  But  for  the  presence  of  the  children, 
it  would  have  seemed  dulness  personified,  as  signs  of  occupation  or 
amusement  there  were  none.  So  much  for  the  bit  of  quiet  home 
life  in  Gabul :  how  monotonous  it  must  be,  none  can  tell,  except, 
perhaps,  those  who  have  to  endure  it ! 

The  dress  of  the  Afghan  women,  especially  those  whose  hus- 
bands have  rank  or  wealth,  is  extremely  picturesque.  A  short, 
tightly-fitting  bodice  of  green,  blue,  or  crimson  silk,  confines 
the  bust,  but  buttons  so  closely  up  to  the  throat,  that  one  can  only 
guess  at  the  proportions  of  shoulders  and  bosom.  The  bodice  is 
generally  embroidered  with  gold,  and  then  becomes  so  stiff  and 
unyielding,  that  it  is  virtually  a  corset.  In  this  cold  weather  the 
short  arms  of  this  zari  are  continued  down  to  the  wrist,  and  the 
vest  itself  is  padded  with  wool  for  the  sake  of  warmth.  Trousers 
h  la  Turc,  baggy  and  flowing  as  Patima's,  and  tightly  fastened  at 
the  ankles  with  gold  or  silver  bands,  a  broad  silk  Jcummerbund  of 
almost  endless  length  about  the  waist,  with  the  ends  so  disposed 
that  they  become  skirts ;  dainty  white  socks  and  a  tiny  slipper  or 
shoe,  gold-embroidered — such  is  the  indoor  dress  of  a  Cabuli  lady ; 
while  covering  and  hiding  all  save  feet  and  ankles  is  the  volu- 
minous white  garment  drawn  over  the  head  and  face,  and  falling 
to  the  heels.  These  veiled  beauties  wear  jewellery  alike  about  the 
forehead,  hands,  wrists,  arms,  ankles,  and  ears ;  while  handsome 
gold  loops  secure  the  yashmak  at  the  back  of  the  head ;  the  hair 
being  drawn  from  the  forehead  and  tied  tightly  into  a  knot, 
Grecian  fashion.  The  length  of  a  silk  kummcrhund,  which  en- 
circles a  lady's  waist,  is  sometimes  astonishing  :  one  I  saw  must 
have  been  12  yards  long  by  18  inches  broad,  and  the  end  was  even 
then  not  forthcoming.  The  slippers  and  shoes  are  of  Cabuli 
make,  and  are  very  pretty.  On  a  pale  green  ground  beautiful 
patterns  are  worked  with  gold  and  silver  thread  and  particoloured 
silk,  until  the  effect  is  more  like  that  of  a  fairy  slipper  than  one  for 
daily  use.     When  a  stout  leathern  sole  is  put  on  with  high  heels 


The  Cabuli  Beauties,  313 

rudely  bound  with  iron,  the  work  of  art  is  complete.  The  stalls 
in  which  these  slippers  and  shoes  are  made  are  the  gayest  in  the 
whole  bazaar.  A  Cabuli  lady's  foot  is  small,  almost  to  deformity, 
and  the  baggy  trousers  by  contrast  make  them  appear  exceedingly 

From  the  few  faces  seen,  being  chiefly  those  of  old  or  passee 
women,  it  is  difficult  to  judge  of  the  famed  beauty  which  the  Cabulis 
are  said  to  boast.  The  children  are  certainly,  as  a  whole,  the 
prettiest  I  have  ever  seen.  Their  complexions  are  red  and  white, 
with  a  tinge  of  olive  pervading  the  skin,  eyes  black  and  lustrous, 
well-shaped  features,  teeth  to  make  a  Western  beauty  envious, 
and  bright,  intelligent  looks,  that  sadly  belie  the  race  to  which 
they  belong.  Their  mothers  must  be  beautiful,  for  their  fathers 
are  generally  villanous-looking :  the  men  losing  all  the  pleasing 
traits  which  they  possessed  as  boys,  The  lady  I  have  described 
as  seen  in  the  zenana  for  a  moment  was  certainly  handsome,  and 
was  far  lighter  in  complexion  than  a  Spaniard;  her  eyes  were 
really  worthy  of  the  praises  sung  by  Hafiz,  but  the  sensuous  lips 
were  a  little  too  full  and  pouting.  It  was  just  such  a  face  as  one 
imagines  in  a  harem,  and  would  be  in  keeping  with  the  langourous 
life  of  a  voluptuary,  to  whom  sensuality  is  a  guiding  star.  Such 
faces  always  lack  character,  and  would  soon  prove  insipid  in  the 
eyes  of  the  West.  The  Cabuli  lady,  when  journeying,  is  either 
carried  in  an  elaborate  wioker-work  cage  covered  with  the  in- 
evitable flowing  linen,  or  rides,  Amazon-fashion,  on  a  pony  behind 
her  lord.  At  times  she  is  coquettish  enough  to  throw  warm 
glances  at  Kafirs,  behind  her  husband's  back,  and  is  no  doubt 
delighted  at  the  admiration  bestowed  upon  her  daintily-shppered 
feet. 

What  the  mission  in  life  is  of  such  women,  in  such  a  country 
as  this,  may  be  summed  up  in  a  few  words.  She  must  play  the 
part  of  a  mother,  rather  than  a  wife,  for  her  sympathies  go  all 
with  the  children  left  to  be  brought  up  in  the  *  zenana,  and  not 
with  their  father,  whose  course  lies  in  different  lines  in  the  busy 
scheming  world  outside.  That  some  women  of  strong  character 
occasionally  riiare  their  husband's  ambition,  and  aid  him  by 
advice  and  suggestions,  is  quite  true.  The  mother  and  wife  of 
Yakub  Khan  are  both  women  of  exceptional  ability,  influencing 


314  ^^  Afglian  War,  1879—80. 

and  guiding  men,  and  well  versed  in  state  intrigues.  But  the 
exceptions  are  few,  and  only  prove  the  general  rule  obtaining  in 
all  Mahomedan  coantries,  that  woman  is  a  cypher  outside  the 
four  walls  of  the  zenana. 

The  life  of  her  master  is  a  most  difficult  subject.  To  fathom 
the  motives  of  an  Afghan,  or  to  explain  his  actions,  would  be  a  task 
for  a  Machiavelli,  and  I  must  deal  with  it  in  such  manner  as  I  can. 
It  has  always  been  held  that  the  distinguishing  features  of  a 
Cabuli  are  turbulence  and  treachery,  and  late  events  have  only 
confirmed  men  in  this  belief.  The  arrangement  of  th^  city  into 
quarters,  each  securely  shut  off  from  its  neighbours  by  strgng  walls 
and  fortified  gateways,  the  part  played  by  the  Bala  Hissar  as  a 
citadel  dominating  the  tower  below,  and  affording  a  refuge  for  the 
sovereign  during  bloody  emeutes,  proved  to  travellers  in  past  days 
that  the  life  of  the  populace  was  far  from  a  peaceful  one.  Even 
now,  though  the  old  subdivisions  of  the  city  exist  but  in  name, 
— except  the  Kizilbash  quarter,  which  has  still  the  means  of  cut- 
ting itself  off  from  outside  by  strong  gateways, — it  is  apparent 
that  the  Amirs  never  trusted  their  lives  and  property  to  the 
tender  mercies  of  their  citizen-subjects.  When  our  army  arrived 
at  Cabul,  the  Bala  Hissar  was  still  a  fortress  capable  of  resisting 
successfully  any  attack  made  without  artillery,  and  within  its  walls 
were  the  palace  of  the  Amir,  his  harem,  and  his  arsenal.  Our 
Envoy,  too,  was  lodged  in  the  fortress,  as  the  fanaticism  of  the 
Cabulis  might  have  prompted  an  attack  upon  the  B^sidency,  if  it 
bad  been  in  the  heart  of  the  city,  with  its  bazaars  re-echoing  to 
the  prayers  of  the  moollahs  and  the  cries  of  fakirs.  That  safety 
was  not  found  even  in  the  Bala  Hissar,  was  due  rather  to  the 
weakness  of  Yakub  Ehan  and  his  contemptuous  treatment  of 
an  exasperated  soldiery  than  to  any  independent  action  of  the 
populace.  It  is  true  that  the  city  rabble  joined  in  the  attack  upon 
the  Embassy,  but  that  was  only  when  military  discipline  was  at  an 
end,  and  the  men  who  should  have  guarded  the  lives  of  the 
Amir's  guests  were  in  the  full  C17  of  mutiny.  Again,  the  build- 
ing of  Sherpur,  with  its  range  of  barracks  and  new  fortress  upon 
Bemaru  (planned,  but  never  executed)  was  due  to  Shere  Ali's 
dread  of  Cabul  and  its  armed  mob.  With  the  Bala  EUssar  on 
one  side  and  Sherpur  on  the  other,  he  was  sanguine  enough  to 


Afghan  Types.  315 

hope  for  peace  and  quietness  in  his  capital ;  and  these  he  would 
no  doubt  have  secured  if  he  had  not  foolishly  quarrelled  with  the 
Indian  Government,  whose  subsidy  gave  him  the  wherewithal  to 
raise  and  equip  a  large  army  and  rear  the  walls  of  his  new 
fortress. 

Every  Afghan  is  a  soldier,  and  the  Gabulis  are  no  exception  to 
^  the  rule.  ,Their  stalls  are  to  them  what  homesteads  ai*e  to  the 
mountain  tribes  and  peasants;  and  when  extortion  or  taxation 
grows,  in  their  opinion  excessive,  they  are  ready  to  turn  out 
armed-to  the  teeth,  and  by  open  menace  to  intimidate  their  rulers. 
A  tyrant  alone  can  hope  to  keep  them  in  due  subjection ;  and, 
as  a  rule,  Gabul  has  been  under  the  influence  of  tyranny  for 
many  centuries.  As  a  natural  result,  when  turbulence  occasionally 
subsides,  treachery  flourishes ;  and  the  history  of  the  city  is  full  of 
instances  of  treacherous  plots,  and  successful  if  bloody  intrigues. 
Coming  as  we  have  done  in  the  guise  of  an  avenging  army,  we 
have  greatly  modified  the  normal  appearance  of  thing?  in  the 
city,  our  proclamation  forbidding  the  carrying  of  arms  having 
destroyed  the  picturesque  ruffianism  which  used  to  stalk  through 
the  bazaars  armed  with  gun,  shield,  and  knife,  and  ready  for  all 
emergencies.  Not  a  weapon  now  is  seen  except  in  an  armourer's 
shop,  or  on  the  person  of  some  armed  retainer  of  a  Sirdar  who 
has  thrown  in  his  lot  with  the  British.  It  is  a  change  for  the 
better  in  our  eyes ;  but  when  the  people  see  our  soldiers  passing 
along  with  Martini  or  Snider  slung  over  the  shoulder,  they  must 
long  to  ruffle  it  again,  and  bring  out  from  their  hiding-places  their 
own  rifles  and  matchlocks.  But  it  is  not  to  be  yet ;  though,  when 
we  again  leave  this  ''  God-governed  country  "  to  its  own  devices, 
the  good  people  of  Cabul  will  once  more  be  able  to  resume  their 
old  habits. 

The  influential  citizens  of  Gabul  are  broadly  divisible  into  two 
representative  classes — the  Sirdar  and  the  trader ;  and  in  taking 
one  from  each  of  these  sections,  I  shall  be  able  fairly  to  sketch 
the  general  life  led  by  the  more  orderiy  of  the  Gabulis.  There 
are,  of  course,  a  mass  of  men  :  artizans,  street-hawkers,  retainers, 
and  hangers-on  generaUy,  who  furnish  the  rabble  which  has 
often  made  mob-law  supreme  within  the  walls ;  but  these  may  be 
left  to  themselves  for  a  little.     The  Sirdar  has   always   been 


3i6  Tfie  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

a  prominent  figure  in  Afghan  history ;  he  is  to  all  intents  a  feudal 
chief,  and  answers  very  much  to  the  Baron  who,  in  the  Dark  Ages, 
had  so  much  to  say  in  the  government  of  Western  countries.  He 
is  generally  of  royal  blood,  a  cousin  (some  twenty  times  removed) 
of  the  Amir;  but  this  relationship  with  the  sovereign  is  not 
advantageous  if  the  Sirdar  is  at  all  ambitious  of  power.  There 
are  so  many  revolutions  of  the  wheel  in  the  Barakzai  dynasty, 
that  the  assumption  of  dignity  by  a  subordinate  is  always  jealously 
watched  by  the  Amir,  and  promptly  nipped  in  the  bud  just  when 
it  bids  fair  to  become  dangerous.  Ties  of  kin  are  but  little 
regarded  in  a  country  where  continually  father  is  arrayed  against 
son,  brother  against  brother ;  and  where  human  life  is  held  so 
cheaply  that  scarcely  a  man  reaches  middle  age  without  having 
blood  upon  his  hands.  The  Sirdar  has  either  to  muzzle  his 
ambition  and  wait  patiently  for  a  chance  of  suddenly  acquiring 
power;  or  to  accept  a  colourless  life  of  ease,  with  nothing  to 
trouble  his  mind  except  the  caprices  of  a  favourite  slave-girl,  or 
the  loss  of  a  valuable  horse.  It  is  not  surprising,  then,  that  in 
Cabul  there  are  Sirdars  perfect  in  dissimulation  and  adepts  in 
intrigue ;  and  others  mere  slaves  of  their  sensuality,  to  whom  the 
world  means  merely  pillam  and  pillows,  cakes  and  concubines. 
Such  men  are  those  loved  by  Csesar  : 

*' men  that  are  fat; 

Sleek-headed  men,  and  such  as  sleep  o'  nights.*' 

And  the  easy-going  Sirdar  answers  so  fully  to  this  description, 
that  it  would  seem  as  if  the  cares  of  life  sat  very  lightly  upon 
him.  Such  men  are  too  characterless  to  repay  observation  ;  and 
though  we  see  many  of  them  here,  we  pass  them  by  contemp- 
tuously, except  when  a  mountain  of  flesh  more  than  usually  for- 
midable looms  upon  us  in  cantonments.  They  are  not  men  given 
to  fighting  or  political  intrigue ;  and  such  as  we  have  now  among 
us  are  anxious  only  as  to  their  allowances  which  the  "Great 
British  Government  '*  guarantees  to  them  while  they  are  faithful 
to  its  interests.  If  they  are  time-servers,  it  is  simply  because 
they  have  no  idea  beyond  the  present  one  of  comfort  and  quiet- 
ness ;  if  we  were  defeated  they  would  probably  make  their  obei- 
sance to  the  new  rulers,  and  would  settle  down  calmly  to  their  daily 


The  Sirdar.  317 

enjoyment  of  the  fat  of  the  land  in  their  well-stocked  harems. 
There  were  such  men  among  our  own  hard-headed  Barons  ages 
ago,  who  watched  their  more  ambitious  compeers  make  and  ruin 
dynasties,  and  lived  placidly  through  all  the  turmoil  without  even 
being  partisans. 

But  the  other  type  of  Sirdar  is  a  very  diflferent  person :  he 
holds  that  to  be  powerful  is  the  salt  of  life,  and  his  aim  from  youth 
to  old  age  is  to  seek  power  in  all  its  forms.  He  is  generally  rich 
and  a  lover  of  show ;  valuing  money  for  the  advantage  to  which 
it  can  be  turned  in  many  ways,  and  estimating  pomp  at  its  real 
worth — to  impress  the  ignorant  and  humiliate  the  inferior.  His 
life  as  now  made  up  is  not  to  outward  seeming  one  of  much 
importance,  but  not  one  of  us  can  hope  to  penetrate  beneath  its 
surface,  and  examine  the  many  schemes  which  pass  through  his 
mind.  He  lives  in  one  of  the  large,  high-walled  houses  which 
are  studded  about  the  city,  though  he  has  a  ''villa"  or  two  in 
pleasant  Eoh-Daman,  or  one  of  the  near  valleys.  If  one  visits 
him,  the  courtesy  with  which  he  receives  a  guest  is  that  of  a 
polished  gentleman,  flavoured,  perhaps  too  highly,  with  the 
Eastern  affectation  of  humility.  His  house  is  reached  through 
byways  and  along  covered-in  streets,  so  dark  and  noisome  that  one 
expects  to  meet  a  ghazi  at  every  turn.  But  all  is  quiet,  and 
finally  a  bit  of  blue  sky  is  seen  overhead,  a  narrow  doorway  is 
passed  through,  and  the  square  courtyard  of  the  house  gained. 
A  few  horses,  saddled  and  bridled,  are  standing  in  a  sunny 
comer ;  a  dozen  picturesque-looking  ruffians  are  lounging  about ; 
the  great  man  is  at  home.  We  find  him  in  a  long  room  squatting 
on  an  ottoman  with  a  dozen  fdends  and  associates  about  him,  to 
whom  he  has  doubtless  been  expounding  some  new  and  brilliant 
idea  that  has  occurred  to  him.  He  is  politely  anxious  about  his 
visitor's  health,  thanking  God  that  it  is  well  with  him,  and 
inquires  if  **  the  Oeneral  *'  also  is  well.  His  conversation  is 
guarded,  but  he  makes  up  for  his  reticence  by  his  hospitality :  it 
would  be  derogatory  to  his  dignity  if  the  rite  were  not  duly 
honoured;  and  in  a  few  minutes  trays  bearing  little  cups  of 
sweetened  tea,  sweetmeats,  nuts  and  grapes,  are  being  handed 
round  by  two  or  three  of  the  loungers  we  passed  in  the  courtyard. 
This  tea  is  a  mystery  to  me ;  it  is  always  ready ;  it  is  always  good » 


3i8  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

and  one  can  sip  cap  after  cup  with  an  enjoyment  that  positively 
increases  with  indulgence.  The  Sirdar's  friends  are  mostly 
notable  men :  that  grey-bearded  old  gentleman  on  his  right  is  a 
tribal  chief  of  some  importance,  who  has  come  from  his  distant 
village  to  see  how  things  move  in  Cabul  after  the  late  jeliad;  that 
dark-visaged  man  is  a  Bokhara  trader,  whose  mind  holds  news  of 
the  White  Czar  and  of  the  changing  fates  of  the  Central  Asian 
Khanates  ;  while  his  counterpart  is  another  trader  returned  from 
Hindustan,  where  he  has,  perhaps,  seen  and  learnt  much  that 
may  shape  the  Sirdar's  views  in  future.  Behind  the  Sirdar  is  a 
richly  embroidered  purdah  veiling  the  entrance  to  the  zenana, 
wherein  the  quiet  life  of  the  women  slowly  moves.  Our  conversa- 
tion is  short  and  purely  ornamental,  and  we  take  our  leave,  plea 
santly  impressed  with  the  courtesy  shown,  but  pondering  over  the 
depth  of  Afghan  duplicity  which  is  so  cunningly  hidden.  The 
Sirdar  passes  his  morning  among  his  friends,  and  in  the  afternoon 
he  will  probably  visit  General  Boberts  or  Major  Hastings,  the 
Chief  Political  Officer,  to  learn  much,  but  to  impart  little.  How 
far  he  can  be  trusted  no  one  knows,  not  excepting  even  him- 
self. If  by  serving  us  he  can  make  his  position  secure,  he  will 
**  sell  "  his  nearest  friends ;  if  he  thinks  his  interests  are  safe  with 
men  opposing  us,  he  will  thwart  our  projects  with  all  the  skill  he 
possesses.  His  life  now  is  not  so  restless  as  in  old  days,  as  our 
army  has  broken  up  all  settled  government,  and  the  prospect  is  so 
hazy,  that  to  dabble  too  openly  in  dangerous  schemes  might  land 
him  in  distant  Calcutta,  to  bear  Daoud  Shah  company.  Our 
Sirdar  has  lakhs  of  money  hidden  away  in  his  house  or  buried  in 
some  secret  spot ;  but  he  is  cunning  enough  to  swear  that  he  lost 
greatly  when  Mahomed  Jan  held  Cabul,  and  asks  the  British 
Oovemment  to  recoup  him,  as  he  has  always  been  faithful  to  its 
interests.  The  new  influences  at  work  upon  his  life  are  not  so 
welcome  to  him,  as  they  are  novel  and  not  to  be  easily  understood; 
and  he  would  far  prefer  the  old  order  of  things,  when  he  could 
pit  himself  against  some  rival  and  gain  his  ends  by  crooked  ways 
that  he  knows  we  should  not  countenance.  If  his  chances  just 
now  of  being  shot  or  stabbed  are  not  so  great  as  formerly,  he  does 
not,  with  his  fatalistic  ideas,  appreciate  the  change ;  and  at  times 
he  grows  sullen,  and  is  discontented  with  our  temporary  rule. 


The  Trader.  319 

The  trader  ie  a  very  different  personage :  he  has  seen  men  and 
cities,  and  his  chief  aim  is  to  amass  wealth,  which  he  believes  to 
be  the  keystone  of  happiness.  His  vocation  now  in  Cabal  is  to 
make  fabulous  profits  out  of  the  British  army  of  occupation  which 
has  invaded  the  sanctity  of  the  city,  and  cowed  its  fanatical  popu- 
lace. In  his  heart  of  hearts  the  trader  hates  us  sincerely ;  but 
he  will  endure  curses  from  the  Commissariat,  or  hard  words  from 
under-strappers,  for  the  sake  of  the  few  lakhs  of  rupees  he  hopes 
to  pocket.  He  will  take  contracts  for  anything,  from  sheep  to 
diarpoys,  and  will  fleece  everyone  dealing  with  him  with  such 
calm  self-assurance,  that  one  is  inclined  to  adopt,  once  for  all, 
the  theory  that  the  Afghans  are,  indeed,  the  lost  tribes  of  Israel. 
He  is  a  power  in  the  city,  for  he  has  money  always  at  his  com- 
mand ;  and  though  he  may  have  suffered  grievously  from  extor- 
tion, he  is  shrewd  enough  to  know  that  complaints  are  useless. 
He  will  visit  our  friend  the  Sirdar,  and  will  gain  his  countenance 
and  help  in  some  nefarious  transaction,  perhaps  such  as  '^  bearing" 
the  money  market,  cutting  off  our  sheep  supply,  or  raising  the 
prices  of  articles  suddenly  in  demand.  He  may  play  the  part  of 
political  spy  in  return  for  the  Sirdar's  help,  or  become  a  principal 
in  some  scheme  that  requires  delicate  working.  The  trader  has 
his  house,  which  also  serves  as  a  store-house  for  his  goods,  in 
some  filthy  comer  of  Cabul ;  and  some  near  relative  acts  as  a 
partner^  and  does  the  dirty  work  of  retailing  his  goods  from  a 
narrow  stall  in  the  bazaar.  Should  a  big  transaction  be  coming 
off,  with  some  merchant  from  the  IQianates,  in  silks,  furs,  or 
precious  stones,  the  trader  has  the  universal  tea-drinking,  to 
which  he  invites  the  stranger,  and  he  spends  days  in  ceaseless 
chafering  until  the  prices  are  duly  fixed  and  the  bargain  con- 
cluded. In  the  bazaar  itself  but  little  trade  on  a  large  scale  is 
carried  on,  the  travelling  merchants  storing  their  goods  in  one  or 
other  of  the  large  serais,  while  they  let  it  be  known  from  stall  to 
stall  that  they  have  merchandise  on  sale.  The  trader  is  naturally 
of  a  peaceable  disposition,  and  as  his  house  is  usually  stored  with 
rich  goods,  and  his  hoards  of  money  are  buried  beneath  the 
ground  in  his  courtyard,  he  dreads  an  outbreak  by  the  populace, 
who  may  levy  contributions  upon  his  effects.  But  he  has  within 
him  the  Afghan  instinct  of  sturdy  resistance  to  all  assailants. 


320  The  Afghan  War,   1879—80. 

Willi  his  iron-studded  door  closed  against  intruders,  with  half  a 
dozen  servants  armed  a  la  Cabul  with  gun  pistol,  and  knife,  he  is 
no  mean  antagonist  to  deal  with.  He  would  scarcely  join  in  a 
tumult  except  when  his  fanaticism  overcame  his  better  judgment, 
for  there  are  too  many  risks  to  be  run  wl^en  once  a  populace  like 
that  of  Cabul  has  broken  &ee  from  all  control.  The  trader  in  this 
respect  is  considerably  removed  from  the  mere  stall  keeper,  who  is 
always  ripe  for  riot,  and  is  never  better  pleased  than  when  turning 
out  fully  armed.  We  have  seen  a  great  deal  since  our  occupation 
of  the  trader,  and  he  does  not  improve  upon  acquaintance.  He 
is  cringing  and  subservient  when  a  tight  hand  is  kept  upon  him, 
hut  beneath  his  plausibility  is  a  fund  of  cunning,  which  carries 
him  triumphantly  through  all  his  knavery.  Like  the  Sirdar,  he 
is  an  instrument  we  are  forced  to  use  in  this  unprofitable  country, 
hut  which  is  to  be  thrown  away  without  compunction  when  done 
with. 


CHAPTER  XXm. 


The  A^ban  Army— The  Amir  Shere  Ali*s  Efforts  to  raise  Disciplined  Troops — ^The 
founding  of  Guns — Snrfentz's  Failure — A  Oabnli  Gnnsmith  sent  to  Pedhawnr 
Arsenal — A  Foundry  established  in  Cabul — ^The  Manufacture  of  Rifled  Ghins  and 
Small  Arms — Cabuli  Gunpowder  and  Cartridges — Percussion  Caps—Army  Oloibing 
Department — ^The  Number  of  Guns  and  Small  Arms  in  Afghanistan — Cost  of  Shere 
All's  Army — ^Weakness  of  the  Organization — ^Regulars  versus  Tribesmen — Their 
Behayiour  in  yarious  Actions — ^The  Failure  of  the  Regular  Army — Suggestion  for 
the  Creation  of  a  Militia— The  Ghazi  Element  among  Irregulars — ^How  a  Ghasi  is 
Made— His  Mode  of  Fighting. 

Sherpur,  28th  January,  1880. 

Afghanistan  is  a  nation  of  soldiers,  every  adult  heing  (apart 
from  any  military  training  he  may  receive)  a  ready  swordsman 
and  <a  fair  shot. .  In  our  old  wars  we  found  but  little  organization 
existing,  among  the  followers  of  the  Dost  and  his  son,  Mahomed 
Akhbar,  and  the  discipline  of  our  troops  told  in  the  long  run 
-ttgainst  the  masses  they  had  to  face.  Afghanistan  then  produced, 
as  a  writer  has  said,  nothing  but  stones  and  men :  th^  stones  made 
good  stmgarSy  which  thousands  of  men  were  always  ready  to  de- 
fend.   But  after  Shere  Ali  had  assumed  the  Amirship,  a  change 


Shere  Alts  Army.  321 

came  over  the  '*  war  department "  of  the  country :  that  shrewd 
soyereign  had  his  eyes  opened  to  the  necessity  of  having  some- 
thing more  than  an  unlimited  supply  of  men  to  fight  his  battles, 
andvjEtfter  his  visit  to  India,  in  1869>  he  began  to  cast  about  for 
means  whereby  he  could  arm  and  equip  his  troops  in  civilized 
fashion.  Fortunately  for  his  project,  he  was  on  the  best  of  terms 
at  that  time  with  the  Indian  Government,  and  among  the  valuable 
presents  he  carried  back  with  him  to  Cabul  were  a  siege-train 
(consisting  of  four  18-pounders  and  two  8-uich  howitzers),  a 
mountain  battery  of  six  guns,  5,000  Snider  rifles,  15,000  Enfields, 
and  no  less  than  1,000,000  rounds  of  ball  ammunition.  This  was 
the  groundwork  upon  which  he  hoped  to  build  up  a  well-equipped 
army,  with  artillery  su£Scient  to  make  himself  feared  by  all  his 
neighbours,  and  respected  both  by  the  English  and  Russian 
Governments,  upon  his  relations  with  which  might  ultimately 
depend  the  safety  of  his  kingdom*  ..To  a  man  of  less  energy  than 
Shere  Ali,  the  project  he  took  in  hand  would  have  seemed  so  full 
of  difficulties,  that  it  might  have  been  reasonably  abandoned  after 
a  fair  trial ;  but  the  then  Amir  was  a  man  of  stubborn  self-will ; 
and  his  mind  once  made  up,  nothing  could  turn  him  &om  his 
object.  The  story  of  his  successful  struggle  to  create  an  army  of 
all  arms  on  the  European  pattern  can  be  best  told  by  reference  to 
a  report  drawn  up  on  information  supplied  by  various  sirdars  and 
artisans,  since  our  occupation  of  Cabul.  Lieutenant  Neville 
Chamberlain,  Extra  Assistant  Political  Officer,  is  the  compiler  of 
this  valuable  report,  which  gives  in  detail  an  account  of  Shere 
AJi's  steady  progress  in  the  armament  of  his  kingdom,  until  he 
made  the  fatal  mistake  of  quarrelling  with  the  British.  One 
cannot  fail  to  be  struck  with  astonishment  at  the  rapidity  with 
which  guns  were  made,  rifles  imitated,  and  cartridges  turned  out 
by  the  100,000  in  a  country  which  boasts  of  but  few  resources. 

.  Shere  Ali  could  easily  enough  make  regiments  of  infantry  .and 
cavalry,  dress  them  after  the  fashion  of  the  men  he  had  seen 
paraded  in  India,  and  drill  them  in  a  few  simple  movements.  If 
he  were  guilty  of  the  solecism  of  making  Highlanders  mou^t  oil 
horseback,  there  was  no  great  blunder  committed ;  they  were  ^is 
mounted  rifles,  and  were  not  likely  to  come  to  grief,  as  Vvery 
Afghan  is  more  or  less  a  horseman.     But  in  t^ie  question  of 

Y 


322  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

artillery,  the  Amir  had  to  face  a  problem  which  must  have  cost 
him  much  anxious  thought.  The  old  brass  cannon  which  had 
been  used  for  many  years  as  wall-pieces  in  the  different  fortresses 
of  Afghanistan,  sank  into  insignificance  when  compared  with  the 
guns  Lord  Mayo  had  giyen  him.  The  latter  were  few  in  number, 
and  it  was  all-important  they  should  be  multiplied,  so  that  if 
three  or  four  armies  took  the  field,  each  should  have  its  due  com- 
plement of  guns.  There  were  skilled  artisans  in  Gabul  who  had 
made  brass  guns  \  and  one  of  these,  named  Surferaz,  was  given 
funds  by  Shore  Ali  and  peremptorily  ordered  to  turn  out  guns  on 
the  pattern  of  the  siege-train  and  mountain  battery  which  had 
lately  arrived  from  India.  The  unlucky  man  tried  his  best ;  but, 
at  the  end  of  a  few  months,  his  work  was  pronounced  a  failure ; 
and  as  he  had  spent  Bs.  12,000  in  his  experiments,  he  was  sum- 
marily thrown  into  prison,  and  all  his  property  confiscated.  This 
was  his  reward  for  obeying  the  orders  of  a  tyrant.  But  Shore  Ali 
was  not  to  be  foiled,  and  rightly  attributing  the  failure  to  want  of 
technical  knowledge,  he  sent  the  uncle  of  Surferaz,  Dost  Mahomed, 
a  skilled  gunsmith,  to  Peshawur,  to  be  instructed  in  the  mysteries 
of  rifled  guns.  Dost  Mahomed  may  be  allowed  to  tell  his  own 
story,  as  it  is  full  of  interest.    He  says  : — 

^'  I  am  a  Gabuli  by  birth  and  a  gunsmith.  My  father  was  a 
gunsmith  before  me.  After  Shere  All's  return  from  India,  I  was 
sent  to  Peshawur  with  a  letter  to  Colonel  Pollock,  the  Com- 
missioner there,  in  which  he  was  asked  to  allow  me  to  visit  the 
Arsenal,  and  see  how  the  rifled  guns  were  made.  I  remained  in 
Peshawur  for  three  months,  until  the  permission  of  Gbvemment 
arrived.  I  then  visited  the  Arsenal  daily,  and  saw  exactly  how 
everything  was  done ;  and  on  my  departure  I  was  given  models  of 
guns  in  wood,  vnth  complete  drawings  of  the  details.  I  returned 
to  Cabul,  and  vnth  these  models  and  some  complete  models  of 
rifled  breech-loading  Armstrongs,  which  had  been  given  to  the 
Amir  during  his  visit  to  India,  I  began  work.  I  had  three 
principal  assistants :  my  nephew,  Surferaz  (who  had  then  been 
liberated),  Mahomed  Ali,  and  a  man  named  Bashed.  Any  number 
of  workmen  were  at  my  disposal,  as  I  had  only  to  state  the  number 
I  required,  and  they  were  impressed  from  among  the  city  smiths. 
Before  commencing  a  gun,  a  sum  of  money  was  given  to  me. 


Gun-making  at  CabuL  323 

which  I  was  not  to  exceed.    The  following  were  the  prices  in 
Gabnli  rupees : — 

Bs. 

Field  gun         1,600 

Royal  Horse  Artillery  gun       1,000 

Moontain  gun 800 

„  ,,     (laminated  steel)         600 

'*  I  neyer  either  lost  or  gained  much  by  my  contract.  The 
iron  for  the  guns  came  principally  from  India — some  through 
Shikarpur,  some  from  Peshawur.  A  small  quantity  was  procured 
from  Bajour  and  Zurmut.  The  core  of  the  gun  was  first  welded 
by  hand  on  an  iron  bar,  the  required  length  and  diameter.  Long 
strips  of  iron  having  been  placed  all  round  the  core,  they  were 
well  hammered  together^  and  bands  of  iron  placed  over  all  to 
keep  everything  in  its  place.  The  gun  was  then  bored  out  by  the 
machinery  at  the  water-mills  of  Deh-i-Afghan.  The  machinery 
for  these  mills  was  set  up  by  a  Hindustani^  named  Muah  Elhan. 
He  learned  his  trade  from  a  negro^  named  Belal^  who  was  taught 
by  one  Ibrahim,  a  native  of  Ispalum,  who  came  years  ago  from 
Persia  to  the  service  of  Sultan  Jan,  late  Governor  of  Herat. 
The  gun  was  then  rifled  by  hand,  the  breech-block  and  details 
completed,  polished  by  machinery,  and  handed  over  to  the  Arsenal. 
The  strength  of  the  guns  was  never  proved  by  heavy  charges  being 
fired  out  of  them,  and  they  were  at  once  taken  into  use.  Out  of 
all  the  guns  I  have  made  only  one  has  burst.  I  could  turn  out 
four  or  five  guns  a  month  if  necessary.  My  pay  was  Bs.  70  a 
month,  and  I  occasionally  received  presents." 

This  was  not  a  bad  example  of  what  perseverance  can  accom- 
plish, for  the  guns  manufactured  are  said  by  our  gunners  to  be 
very  well  made,  lacking  only  finish.  The  Armstrong  breech- 
loaders would  be  creditable  to  an  English  founder,  and  we  are 
now  testing  many  of  them  to  see  if  they  cannot  be  used  for  the 
defences  of  Sherpur.  A  great  number  of  small  brass  guns  for 
mountain  batteries  were  also  made.  The  old  ordnance  was 
broken  up,  and  new  guns  were  cast  in  the  Bala  Hissar  Arsenal, 
the  boring  and  polishing  being  done  at  the  Deh-i-Afghan  water- 
mills.  The  alloy  in  these  brass  guns  contains  a  larger  per- 
centage of  copper   than  we  generally  use.     The  water-mills  to 

Y  2 


324  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

which  reference  has  been  made  can  still  be  seen — a  hage  wheel 
with  a  long  wooden  shaft  in  which  the  boring-tool  was  fixed. 
With  such  simple  means  it  seems  almost  impossible  that  heavy 
gans  conld  be  bored,  but  still  the  work  was  done,  slowly  it  is  tme, 
but  eflfectually. 

The  manufacture  of  small-arms  was  not  such  a  success. 
Eootub-ud-din,  a  Gabul  gunsmith,  was  placed  in  charge  of  the 
Bala  Hissar  Arsenal,  and  workmen  under  his  direction  made 
2,000  Sniders  and  8,000  Enfields.  The  Afghans  placed  but  little 
faith  in  their  imitation  of  our  rifles  ;  they  found  that  the  breech- 
action  of  the  Snider  would  not  act,  the  extractor  often  failing  to 
throw  out  the  cartridge-case  after  firing,  while  the  grooving  of 
the  Enfields  was  so  imperfect,  that  the  barrel  quickly  got  '^  leaded," 
i.e.,  the  groves  were  filled  with  lead  stripped  from  the  bullet 
as  it  was  driven  out  by  the  charge.  It  is  worth  remarking 
that  in  the  Amir's  palace  were  found  several  rifles  of  diflierent 
patterns  (the  French  Ghassepot  among  them),  and  each  had  its 
Gabuli  imitation.  No  doubt  various  experiments  were  made 
before  the  Snider  was  finally  adopted. 

There  was  never  any  lack  of  gunpowder  in  Gabul,  as  the  Amir 
employed  six  contractors  to  turn  out  the  quantities  he  needed. 
Each  mill  could  make  two  maunds  a  day,  and  the  total  daily  out-turn 
on  an  emergency  would  be  nearly  l,0001bs.  These  contractors  were 
also  ready  to  start  other  smaller  mills  during  war-time,  so  that 
doubtless  a  ton  of  powder  could  have  been  supplied  every  day  as  long 
as  funds  were  forthcoming.  The  composition  of  the  powder  was 
seventy-five  parts  of  saltpetre,  ten  of  sulphur,  and  fifteen  of  charcoal. 
Bamian  supplied  the  sulphur,  with  occasional  small  quantities  from 
Hazara  and  the  Derajat.  Saltpetre  abounds  near  Gabul,  and 
excellent  charcoal  is  made  firom  the  thousands  of  small  willow-trees 
which  line  every  watercourse  in  Ghardeh  and  the  near  valleys. 
The  coarse-grain  powder  for  muzzle-loading  guns  was  paid  for  at 
the  rate  of  Rs.  2  per  lb.,  while  that  used  for  breech-loading  field- 
guns  and  for  rifles  was  Es.  8  per  lb.  The  powder,  as  a  rule,  is  far 
inferior  to  that  of  European  make,  as  the  Afghans  do  not  understand 
the  final  process  of  glazing,  which  adds  so  much  to  the  strength  of  the 
composition.  Shot  and  shell  were  strictly  copied  from  the  patterns 
brought  from  India,  but  time-fuses  were  not  understood.    A  burst- 


The  Army  Clothing  Department.  325 

ing  charge — ^the  secret  of  which  was  held  by  a  Herat! — was  used, 
and  not  until  just  before  the  war  of  1879  were  fuses  made  in  the 
Bala  Hissar.  They  are  not  a  success,  the  delicate  nature  of  the 
fuse  not  being  properly  appreciated.  In  the  matter  of  small-arm 
cartridges,  the  Afghan  smiths  deserve  much  credit.  Sixty  of  them 
were  constantly  engaged  in  the  Bala  Hissar  Arsenal  making  up 
cartridges,  and  their  Snider  ammunition  is  excellent.  The  cases 
are  made  by  hand,  and  are  technically  known  as  ''  solid  cold-drawn 
brass."  The  bases  are  very  strong,  and  the  cases  can  be  refilled 
many  times.  In  a  country  where  there  is  no  machinery  for 
turning  out  millions  of  cartridges  in  a  few  days  this  is  a  great 
advantage.  Two  clever  Gabulis,  Safi  Abdul  Latif  and  Safi  Abdul 
Hak,  invented  a  machine  for  making  percussion  caps,  equal  to 
turning  out  5,000  a  day.  The  detonating  composition  is  fairly 
good,  but  spoils  if  the  caps  are  kept  for  two  or  three  years.  Con^ 
sidering  there  were  millions  of  caps  still  in  the  unopened  boxes 
sent  from  Dum-Dum  Arsenal  to  Shore  Ali,  native-made  caps  were 
not  much  needed.  Gun  carriages  and  limbers  were  made  on  the 
English  pattern,  the  guns  captured  in  the  disastrous  business  of 
1841-42  serving  as  models  in  addition  to  the  siege-train  given  by 
Lord  Mayo. 

Among  Shore  All's  other  improvements  in  his  **  War  Depart- 
ment "  was  the  establishment  of  a  Clothing  Department,  which 
had  for  its  object  the  equipment  of  his  soldiers  in  proper  uniforms. 
The  tunics,  trousers,  kilts,  gaiters,  helmets,  &c.,  are  all  neatly 
made ;  and  as  each  soldier  received  a  new  uniform  every  two  years, 
the  regular  regiments  ought  to  have  been  smart  and  well  set-up. 
That  they  were  not  so  was  chiefly  due  to  the  laxity  of  discipline 
and  the  incompetence  of  their  officers.  Pouch-belts  and  bayonet 
frogs  on  the  English  pattern  were  served  out,  and  the  cavalry 
were  all  furnished  with  new  swords,  slightly  curved  like  those  used 
by  our  own  sowars.  The  steel  is  generally  very  soft,  but  the  blade 
is  well-tempered,  and  takes  an  edge  so  keen,  that  even  a  slight 
blow  leaves  a  deep  gash.  Shore  All's  ambition,  while  thus  per- 
fecting his  armament,  was  to  build  a  fortress  of  huge  dimensions, 
and  Sherpur  was  accordingly  begun.  The  subsidy  paid  yearly  by 
the  Indian  Government  gave  him  money  to  lavish  in  this  direc- 
tion,  and  the  cantonments  our  troops  are  now  occupying  were  laid 


326 


The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 


out  on  a  scale  that  eyen  to  European  ideas  ^eems  enormous.  The 
fortress  was  to  have  been  in  the  shape  of  a  huge  square  with 
walls  8,000  yards  long;  and  on  the  Bemaru  Heights,  in  the 
middle,  a  strong  citadel  was  to  have  risen — "  the  New  Bala  Hissar." 
At  the  foot  of  the  southern  slope,  below  the  citadel,  a  splendid 
palace  was  mapped  out,  the  strong  foundations  of  which  eyen 
now  show  how  imposing  the  building  would  haye  been.  Shere 
All's  quarrel  with  the  British  put  an  end  to  his  ambitious  schemes, 
and  Sherpur  remains  to  this  day  incomplete ;  while  away  in  the 
Hazara  Darukht  defile,  thousands  of  logs  are  lying,  ready  squared, 
which  the  Gajis  had  got  ready  for  the  barracks  which  will  now 
neyer  be  built. 

Lieutenant  Chamberlain,  in  summarizing  the  result  of  his  in- 
teresting inquiries  into  Afghan  armaments,  makes  out  the  follow- 
ing tabular  statement : — 


NuMBEB  OF  Guns  previous  to  War  op  1878-79. 

English  Siege  Train  (Elephant)         6 

Calloli     „        „  „  10 

„  „        „      (Bullock)  18 


Horeed  Guns  ^Breech-loaders,  89  ) 
^  Brass  Guns,  56) 
i  Breech-loaders,    6 

Mountain  Guns  <  Muzzle-loaders,  48 
(Brass,  96 

yarioQS  small  guns  of  Position 


} 


145 

150 
50 


Total 


Deduct  Guns  captured,  1 879-80      . . . 
Guns  remaining  in  Country 


379 
256 

128 


These  are  belieyed  to  be  chiefly  in  Herat  and  Turkistan. 

The  number  of  rifles  entered  in  the  Goyemment  books  as  haying 
been  issued  to  the  troops  are — 


English  Sniders        

5.000 

„       Enfields       

15,000 

„       Rifled  Carbines       

1.200 

,,      Brunswick  Rifles 

1,400 

„      Tower  muskets       

1,000 

„      Caraliy  Pistols       \ 

1,045 

Army  Expenditure,  327 


Gabuli  Sniders         

„      Enfields 

„      Rifled  Carbines         

Eandahari  Enfields  ... 

Herati  Enfields         

Various  kinds  for  Cavalry  (doable-barrelled,  &c).., 
Smooth-bores  (probably  many  Tower  Muskets) 
Flint  Muskets  


2,189 

8,212 

589 

453 

516 

1,553 

1,418 

1,800 


Total        49,875 


Of  these  742  English  Enfields,  660  English  Sniders,  and  5,427 
muskets,  Gabuli  Sniders  and  Enfields,  flint  muskets,  &c.,  have 
been  given  up,  leaving  48,146  small-arms  in  the  country. 

It  is  worth  noticing  that  no  information  could  be  got  as  to 
whence  the  English  rifled  carbines,  Brunswick  rifles.  Tower 
muskets,  and  cavalry  pistols  were  obtained.  The  ''  Brown  Besses  " 
were,  perhaps,  part  of  those  taken  in  1841-42.  This  estimate  of 
arms,  it  should  be  remembered,  takes  no  account  of  the  many 
thousands  of  jhezailSf  native  pistols,  &c.,  in  the  hands  of  the 
tribesmen.  The  totals  are  sufficiently  great  to  prove  that  the  late 
Shere  Ali  had  placed  Afghanistan  on  such  a  military  footing,  that 
he  may  well  have  believed  he  could,  with  the  mountain  barriers 
between  Cabul  and  India,  defy  any  force  the  British  could  spare 
to  send  against  him.  He  was  grievously  mistaken ;  his  weakness 
lying  in  the  want  of  discipline  among  his  troops,  and  the  inca- 
pacity of  their  leaders. 

The  cost  of  the  army  which  he  had  raised  and  equipped  was  a 
serious  item  in  his  exchequer  accounts,  if  he  ever  kept  any. 
Lieutenant  Chamberlain  computes  it  at  19,21,195  Gabuli 
rupees,  of  which  Bs.  17,81,288  went  for  pay  to  the  army, 
Bs.  1,20,285  for  Arsenal  expenses  (not  including  Herat  and 
Turkistan),  and  Bs.  19,727  for  uniform.  Gonsidering  that 
Major  Hastings,  Ghief  Political  Officer  here,  has  calculated  the 
whole  revenue  of  Afghanistan  at  only  Bs.  79,82,890,  it  will  thus 
appear  that  nearly  one-fourth  of  the  revenue  was  lavished  in 
militaiy  expenditure.  The  Amir  ought  reasonably  to  have  expected 
his  army  to  have  made  a  better  defence  of  his  kingdom  against 
invasion  than  the  weak  struggle  at  Ali  Musjid  and  the  Peiwar 
EotaL    After  the  present  campaign,  Afghanistan  can  never  hope 


328  The  Afghan  War,   1879—80. 

to  rise  to  the  position  it  occupied  under  Shore  Ali.  The  easy 
capture  of  Gabul  and  214  guns  is  a  blow  that  eyen  a  Dost  Mahomed 
would  find  it  hard  to  recover  from.  Having  dealt  with  the  armaments 
of  Afghanistan,  there  remains  the  regular  army  to  be  considered. 
We  used  to  hear  a  good  deal,  at  first,  of  the  regular  army  of 
Afghanistan,  which  Shore  Ali  had  called  into  being  and  drilled 
according  to  his  idea  of  European  tactics.  So  many  **  regiments  *' 
with  a  proportionate  number  of  guns  were  said  to  be  encamped 
about  Cabul,  while  others  were  hurrying  in  from  outlying  pro- 
vinces to  swell  the  assembly.  Now  there  had  undoubtedly  been  a 
determined  effort  on  Shore  Ali's  part  to  make  every  male  in  the 
population  subject  to  the  conscription,  and  the  carefully  prepared 
lists  we  afterwards  found  proved  that  the  enrolments  had  been  on 
a  large  scale.  But  there  was  one  fault  in  the  organization  which 
told  against  all  the  Amir's  efforts, — and  that  was  the  want  of  com- 
petent officers  to  train  the  thousands  of  men  who  were  available 
for  the  army.  Such  officers  as  were  equal  to  their  work  were 
chiefly  pensioners  of  the  Indian  native  army,  but  these  could 
only  teach  the  sowars  and  infantry  their  drill,  and  could  scarcely 
be  expected  to  manoeuvre  even  a  brigade  in  the  field.  An  intelli- 
gent malik  once  said  to  a  British  officer : — "  We  can  never  hope 
to  fight  you  with  success  until  we  are  educated.**  "  Well,  why  not 
have  schools  and  colleges,  such  as  the  Sircar  builds  in  India  for 
the  people?'*  The  answer  was  one  given  with  a  half-contemp- 
tuous indignation  : — '^  Not  that  kind  of  education ;  I  mean  until 
our  army  is  educated,  and  our  officers  can  do  their  work  as  well  as 
yours."  It  was  military  education  the  petty  chief  was  craving  for, 
and  he  was  unquestionably  right  in  his  aspirations.  Shore  AU 
might  be  able  to  distribute  Enfield  and  Snider  rifles  among  his 
sepoys,  fit  out  batteries  with  every  kind  of  shot  and  shell,  and 
teach  his  men  such  rudimentary  discipline  as  would  enable  them 
to  march  in  fairly  good  order ;  but  he  could  never  get  beyond  this. 
Instead  of  sending  his  young  nobles  to  Europe  to  learn  the 
mysteries  of  military  science,  he  distributed  commands  among 
such  favourites  as  were  ready  to  take  them  with  their  emoluments ; 
and  occasionally  he  made  a  good  selection  from  among  men  of  the 
stamp  of  Daoud  Shah,  soldiers  of  fortune,  whose  courage  was 
above  suspicioui  and  who  could  generally  keep  an  army  in  order. 


Defects  in  Organization.  329 

Then  there  was  the  childish  desire  ever  uppermost  in  the  Amir's 
mind,  of  clothing  his  troops  in  English  uniforms,  and  his  ''  Army 
Clothing  Department "  tamed  ont  imitation  Highland  and  Rifle 
costumes,  or  old  Pandy  uniforms  by  the  hundred.  The  plan  might 
haye  succeeded  if  less  attention  had  been  paid  to  dress  and  more 
to  discipline  and  musketry.  The  Afghan  does  not  lack  native 
courage,  and  in  hill  warfare  he  is  unrivalled  so  long  as  it  takes  the 
shape  of  guerilla  fighting ;  but  once  he  is  asked  to  sink  his  identity 
and  to  become  merely  a  unit  in  a  battalion  he  loses  all  self-confi- 
dence, and  is  apt  to  think  more  of  getting  away  than  of  stubbornly 
holding  his  ground  as  he  would  have  done  with  his  own  friends, 
led  by  his  own  malxk  or  chief.  In  fact,  the  late  Afghan  campaign 
proved  beyond  doubt  that  the  Afghan  ^'  regulars  "  had  reached  that 
most  precarious  stage  where  the  men  are  in  a  transition  state  :  not 
yet  trained  soldiers,  but  a  mob  led  by  strange  ofiBcers  whom  they 
scarcely  know,  and  whom  they  generally  dislike  because  they  are 
the  direct  means  of  imposing  the  irksomeness  of  discipline  upon 
them.  A  tribesman  who  has  never  been  enrolled  is  always  com- 
forted in  action  by  the  thought  that  if  the  battle  ends  disastrously 
he  can  make  good  his  escape  and  probably  reach  his  village  in 
safety,  there  to  play  the  part  of  a  peaceful  peasant  proprietor  if 
his  civilized  enemy  visits  him  afterwards.  But  the  Afghan  sepoy 
is  in  a  very  difierent  position  :  if  he  is  true  to  his  salt  he  must 
remain  with  his  regiment  and  retire  in  some  kind  of  order,  which 
means  to  his  mind  that  the  pursuing  cavalry  will  have  a  much 
better  chance  of  overtaking  him.  The  result  of  this  has  been  that 
on  nearly  every  occasion  the  most  obstiuate  resistance  has  been 
offered  by  tribesmen  acting  as  independent  bodies,  with  no 
organization,  but  with  a  cool  courage  which  made  them  at  times 
foemen  worthy  of  our  steel.  To  deal  more  particularly  with  the 
merits  and  weaknesses  of  the  regular  troops,  and  to  contrast 
their  work  with  that  of  ghazi-led  tribesmen,  may  be  of  some 
interest. 

Upon  Sir  Frederick  Boberts's  arrival  at  Gharasia,  the  Herat  and 
other  regiments  which  had  been  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Cabul  at 
the  time  of  the  Massacre  were  induced  by  Nek  Mahomed  and 
other  sirdars  to  oppose  the  advance  of  the  British  force,  and  a 
strong  position  was  taken  up  to  prevent  the  Sang-i-Nawishta  defile 


330  TJte  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

being  forced.  Guns  were  placed  in  position,  commands  distri- 
buted, and  an  effort. made  to  fight  a  battle  with  some  approadi  to 
Eoropean  methods.  At  the  same  time  regiments  were  strengthened 
by  a  number  of  the  city  people  and  by  tribesmen  from  the 
Ghardeh  Valley  and  Eoh-Daman.  For  all  practical  purposes, 
howeyer,  the  action  was  fought  on  the  Afghan  side  by  regular 
troops,  and  the  poor  show  they  made  against  General  Baker's 
2,000  men,  gaye  eyidence  of  the  weakness  before  suspected.  Our 
enemy  was  well  armed  with  Enfield  and  Snider  rifles,  had  plenty 
of  ammunition,  and  was  in  a  position  which  well- trained  troops 
could  haye  held  against  great  odds ;  and  yet  on  their  left  Major 
White,  with  100  Highlanders,  droye  them  from  their  most  adyanced 
position,  while  on  their  right  the  72nd  and  6th  Ghoorkas,  with  a 
few  companies  of  the  5th  P.I.  and  the  28rd  Pioneers  (supported 
only  by  four  mountain  guns),  turned  their  flank  and  droye  them 
in  confusion  back  upon  Indikee.  Their  rifle-fire  was  well  sustained 
and  yeiy  rapid,  but  badly  directed  and  not  under  control,  and  our 
men  passed  safely  upwards  with  the  storm  of  bullets  rushing  far 
aboye  their  heads.  There  was  no  counter-attack  made,  although 
we  had  practically  no  supports  to  fall  back  upon,  and  any  rush 
would  haye  inyolyed  the  brigade  in  a  yery  awkward  position.  On 
the  road  leading  to  the  Sang-i-Nawishta  tangi  the  enemy  had 
twenty-six  or  thirty  guns  opposed  to  our  single  battery  (G-8),  and 
yet  our  artillery  held  its  own  with  ease,  and  succeeded  in  dis- 
mounting some  of  their  Armstrong  breech-loaders.  Their  leaders 
had  shown  great  patience  and  skill  in  placing  their  guns  on  com- 
manding points,  but  the  gunners  were  firing  almost  at  random,  as 
their  training  was  of  a  superficial  kind.  Had  the  ranges  been 
marked  out,  as  at  Ali  Musjid,  they  would  haye  done  better ;  but 
our  rapid  adyance  destroyed  what  little  confidence  they  might  haye 
felt  in  their  own  weapons. 

Again,  on  October  8th,  they  were  bold  enough  to  engage  in  an 
artillery  duel,  and  from  Asmai  answered  our  guns  on  the  Sherder- 
waza,  shot  for  shot.  But  not  a  man  was  wounded  by  their  fire, 
although  round-shot,  shrapnel  and  common  shell  were  all  tried 
by  their  leaders.  From  this  moment  the  A%han  army  ceased  to 
exist  as  a  real  body,  yet  in  the  actions  which  afterwards  took 
place  we  had  always  fiercer  fighting  and  much  greater  determina- 


Failure  of  S here  Ali's  System.  331 

tion  shown  on  the  part  of  the  adversary.  The  sepoys  and  sowars 
dispersed  to  their  homes,  carrying  their  arms  and  ammunition 
with  them,  but  sinking  their  drill  and  discipline  and  looking  upon 
themselves  as  once  more  tribesmen,  but  better  armed  than  in  the 
days  when  they  had  only  matchlocks  and  jhezails  as  firearms. 
The  rising  in  December  was  not  a  reorganization  of  the  army, 
but  a  gathering  of  all  the  fighting-men  from  Ghazni  to  Charikar 
in  answer  to  the  appeal  of  the  viooUahs  to  their  fanaticism.  The 
short-liyed  success  which  followed  was  due  chiefly  to  the  leading 
of  the  ghazis,  who  knew  no  more  of  generalship  or  discipline 
than  our  own  dhoolie-bearers.  Occasionally  we  saw  some  sort  of 
marshalling  going  on  in  the  leading  lines,  in  which  the  best-armed 
men  were  placed,  but  this  was  due  more  to  the  desire  on  the  part 
of  the  leaders  to  make  the  most  of  their  strength  than  to  any 
idea  of  forming  the  mob  into  battalions.  Mahomed  Jan  and 
Mushk-i-Alam  trusted  to  numbers  and  to  fanaticism,  not  to 
discipline,  to  win  their  battles,  and  their  trust  was  fully  justified. 
The  losses  they  suffered  were  proportionately  small.  Our  artil- 
leiy  could  never  be  concentrated  on  a  particular  regiment  or  squad- 
ron, but  had  to  be  directed  upon  n^en  in  small  scattered  groups, 
or  on  a  line  extending  for  many  miles  across  the  country.  Agsdn, 
when  the  unsuccessful  attack  upon  Sherpur  was  made,  the  retreat 
or  rather  dispersion  of  the  60,000  men  was  so  rapid,  owing  to  no 
regular  army  being  with  them,  that  we  were  powerless  to  overtake 
the  fugitives;  they  had  spread  themselves  broadcast  over  the 
country,  hidden  their  arms,  and  had  once  more  begun  to  play 
the  part  of  an  innocent  peasantry. 

The  reason  for  the  signal  failure  of  Shere  Ali's  system  is  to  be 
found,  as  I  have  said,  chiefly  in  the  want  of  skilled  leaders,  more 
particularly  of  regiments ;  but  there  is  a  further  explanation,  and 
one  which  makes  intelligible  tiie  comparatively  shght  losses  we 
suffered  when  our  troops  were  greatly  outnumbered.  In  our  own 
army,  even  with  all  the  trouble  and  care  devoted  to  instructing  the 
men  in  the  principles  of  musketry,  the  rifle-fire  is  deplorably 
bad ;  thousands  of  rounds  are  expended  with  very  poor  results, 
and  company  oflScers  grow  despondent  when  volley  after  volley  is 
fired  and  no  impression  is  made  upon  the  enemy.  If  this  be  the 
case  with  our  well-disciplined  troops,  it  may  be  readily  believed 


332  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

that  Afghan  sepoys  are  far  worse.  I  learned  from  one  ot 
them  in  Cabal  that  although  Enfields  and  Sniders  were  served 
ont,  each  man  only  received  three  rounds  of  ammunition  per  year 
with  which  to  gain  a  knowledge  of  his  weapon,  and  that  conse- 
quently they  knew  practically  nothing  of  the  capabilities  of  their 
rifles.  They  felt  that  at  close  quarters  they  might  possibly  hit 
their  man,  but  at  longer  ranges  they  could  not  hope  to  shoot 
well.  Their  natural  steadiness  of  hand  and  perfect  eyesight,  of 
course,  served  them  in  good  stead ;  but  position  driU,  the  manipu- 
lation and  sighting  of  the  rifle,  were  generally  a  mystery  to  them. 
This  was  the  cause  of  defeat  when  opposed  to  our  regiments, 
though  holding  positions,  such  as  the  Peiwar  and  Charasia  hills, 
which  were  capable  of  grand  defence.  For  a  time  they  fired  rapidly 
and  resolutely,  but  seeing  no  efifect  produced,  and  our  skirmishing 
line  always  moving  forward,  they  lost  heart  and  abandoned  position 
after  position,  until  they  had  at  last  to  make  a  hasty  retreat. 
Again,  with  the  artillery :  to  each  gun  issued  from  the  Bala  Hissar 
Arsenal  one  cartridge  was  served  out,  and  when  this  had  been 
fired  and  the  gun  had  stood  the  test,  no  further  practice  was 
allowed.  Gould  the  gunners  hope  to  attain  proficiency  under  such 
conditions  ?  This  economy  of  ammunition  was  doubtless  due  to 
the  difficulties  of  manufacture  and  the  necessity  of  husbanding 
cartridges ;  but  it  was  a  short-sighted  policy,  and  one  which  an 
Amir  at  all  versed  in  the  art  of  warfare  would  never  have 
adopted. 

If  the  time  should  ever  arrive  when  Afghanistan  becomes  a  pro- 
tected State  under  the  guidance  of  the  Indian  Government,  and 
the  people  should  recognize  the  advantages  to  be  gained  by  an 
alliance  with  the  British,  the  best  plan  would  be,  not  to  create  a 
regular  army,  but  to  turn  the  population  into  a  huge  militia.  The 
peasantry  would  not  object  to  annual  trainings,  and  if  the  princi- 
ple were  adopted  of  issuing  breech-loaders  only,  instructing  the 
men  in  their  use  and  allowing  them  a  fairly  large  number  of  rounds 
to  be  fired  under  the  eye  of  their  officers,  and  not  to  be  retained  under 
any  circumstances,  a  splendid  contingent  could  be  formed.  The 
men  might  retain  their  rifles,  but  the  reserve  ammunition  should 
be  stored  in  such  a  way  that  they  could  not  gain  access  to  it.  In 
time  of  war  tliey  would  assemble  with  rifles  in  their  hands. 


An  Afghan  Militia  Possible.  333 

bat  with  empty  ammunition  pouches ;  and  upon  the  discretion  of 
our  officers  would  depend  the  number  of  rounds  to  be  served  out 
to  them.  The  mercenary  army  we  have  raised  in  India  owes 
its  strength  to  the  system  of  class  regiments,  and  A^hanistan 
could  be  similarly  dealt  with.  No  combination  between  Pathans 
and  Hazaras  would  ever  take  place,  and  with  the  latter  kept  fully 
armed  and  equipped  doing  garrison  duty,  the  militia  could  be 
called  out  as  a  Landwehr  when  occasion  arose.  These  ideas  may 
of  course  seem  to  some  Quixotic,  but  perhaps  before  another 
generation  has  passed  away  they  may  be  realized.  If  the  French 
can  reconcile  Arabs  to  serve  in  the  Algerian  army,  there  should  be 
but  little  difficulty  in  creating,  hereafter,  an  Afghan  militia — 
always  provided  that  our  influence  is  supreme  in  the  country, 
and  the  kingdom  enjoying  the  benefits  of  our  administra- 
tion. 

When  the  irregular  levies  come  to  be  considered,  we  are  bound 
to  admit  at  once  that  the  fanaticism  which  animates  many  of  their 
number  often  makes  them  formidable  enemies.  Their  ghazis 
make  splendid  leaders  in  an  attack.  The  word  '^  ghazi "  has 
come  to  mean  in  Western  eyes  something  very  di£ferent  from  its 
legitimate  signification.  It  originally  meant  a  conqueror,  or  great 
hero,  and  in  this  sense  it  is  used  in  modem  Turkey.  Osman 
Pasha  was  dubbed  *^  Ghazi "  when  his  splendid  resistance  to  the 
Russians  saved  for  a  time  the  fate  of  his  country ;  and  the  title  is 
one  held  in  the  highest  respect  by  Mahomedans.  From  *'  con- 
queror "  the  meaning  has  passed  into  lower  grades,  one  of  the 
commonest  being  ''a  gallant  soldier"  (especially  combating 
infidels) ;  and  at  last,  in  the  common  course  of  events,  it  has  been 
appropriated  in  the  all-comprehensive  vocabulary  of  the  English 
language  with  a  distinct  and  localized  meaning.  To  us,  now,  a 
ghazi  is  simply  a  man  upon  whom  fanaticism  has  had  so  powerful 
an  effect  that  all  physical  fear  of  death  is  swamped  in  his  desire  to 
take  the  life  of  a  Elafir,  and,  with  his  soul  purified  by  the  blood  of 
the  unbeliever,  to  be  translated  at  once  to  Paradise.  A  true  ghazi 
counts  no  odds  too  great  to  face,  no  danger  too  menacing  to  be 
braved  :  the  certainty  of  death  only  adds  to  his  exaltation ;  and, 
as  in  the  case  of  other  madmen,  desperation  and  insensibility  to 
consequences  add  enormously  to  his  muscular   powers  and  en- 


334  'The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

durance.  To  kill  such  a  man  is  sometimes  so  difficult  a  task  at 
close  quarters,  that  our  men  have  learned  to  respect  their  peculiar 
mode  of  fighting,  and  a  rifle-bullet  at  a  fair  distance  checks  the 
ghazi's  course  before  he  can  close  upon  his  assailants  with  the 
terribly  sharp  knife  he  knows  so  well  how  to  use.  If  every  Afghan 
were  a  ghazi,  as  I  once  said  during  the  siege  of  Sherpur,  our 
defences  would  have  been  carried,  and  enormous  slaughter  would 
have  followed  on  both  sides ;  but  ghazis  are  few  and  &r  between, 
though  a  spurious  imitation  is  not  uncommon.  This  imitation  is 
often  taken  for  the  real  article,  whereas  hhang  or  some  other 
stimulant  is  the  motive  power,  and  not  desperate  fanaticism.  The 
misuse  of  the  word  **  ghazi "  is  strikingly  seen  in  the  accounts  of 
the  last  war  forty  years  ago.  We  are  told  of  bands  of  ghazis, 
many  thousands  strong,  harassing  the  retreating  army  and  cutting 
off  stragglers ;  and  these  ghazis  are  always  spoken  of  as  being 
quite  out  of  the  control  of  Akhbar  Elian.  If  they  had  been  true 
ghazis  they  would  have  made  short  work  of  our  little  army  long 
before  it  reached  the  Ehurd  Cabul.  Their  fanaticism  would  have 
carried  them  into  the  midst  of  the  soldiers;  for  what  resistance 
can  be  made  to  madmen  who  desire  death,  and  have  thrown  all 
thoughts  of  retreat  to  the  winds  ?  Only  a  few  weeks  after  the 
dispersion  of  Mahomed  Jan's  army  from  before  Sherpur,  absurd 
alarmist  telegrams  were  circulated  in  India  and  England  of  a 
gathering  of  20,000  ghazis  on  the  Ghazni  Boad,  only  fifty  miles 
from  Cabul,  and  another  disaster  was  foretold  by  every  croaker, 
who  found  as  much  comfort  in  the  awful  word  '^  ghazi  "  as  did 
the  old  woman  in  many-syllabled  Mesopotamia.  If  that  number 
of  ghazis  had  been  within  fifty  miles  of  us,  we  might,  indeed, 
have  had  our  work  cut  out  for  us;  but  not  in  the  whole  of 
Afghanistan  could  so  many  be  found.  It  is  not  given  to  every 
man  to  rise  to  such  a  pitch  of  religious  exaltation,  and  fortunate 
for  an  ''  infidel "  army  it  is  not.  To  see  how  thousands  of  ghazis 
are  always  being  spoken  of,  one  would  imagine  they  were  a  powerful 
clan,  similar  to  the  Ghilzais,  Eohistanis,  or  Afridis.  Just  as  the 
shining  light  of  a  missionary  meeting  at  home  described  ^*  zenana 
missions"  as  being  missions  sent  to  *^ Zenana,  a  district  of 
Northern  India,  fruitful  and  densely-populated,  but  with  its 
wretched  inhabitants  steeped  in  heathen  ignorance,"  so  do  sen- 


How  a  Ghazi  is  Made.  335 

sation-mongers  dress  out  these  ghazis  as  a  distinct  section  of 
PaUians,  who  gather  together  in  their  thousands  whenever  there  is 
an  appeal  to  arms.  To  them  it  would  seem  as  easy  to  collect 
ghazis  as  to  gather  grapes — and  certainly  the  two  products  are 
noteworthy  enough  in  this  sterile  country — ^but  practical  acquaint- 
ance with  the  form  fanaticism  assumes  about  Gabul  shows  only 
too  clearly  that  out  of  a  crowd  of  60,000  armed  fanatics,  such  as 
lately  held  Gabul,  not  one  in  a  hundred  rises  to  the  supreme  rank 
of  a  ghazi.  *  They  are  not  bom  and  bred  to  the  vocation  :  chance 
makes  them  what  they  are,  and  our  men  know  that  a  stray  spark 
of  enthusiasm  may  kindle  their  fanaticism  and  send  them  into  our 
midst.  The  ghazi  in  Afghanistan,  his  true  abode,  answers  to  the 
assassin  in  Western  countries,  where  enthusiasm  in  religious  or 
political  matters  arouses  him  to  shoot  a  priest  at  the  altar,  or  stab 
a  king  in  his  palace.  How  the  ghazi,  the  '^  conqueror  of  death," 
as  he  deserves  to  be  called,  rises  into  being  may  be  told  with 
sufficient  local  colouring  to  make  the  story  more  than  common- 
place. 

An  infidel  army  is  in  occupation  of  the  country,  and  under  the 
outward  doak  of  sudden  submission  is  hidden  deep  hatred  of  the 
intruders  on  account  of  race  and  religion.  In  every  village  and 
hamlet  the  men  listen  eagerly  to  the  preaching  of  the  viooUahs, 
who  stir  up  their  passions  by  lying  stories  of  the  coming  time 
when  their  religion  will  be  insulted  and  their  zenanas  violated  by 
the  Kafirs.  The  appeal  is  made  first  to  the  two  objects  most 
precious  in  the  eyes  of  an  Afghan  or  of  any  other  Mahomedan — 
his  faith  and  his  women.  When  passions  have  been  deeply  enough 
stirred,  the  mooUah  warms  to  his  work.  A  Koran,  wrapped  and 
rewrapped  in  silks,  and  carefully  protected  from  defiling  influences, 
is  drawn  from  the  priest's  breast,  and  every  passage  imposing  upon 
true  Mahomedans  the  duty  of  destroying  all  unbelievers  is  quoted 
with  vehement  eloquence.  The  mooUah  is  to  these  ignorant 
peasants  the  link  between  this  world  and  the  next ;  in  him  they 
place  all  trust ;  and  as  they  listen  to  his  fierce  harangues,  they 
are  ready  to  do  all  that  he  requires  of  them.  He  is  vested  with 
mysterious  attributes,  rising  occasionally  to  miracle-working ;  and 
with  quiet  assurance  he  promises  that,  if  they  attack  the  infidels 
''  in  the  proper  spirit  and  in  full  faith,"  bullets  shall  turn  harm- 


336  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

lessly  aside,  bayonets  shall  not  pierce  them,  and  their  poshteens 
thrown  over  the  cannon's  mouth  shall  check  shot  and  shell.  The 
priesthood  in  all  ages  have  traded  upon  the  credulity  of  the  people, 
and  have  abused  their  power  without  qualms  of  conscience  to 
obtain  their  ends.  Is  it  any  more  wonderful  that  an  Afghan 
tribesman,  shut  out  from  the  wonders  of  the  outer  world,  should 
believe  the  clap-trap  of  his  priest,  than  that  highly-cultured 
scholars  in  the  full  glare  of  civilization  should  accept  the  dogmas 
of  Papal  Infallibility,  or  a  crowd  of  devotees  watch  with  awe- 
stricken  faces  the  liquefaction,  periodically,  of  the  blood  of  a  saint 
dead  and  gone  ages  ago  ?  Yet  such  things  have  been  in  modem 
Europe,  and  the  world  has  forgotten  to  smile.  The  mooUah  is 
merely  a  clever  trickster  in  his  own  sphere,  though,  like  many 
other  priests,  he  comes  often  to  believe  in  his  own  supernatural 
powers,  and  then  sinks  to  the  level  of  his  followers.  And  the 
ghazi  is  the  creature  of  the  mooUah.  The  latter's  eloquence  is 
listened  to  by  some  more  than  usually  susceptible  villager,  whose 
enthusiasm  is  aroused  to  fever  heat  by  a  glowing  story  of  a  ghazi, 
who  went  into  the  infidel  camp,  cut  down  two  or  three  Kafirs,  and 
died  the  death  of  a  martyr,  his  soul  going  straight  to  the  laps  of 
the  houris,  and  his  name  living  for  ever  among  his  kindred. 
Shall  he  not  emulate  such  a  glorious  example,  so  that  his  children 
and  his  children's  children  may  hand  down  his  name  to  all 
generations  as  a  Ohazi  Allah-din — a  ''  Champion  of  the  Faith  ?  " 
The  mooUah' B  preaching  has  had  its  effect,  and  a  ghazi  has  been 
called  into  being.  If  a  great  jeluid  is  being  preached,  that  man 
will  always  be  in  the  forefront  of  the  battle,  and  will  probably 
carry  the  standard  of  his  clan,  blessed  by  the  mooUah  who  has 
aroused  the  tribesmen.  The  fiery  cross,  which  was  sped  from  end 
to  end  of  the  Scottish  Highlands  in  the  old  days,  when  the  call  to 
arms  was  made,  was  no  more  powerful  than  is  the  Koran  now, 
carried  from  village  to  village  by  the  mooUah  of  Afghanistan.  But 
a  few  weeks  ago  the  arch-mooZZaA,  Mushk-i-Alam,  sent  out  his 
message  from  Gharkh,  and  how  well  it  was  responded  to  we  are 
living  witnesses.  With  ghazis  in  their  midst  to  lead  the  timorous, 
and  mooUahs  always  at  hand  to  fan  their  fanaticism,  Mahomed  Jan's 
rabble  did  wonders.  How  the  ghazis  acquitted  themselves  our 
men  well  know — many  poor  fellows  to  their  cost. 


Ghazi  Recklessness.  337 

In  the  action  in  the  Chardeh  Valley  the  standard-bearers 
mshed  on  even  when  our  cavalry  charged,  and  no  more  reckless 
rush  was  ever  made.  Many  went  down,  but  about  them  were 
others  equal  in  desperation.  A  trooper  of  the  9th  transfixed  a 
man  with  his  lance :  the  ghazi  wriggled  up  like  an  eel,  grasped 
the  lance  with  his  left  hand,  and,  with  one  stroke  of  the  knife,  cut 
through  the  lancer's  hand  and  the  tough  shaft  as  it  had  been  of 
tinder.  This  is  not  romancing :  the  trooper  is  still  living,  but 
minus  the  fingers  of  his  right  hand.  On  the  13th  December, 
when  the  92nd  Highlanders  stormed  the  Takht-i-Shah  Peak, 
isolated  bands  of  ghazis  stood  to  their  posts  when  their  comrades 
were  in  full  retreat,  and  were  shot  and  bayoneted  in  desperate 
hand-to-hand  encounters.  On  the  14th  the  ghazis  were  so  pro- 
minent that  Mahomed  Jan  owed  all  his  success  to  their  daring 
leadership  up  the  Asmai  Heights,  although  many  a  white-clothed 
figure  went  down  before  that  success  was  gained.  In  the  early 
part  of  the  day  the  last  mngar  on  the  Asmai  Heights  was  held  by 
a  score  of  these  fanatics  when  all  else  had  fled.  The  banners  were 
planted  on  the  rude  stone  walls ;  and  when  Colonel  Brownlow  and 
the  Highlanders  made  the  final  rush,  the  scene  was  an  exciting  one. 
What  could  be  finer  than  the  desperate  leap  out  of  the  sungar  by 
the  ghazi  who  attacked  Lance- Corporal  Seller,  our  first  man  for- 
ward ?  Nothing  but  fanatical  madness  could  have  drawn  a  man 
from  the  temporary  shelter  of  the  sungar  while  there  was  still  a 
chance  of  escape  down  the  hill ;  the  ghazi  fulfilled  his  kismut ; 
80  let  us  hope  all  is  well  with  him.  Then,  when  the  enemy 
streamed  out  from  Indikee  into  the  Chardeh  Valley,  and  came 
straight  upon  the  hills  held  by  our  troops,  their  standard-bearers, 
chiefly  ghazis,  were  well  in  front,  and  the  rush  upwards  was  led  by 
these  men,  who  at  times  were  100  yards  in  front  of  the  main  body. 
When  our  men  were  forced  back  from  the  conical  hill,  the  ghazis 
were  the  first  to  crown  the  rocks  ;  and  the  splendid  way  in  which 
they  planted  their  standards  on  the  Asmai  Heights  as  the  High- 
landers and  Guides  were  withdrawn  was  worthy  of  all  respect. 
The  steady  volleys  of  Colonel  Brownlow' s  men  kept  back  the  main 
body;  but  yard  by  yard,  as  our  soldiers  fell  back,  flags  were 
pushed  up  from  behind  protecting  rocks,  their  bearers  being  at 
times  within  fifty  paces  of  our  rifles.    With  such  leaders,  even 

z 


338  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

cowards  mast  have  rushed  on,  and  it  must  have  been  a  prond 
moment  for  the  ghazis  when  they  held  the  crest  of  the  hill,  and 
watched  our  troops  slowly  filing  off  into  Sherpnr. 

They  played  the  same  prominent  part  during  the  siege,  but  they 
were  ill-supported,  and  though  a  few  succeeded  once  in  placing  a 
flag  within  250  yards  of  the  comer  bastion  looking  towards  Deh- 
i- Afghan,  not  a  man  remained,  when  night  fell,  to  remove  their 
cherished  trophy :  our  Martinis  had  proved  too  fatal  at  so  short 
a  range.  In  the  final  assault  on  December  23rd  the  fanatical 
leaders  were  again  in  the  van ;  and  if  they  had  been  followed  by 
the  thousands  who  hung  back  so  irresolutely,  then  there  might  have 
been  a  hand-to-hand  fight  in  our  trenches.  In  isolated  instances, 
a  ghazi  would  be  seen  within  a  few  score  yards  of  our  defences, 
only  to  go  down  riddled  through  and  through,  though  one  more 
desperate  than  his  companions  reached  the  abattisy  and  had  begun 
to  pull  away  the  intercepting  branches,  when  he  also  was  shot.  To 
quote  more  instances  of  the  audacity  of  the  ghazi  would  be  use- 
less. I  have  said  enough  to  prove  his  recklessness,  and  to  show 
that,  with  an  army  of  such  men  against  us,  even  our  splendid 
arms  and  steady  discipline  might  avail  nothing.  But  the  true 
ghazi  is  a  phenomenon — he  at  least  deserves  the  scientific  and 
sonorous  title — and  even  Afghan  fanaticism  cannot  bring  forth 
many,  however  great  may  be  the  eloquence  of  the  mooUahg.  Of 
the  more  despicable  ghazi — the  man  who  runs  amuck  in  an  infidel 
camp  or  waylays  a  Kafir  in  the  streets  of  a  city — I  have  nothing  to 
say.  Cabul  has  been  free  from  such  pests,  and  we  do  not  wish  to 
hear  the  cry  of  ''  ghazi !  *'  raised.  The  fanatic  generally  takes  so 
much  killing  that  our  revolver  ammunition  would  run  short  were 
he  to  put  in  an  appearance  periodically. 


The  Political  Dead- Lock.  339 


CHAPTER  XXrV. 

The  Outlook  at  Catml  in  Febmaiy — Appointment  of  Mr.  Lepel  Griffin  to  be  Chief 
Political  Officer — Abdur  TUhman  Khan  in  Badakshan — Nek  Mahomed  in  Tarkistan 
— Probable  MoTements  of  the  Two  Sirdars — Biography  of  Abdur  Bahman  Khan — 
Hifl  Struggle  with  Shere  Ali — Takes  Refuge  with  the  Russians  in  Tnrkistan — Sir 
Richard  Pollock's  Bstimate  of  his  Character — His  Relations  with  the  Russians — 
Biography  of  Moshk-i-Alam,  the  ifooZ^oA— His  Power  over  the  Tribes — ^Mahomed 
Hasan  Khan's  life — His  Russian  Proclirities — ^Asmatollah  Khan  and  the  Northern 
Ghilzais — ^Daood  Shah's  Career — Serres  under  Akhbar  Khan  and  Shere  AJi-^ 
Reasons  for  his  Deportation  to  India. 

It  wouljl  be  scarcely  worth  while  to  reproduce  letters  which  dealt 
chiefly  with  enrrent  rumonrs  of  Mahomed  Jan's  moyements,  and  I 
will  therefore  only  give  extracts  sufficient  to  make  clear  the  coarse 
of  events.  Our  Gk)yemor  of  Kohistan  was  never  able  to  get  be- 
yond Baba  Euch  Ear,  and  Mahomed  Jan's  agents  in  Logar, 
Wardak,  and  Maidan  were  constantly  heard  of.  Writing  on 
February  1, 1  said  : — 

It  seems  likely  that  we  shall  have  to  visit  Ghazni,  which  is 
now  the  head-quarters  of  the  malcontents,  unless  some  declara- 
tion of  policy  by  the  Home  Government  puts  an  end  to  our  occu- 
pation of  Gabul.  General  Boberts  has  asked  for  the  heavy  bat- 
tery to  be  sent  up  from  Peshawur,  and  with  three  40-pounders 
and  two  S-inch  howitzers,  we  could  batter  the  Ghazni  fortress 
about  the  ears  of  its  defenders.  In  Sherpur  the  guns  captured 
from  the  enemy  in  October  are  being  tried,  i^d  a  certain  number 
found  serviceable  are  being  put  in  order.  Some  garrison  artillery- 
men from  Peshawur  are  being  sent  up,  and  will  form  our  garrison 
battery  here. 

The  political  dead-lo(^  remains  unchanged.  Our  policy  of 
'^  benevolent  inactivity  "  has  not  altogether  pleased  some  of  the 
local  sirdars,  who  are  nothing,  if  not  place-hunters.  They  have 
seen  Wali  Mahomed  made  Governor  of  Cabul,  and  no  doubt  it  was 
expected  that  positions  of  "  trust "  would  be  assigned  to  them.  But 
they  have  been  disappointed,  and,  in  return,  have  vented  their 
anger  and  disgust  by  posting  four  or  five  seditious  placards  on  the 

z  2 


340  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

walls  of  the  city.  The  tenor  of  these  was  to  point  out  how  much 
better  off  the  people  were  under  the  old  Amirs  than  under  General 
Roberts,  whom  they  accuse  of  sinning  "  through  foolishness  and 
ignorance  " — ^perhaps  of  their  own  personal  wants.  Such  abuse 
hurts  no  one,  and  can  have  but  little  effect  upon  the  popular 
mind,  for  there  can  be  no  mistake  as  regards  our  leniency  towards 
Gabul  itself.  The  appointment  of  Mr.  Lepel  Griffin  to  be  Chief 
Political  Officer  here  has  been  announced  by  the  Government  of 
India,  and  has  given  general  satisfaction  in  cantonments,  as  the 
political  work  now  done  by  the  General  will  be  minimized,  and  his 
hands  will  be  free  to  deal  more  fully  with  matters  purely  military. 
One  thing  is  fervently  desired,  and  that  is  that  Mr.  Lepel  Griffin 
will  come  with  a  programme  of  policy  in  his  pocket,  as  it  is  too 
aggravating  to  have  a  G^eneral  and  his  army  in  the  unpleasant 
position  of  a  ship  at  sea  without  orders :  liable  to  be  knocked 
about  by  every  gale  that  blows,  and  yet  without  any  port  to  make 
for.  The  best  crew  in  the  world  would  grow  discontented  under 
such  circumstances.  We  have  had  our  buffeting,  and  have 
weathered  it,  and  now  we  should  like  fair  weather  and  clear 
instructions  as  to  our  future  destination. 

16<A  February. 
It  is  rather  difficult  at  present  to  follow  the  movements  of 
Abdur  Rahman  Khan,  whose  name  now  is  oftener  in  men*s 
mouths  than  that  of  any  other  Afghan  chief  of  importance.  As 
I  predicted,  Abdur  Rahman  seems  likely  to  play  a  leading  part  in 
Afghanistan,  and  his  reported  arrival  in  Badakshan  shows  that  his 
influence  may  be  felt  upon  local  politics  at  any  moment.  We 
have  always  had  much  trouble  in  getting  news  of  Turkistan 
affairs;  and  though  we  heard  from  European  telegrams  that 
Abdur  Rahman  had  been  dismissed  by  the  Russians,  and  had 
started  to  try  his  fortunes  again  in  Afghanistan,  we  could  not 
gain  trustworthy  reports  of  his  arrival  south  of  the  Oxus.  Once, 
it  is  true,  he  was  said  to  be  at  Balkh ;  but  no  confirmation  of  the 
report  was  forthcoming,  and  it  was  soon  disbelieved.  Now,  at 
last,  we  have  new  accounts  of  his  movements.  Merchants  in 
Gabul  have  received  letters  from  agents  at  Balkh,  in  which  it  is 
distinctly  stated  that  the  exiled  son  of  Mir  Afzul  Ehan  is  in 
Badakshan,  with  3,000  Turcomans,  and  is  preparing  to  make 


The  Attitude  of  Abdur  Rahman,  34 1 

good  his  claims  to  the  Amirship.     Without  jumping  to  any  rash 
conclusions^  it  may  be  possible  to  explain  clearly  enough  the  train 
of  circumstances  which  have  brought  Abdur  Bahman  once  more 
to  the  front.     The  death  of  Shore  Ali  and  the  accession  of  Yakub 
Khan  might  have  tempted  him  to  make  another  effort  for  the 
throne;   but  without  the  assistance  and  countenance  of  Bussia 
he  could  scarcely  hope  to  be  successful.     To  raise  an  army  money 
is  needed ;  and  though  the  Bussians  were  considerate  enough  to 
pay  the  exiled  prince  a  liberal  pension,  they  were  too  anxious  to 
keep  on  good  terms  with  England  to  subsidize  a  pretender  to  the 
Amirship  just  when  the  Treaty  of  Gundamak  had  been  signed. 
Abdur  Bahman  may  have  been  convinced,  also,  that  Yakub  Khan 
would  never  be  strong  enough  to  carry  out  the  treaty,  and  that 
his  downfall,  either  at  the  hands  of  his  own  subjects  or  of  the 
British,  would  leave  Cabul  open  to  other  competitors.    The  mas- 
sacre of  our  Envoy,  the  march  of  Sir  F.  Boberts's  force  upon 
Cabul,  and  the  dispersion  of  the  rebel  army,  followed  each  other 
so  rapidly  that  the  country  was  paralysed,  as  far  as  active  resist- 
ance went.    The  flight  of  Nek  Mahomed  (uncle  of  Abdur  Bahman) 
to  Bussian  territory  was  the  signal  for  the  collapse  of  the  Afghan 
army,  and  doubtless  the  fugitive  General  warned  his  nephew  that, 
to  attempt  any  campaign  while  the  British  were  posing  as  the 
protectors  of  Yakub  Khan  and  the  conquerors  of  Cabul  would  be 
little  short  of  madness.    Besides,  if  Yakub  Khan  were  to  be 
reipstated,  and  his  rule  made  secure  by  a  new  British  alliance, 
rebellion  against  him  would  be  full  of  danger.     That,  in  case  of 
certain  contingencies,  a  plan   of  action  was  arranged   between 
Abdur  Bahman  and  Nek  Mahomed  would  appear  certain ;  and  it 
is  half-suspected  that  Bussian  sympathy  was  freely  extended  to 
them,  and  a  hint  given  that  practical  aid  would  also  be  afforded 
when  the  plan  was  ripe  for  execution.     They  were  waiting  upon 
Providence ;  and  the  first  reward  for  their  patience  was  the  deport- 
ation of  Yakub  Khan  to  India  on  December  Ist,  and  the  assump- 
tion by  the  British  of  the  temporary  sovereignty  of  Cabul.     The 
Amirship  thus  became  vacant ;  and  Abdur  Bahman,  as  the  son  of 
Mir  Afzul  Khan,  eldest  son  of  Dost  Mahomed,  could  fairly  lay  claim 
to  the  throne..    Yakub  Khan's  son  was  a  mere  child;  there  was 
no  one  of  any  great  influence  in  the  British  camp  who  could  hope 


342  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

to  be  successful  as  Amir ;  and  who  so  likely  to  be  welcomed  by 
the  people  as  Abdur  Bahman,  a  favourite  alike  with  the  army  and 
the  tribes  ?  Hhi^jthad  preached  by  Mushk-i-Alam,  and  the  tem- 
porary success  of  Mahomed  Jan's  army  at  Sherpur,  must  have 
more  than  ever  convinced  the  exiles  that  their  chance  had  come 
and  their  plan  might  be  put  to  the  test.  What  that  plan  was  can 
only  be  judged  by  after-events ;  but  its  broad  outlines  seem  to 
have  been  the  raising  and  equipping  of  a  body  of  Turcoman  horse 
and  the  crossing  of  the  Oxus  at  two  points.  Abdur  Rahman 
directed  his  steps  towards  Badakshan,  where  his  wife's  kinsmen 
are  in  power ;  while  Nek  Mahomed  passed  into  Turkistan  by  the 
Kilif  ferry,  fifty  miles  north-west  of  Balkh.  Abdur  Rahman's 
force  is  said  to  have  been  2,000  or  3,000  Turcoman  horsemen ; 
and  his  treasure-chest,  by  native  report,  contained  12  lakhs  of 
rupees  in  Bokhara  gold  tiMahs  when  he  crossed  the  river.  Nek 
Mahomed's  escort  is  also  made  up  of  Turcomans  ;  and  his  object 
seems  to  be  to  gain  over  Gholam  Hyder,  Governor  of  Turkistan, 
while  Abdur  Rahman  raises  levies  in  Badakshan.  A  powerful 
combination  would  thus  be  formed  north  of  the  Hindu  Kush  ;  and 
by  the  spring,  which  brings  with  it  the  melting  of  the  snows  and 
the  opening  of  the  Passes  about  Charikar  and  Bamian,  the  pre- 
tender to  the  throne  should  have  under  his  orders  a  well-equipped 
and  numerous  army.  Perhaps  the  most  important  work  to  be 
done  before  Abdur  Rahman  could  move  out  of  Badakshan  was  the 
gaining  of  Oholam  Hyder's  co-operation.  In  a  letter  written  two 
months  ago  I  showed  that  the  Governor  of  Turkistan  really  held 
only  the  country  south  of  the  Oxus  between  Aebak  and  Akcha ;  a 
Kirghiz  chief  having  raided  into  the  districts  west  of  Akcha,  while 
the  Elhan  of  Eunduz  (120  miles  east  of  Balkh)  was  supreme  in 
the  hill-country  between  Aebak  a,nd  Badakshan.  Gholam 
Hyder's  power  lies  mainly  in  his  possession  of  one  or  two  field 
batteries,  and  in  having  under  his  orders  several  regiments  of 
cavalry  and  infantry,  many  of  whom  are  well-armed  with  rifles 
made  on  English  patterns.  Prom  reports  which  have  reached 
Gabul  it  would  appear  that  he  was  very  uneasy  when  the  fact  of 
Abdur  Rahman's  and  Nek  Mahomed's  presence  to  east  and  west 
of  him  became  known.  He  was  at  first  doubtful  of  their  inten- 
tions^ and,  as  a  precautionary  measure,  massed  Uis  cavalry  and 


His  Probable  Plans.  343 

guns  at  Mazar-i-Sharif,  one  march  south-east  of  Balkh.  In  the 
meantime  Abdnr  Bahman,  with  the  aid  of  his  12  lakhs  (of  which 
it  is  shrewdly  suspected  that  at  least  half  was  given  to  him  as  a 
subsidy  by  the  Russians),  was  making  it  clear  in  the  eyes  of  the 
Badakshanis  that  his  new  expedition  was  something  more  than  a 
visionary  attempt  to  regain  Cabul.  One  of  his  wives  is  a  daughter 
of  Jehandar  Shah,  late  Mir  of  Badakshan,  whose  son  now  governs 
at  Faizabad,  the  capital  of  this  northern  province.  So  successful 
has  Abdur  Bahman  been,  that  he  has  not  only  won  over  the  Badak- 
shanis, but  also  the  Khan  of  Kunduz,  who  has  offered  him  help 
in  his  new  venture.  Bumour  also  states  that  Gholam  Hyder  has 
cast  in  his  lot  with  the  pretender,  and  that  an  amicable  meeting 
between  their  forces  is  to  take  place  at  Mazar-i-Sharif.  Of  course 
it  is  possible  that  affairs  have  not  run  so  smoothly  as  represented; 
but  still  native  rumour  is  wonderfully  correct  as  a  rule,  and  the 
appearance  of  Abdur  Bahman  is  a  new  and  most  important  factor 
in  the  Afghan  problem.  He  has  with  him  Ishak  Ehan,  son  of 
Sirdar  Azim  Khan,  who  was  Amir  for  a  short  time  when  Shere 
All's  fortunes  were  at  their  lowest  ebb.  I  have  before  spoken  of 
Abdur  Bahman*s  popularity,  and  his  soldierly  qualities  are  uni- 
versally acknowledged.  What  his  future  plans  may  be  can  only 
be  conjectured.  The  timid  and  characterless  sirdars  we  have  now 
with  us  are  rather  alarmed  at  his  approach,  and  their  uneasiness 
is,  perhaps,  justifiable.  Probably,  in  the  spring,  he  may  march 
an  army  from  Balkh  through  Khulm,  Aebak,  and  Saighan  to 
Bamian,  or  he  may  try  the  more  easterly  route  over  the  Hindu 
Kush  to  Charikar  and  Kohistan.  What  our  course  of  action  will 
be  in  such  a  case  I  am  not  prepared  to  say  ;  but  that  Abdur 
Bahman  may  yet  be  Amir  of  Afghanistan  is  quite  within  the 
range  of  possibility.  But  for  the  fatal  taint  of  Bussian  influence 
which  it  is  only  fair  to  suppose  has  affected  his  character  during 
his  stay  in  Tashkend,  he  would  make  a  nominee  whom  we  could 
trust,  for  his  ability  is  beyond  question. 

The  following  is  a  short  sketch  of  his  life— a  life  which  has  been 
stormy  even  for  an  Afghan  prince.  His  father  was  Mahomed 
Afzul  Ehan,  eldest  son  of  the  Dost  Mahomed ;  but  on  his  mother's 
side  he  has  Populzai  blood  in  his  veins.  In  1863-64,  when  the 
death  of  the  Post  had  rendered  the  throne  vacant,  Afzul  Ehan,  as 


344  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

eldest  son  of  the  deceased  Amiri  objected  to  his  claims  being  set 
aside  in  favour  of  his  younger  half-brother,  Shere  Ali,  and  soon 
the  country  was  in  a  state  of  civil  war.     Abdur  Bahman  was 
placed  by  Ms  father  in  charge  of  Takhtipul,  in  Turidstan,  and 
showed  some  genius  as  a  soldier,  but  was  eventually  obliged  to 
confess  himself  beaten  by  Shere  All's  forces.    He  made  a  half- 
hearted submission,  and,  being  suspected  of  still  intriguing  in 
favour  of  his  father,  was  summoned  to  Cabul.     This  order  he  re- 
fused to  obey ;  but,  dreading  the  consequences,   fled  across  the 
Oxus  into  Bokhara,  where  many  other  sirdars  had  taken  refuge. 
Turkistan  was  still  very  unsettled,  and  Abdur  Bahman  induced 
many  of  the  garrison  of  Balkh  to  desert  Shere  Ali  and  cross  into 
Bokhara.     The  Amir  of  that  Khanate  openly  espoused  his  cause, 
and  aided  him  in  many  ways.     With  a  small,  but  well-equipped, 
force  he  at  last  recrossed  the  Oxus  and  made  for  Akcha,  then  in 
charge  of  Faiz  Mahomed   Khan.      The  latter,   finding  himself 
unequal  to  any  successful  resistance,  threw  over  Shere  Ali  and 
united  his  garrison  with  the  force  from  Bokhara.     The  Governor 
of  Turkistan,  Fateh  Mahomed  Khan,  was  not  so  easily  won  over, 
and  resisted  the  new  army.    His  soldiers,  however,  proved  faith- 
less ;  and,  leaving  them  to  continue  their  own  course  of  action,  he 
fled  from  Turkistan.     Abdur  Bahman  thus  found  himself,  in  a 
few  weeks,  at  the  head  of  a  fairly  powerful  army ;  and,  pushing 
on  to  Takhtipul,  he  resumed  his  old  position  as  Governor.     Turk- 
istan had  thus  fallen  easily  into  his  hands,  and  so  striking  was 
his  success,  that  he  resolved  upon  a  march  to  Cabul.     His  uncle, 
Azim  Khan,  a  man  of  some   ability,  joined  him  ;  and  Shere  Ali> 
still  having  with  him  Afzul  Khan,  a  prisoner,  was  forced  to  leave  his 
capital.     On   the  24th  of  February  Abdur  Bahman  entered  the 
city  without  opposition  ;  but  he  had  still  to  deal  with  Shere  Ali, 
who  was  collecting  an  army  in  the  South.    In  May  the  two  armies 
came  into  collision  at  Sheikhabad,  on  the  Ghazni  Boad,  and  Abdur 
Bahman  gained  a  complete  victory.     His  father  was  released,  and 
was  proclaimed  Amir  in  place  of  Shere  Ali.    But  Afzul  Khan,  a 
confirmed  drunkard,  was  but  a  weak  and  incapable  ruler,  and  his 
brother,  Azim  Khan,  practically   held  all  power  in  his  hands. 
Abdur  Bahman  then,  full  of  energy  and  flushed  with  success,  tried 
to  counteract  his  uncle's  schemes  ;  and  the  quarrel  might  have 


His  Early  Career,  345 

ividened  into  a  serions  breach  between  the  two  had  not  the  pre- 
sence of  Shere  All,  with  a  second  army  at  Candahar,  made  it 
imperative  to  sink  all  differences  before  a  common  danger.     Uncle 
and  nephew  again  took  the  field,  and  marching  southwards  through 
Ghazni,  met  and  defeated  Shere  Ali's  army  at  Khelat-i-Ghilzai. 
This  was  on  the  16th  of  January,  1867.     But  opposition  still  had 
to  be  encountered,.  Faiz  Mahomed,  half-brother  of  Shere  Ali,  hav- 
ing raised  another  army  in  support  of  the  ex- Amir's  cause.     Abdur 
Bahman  was  again  successful  in  his  military  operations,  defeating 
Faiz  Mahomed  at  Eila  Allahdad  on  the  17th  September,  1867. 
But,  while  thus  fighting  with  invariable  success  for  his  father,  he 
had  to  meet  the  designs  of  his  uncle,  whose  ambition  was  to  be 
himself  Amir.     Afzul  Khan  died  in  Gabul  while  his  son  was 
absent  with  the  army ;  and  when  Abdur  Bahman  returned  to  the 
capital,  he  found  his  uncle,  Azim  Khan,  in  possession  of  the 
throne.     The    old    quarrels   broke  out  afresh,  Abdur  Bahman 
naturally  feeling  aggrieved  that,  after  all  his  successes,  the  Amir- 
ship  had  slipped  through  his  hands.     Again  fresh  complications 
in  Turkistan  saved  an  open  rupture  :  Abdur  Bahman  started  for 
the  northern  province  and  tried  to  subdue  the  Usbeg  chiefs.     In 
this  he  was  unsuccessful,  the  Mir  of  Maemena,  a  district  between 
Balkh  and  Herat,  sturdily  resisting  all  attack,  and  eventually 
forcing  Abdur  Bahman  to  fall  back  upon  Takhtipul.     The  absence 
of  the  young  soldier  in  the  north  had  been  Shere  Ali's  opportunity. 
His  forces  were  successful  in  Western  Afghanistan,  and  he  was 
soon  de  facto  Amir.   'Abdur  Bahman's  position  in  Turkistan  then 
became  untenable ;  his  soldiers,  hearing  that  Shere  Ali  was  once 
more  in  possession  of  Cabul,  lost  heart  and  deserted;   and  in 
January  1869,  in  conjunction  with  Azim  Khan,  he  was  once  more 
a  fugitive.    After  Azim  Khan  had  appealed  to  the  Indian  Govern- 
ment for  help,  and  had  been  refiised,  the  two  sirdars    sought 
refuge  in  Persia,  and  afterwards,  in  the  trans-Oxus  Khanates. 
Azim  Khan  died  in  October  1869;   and  Abdur  Bahman,  still 
entertaining  his  idea  of  regaining  Cabul,  went  to  Khiva.     Here 
his  intrigues  to  raise  a  force  with  which  to  conquer   Afghan- 
Turkistan  met  with  such  slight  success  that  he  turned  his  steps 
to  Bokhara.    Living  as  a  refugee  in  that  Khanate  was  Jehandar 
Shah,  ex-Mir  of  Badakshan.     This  chief  had  heartily  aided  Afzul 


346  TJu  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

Ehan  in  his  struggle  for  the  throne,  and  to  cement  the  alliance 
had  given  his  sister  in  marriage  to  Azim  Ehan,  and  his  daughter 
to  Ahdur  Rahman.  Shere  Ali,  in  August  1869,  induced  the 
Badakshan  sirdars  to  depose  Jehandar  Shah,  who  was  imprisoned 
in  his  own  capital  of  Faizabad.  He  persuaded  his  late  subjects 
to  grant  his  release,  and  crossed  the  Oxus  to  Kulab,  where  Abdur 
Kahman  joined  him.  Their  intrigues  to  gain  possession  of 
Badakshan  were  on  the  basis  of  raising  a  force  of  Turcomans  on 
the  north,  while  the  Mir  of  Maemena,  with  an  army  of  Usbegs, 
co-operated  with  them  from  the  west  through  Balkh  and  Eunduz. 
The  want  of  money  was  a  great  obstacle  to  success,  and  Abdur 
Bahman  conceived  the  idea  of  supplicating  aid  from  Russia. 
While  Jehandar  Shah  went  to  Ghitral,  to  seek  aid  from  Aman-ul- 
Mulk,  chief  of  that  country,  Abdur  Rahman  left  Bokhara  for 
Samarcand,  and  reached  Tashkend  in  May  1870.  General  Eauf- 
mann  received  him  hospitably,  but  was  deaf  to  all  his  appeals  for 
troops  to  aid  him  in  conquering  Afghan-Turkistan.  A  pension  of 
about  £5,000  sterling  was  assigned  to  him,  but  a  refusal  was 
given  to  his  request  to  visit  St.  Petersburg  and  represent  his  case 
to  the  Czar.  When  Schuyler  saw  him  he  expressed  a  confident 
belief  that  with  £50,000  to  raise  and  equip  an  army  he  could  once 
more  make  himself  supreme  in  Afghanistan.  With  this  one  idea 
in  his  mind  he  was  saving  nine  tenths  of  his  pension,  and  hinted 
that,  under  favourable  conditions,  he  might  be  aided  by  Russia. 
Jehandar  Shah,  after  raising  an  unsuccessful  insurrection  in  Ba- 
dakshan in  1878,  joined  his  son-in-law  at  Samarcand  in  1875,  but 
has  since  died. 

Of  Abdur  Rahman's  character  I  have  spoken  in  a  previous 
letter ;  and  the  following  estimate  of  his  ability  by  Sir  Richard 
Pollock,  late  Commissioner  of  Peshawur,  is  worth  quoting  as  some- 
what confirming  my  view.  Sir  Richard  Pollock  writes : — "Abdur 
Rahman  was  well  thought  of  as  a  soldier  and  commander  when  in 
charge  of  the  army,  but  showed  less  talent  for  administrative 
work.  He  has  now  lost  all  his  possessions,  both  at  his  home  and 
his  place  of  refuge,  and  has  no  resources  by  which  he  could  collect 
a  party.  Without  help  as  to  money  or  arms,  he  could  do  nothing. 
If  supplied  with  money  by  Russia  or  Bokhara,  and  promised  a 
backing,  he  might  attempt  to  recover  his  position.     Probably, 


His  Relations  with  Russia.  347 

^uch  an  attempt  would  be  nnsuccessfal,  if  made  in  the  Amir's 
(Shere  Ali)  lifetime.  If  later,  after  the  Amir's  death,  and  when 
Tnrkistan  bad  Mir  Alam  Khan  as  Governor,  or  some  equally 
corrupt,  incapable  person,  the  issue  might  be  in  Abdur  Bahman's 
favour,  as  far  as  Turkistan  is  concerned.  On  the  Amir's  death 
such  an  attempt  may  be  looked  upon  as  likely,  unless  a  good 
Governor  should  previously  have  taken  Mir  Alam's  place.  Abdur 
Rahman's  influence  has  already  declined  rapidly,  and  fortune  is 
never  likely  to  favour  him  again  to  the  extent  it  did  when  he  was 
fighting  for  Azim  and  Afzul.  There  was  strong  sympathy  on  the 
part  of  the  nation  for  the  elder  sons,  who  had  been  set  aside  by 
the  Dost  in  favour  of  Shere  Ali  Khan.  Besides,  the  King  of 
Bokhara  afforded  assistance,  which  he  is  not  likely  now  or  later  to 
give."  This  memorandum  was  written  before  the  breach  between 
Shere  Ali  and  the  Indian  Government ;  but  its  remarks  are  still 
applicable.  Abdur  Bahman  seems,  without  doubt,  to  have  been 
supplied  with  means  by  the  Bussians,  and  he  has  an  '^  incapable 
person  "  Governor  of  Turkistan — Gholam  Hyder ;  so  that  it  would 
not  be  unlikely  if  he  possessed  himself  of  the  northern  province 
in  a  few  months.  The  old  sympathy  in  his  favour  may  once  more 
be  revived,  and  we  could  scarcely  dispute  his  authority,  unless  we 
were  prepared  to  begin  a  campaign  vid  Bamian  in  the  spring.  If 
Abdur  Bahman  is  ambitious  enough  not  only  to  claim  Turkistan, 
but  Cabul  also,  we  shall  either  have  to  meet  his  forces  in  the  field, 
or  to  offer  him  the  Amirship  and  our  support  in  the  future.  Whether 
he  would  prefer  England  to  Bussia  yet  remains  to  be  seen. 

What  Abdur  Bahman' s  relations  have  been  with  the  Bussians— • 
and,  perhaps,  still  are — may  be  judged  from  a  letter,  written  in 
May  1878,  by  Shahgassi  Sherdil  Khan,  then  Governor  of  Afghan- 
Turkistan.    He  says: — 

*'  Mina  Salahaddin,  whom  I  depated  towards  Samarcand  and  Tashkend  to  collect 
news  from  those  directions,  has  returned  and  made  a  statement,  to  the  effect  that  the 
RnsBians  inteod  to  induce  Abdnr  Rahman  Khan  to  submit  to  them  a  petition,  setting 
forth  that  he  has  been  putting  up  there  a  long  time  under  the  protection  of  the  Russian 
GoTemment ;  that  he  has  often  petitioned  them  to  help  him  in  securing  the  restitution 
of  his  ancestral  territory  from  the  Amir  of  Cabal,  but  his  prayer  has  not  been  acceded 
to ;  and  that  he  has  now  heard  that  the  Russians  are  preparing  to  fight  against  the 
British  Qovemment ;  that  they  have  sent  enroys  to  wait  upon  the  Amir  to  request  him 
to  allow  passage  through  his  country  to  the  Russian  troops  going  to  India  and  returning 
therefrom,  should  a  necessity  arise  for  such  a  pa&iage ;  and  that,  such  being  the  eaee. 


348  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

he  ofifered  his  aerrioes  in  ease  His  Highness  refuses  to  grant  the  request  of  the  Rossian 
GoTemment  to  capture  Balkh  with  a  small  assistance  from  the  Ozar,  and  then  sabdae 
the  whole  of  Afghanistan,  whioh  is  not  a  dlfficalt  task." 

The  conditions  are  certainly  altered  now,  as  Bassia  is  not  medi- 
tating any  sach  Quixotic  campaign  as  an  advance  upon  India ;  bat 
Abdur  Bahman  may  still  be  credited  with  a  desire  ^^  to  capture 
Balkh  with  a  small  assistance  from  the  Czar,  and  then  subdue 
the  whole  of  Afghanistan."  In  any  settlement  we  may  intend 
making,  it  would  be  folly  to  ignore  his  existence  altogether.  If 
we  are  not  prepared  to  break  up  his  army  and  drive  him  back 
over  the  Oxus,  we  had  better  giv6  him  frankly  a  chance  of  stating 
his  case.  He  might  by  judicious  management — say  the  promise 
of  a  large  annual  subsidy — prove  the  best  man  we  could  place 
in  power  as  successor  of  the  incapable  Takub  Khan. 

While  on  the  subject  of  biography,  I  may  as  well  give  a 
slight  sketch  of  the  lives  of  some  of  the  men  who  have  recently 
played  a  prominent  part  in  Afghan  politics.  We  have  been  so  shut 
off  from  Afghanistan  for  many  years,  that,  except  in  a  few  con- 
fidential reports  furnished  to  Government  by  officers  on  the  frontier, 
but  little  has  been  made  known  of  the  character  and  power  of  Afghan 
sirdars  and  chiefs.  Even  the  Peshavmr  Diary,  which  has  received 
contributions  from  men  of  the  stamp  of  Sir  Bichard  Pollock  and  Sir 
Louis  Gavagnari,  is  a  sealed  book  to  all  but  a  few  favoured  officials ; 
and  as  many  of  the  communications  to  it  are  of  a  secret  nature, 
it  would  be  idle  to  expect  that  its  contents  can  ever  become 
generally  known.  During  our  present  occupation  of  Gabul,  Major 
Hastings,  Ghief  Political  Officer,  has  been  able  to  collect  some 
data  upon  which  trustworthy  biographies  have  been  founded  of 
the  chiefs  and  others  who  have  been  hostile  to  us.  Incidentally, 
it  has  been  found  that  our  Afghan  friends  have  some  marvellous 
pedigrees,  one  old  gentleman  claiming  direct  descent  from  Adam 
himself — an  ancestor,  perhaps,  as  respectable — all  circumstances 
considered — ^as  any  he  could  have  fallen  back  upon.  An  Afghan 
genealogical  tree  is  a  fearful  instrument  of  torture  to  apply  to 
the  minds  of  our  young  '^  politicals,"  for  the  same  name  occurs  over 
and  over  again  generation  after  generation,  and  the  weakness  of 
the  men  for  taking  wives  of  varied  nationality  causes  obscure 
relationships,  which  arei  most  difficult  to  follow.      It  would  be 


Mushk'Z'Alam,  the  Moollak,  349 

useless  to  give  genealogies  of  men  who  are  only  of  importance  as 
regards  their  own  acts  and  personal  influence ;  and  in  now  deal- 
ing with  seyeral  of  the  best  known  names  in  Afghanistan  I  shall 
merely  summarize  their  pedigrees.  The  moollah  who  raised  the  late 
jehad  deserves  first  place,  and  I  will  begin  with  a  sketch  of  his  life. 
Din  Mahomed,  known  as  Muskh-i-Alam  (the  ^'  Scent  of  the 
World''),  belongs  to  the  Sayids  of  Hindustan,  but  his  father's  name 
is  unknown.     His  ancestors  were  Ehwaja  Ehel,  a  section  of  the 
Lukhan  Ehel  of  the  Andar  tribe,  south  of  Ghazni.    He  married 
and  settled  in  Afghanistan,  first  studying  under  Mahomed  Wasil, 
Eakar,  resident  of  the  village  of  Eala  Ali,  in  the  Shilgarh  district, 
south-east  of  Ghazni.    In  the  prosecution  of  his  studies  as  a 
moollahhe  next  went  to  Lughman,  and  lived  in  the  house  of  one 
Abdul  Hakim,  a  priest,  from  whon^  h6  gained  most  of  his  know- 
ledge.    In  his  zeal  for  learning  he  travelled   to  Peshawur  and 
lived  with  Abdul  Malik,  Akhundzada.     Beturning  to  Afghanistan, 
he  again  read  with  Abdul  Hakim  for  about  two  years,  when  his 
master  died,  leaving  two  young  sons.  Din  Mahomed  remained  with 
them  for  a  few  years,  to  protect  their  lives  and  property,  and  his 
devotion  had  its  reward.    A  learned  and  influential  man,  named 
Mahomed  Aslam,  Sahibazda,  a  nephew  of  the  deceased  mooUahy 
Abdul  Karim,  took  notice  of  him,  and  gave  him  shelter,  at  the 
same  time  teaching  him  all  he  knew.   In  course  of  time  Mahomed 
Aslam  nominated  Din  Mahomed  as  his  successor.      So  far   his 
life  had  been  that  of  an  ordinary  moollah,  one  of  great  simplicity 
and  occasional  hardship.    But  we  now  find  him  showing  signs  of 
great  zeal  and  energy.    A  war  broke  out  against  the  Kafiristanis, 
and  he  joined  Haji  Taj  Mahomed  Saib,  known  as  Haji  Shahid 
(a  descendant  of  one  Haji  Mahomed  Said,  of  Lahore,  who  had 
settled  in  the  Surkhrud  district  of  Jellalabad).     Taj  Mahomed 
was  killed  at  Pashgarh,  and  Din  Mahomed  carried  his  body  on 
his  own  shoulders  to  the  shrine  of  Abdul  Earim,  in  Lughman. 
Thence  he  carried  it  in  the  same  fashion  to  Taj  Mahomed's  own 
village  of  Masti  Ehel,  where  he  buried  it.     This  devotion  caused 
his  name  to  become  well  known  in  Western  Afghanistan,  and 
his  fame  as  a  moollah  rose  accordingly.    He  returned  to  his  own 
part  of  the  country,  near  Ghazni,  and  was  for  years  engaged  in 
teaching  others.    Nearly  all  the  motUvis  of  the  Cabul  and  Ghazni 


350  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

districts  are  pupils  of  his,  and  his  influence  over  such  powerful 
tribes  as  the  Ghilzais,  Lughmanis,  and  Mohmunds,  has  been  and 
is  very  great.  The  late  jehad,  which  was  certainly  one  of  the 
most  successful  ever  preached  in  Afghanistan,  was  due  to  his 
summoning  the  tribes  to  arms;  and  it  is  worth  noticing  that, 
while  Sherpur  was  being  besieged  by  the  tribes  in  its  immediate 
locality,  the  Lughmanis,  under  AsmatuUah  Khan,  tried  to  block 
the  Passes,  and  the  Mohmunds  made  a  diversion  on  our  lower 
line  of  communications.  Mushk-i-Alam  is  now  ninety  years  of 
age,  and  has  lately  shown  signs  of  approaching  death.  Ten 
years  ago  he  was  still  hale  and  strong,  and  took  to  himself  a 
young  Mohmund  wife,  who  bore  him  a  son,  who  is  still  alive,  and 
is  called  Abdur  Bahman.  This  son  is  actually  younger  than  one 
of  his  grandsons,  who  is  twenty  years  of  age.  Mushk-i-Alam 
has  two  sons,  Abdul  Aziz  and  Abdul  Earim,  aged  fifty  and  forty- 
five  respectively,  and  these  men  are  most  active  in  carrying  out 
their  father's  orders,  the  old  man  himself  being  unable  to  rise  from 
his  bed,  except  when  urgent  occasion  gives  him  passing  strength. 
A  man  of  great  ability,  now  at  enmity  with  us,  is  Mirza 
Mahomed  Hasan  Ehan,  Dabir-ul-Mulk,  late  Governor  of  JeUala- 
bad,  who  is  acting  as  Mahomed  Jan's  lieutenant  in  Logar,  and 
has  shown  great  zeal  in  his  efforts  to  renew  the  attack  upon 
Sherpur.  He  is  one  of  three  grandsons  of  Haji  Aka  Ashur, 
called  Shamilo  Turk-i-Bum.  Hasan  Ehan  has  long  been  a 
prominent  figure  in  the  Cabul  Court.  He  first  served  as  an  officer 
under  Sirdar  Gholam  Hjder  Khan,  and,  upon  the  latter's  death, 
was  transferred  to  the  Amir  Shore  Ali  Khan,  whom  he  accom- 
panied to  the  Umballa  Conference  in  1869.  The  Amir,  on 
returning  to  Cabul,  appointed  him  **  Dabir-ul-Mulk,"  or  Secretary 
of  State,  and  for  several  years  he  was  his  sovereign's  chief  confi- 
dant and  counsellor.  He  was  privy  to  all  Shore  Ali's  intrigues 
with  the  Bussians,  and  seems  to  have  been  a  most  trusted  agent. 
Upon  the  death  of  Naib  Mahomed  Aslem,  Governor  of  Turkistan, 
who  was  accidentally  killed  by  the  kick  of  a  horse,  he  was 
appointed,  conjointly  with  Eshak  Akasi  (Shaghassi)  Sherdil  Khan, 
Governor  of  Turkistan.  The  Bussian  Mission  soon  afterwards 
arrived  on  the  banks  of  the  Oxus,  and  Hasan  Khan  was  deputed  to 
accompany  its  members  to  Cabul.    Further,  when  General  StoUetoff 


The  Ex-Governor  of  J ellalabad,  351 

started  on  his  return  journey,  Hasan  Khan  accompanied  him,  and 
journeyed  as  far  as  Tashkend.  What  his  instructions  were  from 
Shere  Ali  may  never  be  known  ;  but  it  is  interesting  to  learn  that, 
during  the  first  campaign  in  November  and  December,  1878, 
Shere  Ali  had  one  of  his  ministers  in  fiussian  Turkistan. 
Upon  the  Amir's  arrival  in  full  flight  at  Mazar-i-Sharif,  Hasan 
Khan  joined  him.  Shere  Ali  had  then  great  hope  that  the 
Russians  would  aid  him,  and  he  sent  Hasan  Khan,  Shere  Ali 
Kandahari,  MooUah  Shah  Mahomed,  and  Kazi  Abdul  Kadir  to 
Tashkend.  Their  mission  was  a  failure,  and  they  returned  to 
Turkistan.  When  news  of  the  Amir's  death  reached  Tashkend 
Takub  Khan  recalled  Hasan  Khan  from  Balkh,  and  made  him 
again  Dabir-ul-Mulk.  He  was  afterwards  sent  to  Jellalabad  as 
Governor,  and  remained  at  his  post  as  long  as  Yakub  Khan 
was  in  our  camp  at  Sherpur.  Upon  the  ex- Amir  being  deported 
to  India,  Hasan  Khan  fled  from  Jellalabad,  taking  with  him  a 
lakh  of  rupees — revenue  which  he  had  collected  for  his  master.  He 
reached  Ghazni  in  safety,  and  has  since  been  actively  engaged  in 
recruiting  for  Mahomed  Jan.  He  is  a  man  of  great  ability  and 
keenness,  and  is  said  to  be  ready  to  take  any  views  which  may  suit 
his  purpose.  This  has  been  shown  of  late  by  his  sending  in 
messengers  to  learn  how  he  would  be  treated  if  he  made  sub- 
mission to  the  British.  There  is  no  doubt  that  at  heart  he  is 
thoroughly  Russian,  his  favourite  uniform,  when  in  full  dress, 
being  that  of  the  Russian  staff.  In  any  dealings  we  may  have 
with  him,  it  will  behove  us  to  be  on  our  guard  against  this  side 
of  his  character.  He  has  two  brothers  ;  one  Ali  Ahmed  Khan,  a 
colonel  in  a  cavalry  regiment,  and  the  other  Mahomed  Ibrahim 
Khan,  once  Governor  of  Hazara.  He  has  seven  sons,  who  are  as 
yet  of  no  consequence. 

A  tribal  chief,  who,  on  the  Jellalabad  side  and  about  the  Passes 
has  given  us  great  trouble,  is  Asmatullah  Khan,  Ghilzai,  of  Lugh- 
man.  He  has  far  more  influence  among  the  Ghilzais  than  any  other 
leader,  Padshah  Khan  being  a  very  small  person  compared  with 
the  Lughman  chief.  Asmatullah  Khan's  family  history  affords  a 
striking  instance  of  the  feuds  which  are  so  common  in  Afghanistan, 
where  father  fights  against  son,  and  brother  against  brother,  as  if 
ties  of  blood  were  of  no  consequence.     Asmatullah  Khan's  an- 


352  The  Afghan  War,   1879 — 80. 

cestors  are  of  the  Mariam  Ehel,  a  subdivision  of  the  Jabbar  Khel 
section  of  the  Ghilzai  tribe.  They  are  called  Mariam  Khel,  after 
the  name  of  the  mother,  Mariam  corresponding  to  the  scriptural 
Miriam,  just  as  Ibrahim  answers  to  Abraham  and  Ismail  to  Ishmael. 
In  the  year  of  the  Hejira  1157  (a.d.  1740),  when  Ahmed  Shah 
was  Amir,  Safa  Khan,  who  had  succeeded  his  father,  Ashak 
Khan,  as  chief  of  the  Mariam  Khel,  was  dispossessed  of  his 
Khanship  owin'^  to  heterodoxy  in  his  religious  views.  His  nephew, 
Mahomed  Ali  Khan,  succeeded  him.  But  about  a.h.  1184, 
when  Taimur  Shah  was  King,  it  was  found  that  this  man  was  such 
a  tyrant  that  he  also  had  to  be  thrust  out  of  power.  Taimur 
Shah  was  anxious  for  Safa  Khan  to  resume  the  Khanship,  and  he 
did  so ;  but,  on  the  day  of  his  resumption  of  power,  Mahomed  Ali 
Khan  murdered  him.  Taimur  Shah  seized  the  assassin  and  im- 
prisoned him ;  but,  as  it  was  a  blood-feud,  would  not  put  him  to 
death.  It  was  necessary  that  a  near  relative  of  Safa  Khan  should 
kill  Mahomed  Ali,  and  this  pleasant  duty  fell  upon  Ahmad  Khan, 
son  of  Safa  Khan.  He  was  a  mere  boy  at  the  time ;  but,  as  his 
elder  brothers  were  away,  he  was  fortunate  enough  to  be  the  execu- 
tioner. He  killed  his  uncle,  Taimur  Shah  handing  the  man  over 
to  him,  and  was  greatly  respected  thereafter  as  being  a  youth  of 
good  parts.  After  Taimur  Shah's  death,  Ahmad  Khan  became 
Tery  intimate  with  the  Wazir,  Futteh  Khan,  and  through  his 
influence  was  made  Khan  of  the  Ohilzais.  He  met  his  death  at 
Herat,  fighting  against  the  Persians.  His  son,  Abdul  Aziz  Khan, 
succeeded  him,  but  being  quite  a  youth,  the  new  Khan  entrusted 
the  control  of  the  tribe  to  his  uncle.  Abdul  Aziz,  who  was  devoted 
to  his  religion,  had  born  to  him  during  his  Khanship  six  sons. 
He  was  most  anxious  to  make  the  pilgrimage  to  Mecca,  but  was 
prevented  for  many  years  by  the  elders  of  his  tribe.  Taking  the 
matter  at  last  into  his  own  hands,  he  managed  to  reach  the  Ah- 
madzai  and  Zurmut  country  east  of  Ghazni,  and  thence  escaped 
to  Arabia.  He  reached  Mecca  safely,  but  on  a  visit  to  Medina 
was  seized  vrith  a  fatal  illness,  which  put  an  end  to  his  wanderings. 
His  eldest  son,  NiamatuUah  Khan,  became  chief  of  the  clan,  and 
was  a  very  popular  ruler.  Two  of  his  younger  brothers,  Abdul 
Hamid  and  Halim  Khan,  tried  to  dispossess  him  of  his  inheri- 
tance, and  some  petty  fighting  followed.     The  family  seem  always 


General  Daoud  Shah, 


Ovlv5 


to  have  been  in  a  rabid  state  of  parricide  or  fratricide  ;  and  in  the 
month  of  Bamzan  a.h.  1277  Hamid  Khan  killed  Niamatallah 
Ehan.  The  second  son  of  Abdul  Aziz,  the  present  Asmatullah 
Ehan,  then  became  head  of  the  Ghilzais,  and  still  remains  so. 
During  the  Amir  Shore  All's  reign  he  was  a  member  of  the  Goancil 
of  State.  Asmatullah  Khan's  character  is  thus  curtly  summed 
up  : — "  He  is  said  to  be  dull,  or  slow  of  understanding,  and  want- 
ing in  pluck  ;  he  owes  his  influence  more  to  his  birth  than  to  his 
capacity.*'  The  half-hearted  way  in  which  he  attacked  Jugdulluck 
a  few  weeks  ago,  and  his  inability  to  keep  his  force  together, 
prove  that  he  lacks  courage  and  administratiye  power,  and  now 
that  one  of  our  flying  columns  has  marched  unopposed  through 
the  Lughman  Valley,  his  dignity  in  the  eyes  of  his  followers  must 
have  greatly  diminished. 

My  last  biographical  sketch  is  of  General  Daoud  Shah,  late 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Afghan  army,  who  is  now  a  prisoner 
in  India.  His  father,  Mahomed  Shah,  was  of  the  Lakhan  Ehel, 
a  branch  of  the  Andar  tribe  of  Sohak  Ghilzais  (south  of  Ghazni). 
Like  Nimrod,  he  was  a  great  shikari ;  but  not  content  with  the 
killing  of  beasts,  he  quarrelled  with  his  neighbours  most  persist- 
ently, and  was  neyer  happy  unless  engaged  in  tribal  warfare.  He 
lived  in  the  village  of  Mandi  Chinar,  in  the  Safi  district  of  Tagao ; 
and  upon  the  British  invasion  Of  1839  he  eagerly  took  up  arms 
against  the  Kafirs.  His  career  was  ended  in  a  fight  before  Charikar, 
in  which  our  troops  were  successful  in  beating  the  tribesmen.  His 
son,  Daoud  Shah,  had  his  father's  warlike  instinct,  and  as  a  young 
man  took  service  in  the  army  of  the  Dost.  He  was  Akhbar  Khan's 
orderly  officer,  and  gained  much  experience  under  that  General. 
His  promotion  was  very  slow,  until  Shore  Ali  Khan  made  him 
captain  for  services  rendered  at  the  battle  of  Kajbaz,  in  which 
Sirdar  Mahomed  Ali  Khan,  eldest  son  of  Shore  Ali,  was  killed. 
Daoud  Shah  showed  great  bravery  during  the  campaign  in  Khost, 
and  was  raised  to  the  rank  of  General.  He  it  was  who  won  the 
battle  of  Zana  Khan,  in  which  Shore  Ali  defeated  Azim  Khan 
and  Abdur  Bahman  Khan.  His  fame  as  a  General  was  now 
bruited  all  over  Afghanistan,  and  his  next  campaign  added  to  his 
glory,  as,  in  conjunction  with  Mahomed  Alam  Khan,  he  defeated 
Abdur  Bahman' s  forces  in  Turkistan,  and  settled  the  country  in 

A   A 


354  Tlu  Afghan  IVar,  1879 — 80. 

Shere  All's  name.  HaTing  quarrelled  with  Mahomed  Alam, 
he  was  recalled  to  Cabnl  and  imprisoned  by  Shere  Ali.  The 
latter  could  not  afford  to  alienate  so  able  a  General,  and  Daond 
Shah  was  soon  released,  but  was  given  no  employment.  When 
Yakub  Khan  rebelled  against  his  father,  Daoud  Shah  officiated  as 
Commander-iu -Chief,  General  Faramurz  Khan,  commanding  the 
Amir's  armies  in  the  field,  having  been  killed  by  Aslam  Khan, 
son  of  the  Dost.  Upon  the  new  settlement  of  Turkistan,  Daoud 
Shah  accompained  Takub  Khan  to  Cabul,  and  reverted  again  to 
the  rank  of  General.  Upon  Takub  Khan's  second  rebellion,  an 
army  was  again  sent  to  Herat,  in  which  Daoud  Shah  was  given  a 
command ;  but  Shere  Ali,  finding  that  he  had  no  able  General  at 
Cabul,  recalled  him  and  entrusted  to  him  the  management  of  all 
army  affairs  in  the  capital.  When  the  Amir  fled  to  Turkistan, 
after  the  capture  of  Ali  Musjid  and  the  Peiwar  Kotal,  Daoud  Shah 
was  left  at  Cabul  with  Yakub  Khan,  and  he  accompanied  the  new 
Amir  to  Gundamak.  He  was  at  the  same  time  made  Commander- 
in-Chief,  and  this  office  he  held  until  the  massacre  of  our  Envoy 
and  Yakub's  flight  to  the  British  camp  at  Kushi.  Of  Daoud 
Shah's  conduct  during  the  attack  upon  the  Residency  nothing 
very  exact  is  known.  He  was  said  to  have  tried,  with  200 
or  800  men,  to  check  the  mutineers.  He  certainly  rode  into 
the  crowd  with  half  a  dozen  attendants ;  but  it  was  then  too  late, 
and  he  was  pulled  off  his  horse  and  beaten  by  the  mutinous  soldiery. 
He  probably  dared  to  take  no  action  without  the  Amir's  orders ; 
and  these,  unfortunately,  were  not  forthcoming.  Daoud  Shah 
favourably  impressed  most  of  us  with  whom  he  came  into  contact, 
his  striking  figure  and  open  manner  being  very  different  from  the 
cringing  obeisance  of  the  Barakzai  sirdars.  During  the  siege  it 
was  deemed  inadvisable  that  he  should  be  at  liberty  in  Sherpur ; 
and  he  was,  accordingly,  placed  under  arrest.  After  such  treat- 
ment it  was,  of  course,  imperative  that  he  should  be  deported  to 
India,  as,  if  at  first  inclined  to  be  faithful  to  the  British,  his  im- 
prisonment must  have  turned  him  against  us.  He  was  undoubtedly 
the  ablest  General  in  the  Afghan  army,  and  his  popularity  among 
the  soldiers  would  always  have  ensured  many  thousands  of  men 
answering  to  his  call  to  arms.  He  is  between  forty  and  fifty 
years  of  age,  and  is  still  an  active,  intelligent  soldier. 


Re-Arrangement  of  Commands.  355 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

Ghangei  in  the  Noiihern  Afgbanistftn  Force — Oompletion  of  the  Chain  of  Forts  aboot 
Oabol — Composition  of  the  Force  on  March  22nd — Arrival  of  Mr.  Lepel  Griffin  at 
Sherpnr — Declaration  of  the  Gfoveniment  Policj — Candahar  and  Herat  to  be  8«par- 
ated  from  Cabal— Discontent  among  the  Borakui  Sirdars— The  Fatnre  of  Herat 
— Advantages  of  the  Ehyber  Route — Aigoments  in  favour  of  the  Annexation  of 
the  Jellalabad  Valley— The  Mostanfi's  Mission  to  the  Gbazni  Malcontents— His 
Partial  Snooess— Assembly  of  the  Chiefs  at  Maidan— The  Dorbar  in  Sherpnr  on 
April  18th— Speeches  by  Sir  Frederick  Roberts  and  Mr.  Lepel  Griffin- The  Policy 
of  the  Government  explained — ^Annexatbn  deprecated — ^Approval  of  the  Policy  in 
Camp — The  Exigency  of  Party  Politics  in  England — ^Abdur  Rahman's  Movements 
at  Kondaz. 

With  the  near  approach  of  spring  there  was  a  recasting  of  the 
commands  between  Gabnl  and  Peshawur,  the  following  being  the 
order  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  directing  the  changes : — 

1.  The  Second  Division  of  the  Cabul  Field  Force,  hitherto  ander  the  command  of 
Major- General  Bright,  C.E,  will  be  broken  np. 

2.  The  Reserve  Division,  under  Msjor-General  Ross,  C.6.,  will  also  be  broken  up, 
and  absorbed  into  the  Line  of  Communications. 

3.  The  Force  in  Cabnl,  under  lieutenant-General  Sir  F.  Roberts,  will  be  divided 
ioto  two  divisions.  1st  Division  under  Sir  P.  Roberts's  immediate  command,  and  the 
2nd  Division  under  Major  General  Roes,  C.  B. 

4.  Major-General  Bright,  C.6.,  is  appointed  Inspector-General  of  the  line  of  com- 
munications, and  will  command  all  troops  thereon  stationery,  in  movable  columns,  or 
passing  along  the  line.  Major-General  Bright  will  report  direct  to  Army  Head* 
Quarters. 

5.  The  Peshawur  District  will  be  temporarily  commanded  by  Brigadier-General 
Hank  in,  4th  Bengal  Cavalry,  hitherto  in  command  of  the  Cavalry  Brigade  Reserve 
Division. 

6.  The  line  of  commnnications  will  be  divided  into  three  sections : — 
1st.— From  Jnmrood  to  Bnsawul  inclusive,  under  Brigadier-General  Gib. 

2nd.  —  From  Busawnl  to  Sofed  Sang,  but  not  inclusive  of  either,  under  Brigadier- 
General  Doran,  C.B. 
3rd. — From  Sofed  Sang  to  Botkhak  inclusive,  under  Brigadier-General  Hill, 

7.  The  General  Staff  for  Major-General  Bright's  command  will  consist  of  :— 

Colonel  Wemyss,  Deputy  Ac^utant  and  Qaartermaster-GenenJ  ; 
Major  Thompson,  Assistant  Adjutant-General ; 
Major  Creagh,  Assistant  Quartermaster-General ; 
Lieutenant  Maiscy,  Deputy  Assistant  Quartermaster-General. 

A    A    2 


356  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

8.  The  Divisional  Staff  onder  Major-Oeneral  Ross,  C.B.,  will  consist  of  :— 

Major  Boyes,  Assistant  Adjntant-Oeneral ; 

Captain  the  Honoarable  C.  Datton,  Assistant  Qoartfrmaster-General ; 
and  a  Deputy  Assistint  Qoartermaster-Qeneral,  to  be  detailed  by  Lientenant-General 
Sir  F.  Roberts. 

9.  Colonel  Evans,  Commanding  Royal  Artillevy  on  Line  of  communications,  will  pro- 
ceed with  the  Staff  to  Cabal  as  commanding  Royal  Artillery,  2ad  DiTiuoo. 

Lientenant-Colonel  Porris,  Royal  Artillery,  taking  np  the  dntiea  of  Commanding 
Royal  Artillery,  under  Major-Gkneral  Bright 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Limond  will  proceed  to  Cabal  as  Commanding  Royal  Engineers, 
2nd  Diyision,  and  Major  Hill  will  assume  the  datiee  of  Commanding  Royal  Engineer  to 
Major-General  Bright. 

10.  Brigadier-Qeneral  Roberts  (5th  Fasiliers)  will  proceed  to  Cabal  to  command  a 
brigade  in  the  2nd  Division. 

11.  Brigadier-General  Arbuthnot,  C.B.,  will  command  the  movable  columns  at 
Jeilalabad  and  Sufed  Stng. 

12.  The  Force  under  Sir  F.  Roberts  in  Cabal  will  be  styled  the  Cabul  Field  Force, 
and  the  Force  onder  M^jor-General  Bright  will  be  styled  the  Khyber  Line  Force. 

These  arrangements  were  all  carried  out;  and  the  foUowhig 
extracts  from  letters  written  in  March  will  indicate  what  was 
occurring  in  and  about  Cabul : — 

Sherpur,  March  drd,  1880. 

Brigadier-Gene]*al  Dunham  Massy  left  for  Peshawur  a  few  days 
ago,  where  he  mil  meet  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  offer  certain 
explanations  of  his  course  of  action  on  December  11th,  which,  it 
is  not  too  much  to  say,  may  modify  the  harsh  step  of  recalling 
him  from  Cabul.  The  greatest  sympathy  is  felt  for  General 
Massy  in  the  force  here ;  and  the  decision  to  be  given  on  what  is 
purely  a  question  for  military  critics  will  be  anxiously  looked  for.^ 
Brigadier-General  Hugh  Gough  has  taken  over  charge  of  the 
Cavalry  Brigade,  his  duties  as  Road  Commandant  being  performed 
by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Mark  Heathcote. 

There  is  no  relaxation  of  the  preparations  for  defending  Sherpur 
and  Cabul  against  all-comers.  Certainly  there  is  not  now  a  weak 
point  in  the  cantonment:  the  gap  at  the  north-west  comer, 
defended  during  the  siege  by  a  trench  and  a  parapet  made  out  of 
Cabuli  gun- wheels,  has  now  been  closed  by  a  wall  six  feet  high  on 

*  I  have  not  gone  at  length  into  the  question  of  Genend  Massy^  recall,  as  there 
were  too  many  points  inrolved  for  the  case  to  be  treated  in  a  work  of  this  kind,  which 
is  only  a  diary  of  the  war.  I  may  state,  however,  that  General  Massy  was  giren  a 
brigade  command  in  India,  which  he  still  retains.  '^ 


Sherpur  made  Impregnable.  357 

• 
the  inner  side  of  the  old  barrier ;  the  bastion  at  the  corner,  par- 
tially destroyed  when  the  mutinous  regiments  blew  up  their 
magazine  on  October  7th,  has  been  put  in  thorough  order ;  a  zig- 
zag wall,  with  traverses,  is  also  being  built  up  on  the  western 
slope  of  the  Bemaru  hills ;  and,  in  addition  to  the  block-house  on 
the  top,  a  platform  has  been  made  for  guns,  guarded  by  a  semi- 
circular wall,  which  will  eventually  be  joined  to  the  zig-zag  run- 
ning up  the  hillside.  Looking  at  these  new  defences,  and  also  at 
the  block-houses  upon  the  Asmai  and  Sherderwaza  Heights — to 
say  nothing  of  the  strong  fort  upon  Siah  Sung — one  is  tempted  to 
ask,  "  What  will  be  the  fate  of  all  these  works  when  we  retire  ?  *' 
We  have  made  Sherpur  practicaUy  impregnable  now  against  any 
attack  unsupported  by  heavy  guns  :  shall  we  leave  it  so,  or  shall 
we  order  up  a  few  tons  of  gun-cotton  from  an  Indian  arsenal,  and 
have  everything  in  readiness  to  blow  its  walls  down  when  it  has 
to  be  abandoned  ?  Perhaps,  as  we  shall  inevitably  be  forced  to 
annex  Cabul  in  a  few  years,  we  may  leave  the  cantonment 
intact,  though  it  would  be  cruelty  to  expect  our  men  to  capture  it, 
say  in  1888,  unless  it  had  been  well-pounded  by  a  battery  of 
40-pounders  from  Siah  Sung.  But,  for  all  outsiders  may  know, 
there  may  be  a  plan  lying  cut  and  dry  in  some  secret  drawer  of 
our  Chief  Engineer's  despatch-box,  in  which  the  fate  of  Sherpur 
and  its  surroundings  has  been  once  for  all  decided.  Colonel 
Perkins  has  certainly  been  indefatigable  in  creating  new  defences ; 
perhaps  he  may  show  equal  energy  in  destroying  the  work  of  his 
own  hand  when  the  time  comes.* 

March  21«f. 

The  garrison  of  Cabul  has  been  largely  reinforced,  and  we  have 
at  last  nearly  12,000  troops  here.  The  45th  Sikhs  and  the  27th 
Pdnjabees,  who  marched  in  from  Butkhak  on  Friday,  are  now 
encamped  on  the  Siah  Sung  Ridge,  and  are  holding  the  new  fort 
built  thereon.  The  45th  Sikhs  have,  for  the  time  being,  been 
attached  to  General  Macpherson's  Brigade,  and  the  27th  Punjab 
In&ntry  to  General  Charles  Gough's.  The  various  forts  we 
have  built  upon  Asmai  and  Sherderwaza  Heights  have  had  their 

*  At  Abdar  lUhman's  reqoett  all  the  forts,  &c,,  were  left  intact  when  Sir  Donald 
Stewart  left  Cabal  in  AngnsU 


358 


The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 


garrisons  told  o£f  to  them,  and  are  at  present  held  by  half  the 
number  of  men  assigned  to  guard  them  in  case  of  a  new  outbreak. 
Each  fort  is  being  stored  with  seven  days*  provisions  and  water, 
and  a  liberal  quantity  of  ammunition;  and  the  garrisons  are 
warned  against  using  any  of  the  reserve  stores  until  necessity 
arises.  The  fort  on  A.smai  is  practically  impregnable ;  even 
our  artillery  could  not  hope  to  make  any  impression  upon  it. 
The  walls  are  twelve  feet  thick ;  and  to  carry  it  by  assault,  if  at  all 
well  defended,  would  be  impossible.  Our  cavalry  are  also  showing 
themselves  in  the  country  about,  to  convince  the  people  that  we  are 
on  the  alert,  and  also  to  enable  the  3rd  Bengal  Cavalry  and  the 
Guides  to  become  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  nature  of  the 
ground  they  may  have  to  act  over.  Last  week  all  the  available 
troopers  and  sowars  in  cantonment  went  out  into  Chardeh  and 
over  the  ground  where  the  9th  Lancers  and  14th  Bengal  Lancers 
made  their  gallant  charge  on  December  11th.  Our  infantry  are 
also  marched  out  occasionally,  to  get  the  men  a  little  into  condition, 
and  they  go  swinging  along  over  the  dusty  roads  in  the  same  grand 
style  they  have  shown  since  they  left  Ali  Kheyl  six  months  ago. 
Drafts  for  the  9th  and  72nd  are  now  on  their  way  up  from  Peshawur, 
and  soon  we  shall  have  each  regiment  mustering  about  900  ban- 
quets. All  the  men  here  are  very  fit  and  hardy  after  the  winter, 
and  are  quite  ready  for  another  bout  of  fighting  to  relieve  the  mono- 
tony, which  is  now  becoming  rather  trying.  No.  1  Mountain 
Battery  is  to  be  relieved  by  the  6-8th,  the  screw-gun  battery  which 
did  such  good  seiTice  in  the  Zaimukht  country  with  General 
Tytler  ;  and  the  8rd  Punjab  Cavalry  and  17th  Bengal  Cavalry  are 
to  come  up  to  make  our  cavalry  brigade  complete.  The  strength 
of  the  Cabul  garrison  (including  the  outpost  at  Butkhak)  was 
yesterday  about  11,600  officers  and  men.  The  details  of  the 
force  are :  — 


BUTKHAK. 


2.9ihPoot 

5th  Punjab  Infantry 
17th  Bengal  CaTalry 


Mr.  Lepel  Griffin  at  CabuL 


359 


SHERPUR, 


Officers. 

Men. 

P.A,  Royal  Horse  Artillery         

6 

162 

G-8,  Royal  Artillery         

6 

178 

No.  1  Mountain  Battery 

4 

138 

No.  2  Mountain  Battery 

5 

201 

Hazara  Mountain  Battery 

4 

151 

9th  Lancers           

17 

287 

3rd  Bengal  Gayalry          

8 

372 

Guides' Cavalry 

4 

275 

2-9thFoot 

16 

442 

67t»iFoot 

25 

721 

72nd  Foot 

19 

691 

92nd  Foot, 

20 

681 

23rd  Pioneers        

8 

759 

28th  Punjab  Infantry      

8 

651 

3rd  Sikhs 

10 

684 

5th  Punjab  Infantry        

7 

476 

5thGhoorka8        

8 

636 

2nd  Ghoorkas        

7 

532 

4thGhoorkas        

7 

692 

24th  Punjab  Infantry       

8 

717 

45th  Sikhs 

8 

670 

Guides*  Infantry 

6 

607 

The  two  companies  of  sappers  and  miners  which  belong  to  this 
division,  but  are  now  at  Luttabund,  are  about  160  strong.  Staff 
and  departmental  officers  number  90.  The  draft  for  the  9tli 
Foot  is  820  men,  and  for  the  72nd  Highlanders  about  200. 
The  artillery  musters  twelve  O-pounders  and  fourteen  7-pounders. 
I  give  the  details  of  our  strength  here,  so  that,  in  case  of  any 
further  operations,  the  force  at  General  Roberts's  disposal  may  bo 
estimated  at  its  proper  value. 

On  Friday  Sir  F.  Boberts  met  Mr.  Lepel  Crriffin  on  the  road  to 
Luttabund,  and  the  General  and  his  new  Political  Officer  rode  on 
to  Sherpur  together  in  the  afternoon.  Sir  F.  Boberts  ordered  a 
guard  of  honour  (one  company  of  the  6th  Punjab  Infantry)  to 
escort  Mr.  Lepel  Griffin  from  Siah  Sung  to  the  cantonment.  This 
unusual  honour  was  paid  to  the  Political  Officer  in  order  that  the 
local  sirdars  might  be  duly  impressed  with  a  sense  of  his  dignity. 
The  said  sirdars  turned  out  in  great  force,  with  their  usual  tag- 
rag  of  followers,  and  formed  a  picturesque  qvieut  in  rear  of  the 
General. 


360  The  Afghan  War,   1879—80. 

25t&  Marclu 

Mr.  Lepel  Griffin  has  made  known  to  the  Barakzai  sirdars  here 
what  is  to  be  the  future  of  Afghanistan;  and  although  many 
details  of  the  scheme  sanctioned  by  the  Goyemment  of  India 
cannot,  of  course,  yet  be  settled,  the  outline  is  distinct  enough. 
As  to  the  difficulties  to  be  overcome  before  the  new  arrangements 
mature,  they  are  incidental  to  our  position  as  conquerors  of  Cabul, 
and  will  be  dealt  with  either  diplomatically,  or  by  force  of  arms, 
according  to  the  temper  of  the  tribal  chiefs  and  others.  As  Mr. 
Griffin's  short  speech  to  Wali  Mahomed  Ehan,  Hashim  Khan, 
and  the  other  Barakzai  sirdars  was  of  an  informal  kind — though 
necessarily  carrying  weight  as  an  exposition  of  Government  policy 
— ^I  am  only  able  to  give  its  general  purport,  about  which 
there  can  be  no  manner  of  doubt.  It  was  to  the  effect  that 
certain  wrong  impressions  had  got  abroad  concerning  Yakub  Khan 
and  his  possible  return  to  Cabul.  Such  return  the  Government 
had  decided  could  under  no  conditions  take  place ;  tribal  chiefs 
and  their  followers  had  believed  that  if  a  sufficient  turmoil  were 
kept  up,  and  turbulent  demands  made  persistently  for  Yakub 
Kban's  return,  that  end  might  be  gained.  This  was  a  total  mis- 
take. The  ex- Amir  would  never  be  allowed  to  resume  the  power 
ho  had  forfeited,  and  all  disturbances  with  that  object  would  be 
unavailing.  It  had  also  been  found  that  during  three  genera- 
tions the  Durani  sovereigns  of  Cabul  had  been  unable,  or  unwill- 
ing, to  carry  out  treaty  obligations  with  India,  and  it  had  now 
been  decided  that  their  power  should  be  curtailed  and  certain  sub- 
divisions tnade  of  Afghanistan.  While  the  British  Government 
had  no  desire  to  annex  the  country,  they  were  resolved  that  Can- 
dahar  and  Herat  must  henceforth  no  longer  appertain  to  the 
sovereign  of  Afghanistan.  They  would  be  separate  and  distinct, 
and  the  future  ruler  of  Cabul  would  have  to  look  upon  them  as 
removed  from  his  jurisdiction.*  It  had  also  been  determined 
that  the  army  of  occupation  should  remain  in  Afghanistan  until 
a  new  ruler  had  been  appointed  strong  enough  to  accept  and  carry 
out  the  obligations  to  be  imposed  upon  him,  and  such  a  ruler 
would  have  to  be  found.    He  must  be  strong  enough  to  ensure  the 

*  Tliia  WM  the  polioj  Lord  Igriton  intended  to  eany  oni. 


Intimation  of  British  Policy,  361 

protection  of  such  Afghans  as  were  the  friends  of  the  British,  in 
order  that,  when  the  army  withdrew,  there  might  not  be  a  risk  of 
snch  men  suffering  for  their  fidelity  to  us.  Our  friends  must 
be  the  friends  of  any  ruler  placed  in  power,  and  he  must  be  pre- 
pared to  protect  them. 

Such  is  the  distinct  enunciation  of  what  is  to  happen  here,  and, 
as  might  have  been  expected,  it  is  not  altogether  palatable  to  the 
Barakzai  sirdars.  One  and  all  are  glad  that  Yakub  Khan  is  not 
to  return  ;  he  has  never  been  a  favourite  with  his  kinsmen  since 
Shore  Ali's  death,  and  they  would  look  upon  his  re-assumption  of 
power  as  fatal  to  all  their  hopes.  But  they  feel,  and  it  is  only 
right  they  should  feel,  keenly  enough,  the  curtailment  of  the 
power  hitherto  Tested  in  the  hands  of  the  Amir.  Hashim  Khan, 
who  has  been  buoyed  up  with  the  idea  that  his  chance  of  the 
Amirship  was  a  very  good  one — though  I  must  add,  in  justice  to 
all  our  officials,  that  he  has  never  received  even  a  hint  from  them 
of  what  might  be  in  store  for  him — showed  considerable  suUenness 
when  he  heard  upon  what  terms  the  next  Amir  would  have  to 
accept  power  at  our  hands.  He  did  not  scruple  to  say  openly  that 
it  would  be  impossible  to  guarantee  the  safety  of  any  faction 
friendly  to  the  British  when  our  army  had  marched  back  to  India. 
No  doubt  he  holds  this  view  as  honestly  as  an  Afghan  can  be  said  to 
have  honesty  at  all ;  but  he  might  modify  it  when  he  sees  that 
such  a  condition  will  be  insisted  upon,  and  no  half-hearted  promise 
accepted.  Hashim  Ehan  has  further  said  that,  in  freeing  Gandahar 
and  Herat  from  their  suz^r^inty  to  Cabul,  we  are  reducing  the 
Amir  fron  the  status  of  a  king  to  that  of  a  Nawab.  Herat  has 
always  been  considered  the  key  of  Turkistan  and  of  Southern 
Afghanistan,  and  to  surrender  it  either  to  Persia  or  to  an  inde- 
pendent ruler  would  be  a  severe  blow  to  the  Durani  dynasty. 
Again,  Hashim  Ehan  says  that  to  expect  a  Durani  sovereign  in 
Cabul  to  hold  his  ovm  against  the  turbulent  tribes  in  the  imme- 
diate district,  when  he  has  been  deprived  of  the  great  support  he 
receives  from  the  strong  Durani  factions  about  Gandahar,  is  an 
impossibility.  It  is  true  that  the  Duranis  are  most  numerous  in 
Southern  Afghanistan,  and  at  first  sight  the  objection  seems  tenable 
enough ;  but  Hashim  Khan  has  forgotten  that,  by  our  occupation 
of  Gandahar,  any  Amir  of  Gabul  will  receive  our  countenance  and 


362  The  Afgfian  War,  1879-80. 

support  from  that  quarter^  and  this  will  be  as  well  known  to  the 
turbulent  spirits  of  Eohistan,  Logar,  and  Wardak,  as  to  the 
Durani  faction  itself.  Hashim  Khan's  sullenness  would  be  of  no 
importance  were  it  not  that  he  is  the  only  man  with  a  spark  of 
ability  among  the  Barakzais  now  with  us  in  Gabul ;  and  as  I  have 
said  in  previous  letters,  he  has  been  faTOurably  thought  of  in  our 
plans  for  settling  the  country  on  a  firm  basis.  If  he  will  not 
accept  our  terms,  he  will  inevitably  be  passed  over,  as  far  as  the 
Amirship  is  concerned,  for  the  work  now  before  us  has  to  be  done 
so  thoroughly  that  all  danger  of  another  ^sco,  such  as  the  treaty 
of  Gundamak  proved,  must  be  guarded  against. 

Taking  the  broad  lines  laid  down  by  Mr.  Lepel  Griffin,  a  fore- 
^  cast  of  what  is  likely  to  happen  in  Afghanistan — putting  aside 
]^urely  military  complications,  which  I  will  turn  to  afterwards — 
may  fairly  be  given.  That  such  a  forecast  must  be  tinged  with 
conjecture  is,  of  course,  unavoidable ;  but  still,  perhaps,  a  fair 
estimate  of  the  situation  may  be  given.  Candahar  will  be  retained 
in  our  possession,  but  Herat  will  not  yet  be  annexed.  Its  future 
will  more  probably  be  that  of  an  independent  city,  with  an  impor- 
tant mission  to  fufil  in  Central  Asian  politics.  History  is  full  of 
instances  of  cities  maintaining  their  independence,  and  rising  in 
course  of  time  to  the  rank  of  Great  Powers.  Witness  Venice,  once 
one  of  the  first  maritime  Powers  in  Europe.  Herat  is  self- 
supporting,  and  is  situated  in  so  fertile  a  district  that  its  wealth 
of  produce  is  a  proverb  among  Asiatics.  Its  strength  as  a  military 
post  is  greater  than  that  of  any  city  in  Afghanistan  ;  it  could  be 
defended  against  great  odds  with  almost  a  certainty  of  coming  out 
victorious  from  the  struggle.  If  we  were  to  declare  that  it  is  to  be 
independent,  and  to  guarantee  such  independence  against  all- 
comers, its  future  would  be  assured.  That  this  may  be  done  is 
within  the  bounds  of  possibility,  and  we  should  give  it  a  Governor 
who  could  be  trusted  to  carry  out  our  wishes.  Being  our  nominee, 
and  relying  upon  us  for  support  in  time  of  need,  he  would  jealously 
guard  against  encroachments  on  his  privileges ;  and  would  scarcely 
dare  to  risk  loss  of  authority  by  disobeying  any  wishes  we  might 
make  known  to  him.  To  do  so  would  be  madness  with  a  British 
army  at  Candahar  drawing  its  reinforcements  by  railway  from 
India ;  and  the  Heratis  themselves  finding  security  and  enormously- 


Probable  Results,  363 

iocreased  trade  resulting  from  their  new  position  of  independence^ 

would  probably  be  on  the  alert  to  check  intrigues  against  their 

autonomy.  So  far  as  regards  Southern  and  Western  Afghanistan  : 

there  remain  the  eastern  and  northern  provinces  to  be  dealt  with, 

and  here  conjecture  must  be  indulged  in.  -  Cabul  will  be  freed 

from  the  presence  of  our  army  when  a  new  Afghan  Govemment 

has  been  created;  but  that  our  forces  will  retire  behind  Lundi 

Kotal  is  most  improbable.    By  general  consent,  the  Khyber  route 

seems  to  be  recognized  as  that  most  adapted  for  communication, 

hostile  or  otherwise,  with  Cabul ;  the  Kurram  route  is  woiihless 

during  several  months  of  the  year,  and  Thull  as  a  base  has  not  a 

single  advantage.     It  then  remains    for    consideration  whether 

Lundi  Kotal  is  sufficiently  advanced  for  our  purpose.     To  enable 

our  influence  to  be  supreme  at  Cabul,  we  must  put  ourselves  in 

such  a  position  that  our  army  shall  always  be  within  hail  of  the 

city.     Lundi    Eotal  certainly   does  not  give  such    a   position ; 

Jellalabad  is  much  better,  but  its  climate  is  so  gi*eat  a  di*a\^'back 

that  it  also  drops  out  of  consideration  as  an  advanced  post — 

such  a  post  being  on  the  plan  of  a  large  fortified  camp,  holding  a 

force  fully  equipped  in  the  matter  of  ammunition,  supplies,  and 

transport,  and  ready  to  move  at  the  shortest  notice.     Gundamak, 

or  a  position  on  the  hills  near,  would  unquestionably  give  the  site 

for  the  new  outpost  on  the  north-west  frontier  of  India,  and  its 

connection  with  Peshawur  might  be  not  by  Jellalabad,  but  by  the 

valleys  along  the  northern  slopes  of  the   Safed  Koh,  viz.,  via 

Maizena  and  Peshbolak.     The  Lughman  route  would  involve  a 

strong  garrison  at  Jellalabad,  which  is  to  be  avoided  if  possible. 

Besides,  Lughman  cannot  compare  with  the  fertile  valleys  in  the 

shadow  of  the  Safed  Koh,  wherein  grain,  forage,  fuel,  and  water 

are  abundant.    I  can  speak  from  personal  experience  of  Maizena 

and  Peshbolak,  having  visited  them  during  the  last  campaign ; 

and  if  the  pacification  of  the  Shinwaris  were  once  assured,  the 

route  would  teem  with  advantages  which  cannot  be  found  on  the 

Jellalabad  Boad.     It  would  not  be  a  task  more  difficult  to  reduce 

the  Shinwaris  to  a  state  of  quietude  than  it  was  to  convince  the 

Afridis  of  the  uselessness  of  molesting  us  in  the  Khyber.    As 

there  is  always  a  great  outcry  against  annexation,  it  might  be 

worth  while  to  abandon  Kurram,  merely  taking  a  quid  pro  quo  in 


364  The  Afg/ian  War,  1879—80. 

the  Jellalabad  Valley.  That  this  will  absolutely  be  done,  is  very 
problematical ;  but  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  Government  will  be 
strong  enough  to  disregard  any  non-annexation  outcry  if  the  pre- 
ponderance of  opinion,  both  among  our  military  and  political 
experts,  is  in  favour  of  the  holding  of  Gundamak.* 

Uh  April. 

The  Mustaufi,  Habibulla  Khan,  who  was  sent  by  General  Roberts 
some  weeks  ago  to  negotiate  with  the  Ghazni  malcontents,  and 
induce  them  to  state  what  their  demands  really  were,  has  returned 
to  Sherpur  and  reported  that  he  has  the  majority  of  the  chiefs 
now  at  Maidan,  and  they  are  willing  to  attend  a  Durbar.  Young 
Musa  Khan  has,  however,  been  left  at  Ghazni  with  Mushk-i-Alam. 
When  General  Roberts  first  proposed  to  Habibulla  Khan  to  go  to 
Ghazni,  and  sound  the  temper  of  the  malcontent  leaders,  with  a  view 
to  arrange  some  basis  upon  which  the  settlement  of  Afghanistan 
could  be  carried  out,  the  answer  was  that  it  would  be  useless — ^the 
irreconcilables  would  not  listen  to  him.  There  the  matter  ended 
for  the  time  being,  but  some  weeks  afterwards  the  Mustaufi  volun- 
tarily visited  the  General,  and  said  that  he  was  willing  to  go  to  his 
home  in  Wardak,  whence  he  could  judge  if  it  were  possible  to 
gather  the  tribal  chiefs  together  for  purposes  of  consultation.  He 
accordingly  set  out,  and  for  the  past  two  months  we  have  heard 
strange  rumours  of  what  was  happening  in  Wardak  and  Ghazni. 
The  Mustaufi  now  reports  that,  on  arriving  at  his  home  in  Wardak, 
he  fell  ill,  and  for  some  time  was  unable  to  do  anything  in  the 
way  of  negotiation.  Upon  recovering,  he  began  to  sound  the 
various  Wardak  chiefs  as  to  their  views,  and  was  careful  to  point 
out  the  folly  of  resistance,  now  that  the  British  had  received  large 
reinforcements  and  had  strengthened  Sherpur  and  the  heights 
above  Cabul.  At  first,  no  one  would  listen  to  him,  so  he  proceeded 
to  Ghazni  to  interview  Mahomed  Jan,  young  Tahir  Khan  (half- 
brother   of  Hashim    Khan),  and    finally   Mushk-i-Alam.    Here 

*  The  Afghans  eaonot,  of  coarse,  be  expected  to  ondentaDd  the  principle  of  party- 
goYerament  at  hom^ ;  the  defeat  of  the  Conterrative  partj  and  the  recall  of  Lord 
Ljtton  put  an  end  to  soch  ideas  as  the  retention  of  Candahar  and  the  maintenance  of 
the  scientific  frontier.  Oar  change  of  policy  was  misonderstood  generallj  in  A^^^ianis- 
tan,  where,  to  this  day,  it  is  believed  we  were  too  weak  to  cnrry  oat  oar  original  plans. 


The  Malcontent  Sirdars  at  Ghaznu  365 

also  he  met  with  but  little  success :  MahomedJan  would  not  adopt 
his  views,  but  talked  of  a  new  jehad,  and  the  driving  of  the 
British  out  of  the  country :  the  success  of  the  first  few  weeks  of 
December  was  to  be  repeated  on  a  larger  scale,  and  every  tribes- 
man  was  to  rise  from  Ghazni  to  Jellalabad.  Against  such  tall 
talk  the  Mustaufi  could  only  urge  that  the  jehad  would  come  to 
as  bitter  and  humiliating  an  end  as  the  previous  one  had  done  on 
December  23rd,  when  the  force  sent  to  attack  Sherpur  had  been 
beaten  off  with  great  loss.  Then  Mahomed  Jan  veered  round 
slightly,  and  said  he  would  abandon  all  idea  of  fighting  if  Yakub 
Ehan  were  reinstated,  or  Musa  Ehan  created  Amir.  The  former 
scheme,  he  was  told,  was  impossible ;  the  latter  might  possibly  be 
considered.  The  Mustaufi  was  much  hindered  in  his  work  by 
young  Tahir  Ehan,  who  had  Musa  Khan  in  his  keeping.  This 
young  sirdar  cordially  hates  his  half-brother,  Hashim  Ehan ;  and 
as  he  knew  Habibulla  was  working  solely  in  the  latter's  interest, 
he  tried  to  thwart  him  in  everyway.  This  game  of  cross-purposes 
would  have  been  most  interesting  to  an  outsider  if  all  the  intri- 
cacies of  the  intrigues  could  have  been  understood ;  but  it  must 
sorely  have  tried  the  temper  of  the  Mustaufi,  who  had  everything 
to  gain  by  bringing  the  malcontents  to  look  at  matters  from  his 
point  of  view.  He  was,  however,  more  than  a  match  for  a  drunken 
debauchee,  such  as  Mahomed  Jan  and  an  inexperienced  youth  like 
Tahir  Ehan.  Turning  his  attention  to  Mushk-i-Alam,  he  used 
different  arguments  to  those  employed  with  the  military  leaders  of 
the  disaffected.  He  showed  to  the  old  mooUah  that  the  only  way 
of  getting  rid  of  the  infidels  (whom  he  hated  just  as  much  as  any 
reckless  fanatic)  was  by  negotiation,  and  not  by  resistance  :  the 
former  course  might  put  Cabul  once  more  into  a  position  of 
importance ;  the  latter  only  could  result  in  disaster  to  Afghanistan, 
as  the  British  forces  were  daily  growing  in  strength,  and  it  was 
fully  intended  to  capture  Ghazni  from  the  Candahar  direction,  and 
punish  every  tribe  showing  overt  hostility.  The  moollah  was  half- 
convinced,  and  was  left  in  such  a  frame  of  mind  that  good  results 
might  be  looked  for.  Then  Habibulla  Ehan  turned  his  attention 
to  the  powerful  chiefs  of  his  own  tribe,  and  by  means  which  we 
are  ignorant  of,  won  them  all  over  to  his  side.  Tbey,  perhaps, 
scented  future  rewards  and  great  power  in  the  direction  of  the 


366  TIte  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

State  when  their  kinBman  should  be  Finance  Minister  of  a  new 
Amir,  and  they  announced  themselves  as  prepared  to  consult  with 
the  British  npon  the  subject  of  a  future  Goyemment.  The  example 
of  the  Wardak  chiefs  was  contagious,  and  soon  the  Logar  maiiki 
made  common  cause  with  them.  Mahomed  Jan  thus  saw  himself 
being  deserted  by  the  tribes  upon  whom  he  had  mainly  relied,  and 
he  at  last  promised  to  accompany  the  Mustaufi  to  Maidan  to  take 
part  in  a  great  tribal  Durbar,  although  he  refrained  from  pledging 
himself  to  any  fixed  decision.  Just  about  this  time  the  Hazaras 
raided  upon  Nani,  south  of  Ghazni,  and  the  Mustaufi  was  in  fear 
that  all  his  arrangements  would  be  upset,  as  Mahomed  Jan  started 
to  repel  the  raiders.  From  that  point  much  uncertainty  as  to  what 
was  really  occurring  was  felt  in  Sherpur ;  and  as  it  was  known  that 
Mr.  Lepel  Griffin's  declaration  of  the  partition  of  Afghanistan 
had  been  sullenly  received  even  by  Hashim  Khan,  it  was  not 
unnaturally  supposed  that  the  Mustaufi  would  be  left  in  the  lurch 
by  the.  chiefs  who  had  pledged  themselves  to  follow  his  instruc- 
tions. 

Yesterday  HabibuUa  Khan  rode  from  Maidan  to  Sherpur,  and 
all  doubts,  so  far  as  regards  the  chiefs  being  at  Maidan,  are  set 
at  rest.  He  reports  that  he  left  there  all  the  headmen  of  War- 
dak, Logar,  Ahmadzai  Ghilzais,  and  Zurmut  (the  district  east  of 
Ghazni  towards  Khost),  together  with  Mahomed  Jan,  Mir  Butcha, 
Eohistani ;  Mahomed  Hasan  Khan,  ex-Governor  of  Jellalabad  ; 
Sirdars  Tahir  Khan,  Alim  Khan,  Surwar  Khan,  and  other  notables, 
including  Generals  Aslam  Khan,  Gholam  Jan,  and  Kurrim  Khan, 
who  fought  against  us  at  Gharasia. 

The  news  that  General  Sir  Donald  Stewart  with  a  large  force 
left  Candahar  a  week  ago  for  Ghazni  has  undoubtedly  had  an 
effect  upon  these  men.  It  is  difficult  to  see  what  our  own  policy 
will  be  hereafter,  as  the  change  of  Government  at  home  may 
bring  about  quite  a  new  departure.  All  General  Roberts  and 
Mr.  Lepel  Griffin  can  do  is  to  endeavour  to  gain  the  ear  of  the 
chiefs,  and  to  obtain  a  knowledge  of  their  wishes  in  the  matter  of 
a  settled  Government.  The  chiefs  now  at  Maidan  will  be  asked 
to  attend  a  Durbar,  shortly  to  be  held  in  Sherpur.  Mr.  A.  C. 
Lyall,  Foreign  Secretary,  has  paid  a  flying  visit  to  Cabul,  and  is 
now  on  his  way  back  to  India. 


They  come  into  CabuL  367 

The  Darbar  for  the  reception  of  such  of  the  chiefs  as  chose  to 
come  in  has,  at  last,  been  held,  and  the  fullest  declaration  yet 
made  of  the  intentions  of  the  Government  of  India  has  been 
listened  to  by  the  Cabul  sirdars  and  the  men  whom  the  Mustaufl 
has  induced  to  visit  Sherpur.  It  may  be  as  well,  once  for  all,  to 
state  that  the  chiefs  represented  only  a  minority  of  the  tribes- 
men, although  a  paper  of  requests  which  they  have  presented  was 
signed  by  nearly  all  the  Wardak,  Logar,  and  Southern  Ghilzai 
maliks.  The  Mustaufi's  personal  interest  in  Wardak  was  suffi- 
ciently strong  to  bring  many  of  his  kinsmen  in  ;  but  Mahomed 
Jan's  brother,  who  is  head  of  the  clan,  would  not  accompany  the 
rest,  considering  his  signature  quite  enough  for  all  practical  pur- 
poses. Mahomed  Jan  himself  would  have  come  in  willingly  if  a 
khiUut  had  been  promised  and  certain  honours  paid  to  him  as  a 
successful  General ;  but  this  we  very  sensibly  declined  to  do,  and 
he  is  now  out  in  the  cold.  Mahomed  Hasan  Khan,  ex-Governor 
of  Jellalabad,  also  declined  at  the  last  moment,  as  he  will  have 
no  one  but  Yakub  Khan  as  Amir ;  while  Mir  Butcha  and  Surwar 
Khan,  Purwani,  are  too  busy,  levying  men  in  Kohistan  for  Abdur 
Rahman's  army,  to  think  of  wasting  their  time  at  Sherpur.  We 
had  then,  really,  at  the  Durbar  representatives  of  the  Wardak, 
Logar,  Zurmut,  and  Koli-Dahman  people,  or  sections  of  the 
people,  and  also  all  the  Barakzai  sirdars  with  us  in  Cabul,  as 
well  as  the  three  Sirdars — Surwar  Khan,  Tahir  Khan,  and  Alim 
Khan — who  have  been  taking  care  of  young  Musa  Jan,  at  Ghazni, 
in  the  hope  that  he  might  some  day  be  made  Amir  by  the 
British. 

The  Durbar  was  held  in  a  large  tent  pitched  near  the  Engineers' 
Park  in  Sherpur.  The  sirdars  and  maliks  rode  into  Sherpur 
from  the  city  at  eleven  o'clock,  and  spent  their  time  until  three 
o'clock  in  discussing  current  events  and  admiring  each  other's 
wonderful  raiment.  They  were  marshalled  in  due  order  in  the 
Durbar  tent  before  four  o'clock,  Wali  Mahomed,  Governor  of  the 
city,  being  placed  on  the  right  of  the  seats  assigned  to  Sir  F. 
Roberts  and  Mr.  Lepel  GWffin,  the  Mustaufi  and  the  Nawab  Gho- 
1am  Hussain  being  just  in  rear  ;   while  Sirdar  Hashim  Khan, 


368  The  AfgJian  War,  1879—80. 

Abdnlla  Ehan,  and  the  other  loyal  Barakzai  princes  were  given 
chairs  on  the  right.  The  tribal  chiefs  squatted  on  the  ground  just 
within  the  shadow  of  the  tent,  while  such  British  officers  as 
chose  to  attend  were  seated  on  the  General's  left.  Oeneral  Boss, 
commanding  the  2nd  Division,  and  the  Brigadiers,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  General  Baker,  who  is  lying  ill  from  an  attack  of  fever, 
were  among  the  British  officers  present.  A  guard  of  honour  of 
100  men  of  the  72nd  Highlanders,  with  their  band,  were  drawn 
up — bayonets  fixed,  and  ball  ammunition  in  their  pouches— on 
the  road  leading  from  the  General's  gateway  ;  while  small  parties 
of  the  3rd  Sikhs  and  5th  Ghoorkas  were  stationed  in  rear  of  the 
tent  as  an  extra  precaution.  Afghan  fanaticism  takes,  at  times, 
such  determined  shape  that  even  in  a  Durbar  a  ghazi  might  de- 
clare himself ;  and  it  was  therefore  only  wise  to  be  ready  for  an 
emergency.  It  would  have  fared  ill  with  any  fanatic  who  might 
have  attempted  to  amuse  himself  preparatory  to  entering  Para- 
dise, for  the  Highlanders,  Sikhs,  and  Ghoorkas  are  too  old 
soldiers  to  care  for  a  knife-cut  when  their  bayonets  are  ready 
for  use.  Sir  Frederick  Roberts,  with  his  personal  Staff,  and  Mr. 
Lepel  Griffin,  Chief  Political  Officer,  walked  from  the  head- 
quarters to  the  tent ;  and  as  the  General  entered  after  the  usual 
honours  from  the  guard  outside,  the  sirdars  and  maliks  rose  to 
their  feet  and  made  obeisance  with  true  Oriental  humility.  The 
scene  was  picturesque  enough,  and  yet  there  was  a  grim  touch  of 
irony  in  the  surroundings;  for,  preceding  the  General,  came 
eight  Highlanders  with  the  inevitable  fixed  bayonets,  who  opened 
out  on  either  hand  in  the  tent,  and  stood  to  attention  in  the  space 
between  the  chiefs  and  the  British  officers.  Sir  Frederick  Roberts's 
native  orderlies,  two  long-limbed  Sikhs,  two  wiry  Pathans,  and  a 
pair  of  fierce  little  Ghoorkas,  who  are  always  to  be  found  at  the 
General's  heels,  took  up  their  places  behind  him,  their  bayonets 
shining  out  among  the  gold-laced  caps  of  the  Staff  and  the  un- 
dress uniforms  of  the  officers  of  the  garrison  whom  curiosity 
had  prompted  to  be  present.  After  the  preliminary  shuffling  and 
gathering  up  of  robes,  the  Afghan  notables  followed  the  General's 
example  and  quietly  sat  down,  the  maliks  falling  upon  their 
knees  and  folding  their  hands  in  an  attitude  of  great  attention. 
There  was  not  much  to  attract  notice  either  in  their  faces   or 


Atid  are  Received  in  Duriar.  369 

demeanour :  they  were  merely  commonplace  men,  waiting  respect- 
fully upon  the  General's  pleasure ;  but  there  was  presently  a  stir 
among  them  when  the  names  of  Surwar  Ehan,  Tahir  Khan,  and 
Alim  Khan  were  called  out.  These  three  sirdars  were  presented 
to  the  General  by  Mr.  Griffin,  and  after  shaking  hands  and 
making  respectful  bows  they  returned  to  their  places.  Tahir  Khan 
is  a  young  man  of  nineteen  or  twenty,  with  a  sullen  expression  of 
face,  and  with  none  of  the  dignity  of  a  prince  :  he  might,  with  a 
little  trouble,  be  made  to  look  like  a  decent  Cabuli  nyce ;  but  even 
then  he  would  be  a  poor  figure  among  his  compeers  of  the  stable. 
Sir  Frederick  Roberts  did  not  receive  any  of  the  tribal  chiefs, 
whose  position,  indeed,  would  not  haye  warranted  such  an  atten- 
tion, but  immediately  opened  the  Durbar  by  a  short  speech, 
greatly  to  the  purpose.    He  said : — 

'*SlBI>AB8  ASTD  IliLUU, 

"  I  am  very  glad  to  meet  yon  here  to-daj,  eipeeiallj  those  who  throogh  the  good 
offices  of  the  Mostanfi  have  been  induced  to  come  into  Cabal  to  make  their  wiahee 
known  to  me.  I  tmst  this  Durbar  it  the  beginning  of  the  end,  and  that  it  will  now  be 
potflible  for  ns  to  enter  into  inch  an  arrangement  with  the  people  of  Afghanistan  as 
will  ensore  an  hononrable  peace  and  lasting  friendship  between  them  and  the  British. 
Some  of  yon,  I  nnderstand,  hesitated  to  aooompany  the  Mostanfi,  fearing  yonr  treat- 
ment and  reception  by  ns  might  not  be  soeh  as  we  had  promised  yon,  and  that  some 
evil  might  befidl  yon.  Ton  need  noTer  have  any  snch  fear  when  yonr  safety  has  been 
assured  on  the  word  of  a  British  officer.  The  British  do  not  say  one  thing  and  mean 
another.  Ton  who  have  come  in  have  been  honourably  treated,  and  after  this  Dnrbar 
yon  are  all  at  liberty  to  depart.  I  tmst,  when  yon  leave  Cabal,  yoa  will  carry  away 
with  yon  a  more  friendly  feeling  towards  as  than  some  of  yon  hitherto  entertained ; 
and  that  those  of  yonr  party  who  are  still  holding  aloof  will  be  wise  enoagh  to  follow  the 
good  example  yoa  have  set  them,  and  will  accept  our  inyitation  to  come  into  Cabal. 
Mr.  Lepel  Qriffin,  Chief  Political  Officer  in  North  and  Eastern  Afghanistan,  with  whom 
yon  have  already  become  aoqoMoted,  will  now,  on  the  part  of  the  GoTcmment  of  India, 
answer  the  request  yon  haye  made." 

This  speech  having  been  translated  into  Persian,  Mr*  Lepel 
Griffin  addressed  the  chiefs.  His  speech,  delivered  in  Persian,  was 
to  the  following  effect : — 

"  Snu>ABa,  EHiirs,  aitd  Milks  of  Cabul, 

*'  It  has  been  my  wish,  for  some  time  past,  to  meet  yoo  all  in  Darba/,  and  to 
explain  to  yon  coUectiTely  and  pablidy,  as  I  hare  already  done  prirately,  the  intentiona 
of  the  British  GoTemment  with  regard  to  the  settlement  of  Afghanistan.  This  is  a 
faTonrable  opportanity,  when  replies  have  been  given  to  the  request  of  certain  chiefs 
and  maliU  in  the  neighboorhood  of  Ohaxni  who  have  been  long  hostile,  but  who  haye, 

B   B 


370  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

at  last,  Iktened  to  the  advice  of  the  Mnataoft  whom  Sir  Frederick  Boherts  sent  to 
reaamiie  them,  and  have  deputed  many  of  their  nnmber  to  place  their  reqoests  reepect- 
f ally  before  ^e  Qovenunent  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  more  important  of  the 
leaders  have  not  oome  in  person.  When  the  Government  promised  them  a  safe-conduct, 
there  was  no  reason  for  even  those  who  had  been  most  opposed  to  it^  to  fear  for  their 
lives,  or  their  liberty.  The  British  Government  bears  no  ill-wQl  to  those  who  have 
fought  fairly  against  it,  and  those  of  the  representatives  who  have  oome  to  Cabul  are 
free  to  leave  when  they  wish  ;  daring  their  stay  they  will  be  treated  as  friends  and  guests. 
Bat  those  chiefs  who  have  remained  behind  at  Maidan,  mast  not  think  their  signatures 
on  the  paper  of  requests  will  be  considered  as  equivalent  to  their  presence  ;  the  more  so 
as  we  know  that  the  reason  why  some  of  them  have  not  oome  is  that  they  have  secretly 
abandoned  the  cause  they  profess  to  support,  and  have  made  promises  to  others.  When 
you  return  to  Maidan,  ask  Generals  Gholam  Hyder  and  Mahomed  Jan  when  they  sre 
going  to  desert  you. 

*'Afalik8  of  Ghasni,  Maidan,  and  Logar,  and  Chiefs  of  the  Ghihai,  Wardak,  and 
other  tribes  in  their  neighbourhood, — I  have  met  you  more  than  once  in  private  inter- 
view, and  have  discussed  with  you,  in  a  friendly  way,  your  requests  ;  and  I  now  only 
wish  to  say  publicly,  and  for  the  information  of  the  sirdars  and  the  people  of  the  city 
and  neighbourhood  of  Cabul,  whom  it  oonoems  as  closely  as  it  does  you,  what  I  have 
already  said  to  yon.  Tou  have  first  asked  that  the  former  friendship  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Qaeen-Empress  of  Hindustan  should  be  restored,  that  the  Amir  Takob 
Khan  should  be  released  and  reinstated,  and  that  the  British  Army  should  retire  from 
Afghanistan.  I  reply,  I  would  first  remind  you  that  the  breach  in  our  mutual  friend- 
ship was  made  by  the  Amir  Shere  Ali  Khan.  The  British  Government  not  only  always 
desired  and  still  desires  friendship  with  Afghanistan,  but  will  not  appoint  any  one  as 
Amir  who  does  not  profess  friendship  ;  nor  will  it  allow  him  to  continoe  Amir  unless  he 
plainly  shows  himself  the  friend  of  the  friends  of  the  British  Government,  and  the 
enemy  of  its  enemies.  For  this  reason,  the  Mceroy  has  decided  that  Takub  Khan  shall 
not  return  to  Afghanistan.  Tou  know  whether  he  observed  the  promises  he  had  made 
to  the  British  Government ;  you  know  he  rewarded  those  who  opposed  as  in  the  first 
campaign ;  while  those  who  had  assisted  us  be  turned  out  of  their  lands  and  appoint- 
ments. Tou  have  told  me  privately  that  if  Takub  Khan  be  not  allowed  to  return,  you 
are  willing  to  accept  as  Amir  any  one  whom  the  British  CK>vemment  may  choose  to  select. 
This  expression  of  the  wish  of  a  lai^e  number  of  respectable  mcUiks  will  be  at  a  proper 
time  laid  before  His  Excellency  the  Viceroy,  together  with  that  of  otiiers  who  may  wish 
to  suH>ort  the  candidature  of  Wali  Mahomed,  Hashim  Khan,  Musa  Khan,  Ayub  Khan, 
or  any  other  member  of  the  ruling  family  who  may  be  approved  by  a  large  number  of 
the  people.  Government  has  no  intention  of  annexing  Afghanistan,  and  will  occupy  no 
more  of  it  than  may  be  necessary  for  the  safety  of  its  own  frontier.  But  the  province 
of  Candahar  will  not  remain  united  to  Cabul :  it  will  be  placed  under  the  independent 
rule  of  a  Baraksai  prince.  For  the  administration  of  those  provinces  that  remain 
attached  to  Cabul,  the  Ch>vemment  is  anxious  to  appoint  an  Amir  who  shall  be  strong 
enough  to  govern  his  people  and  be  steadfast  in  his  friendship  to  the  British :  and  if 
only  these  qualifications  be  secured,  the  Government  is  willing  and  anxious  to  recognise 
the  wish  of  the  Afghan  people  and  of  their  tribal  chiefs,  and  to  nominate  an  Amir  of 
their  choice.  But  no  decision  can  be  given  at  present.  Ton  who  have  assembled  here 
represent  but  a  small  part  of  the  people,  and  it  is  necessary  to  ascertain  the  views  and 
wishes  of  many  other  chiefii  and  sirdars  who  are  absent  from  Cabul.  But  your  votes  in 
favour  of  Takub  Khan's  immediate  &miiy  will  be  remembered  and  considered,  if,  until, 


The  Political  Office f^s  Speech.  371 

the  decision  of  the  Govenmient  be  given,  yon  absolntely  abstain  from  all  hostile  action  ; 
otherwise  do  not  e^qwet  that  the  Qoverament  wiU  consider  him  likolj  to  be  a  friendly 
Amir  whose  friends  are  its  persistent  enemies.  The  armies  of  the  Queen-Empress  will 
withdraw  from  Afghanistan,  when  the  Goremment  considers  that  the  proper  time  has 
eome.  As  they  did  not  enter  Afghanistan  with  yonr  permission,  so  they  will  not  with- 
draw at  yonr  request.  When  the  ooontry  is  again  peaceful,  and  when  a  friendly  Amir 
has  been  selected,  the  Gh>Temment  has  no  wish  to  remain  in  Afghanistan.  The  army 
came  to  Cabul  to  inflict  ponishment  for  the  murder  of  its  Envoy  in  time  of  peace,  which 
some  of  yoa  have  called  a  regrettable  accident,  bnt  which  the  British  Qoyemment  con- 
siders aa  atrocious  crime.     It  will  remain  until  some  satisfaotoiy  settlement  can  be 


"  Ton  have  been  told  that  an  army  from  Candahar  is  now  marching  on  Ghazni,  while 
another  from  Bombay  has  taken  its  place  at  Candahar.  A  third  anny  is  in  Knrram,  a 
fourth  at  Cabul,  a  ilfth  at  Jellalabad,  In  the  Khyber,  and  at  Peshawor.  The  General 
has  ordered  a  strong  force  to  march  from  Cabul  in  three  days  towards  Maidan,  to  co- 
operate with  the  Candahar  army.  If  you  are  wise,  you  will  do  everything  to  assist  this 
force,  which  is  not  sent  againtt  you,  nor  will  it  molest  you,  if  only  the  conduct  of  the 
people  is  friendly.  If,  on  the  contrary,  you  listen  to  leaders  who  only  deceiTe  you  for 
their  own  advantage,  and  commit  and  exdte  hostili^  against  the  Government,  punish- 
ment will  quickly  and  certainly  follow.  The  Khugiani  tribe  three  weeks  ago  attacked 
the  British  Fort  near  Gundamak,  at  night ;  tbey  have  since  bad  to  pay  a  fine  of 
Bs.  10,000  and  five  of  their  towers  have  been  blown  up.  The  Hisarak  people  have 
been  commtttiog  ontiages  on  the  road  and  carrying  off  men  and  cattle.  A  large  force 
has  been  sent  by  the  General  into  Hisarak,  and  a  fine  of  Bs.  15,000  has  been  imposed. 

"The  Government  is  quite  willing  to  be  friends  with  you  and  to  treat  you  as  its 
friends  ;  but  it  is  also  resolved  to  be  obeyed,  so  long  as  its  armies  are  in  the  country, 
and  to  punish  severely  any  open  opposition.  Ton  have  a  proverb  that  force  and  money 
are  the  only  powers  in  Afghanistan.  It  is  for  you  to  choose  which  you  wi«h.  Govern- 
ment intends  to  keep  the  sword  for  its  enemies  .and  the  money  for  its  friends  ;  and  if 
you  are  wise  you  will  count  yourselves  as  our  friends.  Those  people  deceive  yon  who 
preach  tkjtkady  and  say  the  English  are  the  enemisB  of  Islam.  In  India  fifty  million 
Mahomedans  enjoy  under  the  government  of  the  Queen  greater  liberty,  happiness,  and 
security  than  in  any  country  of  the  world ;  and  it  is  the  British  Government  which  has 
many  times,  by  a  great  expenditure  of  men  and  treasure,  guarded  and  preserved  the 
empire  of  the  Sultan  of  Turkey  against  his  enemies.  Government  is  the  friend  and 
protector  of  Islam,  and  not  its  destroyer.  As  to  your  own  requests  for  the  appointment 
of  a  Mabomedan  agent  at  Cabul,  and  a  grant  of  assistance  in  money  and  material  to  the 
new  Amir,  I  can  only  ssy  that  these  requests  have  been  made  by  you  in  ignorance,  for 
they  are  matters  which  will  be  decided,  by  the  Government  of  India,  with  the  chief 
whom  tbey  agree  to  appoint  as  Amir.  It  is  not  fitting  for  small  persons  to  discuss  them. 
Of  this  only  be  assured,  that  he  whom  the  Viceroy  of  India  may  select  will  be  supported 
by  the  Government  in  every  possible  way,  so  long  as  ho  shows  friendly  intentions 
towards  it." 

The  chiefs  listened  silently  and  with  the  phlegmatic  attention 
they  always  show  in  Durbar,  and  they  clearly  understood  the 
speeches.  Mr.  Griffin  spoke  in  Persian,  and  a  Pushtu  translation 
was  also  read  out  for  the    benefit  of  such  as  were  imperfectly 

B  B   2 


372  Tlie  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

acquainted  with  Persian.  Such  of  the  British  officers  as  could 
speak  neither  language  were  in  the  dark  as  to  the  Political  Officer's 
declaration,  but  camp  gossip  soon  furnished  them  with  a  fairly- 
correct  translation.  The  firmness  of  the  language  and  the  un- 
compromising terms  in  which  the  sirdars  and  chiefs  were  told  of 
our  intentions  has  been  approved  in  camp  in  the  fullest  way. 
Our  great  hope  is  that  no  exigencies  of  party  politics  at  home  will 
cause  a  modification ;  it  would  be  fatal  to  our  prestige  if  we  had 
to  withdraw  from  resolutions  now  made  public.  The  Cabul  chiefs 
had  already  been  told  what  they  had  to  expect ;  and  the  Barakzai 
sirdars  now  learned  what  decision  the  Government  of  India  had 
arrived  at — Candahar  to  be  the  fief  of  an  independent  prince; 
an  Amir  to  be  elected  by  the  voice  of  the  people,  who  should  be 
friendly  to  the  British;  and  the  withdrawal  of  our  army  when 
such  a  man  had  been  found — these  were  the  main  points.  Herat 
was  not  mentioned,  and  this  is  the  more  significant  as  it  was  fully 
known  that  the  separation  of  Herat  from  the  Durani  kingdom  was 
a  sore  point,  even  with  our  friends  in  Cabul.  The  future  of  that 
district  may  well  be  allowed  to  drop  out  of  sight  for  the  present, 
as  until  it  becomes  clear  who  the  new  Amir  is  to  be,  we  cannot 
possibly  undertake  to  say  what  shall  become  of  Herat.  If  he  is 
a  man  equal  to  holding  Turkistan  and  Herat  as  well  as  Cabul, 
and  to  be  true,  at  the  same  time,  to  his  friendship  to  us,  we  might 
so  strengthen  his  hands  that  he  could  defy  rebellion  and  intrigue 
and  make  his  government  all-powerful  from  our  north-western 
frontier  to  the  borders  of  Persia.  The  allusion  to  Turkey  was 
certainly  not  a  happy  one ;  we  may,  it  is  true,  have  gone  to  war 
several  times  to  maintain  that  Mahomedan  kingdom,  but  our  late 
desertion  of  the  Sultan  cannot  recommend  our  policy  to  such 
fanatical  Mussulmans  as  the  Afghans.  Abdur  Rahman's  name, 
too,  was  not  mentioned ;  and  as  he  is  already  knocking  at  our 
gates,  it  might  have  been  wiser  ta  make  some  allusions  to  him. 

The  result  of  the  Durbar  has  been  satisfactory  enough  as  far 
as  the  Cabul  sirdars  are  concerned,  who  fully  believe  that  one  of 
their  number  will  yet  be  Amir.  Sirdars  Wali  Mahomed  Khan  and 
Hashim  Ehan  have  accepted  the  mediation  of  the  Mustaufi,  and 
have  pledged  themselves  to  act  in  concert,  if  either  of  them  is 
placed  on  the   throne.     They  both  dread   the  advent  of  Abdur 


Results  of  the  Durbar.  373 

Bahman  and  the  possible  enconragement  he  may  receive  from  the 
British,  if  he  comes  as  a  friend,  and  they  are  yery  anxions  to 
show  that  their  combined  party  would  be  strong  enoagh  to  keep 
the  Dorani  kingdom  together.  They  have,  as  yet,  receiyed  no 
distinct  promises  from  as,  and  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  we 
are  inclined  to  treat  their  claims  with  contempt  until  we  learn 
more  of  Abdar  Rahman's  intentions.  The  tribal  chiefs,  too,  are 
not  of  sufficient  importance  to  justify  us  in  believing  that  any 
arrangement  made  with  them  would  be  of  a  lasting  kind ;  and 
though  we  have  so  far  respected  their  feelings  as  not  to  send  our 
force  out  to  Maidan  to-day,  we  still  intend  to  move  4,000  men 
under  General  John  Boss  to  Sheikhabad,  on  the  Ghazni  Bead, 
there  to  join  hands  with  Sir  Donald  Stewart.  News  from  Eun- 
duz  is  to  the  effect  that  Abdur  Bahman  Khan  is  collecting  men 
and  raising  money,  and  that  his  agents  have  been  well  received  in 
Kohistan. 


CHAPTEB  XXVI. 

The  Force  sent  to  co-operate  with  Sir  Donald  Stewart— Strength  of  General  Boss's 
IHrisbn — ^A  Force  moved  out  to  Charasift— Hasan  Khan  b  Logar — Abdnr  Bahman 
and  the  Kohiskania — General  Boss's  Advance  on  the  Ghasni  Boad— Commooication 
opened  with  Sir  Donald  Stewart — News  of  tbo  Action  at  Ahmed  Khel— Action  at 
Cbarasia— Colonel  Jenkins  attacked  bj  Hasan  Khan — The  Oharasia  Force  strength- 
ened— Description  of  the  Action— General  Kacpherson's  Disposition  of  the  Bein- 
forcements— Defeat  and  Dispersion  of  the  Logaria  under  Hasan  Khan— Heavy 
Losses  of  the  Afghans— The  Leaders  of  the  Attack. 

Thb  following  extracts  from  letters  will  explain  General  Boss's  move- 
ment towards  Ghazni  to  co-operate  with  Sir  Donald  Stewart : — 

Vlih  April,  1880. 
Sufficient  time  having  been  given  to  the  chiefs  who  attended  the 
late  Durbar  to  return  to  their  homes,  the  force  told  off  to  co-oper- 
ate with  Sir  Donald  Stewart's  column  advancing  from  Candahar, 
has  started  for  Sheikhabad  on  the  Ghazni  Boad.  It  left  yesterday 
morning  under  command  of  Major-General  John  Boss,  and  took 
the  road  to  Argandeh,  halting  for  the  night  at  Kila  Eazi,  seven  or 


374 


The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 


eight  miles  from  the  Cabal  gorge.    Its  nnmerioal  streogUi  was 
nearly  4,000  fighting  men  of  all  arms,  made  up  as  follows : — 


Officers. 

Bank  and  Filei 

6-8,  Royal  Artillery  (4  8crew-gim«)          

Haxara  Moontain  Battery  (6  gans)           

0th  Lan<*er8  (1  sqaadron) 

3rd  Pan  jab  Cavalry  (2  squadrons)            

3rd  Bengal  Cayalry           

9ihFoot      (General  C.) 

4ih  GhoorkHii          \    Gnogh's  V       ... 

24th  Ponjab  Native  Infantry  (  Brigade.  ) 

23rd  Pioneers         

Srd  Company  Sappers  and  Mi  ners            

Field  Park  (Captain  Braokenbury )           

4 
5 
4 
6 
8 
21 
7 
8 
8 
2 
1 

181 
200 
100 
200 
360 
700 
660 
660 
680 
96 
60 

Total        

74 

3,887 

The  officers  of  the  Staff  are — General  Boss,  commanding; 
Major  Boyes,  A.A.G. ;  Captain  Dutton,  A.Q.M.G.;  and  Dr. 
Macnalty,  Staff  Surgeon ;  Brigadier-General  Charles  Gough, 
C.B.,  V.C. ;  Major  Gerard,  Brigade  Major ;  Major  Kinloch  and 
Major  Combe,  D.A.Q.M.Gs.  Captain  Eidgeway  is  the  Political 
Officer  with  the  Division. 

This  force  is  of  sufficient  strength  to  hold  its  own  against  any 
force  that  can  possibly  be  gathered  together  on  the  Ghazni  Bead, 
but  it  seems  unlikely  that  it  will  meet  with  any  serious  opposition 
in  that  quarter.  Mahomed  Jan's  faction  has  been  so  split  up, 
that  he  will  have  difficulty  in  raising  large  bodies  of  men  in  future, 
particularly  as  the  eyes  of  the  Eobistanis,  Cabulis,  Logaris,  and 
Safis  are  all  turned  northwards,  Abdur  Bahman's  movements 
beyond  the  Hindu  Eush  being  far  more  discussed  than  any  tribal 
warfare  towards  Ghazni.  To-day  heliograms  from  Argandeh  are 
to  the  effect  that  Mahomed  Jan  has  fled  to  Narkh,  the  valley 
wherein  are  Bahadur  Khan's  villages  visited  by  us  in  November 
last.  Two  thousand  men  under  Abdul  Gaffur,  a  local  mooUah  of 
some  importance,  are  said  to  have  assembled  there ;  but  unless 
this  force  is  increased  tenfold,  no  opposition  worthy  of  the  name 
can  be  shown  to  General  Boss.  Mahomed  Jan's  parting  shot  was 
a  summons  to  all  the  Eohistani  maliks  to  raise  their  followers  and 


Joining  Hmids  with  Sir  D.  Stewart.         375 

march  to  Ghazni  to  resist  the  Candahar  force— a  sommons,  it  is 
needless  to  say,  which  will  not  be  obeyed,  as  the  Eohistanis  are 
not  foolish  enough  to  place  themselyes  in  a  position  where  they 
would  be  cut  o£f  from  their  homes.  Mahomed  Hasan  Khan  and 
General  Earim  Ehan  haye  gone  to  Logar  to  get  men  together. 
The  Ghazni  faction  is  on  the  horns  of  a  dilemma,  and  the  next 
few  weeks  will  probably  see  our  troops  promenading  through 
Wardak  and  Logar,  collecting  reyenue  and  supplies,  without  any 
show  of  resistance  to  our  orders.  Of  course,  if  Abdur  Bahman 
makes  a  demonstration  at  Charikar,  there  may  bo  another  out- 
burst of  fematicism ;  but,  so  far  as  we  can  judge,  that  adyenturer 
is  not  too  anxious  to  cross  the  Hindu  Kush  until  matters  are  a 
little  more  advanced.  If  he  can  see  his  way  to  secure  the  Amir- 
ship  easily  without  fighting,  he  will  certainly  make  overtures  to 
Sir  F.  Boberts.  The  rumour  that  he  is  running  short  of  funds 
is  very  significant  in  itself;  he  cannot  keep  an  army  together 
unless  he  has  the  means  wherewith  to  pay  his  sepoys,  and  he 
is  too  shrewd  to  risk  a  failure  by  pushing  his  force  too  far  south 
when  our  army  is  within  five  marches  of  Charikar.  We  are  more 
on  the  alert  now  than  we  have  been  since  the  events  of  December, 
and  the  Eohistanis  know  this  perfectly  well,  though,  perhaps, 
they  do  not  know  that  General  Macpherson's  Brigade  is  to  be  held 
in  readiness  to  move  out  at  an  hour's  notice  should  local  disa£fec- 
tion  require  such  a  step. 

22n<i  AprH. 

General  Boss  has  reached  Eila  Durani,  one  march  from 
Sheikhabad,  without  serious  opposition.  For  the  benefit  of  all 
humanitarian  critics,  I  may  state  that  strict  orders  have  been  given 
under  which  hostile  villages  are  only  to  be  punished  by  the  de- 
struction of  their  towers  and  fortified  places :  the  houses  of  the 
tribesmen  will  in  all  cases  be  spared.  Such  grain  and  stores  as  we 
require  will  be  taken — a  very  mild  way,  indeed,  of  "  living  upon 
the  country."  We  pay  such  exorbitant  prices  for  everything  we 
buy,  that  the  few  maunds  of  com  taken  in  this  way  cannot  prove 
any  serious  loss  to  the  tribesmen. 

In  addition  to  the  column  co-operating  with  Sir  Donald  Stewart, 
it  has  been  found  advisable  to  send  a  small  force  to  Charasia. 


376  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

This  is  made  up  of  two  guna  F- A,  Boyal  Horse  Artillery,  a  wing  of 
the  92nd  Highlanders,  and  the  whole  of  the  Guides,  cavalry  and 
infantry.  The  reason  for  this  step  was  that  Mahomed  Hasan 
Ehan  was  threatening  all  villagers  who  were  sending  in  supplies 
to  Sherpnr  from  Logar,  and  the  roads  had  become  very  unsafe  for 
all  kajdas.  The  case  of  the  Ehan  of  Kushi  will  show  very  clearly 
the  state  of  Logar  at  the  present  moment,  and  the  awkward 
position  in  which  fiuiUkB  friendly  to  the  British  are  placed. 
This  old  man  did  all  he  could  to  aid  our  advance  when  we  crossed 
the  Shutargardan  in  September,  and  he  has  since  remained  faith- 
ful to  his  promises  made  to  us.  A  few  days  ago  he  came  in  to 
Sherpur,  and  asked  for  advice,  his  case  being  that  Hasan  Ehan 
had  ordered  him  to  send  all  his  fighting  men  to  Baraki  Bajan 
and  to  furnish  supplies  for  the  levies  being  raised  in  Logar.  The 
Ehan  would  not  obey  the  order,  and  Hasan  Elhan  then  threatened 
to  destroy  his  villages  and  seize  all  his  goods.  The  threat  may 
have  been  an  idle  one,  but  still  it  was  enough  to  intimidate  the 
WMUk.  He  was  told  to  return  to  his  home  and  to  keep  Hasan 
Ehan  in  play  for  a  few  days,  when  the  advance  of  General  Boss 
upon  Sheikhabad,  and  General  Stewart's  arrival  at  Ghazni,  would 
probably  cause  the  dispersion  of  any  bands  under  Hasan  Ehan. 
In  the  meantime,  to  hasten  this  dispersion,  and  to  keep  the  roads 
from  Logar  to  Cabul  open,  Colonel  Jenkins  was  ordered  to 
Gharasia,  and  there  he  is  now  encamped  waiting  for  orders.  The 
efiect  upon  the  disorderly  spirits  in  Logar  has  been  most  healthy. 
They  dread  an  incursion  into  their  valley  on  both  sides,  and  they 
are  now  anxious  to  renounce  Hasan  Ehan  and  all  his  works. 
There  are  always  men  to  be  found  in  every  tribe  ripe  for  adventure 
and  guerilla  warfare,  and  it  seems  probable  that  Hasan  Ehan  still 
has  several  hundred  of  these  about,  and  intends  harassing 
picquets  and  rear-guards  whenever  opportunity  offers.  He  has 
always  a  road  of  escape  open  towards  Zurmut  or  the  Shutargar- 
dan ;  and  unless  the  maliks  turn  him  out  of  their  villages,  he  will 
continue  to  foment  discontent  in  Logar  until  the  Ghasni  and 
Sheikhabad  Forces  have  united  and  swept  through  the  valley  to 
Eushi.  The  people  are  willing  and,  indeed,  anxious  to  send 
supplies  to  Cabul,  as  the  prices  paid  by  us  are  abnormally  high ; 
but  until  the  presence  of  our  troops  frees  the  headmen  from  all 


Movements  of  Abdur  Rahman.  m 

fear  of  reprisals  by  Hasan  Khan,  the  flow  of  grain  and  cattle  to 
Gabnl  will  be  sluggish  and  nncertain. 

From  the  north  the  news  of  Abdur  Bahman's  moTements  is  still 
meagre  in  the  extreme;  but  the  explanation  most  probably  of 
this  is,  that  he  is  waiting  for  events  to  be  a  little  more  distinctly 
shaped  in  Gabul  before  he  plays  his  trump  card   and   formally 
demands  the  Amirship.    He  has  sent  circulars  to  all  the  leading 
chiefs  in  Eohistan  and  the  Cabul  province,  upon  whose  goodwill 
he  thinks  he  can  count ;  and  having  thus  put  his  claims  forward, 
he  is  content  to  rest  upon  his  arms  and  make  his  position  in 
Turkistan  and  about  Kunduz  secure  before  venturing  over  the 
Hindu  Kush.    His  intentions  towards  the  British  may  be  looked 
upon  as  unformed  so  far:  they  will  depend  upon  the  spirit  in 
which  his  claims  are  received.    If  we  decline  to  have  anything  to 
say  to  him — which  is  extremely  unlikely,  as  it  ie  rumoured  that  a 
Mission  is  to  be  sent  to  Kunduz  from  Sherpur — he  will  either  raise  a 
neyr  jehad,  or  will  wait  until  we  have  left  Gabul,  and  then  quietly 
swoop  down  upon  any  nominee  we  have  placed  on  the  throne, 
and  try  his  fortune  once  more  for  the  Amirship.     If,  on  the  con- 
trary, we  make  our  usual  philanthropic  offers  of  friendship,  and 
invite  him  to  come  forward  and  state  his  case,  leaving  it  to  the 
decision  of  the  chiefs  and  people,  he  will  unquestionably  meet  us 
half-way,  and  trust  to  his  old  popularity  gaining  him  an  easy 
triumph.    His  mainstay  is  Kohistan,  whence  he  looks  to  receive 
arms,  money,  and  men;   and,  so  far    as   can   be   judged,  the 
Kohistanis  favour  his  claims  unreservedly.    Knowing  this,  it  has 
been  all  the  more  imperative  that  we  should  induce  the  Kohistani 
chiefs  to  come  in  and  make  their  wishes  known  :  as,  once  Abdur 
Bahman  is  secured  in  the  interests  of  the  British,  and  his  claims 
allowed  by  the  majority  of  the  tribesmen,  our  political  difficulties 
would  begin  to  clear  away.     An  agent,  Bessalder  Mahomed  Afzul 
of  the  11th  Bengal  Lancers,  was   sent  by  us  into  Kohistan  to 
confer  with  the  maUks,  and  he  has  been  successful  in  bringing 
between  seventy  and  eighty  of  these  men  to  Gabul.    The  chief 
among  these  are  Jabbar  Khan,  Gholam  Hyder  Khan,  and  Khwaja 
Abdul  Kadir,  and  it  is  no  secret  that  they  are  friends  of  Abdur 
Bahman.    Mr.  Lepel  Griffin  received  them  in  Durbar  yesterday, 
and  took  from  Gholam  Hyder  a  paper  signed  not  only  by  the 


378  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

malxk^  present^  bat  by  Sarwar  Eban  Parwaui,  Mir  Batcha^  and 
the  remainder  of  the  Kohistani  chiefs.  Under  the  seals  of  all 
these  men  Gholam  Hyder  was  appointed  their  mouthpiece  to  con- 
fer with  the  British,  against  whom  all  idea  of  enmity  was  dis- 
avowed. Sarwar  Khan  and  the  other  absentees  promised  also  that 
if  the  maUks  reported  favonrably  upon  their  reception  at  Sherpar, 
they  also  woald  come  in.  The  Darbar  was  not  of  the  formal 
kind  at  which  the  Wardak  and  Logar  chiefs  were  received,  it  being 
anderstood  that  the  Kohistanis  shoald  hereafter  formulate  their 
requests,  and  make  them  known  at  a  later  period.  The  behaviour 
of  the  maliks  was  all  that  could  be  wished;  and  Gholam 
Hyder  in  a  temperate  and  respectful  speech,  thanked  Mr.  GrifiSn 
for  the  consideration  with  which  he  and  his  friends  bad  been 
treated,  and  earnestly  hoped  that  a  satisfactory  arrangement  would 
be  come  to,  and  that  perfect  friendliness  would  be  established.  The 
chief  certainly  seemed  sincere  enough,  and  his  words  were  received 
with  marked  approval  by  his  brother  maliks,  who  nodded  an 
affirmative  as  he  quietly  stated  their  desire  to  aid  the  British  in 
creating  a  stable  Government  in  Cabul.  The  maUks  will  remain 
in  Cabul  for  several  days,  and  it  is  probable  that  in  a  few  days  the 
other  chiefs  will  come  in,  and  then  an  answer  can  be  given  to  their 
representations,  which  are  shaped  in  the  form  of  a  request,  that 
Abdur  Bahman's  claims  to  the  Amirship  be  favourably  entertained 
by  the  British. 


26ffc  April. 

The  foraging  parties  sent  out  by  General  Boss  were  fired  at 
in  the  Narkh  Valley  and  on  the  Bamian  Bead  leading  from 
Maidan,  and  in  consequence  of  this  the  Umur  Ehel  Ghilzais  were 
punished  by  a  force  being  sent  into  the  Darra  Narkh.  They  met 
with  no  opposition,  and  having  destroyed  one  of  Bahadur  Khan's 
towers,  they  rejoined  the  main  body. 

After  the  punishment  of  the  Umur  Khel,  General  Boss 
marched  from  Maidan  and  encamped,  on  21st  April,  at  Eila  Sher 
Mahomed,  more  commonly  called  Kila  Durani,  about  two  miles  to 
the  south  of  the  Cabul  river,  which  was  found  to  be  easily  ford- 
able.    There  were  the  remains  of  what  must  once  have  been  a 


Junction  of  the  Cabul  and  Candahar  Forces.   379 

handsome  bridge,  but  time  and  neglect  bad  made  it  a  complete 
ruin.  News  were  brought  in  of  a  combination  of  all  the  neigh- 
bouring tribes,  and  of  an  intended  attack  to  be  made  npon  three 
sides*  Mahomed  Jan,  with  a  large  force  of  Wardaks,  was  to 
appear  from  the  sonth ;  Mahomed  Hasan  Ehan,  with  the  Logans, 
was  to  try  a  flank  attack  from  the  east ;  while  Bahadur  Ehan  and 
Abdul  Oa£fur  were  to  direct  the  movements  of  the  Maidanis  and  the 
Umur  Khel  from  the  hills  to  the  west.  The  combination  seemed 
to  be  one  so  likely  to  take  place,  that  every  precaution  was  taken 
by  General  Boss :  the  camp  was  made  as  compact  as  possible, 
entrenchments  were  thrown  up,  and  the  troops  were  ready  to  turn 
out  at  the  first  alarm.  A  night  attack  on  the  21st  was  fully 
expected,  but  no  alarm  was  given,  and  on  the  following  morning 
the  force  marched  onwards  to  Sar-i-Tope,  ten  miles.  This  left 
the  Maidan  villages  seventeen  miles  in  rear  ;  and  it  became  daily 
more  apparent  that  the  tribesmen  meditated  some  kind  of  attack 
along  the  road.  Parties  of  men  crowned  the  hills  on  the  west, 
and  fired  at  long  ranges  upon  the  column ;  but  such  bullets  as  fell 
near  our  men  were  all  spent,  and  but  little  notice  was  taken  of  so 
harmless  a  demonstration.  The  road  ran  through  a  valley  two 
or  three  miles  broad,  with  a  gradual  ascent  the  whole  way.  Once 
only  a  party  of  men  ventured  down  the  hill  sides,  probably  to  get 
within  range  of  the  column,  but  a  shell  from  the  Hazara  Moun- 
tain Battery  dispersed  them,  and  their  comrades  were  not  bold 
enough  to  repeat  the  manoeuvre.  At  9  a.m.  Sar-i-Tope  was 
reached,  the  camping  ground  being  at  an  elevation  of  about  8,000 
feet,  and  the  Sher-i-Dahan  Pass,  north  of  Ghazni,  could  be  seen. 
Before  noon  a  heliograph  flash  was  noticed  on  the  Sher-i-Dahan 
Eotal,  and  Lieutenant  Whistler  Smith's  signallers  were  soon  in 
communication  with  the  advanced  party  af  the  Candahar  column. 
The  first  message  which  linked  the  two  forces  together  was  sent 
in  the  name  of  Sir  Donald  Stewart,  and  was  as  follows  : — 

"On  the  19th  the  difision  vader  dj  eommand,  while  marching  from  Mnahaki, 
enconntered  an  aimed  gathering  o(  Andaria,  Tumkia,  Snleiman  Kheyla  and  other  tribee- 
men,  who  numbered  aome  15,000  men,  hoiae  and  foot.  Preparation  waa  made  to 
attack  the  itrong  poaition  held  by  the  enemy  at  Ahmed  Khel,  twenty-three  milea  aonth 
of  Ghasni,  when  a  body  of  aome  8,000  fanatic  swordsmen  poored  down  on  onr  troops, 
spreading  out  beyond  either  flanki  of  oar  line.  Hie  fighting  lasted  one  hour,  after  whieh 
the  entire  bo4y  of  the  enemy  qpread  broadcast  o?«r  the  oonntiy.    The  protection  of  the 


380  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

baggage  preTented  pnnuit  by  tbe  caralry.  The  dirisioD,  However,  marobed  forward 
nine  miles  to  Nani  after  the  engagement,  and  the  day  before  jeaterdaj,  the  20th,  the 
advanced  cavalry  entered  Ghasni.  Over  1,000  of  the  enemy's  dead  were  ooaoted  on  the 
ground,  and  their  loss  in  killed  and  woanded  is  stated  to  be  2,030.  Casualties  on  oor 
side:  17  killed  and  115  wounded.  The  following  are  tlie  wounded: — Lieutenant 
Young,  19th  Bengal  Lancers,  dangerously ;  Captain  Corbet,  R.H.A.,  severely  ;  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel  Lawson,  59th  Foot,  Colonel  Yorke,  19th  Bengal  Lancers,  Lieutenant 
Watson,  59th  Foot,  Lieutenant  Stewart,  2nd  Punjab  Cavalry,  all  slightly.  No  officers 
killed.    All  wounded  are  doing  well.'* 

This  good  news  bad  scarcely  reached  Sherpnr  when  the  canton- 
ment was  thrown  into  a  state  of  excitement  by  a  sharp  fight  at 
Gbarasia.  The  discontented  tribesmen  in  Logar,  foreseeing  that  in 
a  very  shoii  time  they  would  have  in  their  midst  a  force  which  they 
could  not  hope  to  contend  against,  made  a  desperate  effort  to  cut  up 
Colonel  Jenkins's  party  at  Charasia.  Since  the  anxious  days  of 
December,  no  such  excitement  has  been  felt  at  Sherpur  as  that  of 
yesterday  morning,  when  it  became  known  that  the  Highlanders 
and  Guides  were  hotly  engaged  beyond  the  Sang-i-Nawishta  defile, 
and  that  General  Macpherson  was  ordered  to  march  to  their  assist- 
ance. The  cantonment  was  all  astir,  and  the  secret  orders 
which  had  been  issued  when  General  Boss  moved  out  were  at 
once  put  into  execution.  The  2nd  Brigade,  under  General  Baker, 
knew  that  in  the  event  of  General  Macpherson' s  brigade  leaving 
Sherpur,  they  had  to  take  charge  of  all  the  posts  held  by  the' 
92nd  Highlanders,  45th  Sikhs,  and  28th  Punjabees ;  and  between 
eight  and  nine  o'clock  the  72nd  Highlanders,  3rd  Sikhs,  5th 
Ghoorkas,  and  5th  Punjab  Infantry,  were  all  falling  in  and  being 
told  off  to  their  respective  stations.  Of  the  Europeans  100  went 
to  Fort  Siah  Sung,  120  to  Fort  Onslow  (the  fort  on  tbe  eastern 
end  of  Bemaru  Heights),  100  to  the  fort  on  Asmai  Heights,  and 
250  to  the  Bemaru  Gorge  as  the  reserve,  where  also  two  guns  of 
G-8  were  placed,  commanding  the  maidan  between  the  gorge  and 
the  Wazirabad  Lake.  The  native  regiments  also  furnished  parties 
for  Asmai,  Siah  Sung,  and  the  detached  forts  about  it,  and  manned 
the  block-houses  and  defences  at  the  eastern  and  western  ends  of 
the  cantonment.  Tbe  gate  guards  were  strengthened  by  small 
parties  held  in  reserve,  and  one  might  have  imagined  that  Sherpur 
was  on  the  eve  of  a  second  siege.  These  precautions  were  neces- 
sary, as  our  spies  had  brought  in  news  of  6,000  or  8,000  Kohis- 


Gathering  of  Kohisianis.  381 

taDis  being  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Baba  Each  Kar,  and  Shahbaz 
Khan,  our  Governor  of  Eoh-Damani  had  sent  in  alarming 
reports  of  Mir  Butcha's  and  Sorwar  Khan's  intentions.  They 
were  said  to  intend  a  sadden  attack  apon  Sherpur ;  and  althoagh 
Mir  Batcha  had  written  in  to  say  that  his  intentions  were  not 
hostile,  and  that  he  woald  shortly  visit  General  Roberts  to  pay 
his  respects,  it  was  deemed  wise  to  take  every  precaation,  and  to 
be  ready  to  check  the  Kohistanis  if  they  crossed  the  Paen  Minar 
or  other  kotciiA  to  the  north  of  the  cantonment.  The  picqaet  of 
100  men  of  the  28th  Panjab  Infontry  were  withdrawn  from  Paen 
Minar,  and  a  troop  of  cavalry  sent  oat  to  watch  the  road  from 
Eoh-Dahman.  Parties  of  signallers  were  stationed  on  all  the  com- 
manding points  in  our  chain  of  defences,  and  a  sharp  look-out 
was  kept  in  every  direction.  From  Batkhak  and  Luttaband 
all  was  reported  quiet ;  while  towards  Pughman  and  Argandeh 
not  a  sign  of  any  tribesmen  being  on  the  move  could  be  detected. 
The  interest,  therefore,  was  concentrated  upon  Gharasia,  with 
which  we  were  in  heliogntphic  communication.  Colonel  Jenkins 
signalling  up  to  the  fort  on  the  Sherderwaza,  and  the  message 
being  flashed  down  to  the  signallers  on  the  General's  gateway. 
The  news  first  sent  in  was  that  2,000  to  8,000  tribesmen  had 
opened  fire  upon  the  camp  at  daybreak,  and  that  their  attack  had 
since  been  developed  in  force.  At  9.50  Colonel  Jenkins  belio- 
graphed  that  his  loss  up  to  that  time  had  been  three  killed  and 
seven  wounded,  that  he  was  holding  his  own  well,  but  that  the 
enemy  were  being  reinforced  from  the  Zahidabad  direction.  By 
this  time  General  Macpherson  was  on  the  move,  and  General 
Hugh  Gough  was  also  getting  together  a  force  to  act  in  support. 

General  Macpherson  took  with  him  the  wing  of  the  92nd  High- 
landers (278  rifles),  still  remaining  in  Sherpur,  the  whole  of  the 
45th  Sikhs  (555  rifles),  and  four  guns  of  Swinley's  mountain 
battery.  A  troop  of  the  8rd  Punjab  Cavalry  escorting  two  guns 
of  the  screw  battery  were  also  ordered  out  to  join  him.  The  road 
to  Beni  Hissar  was  the  route  foUowed  by  the  Brigadier,  and  in 
passing  the  Bala  Hissar  he  was  joined  by  104  men  of  his  old 
regiment,  the  2nd  Ghoorkas.  Highlanders,  Sikhs,  and  Ghoorkas, 
marched  along  in  splendid  style,  and,  making  only  one  halt,  they 
debouched  upon   the  open  ground  beyond  the  Sang-i-Nawishta 


382  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

defile  jast  after  the  midday  gan  had  been  fired.  Two  eompanies 
of  Sildis  were  left  to  hold  the  defile.  General  Hugh  Grough 
followed  with  four  guns  of  F-A,  Eoyal  Horse  Artillery,  escorted  by 
a  troop  of  the  9th  Lancers,  two  squadrons  of  the  17th  Bengal 
Cavalry,  and  a  wing  of  the  28th  Punjabees.  These  were  halted  at 
Beni  Hissar,  ready  to  move  on  in  support  if  the  resistance  made 
by  the  Logaris  necessitated  such  a  step.  Of  the  other  troops  of 
the  garrison  it  will  be  enough  to  say  that  the  67th  Foot  and  the 
remainder  of  the  2nd  Ghoorkas  were  holding  the  Bala  Hissar  and 
Sherderwaza  Fort.  The  heavy  battery  of  40-pounder8  was  in 
position  in  the  Siah  Sung  Fort. 

The  force  under  Colonel  Jenkins  comprised  two  guns  F-A,  a 
wing  of  the  92nd  Highlanders  (266  bayonets),  and  the  Corps  of 
Guides  (260  sowars  and  614  sepoys).  As  I  mentioned  in  a 
previous  letter,  this  party  bad  been  detached  from  Sherpur  to 
watch  the  Logar  Valley  and  keep  open  the  road,  as  Mahomed 
Hasan  Ehan  had  stopped  supplies  coming  in  to  Cabul.  The 
object  had  been  fully  gained,  and  it  was'intended  to  moVe  back  tfa^ 
troops  to  cantonments  yesterday.  In  fact,  on  Saturday  Colonel 
Jenkins  received  instructions  from  Sir  F.  Roberts  to  hold  himseh 
in  readiness  to  move  at  a  minute's  notice,  the  nimours  circulating 
about  the  Kohistanis  having  given  rise  to  these  orders.  It  was 
ivell  known  that  bands  of  men  had  gathered  in  Logar  from  the 
villages  about  Hisarak,  and  on  Saturday  horsemen  were  seen 
some  miles  away  in  the  direction  of  our  old  camping-ground  near 
Zahidabad.  It  was  not  expected,  however,  that  any  attack  in 
force  would  be  made,  but  Colonel  Jenkins  was  on  the  alert,  and 
before  daybreak  yesterday  morning  he  had  his  troops  under  arms, 
&  few  shots  fired  about  five  o'clock  warning  him  that  the  Logaris 
were  lurking  about.  His  camp  was  pitched  to  the  east  of  the 
Charasia  villages,  and  was  from  1,000  to  1,800  yards  distant  from 
the  hills  which  shut  o£f  the  Logar  river  from  the  Kushi-Cabul 
Bead.  In  his  rear  was  a  low  hill  overlooking  s^jheel  on  the  east, 
while  still  further  to  the  north  was  "  White's  Hill,"  which  Major 
White  and  a  company  of  the  92nd  Highlanders  stoi^med  on 
October  6th.  These  hills  command  the  road  leading  to  the 
Sang-i-Nawishta  defile,  and  might  serve  as  rallying  points  for  a 
force  hard  pressed  by  an  enemy  advancing  by  the  south.    On 


Colonel  yenkins  Attacked  at  Ckarasia.         383 

Colonel  Jenkins's  right  flank  were  two  walled  enclosures  and  the 
Charasia  orchards ;  while  on  his  left  was  a  precipitous  i*ange  of 
hills,  with  three  high  peaks,  distant  1,300  yards  from  his  camp. 
To  the  south  was  open  country,  through  which  the  Kushi  Road 
runs,  the  said  road  being  flanked  by  two  deep  ditches  or  nullahs, 
affording  excellent  cover  for  an  enemy. 

The  first  shots  fired  into  the  camp  were  from  the  range  of  hills 
on  Colonel  Jenkins's  left  flank,  and  as  the  enemy  had  breech- 
loading  rifles,  the  bullets  reached  their  mark  without  difficulty. 
Upon  the  first  alarm  the  tents  were  struck,  and  the  baggage- 
animals  loaded  up  ready  for  a  move.  With  daylight  it  was  seen 
that  the  three-peaked-range  was  lined  with  men,  who  had 
their  standards  planted,  and  were  plainly  determined  to  make  an 
attack.  Their  fire  increased  from  dropping  shots  to  a  brisk 
fusillade,  and  the  baggage-animals  were  ordered  to  retire,  with 
tents,  &c.,  to  the  foot  of  the  hill  I  have  mentioned  as  lying  in 
advance  of  White's  Hill.  As  escort,  half  a  company  of  the  92nd 
Highlanders  under  Captain  Napier,  and  a  company  of  the  Guides, 
were  told  off.  Captain  Napier  occupied  the  hiU,  building  Sisungar 
for  the  protection  of  his  men,  and  the  baggage  remained  in  safety 
below  with  a  guard.  In  front  of  the  camping-ground  was  a  karez 
(a  line  of  walls  connected  by  an  underground  tunnel),  and  the 
earth  excavated  from  this  furnished  the  only  cover  possible  for 
the  infantry,  who  were  extended  by  Colonel  Jenkins  in  the  shape 
of  a  semicircle,  so  as  to  hold  the  enemy  on  the  hills  in  check,  and 
also  block  an  advance  along  the  road.  Major  White  was  in  com- 
mand of  the  Highlanders,  and  the  disposition  of  the  men,  it  is 
almost  needless  to  say,  was  admirably  made.  They  held  the  front 
of  the  position.  To  guard  his  left  flank,  Colonel  Jenkins  extended 
three  companies  of  the  Guides'  Infantry,  and  on  his  right  ho 
placed  a  troop  of  cavalry  outside  the  walls  of  a  fort  (held  by 
twenty  sepoys),  ready  to  repel  any  rush  that  might  be  made  from 
Charasia  direction.  When  these  dispositions  had  been  completed^ 
his  strength  of  infantry  was  practically  exhausted  ;  the  main  body 
of  Highlanders  and  Guides  were  lying  along  the  line  of  the  karez, 
and  he  had  only  half  a  company  of  Guides  as  his  reserve.  The 
two  guns  of  F-A  took  up  a  position  about  400  yards  in  the  rear  of 
the  infantry,  and  the  cavalry,  again,  formed  up  in  rear  of  the  guns. 


384  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

The  troops  were  debarred  from  anything  bnt  acting  on  the  defen- 
sive, as  their  baggage  would  have  had  to  be  sacrificed  if  an  attempt 
had  been  made  to  storm  the  hills.  Besides,  as  news  of  the  im- 
pending action  had  been  heliographed  to  the  Sherderwaza  Fort 
and  reinforcements  been  asked  for,  the  main  object  was  to  hold 
the  tribesmen  in  check  until  sufficient  troops  should  arrive  to  sweep 
them  from  their  positions. 

The  enemy  were  bold  enough  at  first,  and  gradually  worked 
down  the  slopes  of  the  range  to  within  800  or  900  yards*  range, 
while  at  the  same  time  the  more  determined  of  their  number,  led 
by  ghazis,  worked  along  the  ditches  flanking  the  Eushi  Boad,  and 
planted  their  standards  within  200  yards  of  our  line  of  skirmishers. 
Their  numbers  were  estimated  at  first  at  about  2,000,  but  some 
reinforcements  began  to  arrive,  and  they  pushed  their  skirmishers 
into  the  Gharasia  orchards,  whence  a  sharp  fire  was  directed  upon 
the  camping  ground.  The  infantry  were  well  protected  by  the 
karez  mounds,  but  the  cavalry  and  guns  were  exposed  to  a  heavy 
cross-fire  from  the  orchards,  the  hillside,  and  the  ditches  in  front. 
One  of  the  artillery  horses  having  been  shot,  and  several  sowars 
hit,  it  was  thought  well  to  remove  the  guns  400  yards  nearer  the 
hill  occupied  by  Captain  Napier.  This  was  accordingly  done,  and 
the  gunners  under  Lieutenant  Wodehouse  found  shelter  in  a 
ditch,  whence  they  could  train  their  guns  upon  the  enemy,  while 
quite  out  of  range  themselves.  The  cavalry  could  not  seek  the 
same  protection,  as  Colonel  Jenkins  relied  upon  them  to  check  any 
rush  by  the  ghazis  attacking  him  in  front.  The  sowars  and  their 
officers  had  therefore  to  remain  under  a  heavy  fire  for  several  hours, 
200  or  800  yards  in  rear  of  the  line  of  skirmishers,  and  their 
losses  were  proportionally  heavy,  both  in  men  and  horses.  No 
more  trying  position  for  cavalry  can  be  imagined  than  waiting 
helplessly  in  the  open  until  their  time  shall  come,  and  it  speaks 
well  for  the  sowars  that  they  never  flinched,  but  kept  quietly  on 
the  move  backwards  and  forwards  until  their  numbers  were  sadly 
thinned.  The  severity  of  the  fire  can  be  understood  from  the 
fact  that  three  mounted  officers,  Major  White,  Lieutenant  Dick 
Cunyngham  (of  the  92nd  Highlanders),  and  Lieutenant  Bobert- 
son  (of  the  Commissariat  Department),  who  were  between  the 
infantry  and  cavalry,  had  all  little  casualties  to  report.     Major 


< 


A  Critical  Moment.  385 

White's  horse  was  shot  through  the  cheek,  a  bullet  struck  Lieu- 
tenant Dick  Cunyngham's  saddle,  and  Lieutenant  Bobertson  had 
his  coat-sleeve  torn  and  his  field-glasses  smashed  by  a  bullet. 
Colonel  Jenkins's  horse  was  also  shot,  and  the  Guides'  cavalry  lost 
eight  horses  killed  and  twenty-four  wounded — one-tenth  of  their 
sowars  were  really  put  out  of  action.  I  have  dwelt  thus  particu- 
larly upon  this  class  of  casualties  simply  to  prove  the  resolute  way 
in  which  the  tribesmen  attacked,  and  the  mischief  they  can  do 
with  good  rifles  in  their  hands.  Our  skirmishers  they  could 
scarcely  touch,  and  the  men  were  well  under  shelter,  and  exposed 
themselves  as  little  as  possible.  The  steady  courage  of  the  92Dd 
HiglJanders  made  light  of  2,000  or  3,000  men  being  in  front,  and 
their  picked  shots  accounted  for  many  of  the  ghazis,  who  tried  to 
advance  beyond  the  shelter  of  the  friendly  ditches  on  their  side  of  the 
road.  Once  or  twice  it  seemed  as  if  a  rush  were  meditated ;  the 
tom-toms  were  beaten,  bugles  sounded  the  advance,  and  standards 
were  waved  ;  but  this  only  brought  upon  the  enemy  a  more  rapid 
fire  from  our  men,  and  a  few  additional  shells  from  our  horse- 
artillery  gnus.  The  movements  of  the  attacking  force  were  directed 
with  some  skill,  200  or  800  horsemen  keeping  up  communication 
with  the  party  on  the  hill  and  the  skirmishers  in  the  orchards ; 
and  it  was  believed  that,  when  larger  reinforcements  arrived  from 
Logar,  an  attempt  would  be  made  to  close  round  in  the  rear  of 
Colonel  Jenkins,  and  cut  off  his  retreat.  By  noon  this  movement 
was  beg'nning  to  be  very  apparent,  as  the  orchards  about  Charasia 
were  swarming  with  men ;  but  the  opportunity  never  really 
arrived,  for  General  Macpherson  with  his  reinforcements  soon  put 
an  end  to  the  whole  affair. 

General  Macpherson,  and  with  him  about  1,000  men  (of  whom 
655  were  of  the  45th  Sikhs),  and  four  guns  now  came  up;  and 
his  first  movement  was  to  clear  the  orchards.  The  two  companies 
of  the  2nd  Ghoorkas  under  Captain  Hill  turned  off  the  road  to 
the  right,  over  the  irrigated  land,  and  made  for  the  Charasia 
orchards,  wherein  they  were  soon  hotly  engaged.  The  wing  of 
the  92nd  under  Colonel  Parker  marched  on  a  few  hundred  yards 
further  along  the  road  and  then  also  turned  off  to  the  right,  so'  as 
to  prolong  the  Ghoorka  line  of  skirmishers  and  enfilade  the 
enemy's  first  line.     The  Sikhs  kept  straight  on,  and,  as  they 

G  0 


386  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

adyancedy  the  92nd  under  Major  White  and  the  Guides'  in&ntry 
rose  from  the  shelter  of  the  kareZy  and  all  three  regiments  went 
up  at  the  hills  from  which  the  enemy  had  annoyed  Colonel  Jenkins 
for  nearly  seven  hours.  The  whole  movement  was  carried  out  to 
perfection ;  our  force  swept  onward  in  the  shape  of  a  fan,  and 
cleared  orchards,  hills,  and  open  country  of  every  armed  man.  A 
plucky  charge  was  made  by  the  Ghoorkas :  General  Macpherson 
sent  word  that  he  wished  a  hill  cleared  of  the  enemy  without  further 
firing,  and  Captain  Hill  telling  his  men  what  was  expected  of  them, 
the  brave  little  fellows  fixed  bayonets,  gave  a  cheer  and  carried  the 
hill. 

The  Guides'  Cavalry  were  sent  out  into  the  open  over  the  low 
Childukhteran  Kotal  on  the  Kushi  Boad,  and  succeeded  in  killing 
some  thirty  stragglers.  The  main  body  kept  to  the  near  ranges 
of  hills,  or  sought  refuge  in  nullah%  and  ravines  intersecting 
them.  The  mountain  guns  got  into  action,  and  made  good 
practice  wherever  any  small  groups  of  fugitives  collected,  and  by 
two  o'clock  the  tribesmen  were  scattered  and  were  making  their 
way  as  best  they  could  along  the  hills  out  of  reach  of  our  cavalry 
and  artillery.  Their  loss  must  have  been  very  heavy,  as  over  100 
bodies  were  counted  on  the  ground,  and  they  had  carried  off  many 
others  during  the  morning.  In  the  ditches  where  the  ghazis  had 
planted  their  standards,  within  200  yards  of  our  men,  more  than 
twenty  bodies  were  found,  lying  just  as  they  had  fallen.  These 
were  nearly  all  men  shot  through  the  head,  showing  the  good 
practice  made  by  our  advanced  skirmishers.  Our  expenditure  of 
Martini  and  Snider  ammunition  was  over  70,000  rounds,  while 
the  two  guns  of  F-A  battery  each  fired  forty-eight  rounds.  Our 
loss  in  men  was  severe  for  such  a  skirmish  ;  92nd  Highlanders, 
one  killed,  seven  wounded  (one  mortally) ;  F-A,  Boyal  Horse 
Artillery,  one  wounded ;  Corps  of  Guides,  four  killed,  twenty-one 
wounded ;  45th  Sikhs,  two  wounded ;  total,  five  killed,  thirty-one 
wounded.  Of  the  Guides  nearly  all  the  casualties  were  among 
the  cavalry.  When  the  enemy  had  been  thoroughly  cleared  off 
the  ground — the  cavalry  pursued  them  four  miles — orders  were 
given  for  the  whole  force  to  return  to  Sherpur,  and  the  march 
back  was  accomplished  without  incident,  except  that  the  Ghoorkas 
made  prisoners  of  twelve  or  fifteen  villagers  who  had  fired  upon 


The  Hostile  Leaders.  387 

our  troops.  General  Boberts  met  General  Macpherson  at  Beni 
Hissar  and  rode  back  with  him  to  cantonments.  The  Eohistanis 
had  remained  quiet  and  undemonstratiye  during  the  day ;  but  it 
was  not  thought  fit  to  allow  the  force  to  remain  out  at  Charasia 
for  the  night,  though  our  retirement  afUr  a  successful  action  is 
sure  to  be  misconstrued  by  the  Afghans. 

To-day  it  has  been  ascertained  that  the  enemy's  losses  were  400 
or  600,  of  whom  at  least  half  were  killed.  The  Chardeh  villages 
alone  are  said  to  contain  200  dead.  The  leaders  were  Sirdar 
Mahomed  Hasan  Ehan,  ex-Goyemor  of  Jellalabad;  General 
Mahomed  Elarim  Khan;  Padshah  Khan,  Ghilzai;  Mahomed 
Shah  Ehan,  of  Elalunga;  and  minor  malika  of  Baraki  Bajan 
and  Charkh.  The  body  of  men  they  commanded  was  5,000 
strong,  and  included  Logaris,  men  of  Chardeh,  Safis  from  Tagao, 
Kohistanis,  and  Ghilzais  from  Padshah  Khan's  Tillages.  It 
seems  a  pity  that  a  faithless  scoundrel  like  Padshah  Khan  cannot 
meet  with  his  deserts.  He  was  forgiven  for  fighting  against  us 
in  December,  and  now  he  coolly  breaks  his  word  with  us  again, 
and  collects  his  men  and  attacks  our  troops  as  if  he  had  never 
received  any  subsidy  from  us.  Hasan  Khan's  followers  were 
well  armed,  many  with  Sniders  and  Enfields,  and  a  few  with 
Martini  rifles,  bullets  from  the  latter  being  picked  up  by  some  of 
our  officers. 

To-day  (Monday)  all  is  quiet  again,  but  our  picquets  are  still 
stationed  on  Asmai  and  the  Bemaru  Heights. 


c  c  2 


388  The  Afghan  War,  1879-80. 


CHAPTER  XXVn. 

General  Ross  at  Sydabad — Skirmishes  wiih  the  Enemy  Sanction  of  the  Cabal  and 
Oandahar  Forces — Sir  Donald  Stewart  asBomea  Command  in  Northern  Afghanistan 
— Mr.  Lepel  Griffin  and  the  Kohistani  Chie& — A  British  Mission  sent  to  Abdar 
Rahman  Khan  at  KuDdna—Slr  Donald  Stewart's  March  from  Candahar  to  Ghazni 
— Attitude  of  the  Tribes  m  route — The  Hazara  Contingent — Scarcity  of  Soppliea — 
The  Battle  of  Ahmed  Khel--General  Stewart's  Formation  of  Attack— Strength  of 
the  Afghan  Force— Attack  by  Ghazis — Defeat  and  Dispersion  of  the  Enemy — ^The 
Afghan  Loss — ^The  March  to  Nani — Capture  of  Gbasni — Action  of  Urzoo— A  Second 
Victory— Mnshkri-Alam's  Plans. 

May  2nd,  1880. 

General  Ross  had  to  clear  the  hills  about  his  camp  at  Sydabad 
on  two  occasions  prior  to  General  Sir  Donald  Stewart's  force 
arriving  from  Ghazni,  bat  there  were  scarcely  any  casualties  on 
our  «ide.  It  would  seem  that  1,500  or  2,000  men  gathered  on 
the  hills  to  the  west  of  the  camp  at  Sydabad  on  the  25th,  and 
built  mngars  on  several  ridges,  as  if  with  the  intention  of  holding 
their  position  to  the  last.  To  clear  these  hills  a  strong  body  of 
our  troops,  made  up  from  the  9th  Foot,  2nd  Ghoorkas,  and  24th 
Punjabees^  with  some  of  the  mountain  guns,  were  sent  out,  and 
they  soon  drove  the  enemy  from  the  ridges.  The  sungars  were 
first  shelled,  and  then  a  rush  made  up  the  hills.  The  Afghans 
had  a  few  ghazis  among  their  number,  as  is  usually  the  case, 
and  these  stood  to  their  post  and  were  shot  down  ;  but  the  main 
body  fled  -in  confusion.  The  Ghoorkas  killed  sixteen  men  in  a 
nuUah,  and  altogether  forty  bodies  were  counted  on  the  ridges. 
Our  loss  was  one  Ghoorka  killed  and  two  wounded.  On  the  fol- 
lowing day,  Monday  the  26th,  the  enemy  again  showed  on  the 
hills,  and  again  our  men  had  to  chase  them  away,  two  companies 
of  the  28rd  Pioneers  sharing  this  time  in  the  climbing.  Again 
the  enemy  fled  in  confusion  from  ridge  to  ridge,  losing  ten  or 
twelve  killed.  Much  to  the  disgust  of  our  men,  the  Afghans 
would  not  wait  to  come  under  the  fire  of  our  Martinis  and  Sniders 
at  200  or  800  yards ;  the  shells  from  the  mountain  guns  being 


Sir  D.  Stewart  Commands  at  CabuL  389 

effective  in  scattering  any  groups  which  for  a  few  moments  held 
together.     After  this  the  overt  resistance  on  the   part   of  the 
mooUahy  Abdul  Gaffur,  was  at  an  end^  and  Mahomed  Jan  and 
Hasan  Khan  were  no  longer  heard  of.     A  force  visited  Lungar, 
and  destroyed  the  mooUoKs  forts,  obtaining  some  small  amount  of 
loot  in  the  shape  of  books  and  china.     Sir  Donald  Stewart's  force 
left  Ohazni  on  April  26th9  having  had  a  second  action  with  the 
enemy  at  Urzoo,  seven  miles  from  Ghazni.    On  the  29th  of  April 
General  Boss  started  for  Maidan  with  his  force,  which  had  been 
joined   by  the  heavy  battery  of  40-pounders   belonging   to  the 
Candahar  column.     Sir  Donald  Stewart,  with  Colonel  Chapmau, 
Chief  of  his  Staff,  accompanied  General  Boss.     Yesterday  (May 
Ist)  the  force  marched  to  Eila  Gholam  Hyder,  on  the  Cabul  side 
of  Argandeh.     The  Candahar  column  turned  off  from  Sheikhabad 
into  Logar,  where  it  will  probably  stay,  collecting  revenue  and 
supplies  for  the  next  few  weeks.    As  it  is  over  6,000  strong,  it  is 
not  likely  to  meet  with  much  opposition ;  and,  indeed,  it  is  stated 
that  the  chief  Logan  maliks  have  already  made  their  submission. 
To-day  General  Boss  marched  to  Sherpur ;  the  elephant  battery 
is  located  in  Sherpur,  while  General  Gough's  Brigade  is  again 
encamped  on  Siah  Sung.    General  Sir  Donald  Stewart  arrived  at 
about  ten  o'clock.     Sir  F.  Boberts  and  Staff  and  Mr.  Lepel  Griffin 
rode  out  a  few  miles  to  meet  him,  and  he  was  received  at  the 
head-quarters  gate  by  a  guard  of  honour  of  the  92Dd  Highlanders. 
A  salute  of  fifteen  guns  is  to  be  fired  in  his  honour  to-morrow 
morning.     To-day  he  has  taken  over  the  command  from  Sir  F. 
Boberts,  a  divisional  order  announcing  that  he  commands   the 
whole  of  the  troops  in  Northern  Afghanistan. 

In  regard*  to  political  matters  here,  we  seem  to  have  come  to 
the  end  of  our  negotiations  with  tribesmen  pure  and  simple,  for 
the  hundred  Eohistani  maJiks  who  have  been  staying  in  Cabul 
were  dismissed  to  their  homes  on  Saturday  by  Mr.  Lepel  Griffin. 
The  text  of  his  speech  in  Durbar  was  as  follows : — 

"Tour  paper  of  reqnetts  has  been  oarefnlly  oontidered,  and  until  some  decision  U 
given  by  the  Goremment  it  is  joar  doty,  and  it  will  be  to  your  adTantage,  to  remain 
qaiet  in  yonr  Tillages.  Do  not  vainly  imagbe  yon  will  obtain  anything  by  elamonr  and 
opposition.  Ton  have  seen  that  the  peojde  of  Qbasni,  Logar,  Maidan  and  Wardak  hare 
not  been  able  to  withstand  for  a  moment  the  British  arms,  and  hare  been  punished  for 
their  hostility.    The  only  fruit  of  their  opposition  is  that  Ui^  hare  to  pay  every  penny ; 


390  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

their  revenne  would  otberwiie  haye  been  remitted.  Ton  will  tell  thoee  of  joor  leaders 
who  are  Bot  bow  present  that  the  British  GbTeroment  will  not  tolerate  disturbances,  and 
collectioDs  of  armed  men  in  the  neigbbourhood  of  Cabul.  All  now  assembled  must  die- 
perse  at  ooce  home.  If  thejdo  not  attend  to  this  adyice  any  misfortune  they  suffer  will 
be  their  own  fault.  Two  Sirdars  of  position  are  now  being  sent  by  the  GoTernment  through 
Kohistan,  and  you  will  ensure  their  safety.  The  hostages  sent  by  Mir  Butcba  as  a 
guarantee  of  their  security  I  do  not  require  ;  the  British  army  is  itself  to  be  sufficient 
guarantee  for  the  observance  of  promises  made  by  you.  Your  professions  of  friendship 
are  accredited,  and  you  may  rest  assured  that  while  the  Qovemment  will  at  once  puuisli 
any  hostile  action,  its  chief  desire  is  to  bo  and  remaiu  friends  with  you." 

Two  malika,  Mir  Agha  Sahibzada  and  Mir  Gholam  Hyder, 
were  especially  mentioned  as  having  done  good  service  during 
their  stay,  and  three  other  minor  chiefs  were  singled  oat  as 
deserving  credit  for  aiding  the  British  Government  in  the  current 
negotiations.  The  most  important  feature  in  the  Durbar  was  the 
announcement  that  the  chiefs  had  guaranteed  the  safe-conduct  of 
two  Sirdars  on  Mr.  Griffin's  staff  through  Eohistan.  These  are 
Ibrahim  Khan,  Khan  Bahadur,  of  the  Punjab  Police,  and  Wazir- 
zada  Afzul  Khan,  Bessaldar  of  the  Bengal  Cavalry :  and  their 
mission  is  to  visit  Abdur  Bahman  at  Kunduz.  What  their  in- 
structions are  I  cannot  say ;  but  if  the  Kohistani  chiefs,  Surwar 
Khan  and  Mir  Butcha,  have  promised  to  ensure  their  personal 
safety,  it  seems  probable  that  we  are  at  last  on  the  eve  of  direct 
negotiation  with  Abdur  Bahman,  who  has  unquestionably  won  the 
goodwill  of  the  Kohistanis.  We  can  punish  any  breach  of  faith 
easily  with  the  force  now  in  Cabul ;  and  this  being  known  to  the 
chiefs  at  Baba  Kuch  Kar,  the  dispersion  of  bands  of  men  such  as 
are  now  scattered  about  Koh-Daman  is  probably  only  a  question 
of  a  few  days. 

5th  May. 

There  is,  -of  course,  great  difficulty  in  describing  an  action 
from  hearsay,  and  in  making  at  all  vivid  an  account  of  severe 
fighting  one  has  not  seen ;  but  it  ifi  the  privilege  of  even  the 
humblest  historians  to  deal  with  important  events  almost  as  con- 
fidently as  the  coolest  eye-witness,  and  I  meekly  claim  that  privi- 
lege in  regard  to  the  late  action  south  of  Ghazni.  There  will, 
almost  of  necessity,  be  errors  in  the  story  of  the  fight,  but  they 
are  only  such  as  will  arise  from  causes  beyond  my  own  control. 
I  can  only  write  upon  the  lines  laid  down  for  me  by  my  inform- 
ants, and  defects  of  omission  are  more  likely  to  occur  than  would 


His  March  from  Candahar.  391 

have  been  the  case  if  I  had  been  a  spectator  of  the  engagement. 
This  half-apology,  if  accepted  in  the  spirit  in  which  it  is  offered, 
shonld  absplve  me  in  the  eyes  of  those  critics  who  are  most  able 
to  estimate  the  fairness  and  accuracy  of  the  story,  namely,  the 
men  who  fought  in  the  action.  They  did  their  work  right  nobly 
and  well,  and  if  appreciation  of  their  efforts  is  lacking,  it  will  be 
rather  because  they  are  too  modest  to  do  justice  to  themselves  than  / 
to  any  unwillingness  on  the  part  of  others  to  concede  to  them  the  f^ 
honour  they  so  well  deserre.  "| 

Sir  Donald  Stewart's  march  upon  Ghazni  was  uneventful  as  far 
as  Shahjui,  the  limit  of  the  Candahar  province,  but  from  that 
point  a  change  took  place ;  it  began  to  be  understood  that  oppo- 
sition was  likely  to  occur  before  Ghazni  was  reached.  At  Shah- 
jui the  Taraki  country  begins,  and  the  mooUahs  had  been  so  active 
in  preaching  a  jehad  that  several  thousand  men  had  collected  on 
the  hills  to  the  east.  These  were  at  first  Tarakis,  ghazis  from 
Candahar,  and  contingents  from  Zamindawar  and  other  neigh- 
bouring districts.  They  kept  well  away  from  the  British  force, 
but  marched  day  by  day,  parallel  to  it,  along  the  foot  of  the  high 
hills  on  the  right  of  the  valley  along  which  ^A^  troops  were 
making  their  way.  They  gathered  strength  daily,  but  it  was 
deemed  unwise  to  attack  them,  as  they^iyoujd  prgj>ably  have 
retired  up  the  hillsides  out  of  reach,  and  mS  meu  would  have 
been  unable  to  scatter  them.  Besides,  the  baggage  train  of  the 
column  was  over  six  miles  in  length  (the  elephant  battery  with  its 
bullock-teams  yoked  to  tn^  ammunition  waggons  stretched  away  for 
a  mile  or  more),  and  to  have  detached  a  brigade  to  make  an 
attack  upon  the  enemy  would  have  left  the  oaggage  open  to 
molestation  from  the  right  flank.  The  tribesmen,  therefore,  were 
allowed  to  march  quietly  along,  our  spies  keeping  Sir  Donald 
Stewart  well  informed  of  all  that  was  happening  in  their  camp. 
Their  numbers,  the  names  of  their  chiefs,  and  their  probable 
intentions  were  made  known  to  Major  Euan  Smith,  Political 
Officer,  and  from  the  first  it  was  certain  that  they  would  try  issues 
with-ihe  British  before  Ghazni  was  reached.  The  aspect  of  the 
country,  too,  showed  that  war  was  meant ;  the  valley  was  fertile 
and  well  cultivated,  but  every  village  had  been  deserted,  all  sup- 
plies buried,  and  the  women  and  children  carried  away  to  the  hiUs 


^ 


392  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

for  safety.  It  was  as  if  the  people  bad  fled  from  pestilence ;  the 
moollahs  had  done  their  work  well,  and  had  so  wrought  upon  the 
fears  and  fanaticism  of  the  ignorant  peasants  that  they  had  left 
their  homes  to  the  tender  mercies  of  our  soldiery.  Perhaps,  also, 
it  was  believed  that  by  cutting  off  supplies  the  march  northwards 
might  be  retarded  or  checked  altogether;  btft  this  belinf  rnn  nevftr 
^Yi^^^^MiynVi  1I111  fni  n[;iiij^  parties  unearthed  the  hidden  stores, 
and  the  troops  were  never  reaUy  short  of  food.  The  leaders  of 
the  tribesmen  were  Shir  Jan  (Taraki),  and  Mahomed  Aslam  Khan 
(Tokhi),  and  so  overawed  were  the  villagers  by  their  threats  that 
even  those  who  would  willingly  have  traded  with  our  purchasing 
agents  had  to  throw  in  their  lot  with  the  more  fanatical  spirits.  " 
With  the  British  force  were  several  thousand  Hazaras,  who,  as 
is  usually  the  case  with  native  allies,  were  rather'  a  source  of 
anxiety  than  any  real  aid.  They  marched  in  wild  irregularity  on 
the  flanks  of  the  column,  and  every  deserted  village  was  plundered 
by  them  without  compunction.  They  thus  appropriated  Isx^ 
quantities  of  supplies  which  would  have  been  welcome  to 
army,  and  it  was  at  times  annomi^  to  find  they  had  cleared  a 
village  of  grain  before  (SOTOwn^mOTcould  arrive.  Their  inveterate 
hatred  of  the  Afghans  had  full  swing,  and  they  hailed  our  march 
upon  Ghazni  with  savage  satisfaction  as  giving  them  an  opportunity 

of  wiping    off  old    scores.       Naw    ihtLt    t^py  fi^^]   ^p    r1.a    ««*    i«fn«r1  — 

fttfty^"g  ?>  the  country  thn'r  npiritn  iiki  inniumbnt  dampodj  nn 
4heir  Xatore  p^sents  nothing  more  pleasing  than  a  war  of 
revenge  by  the  southern  tribesmen  as  soon  as  our  armies  have 
returned  to  India.  The  excesses  lik^y  to  be  committed  when 
that  return  takes  place  "cap  only  be  tiiought  of  with  pain  and 
humiliation  by  us.  We  may  exact  Vhat  promises  we  choose  from 
the  new  Amir,  but  he  will  be  helpless  te^eck  his  unruly  subjects, 
and  we  cannot  march  again  to  Cabul  to  save  the  Hazaras  from 
their  fate.  There  will  be  notliing  for  them  but  to  retire  into  the 
fastnesses  of  their  high  table-land  between  Bamian  and  Herat, 
xthere  to  hold  their  own  until  the  bitterness  of  the  vendetta  shall 

have  died  away.  .  _        -  ■ 

With  such  allies  and  with  his  force  well  on  the  alert.  Sir 
Donald  Stewart  encamped  at  Mushaki,  two  long  marches  south 
of  Ghazni,  on  the  IStb  of  April,  the  enemy's  camp  being  a  few 


Sir  Donald  Stewart's  Forces. 


393 


miles  &^ft7vp'^[*£Pl^^  visited  the  camp,  and  retarned  with  the 
Dews  that  iS^tfomuiMfe  the  tribesmen  would  attempt  to  drive 
back  the  oolamn,  and  would  probably  take  up  their  position  on  a 
low  spar  running  eastwards  from  the  Qui  Eoh  Mountains  and 
dominating  the  road.  With  this  warning  to  guide  him,  Sir 
Donald  Stewart  formed  his  order  of  march,  so  as  to  place  his 
infantry  on  his  left  flank,  upon  which  the  brunt  of  the  attack 
would  be  likely  to  fall.  It  should  be  remembered  that  the 
column  was  marching  in  a  valley  running  almost  due  north  and 
south,  and  that  the  road  from  Mushaki  was  much  nearer  the  hills 
on  the  west  (or  left  flank)  than  the  Shilghur  ranges  on  the  east. 
The  order  of  march  from  Mushaki  was  as  follows  : — 


19th  Bengal  Lancen,  800  sabres.  \ 

A-B,  Boyal  Hone  Artillery,  six  9-pr.  ghns.  LetdHng      brigade 

19th  Pan  jab  Natire  Infantry,  470  Rifles.  I  under  the    oom- 

Field  Force    1 1  company  2-60th  Rifles,  63  Rifles.  )  mand  of  Briga- 

Head-       •<  1  company  25th  Ponjab  Native  In&ntry,  85  rifles.  |  dier-Genenil    C. 

qnarters.      (l  troop  19ih  Bengal  Lancers,  50  sabres.  I  H.  Palliser,  O.B. 

Noa.  i  and  10  Companies  Bengal  Sappers  and  Miners,  80  rifles,  j 


Under  the  com- 
mand of  Briga- 
dier-General R. 
J.  Hngheo/ 


59th  Foot,  486  rifles. 

8rd  Qhoorka  Regiment,  289  Rifles. 

43-4th,  Royal  Artillery,  six  9-pr.  gans. 

6.11th,  Royal  Artillery.  j?^f;P."-^     ., 

'      '  (  Two  6-3-in.  howitzers. 

2nd  Punjab  Catalry,  849  sabres. 

Field  Hospitals. 

Ordnance  and  Engineer  Field  Pkriuk 

Treasure. 

Commissariat. 

Baggage. 

2-60th  Rifles,  443  Rifles. 

15th  Sikhs,  570  rifles. 

25th  Punjab  Native  Infantry,  380  rifles. 

11 -11th,  Royal  Artillery  (Mountain  Battery)  six  7-pr.  guns. 

1st  Ponjab  Catalry,  316  sabres. 

The  length  of  the  column  was  about  six  miles,  so  that  the  19th 
Bengal  Lancers  were  close  upon  Ahmed  Khel  when  the  rear-guard 
was  leaving  Mushaki.  Upon  nearing  the  spur  of  the  Gul  Eoh 
hills  the  enemy  were  seen  drawn  up  in  the  shape  of  a  huge 
parallelogram  at  right  angles  to  the  road  and  completely  barring 
the  way.     The  road  passes  over  a  low  kotal  just  where  the  spur 


!  Under  the  command 
of     Brigadier   - 
General      R. 
Barter. 


394  ^>^  Afghan  War,  1(879—80. 

loses  itself  in  the  valley,  and  it  was  clear  that  Shir  Jan  and 
Mahomed  Aslam  Ehan  meant  to  contest  the  advance  at  this  point. 
The  village  of  Ahmed  Khel  was  marked  in  the  maps  as  lying  in 
a  hollow  helow  the  spur,  hut  really  no  village  exists, -tBl)ti^^-Ae 
liitrTTrig  pliiiii  nl  rfrnpitfo  ie  ruljrrl  AhmTflTfftml      The  enemy  were 
three  miles  away  when  first  sighted,  and  Sir  Donald  Stewart  made 
his  disposition  to  attack  hy  deflecting  General  Hughes's  brif^ade 
to  the  left  so  as  to  face  the  Gul-Koh  spur.     A  squadron  of  the 
19th  Bengal  Lancers  was  sent  out  on  the  extreme  left  to  recon- 
noitre the  enemy's  position  » that  direction,  while  A-B  and  G4 
batteries  were  placed  on  the  right,  ufiKtet>escort  of  the  2nd  Punjab 
Cavalry  and  the  second  squadron  of  the^T9thi.^i^g*l  liancws. 
The  heavy  battery  was  halted  about  a  mile  in  rea^^  *  ^^^  "^' 
The  Lieutenant-General  and  Staflf  with  the  reserve  (^P^^  ^' 
the  19th  Punjabees,  the  Sappers,  and  the  General's  escort^llf '^  ^^  * 
hill  in  rear  commanding  a  good  view  of  the  country.     Soo^^"^^ 
seven  o'clock    orders  were    sent  to   General   Barter    to    cSSf 
forward  half  his  infantry,  and  to  send  on  two  squadrons  of  the^ 
Punjab  cavalry  without  delay.     At  eight  o'clock  the  troops  moA^ 
forward  in  order  of  battle.     The  two  batteries  of  artillery  wi. 
their  cavalry  escort  were  on  the  extreme  right ;  the  59th  FogT 
were  in  the  centre  of  the  line,  with  the  2nd  Sikhs  on  their  le 
flank,  while  the  8rd  Ghoorkas  were  in  the  extreme  left  with  the 
ranks  deflected  a  little  to  the  rear.     There  was  a  gap  of  400 
500  yards  between  the  artillery  and  the  69th,  and  to  fill  this  \\ 
Sir  Donald  Stewart's  escort  of  a  troop  of  the  i9th  Bengal  Lancer^l 
a  company  of  the  60th   Bifles,  and   one  company  of  the  25tl! 
Punjab  Native  Infantry  were  told  ofif ;  but  even  then  the  gap  couldl 
not  altogether  be  filled.    A  company  of  the  19th  Punjabees  were] 
moved  to  the  left  of  A-B  battery,  thus  protecting  botii  batteries 
at  the  same  time.     Such  was  the  first  formation,  but   it  wasi 
afterwards  modified,  the  guns  of  G-4  being  moved  to  various  pointsj 
between  the  infantry  regiments,  and  directing  their  fire  whereveij 
the  numbers  of  the  enemy  seemed  to  threaten  persistent  attacl| 
The  two  squadrons  of  the  19th  Bengal  Lancers  were  also  extend 
upon  the  left  flank  to  check  any  turning  movement  from 
quarter,  and  also  a  guard  to  two  of  the  guns  of  G-4,  which  i 
into  action  in  that  quarter.     The  infantry  were  thus  flank/ 


Battle  of  Ahmed  Khel.  395 

either  hand  by  a  battery  of  artillery,  while  the  cavalry  formed  the 
wings,  as  it  were,  of  the  column  ready  to  strike  to  right  or  left,  or 
to  charge  on  converging  lines  upon  a  common  enemy  in  front. 
The  baggage  stretched  away  in  the  rear  for  several  miles,  and  it  was 
all-important  to  prevent  the  head  of  the  column  being  out-flanked, 
as  in  such  a  case  the  line  would  have  been  broken,  and  a  stampede 
of  men  and  animals  have  taken  place  upon  General  Barter's 
brigade.  The  enemy,  seeing  the  preparations  for  attack,  moved 
down  bodily  from  the  crest  of  the  ridge  to  the  lower  slopes  with 
standards  waving  and  tom-toms  beating;  and  a  fair  amount  of 
order  was  preserved  among  the  horsemen  and  foot  soldiers,  who 
numbered  12,000  or  15,000 — the  Tarakis,  Andaris,  Suleiman 
Kheyls,  and  Tokhis  having  mustered  their  fighting  men  in  obedience 
to  the  summons  of  the  moollahs  sent  by  Mushk-i-Alam.  Omr  i^sji^ 
artillery  (A-B  and  G-4)  got  into  action  and  began  shelling  the 
slopes  preparatory  to  the  infantry  attack ;  but  suddenly  a  commo- 
tion was  observed  in  the  most  advanced  linos  of  the  opposing  army, 
the  moollahs  could  be  seen  haranguing  the  irregular  host  with 
frantic  energy,  the  beating  of  the  tom-Uynis  was  redoubled,  and 
then,  as  if  by  magic,  a  wave  of  men — ghazis  of  the  most  des- 
perate type — ^poured  down  upon  the  plain  and  rushed  upon 
General  Stewart's  force.  The  main  body  of  the  Afghan  army 
remained  upon  the  hill  to  watch  the  ghazis  in  their  reckless 
onslaught,  and  to  take  advantage  of  any  success  they  might  gain. 
The  fanaticism  of  the  8,000  or  4,000  men  who  made  this  des- 
perate charge  l^tjrg&hapirna'^if  buoiii  iMimJled ;  they  had  500  or 
600  yards  to  cover  before  they  could  come  to  close  quarters  with 
our  infantry,  and  yet  they  made  nothing  of  the  distance.  They 
advanced,  or  rather  rushed  forward,  in  three  lines ;  many  of  the 
men  were  on  horseback,  and  nearly  all  well  armed  with  tulwars, 
knives,  and  pistols.  Somecarried  rifles  and  matchlocks,  while  a 
few — and  these  must,  indeed,  have  been  resolute  fanatics — had 
simply  pikes  made  of  bayonets,  or  pieces  of  sharpened  iron  1 
fastened  upon  long  sticks.  The  ground  right  and  left  of  6ot^^ 
troops  was  more  open  and  level  than  that  immediately  in  front, 
and  consequently  the  ghazis'  attack  broke  with  greatest  violence 
upon  o«F  flanks.  On  Mfleft  flank  the  two  squadrons  of  the  19th 
Bengal  Lancers  were  still  at  the  trot  moving  into  position  when 


f 


396  The  Afglian  War,   1879—80. 


the  ghazis  rushed  among  them.  Lancers  are  always  at  a  dis- 
advantage when  infantry  have  broken  their  ranks,  and  the  19th 
were  no  exception  to  the  rule.  In  an  instant  they  were  lost  to 
sight  in  the  cloud  of  dust  and  smoke  caused  by  the  fight ;  and  in 
the  confusion,  owing,  perhaps,  to  some  misunderstood  order,  or  to 
the  men  losing  their  heads,  a  troop  charged  to  the  right  in  rear  of 
the  infantry  line  and  came  smashing  into  the  19th  Punjab  Native 
Infantry,  in  rear  of  the  Lieutenant- General  and  his  StaflF.  All 
was  confusion  for  a  moment;  the  ammunition  mules  were 
stampeded,  and  with  the  riderless  horses  of  the  Lancers  killed  or  ^ 
wounded  in  the  melee,  dashed  into  the  head-quarters'*  Staff.  The 
ghazis  had  continued  their  onward  rush  and  were  engaged  in 
hand-to-hand  fighting  with  dilfr  infantry.  Some  penetrated  to 
within  twenty  yards  of  the  spot  upon  which  the  Staff  were  watch- 
ing the  action,  and  so  critical  was  the  moment,  that  Sir  Donald 
Stewart  and  every  man  of  his  Staff  drew  their  swords  and  pre- 
pared for  self-defence.  The  impetupsity  of  the  ghazis  on  the  left 
carried  them  right  in  rear  of  «ff  infantry,  and  but  for  the  cool 
promptitude  of  Colonel  Lyster,  V.C.,  commanding  Ihe  8rd 
Ghoorkas,  this  rush  might  have  had  tenable  results.  Colonel 
Lyster  formed  his  men  into  company  squares,  and  poured  volley 
afteir  volley  into  the  fanatics  as  they  surged  onwards.  In  the 
meantime  the  attack  had  also  hurst  all  along  the  line,  and  in  the 
hurry  and  confusion  some  of  rarmen  did  not  fix  bayonets. 

The  GeneraPs  escort,  filling  the  gap  between  the  Horse  Artillery 
Battery  and  the  59th,  were  driven  back,  and  the  59th  were  ordered 
to  throw  back  their  right  to  check  the  rush.  The  order  was  so 
delivered  that  it  was  understood  to  imply  the  retirement  of  the 
whole  regiment,  and  the  movement  was  carried  out.  The  ghazis 
were  so  close  that  there  was  a  tendency  to  collect  in  groups  for 
mutual  protection — a  fatal  course  when  a  general  rush  has  to  be 
checked ;  but  General  Hughes,  by  his  example  and  energy, 
checked  this  in  time,  and  after  a  few  minutes'  excitement, — an 
excitement  quite  pardonable  under  the  circumstances, — 5ot  men 
settled  down  and  began  a  steady  and  continuous  fire  from  their 
breech-loaders,  which  swept  away  the  ghazis  and  covered  the  plain 
with  dead.  But  there  had  been  persistent  hand-to-hand  fighting 
before  this  fire  began  to  take  effect,  for  the  ghazis  fought  with  a 


^n 


Ahmed  Rhei  397 


bra*     ^ery  never  excelled,  and  sold  their  lives  as  dearly  as  fana- 
tic    e  can  sell  them.    Yet  the  three  regiments — British,  Sikh,  and  . 
6     moorka — ^to  whom  they  were  exposed,  held  their  own,  the  2nd    ^     ju9^ 
S     'ikhs,  in   particular,  fittnu(iii[j  lliii    niiiidiiVM   nnti(;p   fnr   thmV  ^' 
sp     tendid  steadiness  in  rolling  back  the  attack,  aUtTttie  main  body      \   ^.^t^ 
of     yAfghttns  holding  rioof,  the  ghaiAis  tuulil  nuh  hupe-tS^breafr-t^nr  '  ^^ 
Hb    4e.     fiat  with  what  grand  disregard  for  their  lives  tbejl^^ust 
ha    fve  fought  is  shown  by  their  charging  to  within  thirty  yards  of 
tl     A  muzzles  of  Major  Warter's  guns,  and  facing  case  and  reversed 
BJ     jrapnel,  which  at  close  quarters  mowed  them  down  in  scores. 
'    ria  gunners  never  flinched,  but  stood  to  their  pieces  manfully, 
truing  to  the  2nd  Punjab  Cavalry  to  clear  the  enemy  away  until 
the  infantry  fire  should   begin  to  tell.     The  charges   made  by 
the  2nd  Punjab  Cavalry  were  repeated  again  and  again,  and  were 
as  brillilint  as  any  made  by  cavalry  during  the  whole  war.      This 
is  the  deliberate  opinion  of  the  men  who  witnessed  them,  and  who 
owed  n&uch  to  the  sowars  who  kept  the  right  flank  safe.      The 
Horse  Artillery  guns  were  retired  160  yards  when  the  first  shock 
had  passed,  and  at  a  range  of  a  few  hundred  yards  they  continued 
to  fire  shell  into  the  enemy  with  admirable  precision.       The  guns 
of  G-4  weill^n  a  comparatively  safer  position  among  the  infantry, 
and  their  fire    also  was  well  directed  and  very  effective.    In 
the  gap  I  have  mentioned  between  A-B  battery  and  the  69th 
Foot  the  General's  escort  had  a  tough  hand-to-hand  fight  with  a 
body  of  gihazis  who  closed  with  them.    Breech-loader  and  bayonet 
told  against  pistol  and   ttdwar,  while  the  few  sowars  of  the  19th 
Bengal  Lancers  also  gave  their  aid  in  the  m^Ue.    How  desperate 
the  fighting  must  have  been  is  shown  by  the  casualties  among 
the  escort  alone,  which  was  merely  used  to  give  cohesion  to  the 
line.     The  company  of  the  60th  lost  its  Colour-Sergeant  (Ches- 
ham)  and  two  privates  killed  and  a  bugler  wounded ;  the  company 
of  the  26th  had  two  sepoys  killed,  and  the  detachment  of  the 
19th  Bengal  Lancers  had  seven  sowars  wounded.     The  heavy 
battery  contributed  its  quota  to  the  engagement  as  it  got  into 
action   on  a  convenient  piece  of  rising  ground  in   rear  of  the 
infiintry,    and   shelled  a   hill  south   of  Ahmed  Khel   spur,  on 
which  large  masses  of  the  enemy  had  congregated,  as  if  meditating 
a  flank  attack  upon  the  baggage  line.    In  the  early  part  of  the 


?' 


398  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

day  Sir  Donald  Stewart,  as  I  have  said,  had  sent  back  wor 
General  Barter  to  hurry  up  with  reinforcements.  General  Bat 
started  the  Ist  Punjab  Cavaby  at  a  trot,  and  followed  with  the  60e^ 
Rifles,  The  1st  Cavalry  arrived  in  time  to  share  in  the  pursuit^ 
the  fugitives,  who  had  been  unsuccessful  in  their  attack  upon 
right  flank,  and  many  were  killed  before  they  could  reach 
protecting  slopes  of  the  Shilghur  Hills  on  the  east.  The  ofl 
formed  up  on  the  right  of  the  59th  Foot,  and  the  '*  cease  firj 
sounded  just  as  they  arrived,  the  enemy  by  that  time  being  in 
retreat.  The  cavalry  pursuit  had  to  be  checked,  as  the  six  mij 
of  baggage  had  to  be  looked  after ;  and  with  so  many  reginae^ 
in  advance,  it  was  feared  that  detached  bodies  of  ghazis  b^"^ 
run  amuck  in  the  rear.  The  action  had  begun  at  nine  o'clooi^  ao" 
*'  cease  fire  *'  sounded  at  ten,  just  an  hour's  fighting ;  P^^  *"^ 
casualties  were  unusually  heavy  for  Afghan  warfare.  \  Of  w® 
enemy  1,000  dead  were  counted  on  the  field,  and  man^  bodies 
had  been  carried  oflf :  while  their  wounded  must,  at  the  ^aU®^^ 
estimate,  have  numbered  1,000  or  1,500.  The-gha^s  IdW 
were  all  fine,  hfludsomo  man,  if  ell  nunriibcd  ancj^-of^  splettdid 
^ysi^tnO)  and  theig  fapaticigm  bad  given  them  courage  wmob 
vMkiiHii  Mnldifii'd  migULmiyj  Among iAie  d(M  Wku  ^e  womtt» 
^^j^ while  twelve  others  were  ti^n  prisoners  with  arms  in  taeir  hands- 
\^^  The  casualties  among  St^troops  were  seventeen  kille4>  and  126 
K  ^^->  wounde^  among  the'iatter  bemg  six  officers  wE^Me  uafll85T»^^ 
i^^^  aKeacIybeeB  publishgar-laieuLenanL  Ytmng,  of  the  i9tV  Bet^a*"^ 

XjanoofD,  had  the  misforluuo  to  lose  cuntrorover  his  horse,  andliw 
snimfll  rarriod  him  into  fee  thidr-oftiwr^azis,  by  whom  fie  was 
cut  do«^  and  fearfally  wounded;  From  head  to  heel  he  was  slashed 
until  ftlmoot  past  reeognition>  and  ■whon-picked  up  he  "wao  believed 
to  bo  in  a  djlng  fllate>  -  TLy  yurgaeuH  liavu  irince  giV6n*b€tter 
reports  of  him»  and  bio  rooovory  qeefflg  assured.  Of  the  wounded^ 
men,  four  have  since  died  of  their-  wocmds,  which  in  nearly  eTorj 
case  :neEa.  Xuhcax.  Jot  kni£B.-cnts-. reoeived  in  hand-to-hand  en- 
co«mt6ra.'^|fThe  19th  Bengal  Lancers  had  fifty-three  casualties, 
and  twenty-four  amongst  the  horses ;  the  total  loss  of  the  whole 
cavalry  brigade  was  more  than  100,  and  from  seventy  to  eighty 
horses. 
TheHazaras,  seeing  the  Afghans  in  full  flight,  pursued  them 


Ahmed  KheL  399 

with  ardouTy  and  their  knowledge  of  the  country  gave  them  an 
advantage  European  troops  could  not  hope  to  possess.  Qow  they 
harassed  the  fugitiyes  only  their  own  kinsmen  will  ever  know, 
as  pursuers  and  pursued  disappeared  into  the  hills  very  shortly 
after  the  action  came  to  an  end.  The  prisoners  taken  after  the 
fight  were  dealt  with  by  Major  Euan  Smith,  Political  Officer,  all 
the  wounded  being  treated  by  m^  surgeons  and  taken  onwards 
towards  Ghazni.  Two  ghazis  only  had  to  be  shot;  they  were 
fanatics  of  too  exalted  minds  to  accept  mercy,  and  when  promised 
liberty  in  return  for  an  undertaking  to  go  quietly  to  their  homes, 
they  simply  cursed  all  Elafirs,  and  swore  to  kiU^Feringhi  the 
instant  they  should  be  released.  In  justice  to  Mir^  men,  their 
lives  had  to  be  taken,  as  Candahar  experience  has  shown  that 
such  fjEtnatics  always  keep  their  word,  ^ut^  dead  were  buried 
on  the  field  by  Mr.  Wamford,  the  Chaplain,  as  Sir  Donald 
Stewart  had  resolved  to  march  on  to  Nani  without  delay ;  and 
early  in  the  afternoon  the  column  was  again  moving  northward. 
.As  our  men  passed  along,  ghazis  who  had  feigned  death  rose  and 
fired  at  them,  and  men  severely  wounded  slashed  at  the  legs  of 
the  soldiers ;  these  dying  spasms  of  fanaticism  proving  that  the 
ghazis  were  consistent  to  the  ^xAy 

On  the  evening  of  the  .19th  the  force  encamped  at  Nani,  within 
fifteen  miles  of  Ghazni,  and  on  the  following  day  the  cavalry 
reached  the  fortress  itself  without  further  opposition.  Tlnie  tribes- 
men had  made  their  grand  efibrt  to  save  the  place,  and  had  failed  ; 
there  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  allow  the  Elafirs  to  do  as  they 
willed  with  the  city  and  citadel,  since  it  had  fallen  into  their 
hands.  The  infantry  and  artillery  encamped  for  the  night  at 
Chel  Butcha  Gaum  (the  Village  of  the  Forty  Children),  a  few 
miles  south  of  Ghazni.  It  was  noticed  at  the  time  that  a  low 
hill,  some  miles  away  onjhe  right,  was  occupied  by  a  large  force 
of  Afghans,  who  had  their  standards  flying,  but  did  not  seem 
otherwise  bent  on  hostilities.  They  were  not  interfered  with 
then,  as  it  was  deemed  advisable  to  push  on  to  Ghazni,  under 
the  walls  of  which  the  Candahar  column  encamped  on  the  21st 
without  further  incident.  Sir  Donald  Stewart  had  orders  to  make 
no  long  stay  in  Ghazni,  and  he  intended  moving  out  on  the 
28rd ;  but  it  was  reported  that  the  gathering  of  men  seen  on 


400  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

the  20th  and  Slst  had  largely  increased,  and  that  they  were  the 
advance-guard  of  an  army  of  15,000  or  20,000  which  Mnshk-i- 
Alam  had  raised  in  Shilghnr  and  Znrmat.  The  effect  upon  the 
native  mind,  if  such  a  force  had  heen  left  unmolested  when  our 
troops  evacuated  Ghazni,  would  have  been  very  damaging  to  our 
prestige,  and  Sir  Donald  Stewart  resolved  to  disperse  the  tribes- 
men before  moving  northward.  The  peaceful  state  of  Ghazni 
itself  was  an  encouragement  to  this  course  of  action,  as  he  could 
freely  use  the  regiments  at  his  disposal  without  fear  of  an  emeute 
in  the  city. 

As  a  preparatory  measure  a  wing  of  the  19th  Punjab  Infantry 
occupied  the  citadel,  and  early  on  the  morning  of  the  28rd  a  force 
under  command  of  Brigadier-Oeneral  Palliser  marched  towards 
Shalez,  six  miles  south-east  of  Ghazni,  said  to  be  occapied  by  the 
enemy.     The  troops  detailed  for  the  work  were  : — 

A-B,  Royal  Horse  ArtUlery.  ^  ^ 

11-llih,  Royal  Artillery. 

2-60tb  Rifles,  525  rifles.  Brigadier-General  R. 

15th  Sikhs,  578  rifles.  )       Barter     command- 


25th  Fan  jab  Native  Infantry,  458 

rifles. 
2nd  Sikhs,  424  rifles. 
Ist  Ponjab  Oaralry,  322  sabres. 
2nd  Punjab  Cavalry,  825  sabres. 


ing. 


Under  the  oommand  of 
Brigadier  -  General 
C.  H.  Palliser,  C.B. 


; 


On  the  previous  day  a  cavalry  reconnaissance  had  been  made, 
and  2,000  or  8,000  men  had  been  seen  about  the  Urzoo  villages 
near  Shalez.  General  Palliser,  on  arriving  near  the  villages,  found 
them  occupied  in  force  by  3,000  or  4,000  men.  He  immediately  got 
his  guns  into  action,  and  shelled  the  villages,  but  without  any 
apparent  effect.  The  enemy  remained  quietly  within  the  walls, 
except  their  videttes,  which  were  pushed  forward  more  into  the 
open,  while  some  of  their  sharp-shooters  lined  a  narrow  ditch  in 
the  fields,  and  bogan  firing  at  long  ranges  upon  our  infantry.  The 
villages  consisted  of  three  walled  enclosures,  two  in  close  proximity 
to  each  other  facing  our  right,  and  a  third  somewhat  in  rear  of, 
and  removed  from,  the  others.  This  third  village  would  have 
borne  the  brunt  of  any  attack  from  our  left  flank,  and  it  had  as 
a  sort  of  screen  a  small  garden  outside  the  walls.  General 
Palliser  believed  the  ground  between  his  troops  and  the  villages 


The  Affair  at  Urzoo.  401 

to  be  irrigated,  and  thought  that  much  loss  of  life  would  occur  if 
he  sent  his  infantry  to  make  a  direct  attack.  He  silenced  such  of 
the  enemy's  sharp-shooters  as  grew  troublesome  by  telling  off 
marksmen  to  keep  their  fire  under,  and  continued  shelling  the 
villages  very  vigorously.  Still  the  enemy  made  no  sign  either  of 
attacking  or  retiring,  and  a  message  was  at  last  heliographed  to 
Sir  Donald  Stewart,  saying  the  place  was  too  strong  to  be  taken 
by  the  troops  then  in  front  of  it  without  sacrificing  many  lives. 
Upon  news  being  received.  General  Hughes's  Brigade  was  ordered 
under  arms,  and  a  half  battalion  of  the  69th  foot  (253  rifles),  and 
six  companies  of  the  8rd  Ghoorkas  (191  rifles),  were  sent  out  as  a 
reinforcement.  Still  General  Palliser  did  not  consider  it  advisable 
to  attack,  and  he  withdrew  to  a  ridge  2,500  yards  from  the  villages, 
whence  he  continued  to  shell  the  enemy.  Upon  this  Sir  Donald 
Stewart  moved  forward  with  G-4,  R.A.,  254  rifles  of  the  59th, 
a  half  battalion  of  the  19th  Punjabees,  and  the  19th  Bengal 
Lancers.  The  heavy  battery  was  left  in  camp  with  two  companies 
of  the  59th,  two  companies  of  Sappers,  and  a  complement  of 
guards  furnished  from  each  regiment.  Sir  Donald  Stewart 
reached  Shalez  at  nine  o'clock,  and  found  that  General  Palliser 
had  withdrawn  his  artillery  and  infantry  to  a  low  hill  some  distance 
from  the  villages,  with  a  view  to  entice  the  enemy  into  the  open. 
The  tribesmen  were  too  cautious  to  be  deceived  by  this  manoBuvre^ 
and  preferred  bearing  bombardment  to  coming  under  infieintry  fire 
in  the  plain.  The  two  batteries  had  fired  the  unusual  number  of 
thirty  rounds  of  shell  per  gun,  a  total  of  860  rounds,  but  7-pr. 
and  9*pr.  shells  can  do  but  little  damage  against  walled  enclosures 
and  stout  mud  walls.  When  our  reinforcements  arrived,  a  sudden 
burst  of  fanatical  enthusiasm  seized  the  defenders  of  the  villages, 
and  it  seemed  as  if  the  ghazis'  rush  at  Ahmed  Ehel  was  about 
to  be  repeated.  At  first  only  their  videttes  were  seen  watching 
our  troops,  while  an  occasional  pufif  of  smoke  from  the  ditch 
showed  the  presence  of  a  sharp-shooter ;  but  soon  a  number  of 
mounted  men  were  seen  galloping  about,  and  then  out  poured  a 
mob  from  the  shelter  of  the  walls.  They  formed  themselves  rudely 
into  line,  and  to  the  din  of  their  tom-toms  began  to  advance. 
This  unexpected  boldness  on  their  part  was  met  by  our  batteries 
of  artillery  opening  fire  at  800  or  900  yards'  range,  and  the  first 

D    D 


402  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

few  shells  caused  many  of  the  more  timid  to  break  and  retire. 
Sir  Donald  Stewart  ordered  the  infantry  to  clear  the  villages 
without  delay,  and  General  Barter's  Brigade  advanced  in  lino 
upon  the  right ;  while  General  Hughes,  whose  brigade  had  been 
joined  by  the  2nd  Sikhs,  made  a  direct  attack  in  front,  his  left 
swinging  round  so  as  to  take  the  detached  village  of  Urzoo  in 
rear.  Our  troops  steadily  advanced  until  within  200  yards  of  the 
enemy,  when  file-firing  commenced.  The  fusillade  was  terrible, 
and  so  stunned  were  the  wretched  and  ill-armed  tribesmen,  that 
they  fled  in  confusion.  Some  profeiTod  staying  crouched  in  the 
ditch  to  running  the  gauntlet  of  the  bullets.  One  can  imagine  the 
incessant  ''ping"  when  six  regiments  armed  with  breech-loaders 
are  advancing  in  one  long  line,  firing  as  rapidly  as  men  can 
load.  It  was  natural  that  an  undisciplined  mob  should  melt 
away  before  such  an  attack.  The  men  who  lay  hidden  fought 
hand  to  hand  with  our  soldiers  as  the  latter  reached  them ;  but 
there  was  really  no  stubborn  resistance,  and  the  cavalry  and  horse 
artillery  were  let  loose  to  pursue  the  fugitives  as  soon  as  the 
villages  were  surrounded.  The  total  loss  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy  was  300  or  400;  while  our  casualties  were  almost  nil — one 
private  of  the  60th  and  one  sowar  of  the  1st  Punjab  Cavalry  shot 
dead.  Such  of  the  enemy  as  came  to  close  quarters  with  our 
men  fought  bravely  enough,  one  ghazi  making  a  desperate  rush  at 
Lieutenant  Legh,  of  the  60th,  who  killed  him  with  his  sword. 

The  Tajik  villagers  of  Urzoo  stated  that  there  were  originally 
4,000  footmen  and  200  cavalry  in  the  villages  when  General 
Palliser  first  arrived ;  but  that,  when  our  troops  did  not  attack, 
word  was  sent  to  all  neighbouring  villages  to  turn  out  their  fight- 
ing men,  and  many  Pathans  joined  their  friends  just  before  Sir 
Donald  Stewart's  aiTival.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Mushk-i- 
Alam  had  worked  upon  the  fanaticism  of  the  local  tribesmen,  in 
the  hope  of  retrieving  the  defeat  of  Ahmed  Khel.  His  hopes  have 
been  completely  shattered,  but  as  he  has  young  Musa  Khan  still 
with  him  he  may  yet  give  us  trouble.  General  Stewart  left  Sirdar 
Alum  Khan  in  charge  of  Ghazni  when  the  Gandahar  force  moved 
towards  Cabul.  The  defences  of  Ghazni  were  not  touched,  as  they 
were  considered  too  contemptible  to  give  trouble  if  a  force  should 
ever  find  itself  beneath  the  walls  of  the  city. 


ROUGH  SKETCH 

Shewing  the  attack  upon  the  villa fe$  of  UnoQ 

and  Shale*  hy  the  Ghazni  Field  Fwxm, 

on  the  tSrd  April  1880. 


Urzoo 


Midge  occupied  hy    /«?^k  ^''^^^    o     '^ 
Br.GenerfUFaUiser    \^f^:]        ^% 
pending  the  arHval    (i[{^mC»4^srvM<^    ^'^  ' 
of   the   Lieutonant.lWW^ir'i^^^^     ^  5*     V^ 


gfeneral. 


if= 


55 »; 


\ 


\ 


^.*^ 


o 


lit  Infantry  Briffido  ^  f 


♦tMt 


Abdur  Rahman  Expected  at  Cabul.  403 


CHAPTER  XXVHL 

•*  The  Divine  Kgnre  from  the  North  "— Sberpnr  doriDg  May— TnrkUh  FngitiTes  from 
Rassian  Territory— Ca1>al  in  Prosperity— The  People  enriched  at  the  Expense  of 
the  British  Government— The  Coining  of  Cabnli  Rupees — The  Effect  upon  the 
People — Street  Sketches— Life  in  the  Bazaars— The  Hinda  and  Kisilbash  Quarters 
—Rapacity  of  the  Traders— The  Abundance  of  Fruit— Ice-cream  Stalls  —  An 
Instance  of  Fanaticism -History  of  the  Kialbashes — ^Their  Turki  Descent « 
Elphinstone's  Estimate  of  their  Character— Their  Strength  in  Cahul  estimated  at 
6,000  Fighting  Men— Their  Treatment  by  the  Amira. 

IGfft  May,  1880. 

There  is  such  a  holy  calm  in  Sherpar  that  we  begin  to  question 
whether  all  the  excitement  of  the  last  six  months  has  not  been  a 
nightmare.  No  bustle  or  excitement,  no  sudden  alarms,  no  gathering 
of  armed  men  to  pour  out  upon  Asmai,  Siah  Sung,  or  Charasia ;  our 
cavalry  rest  quietly  in  their  lines  without  any  expectation  of  **  boot- 
and-saddle  "  sounding ;  and  every  sentry  in  the  cantonment  whiles 
away  his  time,  not  in  wondering  whether  the  enemy  are  near,  but 
in  sweet  speculation  as  to  when  orders  will  be  issued  for  the  march 
to  India.  The  majority  of  us  believe  that,  as  regards  severe  fighting,, 
we  have  satisfied  the  Afghans,  although  a  last  flash  in  the  pan  may 
occur  before  the  final  settlement ;  and  there  being  no  amuse- 
ment in  calculating  the  chances  of  the  next  action,  we  fall  back 
upon  discussion  of  possil  e  arrangements  with  the  various 
claimants  to  the  Amirship.  Abdur  Bahman*s  name  is  in  every 
man's  mouth,  and  the  news  of  his  departure  from  Eunduz  for 
Cabul  is  awaited  with  almost  as  much  anxiety  as  the  result  of  the 
Derby.  The  Sirdar  is  our  "  divine  figure  from  the  north,"  at 
least  just  now.  But  we  have  to  live  as  comfortably  as  we  can  in 
the  meantime ;  and  though  our  life  in  cantonments  is  necessarily 
a  colourless  one,  it  has  more  points  than  a  hot-house  existence  in 
India.  First,  in  the  order  of  comparison,  we  have  an  almost  per- 
fect climate ;  liext,  we  have  some  little  amusements ;  and  lastly, 
by  reason  of  our  separation  from  civilization,  we  have  a  less 
artificial  and  less  blameful  life  than  is  possible  in  the  irritating  and 
bilious  furnace  **  down  below."     It  does  not  say  much  for  civiliza- 

D  D  2 


404  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

lion  that  this  should  be  so  ;  but  we  have  fewer  temptations,  and, 
consequently,  fewer  faults  to  atone  for.  The  "  grass-widowers  '*  of 
Cabul,  I  undertake  to  say  with  most  serious  earnestness,  are  on  a 
far  higher  level  of  moral  purity  than  that  easy-living,  freely-flirt- 
ing, and  most  charming  section  of  Indian  society  which  migrates 
yearly  to  the  hills  when  punkahs  are  in  full  swing.  We  talk  less 
scandal ;  we  are  less  covetous  of  other  persons*  property,  animate 
or  inanimate ;  we  do  not  turn  night  into  day  to  the  music  of  the 
trois  temps  or  "  Pinafore ;  *'  and  we  do  our  duty  quietly,  albeit  with 
a  little  wholesome  grumbling.  But  as  news  drifts  up  from  the 
Khyber  line,  and  we  learn  how  the  poor  fellows  between  Gundamak 
and  Lundi  Kotal  are  grilling  in  their  single-fly  tents  with  manifold 
troubles  on  every  hand,  we  grow  placidly  thankful  that  we  are  in 
Cabul,  with  good  thick  walls  about  us,  and  a  foot  of  mud  between 
us  and  the  sun.  Not  everyone  could  be  in  hill  stations  if  all  the 
troops  weie  back  in  India ;  and  we  are  less  discontented  now  at 
our  lot — a  wifeless,  loverless  one  though  it  be — than  we  were  three 
months  ago.  Cabul  "  gi-ass-widowers  "  will  no  doubt  be  in  great 
demand  when  once  more  they  are  transplanted  into  Simla,  Mus- 
soorie,  or  Naini  Tal  society,  for  a  war  beaten-warrior  is  far  more 
esteemed  than  a  carpet  knight.  Fair  ears  will  tingle  with  pleasure 
when  whispered  explanations  are  given  of  the  days  spent  in  un- 
wonted innocence  in  Afghanistan — 

"  Days  when  we  laughed  for  joy  of  summer  heat, 
Nor  laughed  less  lood  when  snow  made  white  the  groand." 

We  have  pined  for  "  loot,  love,  and  liberty :  "  the  first  we  may 
never  get ;  but  every  day  brings  us  nearer  to  the  others,  and  we 
well  know  what  our  reward  will  be.  Will  it  not  be  counted  in 
our  favour  that  no  band  will  play  "  The  girl  I  left  behind  me  " 
when  once  more  our  faces  are  turned  eastwards  ?  It  surely  should 
be,  or  our  grass-widowhood  will  have  been  precious  time  uselessly 
squandered.  But,  frivolity  apart,  we  take  our  change  at  Time's 
counter  with  composure,  and  are  not  too  anxious  concerning  our 
immediate  fate.  There  are  the  current  duties  of  a  large  camp  to 
be  gone  through  daily :  they  can  never  be  shirked,  but  must 
always  be  done  systematically  and  thoroughly.  Regiments  have 
their  guards  to  mount  day  and  night,  spring  drill  and  parades  to 


Travellers  from  Afar.  405 

attend,  reornits  to  bo  shaped  into  good  soldiers,  embryo  signallers 
to  be  trained,  transport  to  be  kept  in  good  order.  Colonel 
Low  has  worked  a  wonderful  change  in  oar  transport,  and  we 
shall  soon  be  able  to  "march  anywhere  and  do  anything." 
General  Roberts  is  away  with  a  division' of  5,000  men  visiting 
Logar,  Wardak  and  Maidan ;  his  troops  are  in  excellent  health 
and  are  enjoying  the  trip  amazingly. 

We  have  visitors  occasionally,  other  than  of&cers  who  have 
taken  a  short  leave  from  a  station  down  the  line  to  pay  a  visit  to 
Cabal.  A  few  days  ago  three  Turkish  soldiers  applied  at  the 
Bala  Hissar  for  food  and  assistance  on  their  journey  to  India. 
They  were  sent  to  Major  Hastings,  Political  Officer,  and  told  a 
story  full  of  adventure.  They  were  an  old  man,  his  son,  and  a 
wild-looking  Turk  of  the  Bashi-Bazouk  order.  The  youngest  of 
the  party  was  very  intelligent,  and  a  handsome  specimen  of  the 
Turldsh  peasantry,  while  his  father  was  still  unbroken  in  strength 
in  spite  of  his  misfortunes.  The  "  Bashi-Bazouk,"  as  we 
imagined  him  to  be,  though  he  denied  the  impeachment,  was  the 
embodiment  of  rude  strength :  he  still  wore  the  long  blue  coat 
he  had  donned  when  called  upon  to  fight  the  Russians,  and  across 
the  breast  were  a  dozen  little  pockets,  each  large  enough  to  hold 
a  cartridge,  and  showing  signs  of  great  wear.  A  Turcoman  fur 
cap,  with  the  tanned  skin  outside  and  a  fringe  of  fur  showing  all 
round,  covered  his  long,  matted  hair,  and  added  to  the  wildness  of 
his  appearance*  All  the  men  were  travel-stained,  and  looked 
forlorn  enough;  but  theii*  satisfaction  at  being  among  the  "Inglis" 
was  without  bounds,  and  they  were  as  cheerful  and  contented  as 
if  the  10,000  miles  between  Cabul  and  Istamboul  were  only  a 
league.  Their  story  was  that  they  were  natives  of  the  village  of 
Soghral,  ten  days'  march  from  Kara,  and  that  when  the  Russian 
war  broke  out  tiiey  joined  Haji  All's  regiment,  their  captain  being 
Haji  Shmnan.  The  latter  was  killed  in  action,  and  the  Russians 
took  the  whole  of  the  Soghral  villagers  prisoners.  Men,  women, 
and  children  were  marched  for  eleven  days  until  the  railway  was 
reached  in  the  district  of  the  Caucasus,  when  the  whole  party  were 
transferred  to  the  rail.  After  four  days'  travelling  they  gainec. 
Moscow,  whence  their  famiUes  were  sent  to  St.  Petersburg,  while 
the  men  were  sent  eastwards  to  Dobiska.    Hero  they  were  kept 


4o6  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

prisoners  for  two  years,  being  lightly  ironed,  but  having  no  work 
to  do.  They  received  about  two  and  a  half  annas  in  Russian 
money  daily,  with  which  they  bought  food,  and  upon  which  they 
managed  to  live.  At  the  end  of  two  years  their  irons  were 
removed,  and  they  were  told  to  settle  down  abont  Dobiska  and 
cultivate  the  land.  At  the  earliest  opportunity  a  number  of  them 
absconded,  of  whom  these  three  men  kept  together.  For  fifteen 
days  they  travelled  secretly,  doing  long  distances  at  night,  until 
they  reached  Kazakia,  on  the  outer  border  of  Bokhara.  Here 
they  were  safe,  as  their  fellow-Mussulmans  willingly  gave  them 
food  ;  but  they  did  not  dare  to  go  before  the  Amir  of  Bokhara,  as 
they  believed  he  was  on  friendly  terms  with  the  Russians.  They 
stayed  during  the  winter  at  Guzar,  as  ihcy  were  told  the  Passes 
towards  Cabul  were  closed ;  but  in  the  spring  they  left  Bokhara 
and  made  for  Mazar-i-Sharif.  Here  they  found  Ishak  Elhan  as 
Governor :  the  place  was  quiet  enough,  and  but  few  troops  were 
holding  it.  Thence  they  marched  to  Bamian,  their  poverty  no 
doubt  saving  them  from  molestation,  and  at  last  they  reached 
Cabul.  Their  desire  was  to  be  sent  to  Bombay,  whence  their 
Consul  could  foi*ward  them  to  Constantinople.  Major  Hastings 
gave  them  Rs.  60  to  get  a  new  outfit  in  the  city,  and  make  them- 
selves clean  and  comfortable.  On  Monday  they  were  presented  to 
Sir  Donald  Stewart,  and  were  afterwards  jfttd  and  photographed : 
the  native  officers  of  the  Guides  giving  them  a  great  dinner, 
while  Mr.  Burke  immortalized  them  with  his  camera.  The  poor 
wretches  were  immensely  pleased,  and  will  no  doubt  carry  ba<^  to 
Turkey  good  impressions  of  our  kindness  to  them  in  distant  Cabul. 
It  has  chanced  that  since  December  last  I  have  visited  the 
city  of  Cabul  but  twice :  once  when  the  snow  was  still  lying 
on  the  ground,  and  our  engineers  were  busy  raising  new  fortifica- 
tions on  the  Sherderwaza  Heights.  On  this  occasion  I  merely 
passed  from  the  Bala  Hissar  along  the  skirts  of  the  lowest 
quarters  of  the  city,  as  the  Heights  had  to  be  scaled ;  so  that, 
in  wandering  through  the  bazaars  a  few  days  ago,  the  impres- 
sion uppermost  in  my  mind  was  the  state  of  Cabul  immediately 
after  Mahomed  Jan's  flight.  Then  the  city  was  gloomy  and  terror- 
stricken  :  it  had  gone  hand  and  heart  with  the  ghazi-Jo^  during 
the  triumphant  days  of  the  siege  of  Sherpur,  and  it  dreaded  the 


Cabul  Prospers.  407 

retribution  which  hnng  over  it.  The  alien  Kizilbashes  and  Hindus 
were  joyful  enough  at  the  re-establishment  of  order :  but  their 
wrecked  shops  and  pillaged  houses  were  sad  relics  of  the  fanatical 
storm  which  had  passed  over  Cabul.  No  man  of  the  Mussulman 
population  could  foretell  what  the  punishment  of  the  city  would 
be,  and  the  half-deserted  bazaars  and  the  still  by-streets  were 
eloquent  of  the  fear  which  cowed  the  unruly  populace.  But 
instead  of  bloody  reprisals  and  harsh  repression,  it  seemed  good 
in  the  eyes  of  our  leaders  that  gentleness  and  free  forgiveuess 
should  be  the  means  used  to  win  oyer  the  city ;  and  now  Cabul  is 
more  prosperous  and  peaceful  than  it  has  been  for  many  genera- 
tions. The  rumours  of  new  wars  and  insidious  intrigues  of  Abdur 
Bahman's  approach  from  the  north,  and  the  gathering  of  the  tribes 
at  Ghazni,  pass  over  the  heads  of  the  people  like  a  fitful  wind 
over  a  lake,  stirring  the  placid  surface,  but  leaving  no  lasting 
impression.  There  have  been,  since  the  beginning  of  the  yeai, 
long,  long  days  in  which  the  traders  and  holders  of  contracts  from 
the  British  saw  their  coffers  filling  with  the  rupees  which  are  now 
looked  upon  in  India  as  having  ''  mysteriously  disappeared  **  from 
the  Punjab  treasuries ;  longer  weeks  wherein  everyone,  from  Sirdar 
Wali  Mahomed  to  the  commonest  Hazara  coolie,  found  how  good 
a  paymaster  the  Sircar  is  when  his  necessity  is  urgent ;  and  still 
longer  months  during  which  lakhs  of  Indian  rupees  were  melted 
down  in  the  city  mint  to  be  reissued  in  the  form  of  Cabul  rupees 
and  spread  broadcast  over  the  land.  Cabul  has  prospered,  and 
waxed  proud :  its  merchants  have  never  been  so  rich ;  the  common 
people  have  never  seen  such  a  steady  flow  of  money  through  the 
bazaars.  Even  the  Hindus,  who  know  something  of  our  wealth, 
are  astonished ;  they  cannot  appreciate  the  self-denial  and  honesty 
of  purpose  which  guide  us  in  our  transactions  with  a  conquered 
race.  '^  Your  money  is  without  limit,  '*  a  Hindu  banker  said  to 
me ;  "  but  why  do  you  give  it  all  to  this  faithless  people  i)>t'%man 
log)  ?  They  are  your  enemies,  they  hate  and  revile  you  ;  why  not 
iakt  what  you  want?''  Any  other  nation  making  war  would 
probably  requisition  the  country  and  forcibly  seize  supplies ;  but 
with  the  philanthropy  which  guides  our  actions,  we  pay  ten  times 
the  normal  value  of  the  things  needed  for  our  army,  and  plume 
ourselves  proudly  as  men  walking  upright  before  the  Lord.    To 


4o8  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

enrich  dishonest  men ;  to  give  to  our  enemies  that  which  they 
most  need — sterling  money ;  to  encourage  chicanery  and  wanton 
deceit — this  is  a  poor  r6le  to  play  when  we  come  to  Cahnl  as  an 
avenging  army;  hut,  perhaps  there  are  ''exigencies**  which 
plead  for  all  this  weakness,  and  will  in  the  fatore  give  a  rose- 
coloured  tinge  to  our  balance-sheets.  Can  Gabul  fail  to  be  pros- 
perous  under  such  conditions  ?  can  its  citizens  not  afford  to  wear 
an  insolent  air  of  triumph,  and  treat  such  customers  as  appear 
among  them  with  an  easy  assumption  of  independence,  sorely 
aggravating  to  officer  and  soldier  alike  ? 

I  have  called  this  article  ''  Cabul  in  Prosperity,  **  and  I  think 
the  title  is  justifiable.  We  have  worked  our  will  in  the  Bala 
Hissar,  and  have  made  it  a  citadel  worthy  of  the  name  :  but  in 
the  city  proper  we  have  neither  made  nor  meddled,  and  the  narrow 
streets,  if  cleaner,  still  retain  their  distinctive  features.  Buying 
and  selling,  money-changing  and  broking,  flourish  with  an  energy 
that  makes  no  count  of  changing  fortunes  or  shifting  careers. 
Sirdar  Wali  Mahomed's  governorship  can  only  last  so  long  as 
]3ritish  bayonets  are  at  his  back ;  but  in  the  sunshine  of  our 
favour  he  sets  the  example  of  amassing  wealth,  and  all  his 
followers  tread  in  his  footsteps.  Sirdar  Hashim  Ehan  is  on  the 
ove  of  departure  for  Candahar,  where  Shore  Ali  Elhan  has  offered 
liim  asylum.  His  departure  troubles  the  minds  of  the  citizens 
but  little,  as  the  stream  of  Indian  silver  will  not  be  diverted  by  his 
absence.  While  not  understanding  our  simplicity  in  dealing,  and 
while  looking  upon  us  as  madmen  in  the  matter  of  finance — for 
are  we  not  taunted  with  "  changing  our  Rani*s  head  **  by  ordering 
Indian  rupees  to  be  melted  down  and  turned  into  Cabuli  coin  ? — 
the  Cabulis,  with  their  keen  rapacity,  seize  every  opportunity  of 
enriching  themselves.  Take  the  conversion  of  Indian  rupees  into 
local  coin ;  through  our  benevolent  mode  of  action  we  have  never 
been  able  to  say  that  our  coin  shall  have  a  fixed  value,  and  a 
<'  ring  '*  of  scoundrels  in  Cabul  have  so  rigged  the  market  that 
in  the  bazaars  at  the  present  time  the  two  rupees  are  constantly 
of  equal  value.  So  some  clever  financier  at  once  jumps  to  the 
conclusion  that  we  may  as  well  pay  in  Cabuli  rupees  as  in 
Indian.  Now  the  quantity  of  silver  in  100  Indian  rupees  permits 
of  127  Cabulis  being  made  tberewith|  and  so  we  pour  our  brand 


Improving  the  Exchange,  409 

new  coins  into  tho  mint  (wherein  there  is  no  European  supervision 
of  any  kind)y  ani  for  every  100  sent  in  Sirdar  Wali  Mahomed 
returns  us  120  !  Only  a  few  days  ago  three  lakhs  of  the  treasure 
with  General  Hills'  force  was  sent  to  Cabul  to  be  converted 
into  local  rupees.  Is  the  reason  for  this  that  the  Logar  villagers 
refuse  our  rupees  ?  If  so,  it  would  surely  be  the  mildest  form 
of  coercion  to  force  them  to  take  payment  in  whatever  silver 
coin  we  chose.  The  profits  on  the  coining  (say  five  per  cent.)  go 
presumably  into  Wali  Mahomed's  pocket,  as  Government  is  too 
strait-laced  to  make  profit  itself;  and  yet  that  Sirdar  had  the 
cool  effrontery  to  refuse  to  coin  Cabuli  rupees,  when  a  lakh  was 
wanted  for  the  Logar  force,  until  he  first  received  Indian  rupees 
from  Sherpur.  He  was  not  punished  for  his  icsolence  ;  but  as  we 
have  still  to  levy  the  fine  inflicted  upon  the  city  for  the  murder  of 
our  Envoy,  he  may  yet  be  mulcted,  say,  in  a  lakh.  Some  of  us 
are  curious  to  know  when  and  how  the  said  fine  will  be  levied  ; 
but,  perhaps,  we  may  be  looked  upon  as  inquisitive.*  One  thing 
is  clear:  we  shall  never  get  our  money  back  in  the  shape  of 
Indian  rupees,  and  our  only  consolation  is  that  if  Afghanistan 
continues  to  absorb  a  few  hundred  thousand  pounds  worth  of 
silver  monthly,  the  rate  of  exchange  between  India  and  England 
must  improve. 

Having  explained  the  irritating  causes  of  the  present  prosperity 
of  Gabuly  I  may  now  with  a  clear  conscience  describe  a  little  more 
in  detail  the  appearance  of  the  city  itself.  In  the  First  Book  of 
Kings  we  are  told  many  valuable  anecdotes  of  King  Solomon,  not 
the  least  interesting  of  which  is  the  account  of  the  payment  made 
to  Hiram,  King  of  Tyre,  who  furnished  "  cedar  trees,  and  fir 
trees,  and  gold  "  to  assist  the  King  of  Israel  in  the  adornment  and 
fortification  of  Jerusalem.  This  payment  consisted  of  the  gift  of 
twenty  cities  in  the  land  of  Galilee,  cities  so  worthless  that,  when 
Hiram  saw  them,  he  said : — "  What  cities  are  these  which  thou 
hast  given  me,  my  brother?"  And  the  narrative  further  states 
that  *'  he  called  them  the  land  of  Cabul  unto  this  day,  *'  The 
word  "  Cabul  **  our  annotators  explain  as  signifying  "  displeasing 
or  dirty ;  "  and,  strangely  enough,  the  latter  epithet  is  extremely 
applicable  to  the  modern  capital  of  Afghanistan.  The  side-streetB 
•  The  fi'»e  waa  nc^cr  levied. 


4IO  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

and  pnrliens,  even  the  walls  of  many  of  the  hoases,  are  filthy  in 
the  extreme,  thongh  our  strict  sanitary  system  has  made  the 
bazaars  almost  as  clean  as  those  of  an  Indian  city.  Cabal  is 
not  so  "  displeasing  "  to  the  eye  when  viewed  from  the  neighbour- 
ing heights,  for  the  orchards  of  Deh-i- Afghan  and  scattered  clumps 
of  trees  in  Chandaul  make  the  place  look  quite  picturesque. 
But  once  in  the  heart  of  the  city,  beyond  the  busy  stream  of 
life  which  pours  along  the  bazaars  and  renews  itself  every  hour  in 
some  mysterious  way,  there  is  nothing  but  dulness  and  gloom  in 
the  dead  mud  walls  of  the  houses,  with  their  frowning  dooi*waj8 
or  dark  noisome  passages  leading  to  unknown  dens  behind.  In 
the  bazaars  all  is  life  and  bustle.  Entering  the  city  by  a  side-road 
from  Sherpur,  one  sees  the  bed  of  the  Cabul  river  lying  waterless 
on  the  left,  save  for  a  few  stagnant  pools,  where  the  dhobies  are  at 
work,  or  a  vendor  of  atchcha  salad  is  washing  a  donkey-load  of 
leltuce  preparatory  to  the  day's  business.  Over  a  bridge,  on  one 
side  of  which  are  a  score  of  shoemakers'  stalls — there  seems  to  be 
one  shoemaker  to  every  twenty  inhabitants  in  Cabul — and  then 
into  the  narrow  Shore  Bazaar,  I  find  more  shoemakers  and  leather- 
sellers,  whose  stalls  are  oddly  mixed  up  with  those  of  fruit- 
erers, bakers,  retailers  of  ices,  and  workers  in  iron  and  copper. 
Men  on  horseback,  swaggering  sowars  of  Wali  Mahomed  or  other 
sirdars ;  Hazara  coolies  with  heavy  loads  on  their  broad  backs ; 
idle  Cabulis ;  peasants  from  the  district  with  blue  turbans ; 
stalwart  mountaineers  who  look  upon  the  street  as  their  own ;  a 
sprinkling  of  red-coated  British  soldiers,  and  sepoys  and  sowars  in 
all  stages  of  negligent  undress  (but  with  rifles  or  swords  always 
ready) — all  these  elements  are  mingled  in  noisy  but  good-tempered 
confusion ;  while  at  every  ten  yards  one's  horse  has  to  be-  pulled 
on  his  haunches,  because  some  young  Cabul  chief  is  playing  at  hide- 
and-seek  under  his  legs.  Suddenly  a  string  of  camels,  with  loads 
of  firewood  or  heavy  merchandise,  has  to  be  passed — rather  a 
ticklish  business  occasionally,  as  the  dead  weight  of  the  beasts 
and  their  loads  cleave  a  way  for  itself,  regardless  of  obstacles.  A 
few  white-clad  women  glide  unobtrusively  along,  their  yashmaks 
hiding  whatever  charms  they  may  possess;  blind  beggars  and 
shrill  voiced  fakirs  obtrude  their  wants  upon  the  stranger ;  bhistees 
clank  their  metal  drinking  vessels,  or  pour  out  a  cool  draught 


Life  in  the  Streets.  411 

from  the  ever-ready  mussuk\  salad  vendors  pilot  their  sedate 
donkeys,  laden  with  crisp  green  food,  throngh  the  crowd ;  hoys, 
with  their  trays  of  chupaties,  cry  oat  the  goodness  of  their  rotee  ; 
a  marriage  procession,  with  tom-toms  beating  and  lusty  Inngs 
ponring  forth  jubilant  songs,  comes  gaily  along,  a  closely  covered 
structure,  somewhat  in  the  shape  of  a  beehive,  containing  the 
bride,  whose  weight  is  not  felt  by  the  shoulders  of  her  bearers, — 
this  is  the  living  mosaic  which  paves  the  bazaars.  There  is  a 
vividness  in  all  the  types  of  life,  which  is  very  striking,  from  the 
matted-haired/a&ir,  who  does  not  hesitate  to  seize  a  passer-by  in 
his  repulsive  grip,  so  resolute  is  his  demand  for  alms,  to  the 
cureless  youngster  who  leans  over  his  donkey,  idly  chewing  a 
young  onion,  which  answers  to  the  straw  of  Western  street-life. 
An  unveiled  woman,  wretchedly  clad,  dirty,  and  with  the  features 
of  a  Seven  Dials*  hag,  takes  a  handful  of  the  youngster's  salad 
from  his  donkey's  back ;  he  strikes  her  on  the  back  with  his  stick, 
whereupon  she  turns  round,  flings  the  pilferred  stalks  in  his  face, 
and  abuses  him  in  choicest  Gabuli.  This  unexpected  '^  knocking 
of  his  leek  about  his  pate  '*  so  cows  the  boy  that  he  moves  off 
hastily,  leaving  the  harridan  in  possession  of  the  field. 

I  have  by  this  time  wandered  into  the  Char  Chowk,  or  principal 
bazaar  of  the  city,  and  here  the  crowd  is  denser,  the  stalls  more 
pretentious,  the  trade  brisker.  The  bazaar  is  in  four  lengths, 
each  roofed  over  and  solidly  built  of  masonry,  and  the  stalls  are 
nearly  all  rented  by  jewellers  and  dealers  in  silks  and  cottons. 
On  either  hand,  above  the  stalls,  richly  coloured  silks,  gaudy 
chintzes,  carpets,  and  caps  of  brilliant  hues  are  hung  out,  making 
a  brave  show ;  while  the  traders,  seated  cross-legged  below,  are 
surrounded  by  their  stock,  upon  which  they  seem  to  keep  a  careless 
eye.  I  have  before  spoken  of  their  keenness  in  trade,  and  I  can 
only  add  that,  since  the  early  days  of  our  occupation  they  have 
grown  keener  and  more  rapacious,  until  to  buy  goods  direct  from 
them  is  to  court  being  cheated  in  every  way.  Still,  this  does  not 
prevent  ofBcers  and  men  from  purchasing  Bokhara  silks  and 
various  knick-knacks,  for  all  of  which  absurdly  high  prices  are 
given.  A  good  Pathan  Sepoy  is  the  best  companion  to  have  when 
buying  any  articles  at  the  stalls,  and  he  will  bully  the  shopkeeper 
and  finally  induce  him  to  take  about  one-fourth  of  the  price  first 


412  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

asked.  As  the  day  wears  on  trade  slaokens  a  little,  and  here  and  there 
a  shopkeeper  pores  over  a  Persian  book,  while  his  sou  keeps  watch 
npon  the  stock-in-trade.  In  that  silk  merchant's  stall,  though  it 
be  in  the  heart  of  the  bazaar,  are  three  grey-bearded  men  listening 
with  supreme  pleasure  to  the  excited  reader,  whom,  in  my  own 
mind,  I  believe  to  be  reading  the  songs  of  Hafiz  ;  in  the  next  stall 
a  burly  Mussulman  lies  sleeping  on  a  pile  of  Manchester  cottons ; 
while  near  at  hand  is  a  pious  old  villain  taking  advantage  of  a  lull 
to  submit  his  hoary  head  to  the  hands  of  a  barber.  A  shrill  cry 
as  of  a  child  in  pain  draws  one  further  on ;  it  is  nothing  serious : 
another  pious  old  gentleman  is  watching  his  son's  scalp  being 
treated  in  the  same  way  by  another  barber.  The  boy,  some  three 
or  four  years  old,  has  never  felt  the  razor's  edge  before,  and 
shrieks  at  every  stroke,  while  his  father  threatens  him  with  a  huge 
stick :  the  operation  is  at  last  over,  and  the  child,  still  quietly 
sobbing,  passes  his  hands  carefully  over  his  head  as  if  doubtful  of 
it  still  remaining  upon  his  shoulders.  Once  convinced  that  his 
hair  only  has  gone  by  the  board,  he  plucks  up  courage  and  smiles 
apologetically  upon  his  father,  who  gravely  strokes  his  beard  in 
approval.  The  little  incident  is  only  one  of  many  which  draw 
attention,  and  one  might  easily  elaborate  such  scenes ;  but  then 
the  charm  of  simplicity  would  be  destroyed.  From  the  Char 
Ghowk  Bazaar  to  Ghandaul  is  but  a  few  yards,  and  one  passes  on 
the  way  more  fruit-stalls,  in  which  tiers  upon  tiers  of  lettuce  flank 
the  luscious  heaps  of  apricots,  cherries,  peaches,  and  apples 
which  are  now  pouring  into  Cabul  from  Koh-Daman  and  Chardeh. 
So  much  has  been  written  about  the  Cabiil  fruit-stalls  that  it 
is  necessary  to  say  the  abundance  of  fruit  has  not  at  all  been 
exaggerated;  the  stone  fruits  seem  just  as  abundant  as  the 
delicious  grapes  which  we  indulged  in  so  freely  in  the  autumn. 
The  vendors  of  ices  are  nearly  always  side  by  side  with  the  froit- 
sellers ;  the  huge  blocks  of  snow  which  adorn  their  stalls  tempt- 
ing all  sun-dried  souls  to  cool  their  palates  with  a  little  saucer 
of  icy-cold  cream  flavoured  with  a  sprinkling  of  mashed  fruit. 
The  trade  is  brisk  in  these  ices,  although  the  dust  coats  the 
open  trays  of  cream  until  it  tu3?nfi.  a  delicate  brown.  It  is  not 
pleasant  for  any  of  us  to  pause  at  the  stall,  as  the  fanaticism  of 
these  dealers  is  proverbial.     There  is  a  story  afloat,  that  after  an 


The  Kizilbashes.  413 

officer  had  eftten  an  ''  ice/'  the  dealer  took  the  saucer  and  dashed 
it  to  the  ground  as  having  heen  defiled  hy  a  Kafir.  These  people 
do  i^ot  love  us,  however  well  we  treat  them.  Chandaul  Bazaar  is 
only  a  repetition  of  the  Char-Chowk  on  a  smaller  scale,  with  more 
fruit  shops  and  a  few  foul-smelling  butcher's  stalls,  but  the 
ti'aders  are  nearly  all  Hindus  and  Eizilbashes,  who,  I  must  in 
justice  say,  are  just  as  rapacious  as  the  Mahomedans.  And  so 
one  wanders  back  into  the  main  bazaar,  where  bhistees  are 
sprinkling  the  roadway  liberally  with  water,  and  the  afternoon 
trade  is  reviving ;  past  the  kotwali,  where  a  few  sepoys  of  the 
6th  Punjabees  are  on  duty ;  and  thence  out  by  the  Peshawur  Gate, 
near  the  Bala  Hissar.  We  have  seen  Cabul  in  prosperity,  its 
people  insolent  enough  to  check  all  desire  to  enter  the  walls  again, 
and  on  the  ride  back  to  cantonments  we  are  lost  in  a  dream  of 
what  the  future  will  be  of  the  city  which  we  have  twice  occupied, 
and  which  has  always  cost  us  so  dear. 

The  question  of  retirement  is  a  serious  one  to  many  people  in 
Cabul  and  the  district.  The  Hindu  traders  of  the  city  will,  it  is 
believed,  migrate  almost  to  a  man,  but  the  Eizilbashes  will  trust 
to  their  traditional  influence  in  Cabul  to  pull  them  through  any 
difficulty  in  the  future.  These  two  trading  classes  have  amassed 
large  sums  of  money  during  our  occupation ;  and  the  Hindu, 
weak  and  defenceless,  knows  too  well  that  a  needy  Amir  would 
"  borrow "  most  of  his  gains  in  a  very  high-handed  way.  The 
Kizilbash  is  more  independent ;  and  as,  at  a  pinch,  the  Shiahs 
can  turn  out  6,000  fighting  men,  all  well-equipped,  any  Amir 
would  hesitate  to  make  the  ''red-heads"  his  enemies.  Major 
Hastings  has  prepared  a  short  account  of  these  aliens,  which  is 
of  some  interest  at  the  present  time,  but  little  having  been  pre- 
viously known  of  this  important  section  of  the  Cabul  populace. 
Elphinstone,  it  is  true,  states  that  they  are  members  of  that 
colony  of  Turks  which  predominates  in  Persia,  and  traces  its 
descent  from  Eijan.  To  them  was  given  the  place  of  honour  in 
Nadir  Shah's  conquering  army,  and  when  a  military  colony  was 
formed  in  Cabul,  their  quarter  was  called  "  Chandaul,"  which,  by 
interpretation,  is  "  vanguard."  Elphinstone's  opinion  of  them 
was  thus  expressed : — "  The  Kizilbashes  in  Afghanistan  partake 
of  the  character  of  their  countrymen  in  Persia.     They  are  lively, 


414  T^f^  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

ingenious,  and  even  elegant  and  refined ;  but  false,  designing,  and 
crnel ;  rapacioas,  but  profase,  yolnptnons,  and  fond  of  show ;  at 
once  insolent  and  servile,  destitute  of  all  moderation  in  prosperity 
and  of  all  pride  in  adveraity ;  brave  at  one  time  and  cowardly  at 
another,  but  always  fond  of  glory;  fall  of  prejudice,  but  affecting 
to  be  liberal  and  enlightened  ;  admirable  for  a  mere  acquaintance 
(if  one  can  bear  with  their  vanity),  but  dangerous  for  a  close  con- 
nection." They  are,  according  to  Major  Hastings,  still  distinct 
in  many  respects  from  those  around  them  ;  and  being  of  the  Shiah 
section  of  Mahomedans,  there  is  great  religious  animosity  be- 
tween them  and  the  Afghans,  who  are  Sunis.  They  all  speak 
Persian,  but  the  Kizilbashes  of  Aoshahr,  in  the  Ghardeh  Valley 
and  some  of  the  older  men  among  the  Jawansher  of  Chandaul, 
still  talk  Turki  in  the  privacy  of  their  own  families.  The  portions 
of  Cabul  city  occupied  by  the  "  red-heads  " — so  called  because  of 
their  distinctive  turbans  of  crimson  cloth — are  Chandaul,  imme- 
diately at  the  foot  of  the  Sherderwaza  Hill  and  Moradkhani,  look- 
ing towards  Sherpur.  In  Ghardeh  their  chief  villages  are  Nanu- 
chi  and  Taiba.  The  total  number  of  families  in  and  about  Gabul 
is  8,220,  but  these  can  furnish  only  6,000  fighting  men — a  small 
proportion  compared  with  Afghan  families,  every  male  in  which 
is  a  fighting  unit.  In  Gandahar  and  Herat  there  are  a  large 
number  of  families  descended  from  Nadir  Shah's  vanguard,  and  a 
few  Kizilbashes  are  also  located  in  Turkistan.  The  Jawansher 
section,  occupying  the  greater  part  of  Ghandaul,  is  the  most 
important  clan  in  Gabul,  and  has  at  the  present  moment  several 
of  its  members  holding  commands  in  the  Turkistan  army.  Ap- 
pointments under  Govemment,  such  as  those  of  secretaries, 
accountants,  and  similar  grades,  are  always  largely  held  by  Kizil- 
bashes ;  while  in  years  gone  by  there  were  several  Kizilbash  regi- 
ments in  the  regular  aimy.  Hussein  Ali  Khan,  of  the  Jawansher 
section,  was  once  Gommander-in-Ghief  of  the  Afghan  army,  and 
many  others  of  the  clan  rose  to  important  commands.  The  red- 
capped  regiments  were  so  powerful  in  Ahmed  Shah's  reign  that  to 
prevent  civil  war  in  Gabul  that  monarch  sent  them  to  Turkistan, 
with  orders  to  conquer  Balkh.  This  they  did  with  very  little 
trouble,  and  Ahmed  Shah  was  then  possessed  with  a  fear  that 
they  would  become  independent,   and  finally  prove  dangerous 


Their  Position  in  Afghanistan.  415 

enemies.  At  the  suggestion  of  Morad  Khan,  Populzai,  he  recalled 
them,  and  assigned  to  them  permanently  the  portion  of  Cabnl 
and  Ghardeh  which  they  now  occupy.  Moradkhani  was  called 
after  Ahmed  Shah's  adviser.  In  ShaJi  Suja*s  and  Shah  Zuman*B 
reigns  they  were  harshly  treated,  and  witii  their  usual  indepen- 
dence they  joined  Haji  Jumal  and  Paenda  Khan,  the  father 
of  the  Dost  Mahomed.  When  the  Dost  was  in  power,  he  singled 
his  allies  out  for  many  distinctions,  the  fact  of  his  mother  being 
a  Eizilbash  lady  having,  no  doubt,  great  weight  with  him.  The 
clan  refer  to  their  treatment  by  the  Amir  Shere  Ali  Ehan  and 
his  son,  Yakub,  in  an}i;hing  but  grateful  terms.  Both  Amirs, 
it  would  seem,  were  rather  inclined  to  tyrannize  over  the  Shiahs. 
Major  Hastings  gives  some  carefully-prepared  genealogical 
tables,  showing  the  status  and  place  of  residence  of  the 
chief  families,  and  concludes  his  report  by  stating  that,  though 
the  Kizilbashes  still  represent  a  certain  amount  of  strength  in 
Afghanistan,  their  power  is  by  no  means  so  great  as  in  former 
years. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

Deportation  of  the  Mastanfi  to  India — His  Syini<athj  with  the  Family  of  Shere  Ali— 
Progren  of  Negotiations  with  Abdnr  Rahman — ArriTal  of  the  British  Mission  at 
Khanahad — Probable  Popolarity  of  the  Sirdar*8  Cause  -Beoeption  of  the  Mission — 
The  Aminhip  formall/  offered  to  AbJur  Rahman — Return  of  Ibrahim  Khan  to 
SherpUr — His  Report — 4-  Russian  Agent  in  the  Kbana^ad  Camp— Treatment  of  our 
BnToys  as  Prisoners — ^Photograph  of  the  Sirdar  sent  to  Cabal — His  Vacillatioti  and 
Intrigues  with  the  Tribes — Flight  of  Sirdars  Hashim  Khan  and  Abdulla  Khan — 
Arrival  of  Afzul  Khan — His  favourable  Estimate  of  Abdur  Rahman — Hasan 
Khan's  Movements  in  Logar — Cav^Irj  Action  at  Podkhao  Sbana  on  July  1st — 
General  Palliser's  Success — ^Two  Hundred  Tribesmen  Killed — Dispersion  of  Hasan 
Khan's  Force. 

The  following  letters,  written  in  May,  June,  and  July,  will  explain 
the  progress  of  our  negotiations  with  Sirdar  Abdur  Bahman  which 
eventually  led  to  his  assumption  of  the  Amirship  : — 

26/A  May,  1880. 

Yet  another  minister  of  Yakub  Khan's  has  been  deported  to 
India.     The  Mustaufi,  HabibuUa  Khan,  has  broken  down  in  his 


41 6  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

professions  of  faithfulDess  to  the  British,  and  on  the  morning  of 
May  20th  he  left  Cabnl  in  a  dhoolie,  under  an  escort  furnished  by 
the  9th  Lancers,  which  accompanied  him  as  far  as  Butkhak.  Here 
two  companies  of  the  67th  Foot  were  in  readiness  to  escort  him  to 
Luttabund.  They  had  been  sent  out  on  the  previous  afternoon, 
their  sudden  march  giving  rise  to  rumours  of  an  impending  attack 
upon  our  communications,  a  rumour  strengthened  by  the  9th 
Lancers  standing  to  their  horses  the  whole  afternoon,  as  if  ready 
for  a  gallop  out.  What  may  have  been  the  Mustaufi's  crime  I 
can  only  conjecture  :  officially  we  are  told  that  "  he  was  summoned 
to  Sherpur,  and  after  a  long  investigation  was  found  guilty  of  con- 
spiring against  the  British,  and  was  at  once  put  under  arrest." 
Camp  gossip  runs  that  letters  were  intercepted,  bearing  his  sign 
manual^  inciting  the  chiefs  to  rise  again,  and  that  these  were  pro« 
duced  before  Wali  Mahomed  and  other  sirdars,  who  swore  to  the 
genuineness  of  the  signature.  The  old  man  when  found  out  took 
the  matter  quite  calmly,  and  when  told  that  he  would  be  sent  at 
once  to  India  rather  welcomed  the  idea,  saying  he  would  go  on  a 
pilgrimage  to  Mecca  and  afterwards  visit  England.  The  Mustaufi 
seems  to  have  recognized  the  simple  fact  that  we  are  bent  upon 
making  Abdur  Bahman  Amir,  and  this  he  regards  as  a  breach  of 
faith,  as  nothing  was  said  of  Our  intention  when  he  was  striving  so 
hard  to  bring  the  Ghazni  malcontents  to  Sherpur.  He  knew  that 
he  could  not  hope  for  power  under  Abdur  Bahman — ^his  partisan- 
ship for  Shore  Ali's  family  was  too  notorious — and  hence  in  his 
extremity  he  resorted  to  fresh  intrigues  to  delay  or  put  altogether 
out  of  the  question  Abdur  Bahman' s  visit  to  the  British  camp. 
He  has  been  detected,  and  as  Abdur  Bahman*s  path  must  be 
cleared  of  every  obstacle,  Habibulla  Khan  has  been  summarily 
sent  to  India. 

Contrary  opinions  as  to  the  final  result  of  our  mission  to  Abdur 
Bahman  are  still  afloat  both  in^ur  camp  and  in  the  Cabul  bazaars  ; 
but  so  far  everything  that  the  most  sanguine  could  have  hoped  for 
in  the  direction  of  an  entente  cordiale  being  established  between 
the  Pretender  and  the  British  Government  has  happily  come  to 
pass.  Our  Mission  has  reached  its  destination  in  safety,  has  been 
honourably  and  even  eflfusively  received,  and  we  are  on  the  eve  of 
receiving  an  answer  from  the  Sirdar  himself  regarding  the  pro- 


"  Birds  of  Ill-omen. "  417 

posals  we  have  made  to  him.  And  yet  there  is  a  large  party  in  the 
city  who  still  persist  in  prophesying  that  Abdnr  Rahman  will  neyer 
visit  Cabnl  so  long  as  the  British  force  occupies  the  city.  Their 
reasons  are  disjointed  and  somewhat  irrational,  bat  they  are  re- 
peated with  such  persistent  head-shaking  and  beard-wagging  that, 
in  spite  of  one's  own  better  belief,  it  is  difficult  at  times  to  avoid 
thinking  as  these  birds  of  ill-omen  think.  Not  that  they  deny 
either  the  Sirdar's  anxiety  or  determination  to  be  Amir  (this  they 
admit  most  oneqaivocally),  bnt  they  argue  that  he  is  too  wise  to 
ruin  himself  in  the  eye  of  the  nation  by  accepting  the  Amirship 
from  the  hands  of  a  British  General.  When  they  are  reminded 
that  the  British  are  just  as  determined  that  the  new  Amir  shall  be 
simply  and  solely  their  nominee,  as  their  work  would  be  incom- 
plete if  they  left  the  throne  to  be  filled  by  any  candidate  who  might 
get  a  party  together,  they  cry  back  on  their  lines  of  argument,  and 
insist  that  Abdur  Bahman  wiU  be  Amir,  but  by  virtue  of  his  own 
popularity  and  prowess,  and  not  "as  a  man  accepting  a  boon  from 
a  conquering  army.  When  it  comes  to  the  finer  details  of  ways 
and  means,  the  prophets  can  only  take  refuge  in  vague  hints  and 
inane  mumblings  which  would  have  shamed  even  the  vilest  impos- 
tor in  the  old  days,  when  prophecy  had  some  points  to  recommend 
it  to  the  credulous.  Perhaps  the  explanation  is  that  Abdur  Bah- 
man has  not  in  Cabul  itself  a  faction  worthy  of  the  name.  His 
prestige  lies  not  so  much  in  the  sympathy  of  the  citizens  as  in  the 
support  the  hardier  tribesmen  are  willing  to  give  him  as  a  soldier 
and  a  ruler.  There  is  something  in  his  success  in  Eastern  Turkis- 
tan  which  has  drawn  the  independent  and  reckless  spirits  of 
Kohistan,  £oh-Daman,  and  Logar  to  him  :  it  may  be  the  boldness 
with  which  he  has  declared  himself  claimant  to  the  throne,  or  that 
his  old  fame  as  a  successful  general  still  lives  in  the  hearts  of  the 
people.  Every  man  born  in  Afghanistan  is  bom  to  a  soldier's  life, 
not  the  life  of  camps  and  campaigns  so  much  as  the  constant 
struggle  of  intertribal  warfare,  or  time-honoured  family  feuds. 
Every  man's  hand  is  familiar  with  the  use  of  jhezail  or  rifle, 
tulwar  or  knife,  and  a  successful  leader  is  far  more  honoured  and 
more  faithfully  followed  than  a  chief  who  lives  by  intrigue  and  begs 
his  way  to  power  by  lavish  bribery.  Abdur  Bahman  ruled  in 
Cabul,  after  Dost  Mahomed's  death  and  Shore  Ali's  usurpation,  by 

E   A 


41 8  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

mere  force  of  BQccess  in  arms.  He  placed  his  faUier  upon  the 
throne  in  defiance  of  Shere  Ali,  who  was  never  a  match  for  him 
in  the  field,  even  though  backed  by  the  support  of  the  Indian 
Oovemment.  Shere  Ali  won  Gabnl  finally  in  the  absence  of  his 
young  rival  in  Turkisban.  In  an  instant  his  success  was  magni- 
fied, he  became  the  successful  warrior,  and  his  power  was  assured. 
Abdur  Rahman  sank  out  of  sight.  Later,  Yakub  Ehan  blazed 
into  power,  a  bold  leader  of  armies,  full  of  vigorous  life.  How 
success  bred  success  in  his  case  until  Herat  and  Turkistan  were 
practically  lost  to  his  father,  contemporary  history  shows ;  and  only 
when  he  sank  the  soldier  in  the  son,  and  trusted  in  his  father's 
rotten  honour,  did  his  career  come  to  an  end.  Yakub,  free  and 
holding  his  own  proudly  in  Herat,  was  a  figure  ta  draw  men's  ad- 
miration and  support :  Yakub,  a  prisoner  in  the  Bala  Hissar,  was 
a  fallen  star  which  could  no  longer  dazzle  men's  eyes.  So  it  has 
been  with  Abdur  Bahman  Ehan.  In  January  1869  he  crossed  the 
Oxus  a  fugitive,  and  since  that  eventful  year  he  has  been  nothing 
but  a  lay  figure  in  Afghan  politics.  Now  he  is  once  more  clearly 
outlined  before  the  people,  who  have  been  bitterly  humiliated  by 
our  armies  since  the  murder  of  our  Envoy  in  the  Bala  Hissar. 

They  may  at  first  have  looked  to  the  grandson  of  the  Dost  to 
avenge  their  humiliations  by  force  of  arms ;  but  the  fall  of  Ghazni 
and  the  appearance  of  another  7,000  men  to  swell  our  numbers  in 
Cabul  and  the  Logar  Valley  have  dashed  their  hopes  once  and  for 
all.  Now  they  turn  their  eyes  northward,  mayhap  their  feet  also, 
and  await  the  sign  that  will  free  them  from  the  presence  of  the 
Kafir  armies.  So  it  is  that  Abdur  Bahman  seems  to  them  a  hero, 
a  deliverer;  they  are  lifted  beyond  the  petty  intrigues  of  the 
Barakzai  sirdars  in  Cabul,  the  deep  plotting  of  the  Mustaufi,  or 
the  empty  bombast  of  Mahomed  Jan.  Even  Mushk-i-Alam,  the 
arch-priest  of  discontent,  is  silent  for  a  while :  there  are  no  new 
appeals  to  their  fanaticism,  and  not  1,000  men  are  under  arms  in 
districts  which  have  been  seething  with  revolt  for  months.  Logar, 
Kohistan,  Wardak,  are  no  longer  names  to  conjure  "(iritb*  Maho- 
med Jan  even  has  drifted  into  Elharwar  and  Zurmut,  whose  widely- 
armed  tribes  are  held  in  contempt,  by  the  better  trained  forces  of 
the  provinces  about  Cabul,  the  male  population  of  which  has 
been  leavened  with  sepoys  carrying  firearms  equal   in  part  to 


Intrigues  by  Disappointed  Candidates.        419 

our  own.  The  Northern  Ghilzais  are  for  a  moment  sobered 
by  the  reflection  that  Afghanistan  is  likely  to  be  rid  of  a  foreign 
army  sooner  by  the  advent  of  the  Sirdar  now  in  Khanabad  than 
by  listening  to  suggestions  of  renewed  outbreaks  and  ceaseless 
harrying  of  our  posts  in  the  Passes.  True,  factious  moolahs,  like 
Ehalil  and  Fakir,  are  stirring  up  disaffection  about  Jellalabad; 
but  that  district  is  somewhat  remoyed  from  the  direct  effect  of  the 
influences  at  work  about  Cabul,  and  we  can  afford  to  disregard 
such  petty  outbreaks,  which  only  give  us  a  better  chance  of  show- 
ing our  power  to  strike  in  all  directions.  The  little  actions  which 
have  lately  been  fought  in  Beshud  and  the  Shinwari  country  will 
bear  their  own  fruit ;  every  additional  tower  destroyed  is  another 
mark  of  our  current  supremacy,  another  warning  that  our  for- 
bearance has  limits — ^wide  though  they  be.  Even  the  towers 
of  Padshah  Khan — ally,  enemy,  friend,  traitor,  alternately — are  at 
last  in  ruins,  and  his  crops  may  yet  be  reaped  by  our  soldiers.  On 
the  one  hand,  we  proffer  honest  negotiation  leading  to  a  stable 
settlement;  on  the  other,  we  are  firm  to  punish  the  restless  sni- 
mosity  which  seeks  to  force  us  out  of  tbe  country  by  incessant 
annoyance  and  harassing  intrigue. 

Pe4)api9  the  reasoning  which  I  have  mentioned  as  being  in 
Yfgoe  in  Gabul  as  to  the  probable  failure  of  any  negotiations  with 
Sirdar  Abdur  Bahman  may  be  due  to  the  efforts  of  the  Cabql 
sirdars,  who  dread  the  coming  of  our  nominee  more  than  thagr 
loathe  our  own  domination  over  the  city.  Ambition  is  not  a  passicMi 
easily  foregone,  and  both  Wali  Mahomed  and  Hashim  Khan  know 
that  the  dreams  once  indulged  in  of  power  and  pre-eminence  i^ 
Afghanistan  are  now  at  an  end.  The  offer  of  the  Amirship  has 
been  formally  made  to  their  rival :  his  claims  have  thus  been 
declared  pre-eminent,  and  minor  pretenders  are  cast  out  into  the 
utter  darkness  of  neglect  and  contempt.  The  sirdars  know  they 
have  nothing  to  expect  at  the  hands  of  Mahom^  A&ul's  soji 
except  contumely  or  even  worse ;  his  years  of  exile  have  hui^ 
heavily  upon  hijn ;  and  Shore  All's  fiEunily  and  partisans  are  in 
his  black  list.  ^  Petrovsky,  the  Russian  writer,  who  saw  so  much 
of  the  Sirdar  and  professed  to  know  him  very  intimately,  wrote, 
**  To  get  square  some  day  with  the  English  and  Shore  AH  was 
Abdur  Bahman's  most  cherished  thought,  his  dominant,  never- 

B  E  2 


420  The  Afghan  War^  1879 — 80. 

failing  passion."  No  doubt  Petrovsky  believed  the  hatred  towards 
the  English  was  equal  to  that  against  Shore  Ali ;  but  time  and 
events  have  modified  the  former,  particularly  as  the  English  are 
masters  of  the  situation,  while  it  is  probable  the  feeling  of  re* 
venge  against  Shere  Ali*s  family  is  still  as  lively  as  ever.7  It  there- 
fore behoves  Hashim  Khan,  who,  by  his  marriage  with  AbduUa 
Jan's  sister,  became  one  of  the  family,  to  exert  himself  to 
prevent  the  Sirdar  becoming  Amir;  and  this  he  is  doing  by 
intrigues  which  have,  luckily,  as  yet  borne  but  little  fruit.  Know- 
ing his  own  chance  has  disappeared,  he  thinks  to  make  Ayub 
Elhau  a  powerful  claimant  through  the  latter's  position  in  Herat. 
Hashim,  it  is  believed,  has  also  made  attempts  to  seduce  the 
Kohistanis  from  Abdur  Bahman's  cause,  and  how  much  further 
his  intrigues  may  go  we  cannot  at  all  estimate.  Probably  he  has 
sown  distrust,  by  means  of  agents,  in  the  mind  of  Abdur  Rahman 
himself,  warning  him  that  the  British  only  wish  to  get  possession 
of  his  person  with  a  view  to  sending  him  a  prisoner  to  India. 

From  whatever  cause  it  may  be,  the  fact  is  clear  that  Abdur 
Rahman  is  somewhat  distrustful  of  our  overtures,  though  welcom- 
ing them  warmly  as  becomes  a  pretender  who  suddenly  finds  him- 
self first  in  the  running  for  a  throne.  The  news  which  has 
reached  Cabul  of  the  progress  of  our  Mission  is  highly  important ; 
and  although  official  reticence  is  great,  the  messengers  and  others 
who  have  arrived  from  Khanabad  a  few  days  ago  have  spread  pretty 
trustworthy  reports  of  what  has  really  occurred.  The  little  party 
which  left  Sherpur  on  May  8rd  passed  through  Kohistan  unmo- 
lested, and  after  trying  a  journey  through  the  Sir-i-Lang  Pass,  in 
parts  of  which  the  snow  was  still  lying,  they  found  themselves 
beyond  the  Hindu  Kush  and  well  on  their  way  to  Kunduz.  For 
a  day  they  were  delayed  by  stress  of  weather,  but  afterwards  their 
journey  was  unbroken,  Ghori  being  reached,  and  finally  Kunduz, 
about  the  14th  or  16th  of  May.  They  had  been  joined  by  num- 
bers of  men  from  Kohistan  anxious  to  pay  their  respects  to  the 
Sirdar,  and  they  seem  never  to  have  been  in  any  danger  from 
marauding  bands  which  are  known  to  infest  the  country.  Abdur 
Rahman  sent  a  troop  of  cavalry  to  escort  them  to  Khanabad,  and 
on  their  arrival  every  honour  due  to  the  Ambassadors  of  the 
British  Government  was  paid  to  them.    A  tent  near  the  Sirdar's 


The  British  Mission  to  Khanabad.  421 

own  was  placed  at  their  serrice,  and  they  were  treated  throagh- 
ont  with  great  courtesy,  though  always  strictly  guarded.     Then 
began  their  real  work,  the  usual  public  and  private  interviews, 
so  much  in  vogue  in  the  East,  taking  place  daily.     Finally,  in 
a  great  Durbar,  the  letter  from  the  British  was  presented  to  the 
Sirdar,  and  the  contents  were  read  out.    My  information  goes  so 
far  in  regard   to  the   letter  that  I   am  justified  in  stating  its 
purport  to  have  been  an  unfettered  offer  of  the  Amirship  to  Abdur 
Bahman  Ehan.    Whether  Herat  and  Candahar  were  specified  as 
being  detached  from  the  Durani  kingdom,  I  cannot  say ;  but  most 
probably  they  were,  perhaps  with  the  after-idea  of  gracefully  yield- 
ing Herat  to  the  Amir,  and  so  giving  the  appearance  of  concession 
on  our  part.    But  for  ofiBcial  secrecy,  this  point  could  be  at  once 
cleared  up ;  but  the  Government  of  India  are  the  best  judges  of 
what  should  be  made  known  on  their  part,  and  until  they  contra- 
dict the  belief  here  that  Herat  is  to  be  independent,  we  must  go 
on  believing  that  the  proposal  to  the  Sirdar  is  that  he  may  become 
Amir  of   Eastern    and    Northern    Afghanistan,   Turkistan  and 
Badakshan,  leaving  Candahar  in  our  possession,  while  Herat  is 
to  be  "  independent," — ^though  in  whose  charge  is  not  very  clear. 
The  effect  upon  Abdur  Bahman  of  Mr.  Lepel  Griffin's  letter  is 
described  as  one  of  great  satisfaction  and  even  joy ;  he  caused 
alms  to  be  distributed  among  the  poor,  and  generally  rejoiced  at 
the  new  prospect  opened  out  to  him.    But  he  is  a  cautious  and 
sagacious  man,  and  after  eleven  years'  waiting  is  not   foolish 
enough  to  mar  his  chance  by  unseemly  haste.    For  himself  he 
declares  that  the  offer  is  most  tempting  and  highly  pleasing ;  but, 
that  his  power  as  Amir  may  be  unquestioned,  he  desires  to  have 
the  opinion  of  all  the  chiefs  of  the  country  who  shall  share  with 
liim  the  responsibility  of  forming  a  new  Government.    Thus  he 
does  not  hasten  to  leave  Khanabad,  to  rush  to  Sherpur,  assume 
power,  and  trust  to  his  own  personal  energy  to  retain  it;   he 
methodically  takes  the  best  course  to  secure  popular  election ; 
and  until  he  has  gained  the  ear  of  the  people,  he  will  not  leave 
ihe  Eattagan  country,  where   his  camp  is  now  pitched.     That 
distrust,  which  is  so  essentially  a  part  of  the  Afghan  character,  is 
also  at  work  in  his  mind,  as  his  good  fortune  seems  almost  too 
sudden  and  too  unqualified  not  to  have  hidden  beneath  it  some 


422  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

sinister  meaning ;  and  nntil  he  is  convinced  of  the  contraiyy  and 
tiioronghly  reassured,  he  is  not  likely  to  cross  the  Hindu  Kush. 
He  is  sending  his  formal  answer  by  one  of  the  members  of  the 
Mission ;  and  upon  its  arrival  we  shall,  of  course,  have  to  take 
steps  to  sweep  all  distrust  from  the  Sirdar's  mind  and  convince 
him  of  the  honesty  of  our  intentions.  This  will  not  be  difficult, 
and  then  the  negotiations  will  crystallize  into  tangible  shape,  and 
we  may,  at  last,  see  our  way  to  unravel  the  Afghan  tangle  which 
has  so  long  irritated  and  perplexed  us.  The  first  signs  of  the 
new  order  of  things  is  that  a  loan  of  a  lakh  of  rupees  has  been 
advanced  to  the  Sirdar  by  the  Hindus  and  ryots  of  Kohistan,  who 
are  astute  enough  to  see  that  the  British  are  the  real  sureties  for 
repayment,  as  Abdur  Bahman  must  receive  their  support  if  he  is 
to  hold  his  own,  in  the  future,  in  Cabul. 

Sirdar  Ibrahim  Ehan,  one  of  the  members  of  our  Mission  to 
Abdur  Bahman  Ehan,  has  returned  to  Cabul,  and  has  proved 
•  the  possibility  of  communicating  direct  with  the  Pretender.  But 
still  we  seem  no  nearer  a  settlemeni  than  before  the  Mission 
started ;  for  the  Sirdar,  acting,  perhaps,  at  the  instigation  of  the 
native  Russian  agent,  said  to  be  in  his  camp,  is  serenely  inde- 
pendent in  his  attitude,  and  has  given  no  promise  whatever  on  any 
specifio  points  connected  with  the  Amirship.  He  seems  to  be 
fully  aware  of  our  awkward  position  in  the  country,  and  is  not 
at  all  anxious  to  aid  us  in  extricating  ourselves.  Our  military 
supremacy  he  does  not  doubt,  but  the  political  dead-lock,  he 
knows,  has  nonplussed  us ;  and  secure  in  his  retreat  beyond  the 
Hindu  Eush,  he  is  working  rather  to  make  the  British,  and  not 
himself,  the  grateful  party  in  the  crlrrent  negotiations.  What 
the  status  of  the  native  representing  Russia  at  Ehanabad  may  be, 
I  have  but  limited  means  of  knowing ;  but  if  native  report  is  to 
be  trusted, — and  it  is  all  I  have  to  rely  upon, — Abdur  Bahman  is 
being  guided  entirely  by  this  man's  advice.  The  result  is  that 
any  speedy  settlement  is  out  of  the  question,  for  the  crooked  ways 
of  Russian  diplomacy  are  difficult  to  follow ;  and  what  the  Sirdar 
may  be  egged  on  yet  to  demand,  even  the  greatest  diplomat  in 
Sherpur  or  Simla  cannot  conjecture.     Ibrahim  Ehan,  it  is  true. 


Abdur  Rahman  Independent.  423 

brought  with  him  a  letter  from  Abdar  Bahman,  which  was  conohed 
in  cordial  terms.  But  beyond  cordiality,  which  costs  nothing 
among  Eastern  nations,  Ihe  letter  contains  little  of  value. 
The  Sirdar,  like  a  precodons  child,  ''  Wants  to  know  too  much." 
There  is  no  spontaneous  outburst  of  gratitude,  no  eager  acceptance 
of  our  offer  of  the  Amirship :  but,  on  the  contrary,  a  cool,  self- 
possessed  tone  of  inquiry,  as  if  the  writer  felt  himself  master  of 
the  situation,  and  meant  to  dictate  his  own  terms.  This  is  the 
more  unfortunate,  because  there  is  no  longer  a  strong  power  to 
back  our  efforts  to  settle  the  question  with  the  high  hand  of  con- 
querors.  The  change  of  front  in  English  politics  has  reacted 
upon  us  here  with  tremendous  effect,  and  we  are  appearing  in  the 
eyes  of  the  people  rather  as  suppliants  than  dictators  to  Abdur 
Bahman.  Perhaps  the  Sirdar  himself  is  of  much  the  same 
opinion,  but  he  may  find  himself  wofuUy  mistaken  in  a  few  weeks. 
We  shall  not  yield  on  every  point  he  raises ;  simply  because  we 
have  other  cards  to  play.  This  he  will  soon  be  made  to  under- 
stand ;  and  he  must  then  choose  once  for  all.  He  is  trying  our 
patience  a  good  deal  now ;  but  there  are  limits  to  our  forbearance, 
and  these  limits  are  not  far  distant. 

Cabul  has,  indeed,  proved  a  white  elephant  which  we  cannot 
afford  to  feed.  We  are  so  anxious  to  get  rid  of  the  beast  at  any 
price,  that  we  are  thrusting  it  as  a  gift  upon  a  man  who  looks 
upon  it  as  his  lawful  property,  which  we  have  seriously  injured 
while  holding  it  tethered  in  our  midst.  The  independent  spirit 
shown  by  the  Sirdar,  whether  real  or  affected,  cannot  but  have  a 
bad  effect  upon  the  tribal  chiefs ;  and  if  we  allow  the  negotiations 
to  '^drag''  much  longer,  serious  mischief  may  follow.  The 
natural  restlessness  of  the  Afghans  will  not  permit  them  to  watch 
and  wait  for  months  ;  and  already  there  are  signs  of  a  turbulent 
spirit  manifesting  itself.  A  large  body  of  fanatical  Safis  have 
passed  from  Tagao  into  Kohistan,  and  our  only  means  of  counter- 
acting the  j>Aa(2  they  are  said  to  be  raising  has  been  to  dismiss 
the  Qhilzai  and  Eohistani  deputations  hitherto  waiting  in  Cabul. 
The  maliks  have  accordingly  been  sent  to  their  homes,  and  it  is 
hoped  their  efforts  to  maintain  peace  will  be  successful.  To  send 
a  division  now  into  Kohistan  would  be  to  cause  greater  distrust  in 
Turkistan  than  already  exists,  and  if  our  negotiations  are  to  come 


424  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

to  any  satisfactory  point,  this  distrast  must  not  be  excited*  I 
have  learnt  from  Sirdar  Ibrahim  Ehan,.that  while  oar  Mission 
was  honourably  received  at  Ehanabad,  Sirdar  Abdur  Bahman  was 
so  mistrustful,  either  of  his  own  power,  or  of  his  followers'  fsuiati- 
cism,  that  he  had  practically  to  treat  our  representatives  as  pri- 
soners. Sirdar  Wazirzada  Afzul  Ehan,  Ibrahim  Khan,  and  Sher 
Mahomed  Khan  were  lodged  in  a  large  tent  adjoining  the  Sirdar's, 
as  I  mentioned  in  a  previous  letter,  and  a  strong  guard  surrounded 
both.  The  members  of  the  Mission  were  unable  to  move  about 
of  their  own  free-will,  and  they  had  but  little,  if  any,  oppor- 
tunity of  consulting  together.  Abdur  Bahman  can  scarcely  be 
blamed  for  these  precautions,  as,  in  case  of  insult  or  violence  being 
offered  to  the  Sirdars,  he  would  have  been  held  personally  respon- 
sible for  the  breach  of  hospitality.  He  does  not  seem  to  have  had 
any  very  large  body  of  troops  with  him,  the  want  of  money,  of 
course,  hindering  him  in  his  efforts  to  collect  the  army  of  Turkistan, 
about  him.  Sirdar  Ibrahim  Khan  describes  him  as  by  far  the 
most  civilized,  intelligent,  and  able  Afghan  he  has  ever  met ;  and 
though  the  knowledge  has  been  gained  in  a  short  intercouse,  it  is 
valuable  as  bearing  out  the  opinions  of  Schuyler,  Petrovsky,  and 
other  writers,  who  saw  the  man  under  the  unfavourable  conditions 
of  exile  and  despondency.  During  his  residence  in  Tashkend 
Abdur  Bahman  has  kept  himself  well  informed  on  general  Asiatic 
politics ;  and  this  knowledge  he  is  now  applying,  to  the  best  of 
his  ability,  in  his  negotiations  with  the  British. 

Ibrahim  Khan  saw  a  number  of  photographs  of  the  Sirdar  on 
his  tent,  and  one  of  these  was  presented  to  him  on  his  expressing 
a  desire  to  cany  back  a  copy  with  him.  The  portrait  is  by  a  pho- 
tographer of  Tashkend,  and  shows  a  man  of  about  forty  years  of 
age,  broad-shouldered  and  stoutly  built,  with  a  face  expressing 
rather  stolid  self-possession  than  striking  intelligence.  A  huge 
black  beard  covers  the  lower  half  of  the  face,  but  cannot  hide  the 
thick  sensual  lips,  which  contrast  greatly  with  the  broad  forehead 
and  stubborn  eyes.  The  Sirdar  is  in  uniform  of  Western  cut,  and 
wears  a  curved  sword  of  the  kind  affected  by  Afghan  nobles.  The 
face  shows.no  marks  of  trouble  or  anxiety,  and  has  not  that 
harassed  look  which  was  so  characteristic  of  Shere  Ali  and  Yakub 
Khan.    Abdur  Babman  is  a  *'  well-preserved  "  man,  and,  if  report 


His  Astuteness.  425 

speaks  truly,  has  still  left  to  him  the  energy  and  ambition  which 
made  him  so  dangerous  an  enemy  of  Shere  Ali  twelve  years  ago. 

Sirdar  Ibrahim  Khan  will  retom  to  Khanabad  in  a  few  days, 
carrying  back  with  him  full  explanations  of  oar  policy  ;  and  these 
once  given,  Abdor  Bahman  will  be  practically  in  the  position  of 
having  received  an  ultimatum.  The  local  sirdars  persist  in  saying 
that  he  will  never  come  in  ;  but  the  last  news  from  the  Norlii  is 
that  the  Sirdar  is  establishing  posts  between  Ehanabad  and 
Charikar,  thus  securing  rapid  and  safe  communication  with 
Kohistan  and  Cabul.  As  he  has  no  army  worthy  of  the  name, 
this  step  can  be  scarcely  a  preparation  for  a  hostile  advance,  but 
looks  more  as  if  he  were  making  his  own  passage  to  Sherpur 
secure  when  the  time  comes  for  his  journey  to  our  camp. 


2nd  Jvly. 

One  might  well  apply  the  words  of  the  Jewish  proverb-monger 
to  Sirdar  Abdur  Bahman  Khan :  '^  The  prince  that  wanteth  under- 
standing is  a  great  oppressor."  The  people  of  Afghanistan  are 
now  oppressed  with  the  burden  of  a  Eafir  occupation,  because  the 
prince  to  whom  we  have  appealed  to  take  the  government  of  the 
country  off  our  hands  lacks  understanding.  He  is  cunning  and 
cautious  to  a  fault,  but  he  is  in  dose  danger  of  over-reaching 
himself.  We  have  so  far  lowered  our  pride  as  to  treat  with  Abdur 
Bahman  in  order  to  secure  peace  for  Afghanistan,  and  now  we 
are  in  the  awkward  position  of  finding  our  words  twisted,  their 
meaning  perverted,  and  the  Pretender  posing  before  the  nation  as 
a  patriot  of  the  first  water.  During  the  past  three  months  Mr. 
Lepel  Ghrifi&n,  acting  under  the  orders  of  the  Government  of  India, 
has  been  striving  to  place  himself  thoroughly  tn  rapport  with 
the  Sirdar,  who  seemed  at  last  to  be  quite  earnest  in  his  expressed 
wish  to  become  and  remain  on  friendly  terms  with  us.  There 
was,  however,  such  hesitation  in  all  his  actions,  and  so  strong  a 
current  of  vacillation  in  his  replies,  that  in  sheer  self-defence  we 
had  to  pin  him  down  to  certain  definite  conditions,  which  he  could 
either  accept  or  reject  as  his  inclination  dictated.  An  ultimatum, 
really,  was  sent  to  him,  though  we  have  avoided  using  the  term 
under  the  peculiar  circumstances  in  which  we  were  placed — viz., 


426  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

that  of  being  in  possession  of  a  kingdom  which  oar  armies 
could  easily  retain^  but  which  we  were  most  anxious  to  leave  at 
the  earliest  mcmient.  In  this  state  document  the  Indian  Ooveru- 
ment  stated  clearly  and  distinctly  that  the  Sirdar  would  be 
welcomed  as  Amir  of  A^hanistan,  and  could  rely  upon  our  future 
countenance  and  support  so  long  as  he  remained  &ithful  to  his 
engagements  with  us,  hit  that  Candahar  and  the  Eurram  Valley 
could  not  be  surrendered  to  him,  as  their  fate  had  onoe  for  all 
been  settled.  So  distinctly  was  the  latter  part  of  the  proposed 
settlement  laid  down,  that  it  was  added  ''  No  discussion  is  possible 
on  this  subject."  Nothing  could  have  been  more  simple  than 
this  :  Abdur  Bahman  could  by  a  word  become  Amir  of  Afghan- 
istan less  Candahar  and  Kurram ;  he  had  but  to  say  ^'  I  accept/' 
and  the  matter  was  at  an  end.  But  his  perversity  is  so  great, 
that  he  has  chosen  to  construe  our  terms  into  an  offer  of  a  united 
Afghanistan,  such  as  his  grandfather  the  Dost  ruled  over,  and 
wiUi  calm  assurance  to  say  that  he  accepts  such  offer.  This 
dishonesty  of  purpose  has  been  pushed  to  such  extremes  that  he 
has  sent  circulars  to  all  the  tribes,  proclaiming  with  more  or  less 
insolent  triumph  that  the  British  have  given  him  the  Amirship 
of  the  whole  country,  and  that  he  will  shortly  arrive  among  them 
to  take  up  the  reins  of  power.  What  sinister  motive  may  have 
prompted  such  a  course  we  cannot  imagine,  unless  it  be  that  the 
Sirdar  wishes  to  assume  the  r6le  of  a  great  patriotic  leader,  to 
accuse  us  of  treachery  in  our  negotiations,  and  thus  to  unite  all 
parties  in  a  supreme  effort  to  force  us  out  of  the  country.  It  may 
be  urged  with  equal  consistency  that  he  wishes  the  people  to 
believe  he  is  no  friend  of  the  British,  and  that  he  only  accepted 
our  real  terms  after  holding  out  for  the  restitution  of  territory 
acquired  by  us  during  the  campaign.  The  effect  of  his  extraor- 
dinary action  upon  the  people  has  been  a  very  unhealthy  one : 
they  cannot  believe,  in  the  face  of  our  protestations,  that  we  have 
included  Candahar  and  Eurram  in  the  terms  of  the  settlement, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  they  are  in  a  feverish  state  of  expectancy 
as  to  whether  the  Pretender  will  insist  upon  such  districts  being 
surrendered  to  him — ^which  would  mean  a  revival  of  the  war — or 
whether  he  will,  under  protest,  take  Afghanistan  shorn  of  two  of 
its  provinces.     Take  Hashim  Ehan's  case :  he  was  about  to  leave 


His  Circular  to  the  Tribes.  427 

for  Candahar,  which  place,  under  our  protection,  would  have  proved 
a  safe  asylum  for  him,  even  if  his  sworn  enemy,  Abdur  Bahman, 
were  ruler  of  Cabul.  But  no  sooner  did  he  see  the  Pretender's 
circular  stating  that  Candahar  was  to  revert  to  the  new  Amir,  than 
he  hastened  to  prepare  for  flight,  suspecting  us  of  having  treacher- 
ously deceived  him  regarding  the  southern  province.  The  circular 
was  received  in  Cabul  fifteen  hours  before  Abdur  Bahman's  answer 
reached  Mr.  Lepel  Griffin,  and  Hashim  Ehan  made  an  effort  to  see 
the  Chief  Political  Officer  to  gain  knowledge,  once  for  all,  of  tho 
truth  of  the  Pretender's  assertions.  Unluckily,  Hashim  Ehan 
could  not  see  Mr.  Griffin  at  once,  and  refusing  to  wait,  he  rode  off 
to.  Cabul,  and  in  company  with  Abdulla  Ehan  fled  in  the  night 
to  Chakri,  in  the  Ghilzai  country  beyond  Ehurd  Cabul.  The  two 
Sirdars  gave  out  that  they  were  ghazis,  probably  to  blind  the 
tribesmen,  and  we  have  sinoe  heard  that  Hashim  Ehan  is  trying 
to  gather  about  him  the  disbanded  sepoys  of  Yakub  Ehan's  army. 
He  has  two  lakhs  and  a  half  of  treasure  with  him,  and  by  offer- 
ing regular  payment,  both  to  armed  and  unarmed  men,  he  has 
already  a  little  army  under  his  control.  As  he  has  so  far  taken  no 
action  against  us,  a  friendly  letter  was  sent  by  order  of  General 
Stewart,  inviting  him  to  return,  and  assuring  him  that  the  state- 
ment about  Candahar  was  a  falsehood.  His  answer  was  that  he 
was  no  enemy  of  the  British,  but  that  under  existing  circum- 
stances he  had  been  ''  advised  "  to  leave  Cabul  and  watch  events 
from  a  safe  distance.  Abdulla  Ehan,  it  is  believed,  is  the 
''adviser'*  referred  to;  that  over-fed  Sirdar  having,  like  Jeshu- 
run,  waxed  fiat  and  kicked  out  savagely.  He  was  apparently  tired 
of  playing  the  part  of  a  nobody  in  Cabul,  and  has  now  incited 
Hashim  Ehan  to  commit  himself  to  a  very  foolish  course  of 
action. 

Since  penning  the  above  strictures  upon  Sirdar  Abdur  Bahman, 
our  envoy.  Sirdar  A&ul  Ehan,  ressaldar  10th  Bengal  Lancers,  has 
arrived  after  a  trying  journey  from  Ehanabad.  Strangely  enough, 
he  brings  letters  of  most  friendly  import  from  Abdur  Bahman, 
whom  he  reports  to  be  already  on  his  way  southwards.  The 
Pretender  marched  with  2,000  men  and  twelve  guns  from  Ehana- 
bad on  the  28th  of  June,  the  day  on  which  he  had  promised  to 
leave,  and  on   the   29th  he  was  encamped  at  Ghasma,  on  the 


428  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

Ishkamisb  Road.  By  this  time  be  is  probably  at  Ebinjan,  wbere 
no  doubt  be  will  wait  tbe  arrival  of  oar  messenger,  wbo  left  Sber- 
pur  tbree  days  ago.  Tbis  time,  it  is  boped,  tbe  negotiations  will 
really  end,  as  Abdnr  Babman  will  learn  tbat  bis  fast-and-loose 
mode  of  dealing  bas  exasperated  tbe  Britisb  Government,  wbicb 
will  not  give  bim  anotber  cbance.  Tbe  arrival  of  Afznl  Eban  is 
most  opportune,  as  be  can  explain  fully,  and  witbout  tbe  caution 
be  bad  to  use  in  bis  letters,  wbat  tbe  Sirdar's  intentions  are, 
and  wby  it  is  tbat  be  bas  disbonestly  perverted  tbe  meaning  of 
tbe  terms  so  generously  offered  to  bim.  I  believe  I  am  rigbt  in 
stating  tbat  botb  General  Stewart  and  Mr.  Lepel  Griffin  incline 
to  tbe  opinion  tbat  tbe  Sirdar  will  sbortly  cross  tbe  Hindu  Eusb 
into  Eobistan,  and  will  accept  tbe  Amirsbip  at  our  bands.  Of 
course,  bis  circular  came  upon  us  as  a  great  surprise,  and  it 
was  impossible  to  reconcile  it  witb  bis  previous  avowals  of  friend- 
sbip  and  a  desire  to  come  to  terms,  but  Afzul  Eban  bas  cleared 
away  some  of  tbe  mistiness  banging  about  tbe  affair,  and  wbat  is 
facetiously  called  in  camp  'Hbe  political  borizon"  is  once  more 
looking  clearer.  Tbere  are  still,  bowever,  many  conflicting 
interests  to  be  reconciled,  and  tbe  news  from  Logar  sbows  tbat 
tbe  supports  of  Yakub's  Eban*s  family— wbom,  to  adopt  Cavag- 
nari's  term,  I  will  call "  Jacobins  " — are  actively  engaged  in  stirring 
up  tbe  tribesmen  against  tbe  Britisb. 

Yesterday  (July  1st)  tbe  tribesmen  grew  so  bold  tbat  tbey 
advanced  to  witbin  a  few  miles  of  General  Hills'  force,  and  gave 
our  cavaliy  an  opportunity  of  punisbing  tbem,  wbicb  was  not 
neglected.  Tbe  Gbazni  Field  Force  bad  been  ordered  to  marcb 
to  Cbarasia,  and  Mabomed  Hasan  Eban,  tbe  staucbest  sup- 
porter of  Yakub  Eban  (wbose  imprisonment  in  tbe  time  of  Sbere 
Ali  be  sbared),  took  advantage  of  General  Hills'  marcb  to 
Cbarasia  to  occupy  tbe  Logar  Valley  witb  a  mixed  force  of 
men  from  Zurmut,  Ebarwar,  Maidan,  and  Wardak;  but  tbe 
gatberings  dispersed  upon  tbe  Gbazni  Field  Force  again  marcbing 
soutbwards.  Finding  General  Hills  did  not  move  beyond  Zer- 
gbun  Sbabr,  Hasan  Eban  took  beart  again,  and  induced  1,000  or 
2,000  men  to  occupy  tbe  large  village  of  Padkbao  Sbana,  on  tbe 
Eusbi  side  of  tbe  Logar,  only  twelve  miles  from  tbe  Britisb  camp. 
Here  tbey  remained  till  yesterday  morning,  wben  Palliser's  cavalry 


The  Cavalry  Action  at  Padkhao  Shana.      429 

brigade,  650  strong,  came  down  upon  them  and  scattered  them  in 
all  directions. 

The  particolars  of  the  action  are  as  follow: — General  Hills 
heard  on  June  80th  that  the  village  had  been  occupied  in  force, 
and  he  ordered  the  cavalry  brigade  to  move  out  at  8.80  a.m. 
yesterday.  Brigadier-General  Palliser's  instractions  were  to  re- 
connoitre their  position,  and  if  an  opportonity  occorred,  to  attack 
them  in  the  open.  His  force  was  made  up  of  281  sabres  of  the 
1st  Punjab  Cavalry,  168  of  the  2nd  Punjab  Cavalry,  and  188 
lances  of  the  19th  Bengal  Lancers.  Upon  nearing  the  spur 
which  runs  down  from  Eushi  towards  the  Logar  Biver,  small 
parties  of  the  enemy  were  seen,  and  the  advanced  cavalry  scouts, 
on  gaining  some  rising  ground  from  wWh  Padkhao  Shana  could 
be  seen,  reported  the  main  body  to  be  in  full  retreat  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Altimour  Hills,  which  separate  the  Logar  district  from 
Zurmut.  Their  strength  appeared  to  be  about  1,600  footmen 
and  a  few  cavalry.  General  Palliser  detached  a  troop  of  the 
2nd  Punjab  Cavalry  to  watch  the  village,  and  with  602  sabres  and 
lance  went  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  The  latter,  seeing  the 
cavalry  bearing  down  upon  them,  broke  into  detached  knots,  and 
took  advantage  of  the  difficult  ground  to  make  good  their  flight. 
The  cavalry,  however,  followed  them  up  very  quickly,  in  spite  of 
the  stony  nature  of  the  ground  and  the  difficulties  presented  by 
nullahs  and  ravines,  and  the  two  squadrons  of  the  Ist  Punjab 
Cavalry  and  the  19th  Lancers  in  the  front  line  were  soon  hotly 
engaged.  The  enemy  fought  with  desperation,  and  tried  to  reform 
their  line,  but  without  success.  They  sheered  off  to  right  and 
left,  and  were  cut  down  by  the  supporting  squadrons  of  the  1st 
and  2nd  Punjab  Cavalry.  The  pursuit  continued  for  two  hours, 
until  the  mouth  of  the  Altimour  Pass  had  been  reached.  Here 
the  cavalry  were  halted.  They  were  then  about  eight  miles  from 
Padkhao  Shana,  whither  they  quickly  returned.  Two  hundred 
bodies  are  said  to  have  been  counted  on  the  ground.  Our  casual- 
ties are  now  reported  as  four  sowars  killed,  twenty-three  wounded, 
and  one  British  officer.  Captain  Barrow,  wounded.  The  ground 
was  such  as  to  give  many  opportunities  for  severe  hand-to-hand 
fighting,  in  which  Major  Atkinson,  1st  Punjab  Cavalry,  and  Cap- 
tain Leslie  Bishop,  2nd  Punjab  Cavalry,  are  specially  mentioned 
by  those  present  as  having  displayed  determined  bravery.    There 


430  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

were  many  hairbreadth  escapes  among  the  officers  and  men, 
notably  in  the  case  of  Colonel  Yorke,  19th  Bengal  Lancers,  who 
received  a  bullet  through  his  helmet,  a  second  ball  grazing  his 
forehead.  His  orderly  was  shot  dead  at  his  side.  This  man, 
Jewand  Sing,  had  distinguished  himself  earlier  in  the  day,  when 
Captain  Barrow  was  wounded.  Captain  Barrow,  who  was  acting 
as  orderly  officer  to  General  Palliser,  engaged  single-handed  with 
an  Afghan  maiik,  who  fought  with  great  coolness  and  bravery. 
He  was  armed  with  rifle,  shield,  ttdwwr,  and  the  usual  long  knife. 
As  Captain  Barrow  rode  at  him  he  fired  his  rifle,  wounding  the 
officer's  horse  in  the  neck.  He  then  betook  himself  to  his  sword, 
and  warded  off  all  blows  with  his  shield.  Captain  Barrow 
received  two  severe  cuts,  the  first  disabling  his  bridle-hand,  and 
the  second  cutting  deep  into  his  right  fore-arm.  Just  at  this 
moment  Jewand  Sing  and  Sowar  Gholam  Ehan,  of  the  Ist 
Punjab  Cavalry,  rode  up,  and  the  Afghan,  who  had  already  been 
badly  wounded,  was  killed  out  of  hand.  In  the  ranks  of  the 
enemy  was  one  of  the  deserters  from  the  Sappers  and  Miners,  who 
would  not  fight,  but  begged  for  mercy.  He  was  shot  in  the 
miUe,  and  his  Snider  rifle  recovered.  Hasan  Khan  deserted 
the  tribesmen  at  the  commencement  of  the  action,  riding  away  to 
a  place  of  safety  as  soon  as  our  cavalry  appeared.  The  cavalry 
did  not  reach  camp  at  Zerghun  Shahr  until  half-past  six  at  night, 
having  been  fifteen  hours  uninterruptedly  in  the  saddle,  and 
having  ridden  over  forty  miles  since  morning.  As  they  rode  into 
camp,  all  the  regiments  turned  out  and  cheered  them  heartily. 
The  results  of  this  brilliant  little  action  cannot  fiail  to  be  most 
beneficial  for  a  time  at  least,  as  Logar  is  once  move  cleared  of 
malcontent  tribesmen. 

It  is  said  that  Hashim  Ehan  intended  sending  a  contingent 
from  Chakri  over  the  Ghilzai  Hills,  but  the  prompt  action  taken 
by  General  Hills  stopped  this,  and  Hashim  Khan  has  again 
written  in  to  say  he  is  ''  no  enemy  of  the  British."  He  may  well 
be  afraid  of  putting  himself  at  the  head  of  men  in  the  field  when 
he  sees  how  easily  our  troops  scatter  the  forces  opposed  to  them. 
Our  cavalry  ha^^e  never  done  so  well  as  at  Padkhao  Shana  during 
the  present  campaign  ;  no  English  cavalry  regiment  was  present, 
the  honours  of  the  fight  resting  with  the  Ist  and  2nd  Punjab 
Cavalry  and  the  19th  Bengal  Lancers. 


N 


Abdur  Rahman  Crosses  the  Hindu  Kush.      431 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

ArriTal  of  Abdur  Rahman  at  Tatandam  in  Eohiskan— Preparatioiia  lor  tlie  Bvaoaatioii 
of  Cabol— A  Depaiatioii  sent  from  Cabal  to  the  Sirdar—The  Friendfl  and  Bnemies 
of  Uie  fatnre  Amir — Attitude  of  the  Kohiatanis,  Ghihais,  and  Wardaka — Mahomed 
Jan  and  Mashk-i-Alam*8  Acceptance  of  Abdor  Rahman — ^Durbar  at  Sherpnr  on 
Jnly  22nd— Formal  Acknowledgment  of  Abdor  Rahman  as  Amir  by  the  British 
GoTemment— Mr.  Lepel  Ghiffin's  Addreas  to  the  Chiefit— Sir  Donald  StewaiVt 
Appeal  to  their  Patriotism— ^bdnr  Rahman's  Departure  from  Obarikar— Resigna- 
tion of  Wall  Mahomed,  GoTemor  of  Cabnl— News  of  the  Maiwand  Disaster-^r- 
Probable  Movement  of  10,000  Troops  to  Candahar— Interview  between  Mr.  Lepel 
GriflKn  and  the  Amir— Disenssion  of  Terms— The  Amir*t  Demeanonr— Seocmd 
Intenriew — A  Satisfactory  Settlement  arrired  at. 

Early  in  July  Sir  Donald  Stewart  sent  a  final  message  to  Sirdar 
Abdur  Bahman  Khan,  requesting  him  to  come  to  Cabul  to  discuss 
the  terms  of  a  settlement,  and  on  the  15th  of  July  the  Sirdar 
reached  Tutandarra,  near  Charikar,  in  Eohistan.  His  passage 
over  the  Hindu  Eush  had  been  a  very  trying  one.  On  the  9th  of 
July  we  had  sent  a  deputation  of  Cabul  gentlemen  to  Eohistan 
to  pay  their  respects  to  the  future  Amir.  Among  these  men  were 
Abdul  Eadir,  the  head  Eazi  of  the  city,  who  was  the  bearer  of  a 
letter  to  Abdur  from  the  chief  Political  Officer ;  the  Ghilzai  Chief 
of  Tezin,  and  Sirdar  Yusuf  Ehan,  Barakzai.  The  negotiations 
seemed  to  be  progressing  so  well  that  all  preparations  were  made 
for  evacuating  Cabul  by  the  16th  of  August,  and  large  convoys 
started  daily  from  the  Bala  Hissar  with  stores  and  surplus  ammu- 
nition for  India.*  The  following  letters  describe  the  close  of  the 
negotiations : — 

\%th  July,  1880, 

There  now  seems  every  prospect  of  a  satisfactory  settlement 

being  made  with  Abdur  Bahman,  who  will  shortly  leave  Tutan- 

darra  for  Charikar,  thence  coming  to  any  place  which  the  British 

representatives  at  Cabul  may  name.     He  raises  no  objection  to 

this;   expresses  his  strong  wish  to  make   a    firm  and  friendly 

*  It  will  he  seen  from  this  that  the  oTaeuation  of  Oabul  was  decided  npon  hmg 
before  the  Maiwand  disaster  was  made  known. 


432  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

arrangement  with  the  British,  and  is  more  anxious  for  personal 
interviews  than  eyen  we  could  be.  Since  his  arrival  in  Kohistan 
the  tone  of  his  messages,  and  his  reception  of  the  deputation  of 
Cabul  gentlemen  sent  to  him  at  Tutandarra,  have  been  more  than 
cordial;  and  there  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt  that  he  has 
finally  determined  to  unreservedly  accept  the  English  conditions, 
and  find  his  strength  in  an  English  alliance.  This  being  the 
case,  it  is  of  some  importance  to  know  what  the  strength  and 
party  of  Abdur  Babman  in  Northern  Afghanistan  are;  and  on 
this  subject  we  have  a  good  deal  to  guide  us.  It  may  be  pre- 
sumed tiiat  the  Oovemment  did  not  blindly  pin  its  faith  to  Abdnr 
Bahman  before  it  had  ascertained  that  there  was  a  sufficiently 
large  party  in  A^hanistan  to  ensure  some  promise  of  stability  if 
the  Sirdar  himself  was  capable  and  considerate  to  his  political 
opponents.  It  is  understood  that  Mr.  Lepel  Griffin  came  to  Cabal 
with  instructions  from  the  late  viceroy  (Lord  Lytton)  to  enter 
into  communication  with  Abdur  Bahman,  and  ascertain  if  he  were 
a  chief  suited  to  the  Government  purposes,  and  that  communica- 
tions were  accordingly  opened  vrith  the  Sirdar  within  a  few  days  of 
the  arrival  of  the  Chief  Political  Officer  in  Cabul.  These  hare 
been  continued  without  interruption  since,  until  Abdur  Bahman 
has  now  felt  himself  strong  enough  to  respond  to  the  Government 
invitation ;  and  unless  unforeseen  accidents  occur  within  the  next 
month,  it  would  seem  certain  that  he  will  be  Amir  of  Cabul. 

Some  critics  have  assumed  that,  as  in  the  first  Purbai-  held  after 
Mr.  Griffin's  arrival  at  Cabul  the  only  candidates  for  the  Amirship 
actually  named  were  Wali  Mahomed  Ehan,  Hashim,  Musa  Jan, 
and  Ayub  Ehan,  the  question  of  the  possibility  of  Abdur  Bahman 
had  then  not  been  considered  by  the  Government.  But  a  com- 
parison of  dates  shows  that  tbis  must  be  incorrect,  and  it  is  con- 
sequently probable  that,  looking  at  the  formidable  character  of  the 
armed  opposition  at  that  time,  and  the  ignorance  of  the  Sirdar's 
character  and  intentions,  his  name  was  expressly  excluded,  not 
because  negotiations  with  him  had  not  commenced,  but  that 
Yakub  Khan's  faction — who  were  then  assembling  in  immense 
numbers,  and  would  have  become  far  more  formidable  but  for  their 
defeat  at  Ahmed  Khel  and  Charasia — might  not  be  rendered  de's- 
perate  and  be  strengthened  by  the  knowledge  that  the  person  to 


His  Following  in  Afghanistan.  433 

whom  they  were  most  opposed  had  been  selected  by  Oovernment, 
while  it  was  uncertain  whether  he  would,  after  all,  prove  suitable. 
The  delay  which  had  taken  place  in  coming  to  an  understanding 
with  Abdur  Bahmau  is  indeed  small  when  the  magnitude  of  tho 
interests  at  stake  is  considered,  and  the  distance  at  which  the 
Sirdar  was  residing  on  the  other  side  of  the  Hindu  Eush.  It 
will  have  been  no  more  than  four  months  from  the  arrival  of  Mr. 
Griffin  at  Gabul,  and  the  opening  of  negotiations  with  Abdur 
Rahman,  before  these  are  virtually  completed,  and  the  army  can 
then  be  withdrawn  as  quickly  as  military  exigencies  or  regard  for 
the  life  and  health  of  the  troops  will  permit. 

It  is  very  difficult  to  say  what  strength  Abdur  Bahman  possesses 
in  Afghanistan,  as  it  was  difficult  to  know  what  really  constituted 
the  party  of  Yakub  Khan  or  Musa  Jan.  One  thing  certain  is  that 
a  very  large  number  of  undecided  persons  of  all  tribes  will  accept 
any  Amir  who  may  be  chosen  by  the  Government,  and  formally 
notified  according  to  the  Mahomedan  religion.  Constant  efforts 
have  been  directed  by  the  Political  Department  at  Cabul  to  break 
up  all  the  strong  opposition  parties ;  to  enlist  on  the  side  of  the 
Government  nominee  the  religious  feeling  of  the  country,  and 
especially  the  assistance  of  the  great  religious  leaders  (which  has 
been  successfully  done)  ;  and  to  break  up  those  great  tribes  which 
are  under  the  control  of  chiefs  of  more  or  less  importance,  so 
that  no  formidable  organized  resistance  might  be  offered  to  the 
new  Amir.  T^ift  mnfl^  impnrf^unt  tribe  in  Afghanistan  is  undoubt- 
edly thfi  Ghihais.  The  Andaris,  one  of  the  most  important  of 
'  the  southern  sections  of  the  tribe,  are  entirely  in  favour  of  Abdur 
Rahman,  as  are  a  great  majority  of  the  Tarakis.  The  northern 
Ghilzais  aje  very  much  under  the  control  of  their  chiefs,  the  most 
important  of  whom  is  AsmatuUah  Khan,  of  Hisarak  and  Lughman. 
He,  it  has  just  been  announced,  has  addressed  Mr.  Griffin,  and 
expressed  his  entire  willingness  to  accept  the  Amir  chosen  by  the 
English,  even  if  this  should  be  Abdur  Rahman.  Another  impor- 
tant Ghilzai  chief.  Khan  Mahomed  Khan,  of  Tezin,  is  with  the 
deputation  sent  to  Gharikar  to  welcome  Abdur  Rahman.  Padshah 
Khan  wiU  be  opposed  to  the  Sirdar ;  MaizuUah  Khan  will  probably 
join  him ;  Fai^  Mahomed  Khan  has  openly  declared  that  he  will 
be  in  opposition.     On  the  whole,  it  may  be  said  that  about  half  of 

F    F 


434  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

the  important  Ghilzai  tribe  will  be  in  fayoor  of  the  new  Amir. 
Others,  should  his  conduct  be  conciliatory^  would  be  doubtless  won 
over  later.  The  Eohistanis,  who  are  almost  entirely  Tajiks,  and 
between  whom  and  the  Afghans  there  is  not  much  love  lost,  can 
also  be  counted  upon. 

There  is,  however,  a  strong  party  in  favour  of  Shore  Ali's 
family ;  but,  roughly  speaking,  two-thirds  of  Eohistan  and  Eoh- 
Daman  may  be  estimated  on  the  side  of  the  Sirdar.  It  is  worth 
noting,  in  spite  of  the  reports  to  the  contrary,  that  General  Mir 
Said  Khan,  of  Istalif,  and  Mir  Butcha  Khan  have  not  yet  visited 
Abdur  Rahman.  They  are  doubtful  of  their  reception,  and  with 
excellent  reason,  as  they  have  been  illegitimately  collecting  Govern- 
ment revenue,  which  they  know  any  organized  Government  at 
Cabul  would  compel  them  to  disgorge.  The  Wardaks,  between 
Logar  and  Ghazni,  are  unfriendly,  but  may  be  won  over  by  good 
treatment.  They  will  very  much  follow  the  example  of  Mahomed 
Jan  and  Mushk-i-Alam.  The  latter  has  for  some  time  past  been 
working  honestly  in  the  interests  of  peace,  and  has  written  that 
he,  together  with  all  the  important  chiefs  assembled  in  Maidan, 
are  ready  to  accept  the  choice  of  the  British  Government.  The 
Sirdars  of  the  ruling  house  are  naturally  unfriendly,  as  the  adhe- 
rents of  the  party  of  A2dm  Khan  and  A£eu1  Khan  have  long  been 
banished  or  reduced  by  Shore  Ali  to  impotence.  A  good  many  of 
the  smaller  sirdars  belong  to  this  party,  and  are  on  Abdur 
Kahman's  side;  but  the  men  who  have  money— like  HaHhim 
Khan,  Wali  Mahomed,  Ibrahim  Khan,  Karim  Khan — are,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  in  opposition. 

The  future  depends  very  much  on  the  Sirdar's  own  conduct.  If 
he  chooses  to  take  a  conciliatory  course,  he  may  help  his  own 
against  the  strong  opposition  against  him.  If  he  becomes  as 
unpopular  in  Cabul  as  he  is  in  Turkistan,  by  oppressing  the  people 
and  exacting  money  from  the  traders,  he  will  not  last  very  long. 
Already  the  news  of  his  exactions  has  caused  the  wholesale  flight 
from  the  city  of  the  Indian  merchants  of  Cabul — two  kafilat  of 
whom  have  already  marched  to  India  with  their  families ;  while 
trade  is  almost  entirely  stopped  between  Cabul,  Turkistan,  and 
Bokhara.  The  necessities  of  the  Sirdar's  position,  and  his  almost 
absolute  want  of  funds,  are,  to  a  certain  extent,  an  excuse  for  this ; 


He  is  formally  recognized  as  Amir,  435 

but  unlesB  he  desires  to  alienate  the  trading  classes^  which  will  be 
a  very  great  blow  to  the  prosperity  of  his  kingdom,  he  will  have  to 
entirely  change  his  policy  with  them. 

22ni  Jvly. 

To-day  the  first  step  in  the  settlement  of  Afghanistan  has  been 
taken,  and  a  new  page  turned  in  the  history  of  our  relations  with 
Gabul.  We  have  formally  acknowledged  the  Sirdai*  Abdur 
Bahman  Khan,  son  of  Mir  Afzul  Ehan,  eldest  son  of  Dost 
Mahomed,  as  Amir  of  Cabul,  and  have  promised  him  our  support 
so  long  as  he  remains  friendly  to  the  British  Government.  Events 
have  marched  so  rapidly  within  the  last  few  days  that  many  of 
ns  can  scarcely  realize  the  importance  of  to*day's  proceedings. 
Mahomed  Jan  and  the  chiefs  assembled  in  Maidan,  sent  in  a 
friendly  deputation,  and  this  was  a  piece  of  good  fortune  which  we 
scarcely  anticipated.  The  old  mooUah^  Mushk-i-Alam,  had,  it  is 
true,  written  to  say  he  would  accept  the  ruler  whom  we  favoured, 
but  it  was  not  expected  that  secessions  from  the  Jacobin  party 
would  follow  BO  rapidly.  The  deputation  sent  by  Mahomed  Jan 
to  Sherpur  offered  to  make  unconditional  submission  to  the  British 
authorities,  but  this  was  a  proceeding  deemed  impolitic  by  Sir 
Donald  Stewart  and  Mr.  Lepel  Griffin.  Our  object  is  to  strengthen 
Abdur  Bahman*8  hands  as  much  as  possible,  not  to  gather  a  party 
about  ourselves,  and  the  proffered  submission  was  diverted  to  the 
Sirdar.  This  gives  the  latter  the  appearance  of  being  chosen  of 
the  people  rather  than  forced  upon  them  by  our  dictation,-  and  our 
anxiety  is  to  ally  ourselves  openly  with  no  party,  though  we  are 
quite  willing  to  acknowledge  the  strongest  man.  Two  sons  of 
Mushk-i-Alam  and  seven  Wardak  chiefs  are  now  at  Charikar, 
where  they  will  be  far  more  useful  than  in  Sherpur,  and  the  effect 
upon  the  popular  mind  is  proportionately  great.  If  the  champion 
of  Yakub  and  Musa  Ehan*s  claims  considers  the  chances  of  a 
restoration  to  power  of  Shere  Ali's  fiamily  at  an  end,  it  is  not  likely 
the  lesser  lights  will  continue  in  factious  opposition.  My  last 
letter  explained  at  length  the  then  strength  of  Abdur  Bahman's 
party,  and  it  will  be  seen  that  he  is  now  quite  powerful  enough, 
with  his  new  allies  from  Maidan,  to  hold  his  own  in  Cabul.  His 
promise  to  the  traders  not  to  raise  forced  loans  and  to  repay  at 

F   F   2 


436  Tlu  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

once  the  money  he  has  extorted  from  merchants  in  Tarkistan  has 
soothed  the  feelings  of  the  Cabal  people,  who  have  hitherto  looked 
with  dismay  upon  the  prospect  of  his  coming  to  rule  over  them. 
It  wonld  have  been  a  fatal  piece  of  folly  if,  as  Amir,  he  renewed  his 
tyranny,  and  there  are  already  signs  on  the  part  of  the  rich  citizens 
here  of  readiness  to  advance  him  money  on  the  security  of  fdtore 
revenae.  Once  he  has  fonds  wherewith  to  raise  and  eqoip  an 
army,  the  Amir  elect  may  reasonably  hope  to  scatter  the  remnants 
of  the  Jacobin  faction  and  to  disperse  Ayub  Khan's  army  if  it 
turns  away  from  Candahar  and  reaches  Ghazni.  Abdar  Rahman 
will  inevitably  have  to  fight  some  of  the  malcontents  remaining 
after  our  armies  have  withdrawn  over  the  Shutargardan  and  beyond 
JugduUuck,  and  our  belief  is  that  he  will  be  strong  enough  to 
crush  all  other  pretenders,  though  he  himself  may  exhaust  his 
means  in  the  struggle.  He  must  then  turn  to  the  British  for 
countenance  and  support,  as  there  is  a  strong  feeling  against 
Russian  interference  with  the  country,  and  we  shall  probably 
revert  to  the  old  policy  of  a  liberal  annual  subsidy.  What  con- 
ditions will  be  imposed  if  the  subsidy  is  granted  only  the  Home 
Government  perhaps  at  present  knows  ;  but  unless  the  war  is  to 
be  fruitless,  they  must  be  somewhat  on  the  lines  laid  down  in  the 
Gundamak  Treaty— the  presence  of  a  British  Envoy  in  Cabnl 
being  waived  for  the  present. 

The  Durbar  was  held  at  five  o'clock  this  evening,  three  large 
tents  having  been  pitched  in  the  Cantonment,  about  150  yards 
from  the  Head-quarters'  Gate.  All  the  afternoon,  sirdars  and 
persons  of  lesser  note  came  streaming  through  the  72nd  Gate- 
way, with  their  wild-looking  retainers  on  horseback  and  on  foot. 
The  order  against  the  candying  of  arms,  so  wisely  enacted  by  Sir 
Frederick  Roberts  in  October,  is  still  in  force;  but  privileged 
persons,  such  as  Sirdar  Wali  Mahomed  Khan  and  the  three 
representatives  sent  by  Abdur  Rahman  from  Charikar,  were 
to-day  allowed  small  escorts  of  armed  men.  With  carbines, 
or  Enfield  rifles,  slung  at  their  back,  a  sword  dangling  from  their 
waist-belt,  pistols  and  knives  stuck  in  their  kummerbunds,  these 
horsemen  trotted  about  full  of  their  own  importance,  evidently 
looking  upon  the  Durbar  as  held  for  the  special  honour  of  their 
masters.     The  said  masters  were,  as  usual,  gorgeous  in  crimson, 


Proceedings  in  Durbar.  437 

pnrple,  and  gold ;  bnt  I  have  so  often  described  the  greasy  Cabal 
Sirdar  in  all  his  glory  that  I  am  loth  to  trot  him  ont  again^  even 
on  such  an  historic  occasion  as  the  present.  We  missed  the  hand- 
some Arab  Hashim  Khan  used  to  ride,  and  that  mountain  of 
flesh,  AbduUa  Khan,  awed  ns  no  more ;  the  two  Sirdars  are  brood- 
ing over  their  wrongs  in  Eharwar  or  Zurmnt,  and  their  hearts 
will  be  foil  of  bitterness  when  they  learn  of  the  success  Abdur 
Bahman  has  scored.  Wali  Mahomed,  as  Governor  of  Cabul,  was  a 
person  of  some  importance  in  his  own  eyes,  though  his  tenure  of 
power  is  now  a  very  weak  one,  for  he  will  be  scarcely  rash  enough 
to  court  death  by  remaining  at  his  post  when  our  army  files  out 
of  Sherpur.  Sirdars  and  servants  were  the  chief  living  features 
in  cantonments,  between  the  Club  and  the  Head-quarters,  all  the 
afternoon,  for  in  his  anxiety  to  secure  a  ''good  place"  each 
petty  member  of  the  Barakzai  family  took  time  by  the  forelock, 
and  hastened  to  the  Durbar  tents  an  hour  or  two  before  the  hour 
fixed  for  the  solemn  proceedings.  The  guard  of  honour  of  100 
men,  furnished  by  the  72nd  Highlanders,  under  the  command 
of  Captain  Gamett,  fell  in  about  half-past  four  o'clock,  and  to 
the  cheery  quick-step  of  '*  Scotland  yet,"  marched  off  to  where  the 
gathering  crowd  of  British  officers  and  Afghan  notabilities  had 
begun  to  arrange  itself.  We  have  not  the  means  wherewith  to 
arrange  a  grand  spectacle,  and  nothing  could  have  been  more 
commonplace  than  the  three  tents  in  which  the  Durbar  was  to  be 
held.  Facing  Bemaru  Heights  was  the  largest  of  all,  towering 
above  its  near  neighbour,  which  again  dwarfed  the  Durbar  tent 
proper,  an  old  weather-beaten  canvas  affair,  dull  red  in  colour^ 
once  the  property  of  the  Amir.  The  guard  of  honour  formed  up 
at  the  entrance  to  the  northernmost  tent,  the  lines  of  bayonets 
shining  out  in  the  sunshine,  and  duly  impressing  certain  weak- 
kneed  sirdars,  who  shuffled  along  to  their  places  in  very  undignified 
fashion.  There  had  been  an  effort  made  to  give  some  picturesque 
colouring  to  the  interior  of  the  small  tent  wherein  sirdars  knelt 
on  one  side  while  British  officers  sat  comfortably  on  their  own 
particular  chairs  and  camp-stools  on  the  other.  Persian  carpets 
covered  the  dusty  floor,  shawls  were  thrown  over  the  chairs  of 
state  reserved  for  the  representatives  of  the  British  Government, 
while  the  very  shabby  tent-poles  were  swathed  in  Hnkoh  work. 


438  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

The  dnsky  (aces  of  the  sirdars  showed  no  more  sensibility^  after 
once  the  crowd  had  settled  or  wriggled  itself  into  something  like 
order,  than  would  so  many  masks  on  lay  figures:  our  policy 
is  so  inscrutable  to  men  like  Wali  Mahomed  that  any  new  declar- 
ation is  placidly  awaited  with  almost  beneyolent  indifference. 
The  rows  of  turbans,  many-coloured  and  full  of  strange  peculi- 
arities in  shape  and  folding,  covered  the  shaven  scalps  of  men 
whose  thoughts  turned,  doubtless,  upon  what  new  phase  the  a&irs 
of  Afghanistan  were  about  to  take.  Sirdar  Wali  Mahomed  looked 
anxious  and  dispirited,  as  must  a  man  whose  power  is  slipping 
rapidly  away ;  the  stuttering  Shahbaz  Khan,  our  whilom  Govemor 
of  Kohistan  ;  Ibrahim  Khan,  who  has  worked  all  along  heartily  in 
our  cause ;  Sher  Mahomed  Khau,  a  man  who  has  studied  Western 
politics  and  knows  which  of  our  Generals  hails  from  Ireland, 
which  from  Scotland,  and  which  from  England ;  Yusuf  Khan,  who 
has  unreservedly  thrown  in  his  lot  with  Abdur  Bahman  Khan ; 
Sarwar  Khan,  who  fought  against  us  in  December ;  all  these 
princes  of  the  Barakzai  dynasty  were  hiding  whatever  curiosity 
they  felt  with  a  kind  of  listless  dignity  which  deceived  no  one  but 
themselves.  Three  strangers  were  in  the  first  row  of  the  sirdars : 
these  were  General  Katol  Khan,  Mahomed  Amin  Khan,  and 
''the  Saiad  Sahib,"  sent  by  Abdur  Bahman  to  represent  him 
at  the  Durbar.  They  were  rather  sorrily  arrayed  for  such  an 
occasion,  their  long  residence  in  Tashkend  having,  perhaps  made 
them  indifferent  to  the  beauties  of  oriental  attire,  but  as  the 
representatives  of  the  future  Amir  they  had  to  be  treated  with 
every  consideration.  Contrasting  with  the  flowing  white  robes 
or  richly-coloured  coats  of  the  Afghan  portion  of  the  assembly  were 
the  quieter  uniforms  of  the  officers  of  the  garrison,  lighted  up 
here  and  there  by  the  gold  and  glitter  of  the  Staff,  always  the 
*'  show-men  *'  on  occasions  of  this  kind.  A  few  of  our  friends 
from  Logar  and  ''  down  the  line  '*  had  come  in  on  leave,  so  that 
the  force  in  Northern  Afghanistan  was  well  represented.  With 
military  punctuality.  Sir  Donald  Stewai  t,  accompanied  by  Sir 
Frederick  Boberts,  Mr.  Lepel  Griffin,  and  the  members  of  the 
Head-quarters'  Staff  in  Sherpur,  reached  the  Durbar  tents  ;  the 
usual  formalities  of  presenting  arms,  &c.,  were  gone  through, 
and  then  the  three  men  with  whose  names  the  present  settlement 


Addressing  the  Chiefs.  439 

will  henceforth  be  most  closely  associated  took  their  seats  in 
solemn  Durbar.  The  representatives  of  Abdur  Rahman  were 
presented,  hand-shakings^exchanged  in  Western  fashion,  and  the 
proceedings  began. 

Sir  Donald  Stewart,  with  a  soldier's  brevity,  said  he  wished  to 
explain  to  the  Sirdars,  Chiefs,  and  people  assembled,  the  reason 
for  holding  the  Durbar  and  requesting  their  presence  and  that 
of  the  English  officers  stationed  in  Gabul.  It  was  that  the  public 
recopiition  hg  ^^^  ftfty^niment   of    Englftn^l   nf    fii'r/ioi.  ak.^^|. 

^twai^  Tn^nn  na   Aty^ii»  nf  floKnl    t^|^^n1<1    bc    made    l^nnwn  wif.Vi  n,^ 

mufl^  hnnftnr  ng  r^^'^ihlf  ■  Mr.  Lepel  Griffin  would  explain  more 
in  detail  the  views .  and  wishes  of  the  Government  on  this  impor- 
tant subject.  Major  Euan  Smith,  Political  Officer  with  General 
Hills'  Division,  translated  this  short  preamble  into  Persian,  after 
which  Mr.  Griffin  read  the  following  speech  in  the  same  lan- 
guage:— 

**  SlRI>A]t8,  Cmsn,    AlTD  GlHTLIMIV, 

*'  It  is  little  more  than  three  months  ago  that,  bjr  command  of  His  Ezcellenoy 
the  Yioeroy  of  India,  I  explained  to  joa  in  Dorbar  the  iotentions  of  the  British  GoTem- 
ment  with  regard  to  the  future  of  Afghanistan.  I  then  told  you  it  was  not  intended 
to  annex  the  country ;  but  that  the  armies  of  Her  Majesty  the  Qaeen-Empress  would  be 
withdrawn  sosoon  as  the  prospect  of  a  settled  administration  had  bften  upsured,  and  a 
fthiftf  ^.Iniftwlftrlf^i^  >■  k^\T  wl^ft  phonld  not  nnW  hft  animated  ^y  friendly  eentimepts 
*^TII^fl  tt**  "RnyliKJi  ftny^rnTnent.  but  have  the  cordial  support  of  his  own  countrymen. 
Since  that  time  Genera]  Sir  Donald  Stewart,  General  Sir  Frederick  Roberts,  and  myself, 
have  endeaTOured  to  carry  into  effect  the  wishes  of  the  Goveroment,  and  you  are  sum- 
moned here  to-day  to  bear  that  our  efforts  have  been  successful.  The  course  of  events 
having  placed  Sirdar  Abdur  Kahman  Kban  in  a  I'osition  which  fulfils  the  wishes  and 
expectations  of  the  Government,  the  Viceroy  of  India  and  the  Government  of  Her  Mo6t 
Gracious  Majesty  the  Queen-Empress  are  pleased  to  announce  that  they  publicly  recog- 
nise Sirdar  Abdur  Babman  Khan,  grandson  of  the  illustrious  Amir  Dost  Mahomed  Khan, 
as  Amir  of  OabuL 

"  It  is  to  the  Government  a  source  of  satisfaction  that  the  tribes  and  chiefs  have  pre- 
ferred a  distinguished  member  of  the  Barakzai  family,  who  is  a  renowned  soldier,  wise, 
and  experienced.  Qissentiments  towards  the  IgotiahLiiiafinUQent^afe  most  friendly  ; 
and  so  long  as  his  rule  shows  that  \A  Is  animated  by  these  sentiments,  he  cannot  fioTto 
receive  the  support  of  the  British  Government  He  will  best  show  his  friendship  for  the 
Government  by  treating  those  of  his  subjects  who  have  done  us  service  as  Aii  friends. 

"  GHiirs  AiTD  GxiTTLimir,  —In  accordance  with  assurances  already  conveyed  to  you, 
the  armSea  of  the  Queen-Empresi  will  shortly  withdraw  within  those  frontiers  which 
were  decided  by  treaty  with  the  ex-Amir,  Mahomed  Takub  Khan.  We  trust  and  firmly 
believe  that  your  remembrance  of  the  English  will  not  be  unkindly.  We  have  fought 
you  in  the  field  whenever  you  opposed  us ;  but  your  religion  has  in  no  way  been  inter- 
fered with ;  the  honour  of  your  women  has  been  respected,  and  every  one  has  been 


440  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 8a 

■ecare  in  potseasion  of  his  property.  Whaterer  hai  been  necenary  lor  tiie  mii^Ktft  of 
the  armj  baa  been  liberally  paid  for.  Since  I  came  to  Cabal,  I  hare  been  in  daily 
intercourse  with  jon ;  but  I  have  never  heard  an  Af^ly^n  nnAa  ^  complaint  of  the  con- 
Ani^i  *ny  ■ftli^flr,  KfTf^^'*^*  ^^^  Tfi^*'^^  Kjiin^ipTny  \^  p^f  Maiegty'fl  anny., 
"''*7rhe  British  0OTemment  bas  always  been  well-disposed  towards  Afghaaistas.  Yon 
all  know  how  it  supported  and  assisted  the  former  rulers  of  the  countiy.  It  has  no 
other  wish  than  your  happiness  and  prosperity  ;  and  it  is  with  this  object  alone  that 
to-day  it  recognizes  Sirdar  Abdnr  Bahman  Eban-as  Amir  of  Gabul.'* 

Mr.  Griffin  then  read  the  speech  in  English  for  the  benefit  of  the 
officers  of  the  garrison,  and  a  Pushtu  translation  was  read  by  Mr. 
Cunningham,  Mr.  Griffin's  Secretary.  Not  a  sign  of  intelligence, 
nor  an  expression  of  approbation  or  dissent,  was  made  in  the 
assembly.  From  the  Sikh  and  Ghoorka  sentries  standing  in  rear 
of  the  tent  to  the  fringe  of  tatterdemalion  retainers  peering  in 
over  the  sirdars'  heads,  all  were  quiet  as  if  cogitating  upon  the 
new  policy  enunciated.  Our  late  envoys  to  the  Sirdar,  Afisul  Khan 
and  Ibrahim  Khan,  standing  behind  Sir  Donald  Stewart,  stroked 
their  beards  silently  and  proudly ;  this  was  the  outcome  of  their 
dangerous  journey  to  Elianabad.  Those  of  us  who  had  marched 
mth  Sir  Frederick  Roberts  over  the  Shutargardan,  and  borne  the 
heat  and  burden  of  the  day  when  the  cry  of  **  retribution  "  was 
raised  after  Gavagnari's  death,  were  delighted  that  our  General's 
name  had  been  linked  with  those  of  Sir  Donald  Stewart  and 
Mr.  Griffin  in  regard  to  that  work  of  settlement  which  the  Got- 
ernment  view  with  such  satisfaction.  There  is  a  tendency  to 
forget,  in  the  present  political  turmoil,  the  work  done  last 
autumn — work  for  which  no  reward  has  been  given  ;  and  this  is 
more  ungenerous  in  the  case  of  a  soldier,  such  as  General 
Roberts  proved  himself,  than  it  would  be  with  a  diplomat  who 
can  always  look  with  confidence  to  future  chances  of  distinction. 

The  Durbar  was  brought  to  an  end  by  an  earnest  appeal  on  Sir 
^Donald  Stewart's  p«^  ^fjj!^  ^^  Sir^**^  "^^  O^iAfa,  w|in  ^^^ 
i  asked  to^sink  their  private  quarrels  and  unite  in  supporting  the 
newAjttir.  Major  Euan  Smith  rendered  this  appeal  in  Persian 
so  earnestly  and  with  such  emphasis  that  its  effect  was  to  stir  a 
little  ripple  of  animation  in  the  dead  sea  of  faces  that  had  made 
no  sign  hitherto.  Sirdar  Yusuf  Khan  promised  on  his  own  part 
so  to  act  for  the  good  of  his  country ;  and  with  his  spontan- 
eous little  outburst  the  Durbar  closed.    In  a  few  minutes  Generals 


The  Friendly  Sirdars.  441 

and  subalterns  jostled  each  other,  Sirdars  and  servants  mingled 
in  familar  groups,  the  tents  were  clear,  the  guard  marching  off, 
and  thus  our  acknowledgment  of  Sirdar  Abdur  Bahman  Ehan 
as  Amir  was  publicly  made.  To-day  is  the  22nd  of  July ;  it  was 
on  the  24th  of  July  last  year  that  Cavagnari  made  his  entry  into 
Cabul  under  the  auspices  of  Yakub  Ehan.  Then  all  seemed 
plain-sailing ;  now  the  outlook  is  nearly  as  placid ;  but  all  who 
have  soldiered  over  the  Indus  since  November  1878  pray  that  the 
present  ^'  satisfactory  settlement"  may  not  prove  as  deceptive  and 
rotten  as  that  consummated  at  Gxindamak. 
"-The  Sirdars  present  in  Durbar  were  as  follow : — 


Wali  Mahomed  Ehan. 
Yusuf  Ehan. 
Sher  Mahomed  Ehan. 
Nur  Mahomed  Ehan. 
Mahomed  Sarwar  Ehan. 
Shahbaz  Ehan. 
Amin-ud-dowla  Ehan. 


Mahomed  Asaf  Ehan. 
Gholam  Ehan. 
Mahomed  Earim  Elhan. 
Shahd  Mahomed  Khan. 
Mahomed  Ali  Jan. 
Abdul  Eaium  Ehan. 
Mahomed  Samir  Ehan. 


Vlih.  July. 
There  has  been  a  lull  since  the  sudden  outburst  of  political 
activity  shown  in  the  Durbar  on  the  22nd  of  July,  but  there  is 
nothing  to  indicate  that  the  wheels  of  the  Indo- Afghan  mill  which 
is  grinding  out  a  new  Government  for  Cabul  are  at  all  clogged. 
The  new  Amir  has  just  left  Charikar,  but  he  has  little  if  any 
armed  gathering  about  him,  and  if  he  is  to  take  over  Sherpur 
and  the  Bala  Hissar  when  we  leave  he  ought  to  have  at  least 
5,000  men  at  his  back.  Our  acknowledgment  of  his  claims  has  of 
course  given  him  new  prestige  in  the  eyes  of  many  of  the  chiefs ; 
and  as,  at  our  advice,  he  is  wisely  adopting  a  conciliatory  tone 
both  towards  the  Cabul  citizens  and  people  hitherto  devoted  to 
Shere  Ali's  family,  there  is  great  hope  that  his  power  will  steadily 
expand.  Being  a  man  suspicious  and  reticent  in  the  extreme,  he 
does  not  take  us  much  into  his  confidence ;  but  his  anxiety  to 
have  personal  interviews  with  Sir  Donald  Stewart  ^and  Mr.  Lepel 
OrifSn  is  not  all  concealed.  It  is  well  known  here  that  there 
are  many  points  of  detail  to  be  discussed  and  settled  before  we 


442  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

leave^  and  snch  settlement  can  be  far  more  easily  broaght  abont 
by  personal  interviews  than  by  continuous  letter-writing.  Mr. 
Lepel  Griffin  is  about  to  go  out  to  General  Gough's  camp  at  Eila 
Dushman,*  and  it  is  understood  that  the  Amir  will  pitch  his  camp 
at  Ak  Serai,  five  or  six  miles  further  north  on  the  Istalif  Boad. 
It  would  be  unwise  for  our  representative  to  go  out  before  the 
Amir  has  actually  left  Gharikar,  as  a  loss  of  dignity  would  surely 
result  from  any  appearance  of  ''  waiting  upon  His  Majesty's 
pleasure.'*  On  Friday  Mr.  Griffin  leaves  for  Kila  Dushman,  and 
upon  his  report  Sir  Donald  Stewart  will  time  his  own  visit  to 
Eoh-Daman.  Then  we  shall  be  able,  at  last,  to  take  an  exact 
estimate  of  the  new  Amir's  strength,  and  form  some  judgment'  of 
his  feelings  towards  the  British  Government.  An  exile  for  so 
many  years  from  Afghanistan,  he  may  push  his  inquisitiveness  as 
to  our  intentions  to  an  awkward  extent.  We  are  not  prepared  to 
promise  too  much  either  in  the  way  of  subsidy  or  moral  support, 
and  before  any  conditions  are  made  we  may  have  to  probe  his 
relations  with  his  friends  at  Tashkend  pretty  deeply.  The  fate  of 
Shore  Ali  should  serve  as  a  warning  to  Abdur  Rahman;  but 
prompted  by  Eaufmann  and  others,  he  may  look  upon  England 
under  a  Liberal  Government  as  a  friend  and  ally  of  Bussia. 
But,  if  I  mistake  not,  he  will  be  given  clearly  to  understand  that 
while  the  Courts  of  St.  James's  and  St.  Petersburg  may  be  on 
the  best  terms  with  each  other,  it  is  not  part  of  the  British 
policy  at  least  that  minor  kingdoms  such  as  Afghanistan  should 
conduct  their  foreign  relations  independently.  There  are  too 
many  interests  involved  for  us  to  tolerate  intrigues  by  any  foreign 
power  in  a  country  bordering  on  India ;  and  if  in  our  generosity 
we  sink  our  claim  to  station  an  English  officer  at  Cabul,  we  shall 
demand  that  no  other  European  State  shall  be  represented  there. 
"  Perish  India !  "  is  not  yet  the  cry  of  the  Eadical  party  in  Eng- 
land, and  until  that  watchword  has  been  accepted  by  the  English 
people,  our  best  efforts  will  be  directed  to  warding  off  danger  from 
our  Indian  possessions.  In  our  late  acknowledgment,  while  advis- 
ing the  Amir  to  remain  friendly  with  us,  we  made  no  mention  of  the 
conditions  under  which  that  friendship  could  be  best  maintained. 

*  General  Gongh's  brigade  had  moyed  into  Koh-Daman  ia  conseqaenoe  of  the  tnrba- 
knoe  of  the  Safia. 


The  Government  of  CabuL  443 

That  task  still  remains.  Whateyer  the  Indian  Government  may 
have  decided,  there  must  be  some  line  laid  down  to  guide  the 
Amir  in  his  course  of  action  when  he  has  made  his  power  supreme 
over  all  rivals.  If  he  be  left  to  his  own  devices  he  may  invite  all 
his  friends  from  Bussian  Turkistan  to  visit  him  in  the  Bala  His- 
sar,  and  India  may  again  be  startled  by  news  of  the  honour  done 
in  Cabul  to  the  representatives  of  the  Czar.  The  stories  told  of 
two  Bussian  agents  being  in  the  camp  at  Ehanabad  have  never 
really  been  discredited,  but  it  is  unlikely  the  Amir  will  allow  them 
publicly  to  accompany  him  when  he  leaves  Ak  Serai  for  Zimma 
on  Saturday.  The  next  few  days  will  see  the  final  details  of 
the  settlement  of  Cabul  discussed  and  formulated,  and  when 
we  turn  our  backs  upon  the  city  next  month  we  shall  be  con- 
tent in  our  knowledge  that  we  have  left  the  most  powerful 
prince  to  succeed  us,  and  that  the  difficulties  he  will  have  to  face 
are  sufficiently  great  to  prevent  him  meddling  with  foreign  politics 
for  some  time  to  come. 

We  have  withdrawn  our  guard  of  sepoys  from  the  Eotwali  in 
the  city,  and  Sirdar  Wali  Mahomed  has  so  little  confidence  in  any 
but  British  bayonets  that  he  has  promptly  resigned  his  Governor- 
ship of  CabuL  Sirdar  Yusuf  Ehan,  who  has  done  much  to  aid  us 
in  re-establishing  a  settled  Government,  has  been  made  Governor, 
and  holds  the  city  now  as  the  representative  of  the  Amir.  As  a 
consequence  of  this,  the  citizens  have  begun  to  swagger  again  in 
all  their  turbulent  boastfulness,  and  our  soldiers  are  warned 
against  entering  the  bazaara.  Armed  men  are  now  constantly  . 
seen,  and  many  of  us  think  it  is  perhaps  a  little  premature 
to  repeal  the  law  forbidding  the  carrying  of  arms.  It  is  not  an 
uncommon  sight  now,  even  in  Sherpur,  to  meet  men  on  horse- 
back or  on  foot  with  Enfield  rifles  at  their  backs,  and  knives  in 
their  girdles.  To-day  I  saw  one  of  the  military  police  '*  showing 
the  door  "  to  three  Aighan  sepoys.  These  men  had  cross-belts, 
pouches,  and  bayonets,  but  carried  their  rifles  slung  over  their 
shoulders  in  a  very  unsoldier-like  way.  How  they  had  crept  into 
cantonments  no  one  could  find  out,  but  they  were  quite  self- 
possessed,  and  were  very  observant  of  all  that  was  going  on. 
They  are  probably  sepoys,  who  being  sent  from  Charikar  to  recruit 
men  for  the  Amir's  army,  had  taken  advantage  of  some  Pathan 


444  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

being  on  sentry  at  one  of  the  gates  to  walk  into  Sherpur  and  criti- 
cize our  arrangements. 

2iu2  August. 

-  Interest  has  been  divided,  during  the  past  week,  between  the 
startling  news  from  Gandahar*  and  the  near  approach  of  the  new 
Amir  to  Cabul.  The  Candahar  news  is  serious  enough,  but  we 
are  still  in  the  dark  as  to  the  exact  extent  of  our  defeat  on  the 
Gririshk  Boad,  and  consequently  can  only  speculate  vaguely  upon 
the  results  of  the  action.  Already  a  strong  division  has  been 
told  off  to  march  southwards,  if  the  Government  of  India 
should  consider  the  necessity  sufficiently  urgent.  Sir  Frederick 
Roberts  will  have  command,  and  his  old  troops  will  be  quite  equal 
to  dealing  with  Ayub  Khan,  if  the  latter  tries  to  follow  up  his 
first  success.  It  may  be  disappointing  to  regiments  just  on  the 
eve  of  returning  to  the  civilization  of  the  plains  to  find  themselves 
marching  away  to  Candahar ;  but  the  work  has  to  be  done,  and 
our  soldiers  sink  their  feelings,  or  calculate  that  *'  after  all  it  is 
only  reaching  the  railway  at  Sibi  instead  of  Bawal  Kndi."  The 
plan  is  to  take  a  division  made  up  of  British,  Ghoorka,  and 
Sikh  infantry,  with  a  fair  allowance  of  cavalry  and  two  or  three 
mountain  batteries  (including  the  screw-guns),  and  march  steadily 
upon  Candahar,  doing  our  fighting  on  the  way,  but  never  halting 
or  going  off  the  route  to  meet  the  enemy.  Of  course  the  flower 
of  the  force  about  Cabul  having  been  taken  away  (say  10,000  men), 
•  it  would  be  imperative  that  the  army  left  in  Sherpur  should  retire 
upon  the  Khyber  line,  letting  in  the  new  Amir  to  assume  power  in 
Cabul  without  further  delay.  *^o  remain  in  occupation  of  Cabul 
would  be  false  policy,  as  not  only  would  the  people  be  irritated  at 
our  presence  and  tempted  to  harass  our  weakened  force,  but  the 
Amir  would  grow  unpopular,  as  he  would  seem  to  be  allying  him- 
self too  intimately  with  the  Kafir  intruders.7  The  diversion  of 
troops  to  Candahar  must  not  be  looked  upon  as  settled,  for  there 

*  The  news  of  the  Maiwand  disaster  reached  Sir  Donald  Stewart  on  July  29th,  the 
first  telegram  speaking  of  the  '* annihilation'*  of  (General  Barrows*  hrigade.  Later 
telegrams  showed  that  the  defeat,  while  serious  enough,  was  not  ao  terrible  as  at  fint 
reported.  The  news  was  kept  as  secret  as  possible,  as  it  was  feared  that  the  negotia- 
tions with  Abdor  Bahman  might  be  delayed  if  the  hew  complications  in  Southern 
Afghanistan  were  made  known./ 


The  ''Politicals''  with  Abdur  Rahman.        445 

are  many  considerations  yet  to  be  thought  of  before  snch  a  step 
could  be  taken.  The  defeat  of  the  brigade  at  ELhusk-i-Nakhud 
may  have  been  exaggerated^  or  Aynb's  snccess  not  pushed  to  its 
fall  extent,  in  which  case  the  force  under  General  Phayre  at 
Peshin  might  suffice  to  re-establish  our  power  in  Southern 
Afghanistan.  Again,  Ayub  may  not  choose  to  waste  his  strength 
against  Candahar  itself,  but  may  turn  northwards  and  march 
leisurely  to  Ghazni,  gathering  strength  day  by  day.  In  this  case, 
we  certainly  should  not  send  a  force  from  Candahar  to  follow  him, 
and  if  we  did  not  occupy  Ghazni  in  strength,  the  tenure  of  Abdur 
Bahman's  power  in  Cabul  would  be  very  short  indeed.  All  the 
Jacobin  faction  would  be  united  at  Ghazni,  and  the  prestige 
attaching  to  Ayub  Khan  would  make  him  a  leader  whom  the  new 
Amir  might  well  dread. 

But,  as  in  a  few  days  our  course  of  action  will  probably  be  made 
clear,  the  Candahar  matter  can  be  left  where  it  stands,  while  local 
politics  are  dealt  with.  Our  representatives  have  at  last  met 
Abdur  Bahman  Khan  face  to  face,  and  although  part  of  their 
programme — a  public  Durbar — has  not  been  carried  out,  still  it 
id  believed  such  satisfactory  arrangements  have  been  made  that 
Cabul  can  be  evacuated  during  the  current  month.  On  Friday, 
Mr.  Lepel  Griffin,  Chief  PoUtical  Officer,  and  his  Staff  went  out 
to  Brigadier-General  Charles  Gough's  Camp  at  Eila  Hajee,  about 
nine  miles  due  north  of  Sherpur,  on  the  Charikar  Boad.  Mr. 
Griffin  was  to  meet  the  Amir,  who  had  come  down  from  Charikar 
to  Ak-Serai,  and  was  to  smooth  away  such  difficulties  as  might 
crop  up  prior  to  the  holding  of  the  Durbar  on  Monday.  Sirdar 
Yusuf  Khan,  Governor  of  Cabul,  and  Captain  Bidgeway,  Assistant 
Political  Officer,  made  aiTangements  for  the  interview,  which  was 
supposed  to  take  place  about  midway  between  Kila  Hajee  and  Ak- 
Serai.  A  vineyard  near  Zimma  was  first  proposed  by  Yusuf 
Khan,  but  this  was  objected  to,  possibly  because  the  temper  of 
the  Amir's  followers  was  known  to  be  very  uncertain,  and  it  is 
always  well  to  be  on  guard  against  Afghan  fanaticism.  Finally, 
a  hill  was  chosen  a  little  off  the  road,  and  on  this  a  large  tent, 
sent  out  from  Sherpur,  was  pitched.  The  hill  was  five  miles  from 
Kila  Hajee,  and  only  two  from  the  Amir's  camp  at  Ak- Serai,  but 
of  this  little  account  was  made.    At  half-past  seven,  on  Saturday 


446  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

momingy  a  squadron  of  the  9th  Lancers^  the  Srd  Bengal  Cavaby, 
and  the  Srd  Punjab  Gavaby, — the  whole  under  the  command  of 
Colonel  Mackenzie,  of  the  Srd  Bengal  GaTalry, — ^formed  up  at 
Kila  Hajee  as  escort  to  Mr*  Orifiin,  who  was  accompanied  by 
Major  Hastings  and  his  political  staff,  and  a  few  officers  whom 
curiosity  prompted  to  turn  out.  A  few  Ghoorkas  held  the  Kotal 
a  mile  from  camp,  but  beyond  this  no  display  of  infantry  was 
made.  The  Lancers  and  the  Srd  Bengal  Cavalry  trotted  on  ahead, 
and  the  road  to  Zimma  was  followed,  up  hill  and  down  ravine, 
until  the  Durbar  tent  was  sighted  on  the  crest.  The  country  about 
was  very  fertile,  vineyards  and  orchards  abounding,  while  north- 
wards towards  Istalif  a  mass  of  vegetation  was  seen.  On  arrival 
at  the  Durbar  tent  a  halt  was  called,  the  9th  Lancers  forming  up 
near  the  entrance,  while  the  native  cavalry  drew  off  to  some  dis- 
tance below.  About  200  yards  to  the  north  the  Amir's  private  tent 
had  been  pitched,  and  about  this  some  100  of  his  retainers  were 
seen  to  be  gathered.  Mr.  Griffin  sent  Captain  Bidgeway,  Mr. 
Cunningham,  Bajah  Jehandad  Ehan,  and  Afzul  E^an  to  escort 
the  Amir  up  the  hill,  and  with  the  remainder  of  the  British 
officers,  about  twenty  in  number,  waited  near  the  Durbar  tent. 
The  Amir  met  the  party  of  four,  as  it  appeared,  at  the  entrance 
of  his  tent,  and  after  the  usual  formal  salutation,  a  move  was 
made  up  the  slope.  One  of  the  Amir's  attendants  unfurled  a  large 
red  umbrella,  his  white  charger  with  gorgeous  trappings  was  led  in 
rear ;  and  with  a  small  mob  of  armed  retainers  following,  his 
Highness  walked  slowly  along.  Mr.  Griffin,  as  in  courtesy  bound, 
met  him  halfway,  hands  were  cordially  shaken,  and  then  every- 
one made  for  the  large  square  tent  which  offered  grateful  shelter 
from  the  sun. 

The  troopers  of  the  9th  Lancers  formed  a  striking  contrast  to 
the  100  men  of  the  Amir's  body-guard,  none  of  whom  were  dad 
alike,  and  whose  '*  uniform  "  deserved  its  name  on  one  ground — 
it  was  of  uniform  irregularity.  The  arms  of  these  men  of  motley 
were  equally  curious :  Martinis,  Sniders,  Chassepots,  Minies,  such 
were  some  of  the  rifles ;  while  double-barrelled  shot-guns,  match- 
locks, and  jhezails  were  also  conspicuous.  The  guard  had  been 
chosen  probably  from  among  men  whom  the  Amir  could  thoroughly 
trust,  as  he  could  from  his  Turkistan  regiments  easily  have  taken 


n^^^nn^r  ^f  *^^  ^^^1  Amir  447 

two  oompanies  armed  with  rifles  of  the  same  pattern.  Within 
the  tent  a  semicircle  of  chairs  had  been  placed  at  the  head  of 
three  long  narrow  tables,  on  which  were  some  English  sweetmeats 
and  Gabnli  confectionery.  The  Amir,  with  whom  was  Sirdar 
Afznl  Ehan,  the  Ehan  of  Eulab,  and  half  a  dozen  personal 
attendants,  including  a  fayonrite  slave-boy,  went  through  the 
ordeal  of  receiving  all  the  officers  introduced  to  him  with  quiet 
self-possession  and  good-humour.  Behind  him,  in  the  verandah 
of  the  tent,  were  clustered  his  wild-looking  body-guard,  with  their 
weapons  carried  in  every  picturesque  style  of  carelessness ;  each 
man  looking  upon  the  ceremonious  introductions  with  more  of 
contempt  than  curiosity.  The  Amir's  demeanour  was  a  surprise 
to  every  one,  from  Mr.  Griffin  downwards.  From  the  photograph 
brought  by  Afzul  Khan  from  Ehanabad,  one  was  led  to  expect  a 
gross,  sensual-looking  man  on  the  usual  stereotyped  pattern  of 
Barakzai  Sirdars.  The  reality  was  quite  different :  a  man  of 
middle-age,  broadly-built  but  not  obese,  with  features  marked  and 
worn  by  care  and  anxiety,  but  lighted  up  by  a  smile  which  gave 
character  and  pleasantness  to  the  whole  face.  His  dress  was  quiet 
and  unostentatious ;  a  blue  coat,  half  uniform,  with  gold  epau- 
lettes ;  a  pair  of  cloth  breeches,  short  riding  boots,  a  handsome 
sword  and  belt,  and  a  cap  of  Asti-akan  fur,  with  the  ribbon  of  an 
order  (perhaps  Turkish)  let  in  deeply  in  front.  So  winning 
a  mannw  had  the  Amir  that  men  who  came  quite  prepared 
to  revile  him,  went  away  most  favourably  impressed.  He  is 
not  the  ''brute  "  an  Afghan  Sirdar  usually  is,  and  his  after-con- 
versation with  our  political  officers  showed  him  to  be  familiar  with 
Western  ideas,  and  to  have  made  good  use  of  the  time  he  has 
spent  in  Tashkend. 

After  the  introductions  had  been  got  through,  the  tent  was 
cleared  of  all  but  those  who  were  to  take  part  in  the  ''discussion." 
I  am  not  sure  if  the  word  should  be  used;  but  as  there  is  a 
great  objection  to  the  use  of  the  term  "  negotiations,"  I  will  let 
it  stand.  With  Mr.  Griffin  remained  Major  Hastings,  Mr.  Cun- 
ningham, C.S.  (Secretary),  and  Mr.  Christie  (the  officer  in  charge 
of  the  Political  Intelligence  Department)  ;  with  the  Amir,  Yusuf 
Ehan,  and  a  Mooushee,  who  took  notes  of  what  was  said.  Out  of 
ear-shot  in  the  tent  sat,  also^  the  Ehan  of  Eulab,    who    dozed 


448  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

daring  the  interview  in  happy  nnconscionsness  of  what  was  going 
on*  Outside,  in  the  verandahs,  the  sweetmeats  were  served  roand 
to  all  who  chose  to  partake  of  them,  and  the  Amir's  servants  also 
handed  round  cups  of  tea,  which  Afghan  and  Britisher  alike  sipped 
while  the  three  hours  of  the  interview  slipped  away.  The  tents 
of  the  Afghan  army  could  be  seen  amid  the  vineyards,  a  couple 
of  miles  away ;  but  no  sign  of  the  6,000  or  6,000  armed  men 
known  to  be  in  rear  of  the  near  hill  could  be  detected.  Our 
cavalry  were  the  chief  figures  in  the  landscape,  which  was  as 
peaceftil  as  could  be  wished.  The  interview  with  the  Amir 
lasted  from  9  o'clock  till  noon,  and  no  doubt  many  state  secrets 
were  aired,  and  much  mutual  cross-questioning  gone  through. 
The  following  may  be  taken  as  the  purport  of  the  conversation : 
— The  Amir  expressed  himself  most  anxious  to  do  everything  to 
secure  the  throne  for  himself,  and  to  remain  on  friendly  terms 
with  us ;  but  he  confessed  his  present  weakness,  and  asked  what 
we  were  prepared  to  do  for  him.  Quoting  our  generous  conduct 
towards  Shere  Ali,  and  the  gifts  of  guns,  ammunition,  and  money 
we  had  made  to  that  monarch,  he  let  it  be  inferred  that  he  also 
should  expect  the  same  kind  of  treatment.  What  answerhe  got 
I  am  not  prepared  to  say ;  but  if  it  were  that  he  would  receive 
money  but  no  arms,  I  should  not  be  surprised.  He  was  told 
that  necessity  might  arise  for  marching  troops  from  Cabul  to 
Candahar,  as  Ayub  Khan  had  shown  unexpected  strength  in  the 
south ;  and  in  answer  to  the  questiob  whether  there  would  be 
objections  raised  to  such  a  march,  be  said  he  should  like  to  con- 
sult the  people  with  him.  No  doubt  the  three  hours  were  profit- 
ably filled,  and  our  representative  at  least  learned  that  the  2,000 
Turkistan  troops  with  the  Amir  were  exceedingly  suspicious  of  all 
his  dealings  with  the  British,  and  pai-ticularly  objected  to  his 
visiting  General  Gough's  camp.  They  had  an  idea  that  treachery 
was  contemplated,  and  that  Abdur  Babman  might  be  spirited  off 
to  India  to  keep  Yakub  Khan  company.  At  noon  the  Amir 
appeared  with  Mr.  GrifSn  at  the  door  of  the  tent,  the  Lancers 
saluted,  farewells  were  exchanged,  and  in  a  few  minutes  our 
representative  and  escort  were  cantering  back  to  Eila  Hajee,  while 
the  Amir  was  thoughtfully  returning  to  his  excited  followers  at 
Ak-Serai. 


The  Bargain  finally  Closed.  449 

It  was  still  believed  on  Saturday  that  a  Durbar  at  Kila  Hajee 
could  be  arranged,  and  Sir  Donald  Stewart,  Sir  Frederick  Roberts 
and  their  Staffs  rode  out  to  General  Gough's  camp.  The  Guides' 
eayaliy  and  four  guns  of  G-S,  RA.,  with  blank  cartridges  for 
saluting  purposes,  also  moved  out  to  Eila  Hajee*  On  Saturday 
night  the  Amir's  troops  occupied  the  Eotal,  a  mile  from  our 
camp,  evidently  fearing  a  surprise,  and  only  withdrew  at  daylight 
on  Sunday.  General  Gough  equally  mistrusted  them,  and  a  com- 
pany of  each  regiment  slept  fully  accoutred  in  their  respective 
quarter-guards.  A  second  interview  between  Mr.  Griffin  and  the 
Amir  took  place  yesterday  (Sunday)  morning,  but  in  view  of  the 
uneasiness  among  the  Turkistani  troops,  the  precaution  was 
taken  of  sending  four  companies  of  our  Infantry  to  within  a  mile 
of  the  Durbar  tents,  and  the  Eotal  in  rear  was  also  held  in  force. 
The  conversation  of  the  previous  day  was  renewed,  and  I  under- 
stand the  Amir  said  the  tribes  might  object  to  a  force  marching 
to  Gandahar,  but  that  if  no  long  halts  were  made  on  the  way, 
there  could  be  no  objection  on  his  part.  Finally,  the  Amir  asked 
that  all  English  and  native  officials  might  withdraw,  aud  for  an 
hour  he  remained  in  conversation  with  Mr.  Griffin.  As  we  have 
since  heard  that  everything  has  been  satisfactorily  settled,  it  is  to 
be  supposed  that  the  "  bargain  " — ^if  a  rude  mercantile  term  may 
be  imported  into  high  politics — ^was  closed,  and  that  the  Amir 
Abdur  Bahman  Ehan  has  declared  his  readiness  fo  occupy  Cabul, 
as  we  march  out  in  a  week  or  more,  and  will  thereafter  abide  in  . 
his  friendly  sentiments  towards  the  British.  No  Durbar,  there- 
fore, was  held  this  morning,  and  now  our  Generals  and  Politicals 
are  once  more  safe  within  the  walls  of  Sherpur,  and  we  are  all 
discussing  the  chances  of  10,000  men  having  to  return  to  India  by 
way  of  Gandahar  and  Quetta. 

A  little  incident  occurred  at  Zimma  on  Sunday,  which  shows 
that  the  pestilent  moollah  is  always  taking  occasion  to  arouse  the 
people's  passions  against  us.  While  the  Amir  and  Mr.  Griffin  were 
closeted  together,  a  ragged-looking  man  {sl  fakir)  approached  the  tent 
and  began  shrieking  out,  whereupon  old  Nakshband  Ehan,  an  ex- 
Bessaldar  of  Native  Cavalry,  called  out  to  the  Amir's  sentries  to  drive 
him  o£f.  There  was  a  sentry  at  each  comer  of  the  tent,  and  one  of 
these  men  promptly  stoned  the  moollah,  Nakshband  explaining, 

Q   Q 


4SO  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

with  much  energetic  abuse^  that  sach  beasts  did  all  the  mischief 
in  the  country.  The  mooUaJis  have  been  very  quiet  of  late,  but 
with  Ayub's  success  as  a  text,  they  may  again  begin  preaching  war 
to  the  knife  against  all  Kafirs. 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 


Farther  Details  of  the  llaiwand  Diaaflter— A  Foroe  ordered  to  much  from  OtAnl  to 
Oandahar— Aid  giyen  by  the  Amir— Farewell  Dimier  to  Sir  F.  Roberta— Details  of 
the  Force  destined  for  Feshawar— Closing  Scenes  of  the  Occapation  of  Oabnl— 
Interview  between  the  Amir  and  Sir  Donald  Stewart— A  Friendly  Leave-Taking— 
The  Bvacnation  of  Sheipnr  on  Angnst  11th— Peaoefal  March  to  India— The  Arrange- 
ments made  with  the  Amir— Grant  of  £190,500  and  Thirty  Gons— The  Forts  left 
intact  about  Cabal— Weakness  of  snch  a  Polipy. 

6th  August,  1880. 
"  On  the  4th  of  Augast  orderswere  received  from  the  Qt>Yemment 

of  India  for  a    foroe    10,000  wtrnyig  npilftr  T.iftnf^y^ftpt.(^fl^flrft1j^ir 

F.  Eoherts  to  march  from  Cabulio  the  ;relief  of  Candahar  \  bnt  it 
was  not  until  last  eyening  that  the  full  meaning^  of  JJie  sinister 
news  from  Candahar  was  generally  recognized  in  camp.  So  much 
secrecy'haTIBeen  kept  ];pgarding  the  earlier  despatches,  no  doubt 
in  the  hope  that  later  news  would  show  the  disaster  to  have  been 
exaggerated,  that  until  Colonel  St.  John's  long  telegram  giving 
details  of  the  losses  was  issued  in  the  Club,  we  could  not  accept 
the  defeat  At  Ehusk-i-Nakhud  as  a  reality.  In  a  large  camp  like 
this  wild  rumours  obtain  ready  circulation ;  they  are  believed  for  a 
day,  or  a  week,  until  some  new  theory  is  broached  and  a  new  turn  ^ 
given  to  the  current  6f  men's  thoughts.  First  we  believed  that 
General  Burrows'  Brigade  had  indeed  been  annihilated ;  then  the 
affair  sank  into  a  reconnaissance  in  which  two  companies  of  the 
66th  had  been  cut  up  to  a  man,  and  two  guns  lost  ;^  and  at  last, 
when  it  became  known  that  General  Il9|)e|^q  w<|b  fif^  ^^^t"  ft  <^'^'- 
Sion  to  march. southward^  the  belief  bftfiaTna  inrfinfirftHhat  nnr  fppy 
in  Canjahar  bad  ^eeq  rongln^y  ^ftfifllfldl!  ^^d  that  Ayub  Khan's 
success  was  ^0Kin£  with  alarming  strides.    WhsiuJCoIan^  St. 


Order  to  Relieve  Candahar.  451 

John's  teleyram  was  read  ontside  the  Clnb-honae  to  an  aadience  of 
twenty  or  thirty  oflScers,  we  coald  Bcarcelj  realize  that  1,200  of  our 
men  "KSd  heen  killed  in  pp^n  fight,  and  that  the  remainder  of  the 
ill«fated  brigade  had  made  the  best  of  their  way  haA  tn  C^y^  j^har 
"Cter  an  jJ[fljQat  w<^^^^1^Pfl  fionn^T^  Bat  there  was  no  mistaking 
tLe  Kard  facts  set  forth ;  the  list  of  officers  killed  and  woanded ; 
and  the  ominous  closing  paragraph  that  the  British  garrison  was 
preparing  for  a  siege.  Our  past  experience  in  December  had 
taught  us  one  salutary  lesson  ;  ttie  Aff;hans  respond  to  the  call  of 
a  successful  leader  with  a  readiness  which  defies  all  ordinary  ^^1- 
'"  culationsj.  and  we  saw  tha^tJtbfitfi  ij^igiit  judged  be  good  cause  for 
BKfcBmg  even  such  war-TOin.  ^^gJTT^f^^"  ftg  ^^^^^  about  Cftbnl 
ng^down  to  distant  ^^^^?^'>»  Our  hearts  were  light  a  fort- 
night ago  at  the  prospect  of  an  early  return  to  India,  for  the 
campaign  has  been  a  trying  one,  and  officers  and  men  have  grown 
very  weary  of  the  endless  see-saw  in  the  political  world  wherein 
Mr.  Ghriffin  and  Abdur  Bahman  are  the  chief  figures.  All  hopes 
were  dashed  when  the  order  went  forth  for  a  new  and  arduous 
march,  with  the  prospect  of  guerilla  fighting  half  the  way ;  and  it 
must  be  confessed  that  at  first  there  were  hearty  curses  bestowed  . 
upon  the  heads  of  those  responsible  for  the  change  in  the  pro- 
gramme. But  when  the  details  of  th©  disaster  were  made  known, 
the  duty  of*^  relieving  Candahar  was  accepted  quietly  and  with  a 
dggSTpridft,  all  sense  of  persoiial  discomfort  and  danger  being 
sunk  jitthe  lolling  that  the  credit  of  our  army  must  be  vindicated 
mthoAt-nsfilesd  delay.  To  form  one  of  a  picked  force  such  as 
General  Boberts  has  now  under  his  orders  is  no  common  fortune, 
for  certainly  not  in  the  whole  of  India  could  be  a  better  lot  of  fight- 
ing men  be  got  together  than  that  now  waiting  the  final  order  to 
march.  We  are  self-conscious  of  our  own  strength,  and  are  just  a 
little  impatient  that  it  cannot  be  put  forth  at  once,  while  our 
enemies  are  still  in  the  flush  of  success.  To  meet  10,000  British, 
Stb,  and  Gho^rkft  flf^1<^ifty« — for  Sir  Jredftrirk  "Rnhflrfs's  force  is 
made  up  almost  ^r^tirftlj  ftf  t^^g^  rftAfla^wpnlfl  tryJhejcOfiUlajiLa 
Better  aracf^fl  ftpf*  ^'°^'pi'^^^  army  flmn  tho  Afghans  can  ever  hope 
I  to  £utJuLihtt^ld ;  and  if  this  force  cannot  daJha.Wi^rlunarked 
ont  f(f)r  it,  then  our  military  supremacy  ^^  tihfl  F**°^  ^"°*^  'Hf!''^ 

Lb^^QjOUfiS^^^aend.    I  do  not  care  to  play  the  part  of  a  trumpeter 
Q  o  2 


452  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

to  the  Cabal  army,  bat  the  merits  of  the  regiments  now  brigaded 
are  too  great  to  be  lightly  passed  by.  Tl^^  ty^^pt  whjA  is  placed 
in  the  infantry  an4  tfr<?if  ]^yflAf*,h-)nftilAra  Appeai^^  at  ouc^  IWlHi '  the 
/ftfit  that  po  fiftlil  fLrf.inftry  ifl  f^  ^a  taken,  (jjnflral  JBfll^rtB  yill 
have  only  three  maleJbatt^g^eg^T-pnnndflrfl).  althongb  one  of  these 
i^IsCfiPJUSlid  .^  tba-  'fific^-gan  battery^  which  has  a  rejgotation  for 
accuracy  and^^rai^gp  that  ^auAot  be  ejaalled  by  our^-poonders. 
r  ^^---^  tVjf,li  fViAHfi  fihrrrr  Itb^^^^'^^  (^'^  "^i  fliyhtf ^^  ff^°^)>, Ji^  ^^^^  to  meet 
I  v^  Ayub  Kh|jl^thirty  or  forty  gans.  and  we  are  f{oin'f|  oal  lipuii^oar 
^*"**^-n/  efrancTwithoat  any  fear  of  results:  our  screw-gans  can  silence 
one  or  Iwo'of  the  batteries  which  were  turned  upon  our  little  force 
at  E^usk-i-Nakhud,  and  our  infantry  can  deal  with  the  rest. 
We  shall  meet  Ayub  Ehan,  presumably,  either  within  sight  of 
Candahar,^or  Qn  the  Ghazni  Boad,  and  then  his  army  of  regulars 
and  ghazis  wil}  have  a  fair  opportunity  of  measuring  itself  against 
a  British  force  wotthy  of  the  name.  We  shall  not  make  the  fatal 
mistake  of  flcatterin^  our  brigades  over  the  country  side,  each 
liable  at  any  moment  to  be  taken  in  detau  and  DroKen  up  by  over- 
'■^Svhelming  numbers.  Our  march  has  not  yet  begun,  and  there  are 
soothsayers  in  our  midst  who^^fbreteH.a^umey  to  Ghazni  only, 
and  then  a  backward  movement  towards  the  Shutargardan — Gan- 
dahar  having  been  relieved  in  the  meantime  by  General  Phayce ; 
but  if  it  should  bo  our  lot  to  cut  ourselves  off  for  three  weeks 
from  the  outer  world,  tiiere  need  be  no  anxiety  as  to  our  fate ;  we 
are  well  able  to  take  care  of  ourselves. 

Thft  hfth^vin^^r  nf  t.liA  ATm>,  p^^y^pfi  |^^  Tina  learnt^  illftt^JL  strong 
force  will  march  to  Candahar,  has  been  all  that  could  be  wished. 
'  He  is  sage^  enough  to  .s§fiJiiat.ACTfe..iPia^  is  the  only  dangerous 
rivaT  te  now  has  in  Afghanifitan^  ftpd  if  we  break-up  the  Herat 
army,  Cabul  will  be  made  quite  safe.  ^The^  Amir  has  also  sent 
several  men  of  importance  to  travel  a  day's  march  ahead  of  our 
Hmy,  and  arrange  with  the  maliks  for  the  provision  of  supplies. 
^{[^iS^if^^iiilS  ^^  AMnr  Rahman  really  do  their  work  prgjerlj, 
our  Commi^ariat  officers  wiH  find  their  task  ^.Jbadifig  15,660 
fighting  men  and  followers  greatly  lightened.  South  of  Ghazni 
we  shall  have  to  trust  mostly  to  our  own  foraging  parties,  and  we 
shall  doubtless  be  on  half-rations  before  Ehelat-i-Ghilzai  is  reached. 
Sir  Donald  Stewart  on  the  march  to  Cabul  had  at  times  difficulty 


Parting  Honours  to  General  Roberts.  453 

in  collecting  sapplies,  as  the  villages  on  the  road  were  deserted, 
and  if  the  peasants  have  not  since  returned  to  look  after  their 
crops  the  country  will  not  furnish  much  food.  I^owevery  our  own 
resources  will  carry  us  over  half  ^^  ^8i^(^  ai[  J^aflfc^  a^^  a  few 
doubly  f*lftrir?T^"  ^^^  make  Khelat-i-Ghil7Ai  tu^jQ  gy<^  ^  fi^^  yff  ^^r 
Mushk-i-Alam  has  accepted  the  new  order  of  things  in  such 
cT  thorough-going  spirit  that  he  now  talks  of  coming  in  with 
Mahomed  Jan  and  accompanying  Sir  Donald  Stewart's  army  to 
India.  Both  our  late  foes  are  anxious  to  make  a  pilgrimage  to 
Mecca. 

I<flflti  Tlip^^  *^^  p^iu;/*«i  Affi«^>»  pi>-A  ^  farewell  dinner  in 
honour  of  General  jEloberts^atjwWc^  Donald^StejaiL  and  the 
chief  officers  of  tiie  force  were  present.  T"  reappBJJiig^^-^  ^® 
toast  of  his  bedUh  Sir  f xedexick  Boborta,  madfi.ih&JEioUowing 
ctiar 


'*  Mb.  GuTFni,  Sn  Dohald  Stkwabt,  and  Gbhtlbxbh, 

'*  I  •oaroely  know  how  to  thank  yon  all  for  the  kind  way  in  which  yon  have 
drank  my  health,  and  that  of  the  Colomn  under  orders  for  Oandahar.  To  the  rery 
flattering  terms  in  which  Mr.  Griffin  has  spoken  of  me  I  should  have  oonsiderable 
difficnlty  in  replying,  were  it  not  that  I  can  honestly  say  that  any  saooesses  which  I  may 
have  attained  hitherto  have  been  due  entirely  to  the  ezperieneed  commanders  I  have 
had  with  me,  the  most  capable  Staff  that  ever  accompanied  a  General  Officer  in  the 
fi^ld,  and  the  gallantly  and  discipline  of  the  troops  under  me.  I  do  not  think  there 
erer  have  been,  and  I  doubt  if  there  ever  will  be,  more  efficient  troops  sent  from  India 
than  those  which  General  Stewart  and  I  have  had  the  honour  to  oommand  for  the  last 
two  years.  With^|ju}UMSp»«ats«MMMSslsinty.  Without  wishing  to  underrate  the 
dangers  and  dfficalties  of  the  task  before  us,  I  feel  quite  confident  that  the  efficient 
force  which  Sir  Donald  Stewart  has  placed  at  my  dispotal  will  succeed  in  reaching 
Candahar  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  in  effectaally  disposing  of  any  A^ban  army  that 
may  be  brought  sgainst  us.  As  Mr.  €hiffin  has  said,  we  must  aU  deplore  the  cause  which 
requires  Cabul  troops  to  be  now  sent  to  Oandahar.  A  few  days  ago  we  were  all  congratu- 
lating tfurselves  upon  the  prospect  of  a  speedy  return  to  India.  Some  of  us  had  laid  in 
a  store  of  Nipal  pepper  for  use  at  home  ;  others,  I  have  heard,  had  actually  named  an  * 
early  date  for  leafing  Bombay  for  Bngland.  Well,  Sir  Donald  Stewart  is  willing  to  ' 
guarantee — and  were  it  not  an  indecorous  thing  for  an  officer  so  high  in  rank — would 
even  bet— that  we  shall  reaeh  India  agaio>  vt^  Candahar,  in  November  next.  Gentle- 
men, this  is  a  country  of  great  uncertainties.  We  have  been  living  in  a  stale  of  uncer- 
tainty for  many  months  ;  but»  thanks  to  the  poUtioal  skill  of  our  kind  host,  affairs  have 
during  the  last  few  weeks,  progroised  so  rapidly  and  fiivourably  that  we  have  reason  to 
hope  the  country  may  now  have  comparative  rest  and  quiet,  and  that  some  settled  form 
of  government  will  be  established.  However,  we  must  not  be  too  sanguine :  and  I  trust 
that  our  fellow-countrymen,  who  have  not  had  the  same  opportunity  that  we  have  had 
of  lowing  A^anistan  and  the  Afghans,  will  not  be  disappointed  if  matters  do  not  go 
altogether  smoothly  after  the  British  troops  leave  CabuL    No  Amir  has  ever  yet  occupied 


454  '^^  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

the  tbrooe  for  any  time  nntil  he  has  prored  himBelf  capable  of  gOTeniog  the  oonntry, 
and  it  is  not  likely  that  Amir  Abdnr  Bahman  will  be  an  exception.  We  all  know  what 
difficulties  Mr.  Griffin  has  had  to  contend  with,  and  we  all  rejoice  at  the  great  soooess 
which  has  attended  his  efforts— efforts  so  ably  assisted  by  the  Political  Officers  now  with 
him.  It  now  remans  for  Abdar  Bahman  to  show  that  he  is  capable  of  filling  the  great 
position  in  which  he  has  been  placed.  From  the  commencement  of  this  campaign,  the 
Political  Officeis  haye  borne  as  important,  if  not  as  active,  work  as  the  soldier.  First 
and  foremost  the  gallant  Cavagnari,  known  to  and  monmed  by  ns  all,  and  more  than 
liked  by  many  of  ns  :  with  him  many  brave  men  fell,  and  it  was  to  avenge  their  base 
and  treacherous  murder  that  this  force  came  to  Oabul.  It  is  a  great  satisfaction  to  me 
to  think  that  at  present,  at  any  rate,  no  officers  will  be  required  to  remain  at  Cabul, 
and  that  all  the  Political  Officers  I  see  around  me  will  return  to  India  with  the  troops. 
Bat  I  feel  quite  sure  if  the  decision  had  been  otherwise,  officers  would  have  been  found 
to  accept  the  dangerous  post,  either  officers  of  the  civil  service,  or  amongst  those 
military  politicals  who  have  gained  for  themselves  a  reputation  on  the  frontier  and 
other  parts  of  India.*' 


Th^  ^^^'^e^ing  wf^n  thn  lunti  nf  ni,T  Irtters  from  Sherpar^^aa-on 
the  8th  of  August  I  joined  the  force  destined  for  Cani^ftViar. 
Accordingly,  I  will  here  briefly  summarize  the  eyents  which 
occurred  at  Cabul  after  the  march  upon  Candaharhad  been  begun. 
The  force  left  in  Sherpur  and  in  the  fortifications  about  Cabul 
were  the  2nd  Division  under  the  Command  of  Major-General 
Hills.  _  ^hey  were  brigaded  as  follows : — 
Tst  Brigade.— General  C.  Gough— 9th  Foot,  28th  Punjab  Native 
Infantry,  45tli  Sikhs. 

2nd  Brigade. — General  Hughes — 59th  Foot,  8rd  Ghoorkas,  19th 
Ptinjat)  Native  Infantry. 

8rd  Brigade. — Genetal  Daunt — 67th  Foot,  5th  Punjab  Infantry, 
27th  Punjab  Native  Infantry. 

Cavalry  Brigade.— General  Palliser — 1st  Punjab  Cavalry,  2nd 
Punjab  Cavalry. 

Artillery.— ll-ll  R.A..  and  G-4  R.A. 

With  camp-followers  and  servants  there  were  about  20,0Q0  men 
in  flie  ©Tvision.  tSlr  Donald  Stewart  waited  .nnlil  Sir  Frederick 
Hbbei-ts  had  entered  the  Upper  Logar  Valley  and  heliographic 
communication  had  ceased  before  giving  the  order  to  evacuate 
Sherpur,  The  troops  were  all  under  canvas  ready  to  file  out  at 
a  moment's  notice.  The  following  extract  from  a  letter  written 
by  a  trustworthy  correspondent  will  give  an  exact  idea  of  the  aotual 
evacuation: — 


Another  Leave-taking.  455 

"BuTKHAK,  lltA  August. 

**  Late  in  the  eveniog  of  the  10th  instant  arrangements  were 
finally  concluded  for  lujjnliii'fiiMv  Imfiwynn  |[i« 'n'^p;htiAaa  ^^a  Amir 
Abdnr  Rahman  Khan  and  the  Brit""}}  |'f|prf«^*^^*»^^'-'>^°  ^r%  riab];]^ 
whetner  a  mdetlngconld  be  arranged  was  doubtful,  I  understand, 
up  to  nearly  nine  o'clock;  and  if  it  had  not  taken  place,  Sir 
Donald  Stewart  would  have  had  to  forego  the  pleasure  of  seeing 
the  Amir  whom  his  efforts  have  done  so  much  towards  placing  on 
the  throne  of  Cabul.  But  good  fortune  favoured  Sir  Donald. 
The  camp  of  the  Amir  had  been  moved  during  the  morning  of 
the  10th  to  Deh  Gopak,  a  small  secluded  village  about  three  miles 
from,  and  within  easy  sight  of,  the  Sherpur  cantonments.  Prior 
to  this,  the  camp  had  been  at  Eila  Murad  Beg,  six  miles  from 
Gabul,  and  on  the  other  side  of  the  first  low  range  of  hills  beyond 
the  lake.  His  Highness  did  not,  however,  arrive  at  Deh  Gopak  till 
eight  o'clock  in  the  evening ;  and  here  he  was  agreeably  surprised 
to  find  Sirdar  Mahomed  Afzul  Khan  waiting  for  him.  This  dis- 
tinguished gentleman,  who,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  the  lead- 
ing member  of  the  Mission  to  Turkistan  at  the  beginning  of 
negotiations  with  Abdur  Rahman,  had  been  fitly  selected  as  the 
bearer  of  the  Government  presents  to  the  Amir.  They  consisted 
of  a  handsome  grey  English  horse,  a  rifle,  a  pair  of  pistols  i^nd  a 
gold  watch.  The  Sirdar  arrived  at  Deh  Gopak  about  six  o'clock, 
and  had  to  wait  two  hours  before  the  Amir  arrived.'  He  was 
greatly  pleased  with  the  presents ;  insisted  on  the  Sirdar's  dining 
with  him ;  presented  him  with  a  Kashmir  shawl  and  a  few  other 
articles  of  dress ;  and  on  dismissing  him  sent  a  message  to  the 
efiidct  that  he  would  be  glad  to  meet  the  British  officers  at  seven 
o'clock  the  following  morning.  It  will  tlxoB  be  aefiu  that  tka  Amir 
has  got  the  better^  the  abflurd  flnapiclQP**  ^^^^>>  ^^^'  f^^Aj  wailA 
him  bacEmd  in  4ealiug  vith  iWy  bvi  aotaaUjr  Jfid  JbiXBuiCL-tturow 
away  the  food  ^Aftr  wlij^^l^ j^  ntiinilflii  liftrl  mm nlj  piisaiij  fafli  fnnr 
of^ingjoisoned. 

^Before  the  return  of  Mahomed  Afzul  Khan,  a  tent  had  been 
pitched  within  a  couple  of  hundred  yards  of  the  cantonment  walls, 
in  anticipation  of  the  Amir's  consent  to  come  in ;  so  that  though 
the  interview  was  not  decided  upon  till  so  late,  there  was  no  bustle 


456  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

or  confusion.  Sir  Donald  Stewart  and  the  Chief  Political  Officer 
had  moved  under  canvas  in  the  centre  of  the  cantonments,  and  as 
all  tents  and  baggage  had  to  be  ready  to  start  by  6  a.m.,  there  was 
a  weary  period  of  waiting  in  the  open  air,  under  a  sun  sufficiently 
warm  even  at  six  o'clock.  At  a  few  minutes  before  seven  the 
escort  of  Guides'  Cavalry  rode  up;  the  General  mounted,  and 
followed  by  a  string  of  some  thirty  or  forty  officers  approached 
the  tent,  which  was  in  a  field  about  twenty  paces  from  the  road- 
side. As  soon  as  the  British  party  got  outside  the  Head-quarters* 
Gate,  the  A?^%  ^^^  ^^  followers  were  seen  coming  from  the  dppo* 
flffe  direction.  Half  a  mile  in  his  rear  on  the  side  of  a  lilll  were 
a  large  number  of  "his  troops,  both  cavalry  and  infantry TTbut  the 
number  of  followers  with  His  Highness  was  hardlj.puttp  ^^^^^^ 
sixty ;  and  only  two  of  his  sepoys  were  on  sentry  at  the  tent  itself. 
The  two  parties  met  exactly  in  front  of  the  path  leading  to  the 
tent.  Abdur  Rahman  had  with  him  Sirdar  Yusuf  Ehan.  Sir 
Donald  Stewart  was  accompanied  by  Mr.  Lepel  Griffin,  all  the 
rest  standing  at  some  few  yards'  distance.  The  Chief  Political 
Officer  introduced  the  Amir  to  the  Lieutenant-General  as  they 
met;  and  then  walked  towards  the  tent,  followed  by  all  the 
British  officers  present.  There  were  not  more  than  five  chairs. 
His  Highness  occupied  the  centre  seat:  on  his  right  were  Sir 
Donald  Stewart  and  General  Hills ;  on  his  left  Mr.  Griffin.  The 
conversation  was  conducted  in  Persian  by  Mr.  Griffin  on  behalf  of 
the  Lieutenant-General,  His  Highness  having  little  or  no  com- 
mand of  Hindustani.  After  the  usual  formalities  were  concluded 
several  officers  were  introduced  to  the  Amir ;  amongst  others  were 
the  three  Brigadiers  under  Major-General  Hills ;  Colonel  Lockart 
(Chief  of  the  StaflF),  Dr.  Smith  (Chief  Medical  Officer),  Colonel 
Fryer,  Major  Morgan,  Major  Lance,  and  others.  His  Highness  was 
dressed  in  a  drab  suit  of  striped  cloth,  with  his  '  continuations  * 
tucked  into  long  black  boots ;  a  black  Astrakan  cap,  in  which  a 
diamond  star  glittered,  covered  his  head  ;  his  arms  consisted  of  a 
revolver  only,  which  he  carried  in  an  ordinary  waist-belt.  Though 
still  nervous,  I  thought  he  was  less  so  than  on  the  former 
occasions  when  I  saw  him ;  and  all  who  observed  him  were  greatly 
pleased  at  his  appearance.  In  the  course  of  conversation  he  said 
that  his  whole  heart  was  full  of  gratitude  to  the  British,  and  he 


General  Stewart  Marches  for  India.  457 

begged  that  his  best  thapfcg  might  be  conyeyed  to  His  Excellency 
the^Viceroy. '  l^e  interview  was  public  througEoul  f^ilo  busfiess 
was  entered  into  (indeed  it  is  said  that  all  matters  of  business 
were  concluded  at  Mr.  Griffin's  last  meeting  with  the  Amir) ;  and 
we  took  our  leave  in  less  than  a  quarter  of  an  hour.  His  Highness 
shaking  hands  with  all  who  cared  to  wish  him  geod-bye  and  good- 
luck. 

^*  The  Amir  deputed  his  right-hand  man,  Sirdar  Yusuf  Ehan^ 
to  accompany  the  General  out  of  Cabul,  himself  returning  almost 
at  once  to  Deh  Gopak.  The  British  officials  did  not  return  to  the 
cantonmenty  but  went  by  the  road  along  the  outer  wall,  out  by 
Siah  Sung,  and  thence  by  the  main  road  to  Butkhak.  As  we 
rode  along  we  could  see  the  forts  on  Bemaru  already  occupied  by 
small  parties  of  the  Amir's  infantry.  The  Asmai  fort  had  been 
occupied  the  night  before  as  soon  as  our  own  picquets  left  it ;  the 
big  fort  on  Siah  Sung  was  occupied  during  the  day,  as  were  the 
Sherderwaza  and  other  forts.  The  Bala  Hissar  was  taken  over 
by  General  Gholam  Hyder  Ehan,  with  one  regiment  of  infEtntry 
and  about  a  hundred  cavalry.  Sherpur  itself  was  garrisoned  by 
the  Haz  Danari,  a  celebrated  Turkistan  cavalry  regiment,  and 
500  khasidars,  a  force  scarcely  strong  enough  to  defend  any  single 
comer  of  the  huge  cantonment.  The  Amir  on  his  way  back  to 
his  camp  at  Deh  Gopak  was  preceded  by  a  band  of  music,  and  on 
his  arrival  there  received  a  salute  of  thirty-one  guns.  Consider- 
able enthusiasm  was  evinced  among  his  followers ;  for,  incredible 
as  it  may  appear,  there  were  many  of  them  who  haliaTrad  that  the 
Amir  would^l^OAftd^  a  JIA^O^er  by  U£f«  even  up  to  the  last  moment 
oTlhe  intgrggs^  Had  anything  happened.  toTiinV.  tJHeyr  inew 
"Veil  what  would  be  their  fate  with  any  new-comer  who  might  be 
chosen,  and  they  feared  any  mishap  to  the  man  with  whom  they 
had  thro\^  in  th^ir  I0L 

^Up  to  the  present  the  Amir  has  not  made  his  entry  into 
Gabul.  His  nine  years'  residence  in  Russian  territory  has  in  no 
way  removed  or  lessened  his  Oriental  superstition )  and  he  left 
the  choice  of  an  auspicious  hour  and  day  to  the  astrologers,  of 
whom  he  has  several  attached  to  his  court.  The  chief  of  these 
has  named  eleven  o'clock  on  Sunday  next  for  the  public  entry, 
and  has  decreed  that  no  luck  can  attend  the  occasion  unless  His 


458  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

Higbness  wears  an  emerald  ring.  One  is  acoordingly  being 
prepared,  and  the  words  *  Amir  Abdar  Bahman,  1297/  are  to  be 
engraved  on  it.  Meantime  Sirdar  Yasuf  Khan  is  still  carrying 
on  his  duties  as  the  Governor  of  Cabnl.  He  has  established 
pioqaets  on  all  the  approaches  to  the  city,  and  the  passport  system 
is  again  in  fall  swing.  All  went  perfectly  well  the  first  day 
of  our  absence,  and  if  His  Highness  prove  wise  and  conciliatory, 
his  reign  at  Cabal  may,  with  the  support  already  given  him, 
possibly  be  longer  than  that  of  either  of  the  last  two  Amirs.  This 
letter,  however,  purports  to  be  an  account  of  our  evacuation  of 
GabiU,  and  I  must  keep  to  my  subject,  and  not  concern  myself 
with  either  the  present,  past,  or  fature  politics  of  Afghanistan. 

**  The  three  brigades  arrived  at  Butkhak  to-day,  after  a  dusty 
march,  before  noon.  The  first  march  has  been  got  over  without 
a  single  accident  of  any  description,  and  too  great  praise  cannot 
be  bestowed  on  Sir  Donald  Stewart,  on  the  Chief  Political  Officer, 
and  on  the  officers  and  troops  themselves  for  the  excellent  result 
of  their  exertions.  The  country  is  perfectly  quiet,  though  there 
are  plenty  of  marauders  ready  to  drop  on  any  unfortunate 
straggler.  Accompanying  us  to  India  are  a  few  of  the  Cabul  Sirdars, 
including  Wali  Mahomed  Ehan  and  Tahir  Ehan.  Several  Hindu 
merchants  from  the  city  have  also  grasped  the  opportunity  of  our 
march  to  proceed  unmolested  to  India,  as  well  as  two  Khokandi 
pilgrims  travelling  to  Mecca.*' 


The  march  thus  begun  was  carried  out  without  the  lightest 
opposition  on  the  part  of  the  tribesmen  between  Cabul  and^^g^ha- 
'  wur;  and  it  may  be  said  that  not  a  shot  was  fired  after  fiftfeul 
sliad  been  left.  ^  The  heat  was  yery  tidying  in  tb^  JeQalabad  Valley 
and  the  Khyber,  but  the  men  bore  up  bravely,  and  they  had  not 
thto  time  to  fight  a^^ainst  cholera.  It  was  believed  that  GunSunak 
or  Jellalabad  would  be  held  until  General  Koberts  reported  that 
Gandahar  had  been  relieved,  but  the  Indian  Government  were 
anxious  to  get  the  troops  over  the  frontier,  as  the  garrisons  of 
Northern  India  were  very  weak.  Lundi  Kotal,  therefore,  onoe 
more  became  our  outpost  in  North-Eastem  Afghanistan,  and  the 
regiments  composing  General  Hills'  division  were  sent  to  various 


The  Settlement  with  Abdur  Rahman.         459 

stations  in  India,  except  snch  as  were  required  to  hold  the  Ehyber 
posts. 

Regarding  the  arrangements  with  the  Amir :  he  received  thirty 
guns  (chiefly  of  small  calibre) ,  which  we  left  behind  as  in  Sherpnri 
and  19^  lakhs  of  mpees  (£190,500).  Of  this  sum  ten  lakhs 
(£100,000)  were  given  as  an  earnest  of  British  friendship,  and  9^ 
were  "  restored  "  as  merely  belonging  to  the  State.  This  was  the 
sum  seized  in  Yahiya  Ehan's  honse  in  October  1879,  upon  oar 
first  arrival  at  Cabal.  It  was  spent  in  purchasing  sapplies  for  the 
army,  as  oar  treasury  was  nearly  empty  at  that  time.  The  Prize 
Committee  had  regarded  it  as  prize-money,  bat  this  view  was  not 
coantenanced  by  the  Government. 

A  concession  was  made  which  I  strongly  condemned  in  one 
of  my  former  letters ;  the  fortifications  we  had  bailt  aboat  Cabal 
were  not  destroyed.  The  rather  sophistical  reason  given  for  this 
coarse  of  action  was  that  the  Amir  made  many  requests  to  as, 
all  of  which  were  at  first  refused  with  the  exception  of  one  re- 
specting money.  One  request  which  he  urged  with  singular 
pertinacity  was  that  the  forts,  &c.,  we  had  built  mi^t  not  be  _de- 
stroyed.  Again  and  again  he  was  told  his  wish  couT^  not  be 
granted,  but  he  returned  to  the  ch^gfj^jl^ftdjpg  t^^t  V«  prflflligft 
would  be  lowered  in  the  eyes  of  the  peppLei  if  jto.  showad  such 
6pen*3istrusE  of  Ebci  At  the.  coxmft^qeiBpnt.  7'^^  ^^^^Tnmf"^- 
at  last^yielded  to  his  insifltance^  ftnil  wa  ^<^ff.  fTiA  i^^\i  pf  fr>rf.« 
"li^ut  the  city  intact : . they  will  gije  onr  flnldiflrfli  j^rbapfl»  some 
amusement  when  we  return  in  three  or  four  years  to  an]X63U<the 
country.  We  reftased  to  make  any  treaty  with  Abdur  Rahman, 
and  also  to  promise  him  gifts  of  arms  and  ammunition .  in  the. 
future,  but  with  our  rupees  he  should  be  able  to  equip  an  arniy 
pretty  rapidly,  and  to  consolidate  his  power. 


PART    11. 


THE  MAECH  UPON  CANDAHAB  AND  DEFEAT 
OF  SIEDAE  ATUB   KHAN. 


INTRODUCTION. 


The  following  is  a  bare  Bommary  of  the  fiicts  connected  with 
Oeneral  Barrows*  advance  upon  Oirishk,  and  the  defeat  of  his 
brigade  at  Maiwand.  I  have  gone  more  into  the  details  of  the 
defeat  in  letters  written  after  my  arrival  at  Candahar,  my  infor- 
mants being  officers  engaged  in  the  action. 

At  the  end  of  June  1880»  reports,,  which  were  tbongbt  trust- 
worthy, reached  Candahar  that^  As^\  Khan  had  Ifift^. Herat  .early 
in^tfae  month  with  aU  his  troops^  amoontisg  to  elav^wj^giments 
of  infantry,  thirty-six  guns,  and  a  very  large  numbet  of  .^valry, 
regular  and  irregokr.  He  was  said  to  have  told  the  troops  that 
the  EngUsh  had  spent  millions  of  rupees  in  Candahar^  whiph, 
with  all  other  prc^perty  and  the  women  of  the  people  would  be  at 
their  disposal  after  they  had  dmeAimL  .the  EogUsh.  A  strong 
body  oTcavalry  under  the  Luinab,  formerly  Governor  of  Turkis- 
tan,  was  supposed  to  form  Ayub's  advance-guard.  On  July  11th 
it  was  officially  reported  by  the  Oovemment  that  Ayub  Khan's 
army  had  actually  reached  Farrah,  half-way  to  Candahar,  on  June 
80th.  In  the  meantime  the  following  force  under  Brigadier- 
Oeneral  Burrows  had  moved  out  westwards  on  the  Herat 
Eoad:— 

Three  hundred  sabres,  8rd  Bombay  Light  Cavalry,  under  Major 
Currie,  200  sabres,  8rd  Sdnd  Horse,  under  Colonel  Malcolmson, 
six  guns  E-B,  Boyal  Horse  Artillery,  under  Major  Blackwood,  two 


462  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

companies  of  the  1st  Bombay  Gremtdiers,  and  forty  Sappers; 
the  whole  under  the  command  of  Brigadier-General  Nattal,  with 
Major  Hogg  as  Brigade  Major.  The  infiemtry  were : — six  com- 
panies of  the  66th  Begiment  under  Colonel  Ghalbraith,  remainder 
of  the  1st  Grenadiers  under  Colonel  Anderson,  Jacob's  Bifles 
under  Colonel  Main  waring ;  the  whole  under  Brigadier-General 
Burrows,  with  Captain  McMath  as  Brigade  Major  and  Captain 
T.  Harris,  Deputy  Assistant  Quartermaster-General.  Surgeon- 
Major  Edge  and  Surgeon  Earle  were  in  charge  of  the  Field  EEos- 
pital;  Captain  Dobbs  had  charge  of  the  Commissariat;  and 
Lieutenants  G.  S.  Jones  and  E.  E.  M.  Lawford  of  the  Transport. 
Major  Leach,  B.E.,  V.C.,  had  charge  of  a  Survey  party.  The 
force  was  accompanied  by  Colonel  St.  John,  Chief  Political  OflBcer, 
and  the  Nawab  Hasan  Ali  Ehan.  The  Wali  Shore  Ali  Ehan, 
Governor  of  Candahar,  with  a  battery  of  six-pounders  and  a  force 
of  cavalry  and  infantry,  was  at  GUrishk,  on  the  Helmund,  collecting 
supplies  and  watching  the  road  to  Farrah.  General  Burrows 
reached  Ehusk-i-Nakhud  on  July  7th,  and  Girishk  on  July  11th. 
We  found  the  Helmund  Eiver  fordable  everywhere.  On  July  15th 
Shore  Ali's  infantry  mutinied.  His  cavalry  had  reported  Ayub's 
scouts  to  be  within  20  miles,  and  this  fact  caused  great  excitement 
among  his  men.  They  were  encamped  at  Eadanak,  on  the 
bank  of  the  ^Helmund,  General  Burrows'  camp  being  on  the 
eastern  side.  On  Shore  Ali  ordering  his  force  to  retire  from  Camp 
Eadanak  towards  Girishk,  the  infantry  deserted  in  a  body,  taking 
guns,  arms,  and  ammunition,  and  went  off  towards  Zamindawar. 
A  British  force  crossed  the  river  in  pursuit,  overtook  them  at 
Shoraki,  and  completely  dispersed  them,  killing  200,  and  recover- 
ing guns  and  baggage.  Shere  Ali's  cavalry  did  not  share  in  the 
mutiny.  On  July  16th,  General  Burrows  made  a  night  march  to 
Ehusk-i-Nakhud,  some  26  miles  nearer  Candahar,  where  he 
awaited  Ayub's  advance.  By  the  28rd,  the  main  body  of  the 
Herat  army  had  crossed  the  Helmund,  and  encamped  at  Hydera- 
bad, above  Girishk,  and  A%han  caval^  were  seen  pretty  fre- 
quently by  our  reconnoitring  parties.  ^ .  Qz^he  27thy  General 
Bugows  marched  to  Maiwand^to  intercept  Aynb'aj^gay,  and  the^ 
same  day  the  disastrous  action  which  resulted  in  th^  siege  of 
CtuodaJiarTwas"  foughtl     TEe^ritish  loss  was  upwards  of  1,000 


Introduction.  463 


V 


fighting  men  HVLeA^  alone.    The  published  despatches  have  abready 
given  fall  details  of  oar  losses  on  this  occasion,  therefore  I  will  not 
enamerate.    It  was  to  r^li^yft  fifti^^«'^«>^  ^^'^  STrftttltr  ^YM^  JK^"^^'^ 
anny  ^LQetreral  B/^T^^^^^q  »aa  Ar<lArA<l  tn  y^Mo\x  gngthwards  from 
Cabnl.  > 


464  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 


/ 


CHAPTER  I. 

ompontion  of  the  Cabul-Candaliar  Force — ^The  Scale  of  Bqnipmeni — ^Food  Sapplict^ 
BeaBODB  for  ebooaing  the  Logar  Boate  to  Ghaxni— The  March  from  Beni  Hiaar 
to  Zahidabad — Arrival  at  Zerghan  Shahr — Commimicatioii  cut  off  witli  Sir  Donald 
Stewart—The  Transport  of  the  Force— The  Soccen  of  the  March  dependent  upon 
oar  Baggage  Animals— The  Mardi  throngh  Logar  and  the  Shinii  Valley— Flentifol 
Sapplies — ^Arrived  at  Shashgao— Beconnaiasance  over  the  8hei4-I)ahan  Eotal — ^Tbe 
State  of  Ghazni  and  the  Diittrict— An  Obitnaiy  Notice. 

Camp  nbab  Zahidabad^  9t&  August,  1880. 

.Ykszsbday  titefbroe  destined  to  march  to  Caud^bM*  ^UBdei"  ^e 
command  of  Sir  Frederick  Boberts^  left  Sherpur  Cantonments, 
equipped  for  rapid  marching  and  sharp  fighting,  fr'''  ^  ^hfirt^ 
holds  the  supreme  command ;  Hajor-General  John  Boss  commands 
the  whole  of  the  infantry  battalions ;  Brigadier-General  Hugh 
Gongh  the  cavalry ;  and  Colonel  C.  A.  Johnson  Um-  Aftillery. 
Colonel  Perkins  is  commanding  the  Boyal  Engineers;  Colonel 
'Chapman  is  Chief  of  the  StaflF;  Deputy  Surgaon-General  Hanhury, 
Chief  Medical  Officer ;  Colonel  Low,  13th  Boyal  Bengal  Laacers, 
Chief  Director  of  Transport ;  and  Major  Badcock,  Chief  Com- 
missariat Officer.  Major  p^orham,  B.A.,  is  Judge  Advocate,  and 
Captain  Straton,  Si2nd  Foot,  Superintendent  of  Signalling.  The' 
Political  StaflF  consists  of  Major  Hastings;  Chief  Political  Officer; 
Major  Euan  Smithy  Political  Secretary  ;  Major  Protheroe,  and 
Captain  Bidprewfty.  Of  these,  Ma^'or  E^ai]  ^\^hh  Anj^j\nyn§Lr\\fiA 
Sir  Donald  Stewart  in  iiis  march  from  t/an^ajiaiH  and  his  JEnow- 
ledge  of  the  route Ynd  the  tfiBes  about  it  wiU^be  invaluable-  T^a 
— — ^•"^dllowing^^Me  the  troops  now  brigaded : — 

1st  Brigade. — General  Macpherson,  V.C,  C.B. — 92nd  High- 
landers, 2nd  Ghoorkas,  23rd  Pioneers,  24th  P.N.I.,  6-8  B.A. 
(screw-guns). 

2nd  Brigade. — General  Baker,  C.B. — 72nd  Highlanders,  2nd 
Sikhs,  8rd  Sikhs,  5th  Ghoorkas,  No.  2  Mountain  Battery. 


The  Candahar  Army  of  Relief. 


465 
-60th  Rifles, 


8rd  Brigade.— General  Macgregor,  V.C,  C.B.,  &c,- 
16ih  Sikhs,  4th  Ohoorkas,  25th  P.N.I.,  11-9  B.A. 

Cavalry  Brigade. — General  H.    Gough,    V.C. — 9th    Lancers, 
Srd  Bengal  Cavalry,  Srd  Panjab  Cavalry,  Central  India  Horse. 

The  detailed  strength  of  the  force  is  as  follows  :-^ 


Xurupeans. 

NatlTw. 

OfBoers. 

Men. 

6-8  Boyal  Artillery          

11-9  Royal  Artillery        

No.  2  Mountain  Battery 

9th  Lancers          

Srd  Bengal  CaTab7         

Srd  Punjab  Cavalry         

Central  India  Horse         

92nd  Highlanders      

1st         28rd  Pioneers 

Brigade.  ]  24th  Puojab  Infantry 

(2ndGboorka8 

72nd  Highlanders      

2nd         2nd  Sikhs       >       ... 

Brigade.     Srd  Sikhs       

f  6th  Qhoorkaa 

(  2.60tb  lUfles 

Srd      )l5Ui  Sikhs     

Brigade.  J  25th  Punjab  Infantry           a, 

(4thGhoorkas 

Staff  Officers        

6 
6 
6 

19 
7 
9 

11 

19 
8 
7 
7 

2S 
7 
7 
8 

21 

10 
7 
8 

79 

95 
95 

818 
651 
787 
616 

189 
189 
140 

894 
408 
495 

701 
575 
501 

612 
570 
561 

650 
687 
629 

Total 

274 

2,562 

7,151 

This  gives  a  total  of  9,987  fighting  men,  or  for  all  practical 
purposes  say  10,000.  Tjhere  are  about  «,uuu  liMlowers.  We  have 
thus  to  feed  18,000  men  for  three  or  four  weeks,  while  1,977 
chargers,  760  artillery  mules,  and  7,235  transport  animals  have 
also  to  be  provided  for.  The  Amir  sent  in  700  baggage  animals^ 
(yaboos), — a  most  acceptable  gift, — and  has  despatched  his  agents 
into  Logar  to  prepare  the  people  for  our  coming.    He  has.  par- 

♦|^nlarly  «°^Q^  *^«<^  fnygging  purfiPH  mfty  got  be  Bent  nnfc   bfitwgftn 

Cabnl  and  Ghazni^  as  he  believes  that  his  pnw^r  r^y^r  iha  rritQ^''^'] 
ifl  ffTftftt  fi^^"gh  ti)  secure  alT'suppIies  without  trouble.  Once  well 
on  the  march,  we  shalTbe  able  to  test  the  extent  of  his  power  by 
the  willingness  of  such  unruly  clans  as  the  Wardaks  to  bring  in 
com  and  sheep  without  coercion  of  any  kind.      The  Commissariat 

B  B 


466  The  Afghan  War,  1 879— 80. 

^epartcient  are  carrying  for  the  BritiakJjoops  tfla.^ngar.  an4 
_rum  jgrthirty  days,  preserved  meat  for  two  days,  brgad  -stuffs  lo\ 
five  days,  ouu  lbs",  of  army  food.  200  fytlloos  ofjiipe-iarce,  aiid 
air^ySftsMglpreserved  vegetables  jire  also^^being  jarried.  Sheep 
for  ten  days  are  being  driven  with  the  force.  The  scale  of  baggage 
is  very  low,  of  necessity.  Each  British  officer  is  allowed  one 
male>  on  which  his  tent  and  his  kit  have  to  be  packed ;  bat  as 
arrangements  have  generally  been  made  to  "  doable  up  " — i.e.  two 
officers  to  sleep  in  one  tent — ^the  allowance  is  quite  enough.  The 
allowance  for  efiicfa  British  soldier,  as  kit  and  equipage,  is  SOlbs.,  and 
for  each  native  201bs. 

Prior  to  our  moving  out  all  was  hurry  and  confusion  in  Sherpur 
— not  a  confusion  resulting  from  indecision  and  conflicting  orders, 
\  but  rather  that  exciting  rush  of  work  which  follows  sudden  orders 
to  reduce  an  army's  equipment.^  Tf  Sir  y.  '^yy\^  y  ^g  jfti^  ^ 
Candahar  in  time  to  be  of  s^y  service  to  the  g^urison  big  j|y[jg|op 
must  realty  be  a  flying  column,  able  to  make  forced  marches,  and 
so  mobile  that  the  fighting  of  an  action  in  the  morning  aoalTnot 
necessarily  detain  the  whole  line  twenty-foW ^ htitfrs'.  "^i^  \n^M^ 
thatjhe  troops  may  be  in  the  lightest  marching  order^  their  jgeat- 
""coats  ftTft  hftifijOf  ftarrifid  for  thflm^    ftTi<1    f.liA  rft1ift|  ^jpfl  nfT/^^J^^J^   ig 

"^fBSter  ttian  at  first  sight  appears.  Six  pounds  is  not  ^jjuiiaelf 
a^reavy  weight  for  a  soldier  to  carry,  but  the  rolled  CTeatcoat 
presses  upon  a  man's  chest,  impedes  his  breathing*^  ftT^Jjylfes 
him  hot  and  uncomfortable  on  a  long  march.  The  92nd  High- 
landers have  sold  all  their  greatcoats  except  a  few  for  men  on 
picquet  duty ;  the  Highlanders  are  of  such  physique  that  they  do 
not  dread  the  change  of  temperature  which  we  are  sure  to 
\  experience  when  once  Ghazni  is  reached.  Our  route,  it  will  be 
seen,  \av\A  the  Logar  Valley,  and  not  by  way  of  Argandeh  and 
Maidan  (the  shortest  route).  The  reason  of  the  Logar  Boad  being 
chosen  is  that  supplies  are  plentmii  in  the  viIlages~on  the. j^te. 
The  late  sojourn  InXogar  of  ^ptt^^iI  Hi"i'  fnrr^f  flir^r'  *bt  flm*t 
capabilities  of  tW  icaUcgr  lA  the  uukttttr  4ȣ-^orQ  and  sheep,  and 
the  people  are  only  too  anxious  to  deal  with  us. 

The  order  of  march  yesterday  morning  was : — Cavalry  Brigade 
under  General  Hugh  Gough  to  Charasia;  1st  and  Srd  Brigades 
under  Generals  Macpherson  and  Macgregor  to  Beni  Hissar ;  and 


Preparations  for  the  March.  467 

and  Brigade  under  General  Baker  to  Indikee  by  way  of  the  Deh- 
mazung  Gorge.  Accordingly  the  cantonment  was  fall  of  warlike 
pomp  and  circumstance — chiefly  the  latter — ^from  5  o'clock  in  the 
morning.  All  the  troops  told  off  for  the  Division  were  under 
canvas,  with  their  kit  ready  at  hand,  and  there  remained  nothing 
but  to  strike  tents,  load  up  baggage  animals,  and  march  away  to  a 
merry  quick-step.  Everything  had  been  carefully  prepared,  all 
the  men's  kits  weighed  and  tested  to  a  pound ;  and  with  little 
confusion,  but  much  soldier-like  energy,  thft  Hpe  of  marfih  waa 
formed  in  two  column«,  ^^  ^lifi  ^^°^"°*^'nT1  0^^**^"^  ^ftg""  Ten 
tiiousand  men  of  the  present  garrison  moved  out,  and  tiieir  com- 
rades, who  filed  in  from  Siah  Sung  to  take  their  places,  will 
probably  start  on  the  11th  for  India.  We  are  ^oiny  so  roundaboi^t 
a  road  that  civilization  seems  a  long  way  off ;  our  firiends  are  within 
twenty  days  of  Peshawur,  wnere  tJie  untold  luxuries  of  dak-bun- 
galows and  gharries  begin.  Sir  Donald  Stewart's  march  will,  it 
is  expected,  be  a  very  peaceful  one,  for  the  chief  Ghilzai  leaders 
are  with  the  Amir,  who  has  been  quietly  warned  to  keep  them  with 
him  and  put  of  mischief  until  the  troops  have  got  to  the  east  of 
Gundamak.  What  may  happen  to  Sir  Frederick  Roberts  between  '^ 
Cabal  and  Candahar  no  prophet,  Kafir  or  Mahomedan,  can  venture  n/ 
to  say.  There  may  be  a  most  resolute  opposition  at  Shahjui 
or  nearer  Candahar,  or  the  fanatical  enthusiasm  of  the  ghazis 
who  beat  back  General  Burrows  at  Khusk-i-Nakhud  may  have 
cooled  somewhat,  and  our  army  may  have  only  a  few  scattered 
bands  to  pursue.  How  far  our  pursuit  will  extend,  also,  cannot 
be  foreseen.  If  Ayub  shows  the  white  feather,  shall  we  tamely 
allow  him  to  retain  the  1,200  Snider  and  Martini  rifles,  and  the 
two  Horse  Artillery  guns  he  has  captured?  If  so,  his  wisest 
course  would  be  to  retire  upon  Herat,  raise  and  drill  three  or  four 
regiments,  whom  he  could  arm  with  breech-loaders,  and  in  a 
year  try  his  fortune  again,  avoiding  Candahar  altogether,  but 
striking  for  Cabul  by  way  of  Turkistan  and  Balkh.  There  are 
many  questions  involved  in  this  march  to  Candahar,  and  whispers 
of  "  Herat !  "  are  already  being  heard  in  camp.  Every  step  we 
move  threatens  Abdur  Rahman's  position  in  Cabul,  so  far:  but  ^ 
unlessjre  completely  bwli  Aydl»'i^.pagfii:  oar  nominal ,  Apjr  vill 
liave  a  hard  fight  for  his  kingdom  jiereafier. 

H  H  2 


468  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

Bat  I  have  wandered  ofif  from  oar  march  oat.  General  Baker, 
with  the  72nd  Highlanders,  2nd  and  Srd  Sikhs,  4th  Ghoorkas, 
and  a  Moontaiu  Battery,  reached  Indikee  du;*ing  the  morning, 
while  the  other  two  Brigades  pitched  camp  in  the  fields  beyond 
Beni  Hissar.  The  tail-end  of  a  thanderstorm  laid  the  dast  in 
the  afternoon,  and  when  Sir  F,  Roberts  yode  oyt  in  the  evening  to 
assume  j^Qxaxs^SSOsL^ic^^^ 

fresET^  Sir  Donald.  Ste.wjart».Gmflral  HiHb,  aod  some  of  the^taff 
of  the  new  2nd  Division,  accompanied  Qen^raliBabftrta^  and  ignch 
had  to  be  said  during  the  short  ride.  Some  of  oar  friends,  who 
were  bound  for  Peshawar,  also  came  out  to  camp,  and  hand- 
shakings and  cries  of  ''  good-bye  and  good-luck  "  were  all  the  order 
of  the  evening.  There  were  certain  little  signs  of  seriousness  in 
some  cases,  which  showed  our  errand  was  looked  upon  as  spiced 
with  danger ;  but  in  the  majority  of  instances  the  farewells^  were 
as  loud  an^  ppftny  qq  ani/H/it.Q*  poi»f;r.gfl  °hnn1fl  b"* 

Sherpur  looked  the  ghost  of  its  former  self  when  we  left  it  in 
the  evening.  The  barracks  of  the  south-western  end  were  nearly 
all  empty ;  there  were  no  figures  visible  beyond  those  of  Cabuli 
chiffonniers,  intent  upon  looting  everything,  from  old  tin  cans  to 
charpoya  and  newspapers ;  and,  saddest  of  all,  our  well-beloved 
Club  was  no  more.  The  walls  were  still  standing  in  skeleton  bare- 
ness, but  the  large  tent  which  had  seen  many  a  genial  rubber 
played,  and  heard  many  a  quip  and  crank—"  bar-made  jokes  *'  we 
call  them — over  good  wholesome  liquor,  was  a  prey  to  the  Afghan. 
It  had  been  bought  for  a  song,  equally  with  the  "  fittings  "  and 
spare  stores,  and  was  being  carried  ofif  to  the  city.  How  we 
have  hated  our  sojourn  in  Afghanistan  of  late,  when,  the  hot 
weather  found  matters  not  yet  settled,  only  the  record  of  our 
curses,  an*  it  be  kept,  can  never  reveal.  The  bare,  brown  hills 
of  Bemaru  and  the.  higher  ranges  about  had  grown  so  wearisome 
i  I  our  sight  that  we  bore  with  philosophy  the  dust-storms  which 
visited  us  daily :  they  hid  the  hated  landscape  for  a  time,  and 
made  us  forget  everything  but  the  dust  in  our  eyes  and  the  dry- 
nass  of  our  throats.  Sherpur  is  not  a  "  desirable  place  of  resi- 
dence," although  it  has  had  its  pleasures  and  fortunes,  which  I 
liave  faithfully  chronicled ;  and  can  we  be  blamed  for  shaking  its 
dust  from  our  feet  with  unholy  joy,  even  though  we  know  that 


The  Departure.  '^  469 

many  a  weary  mile  lies  between  Cabul  and  the  Sibi  Bailway  ? 
Last  night  General  Boberts  issued  an  order  to  the  troops  which 
stirred  our  blood  a  little,  for  if  Candahar  and  Ehelat-i-Ghilzai 
have  really  to  be  relieved,  there  may  be  some  pretty  work  cut  out 
for  us.     The  order  was  as  follows : — 

"  It  has  been  dprnrlfid  by  <|bfl  anvflmyy^flpt  ftf  ^P^jft  \W'  ^  ^^^'^ 
shall  proceed  rith  nV  p^n"^'^^"  ^nipriV^  froTTl  ^ln^n1  * — —-^r 
^elati-GhlLsai  and  Caadahar  -laB-.tha  inliaf  nf  tbo  British 
garrison  in  those  plac.ea»  liow  thiflfttoadi  >by-^togft  Afghsn  aryny 
linder  the  leadership,  of  Sirdar,  Mahomed ,  AtoJ^J^JjI^j^  Sir 
Frederick  Eoberts  feels  sure  that  the  troops  placed  under  his 
command  for  this  important  duty  will  cheerfully  respond  to  the 
call  made  upon  them,  notwithstanding  the  privations  and  hard- 
ships inseparable  from  a  long  march  through  a  hostile  country. 
The  Lieutenant-Genei^l  wishes  to  impress  on  both  officers  and 
men  the  necessity  of  preserving  the  same  strict  discipline  which 
has  been  so  successfully  and  uniformly  maintained  since  the 
commencement  of  the  war,  and  to  treat  all  the  people  who  may  be 
well  disposed  towards  the  British  with  justice  and  forbearance. 
Sir  Frederick  Boberts  looks  confidently  fprward_  to  jyi^SUfilifiCMsful 
accomplishment  of  the  object  of  the  expedition,  convinced  as  he 
!s  that,,  all  ranks  are  animated  with  the  jjroudfeelingjjjiat  to 
them  is  entrusted  the  duty  and  privilege  of  relieiyipg  their 
fellow- soldiers  and  restoring  the  prestige  of  the^BiiiislJarmy." 

"We  are  not  letting  the  grass  grow  under  our  feet,  for  we  have 
only  mule  and  pony  carnage,  and  our  progress  is  not  delayed  by 
camels  or  bullocks  persistently  casting  their  loads.  To-day  we 
have  marched  (that  is  the  1st  and  Srd  Brigades,  and  Divisional 
Head-Quarters)  about  14  miles,  while  General  Baker,  who  is 
encamped  higher  up  the  Logar,  must  have  done  16  or  17.  To- 
morrow the  whole  force  crosses  the  river,  and  then  we  shall  push 
on  for  Ghazni,  which  we  hope  to  reach  in  four  or  five  days.  This 
will,  in  all  likelihood,  be  the  last  letter  which  I  can  hope  to  get 
through,  though  runners  may  try  to  reach  Sir  Donald  Stewart  as 
he  retires  upon  Gundamak.  The  troops  are  all  very  fit,  and 
march  splendidly;  the  mornings  are  cold  and  bracing;  while 
during  the  day  a  cool  wind  prevents  the  sun  from  makmg  itself 
felt.    We  shall  have  a  most  enjoyable  march  for  the  next  few 


470  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

days  so  far  as  climate  is  concerned,  and  we  liope  for  the  best  in 
the  matter  of  supplies.  To-day  they  are  coming  in  very  fairly. 
The  moollah,  Abdurrahim,  the  eldest  son  of  Mushk-i-Alam,  who  is 
accompanying  the  force,  has  been  created  Ehan-ul-Alam,  or  chief 
mooUah,  by  the  Amir.  This  appointment  has  had  a  good  effect, 
and  Mushk-i-Alam  with  his  party  is  reported  to  be  proceeding  to 
join  the  Amir.* 

Zerghun  Shahr,  10th  Awgust, 

J]a-day  we  look  ripon  p-s  the  last  we  shall  be  in  communication 
withfiabul,  and  consequently  with  India :  but  we  ai'(^  llOt  in  iBgTfeast 
dnprninnd  thart^j,  iff  TYfl  linin  mir  —'-^  '^^fr^^^^  y\^  «r^d  have  ipade 
.  ^-p  nr,»  m^i*.;\n  ^n  ^^  u  *i.^^^y|yi.i j  ^\^q  diary  of  our  march  should 
be  of  interest,  as  it  is  of  a  kind  not  often  undertaken.  We  have 
cut  ourselves  off"  completely  from  any  supports ;  we  are  self- 
supporting  in  every  sense  of  the  word;  and  we  have  as  our 
objective  point  a  town  nominally  held  by  our  own  troops,  but  which 
may,  before  our  arrival,  be  surrounded  by  an  ar^ny  far  su^assing 
our  own  in  numbers  and  guns.     The  effect  of  the  disastrous  action 

!^t  Khusk-i-Nakhud  will  have  raised  the  whole  cojintry  about 
Candahar  against  us,  and  Afj^ans  never  show  soJ)old  a  front  as 
when  living  on  the  fruits  of  a  victory.  If  Candahar  were  held  in 
force  by  an  unbeaten  army  of  British  soldiers^  we  should  have 
little  to  do  beyond  making  the  best  of  our  way  to  the  place  and 
joining  hands  with  the  garrison ;  there  would  be  little  danger  and 
less  glory  in  such  an  undertaking ;  but  as  it  is  we  are  a  body  of 
10,000  men,  making  forced  marches  Imd  jrot  knowing  froffl  fffiy*^ 
to  day  what  may  be  before  us.  SoliU!^  aa  we  Are  '"mrfh  gf 
Ghazni  we  shall  have  no  anxiety  regarding  supplies,  but  0ijj{§„.we 
ha^-passed  that  fortress  our  very  food  will  have  to  be  sought  for 
at  everj  haBing^-pTace^  and  the  prp£ipect  of  deserted  vi]l«g6a.Mand 
crops  secretly  stored  is  not  a  vex^  ^ocoosagiagf'one.  Sut  it  will  be 
time  enough  to  deal  with  our  diflSculties  when  they  occur,  and  as 
we  are  now  in  the  rich  Logar  VaUey,  where  corn  and  forage  are 
plentiful,  I  will  not  speculate  further  as  to  what  the  marches  to 
Khelat-i-Ghilzai  may  bring  forth.     Our  chief  sour^^  ^^  ftP'^'^ty  in 

*  The  old  fMoUah  kept  his  word  and  took  a  prominent  part  in  the  ceremonies  attend- 
ing Abdar  Rahman's  coronation. 


The  Transpart  Service.  471 

th|^t  flifl   TTf>rftf.   f^pny  ftnil  itff  ^tc^k    ftlliflfl  ypfl^y  not.  (fYf  ^?  fl  fnir 

chance  of  what  the  soldiers  call  **  pjetting  at  them."     That  would 
indeed  be  a  disappointment  too  grievons  to  be  borne. 

The  march  from  Beni  Hissar  to  Zahidabad  was  as  trying  as  any 
we  are  likely  to  have  between  Gabul  and  Ohazni.    The  rear-gnard 
of  General  Macpherson's  Brigade  did  not  reach  camp  until  after 
seyen  o'clock,  having  been  under  arms  for  fourteen  hours,  and 
the  92nd  Highlanders  and  23rd  Pioneers  were  so  tired  and  worn 
out  that  many  threw  themselves  down  in  their  tents  without  energy 
enough  to  take  more  than  ift  mouthful  of  food.   ^  ^iras  not  the 
actual  distance  (16  miles)  which  told  upon  them  so  much  as  the 
long  halts  in  the  sun-while^tbe  baggage  was  being  pushedTorward ; 
while  a  dust-storm  the  whole  afternoon  added  greatly  to  their  dis- 
comfort.   The  sun  is  stronger  than  was  expected^  and  y^  men, 
not  ^eing  yet  ii\ Jijbor^pgb  marching  order,  felt  its  effects  jrather 
lieve'rely.     The  camp  was  pitched  in  the  open  fields  near  where 
"W8*encamped  in  October  last,  when  our  mission  was  to  punish 
Cabul.     Our  force  now  is  nearly  as  strong  again  as  the  old  Cabul 
Field  Force,  "  the  avenging  army  "  as  it  was  termed ;  but  the 
brigades  are  not  yet  united,  the  cavalry  and  General  Baker's 
Brigade  beil^g  a  few  miles  in  advance.     This  is  to  enable  us  to 
march  with  greater  rapidity.    That  rapidity  naturally  depends  upon 
our  transport,  the  marching  power  of  our  men  not  being  a  doubtful 
factor  in  our  calculations.     We  are  nyyvyded  with  mu^e  gp^  ^pony 
carriage,  camels  beinp;  npsuita^e  for  fefgg^  "IftT^-hJPgt  and  I  am 
glaa  to  say  we  Have  an  unusuflly  s^yffy^g  staff  of  transport  officers, 
^^^^^^^Ifli'^riintfT^  ^^  ^^^"'  \\gft^f  ^bo.  ay^.fiSWalJtC.all  the  demands 
"^°^"pnn  thflir  twrnr^^^B^  nr^  eadxuance.    Upon  the  efforts  of 
this  staff  much  will  depend,  as  if  carelessness  were  once  to  creep 
into  the  management  and  care  of  the  animals  a  dead-lock  would 
follow.    In  the  first  campaign  the  stupid  experiment  of  trying  to 
work  camels  without  food  was  tried,  and  the  result,  as  Government 
found  to  its  cost^  was  terrible  failure.    Now,  Sir  Frederick  Boberts 
is  determined  to  try  what  can  be  done  when  the  animals  are  given 
grain  and  forage  with  a  liberal  hand,  and  when  we  have  reached  , 
Candahar  I  will  note  the  result  m  ffti^.  caso;  also.    The  Transport,' 
Staff,  to  which  I,  in  common  with  the  whole  force,  look  with  great' 
confidence,  is  as  follows : — 


472  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

lieatenani-Colonel  Low,  Chief  Director. 

lieatenant  Booth,  Staff  Officer. 

Captain  Wynter,  S8rd  Foot,  General  Transport  Officer. 

Lientenant  Fisher,  10th  Hussars,  Cavalry  Brigade. 

Lieatenant  Wilson,  10th  Hussars,  1st  Brigade. 

C^[)taln  Elliot,  3rd  Bengal  Cavalry,  2nd  Brigade. 

Captain  Macgregor,  44th  Native  Infantry,  Srd  Brigade. 

Lientenant  Robertson,  8th  Foot,  Ordnance  Park. 

Lieutenant  Elverson,  2nd  Qaeen*s,  also  attached  to  3rd  Brigade. 

But  even  this  staff  cannot  ensare  the  service  heing  kept  np  to  its 
present  state  of  efficiency  unless  regimental  commanders  and 
Other  responsible  persons  see  that  orders  are  strictly  carried  ont* 
The  Lieutenant-Oeneral  issued  an  order  at  Zahidabad  reminding 
commanding  officers  of  the  necessity  for  exercising  the  closest 
supervision  over  the  transport  animals.  In  this  General  Boberts 
says  : — *'  The  performance  of  Jong^  and  continuous  matches  such 
as  those  which  will  be  undertaken  by  the  force  can  only  be 
successfully  accomplished  if  the  animals  are  regularly  fed  and  the 
adjustment  of  loads  attended  to.  Becognizing  that  tKe  success  of 
the  undertaking  in  hand  must  depend  upon  the  rapidity  with 
which  Candahar  is  reached,  the  Lieutenant-General  relies  con- 
fidently on  the  exertions  of  all  ranks  to  aid  in  maintaining  the 
transport  animals  in  efficient  condition." 

To-day  the  cavalry  under  General  Hugh  Gough  joined  the  2nd 
Brigade  (72nd  Highlanders,  2nd  and  Srd  Sikhs,  6tb  Ghoorkas, 
and  Swinley's  Mountain  Battery)  on  their  camping-ground  over  the 
Logar  above  Zahidabad,  and  skirted  the  right  bank  of  the  river 
past  Deh-i-Nao  to  the  ground  near  Paza  and  Wazir  Eila,  from 
which  villages  they  drew  their  supplies.  The  1st  and  Srd 
Brigades,  with  General  Boberts's  and  General  Boss's  head-quarters, 
struck  camp  at  three  o'clock,  and  General  Macpherson's  Brigade 
moved  off  first.  The  only  difficulty  was  at  the  bridge  over  the 
Logar;  but  as  the  stream  was  fordable,  the  baggage.  apimalg^Jia? 
no  trouble  in  wading  aflrnss.  General  BobeiJ;a.^alK2]bed  the  brigade 
cross,  and  it  was  pleasant  to  notice  that  tiae  men  seemed  in  the 
best,  of  apiritftr  doiihlinj;  iq>  the  bank  and.  h^rryirg  aliMifi  "°  if 
Candahar  were  onlj:  10  miles  away*  One  company -of  the  23rd 
Pioneers  recognized  the  General,  and  raised  the  Sikh  war-cry  of 
*'  Ouruf  Guru/  FuUeh  Oui-uf*'  Once  the  river  had  been  left 
behind  open  ground  was  reached,  and  after  a  march  of  14  miles 


On  the  March,  473 

camp  was  pitched  a  short  distance  beyond  Zerghnn  Shahr.  Here 
supplies  and  forage  were  obtained  in  abundance,  the  villagers  being 
quite  willing  to  give  all  that  was  required.  The  agents  of  the 
Amir  accompanying  the  force  did  g^ood  work  i  _aiding_tbe 
Political  Officers  in  making  all  smooth  for  the  Commissariat. 


Camp  Shashoao,  14tA  August. 

Wq^ako.  m^m-  wifeiu  mi  «my  mntir  nf  Olmiiii^  iinljJUl.  cavalry 
have  already  reconnoitred  over  the  Sher-i-JQAhan  Pasa^  without 
mieling  an  enemy.     _^yufr  yViftn!fl  iixflufinca.doea  not  .seem  to 

extend  so  fn^  r^^'^^j  ^^^'^^    TTftnln'm    Vhan    ttr^A    lijfl  fnll/^wftiKi    havC 

iteff  southwards,  declaring  ^Vj  hava  ne  wish  ta  fight  the  British, 
I)ut  will  return  wfaffl  lyfi  hftYfl  pSiVgftf!  ifVif\  n** V  pr^parfttion;  for 
tTstruggle  with  Abdur  Bahmap.  Since  my  last  letter  we  have 
made  four  marches,  V^e  halting-places  of  General  Boberts*s  head- 
quarters having  been  Padkhao  Barak  in  Logar,  Amir  Kila  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Tang-i-Wardak,  Takia  in  the  Shiniz  Valley,  and 
Shashgao.  There  has  Potbeen  a  shot  fired,  and  all  our  efforts 
haxQ^^en  C9ncentrated  in  keeping  our  baggage  animals  up  to  their 
wofh)  and  iu.drawftrg  supplies' from  the  country  passed  throggh. 

On  August  11th,  the  1st  and  Srd  Brigades  with  head-quarters 
turned  out  at  2.46  a.m.,  and  moved  off  at  four  o'clock  towards  the 
Baraki  group  of  villages  which  cluster  about  the  Logar  River, 
where  it  turns  to  the  north.  The  brigades  moved  in  parallel 
columns  of  route  across  an  open  stony  plain,  and  the  first  10 
miles  were  made  in  grand  style,  there  being  nothing  to  impede 
the  troops.  Cultivation  was  then  reached,  and  as  the  crops  of 
Indian-corn,  lucerne,  &c.,  were  still  on  the  ground,  much  delay 
occurred  in  getting  the  baggage  along.  The  water  was  cut  off  from 
two  or  three  of  the  deepest  canals,  and  the  road  improved ;  but 
there  was  a  **  nasty  bit "  just  outside  Baraki  Bajan,  where  the 
bed  of  a  tributary  of  the  Logar  had  to  be  crossed.  The  camping- 
ground  was  on  a  ridge,  with  water  close  at  hand,  and  fields  of 
half-grown  Indian-corn,  which  were  bought  up  at  Rs.  60  a  bigah 
and  used  as  forage.  The  2nd  Brigade  and  the  cavalry  were 
encamped  8  miles  away  at  Baraki  Barak,  having  crossed  the  river 
at  Hisarak.    The  Logar  Valley  presented  a  picture  of  fertility 


474  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

perhaps  unequalled  in  Afghanistan.  It  is  well- wooded^  and  the 
irrigation  &om  the  river  is  admirably  carried  out.  On  either 
hand  the  cultivation  extends  for  several  miles,  and  the  villages 
are  surrounded  by  orchards  and  plantations  of  willow  and  other 
trees  for  firewood.  The  number  of  the  people  visible  all  along  the 
line  of  march  showed  the  valley  to  be  thickly  populated.  To  the 
south  the  valley  is  bounded  by  the  barren  Altimour  Range,  shutting 
out  Zurmut,  while  to  the  north-east  are  the  Shutargardan  and  the 
mass  of  mountains  about  it.  Our  faces  were  turned  westwards 
towards  the  Tang-i-Wardak,  the  barrier  of  hills  through  which  that 
Pass  leads  being  overtopped  by  the  more  distant  Pughman  Bauge. 
On  the  12th  the  cavalry  and  General  Baker's  Brigade  had  a  long 
and  trying  march  from  Baraki  Barak,  past  Amir  Kila,  over  the 
Samburak  Eotal  to  Sydabad  in  the  Shiniz  Valley.  This  placed 
them  on  the  direct  Cabul-Ghazni  Boad,  the  Shiniz  Valley  extend-, 
ing  from  the  Sher-i-Dahan  Kotal  to  Sheikhabad.  The  Lieuten- 
ant-General  watched  the  Cavalry  Brigade  pass  Amir  Eila,  and  a 
gallant  show  it  made.  The  horses  looked  in  griand  condition,  the 
Central  India  Horse  seeming  none  the  worse  for  their  hurried 
march  from  Jellalabad.  The  road  was  so  narrow  that  the  baggage 
animals  had  in  many  places  to  go  in  Indian  file,  and,  although  the 
advance-guard  started  at  four  o'clock,  only  part  of  the  cavalry 
baggage  reached  Sydabad.  The  remainder  was  halted  for  the 
night,  just  above  the  Amir  Eila,  near  the  camp  of  the  1st  and  8rd 
Brigades,  which  had  marched  only  nine  miles  from  Padkhao 
Barak.  The  Samburak  Kotal  is  to  the  north  of  the  Tang-i- War- 
dak,  and  is  comparatively  easy ;  but  there  was  only  one  road  over 
it— that  made  by  the  Candahar  Force  in  April  for  the  Horse 
Artillery  and  Field  guns.  A  few  hundred  yards  of  this  road  near 
the  crest  were  so  steep  that  some  of  the  cavalry  ponies  cast  their 
loads ;  but  on  the  transport  officers  going  up  early  on  the  morning 
of  the  18th,  the  baggage  was  found  to  have  been  left  untouched 
by  the  villagers,  and  only  one  pony  was  lying  exhausted  on  the 
road.  General  Macgregor  moved  off  by  way  of  the  Tan^-i-Ww- 
dak  to  Hyder  Ehel,  which  had  been  fixed  as  the  halting-place  of  the 
1st  and  8rd  Brigades ;  and  then  Colonel  Low^  Director  of  Trans- 
port^ saw  to  the  clearing  away  of  the  baggage  of  General  Baker'9 
Brigade.    Fatigue  parties  were  told  off  to  carry  the  loa48  lying 


At  Shashgao.  475 

on  the  road,  to  the  top  of  the  Eotal,  and  then  the  stream  of  moles 
and  ponies  was  set  in  motion.  Working  parties  also  improved 
and  widened  the  road,  and  two  "  diversions  "  were  made  which 
allowed  of  three  lines  of  animals  moving  upwards  at  the  same 
time.  By  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  whole  of  the  baggage 
was  clear  of  the  Eotal ;  only  three  animals  having  had  to  be  aban- 
doned. Tliia  ^11  flhnw  f^  what  fTood  Condition  our  transport  now 
is:  not  a  load  was  left  behind  and  the  regiments  with  General 
BaEer  had  once  more  the  pleasure  of  seeing  their  tents  and  kit. 
The  men  had  bivouacked  at  Sydabad,  and  the  cold  air  of  the  early 
morning  had  been  too  keen  to  be  comfortable.  General  Boberts 
with  head-quarters  joined  the  2nd  Brigade  which  encamped  at 
Takia,  two  miles  beyond  Hyder  Ehel,  the  distance  from  Sydabad 
being  about  12  miles. 

To-day  (August  14th)  the  whole  force  is  concentrated  about 
Shashgao,  within  three  miles  of  the  Sher-i-Dahan  Eotal,  the 
cavalry  and  General  Baker's  brigade  having  marched  fourteen  miles 
from  Takia,  while  the  troops  commanded  by  Generals  Macpherson 
and  Macgregor  have  covered  between  sixteen  and  seventeen.  The 
Shiniz  Valley  is  from  six  to  ten  miles  across,  and  runs  almost  due 
north  and  south.  High  rolling  hills  rise  gradually  on  either  side, 
and  there  is  a  gentle  rise  from  about  7,000  feet  above  sea  level 
at  Sydabad  to  8,000  feet  at  Shashgao,  where  we  are  now  encamped. 
There  is  only  a  narrow  strip  of  cultivation  about  the  river,  and 
scarcely  any  trees  after  Takia  is  left.  The  villages  are  all  strongly 
fortified,  each  consisting  of  a  number  of  walled  enclosures  with 
flanking  buttresses^  These  miniature  forts  are  usually  built  in 
echelon,  and  against  anything  but  artillery  could  make  a  stout 
resistance.  The  Shiniz  is  a  very  small  stream  at  this  season  of 
the  year,  but  there  are  numerous  springs  which  give  an  excellent 
supply  of  water.  Shashgao  is  almost  surrounded  by  a  barren 
stony  plain,  the  cultivation  extending  but  a  mile  or  so  from  the 
village.  On  this  plain  the  whole  of  our  force  is  now  encamped, 
this  being  the  first  time  the  Lieutenant-General  has  had  the  four 
brigades  concentrated.  It^  is  a  huge  encampment,  and  if  Sirdar 
Hashim  Ehan  has  caught  a  glimpse  of  it  he  may  well  be  pardoned 
for  hastening  away  to  Zurmut.  Supplies  have  not  come  in  so  abun- 
dantly as  in  Logar,  the  country  being  much  poorer ;  but  still  good 


ike 

rah 


476  TAe  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

green  forage  has  been  got  for  the  cavalry  and  transport,  and 
enough  food  for  the  troops.  It  should  be  remembered  that  for  the 
last  three  days  we  have  been  in  the  Wardak  country,  and  that  thd 
Wardaks  are  no  great  friends  of  the  new  Amir,  whose  agents 
therefore  we  expected  to  do  little  for  us.  But  the  people  have 
shown  no  hostility,  and  Major  Hastings  and  the  Political  Officers 
have  had  no  difficulty  in  dealing  with  the  malika.  This  is  a  good 
sign,  and  proves  that  Hashim  Khan  has  really  no  party  worthy  of 
name  in  this  district.  To  have  reached  within  one  marfli  ^f 
Ghazni  without  a  sign  of  opposition  of  any  kind  must  convince 
even  the  greatest  alarmist  that  the  eflFect  upon  the  Afghan  mind 
of  Ayub's  victory  has  been  purely  local.  The  whole  country  about 
(Tandahar""may  be  up  in  arms,  but  there  is  no  corresponding  move- 
ment among  the  warlike  population  between  Cabnl  and  Ghazni. 

The  troops  are  improving  in  health  daily,  and  in  spite  of  long 
and  trying  marching  there  4sl  the  best  spirit  aiifiypy  al^  ^anks. 
Men  falling  out  on  the  jnar^h  ara  mouat^jd^on  spare  ponies, 
but  their  lot  is  not  a  cheerful  one^s  they  are  unmercifully 
"  chaffed  "  by  their  comrades,  wboVo  s wmHng'alQDir  wiih  many 
a  cheery  allusion  to  wh&t  is  to  be.^ae  at  £!jn^^ahar.  The 
greatest  anxiety  is  for  plenty  of  wholesome  fightin^'to  reward 
them  for  their  weary  tramp,  and  nothing  would  please  them 
more  than  to  see  the  Sher-i-Dahan  Kotal  covered  with  Afghans 
to-morrow  morning. 

In  the  midst  of  our  new  excitement  relative  to  Gandahar  a 
little  incident  carries  many  of  us  back  to  the  old  days  of 
December,  when  the  Gabul  Field  Force  was  fighting  against 
great  odds  about  Sherpur.  To-night  in  the  Field  Force  orders 
appears  the  following  in  memoriam : — 

**  Lieutenant-General  Sir  F.  Boberts  is  sure  that  all  ranks  of 
the  late  Cabul  Field  Force  will  share  the  regret  he  feels  at 
the  death  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Cleland,  9th  (Queen's  Boyal) 
Lancers.  On  the  11th  December  last,  in  the  Chardeh  Valley, 
this  officer  was  dangerously  wounded  whilst  gallantly  leading  his 
distinguished  regiment  against  the  enemy.  From  the  effects  of 
that  wound  Lieutenant-Colonel  Cleland  died  at  Murree  on  the 
7th  instant,  after  many  months  of  severe  suffering.  By  the  death 
of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Cleland,  Sir  F.  Roberts,  in  common  with  a 


Precautions  in  the  Sher-uDahan.  477 

large  number  of  officers  and  soldiers,  has  lost  a  valued  friend, 
whilst  Her  Majesty's  Army  has  been  deprived  of  the  services  of 
a  most  promising  and  gallant  officer.  The  Lieutenant-General 
desires  to  express  the  deep  sympathy  he  feels  with  the  officers 
and  men  of  the  9th  Lancers  in  the  personal  loss  they  have 
sustained." 


CHAPTER  n. 

The  Advance  tbroogh  the  Sher-i-Da1ian  Pass— The  Tomb  of  Mahmood  at  Rosa— Aniyal 
at  Gbazni— State  of  the  Citadel — A  Miserable-looking  City — Condition  of  the 
Camp-Folloirers—  Splendid  Marching — Losses  bj  the  Eoad— Caralry  Scouts — The 
Battle  field  of  Ahmed  Khel— A  Raid  on  Powindah  Traders  at  Chardeh— News  from 
Khelat-i-Ghiliai  and  Candabar — Makar  to  Panjak:  a  Trjing  March— Sir  P. 
Roberts  and  the  Troops— The  Candabar  Province  entered  at  Shahjui — Helicgraphic 
Communication  with  Kbelat-i-Ghilzai — Relief  of  Colonel  Tanner's  Troops — Disas- 
trous Sortie  at  Candabar— Ayab  Khan  Raises  the  Siege— Cavalry  March  to  Robat — 
Heliographing  with  General  Primrose— General  H.  Gongh  meets  Colonel  Si  John — 
**  In  ToQch  "  of  Ayub  Khan— Diary  of  the  March  from  Cabol. 

Ghazni,  15fA  August^  1880. 
JJ^OTHiNG  oeeurred  to  disturb  ua  last  night  in  our  camping-ground 
at  Shashgao,  and  we  turned  out  as  usual  at  three  o'clock  and  loaded 
up  for  the  day!fl  march.  It  was  well  known  yesterday  ffiat  no 
arrned  gathering  was  at  Ohazni ;  but  in  this  country  no  one  can 
say  what  a  night  may  bring  forth,  and  orders  were  accordingly 
issued  for  the  advance  through  the  Sher-i-Dahan  Pass  to  be  made 
as  if  an  enemy  were  actually  at  hand.  With  between  8,000  and 
9,000  baggage  animals  to  be  guarded,  great  precautions  had  to 
be  taken  to  make  the  line  of  march  as  compact  as  possible,  and 
this  object  was  gained  by  the  following  disposition  : — 

1  Regiment  of  Caralry. 
.  Company  23rd  Pioneers. 


"^2  Guns  No.  2  Mountain  Battery. 

.  Regiment  Infantry  from  Ist  Brigade. 
2.— Remainder  of  1st  Brigade  with  i  gone  No.  2  Mountain  Battery  preceding  6-8  Royal 

Artillery  in  order  of  march. 
C— 2nd  Infantry  Brigade. 

4.— CaTalry  Brigade,  with  the  exception  of  one  troop  attached  to  Srd  Brigade. 
5. — Baggage  Column,  marshalled  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Low. 
6.  — Rear-guard,  eonsisting  of  the  whole  of  8rd  Brigade  with  a  troop  of  Cavalry. 

Owing  to  the  darkness  of  the  morning  and  the  nature  of  the  road 


478  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

it  was  found  necessary  to  modify  this  disposition ;  the  92nd 
Highlanders  went  first,  with  the  Cavalry  Brigade  following,  until 
the  southern  end  of  the  Pass  was  reached,  when  a  squadron  of 
cavalry  trotted  forward  to  reconnoitre  the  country  towards  Ghazni. 

The  Sher-i-Dahan  Pass  might,  from  its  name  (the  lion's  mouth) 
be  expected  to  be  very  formidable,  whereas  it  is  one  of  the  easiest 
in  Afghanistan.  The  rise  from  the  Shashgao  plain  to  the  Eotal  is 
only  400  feet,  and  is  so  gradual  that  it  is  scarcely  noticeable. 
The  road  is  not  at  all  shut  in  for  the  first  2  miles,  the  hills  rolling 
away  on  either  hand  in  easy  undulations.  The  Eotal  is  marked 
on  our  maps  as  9,000  feet  high,  but  it  was  found  by  aneroid 
measurements  to  be  only  8i^60.  The  road  is  sufficiently  broad 
to  allow  of  four  horsemen  riding  abreast,  and  is  in  very  good  order. 
For  about  a  mile  after  the  Kotal  is  crossed  there  is  a  gradual 
descent  and  the  hills  close  in ;  but  they  soon  recede,  and  one 
enters  upon  an  open  plain,  basin-shaped,  in  which  is  a  line  of 
harez  furnishing  water  for  a  few  score  acres  of  cultivation.  The 
road  crosses  the  plain,  and  goes  in  nearly  a  straight  line  up  a 
second  low  Eotal,  from  the  top  of  which  the  Ghazni  plain  is  over- 
looked. The  villages  of  Eila  Hindu  and  Ehodobad  are  seen  on 
the  left ;  Boza  is  directly  in  front ;  while  in  the  distance,  over  a 
mass  of  vegetation,  rises  the  Ghazni  citadel,  the  town  itself  not 
being  visible.  The  Sher-i-Dahan  could  scarcely  be  held  against 
any  large  force,  as  it  can  be  turned  on  either  hand,  all  the  hills 
being  accessible  to  infantry  and  mountain  guns.  There  are  no 
positions  such  as  can  be  held  by  a  few  hundred  men,  as  in  the 
Ehyber,  Shutargardan,  and  Jugdulluck  Passes ;  only  sloping  sides 
of  hills,  many  of  which  horsemen  can  ride  up.  These  hills  are 
as  bare  and  barren  as  Afghan  hills  generally  are,  not  a  tree  being 
seen  for  miles. 

It  was,  therefore,  a  great  relief  to  enter  upon  the  fertile  country 
about  Ohazni  itself.  At  this  season  of  the  year  the  crops  of 
Indian-corn  and  lucerne  grass  cover  the  fields  with  greenness, 
while  the  walled  orchards  surround  the  villages  with  belts  of  foliage, 
promising  shade  and  coolness  most  grateful  to  wearied  men. 
Vineyards  also  abound,  the  ground  being  rich  and  water  plentiful, 
and  delicious  grapes  are  retailed  at  prices  lower  than  in  Cabul 
itself.    A  donkey  load  made  up  of  two  large  baskets,  each  wei^- 


The  Tomb  of  Mahmood.  4^9 

ing  40Ibg.  or  SOIbs.,  cost  as  only  three  rupees  when  oar  advanced 
gaard  was  at  Boza,  though  prices  rose  enormously  as  the  day 
wore  on.  The  troops  passed  by  a  narrow  lane  through  Boza,  the 
outskirts  of  which  are  a  mass  of  vineyards,  while  the  village 
itself  boasts  of  several  high,  well-built  houses  as  well  as  of  the 
tomb  of  Mahmood  of  Ghazni.  A  running  stream  of  pure  water 
pours  through  the  village  and  crosses  the  road  near  the  gate,  and 
about  this  some  hundred  men  were  gathered  to  watch  our  army 
file  past.  Some  of  us  turned  into  Boza,  and  made  our  way  to 
Mahmood's  tomb,  to  which  we  were  directed  with  every  show  of 
eagerness.  It  stands  in  a  walled  garden,  and  there  is  a  rude 
building  about  it  which  probably  serves  as  a  mosque.  In  the 
garden  are  richly-carved  stone  gargoyles  add  images  resembling 
the  Assyrian  bull,  probably  the  spoil  brought  by  Mahmood  to  his 
capital  when  returning  from  some  of  his  successful  expeditions. 
The  tomb  itself  is  still  well  preserved,  the  marble  being  beauti- 
fully polished  and  kept  clear  of  even  a  speck  of  dirt  or  dust.  In 
place  of  the  gates  of  Somnath,  which  Nott  carried  back  to  India 
nearly  forty  years  ago,  are  richly-carved  doors  of  a  wood  made  to 
resemble  sandal  wood,  while  hundreds  of  horseshoes  and  otheif 
tokens  are  nailed  on  the  lintel.  The  tiger-skin  mentioned  by 
Yigne  as  being  the  largest  he  had  ever  seen,  still  hangs  on  the 
wall  Just  outside  the  gate.  Bits  of  rich  carving  and  elaborate 
inscriptions  can  still  be  traced  on  the  walls  of  the  room  built 
about  the  tomb ;  but  there  is  an  air  of  decay  about  everything 
except  the  marble  slabs  of  the  tomb  itself.  These  are  about  8 
feet  long  by  2  in  breadth,  and  are  raised  some  2  feet  above  the 
cracked  stone  flooring.  The  Eiific  inscriptions  are  still  very  well 
preserved.  Particoloured  banners  are  stretched  across  the  roof, 
to  prevent  dust  falling  from  above,  and  a  janitor  sits  stolidly  at 
the  entrance  to  see  that  the  tomb  is  not  desecrated.  The  remains 
of  the  King  who  invaded  India  eleven  times  rest  peacefully  enough 
in  the  picturesque  village  overlooked  by  the  Ghazni  citadel,  but 
glory  has  departed  from  the  neighbouring  city,  once  the  capital 
of  a  most  powerful  kingdom. 

runs  down  fstotsk  the  west  of  the  Sher-i-Dahaa  Pass  and  gjadoally 
loses  itself  in  the  plain.    Two  minars — high  tapering  pillars,  said 


48o  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

to  have  been  built  ages  ago  by  Mahmood — ^mark  the  road  leading 
from  Boza  to  the  Cabal  Gate,  with  which  Dnrand's  name  is  insepa- 
rably connected ;  and  in  the  shade  of  these  piUars^^^^Vedhainck 
Roberts  and  his^  Staff  hft^^^^i  ^^''^^  iyffl,jg^j-rftating8.  Chief  Politi- 

'CaJ^UttlCerrioda^ta  ^^^    mfo^^l    i^    Krinpf   in    AMnI    ^«MJn'f(.  wT^o 

is  nominally  acting  as  Governor  of  the  city  \r\  thflt^y  trnnblong 
"H^^  That  worthy  presently  appeared  with  a  score  of  mounted 
retainers^  all  more  or  less  ragged  and  disreputable,  and  the  Gene* 
ral  rode  on  to  visit  the  Bala  Hissar  and  the  city  itself.  From  a 
military  point  of  view  the  citadel,  is  badly  .placed^  as  a  knoll  on 
the  spur  of  the  hill  comman4fi  the  btritding  at  a  distance  of  only 
800  yardi.  '  Artillery  on  this  knoll  could  make  the  fortress  quite 
untenable,  while  guna  could  scarcely  be  worked  on  the  walls  in 
the  face  of  rifle-fire  from  breech-loaders,  ^nfi  JitLP  walls  are  by 
no  means  in  the  state  of  ruin  reported  by  Sir  Donald  S|;e\^rt's 
ibrce*  There  are  certainly  two  breaches  on  the  south-western  side, 
Gut  they  could  be  easily  repaired,  and  the  walls  are  so  thick  and 
high  that  to  send  a  storming  party  against  them  would  involve 
heavy  loss  of  life,  and  success  would  be  very  problematical  if  the 
garrison  were  at  all  resolute  in  defence.  The  moat  is  nearly  dry, 
but  an  irrigation  channel  runs  alongside,  from  which  the  water 
could  be  diverted.  A  low  wall,  2  feet  high,  pierced  for  musketry, 
and  with  small  flanking  bastions  on  the  escarp  8  or  10  yards 
above  the  moat,  is  in  utter  ruin ;  but  of  the  main  walls  above,  the 
parapet  only  is  fallen  away,  the  roadway  along  the  top  being  still 
practicable  for  men  lining  it.  An  engineer  officer  gave  it  as  his 
opinion  that  the  Cabul  Bala  Hissar  was  really  in  very  little  better 
repair,  when  we  entered  it  last  October,  than  is  that  of  Ghazni  now. 
The  approach  to  the  Cabul  Gate  is  by  a  road  over  the  moat,  but  the 
gateway  itself  is  hidden  from  view,  as  two  flanking  walls,  88  feet 
high  and  20  yards  in  length,  stretch  out  in  nearly  semicircular 
shape.  Between  these  one  can  only  see  a  few  jards  in  advance, 
until  a  sharp  turn  shows  the  gateway  right  in  front.  There  is 
nothing  distinctive  in  its  appearance ;  it  is  of  the  pattern  common 
in  all  Afghan  forts :  two  high  wooden  doors  opening  inwards,  of 
great  thickness  and  studded  with  iron  bolts.  The  masonry  on 
cither  side  and  above  it  is  blotched  and  scarred  by  time,  but  is 
still  fairly  substantial.    A  drinking  fountain  is  on  the  left,  the 


The  Citadel  at  Ghazni,  481 

water  being  carried  into  the  city  by  a  channel  from  the  hill  above. 
The  immediate  approach  from  outside  is  rather  steep,  bat  is  broad  • 
eifongh  to  admit  a  regiment  marching  up  in  fours.  ^ A  crowd  of 
curiojUuaLi%6U&.  hlofekftd  tba .  gatawa^y  \im^-  4Ji^  -gwwtity  gft»e-j>ka»  - 
as  we  rode  in.  Immediately  within  the  gate  is  an  open  space 
some  50  J^ds  sqoaxe^  a&d  riaixig.  iaJraai  o  -#  aMWBfl  IQQ^Ieifli 
high  is  the  citadak  Two  well-worn  roads  lead  up  to  it  at  an  angle 
sufficient  to  make  riding  up  rather  difficult.  It  was  down  these 
that  a  swarm  of  swordsmen  rushed  and  cut  up  our  leading  com- 
panies when  Nott  stormed  the  place.  Two  old  field-guns,  ft-poun- 
ders,  were  standing  on  the  left,  mounted  on  carriages  of  very 
recent  make,  while  a  mud  building  with  barricaded  doors  was  said 
to  be  the  '*  magazine  "  and  to  contain  two  nK)re  guns  and  some 
ammunition.  The  interior  approaches  to  the  walls  were  in  bad 
repair ;  but  there  were  pathways  along  them,  and  plenty  of  mate- 
rials in  the  shape  of  sun-dried  mud  and  debris  to  build  a  new 
parapet. 

nnn/IH^^  lijr  A,Mnl  ffnaftbirl  who,  l^y  ^^  yr^Yi  is  feMfT.i^^ 
strong  liqn^^  til)ffr  1  tiHIfir  H*\hnyr^T'^  ^\^^r^!K  \^  c;;j^»  T?^  gnKftrta 
°?^finirrift  twfflntjr  nffinrrr  rH^  np  tr-  ^hf  citad.eU/w^^i<^h>  wag^.jtmg^ 
quitedgglQfiUd.  It  is  rectangular  in  shape,  and  has  only  one 
gateway  facing  towards  Boza,  the  mound  on  which  it  stands  fall- 
ing down  on  the  other  sides  almost  perpendicularly.  The  walls 
are  thirty  feet  high,  and  are  built  of  brick  and  mud,  each  of  the 
four  comers  boasting  of  embattled  towers,  which  at  a  distance 
seem  very  imposing.  The  eastern  half  overlooking  the  city  has 
been  built  within  the  last  few  years,  and  has  some  pretenrion  to 
architecture,  but  the  westeiii  section  is  just  as  it  stood  in  1840-41. 
An  open  courtyard  is  entered  after  the  narrow  gateway  has 
been  passed,  and  two  tiers  of  rooms  look  down  upcm  the 
blank  space  below,  which  shows  no  signs  of  being  the  keep  of  a 
citadel.  Abdul  Beschid  explained  that  in  the  old  rooms  on  the 
right  the  English  prisoners  were  confined,  while  the  Governor 
always  lived  in  the  new  quarters  commanding  the  city.  Into  these 
we  accordingly  went,  and  from  the  upper  rooms  a  grand  view 
was  obtained  of  the  surrounding  country,  thickly  dotted  over  with 
villages  embowered  in  orchards  and  vineyards.  One  could  appre- 
ciate the  fertility  of  the  Qhazni  province  at  cmce,  and  our  hopes  of 

I  I 


482  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

plentifal  supplies  being  forthcoming  for  the  troops  mounted  high. 
At  oar  feet  lay  Ghazni  itself,  with  its  encircling  ^<^^1h>  *^^^  ^  "^/^"^ 
mi8^r8fate-l06kiiJiJ  city  could  scarcelgj»emiagined.  The  "houses" 
are  low  mud  huts,  nearly  all  of  one  story,  and  streets  there 
appeared  to  be  none.  The  24th  P.N.I,  had  marqhed  in  through 
the  Cabul  Gate  directly  in  our  wake,  and  their  band  woke  the 
echoes  of  the  place  right  cheerily  as  we  listened  to  Abdul  Bes- 
chid's  chatter  concerning  Hashim  Ehan  and  young  Mahomed  Ali 
Jan,  who  had  fled  four  days  before — not  in  fear,  but  because  they 
had  no  wish  to  fight  the  British,  their  quarrel  being  with  Abdar 
Rahman  alone.  Presently  we  rode  down  into  the  town,  and 
found  it  as  miserable  as  it  looked  from  above.  There  was  an 
attempt  at  a  covered  bazaar,  the  covering  being  twigs  and  branches 
of  trees  to  afford  shelter  from  the  sun ;  but  the  street  was  so 
narrow  that  we  had  to  go  in  single  file,  and  in  places  one  could 
step  from  shop  to  shop  across  the  roadway  without  effort.  I 
have  called  them  shops  out  of  courtesy,  for  Ghazni  was  once  a 
great  city,  but  they  are  really  wretched  stalls,  in  which  grapes, 
fruit,  corn,  and  attar  are  retailed.  A  few  blacksmiths'  and  shoe- 
makers' shops  were  alone  worthy  of  the  name,  and  after  ten 
minutes'  inspection  we  rode  out  of  Ghazni  by  a  second  gate, 
some  200  yards  distant  from  the  one  by  which  we  had  entered. 
This  gate  was  also  in  fairly  good  order,  and  a  storming  party 
entering  by  it  would  get  entangled  in  the  narrow  streets,  all 
commanded  by  the  citadel  above.  Ghazni,  while  not  so  ruinous 
as  it  has  been  painted,  is  certainly  rapidly  decaying,  and  another 
generation  will  probably  see  it  at  its  lowest  ebb. 

Our  camp  was  pitched  on  a  large  sandy  plain  almost  due  east 
of  the  city,  and  to-morrow  we  begin  our  march  to  Khelat-i-Ghilzai, 
which  we  hope  to  reach  on  the  28th  or  29th  of  the  month,  the 
rapidity  of  our  movements  depending  now  upon  the  capacity  of 
the  country  to  furnish  forage  for  our  cavalry  and  our  transport 
animals.  The  excitement  known  to  exist  about  Candaharhas 
not  extended  northwards  yet,  and  there  seems  more  interest  in 
Cabul  affairs  consequent  upon  the  accession  of  Abdur  Bahman 
than  in  the  movements  of  Ayub  Ehan.  Supplies  of  grain,  flour 
and  forage  have  been  got  in  abundance  to-day,  and  if  we  could 
only  be  sure  that  the  crops  of  Indian-corn  have  been  sown  about 


Camp-Followers.  483 

the  Tillages  on  the  route  our  prospects  would  be  very  bright.  We 
have  hitherto  got  along  wonderfully  well ;  our  troops  are  getting 
in  better  marching  order  daily,  and  our  transport  animals  having 
been  well  rationed  are  as  fit  for  heavy  and  continuous  work 
as  can  ever  be  expected.  The  disappearance  of  Hashim  Khan 
and  MahQT"^  ^  Jan  proves  that  the  people  have  no  stomach 
for^  fightjm^Jbr  if  the  SirdarP  ^^"^^  Vve  raiged  an  army  in 
this  district  they  would  undoubtedly  have  tried  to  harry  us  on 
the  march^  Our  force  numbers  in  all  over  18,000  men,  soldiers 
and  followers,  and  our  line  must  straggle  a  little  in  spite  of  all 
precautions.  The  weakest  link  in  our  chain  is  the  state  ^.q£  the 
dhoolie-bearers  an'S  foilo^^T  who  lack  the  stamina  of  the  sepoys, 
and  are  left  more  to  their  own  resources  than  men  under  strict 
regimental  discipline.  Dr.  Hanbury,  Chief  Medical  Officer,  is 
doing  all  he  can  to  keep  the  kahars  in  health,  and  as  ghee  is  not 
obtainable  he  has  procured  the  issue  of  a  small  meat  ration  to  all 
followers.  The  quantity  will  be  increased  if  sheep  can  be  got  at 
the  villages,  and  under  this  system  break-downs  are  likely  to  be 
reduced  to  a  minimum.  To  avoid  placing  in  dhooUes  men  who  are 
only  foot-sore.  Colonel  Low  is  buying  up  all  the  donkeys  he  can 
find,  and  on  these  such  men  will  be  carried  until  they  are  again 
able  to  walk.  There  is  really  no  sickness  in  the  force,  except 
mild  forms  of  fever  and  diarrhoea,  from  which  men  are  detained 
in  hospital  only  a  few  days.  No  messengers  have  as  yet  arrived 
from  Ehelat-i-Ghilzai,  but  we  expect  to  receive  letters  in  a  few 
days. 

Camp  Khelat-i-Ghilzai,  28rd  August. 

To-day  is  the  fifteenth  from  Cai^l^  andthe  eighth  from  Ghazni, 

and  so  HulSix  JE  Bnhflrtig.i  matrh  iiftS  been  most  successful.  '  We 

have  i»Ay|^p  fhrATigli  m^  aodooiy'a  fA'?itry  without    any  show  of 

opposition  being  made,  and  the  merit  of  the  march  is  therefore 

'itsjttnejualled  rapidity.  Froax-  .fihJBiyjji  .  we^ave  ciovered  136 
Siles  in  eight  days,  giving  an  aver^igj^  of  17  miles  per  day,  con- 
tinnoTig  mfirfhinfr;  while,  Uking  Beni  Hissar  as  our  starting 
pointj  we  have  done  236  miles  in  fifteen  days^  or  on  an  average 
16*7  miles  per  d§y.  Y9T  ^  r^fi"^^^*^^  «^1»"ft  tn  an  f.liiR  wnnl/1  imt 
Be  extr^flf(1i"fti7r  bttfc  £os  ^  hn%  numhnring  1P,A^,^  "^TJlfiuVit^ 

•"""^  I  I  2 


484  The  Afghan  War,   1879—80. 

between  8,000  and  9«0Q0  bftSgage  animals,  to  cover  thk^isiance 
^without  a  day's  halt,  is  a  feat  in  marching  which  is  perhaps  un- 
jjjjftUgd.  Sir  F.  Koberts's  march  upon  Cabul  last  year  proved  what 
can  be  done  by  a  determined  General  in  the  face  of  enormons 
difficulties,  but  our  present  work  is  a  more  remarkable  achieve- 
ment ;  and  even  if  there  should  be  no  second  Charasia  at  the  end 
both  officers  and  men  will  have  deserved  well  of  their  country. 
"When  there  is  no  butcher's  bill  there  is  a  tendency  to  underrate 
the  importance  of  military  movements ;  but  it  is  to  be  hoped 
there  will  be  little  detraction  in  regard  to  the  relief  of  Candahar. 
>.Only  those  who  have  shared  in  the  march  caq  f^rm  ^n  \A(^  nftbA 
discomfort  and  hardship  involved]  and  I,  as  a  non-combatant, 
with  no  one  but  myself  to  take  care  of,Tiave  nad  many  opportuni- 
ties  of  seeing  how  splendidly  the  men  have  behaved,  and  how 
officers  have  not  spared  themselves  in  carrying  out  the  orders  of 
the  General  directing  the  movement.  The  regiments  forming  the 
fighting  line  have,  after  marching  for  eight  hours,  often  through 
sandy  soil  or  over  rough  ground,  to  furnish  on  arrival  at  camp 
parties  for  all  kinds  of  duty;  one  party  for  wood,  ^rUhpc^jor 
bhoos^nd  green  forage,  a  third  for  guards,  while  sentry-go  and 
picquet  duty  at  night  have  allowed  what  is  technically  known  as 
only  "  three  nights  in  bed."  Then  the  rear-guard  work  has  been 
tenibly  heavy:  regiments  on  this  duty  reach  camp  sometimes 
as  late  as  nine  o'clock,  having  been  under  arms  since  four  o'clock 
in  the  early  morning.  The  next  day's  march  begins  at  4  a.m., 
and  the  men  have  had  to  turn  out  at  reveille  (2.45  a.m.),  load  up 
their  baggage  animals,  and  fall  in  as  if  they  had  enjoyed  a  long 
night's  rest.  The  nights  have  luckily  been  deliciously  cool,  and  the 
early  mornings  even  bitterly  cold ;  but  two  hours  after  sunrise  the 
heat  makes  itself  felt,  and  from  eight  o'clock  until  four  the  son 
beats  down  upon  the  open  treeless  country  with  great  fierceness. 
Marching,  one  does  not  feel  it  so  much,  but  in  the  trying  pauses 
when  cast  loads  have  to  be  replaced  upon  broken-down  mules,  and 
when  waiting  in  camp  for  the  tents  to  come  up,  the  heat  punishes 
the  men  fearfully.  Blistered  hands  and  faces  were  common 
enough  during  the  first  days  of  the  march,  and  although  these 
have  come  to  be  little  regarded,  there  remain  that  bodily  exhaus- 
tion and  lassitude  resulting  from  long  exposure  in  the  sun  and  a 


Night  Marches.  485 

short  allowauce  of  sleep  at  night.     Thg,^|jyy;gBMUi&JbUttt^ 
may  be  appreciated  when  I  state  that  the  thtrmoniatftT  M\  JLJj^^ 
registers  45""  in^the  jQi)exw.4uauL..Ai.4^-£«UMj|Qg^^]^,J^ 
tgnlT  y[\\  tlin  Innt  firn  mnrnhnn  rrn  hrY(n  tnrnfiil  ^"^  ft^i  1  AiMt^lM 
marched  at  2.80,  in  order  to  get  the  main  body  into  camp  early  m 
the  aaj[,  and  as  we  have  had  a  bright  moon  to  Iighl  up  the  road, 
^e  marching  has  bpen  excellent.     The  rear-guard  gets  in  by  about 
ttree  o'clock  in  ^^^^jftfimrr^T^i  nnTTJ^e^^roopa  have  ample  time  to 
preparelEeirlfoQd  hft&MKfl  **4nrniTig  inZl.&tJialf-past  seffn. 

^it  is  ^"V  fnr  nn  tf  °ti  M  ^"°  Vflfln  p^^^*^^"^  ^^^^^q  ^hn  rnr^  ^"' 

without  liberal  rations  no  men  could  staniLtbft.pOQ^tant  call  upon 
ftretf' powers ;  and  we  taveTbeen  lucky  also  in  getting  plentyof 
green  forage  for  ouf  anffnals.  '  TLe'  vHIagea  whifih  were  d'esened 
^HHflB  Sir  Donald  Stewart  marched  to  Cabul,  we  hJ[J^xg^und,^ll 
fairly  w^^^gQpIed  -y.  *^^  "^^^'^flirfl  hid HWl?  ti^i^  crpjaa  ^|.  lQ4iftn- 
com,  which  we  haye  bftfin  ablQ  tapnygl^g^  f(^i^  ^^^ftflaBa^^  require- 
pfitents.  We  expected  to  find  ^  howling  desert,  whereas  we  have 
"'^tbund  a  strip  of  cultivation,  narrow  enough,  but  still  suflScient  for 
our  needs.  We  could  not  possibly  have  maintained  our  rate  of 
rapid  marching  if  this  had  not  been  so,  for  continuous  work  will 
break  down  the  best  mule  ever  bred  if  the  animal  be  not  properly 
fed.  General  Hugh  Gough's  cavalry  brigade  has  also  been  kept 
up  to  its  e£Boient  state,  and  the  horses  look  nearly  as  fit  as  when 
they  left  Gabul. 

I  have  already  alluded  to  our  followers  as  being  the  greatest 
drag  upon  us,  and  the  kahars  have  undoubtedly  had  a  struggle  to  ' 
keep  up.  They  are  such  fatalists  that  they  believe  it  is  part  of 
their  kismut  to  wander  off  the  road  into  obscure  nullahs,  there  to 
fall  asleep,  and  take  tl^e  risk  of  being  cut  up  by  Afghans.  Of  late 
the  troops  of  cavalry  forming  the  rear-guard  have  quartered  the 
country  like  beaters  at  a  tiger  hunt,  and  the  sleeping  kahars  have 
been  rudely  wakened  and  brought  along.  Baggage  animals  with 
sore  backs  have  been  utilized  for  carrying  the  poor  wretches  into 
camp,  a  mule  gone  in  the  withers  bei^ig  quite  equal  to  bearing  a 
man  astride  his  back.  Wonderful  to  say,  men  wtragglA  jj^\p  fifimp 
long  after  "^^*^"^g¥i,  nnfftt^^^  ^"^  r^rfi>/>fiy  o^if-Qofi'ofi^^  "Y]^^ 
trSvelBnjojed  tl^..fllM49L.m.i)hacu]:e  ravinefi^and  hMfiu^hfixuxe- 
Tumed  theit  mArch  as  if  in  *  ^^^^^ly  "W^nntirTi  _^,°^^  ^^  ^^^1^ 


486  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

tell  strange  stories  of  havjpig  been  stripped  by  AjGg;]2^s  and  then 
allowed  to  escape ;  but  these  are  Mahomedans  who  have  claimed 
WHbwship  In" "religion  with  the  tribesmen.  Our  actual  loss  in 
dead  and  missing  since  we  left  Cabul  is,  I  beUeve,  as  follows  : — 
Died — Europeans,  one;  sepoys,  four;  kahars,  five;  followers, 
five ;  missing — forty-three.  Of  the  men  who  have  died,  one 
private  of  the  72nd  and  one  sepoy  of  the  23rd  Pioneers  committed 
suicide :  three  sepoys  died  from  obstruction  of  the  bowels  caused 
by  eating  unripe  Indian-corn,  and  then  drinking  large  quantities 
of  water.  Of  the  missing  many  are  known  to  have  been  kahars 
trying  to  get  to  the  Khyber  line,  and  Hazara  syces  who  have  gone 
to  their  own  country.  There  were  494  soldiers  in  hospital  on  the 
24th  August. 

Regarding  our  transport,  we  have  at  work  now  2,664  yahoos  and 
ponies,  as  against  2,919  when  we  left  Cabul;  4,426  mules  as 
against  4,509 ;  934  donkeys  as  against  929 ;  and  150  camels. 
Many  of  the  donkeys  and  all  the  camels  have  been  obtained  on 
the  road.  Our  total  transport  now  consists  of  8,174  animals  of 
all  kinds,  while  the  IChelat-i-Ghilzai  garrison  will  furnish  801 
camels,  132  mules,  ten  ponies,  and  265  donkeys.  The  garrison 
is  made  up  of  two  companies  of  the  66th  (141  men),  the  2nd 
Beluchis  (675),  squadron  3rd  Scind  Horse  (107  sabres),  with  two 
guns  of  C-2  R.A.  (forty-seven  men),  two  medical  officers,  one 
commissariat  officer,  and  various  details,  amounting  in  all  to  a 
total  of  1,006  men.  They  have  stored  in  the  fort  a  large  quan- 
tity of  tinned  meat  and  soups,  attar,  com,  and  bhoosa,  which  will 
be  a  most  welcome  addition  to  our  stores.  To-day,  also,  a  wing 
of  the  Beluchis  have  moved  out  to  Jaldak,  our  next  stage,  where 
they  will  collect  supplies  for  the  force.  We  are  to  halt  here  to- 
morrow to  give  men  and  animals  a  short  rest. 

Having  summarized  some  of  our  difficulties  and  drawn 
attention  to  the  merits  of  the  march,  considered  apart  from  its 
ultimate  ending,  I  will  now  give  in  detail  the  stages  marched  from 
day  to  day  and  the  actual  distances  covered.  c)n  August  12th  we 
left  Ghazni  and  marched  to  Yergatta/ just  past  the  battlefield  of 
Ahmed  Khel — 20  good  miles.  The  brigades  got  into  motion  at 
4  A.M.,  and  the  cavalry  began  the  work  which  they  have  since 
performed  daily,  and  which  I  will   now  allude  to   once  for  all. 


Cavalry  Scouts.  487 

They  were  spread  out  all  across  the  valley^  and  worked 
steadily  along,  examining  every  yard  of  ground  and  feeling  for 
an  enemy  who  has  never  yet  shown  himself.  A  bright  moon 
favoured  their  movements,  and  when  one  got  a  little  ahead  of  the 
infantry  it  was  a  weird  sight  to  see  a  chain  of  phantom-like  men 
and  horses  stretching  away  on  either  lutnA^^atj]  |pf^f,  in  fT>A  t^ojAj 
i4O0Mftg-iBT8t.  Too  high  praise  cannot  be  given  to  General  Hugh 
Gough  and  his  fine  cavalry  brigade  for  the  way  in  which  this 
covering  movement  was  done.  The  infantry  could  march  along 
in  perfect  security  with  the  knowledge  that  some  1,500  troops 
were  in  front  and  on  the  flanks,  that  the  *'  eyes  of  our  army,"  as 
the  Germans  have  it,  were  wide  open.  Sowars,  when  properly 
handled,  make  excellent  Uhlans,  as  they  are  all  light-weights  and 
their  horses  seldom  tire.  Our  more  heavily  accoutred  English 
cavalry  are  of  course  handicapped  at  such  cross-country  work,  but 
the  9th  Lancers  are  so  eager  to  reach  Candahar  and  capture  a  few 
of  Ayub's  guns  that  they  make  light  of  the  burning  sun  and  bitter 
fatigue ;  their  want  of  knowledge  of  the  language  and  habits  of 
the  people  is  more  than  compensated  by  extra  vigilance  and  care  in 
scouting.  The  cavalry  marches  wp.rfl  alwi^R  RPj^rfi]  milflff  Iftpg^r 
than  those  made  by  the  infantry,  hf  mmop  a£  their  oftpstant 
scouting;  while  before  camp  was  pitched-patrola  Wiiirfi  jaofit  .opt .fiJM 
miles  ij^ftdlfrnce  on  reconnoitriujg  duty.  A  troop  was  detailed  da 
to  iu*i.  wjtb  ^"y  iTiffl.nf.ry  jfiflj-guardj  and  tn^  werfi  f\Iwq.y^  Jftst  m^ 
as  they  had  to  sweep  all  straj^  aniqiftls  and  foUoweya  frafflgfi  tibfir^ 
But  for  this  arrangement  many  lives  would  have  been  lost,  as  the 
apathy  of  a  tired  kahar  or  other  follower  is  extraordinary. 

This  first  march  out  at  Ghazni  was  very  trying.  After  passing 
through  the  walled  gardens  about  the  town,  and  turning  to  take  a 
farewell  look  at  the  Bala  Hissar,  most  imposing  when  viewed  from 
the  south,  we  got  into  the  open  country,  and  before  us  was  the 
plain  stretching  right  away  to  Khelat-i-Ghilzai,  with  no  break  in 
its  continuity.  The  hills  which  bound  it  may  send  out  minor 
spurs,  and  the  lower  ranges  on  the  east  between  the  Ghazni  River 
and  the  high  Elhonak  mountains  may  seem  at  times  about  to  close 
in  upon  the  road ;  but  there  is  not  a  kotal  to  be  crossed,  and  the 
valley  is  always  broad  enough  to  allow  of  three  columns  of  route. 

The  characteristics  of  the  country  north  of  Khelat-i-Ghilzai  are 


488  The  Afghan  War,   1879—80. 

very  accurately  detailed  in  ofl&cial  route  books  :  the  villages,  with 
their  orchards  and  patches  of  cultivation,  are  numerous  enough 
for  the  first  few  miles.  They  then  grow  fewer  and  fewer,  and  the 
plain  becomes  a  waste  covered  with  the  damel-th()m  scrub  and 
intersected  by  deep  ravines  running  from  the  foot  of  the  hills  on 
either  side  down  to  the  river  bed.  These  are  formed  by  the 
streams  resulting  from  the  melting  snows,  and  their  banks  are 
so  steep  that  they  are  at  times  formidable  obstacles  to  baggage 
animals.  Streams  of  water,  chiefly  from  karez  sources^  cross  the 
road  at  right-angles  from  time  to  time,  and  near  these  are 
generally  a  few  fields  of  Indian-corn,  lucerne  and  melon  beds. 
In  this  first  march,  for  example,  we  crossed  a  broad  river  bed 
three  miles  south  of  Ghazni,  and  then  got  upon  a  sandy  plain 
which  lasted  almost  as  far  as  Nani,  where  a  number  of  small 
streams  furnish  water  for  the  crops.  Here  an  hour's  halt  was 
fift11<^4  (^hich  only  served  \x\  stiffen  the  menVTand  th^n^lPTrltfiioved 
towards  Ahmed  Khel  over  an  arid  plain  which  led  to  the  rolJiBg 
hills  on  which  Sir  Donald  Sf^.w^yf.  /nnp^tif  ^jg  ftctioAr**TffQ5iing 
could  be  more  desolate  than  the  country  of  Ahmed  Khel  and  the 
battlefield  itself,  but  we  got  water  at  Yergatta,  and  a  few  fields  of 
Indian-corn  for  our  worn-out  animals.  The  scarcity  of  wood  all 
down  the  line  of  march  was  also  a  source  of  constant  trouble — at 
Yergatta  camel-thorn  scrub  having  to  be  collected  and  burned. 
The  order  of  march  from  Ghazni  was:  2nd  and  3rd  Brigades 
leading,  and  Ist  Brigade  (with  troop  of  cavalry)  acting  as  rear- 
guard. The  leading  brigades  marched  in  parallel  columns  of 
route  and  reached  Yergatta  about  8  p.m.  A  temfic  dust-storm 
was  blowing,  and  the  task  of  getting  in  the  baggage  was 
unusually  hard.  The  1st  Brigade  lost  its  way  in  the  storm,  and 
the  rear-guard  did  not  arrive  in  camp  until  long  after  dark.  Men 
and  animals  were  alike  exhausted  by  this  long  march,  the  longest 
save  one  made  on  the  route. 

Such  oflBcers  of  General  Stewart's  force  as  were  with  us 
explained  the  positions  in  the  Ahmed  Khel  action,  and  our 
surprise  was  indeed  great  that  even  ghazis  could  **  rush  "  infantry 
armed  with  ireech-loaders  over  ground  on  which  there  was  not  a 
bit  of  cover.  There  were  between  400  or  500  graves  on  the  battle- 
field showing  where  the  enemy's  dead  had  been  buried :  in  place 


A  Raid  on  Powindah   Traders.  489 

of  headstones  there  were,  in  a  few  cases,  the  scabbard  of  a  sword 
or  knife  sticking  up,  transfixing  a  bloody  cap  or  a  pair  of  old 
shoes  belonging  to  tJie  dead  ghazi.  I  am  sorry  to  say  the  graves 
in  which  onr  dead  werebnried  had  been  torn  open  and  dishonoured. 
On  one  of  the  largest  graves  had  been  found  a  small  piece  of 
paper  tied  to  a  stick.  On  being  unrolled  an  inscription  was 
seen,  stating  that  the  spot  was  sacred  to  the  memory  of  the 
"  martyrs  "  who  had  fallen  in  fight  against  the  English  army— 
the  date  ^ven  was  1297  a.h.  But  for  the  interest  attaching  to 
Ahmed  Khel  our  camp  at  Yergatta  would  have  seemed  doubly 
dreary.  Fortunately  our  animals  had  been  fed  at  the  halting- 
place  at  Nani,  which  somewhat  lessened  the  soldier's  work  when 
camp  was  pitched. 

On  August  17th  a  comparatively  short  march  of  twelve  miles 
was  made  to  Chardeh  by  way  of  Mushaki.  The  previous  day's 
march  had  sorely  tried  our  transport,  but  we  got  in  after  much 
straggling  of  animals  on  the  road.  Sandy  stretches  also  tried 
the  men's  feet  a  good  deal,  numbers  of  sepoys  falling  out  of  the 
ranks  from  foot-soreness.  The  Chardeh  group  of  villages  covers 
a  wide  stretch  of  country,  but  many  of  the  walled  enclosures 
were  deserted,  and  forage  was  di£Bcult  to  get.  Numbers  of 
Powindah  traders  were  seen,  and  there  was  a  little  excitement  in 
the  evening,  thanks  to  these  men.  We  were  anxious  to  hire  or 
purchase  a  number  of  camels  to  aid  our  transport,  and  the 
Powindahs  at  one  large  encampment  promised  to  provide  500  of 
their  beasts.  They  afterwards  refused  to  send  in  even  100,  and 
Colonel  Low,  with  300  men  drawn  from  Macpherson's  brigade, 
surrounded  their  camp  at  dusk.  The  Powindahs  had  hidden  the 
camel-saddles,  and  they  turned  the  camels  loose,  while  the 
women  and  children  rushed  among  the  soldiers,  abusing  them 
heartily  and  making  a  terrific  din.  Some  shots  were  fired  at  the 
Ohoorkas,  who  returned  the  fire,  but  our  officers  prevented  any 
serious  fight.  Lieutenant  Gordon,  of  the  4th  Ghoorkas,  had  a 
narrow  escape  from  being  hamstrung ;  as  he  was  passing  one  of 
the  tents,  a  man  struck  at  his  leg  with  a  knife,  thrusting  it 
out  from  below.  Gordon's  sword  saved  him,  the  knife  cutting 
through  the  scabbard  to  the  steel.  Eventually  150  camels  were 
captured  and  brought  into  our  camp.      On  this  day  we  received 


490  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

our  first  news  from  Khelat-i-Ghilzai,  a  messenger  arriving  with 
a  letter  from  Colonel  Tannef,  2nd  Beluchis,  commanding  the 
garrison.  He  set  our  minds  at  rest  on  several  points,  for  the 
Powindahs  had  alarmed  ns  by  stating  that  Candahar  had  fallen, 
and  the  £lhelat-i-Ghilzai  garrison  were  hard  pressed.  In  place  of 
this  we  learned  that  all  was  well  at  the  latter  place,  the  coontiy 
not  having  risen.  A  letter  from  Cokjel^Stj.iTgJyjiJl^^ 

was  also  ATiAlnfu>>j  ,*^ iffljmrjinrl,  ^AiTig  f^idi  r.on/loKf^^  ya^  g^^mplftf^ly' 

invested,  but  tGat  the  prurriflnn  hail  «"pr]ffi^,iQr,tlffl  f^"^^^,"  aiid 
hlioozdiox  fifteen  days;  15,000  Aft^biana  hAdJjfifift  taCT^-Pfit  of 
tlie  city,  wliich  was  hdd.by  oxkt  troops.    At  ^h*^^^^^  xs\m\  of  the 
Hazaras  who  had  marched  with  us  from  Gabul  left  camp  for  their 
own  country,  which  lay  beyond  the  range  of  hills  on  our  right. 
Our  cavalry  found  about  a  thousand  Hazaras  with   their  horses 
and   cattle  in   a  fort  near  our  camping  ground.      .Their  story 
was  that  they  had  beoa  flhot  up.  since  4£ril_  b;[  Jhe   Afghans, 
who  had    sworn   to   kill  them  for  aiding  Sir.Douald    Stosart. 
They  regarded  us  as  their  delivoMrB,  AMd< mado.it Juudfid^xit 
over  the   hills,  glad  to   escape  while  cy2£.»4UHn)L  .Wfts  _^fil^g 
t)h€M?det.  ■ 
""Dn-August  18th  we  marched  16  miles  to  Oba  Earez,  our  way 
being  Hghted  for  a  mile  by  the  blazing  ruins  of  the  fort  lately 
occupied  by  the  Hazaras,  which  the  Afghan  villagers  had  fired. 
We  could  see  villages  dotted  about  for  the  first  five  or  six  miles, 
and  running  streams  gave  ample  water  for  the  troops ;  but  the 
last  eight  or  nine  miles  was  barren  plain,  with  nothing  growing 
but  camel-thorn ;  not  even  a  stagnant  pool  to  relieve  the  men's 
thirst.     There  is  no  village  at  Oba  Karez,  which  is  merely  a 
halting-place,  where  a  delicious  stream  of  wat-er  from  a  karez 
bursts  out  at  the  foot  of  a  mound  150  feet  high.     A  number  of 
villagers  from  a  distance  had  brought  a  few  supplies  to  this  mound, 
and  also  donkey-loads  of  water-melons,  whicli\)ur  men  fell  upon 
most  ravenously.     The  want  of  water  told  most  of  all  upon  the 
followers,  whose  state  at  times  was  pitiable.     We  camped  about  a 
mile  beyond  the  ka/reZy  near  the  stream  flowing  from  it.     To-day 
we  received  another  letter  from  Khelat-i-Ghilzai,  under  date  18th 
August.    It  was  from  Captain  Yate,  Political  OflScer  with  Colonel 
Tanner.     Captain  Yate  wrote  : — 


News  from  Khelat-i-Ghtlzai,  491 

"  I  send  you  a  copy  of  Colonel  St.  John's  letter  of  8th  August, 
received  yesterday,  our  only  communication  with  the  outer  world 
since  July  26th.  That  letter  will  give  you  all  the  information 
we  possess.  I  shall  be  glad  if  you  will  kindly  send  me  by  the 
return  messenger  a  copy  of  your  route  to  Candahar,  to  enable 
me  to  make  what  arrangements  I  can  for  supplies  along  the 
road.  Everything  is  quiet  about  here  and  down  the  road,  I 
believe,  as  far  as  Shahr-i-Safa  or  Khel-i-Akhund,  and  I  hope  to 
be  able  to  have  bhoosa  and  j9our  stored  ready  at  the  different 
stages.  The  Shahjui  district  has  been  very  unsettled  of  late  owing 
to  the  continued  presence  of  Mahomed  Aslam,  the  Tokhi  Chief, 
but  he,  I  fancy,  will  move  off  as  soon  as  he  hears  of  the  approach 
of  your  force.  Directly  I  know  where  you  are  for  certain  I  will 
send  out  Mahomed  Sadik,  a  friendly  Tokhi  Chief,  who  will  help  to 
get  in  supplies  for  your  force  ....  Yesterday  we  received  letters 
from  Sir  R.  Sandeman  and  Wyllie  at  Quetta,  who  were  anxious 
concerning  our  safety." 

I  quote  this  letter,  as  the  news  that  the  country  was  quiet 
north  of  Candahar  was  very  satisfactory  to  us  in  camp. 


Khelat-i-Ghilzai,  28ri  August. 

On  August  19th  our  eleventh  march  from  Beni  Hissar  was  made 
to  Mukur,  about  16  miles.  When  we  were  at  Ghazni  we  were 
warned  that  a  great  tribal  gathering  would  bar  our  road  at  Mukur ; 
but  the  people  have  not  yet  forgotten  the  action  of  Ahmed  Ehel, 
and  not  an  armed  man  presents  himself  at  any  village  we  visit. 
For  the  first  6  miles  out  of  Oba  Ejirez,  not  a  drop  of  water  was 
found  on  the  camel-thorn  desert.  Our  route  took  us  gradually 
nearer  to  the  range  of  hills  on  the  west,  which  rise  almost  perpen- 
dicularly out  of  the  plain.  The  order  of  march  was  changed,  the 
three  brigades  advancing  abreast  with  their  respective  baggage  in 
rear,  and  a  regiment  of  cavalry  arrayed  on  either  flank.  The 
country  was  so  flat  that  dur  line  extended  for  2  miles,  at  times ; 
and  a  brave  show  was  thus  made  of  our  fighting  strength.  At 
about  the  seventh  mile  we  were  cheered  by  a  line  of  trees  in  the 
far  distance,  showing  where  the  Mukur  villages  were  scattered  on 
the  headwaters  of  the  Tumak  River.    Without  any  perceptible 


492  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

rise  or  fall  we  crossed  the  watershed  of  the  valley,  and  by  noon  onr 
advanced  guard  of  infantry  was  resting  under  the  shade  of  the 
trees  about  a  village  at  the  foot  of  a  hill  700  feet  high,  rising 
sheer  above  the  springs  from  which  the  Tumak  takes  its  rise. 
The  camping-ground  was  on  a  rolling  plain  in  rear  of  the  village, 
and  was  the  best  on  which  we  had  yet  encamped.  Supplies  were 
abundant,  and  we  got  such  luxuries  as  fowls,  eggs,  and  milk  at 
reasonable  rates.  The  villagers  turned  out  in  great  numbers,  and 
were  generally  fine,  handsome  fellows,  good-natured,  but  very 
independent.  "We  had  to  pull  down  a  few  of  their  houses  for 
firewood;  but  as  the  owners  were  paid  handsomely  both  for  the 
wood  and  the  "  ruins,"  they  did  not  lose  their  good  temper,  and 
we  believed  in  the  end  that  similar  terms  would  have  induced  them 
to  pull  down  the  whole  village. 

August  20th  will  always  be  remembered,  by  those  who  survive 
the  operations  now  being  carried  out,  as  a  day  full  of  privation, 
and  calling  for  much  endurance  by  oflScers  and  men.  We  marched 
from  Mukur  to  Panjak,  covering  21  miles  by  the  direct  road. 
Water  was  so  scarce  that  followers  fell  exhausted  on  the  roadside, 
and  we  had  to  send  back  bhistees  with  viussuks  of  water  to  save 
the  kahars  and  others  from  dying  of  thirst.  The  heat  was  greater 
than  ever  in  the  day,  although  in  the  early  morning  the  air  had 
been  bitterly  cold.  One  company  of  a  native  regiment  lay  down 
in  an  irrigation  channel,  the  water  of  which  was  too  muddy  to 
drink.  Not  a  tree  gave  shade  in  any  direction,  and  the  arid  plain 
with  its  scrub-growth  seemed  to  grow  red  hot.  I  do  not  wish  to 
exaggerate  the  sufferings  of  the  army ;  but  it  should  be  counted 
in  our  favour  hereafter  that  we  are  marching  day  after  day 
through  a  half-desolate  land,  with  no  supports  to  fall  back  upon 
in  case  of  disaster,  and  uncertain  of  what  lay  before  us ;  with 
nothing  but  thin  tents  to  shield  us  from  a  sun  which  laughed  to 
scorn  100^  in  the  shade,  and  with  a  water-supply  so  uncertain 
that  we  never  knew  in  the  morning  where  our  camping-ground  in 
the  evening  might  be.  At  Panjak  itself  were  good  villages  be- 
longing to  Aslam  Khan,  the  Tokhi  Chief,  and  we  had  water  and 
supplies  more  than  enough  for  our  force;  but  the  struggle  to  reach 
this  oasis  broke  down  many  a  man  and  beast.  The  troops  were 
rewarded  by  the  issue  of  an  extra  ration  of  rum,  non-drinkers 


/;/  the  Candahar  Province.  493 

recemng  an  extra  meat  ration  ;  and  as  the  heat  had  been  so  trying, 
it  was  debated  whether,  in  future,  reveille  should  not  sound  at 
1  A.M.,  and  the  march  begin  at  2.80  a.m.,  a  bright  moon  favouring 
this  arrangement. 

We  had  again  news  from  Khelat-i-Ghilzai,  and  in  the  evening 
Sir  F.  Roberts  issued  the  following  Divisional  Order  : — 

"  The  Lieutenant-General  has  received  news  from  £lhelat-i- 
Ghilzai,  dated  the  18th  instant.  ^jjijK^jji/jjj^gsJiiiitiimi^^ 
and  the  neighbouring  country  wa8^ilL|^iet.  A  letter  has  been 
ialJor-Vjeneral  Pnayre,  C.B.,  dated  Quetta,  12th 
August,  in  which  he  states  that  he  is  marching  with  a  large  force 
of  cavalry,  artillery,  and  infantry,  British  and  native,  and  expects 
to  reach  Candahar  not  later  than  the  2nd  of  September.  Lieu- 
tenant-General Sir  F.  Roberts  takes  this  opportunity  of  thanking 
the  troops  under  his  command  for  the  admirable  manner  in  which 
they  have  executed  this  march  from  Cabul  hitherto.  If  the  pre- 
sent rate  of  marching  be  continued,  Khelat-i-Ghilzai  should  be 
reached  not  later  than  the  28rd,  and  Candahar  not  later  than  the 
29th.  By  the  latest  accounts  the  Afghan  army  under  Ayub  Khan  is 
still  at  Candahar.  The  Lieutenant-General  hopes  it  may  remain 
there,  and  that  th^  honour  of  relieving  the  British  garrison  may 
fall  to  the  lot  of  th^  magnificent  troops  now  with  him." 

At  Panjak  we  h^rd  from  Mahomed  Sadik,  who  met  us  in 
accordance  with  previous  arrangements,  ^t  AyT^^  Trypan  \^^ 
^'ttfin  t^  Ag^fi*^  ^^«^^  order^'"g  ^^'"^  tift  fiO^V^t  °"rr^''^j  fr^^  all 
^,tib^,„Tft,K!^  Cl^efs  had  done  was  f^  rairl  nnon  a  villaprfl  the 
previous  day  and  carry  off  two  ^^{f'/jiff  ft"^  '^  i|nftpfifjr  ^f  gr^jj 
mUve  re|)ort  also  stated  i'hat  Ayub's  men  were  driving  three  mines 
into  Candahar,  but  rocky  ground  had  prevented  them  from 
making  much  progress. 

On  August  21st  we  reached  a  camping-ground  called  Garjui,  8 
miles  short  of-^^Sui,  our  marcETbeiug.  ^8  miles.  Shahjui,  the 
northern  limit  of  the  Candahar  Province,  was  passed,  and  here 
again  some  little  interest  was  excited,  as  we  could  see  the  hill  on 
the  right  where  Sartorius  won  his  Y.C,  when  Sahib  Jan  was 
defeated  and  killed.  The  .country  was  very  open  and  water  fairly 
plentiful.  Camp  was  pitched  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Tumak. 
Captain  Straton,  with   a  small  party  of  signallers,  had  gone  on 


494  T^  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

ahead  with  the  cavalry  and  climbed  the  Tazi  Hill,  whence  he 
expected  to  communicate  by  heliograph  with  Khelat-i-Ghilzai. 
Seeing  a  hill  in  the  distance,  which  seemed  to  answer  to  the  de- 
scnption  of  the  fortress,  he  directed  his  light  upon  it,  and  within 
ten  minutes  came  bac^^jj^n8j|^^3|^ggsh.  In  half  an  hour  General 
Roberts  and  Colonel  Tanner  naa  excnanged  messages,  and  then 
we  learned  of  the  disastrous  sortie  of  the  l-6th  and  the  death  of 
General  Brooke  and  the  other  brave  fellows  who  fell  with  him. 
Ooionei  Tanner  informed  us  that  he  would  send  a  company  of  his 
regiment  to  Baba  Eazai  to  encamp  there  and  collect  supplies  for  us. 
On  August  22nd,  reveille  sounded  at  1  a.m.,  and  we  marched  at 
2.30,  the  heat  of  the  few  previous  days  having  been  so  great  that 
night  marching  was  decided  upon.  The  troops  turned  out  with 
alacrity,  but  in  the  half-darkness  it  was  hard  work  to  get  all  the 
baggage  animals  clear  of  camp,  particularly  as  the  face  of  the 
country  had  quite  changed,  the  road  passing  over  rolling  hills 
which  shut  out  the  view  on  either  hand.  All  cultivation  ceased 
except  in  the  bed  of  the  river,  which  lay  in  places  200  or  300  feet 
below  the  road.  Here  and  there  were  fields  of  Indian-corn  which 
promised  rich  crops  in  the  future.  After  17  miles  we  reached 
Baba  Eazai  and  found  the  company  of  Beluchis  awaiting  us  with 
piles  of  bhoosa  and  com  ready  to  our  hand.  We  pitched  on  the 
hillside,  within  200  yards  of  Turnak,  and  were  busy  all  day  ex- 
changing heliograms  with  Ehelat-i-Ghilzai. 
N^  On  the  following  day  (August  23rd)  the  force  marched  again  at 
1  A.M.,  this  being  our  fifteenth  march  from  Beni  Hissar^  We 
covered  17  miles,  and  were  heartily  glad  to  see  the  fortress  of 
Khelat-i-Gbilzai  rising  before  us.  As  our  force  marched  to  its 
camping-ground  to  the  south  of  the  solitary  Jiill,  great  crowds  of 
villagers  lined  the  road  and  watched  with  curiosity  the  appearance 
of  regiment  after  regiment.  The  number  of  Ghoorkas  and  Sikhs 
astonished  them  greatly,  and  they  plainly  respected  the  composition 
of  the  army  marching  to  the  relief  of  Candahar.  A  letter  from 
Major  Adam,  Assistant  Quartermaster-General  with  General 
Primrose,  was  handed  to  General  Eoberts^nd  we  learned  more 
details  of  the  Deh-i-Khwaja  softie,  and  of  the  position  in  the  city. 
The  following  are  the  more  interesting  portions  of  Major  Adams's 
letter,  which  was  dated  17th  August : — 


News  from  Candahar.  495 

*'  Ayub's  forces,  difjnflg"^  ^y  ^""'  p""^7  ''  "^  '^    '  j  close 

to  Ibe  Ghoorka   lineH    hflvf   tiflken  to  the  ground  between  Mir 

zaarand  tbe  Ar^an<^ft];^  R^'^^fj  ^^^^^  tfaey  are  sheltered  by  Ibe 
Jiiy^rftflpre  ot  hills  west  of  this.  He  had  two  guns  (an  Armstrong 
and  one  of  our  9-pounders  caj]  Lured  at  MaiwauJ)  on  Kcquet  Hill. 
One  was  dismounted  by  our  fire  yesteniay.  Jle  has  also  a 
6-pounder  in  an  embrasure  near  the  He  ad- Quarters'  Garden;  one 
in  Deh-i-Khwaja  900  yards  eust  of  the  Cabal  Grate,  nnd  a  third  in 
a  garden  1,100  yards  from  tho  Shlkarpur  Clate,  The  villages  all 
round  the  walls  are  held,  aB  is  also  a  portion  of  our  old  canton- 
ment walls.  Some  of  the  rtL,niliij?  regimencs  are  cantoned  in  the 
villages,  which  contain  besides  vory  large  caiitmgeiits  of  outsiders. 
Yesterday  morning,  hoping  to  *^^  into  Deh-i-Khwajii  to  pull  down 
the  loopholed  walls  facing  thc^  Ciibul  and  Bur  Daruiii  Gates,  we 
made  a  sortie  with  300  cavalry  and  900  infantry  drawn  from  the 
7th  Fusiliers,  and  19th  and  2y',li  Bombay  Native  lufantry.  The 
village  was  found  to  be  stron^^I y  heU,  and  honeycombed  with  loop- 
holes. Our  infantry  managi  il  to  pull  through,  but  could  not 
jain  a  hold  upon  the  place,  tliKigh  the  enemy's  bU[)poi'ts  got  a 
good  *  slating '  from  our  cavalry,  nud  from  our  infantry  and  artillery 
fire.  We  had  to  get  back  to  tUe  walls  of  the  city  under  heavy 
fire  from  the  village  walls  :  \\\\\  oar  loss,  in  oiliciM  s  particularly, 

was  very  heavy The  enemy  must,  however,  have  seen 

that  we  have  some  fighting  power  in  us,  and  we  heard  that  the 
regular  regiments  under  Ayub  would  not  turn  out  to  reinforce  the 
village,  so  that  an  efiect  had  been  produced,  and  the  morcUe  of  our 
troops  here  is  still  good.  The  misfortune  is  they  have  so  few 
officers  to  native  regiments  :  wearing  helmets  makes  them  a  con- 
spicuous mark,  of  which  the  enemy  fully  avail  themselves. 
Our  supplies  are  abundant,  with  the  exception  of  mutton  and 
bhoosa.  Of  the  latter  we  have  about  ten  days'  full  ration,  which 
we  can  make  last  fifteen,  and  good  luck  may  produce  hidden  stores 
in  the  town.    We  are  in  daily  search,  and  get  nearly  20,0001b8. 

per  day TVi^  Anpn^y  liAr^^  T  fanPj   l^^fpti  f^  fl.i»lr  fl.^  ff«'"^f|;« 

r./.n>1y  «p^    OT./I    I'f    ^}^py  ^^^r^    f^    f^fftftHJt'     ^'^^^  "^""^1  tiff    ^Q  WlthiU      ^ 

liave  mostlv  been  dearfid.^MKag,^tZifl^^k^^^giii.jrirfi-^ntande- 
^io  Jm^i  -  Itiwninnn  ■AiBk»dfifiQnces.  blue  lights^ 


496 


ar,    1 8  79— So. 


ehells,  small  miil€B  in  drains — aU  hate  been  got  ready ;  and  if 
th^do  jjlack  it  will  ^m  at  a  grtHit  loss  of  Hfe  to  them.  They 
say  they  have  nmn}  ladders  reiJilv,  but  as  they  will  require  at 
least  from  ten  to  fifteen  meu  U>  carry  tliem,  and  most  will 
have  to  be  got  ufer  MO  yards  et  open  groan d,  you  caa  imagine 
that  their  chances  of  Buceess  ift-e  Tory  sraiilL  They  ran  away 
like  hares  yesterday  irhen  our  cavalry  got  them  in  the  open, 
and  also  when  unr  sappers  turned  round  and  gave  them  a  volley, 
Ayub*a  position  is  well  choseb  r  liis  ri;:^iit  fljuik  caunot  be  turned, 
resting  as  it  dor  n  on  a  high  liiJl  Uiat  cannot  he  crossed,  and  his 
left  is  on  the  Argandab,  while  al^n;^'  his  front  he  has  a  number  of 
orchards  and  enuals  which  mn  only  be  crossed  at  a  few  points. 
Artillery  fire  is  i'<3quir**d  to  oover  auy  iufiinti-y  movement  to  attack 
hie  centre,  and  l»[»fore  tiiafc  can  hv  attempted  Picquet  Hill  must  be 
taken.  You  will  reaogoi^e  how  thoroughly  he  has  protocted  him- 
self, and  how^  pi>vrerl©88  we  are  to  attack  until  stron^dy  reinforced. 
We  find  it  most  difficult  to  get  mews*  Tlie  wliole  place  is  covered 
by  groups  of  Yillag^a ;  and  the  ghazis  are  spread  about  in  the  old 
cavalry  lines  and  the  cf&ntouiDents.  I  only  got  a  view  of  Ayub's 
camp  the  other  dny  by  going  out  at  dark,  getting  on  a  hill  before 
daybreak,  and  waiting  until  daylight,  Phillips,  f^upporting  with 
cavalry,  liad  a  nM90W*«a6a)»«»  Thinking  to  capture  two  men  on 
pahooa  I  gave  chase,  but  they  werts  too  far  ahead,  and  raised  an 
alarm.  Their  artillery  turned  out  and  opened  fire,  not  at  me,  but 
at  Phillips'  squadron.  One  shell  burst  under  his  horse's  nose, 
and  although  Mayne  and  two  orderlies  were  standing  by,  the  only 
damage  done  was  the  orderly's  horse  shot.  Altogether  there  is  no 
want  of  excitement." 

This^  letter  shows  the  thorough  nature  of  the  investment  of 
nuTijftl^if^r  and  howli^TpTft^Hjhe  garnson 


^ ^  ^in  tliefc 

Ayub's  overwhelming  strength. 

I  have  not  energy  enougli  to  say  much  about  Khelat-i-Ghilzai 
itself:  the  character  of  the  fortress  is  well  known,  and  w^th  the 
thermometer  registering  105®  in  tents,  and  a  hot  wind  blowing,  I 
find  the  task  of  climbing  up  to  the  gates  too  much.  Picture  a 
hill  rising  out  of  a  plain  some  hundreds  of  feet,  vrith  a 
strong  wall,  loopholed  and  bastioned  encircling  it  near  the  top, 
and  above  all  a  huge  rock  springing  out  of  the  middle  ;of  thd 


At  Khelat'i'Ghilzai.  497 

enclosed  spaoe,  and  70a  have  Ehelat-i-Ghilzai.  It  boasts  a  hot  and 
a  cold  spring  within  the  walls,  and  has  other  nataral  featares 
which  might  interest  the  geolbgist.  Its  barracks  will  accommodate 
a  safficiently  large  garrison  to  man  the  walls,  against  which  no 
infhntry  assanlt  could  be  snccessfol,  bat  there  is  a  long,  flat-topped 
hill  about  3,000  yards  away  from  which  artillery  could  com- 
mand the  place  and  make  the  garrison  very  uncomfortable.  The 
country  about  is  not  at  all  attractive,  barren  rolling  hills  stretching 
away  as  far  as  the  eye  can  reach.  We  all  pity  the  unlucky  fellows 
who  have  had  to  hold  the  place  for  so  many  months. 


Cavalry  Hbad-Quartebs,  Robat,  27</i  Aujust. 

To'day  we  have  established  heliog^raphic  communication  with 
the  Uan^fttiar  ^'^"Iflff^i  *^^'^  ^^  ^'^^'^  "^^  '"  ^"''  ^'^"'p  Colonel 
St.  John,  Chief  Political  Officer,  Major  Adam,  A.Q.M.G.,  Major 
Leech,  V.C,  B.E.,  and  Captain  Anderson,  commanding  the  escort 
of  Poena  Horse.  This  morning,  when  the  garrison  saw  the  first 
flash  of  Captain  Straton's  mirror,  they  could  scarcely  believe 
that  it  was  the  heliograph.  We  were  three  days  in  advance  of  the 
time  laid  down  by  the  wiseacres  for  our  appearance.  To-day  is  the 
19th  from  Beni  Hissar,  and  although  the  infant]^  is^ne  march  in 
rear,  here  we  are  with  two  regiments  of  cavalry  exchanging  notes 
with  officers  of  the  lately  besieged  garrison,  and  coolly  camping 
within  one  march  of  Ayub's  camp  on  the  Argandab.  I  do  not 
wiBh_to  boast  of  ^t^fl  f^^i^  ^pne  by  troops  whose  marches  I  have 
shared,  and  with  whom  Ir  all  my  sympathy;  but  it  has  been 
"  grand  going,"  to  use  a  hunting  phrase,  and  we  hope  the  finish 
will  be  as  good,  for  Ayub  has  not  fled,  although  he  has  raised  the 
siege  of  the  city.  Our  troops  are  perhaps  a  little  tired  with 
their  hard  work,  but  a  day*s  rest  will  give  them  new  strength, 
and  this  rest  they  can  now  take  without  anxiety,  for  Candahar  is 
safe,  and  there  is  every  sign  that  the  enemy  will  await  our 
approach,  and  defend  the  strong  position  they  hold  with  great 
determination. 

We  have  of  late  marched  at  2.30  each  morning,  and  con- 
sequently I  have  seen  but  little  of  the  country  passed  through. 
My  general  impression   is,  that  it  is  wild   and  bleak,  the  road 

K   K 


498  The  Afghan  War,  1879— 8o, 

following  the  coarse  of  the  Tornak  BiTer,  which  is  not  a  Tery  large 
stream  at  this  time  of  the  year.  On  August  25th  we  marched  to 
Jaldak,  sixteen  miles.  As  we  were  striking  camp  at  Ehelat-i-Ghilzaiy 
some  bands  of  robbers  tried  to  get  past  oar  picqaets  near  the 
river,  the  mist  rising  from  the  water  covering  their  movements. 
They  plainly  hoped  to  pick  ap  a  few  stray  moles  vdth  their  loads, 
as  there  is  always  great  confusion  when  a  large  force  has  to  move 
ofif  in  the  darkness,  for  the  moon  is  now  a  very  poor  substitute 
for  daylight.  The  thieves,  unfortunately  for  themselves,  found 
that  Ghoorkas  are  unusually  keen-sighted,  and  the  result  was  that 
four  Afghans  were  killed  before  our  rear-guard  had  left  the  fortress 
in  rear.  We  watched  the  shooting  while  our  advance-brigade  was 
waiting  for  orders  to  move,  and  the  reports  which  followed  us  were 
satisfieictory.  Nothing  was  lost,  although  a  kahar  who  straggled 
had  a  narrow  escape.  He  was  enjoying  a  peaceful  ^^  smoke  "  over 
the  dying  embers  of  his  fire  on  the  camping-ground,  when  a 
small  party  of  Afghans  came  upon  him.  He  cried  out  vigorously 
for  help,  and  the  Subadar  of  the  6th  Ghoorkas,  with  a  few  of  his 
men,  ran  back  from  the  rear-guard.  For  a  moment  the  Afghans 
faced  them,  but  the  Subadar  cut  one  man  down  with  his 
sword,  and  another  being  shot  the  robbers  decamped.  This  is 
the  only  occasion  on  which  our  men  have  been  troubled  on 
picquet. 

Yesterday  (August  25th)  we  reached  Tirandez,  sixteen  miles,  a 
rather  troublesome  inarch,  as  the  road  skirted  a  low  range  of  hills 
on  the  right,  and  was  in  places  too  narrow  to  admit  of  the  troops 
marching  in  open  formation.  At  Tirandez,  the  General  received 
letters  from  General  Primrose  and  Colonel  St.  John,  in  which  it 
was  stated  that  Ayub  Khan  had  become  alarmed  at  the  near 
approach  of  the  Cabul  Force,  and  had  raised  the  siege  of  the  city 
on  the  24th.  Sir  F.  Boberts  thereupon  resolved  to  put  himsdf 
into  direct  communication  with  the  garrison  as  quickly  as  possible, 
and  General  Hugh  Gough  was  ordered  to  hold  two  regiments  of 
cavalry  in  readiness  to  march  to  Bobat,  whence  heliograms  could 
be  exchanged  with  Candahar.  Bobat  is  thirty-four  miles  frtmi 
Tirandez,  and  about  eighteen  from  Candahar.  The  8rd  Punjab 
Cavalry  and  the  8rd  Bengal  Cavalry,  who  could  muster  the  most 
available  sabres,  were  told  off  by  General  Gough,  and  at  1  AJf. 


Cavalry  Advance  to  Robat.  499 

ibey  started  from  camp,  their  baggage  following  on  the  wiry  little 
ponies  whioh  serve  as  baggage  animals.  I  accompanied  the 
cayalry,  with  the  permission  of  the  (General.  Sir  F.  Boberts,  with 
Colonel  Chapman,  Chief  of  the  Staff,  Major  Hastings,  and  Major 
Enan  Smith,  intended  to  ride  with  Uie  cavalry,  in  order  to  meet 
Colonel  St.  John,  who,  it  was  thought,  might  ride  out  from 
Candahar  to  Bobat.  When,  howevever,  we  reached  Ehel-i-Akhnnd, 
where  the  Beluchis  were  encamped,  word  was  sent  to  General 
Hugh  Gough  that  Shr  F.  Boberts  was  so  weak  from  an  attack  of 
fever  that  he  could  not  proceed  farther.  The  cavalry  were  ordered 
to  complete  their  march.  Colonel  Chapman  alone  of  the  original 
party  going  on  with  them. 

We  rode  quietly  onwards,  halting  every  seven  or  eight  miles  to 
give  our  horses  a  feed  in  the  fields  of  Indian-corn,  and  allow  the 
baggage  ponies  to  close  up  in  the  rear.  We  did  not  know  what 
might  be  in  the  front  of  us— had  not  Ayub  some  thousands  of  ^ 
Aimak  horsemen,  who  were  great  at  surprises  ? — ^and  we  kept  in  X 
as  compact  a  body  as  possible,  while  our  advance-guard  and  scouts 
on  the  flanks  were  on  the  watch  for  any  signs  of  the  enemy.  But 
all  was  quiet,  though  a  few  unarmed  men  were  met  who  were 
believed  to  be  returning  from  Ayub's  army  to  their  homes.  They 
reported  Candahar  as  no  longer  besieged,  and  added  that  all  the 
villages  about  it  were  quite  deserted.  This  news  was  confirmed 
by  a  number  of  men,  welt  mounted  and  armed  with  rifles  and 
swords,  who  had  been  sent  out  by  the  Wali  Shore  Ali  to  meet  our 
army.  At  about  the  twenty-seventh  mile  we  had  our  last  halt  at 
a  running  stream,  where  forage  was  plentiful,  and  we  then  pushed 
on  over  a  series  of  low  stony  hills  until  the  open  desert  plain 
lying  north-east  of  Candahar  was  reached.  The  range  of  hills  on 
our  left  trended  away  to  the  south,  but  on  the  right  we  could 
follow  the  line  separating  us  from  the  Argandab,  and  could  see 
distinctly  the  high-rounded  hill  (called,  I  think,  the  ^'  Brigade 
Major")  which  juts  up  on  the  eastern  flank  of  the  Baba  Wali 
Eotal.  ^'  Ayub*s  army  is  behind  that ;  let  us  hope  he  will  stay 
there  " — ^was  the  substance  of  our  talk  for  the  first  few  minutes  as 
we  looked  down  from  the  last  rolling  hill  above  the  Bobat  villages ; 
and  then  came  inquiries  as  to  the  position  of  Candahar.  Some 
distance  to  the  left  of  the  ''  Brigade  Major,"  and  separated  from 

K  K  2 


5CO  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

it  by  a  break  in  the  range^  rose  a  conical  hill  at  the  foot  of  a 
higher  ridge.  Candahar  was  said  to  lie,  in  our  line  of  yision, 
directly  beneath  this  hill.  Captain  Straton  had  brought  with  him 
some  of  his  mounted  signallers,  and  at  half-past  eleven  a  light 
was  directed  towards  Candahar.  We  could  not  see  the  city,  even 
with  our  telescopes,  as  a  thick  haze  hung  over  the  country  about  it, 
and  for  a  quarter  of  an  hour  no  answer  was  given.  The  first 
signal  station  was  on  a  low  hillock  to  the  left  of  the  road,  but 
Captain  Straton  took  another  instrument  to  the  slope  of  a  rocky 
ridge  on  the  right,  whence  also  he  could  communicate  with  the 
main  body  of  our  troops  halted  for  the  day  at  Ehel-i-Akhund« 
He  had  scarcely  left  the  road  than  Sergeant  Anderson,  with  the 
first  heliograph,  saw  a  faint  flash  at  Candahar.  It  was  so  weak  a 
glimmer  that  nothing  could  be  made  out,  but  in  a  few  minutes  we 
read  a  message  : — "  Who  are  you  ?  "  The  answer  given  was 
''  General  Qough  and  two  regiments  of  cavalry,"  and  then  Captain 
Straton' s  light  was  evidently  seen  by  the  signallers  in  Candahar, 
who,  puzzled  by  two  flashes,  asked : — "  Where  are  you  ?  *'  After 
this,  our  first  station  was  closed,  and  the  signallers  with  Captain 
Straton  began  sending  messages  from  Colonel  Chapman  to  General 
Primrose.  We  learned  that  all  was  well  with  them  in  Candahar, 
and  that  Colonel  St.  John  would  ride  out  to  Bobat  in  the  after- 
noon. The  two  cavalry  regiments  then  moved  down  to^Bobat,  and 
as  all  their  baggage  had  arrived  at  half-past  twelve,  camp  was  at 
once  pitched.  This  forced  march  of  thirty-four  miles  was  in  itself 
quite  a  little  success,  and  that  the  baggage  animals  should  be 
only  an  hour  behind  the  sowars  proved  that  with  proper  manage- 
ment there  need  be  no  difficulty  in  moving  cavalry  long  distances, 
even  when  tents  and  all  the  belongings  of  a  regiment  are  brought 
on.  The  heat  has  been  terrific  all  day,  and  without  tents  we 
should  have  suffered  much  discomfort. 

At  four  o'clock  this  afternoon,  as  Colonel  St.  John  had  not 
arrived.  Colonel  Chapman  started  for  the  camp  at  Ehel-i-Akhund 
with  a  small  escort.  His  day's  ride  will  be  fifty-four  miles,  but 
his  untiring  energy  will  carry  him  through,  and  it  is  important 
Sir  Frederick  Boberts  should  have  his  Chief  of  the  Staff  with  him 
owing  to  his  own  illness.  About  five  o'clock  our  videttes  looking 
toward  Candahar  sent  word  that  a  body  of  cavalry  was  coming  across 


Meeting  of  General  Gough  and  Colonel  St.  John.   501 

the  plain ;  and  the  sowars,  only  too  anxious  to  have  a  brash  with 
the  enemy,  raised  a  cry  that  the  Afghan  horsemen  were  coming. 
We  fully  believed  it  to  be  merely  Colonel  St.  John  and  his  escort, 
but  the  8rd  Bengal  Gayalry  were  ordered  to  stand  to  their  horses, 
and  we  saddled  up  to  be  ready  for  an  emergency.  In  half  an  hour 
the  cloud  of  dust  which  the  yidettes  had  seen  resolved  itself  at 
first  into  two  horsemen,  Colonel  St.  John  and  Major  Leech,  Y.C., 
B.E.,  who  were  soon  shaking  hands  with  General  Gough  and  his 
Staff.  They  had  ridden  ahead  of  Major  Adam  and  the  troop  of 
Poona  Horse  under  Captain  Anderson,  which  was  acting  as  escort, 
and  which  our  own  party  had  hoped  was  a  detachment  of  Ayub's 
cavalry.  We  made  our  guests  as  comfortable  as  our  limited  camp 
equipage  would  permit,  and  then  we  listened  to  long  stories  of  the 
disaster  at  Maiwand,  the  terrible  retreat  back  to  Candahar,  the 
abandonment  of  cantonments,  and  the  subsequent  investment  of 
the  city,  with  its  leading  incident  of  the  sortie  of  the  16th  inst. 
So  many  serious  charges  could  be  framed  on  these  stories,  that 
until  I  have  had  full  time  to  examine  quietly  into  the  whole 
affair  I  will  refrain  from  mentioning  them.  The  necessity  for 
the  assembling  of  a  court  of  inquiry  as  soon  as  we  have  re- 
established our  military  supremacy  is  so  great  that  both  the 
Indian  Government  and  the  military  authorities  will  utterly  fail  in 
their  duty,  if  they  do  not  order  such  a  court  to  be  formed.  There 
can  be  no  lack  of  evidence,  and  the  blame  should  fall  on  those 
primarily  responsible  for  rendering  possible  such  a  disaster  as  wo 
have  now  come  to  retrieve,  while  the  charges  against  individuals 
and  regiments  should  be  investigated  without  fear  of  conse- 
quences. I  hopa^ereafter  to  tell  the  plain  story  of  the  action  at 
MftiiPttn/1  ftT^i^  f,]ie  retreat  upon  Candahar.  as  also  to  see  wliafc 
justification  there  was  for  abandoning  cantonments  before  General 
Burrows  and  the  Chief  Political  Officer  had  arrived.  Serious 
reflections  may  have  to  be  cast,  jf  we  are  s'l^^^fiHfV'^  i^  I'rnaJTing 
j^ntr  th^e  may  be  a  feeling  that  ugly  truths  should  be  slurred 
over  and  everything  made^pleasant  all  round,  but  this  would 
be  a  fatal  mistake.  A  repetition  of  the  events  of^  ihe  last 
in^TTih  might  SfiriniTV  ilPI^''^^  ft^ir '""^ITffATY  P^^stige  in  the 
ftypig  gf  Am'fttic  nations^  and  re«act  dangerously  upon  our  Indian 
Empire, 


/ 


502  The  Afghan  War,  1879— 8a 

Gandahab,  Sl«t  August,  Evening. 

We  are  at  last  **  in  touch  "  with  the  enemy,  and  while  I  am 
writing  a  sharp  interchange  of  shots  is  taking  place  between  our 
picquets  near  the  Abasabad  village  and  certain  bloodthirsty 
Afghans  who  have  been  stirred  up  by  a  reconnaissance  made  this 
afternoon.  Ayub's  guns  on  the  Baba  Wali  Kotal  are  also  boom- 
ing out,  and  one  or  two  shells  have  fallen  into  camp,  but  have 
done  no  damage.  Before  describing  our  position  here  I  may  as 
well  bring  to  a  close  the  °^^^'T2fL^"'  Frf^f^^"^^  Ttftbfir^^*^  rapid 
march  toreUeve  the  C^^^h"^  govin'cnn 

On  August  28th,  the  main  body  of  the  Cabul  Force  marched 
from  Khel-i-Akhund  to  Eobat,  a  distance  of 'twenty  miles,  all  the 
sick  and  footsore  being  left  about  ten  miles  short  of  Robat,  in 
charge  of  Colonel  Tanner  with  the  2nd  Beluchis.  Our  forced 
marching  was  now  at  an  end ;  Candahar  was  relieved,  and  as  our 
spies  reported  that  Ayub  had  no  intention  of  running  away, 
there  was  no  necessity  for  hurrying  under  the  walls  of  Candahar 
itself.  On  August  29th  we  enjoy^  a  halt  while  Colonel  Tanner 
brought  in  the  sick,  and  on  the  80th  we  quietly  changed  camp  to 
Momand,  some  eleven  miles  nearer  the  city.  General  Boberts's 
forced-marching  may  therefore  be  looked  upon  as  ending  with 
Bobat,  when  the  extraordinary  distance  of  803  miles  had  been 
covered  in  twenty  days.  I  may  be  wrong  in  stating  that  such  a 
march  of  10,000  fighting  men  is  unprecedented,  but  there  can  only  • 
be  one  opinion  as  to  the  energy  of  the  General  who  could  direct 
such  a  movement,  and  the  endurance  of  the  men  to  carry  it  out. 
From  Beni  Hissar  to  Bobat  our  marches  (as  marked  by  head- 
quarters) were  as  follows : — 

Augort  9tli  to  Zahidabftd 16  milei. 

„  lOihtoZeighnnShahr 14  „ 

„  11th  to  Fkdkhao  Bank 18  „ 

„  12th  to  Amir  Eila 11  h 

„  ISthtoTakia 12  „ 

„  14th  to  Shashgao 17  „ 

„  l(»th  to  ahami 18  „ 

„  16th  to  Teigatta 20  „ 

„  17th  to  Ohardeh 12  „ 

„  18th  to  Oba  Eaz«x  .        .       .  .        .  16  „ 

„  19tb  to  Mnkur 15  „ 


Diary  of  the  March.  503 

Aogiut  2OU1  to  Panjak 21  miles. 

,,  2l8tto€hurjai         .......  18  „ 

„        22nd  to  Bala  Kazai 17  „ 

„        28rd  to  KhelaM-Ghilzai 17  ,, 

„  24th  EfOL. 

„        25thtoJaldak 16  „ 

„        26th  to  Tirandez 16  ,, 

„        27th  to  Khel-i-Akhund 14  ,, 

„        28thtoBobat 20  „ 

-  Thns,  as  I  have  said^  in  twenty  days  more  than  800  miles  have 
been   covered^  giving   all    average  (including  one  day's  halt)    of 

fifteen  miles  per  day^    T  wjll  lAf^ye  it  to  military  critics  to  decide / 

ftS  to  the  merits  of  such  a  march.     Our  iiospitai  returns  at  Bobat        |^ 
show  68  Europeans,  448  sepoys,  and  291  followers,  to  be  under       ' 
treatment ;  a  small  percentage  out  of  18,000  men. 


OHAPTEB  m. 

The  Arriral  at  Candahar — ^Meeting  of  Sir  F.  Eoberts  and  G^Deral  Primrose  -The  Bntry 
into  the  City— Lojal  Sirdan — Beconnaissance  along  the  Herat  Road— Demonstra- 
tione  in  Force  bj  the  Afghans — Steadiness  of  oar  Native  Troops — ^The  Battle  of 
Gandahar — The  Boemy's  Position — Sir  Frederick  Robert's  Plan  of  Attack — Occn- 
pation  of  Gtmdigan  by  Aynb  Kban — Strength  of  the  British  Force — Storming  of 
the  Village  of  Mullah  Sabibdad  by  Macpherson's  Brigade — Bombardment  of  the 
Baba  Wali  Kotal — (General  Baker's  Movement  on  the  Left  Flank— Diffi9Qlt  Ni^tnre 
of  the  Qronnd — Death  of  Captain  Frome  and  Colonel  Brovnlov,  72Qd  Highlanders 
— A  Charge  by  Qhaxis— The  Turning  of  the  Pir  Paimal  Ridge— Major  White's 
Gallantry— Bayonet  Charge  of  the  92nd  Highlanders  and  Capture  of  Two  Ghins— 
Dispersion  of  the  Afghan  Army  and  Advance  upon  Mazra -Capture  of  Ayub's 
Camp  and  Thirty-tbree  Guns — Description  of  the  Camp— Recovery  of  Small- Arm 
Ammunition— The  Death  of  Captain  Straton  and  Lientenant  Maclaine — The 
Cavalry  Pnrsait— The  Casnaltiet  in  the  British  Banks. 

^CllfDAHABs  QUt  Auff^'''*t''^^f]^EvenmaJ 

OuB  entry  into  Candahar  has  been  made  without  any  great  parade, 
and  with  rather  a  lack  of  enthusiasm  on  the  part  of  the  garrison 
we  have  relieved.  This  morning  our  force  left  Momand  and 
marched  slowly  towards  Gandaha^,  where  the  leading  regiments 
of  Maepherson's  brigade  piled  arms  outside  the  Shikarpur  Gate 


504  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

soon  after  9  o'clock.  Sir  Frederick  Roberts  was  still  so  weak 
from  feyer  brought  on  by  exposure  to  the  sun,  that  he  was  carried 
iu  a  dhoolie  to  vdthin  two  or  three  miles  of  the  city.  Here  he 
managed  to  mount  his  horse,  and,  with  General  Bo884tndhis  Staff, 
to  ride  forward.  He  was  met  some  distance  east. of  Deh-i-Ehwaja 
by  General  Primrose  and  his  brigadiers,  with  their  respoctiTe 
Btaffs,  Colonel  St.  John^  and  other  officers  of  the  garrison.  There 
was  much  hand-shaking  and  hasty  introduction,  and  then  the 
united  party  rode  across  the  cultiyi(v^,  ground  and  made  for, the 
southern  face  of  the  city.  Deh-i-Khwaja  was  passed  with  its 
doomed  hp.u^es,,  and  strong  enclosures  half-hidden  by  trees, 
wherein  so  many  men  fell  on  the  l6th,  and  then  we  passed  fatigue 
parties  of  Bombay  sepoys  at  work  clearing  out  the  hartz  on  that 
side  of  the  city.  Outside  the  Shi^rpny  ftafA  was  a  crowd  of 
natiyes  and  soldiers,  a  rude  sort  of  bazaar  haying  been  established, 
and  it  was  with  some  difficulty  a  way  was  made  through  the  throng. 
It  was  arranged  that  our  troops  were  to  halt  outside  this  Ghite  and 
breaKtast  quietly,  prior  to  any  moyements  which  might  afferwards 
be  decided  upon.  General  Roberts  and  Staff  rode  into  the  city 
with  the  usual  cayalry  escort,  and  here  a  rather  ridiculous  cere- 
mony was  gone  through.  We  had  been  much  impressed  by 
sand-bags  on  the  parapet  and  in  the  flanking  bastions,  wire 
entanglement  and  ahaifiz  outside  the  walls,  and  other  signs  of  the 
late  stern  business  on  hand,  when  suddenly,  as  we  rode  brayelyup 
the  broad  streets  towards  the  citadel,  we  came  across  the  Wall 
Shore  Ali  ^'  and  the  rest  of  the  royal  family/'  as  they  were  irrele- 
yantly  dubbed,  drawn  up  on  horseback  on  the  right  of  the  road. 
They  were  clad  in  most  gorgeous  attire,  so  dazzling  to  the  eye 
that  in  the  sunshine  the  effect  was  oyerpowering ;  while  their 
helmets  of  yelyet,  or  whateyer  stuff  they  might  be,  were  so 
bespiked,  besilyered,  and  made  generally  beautiful,  that  our  poor 
khaki  headpieces  sank  into  insignificance.  Their  chargers  were 
tail-down  in  the  dirty  drain  skirting  the  road,  but  when  they  were 
spurred  forward  and  shook  their  crests  and  cunretted  in  all  proud 
wilfulness,  one  quite  expected  a  riding-master  to  step  forward  and 
cry  ''  Houp-la  ! ''  for  there  neyer  was  a  better  imitation  of  a  circus 
pageant  on  a  small  scale.  General  Boberts  was  politeness  itself 
to  the  unlucky  Wall,  whose  only  anxiety,  I  bear,  is  to  retire  to 


General  Roberts  in  Candakar.  505 

India  on  a  pension,  and  the  cayalcade  went  prancing  np  the  street 
to  Char  Soo,  where  the  two  main  roads  of  Candahar  bisect  each 
other.  Here  a  turn  to  the  left  was  taken  along  a  sort  of  bonle- 
Tardy  and  then  the  Wali  and  suite  plunged  into  a  narrow  by-path 
which  led  to  the  Nawab's  house.  Kooms  were  placed  at  General 
Roberts's  disposal  therein,  but  I  am  unable  to  say  if  any  real 
circus  does  exist  within  the  walls,  as  no  one  under  the  rank  of  a 
first-class  aide-de-camp  was  admitted. 

attack  upon  Ajjib^TThflnlfl  pOHitinn  WfliBTngfc.    Thnt  p— '*-- j 

be  roughly  described  as  lying  between  the  Axgandab  _Bisfir-Juid 
Candahar,  from  which  it  is  separated^by  a  higlL-ianga^oLhiUs. 
tWughjgbifili  nn  tVift  right  iiift  pofh  Lq^JLj  /^^n^  fi.o  i\^^q>/>i.o 

Kotal  (comjD  ^ni^nil  fill  r"-"^  -^'Iq  flin  fi«ll1  Wl^^'  f  ntffll  B^^° 
ctii^l  access  in  front.  .This  Kotal  has  now  three  or  four  guns 
upon  itj  and  our  spies  report  tlie  narrj^jw^ptad  pypr  [t  to  bsTA  been 
deglrojed.  To  the  soatb^Kftfti^  fhjg  K^fifll  ruq^  the  JPir  Biimal 
Hul,  fl  precipitoug  ridge  protect! pg  Ajoub^s  rightj  butJiit^^jQ^  be 
Curned  as  it  ^nds  abruptly  in  thti  plairC  As  this  plain  is  covered 
with~drchardB  and  walled  enclosures,  witngcorcs  of  rL^^^p^^^fr- 
egte  and  cbanneh  running  in  ev^ry  direction,  any  turn iog^mave- 
mB&t  we  m^  ouLkajHiist  have  for  ita^first  object  the  cleanpj^jjf 
ttii  ground  in  front  of  the  s.  1  u  1 1  i  -  wo  h  t  fac^c^Ji^^ji^ge.  AFortu- 
nately  there  is  on  the  southern  facD  of  Baba  Wali  Kotal  yand  the 
Pir  Faimal  Ridge  an  inferior  ridge,  quite  dotaebed  from  the  main 
ranges,  and  with  from  1,000  to  2,000  yards  of  fairly  open  country 
intervening.  This  ridge  has  on  the  east  a  point  known  as  Picquet 
Hill,  commanding  the  cantonments,  while  the  portion  to  the  south- 
west is  called  Karez  Hill  from  certain  wells  of  pure  spring-water 
near  its  foot.  Tj-,  wita  J^ought  our  brigades  could  encamp  safely 
in  rear  of  these,  as  they  would  be  protected  from  shells  thrown 
from  the  Baba  ^ali  Kotal,  and  accordingly  General  Ross  directed 
Tfacphersogl^s  Brigade,  wifli'the  ggrgw-guns  arj^  \;r^  ^^  thp  CS 
Battery^  R.A.,  to  push  forward  and  nnnnpy  pi'^gnpf,  ani^  y^rftj^ 
Uffls.  The  troops  moved  off  from  thflL^Shikaipiir  jGbata-httfore 
noJtn;  ancTin  au  hour  Colonel  C/hapman .  helingraphed  to  ft^eral 
Hoberts,  who  was  still  resting  in  Candahar : — *'  Line  of  advance 
secured  without  opposition."    A  few  shots  were  tired,  but  they 


5o6 


The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 


were  at  long  ranges,  and  it  was  found  that  the  Tillage  of  Gnndigan, 
in  the  heart  of  the  orchards  and  enclosures,  had  not  been  occupied 
by  the  enemy,  which  was  a  great  point  in  our  fayour.  The  other 
two  brigades  of  infantry  under  Generals  Baker  and  Macgregor 
were  accordingly  ordered  by  General  Boss  to  take  up  their  posi- 
tions under  Picquet  and  Karez  Hills ;  and  the  relative  position 
of  our  infantry  is  now  as  follows : — In  rear  of  Pic<|uet  Hill^  and 
^■^T^ffg^n^i^tly  nearest  to  cantonments^  &eneral  Baker's  Brigade ; 
^^  feia,  1^^'  General  Macpherson^s  lin^adA,  UBBftgrw!t''1Wr<Bgez 
HJjj^aimLagain  to  the  extreme  left,  nearest  fxunjigan  ancl  tbe 
Herat  Road, 
[Mrchar 


acgregror's  troops,   which  flTfi  Pft] 


riin1iii(|  II I iji  linl  iii  fimiliiu'^iip  frftp^-  ^f  ^-^^  P^^  Paim<ti 

rfflge,  Colonel  Chapman  thought  a  r^nMipaamffl  n^^"^^  \^  yp^^ 
'^to*'^d3aaL^*^A^b*ff  ^^""^y  Piore  from  its  diell^and  jMi^flfltfiai^n 
Se8rd  pengal  (^ayairy,  under  ffftT""^<^^ff  ftf  y^^^nel  Mackenj^e, 
""anjpjmrf.A/l  hy  f.TiA  If^f.K  ^i^^j^yfil  two  mountain  guns^  ^oved  oqi^ 
"alon^;. tKeSBiat-.£oad  to  son^ft  In^  yifa.  wIiatiaa  h  view  of  the 
basin  in  rear  of  Pir  Paii^al,  and  ^Baba  Wall  ^7t(f^^  Anni^  Ka  >»>^- 
tamed.  Geiieral'Hugh  Gough  and  Colonel  Ch§B]gi^n  accompanied 
the  reconnoitring  party  in  order  to  direct  its  movements.  The 
cavalry  met  with  nipr  oppositiofa,  and  ittfldu  lliylf  waj^  "for  8  or  4 
miles  without  any  difl&culty,  but  presently  armed  men  were  seen . 
running  from  orchard  to  orchard  and  fmyji  gj^|Qgm^  \^  ^y^A^Aanr<>^ 
^^pt  ftefiily  fiopinj;Jtojg;et  between  the  reconnoitring  party  and  oor 
^  main  b^dy.  Accordingly  it  was  determined  to  retire,  and  no. 
^  sooner  did  the  Afghans  see  the  sowars  get  into  motion  than  they 
swarmed  out  from  the  rear  of  Pir  Paimal  and  opened  a  hot 
fire  with  Martinis  and  Sniders.  But  our  cavalry  were  well  in 
hand  and  retired  at  a  walk,  the  15th  Sikhs  skirmishing  out  to 
protect  them.  The  enemy  unmasked  fivj  guns  about  Pir  Paimal 
and  shelled  our  men  with  great  energy,  but  this  did  not  hurry 
our  movements.  The  jsavalrv  completed  its  retiremenif  yith  oi]]y 
fnnr  f><^HT^ft1t.if>f|,  flp T^eu  the  15th  Sikhs  found  they  had  to  bear 
au,flttafik  from  >SftumJ5U)Qft^jg>Rj3ho  ^res^Tj^m^g^^lMe'y- 
Ayub*a  regn^ara^jttgat  jiave  hftflu  amnngflt  them,  as  bugle-calls 
were  sound.edj^  and  there  was  an  attempt  at  regular  fonxu&tion^ 
now  and  then  when  "charged  were  made*.     The   Sikhs  bgbaved 


^^  Drawing''  Ayub  Khan. 


507 


admirably,  although  crowds  of  Afahans 

to  risk  a  general  action,  the  mei^aing  of  qpr  fAAAnnfligflfl»y*^»^*-i^i*if> 
nusonilerBtood.  General  Macgregor  turned  out  the  4th  Ghoorkas 
an?  some  orthS  Bifles  to  cover  the  final  retirement  of  the  15th 
Sikhs,  and  steady  volley  firing  checked  the  onward  movement  of 
the  enemy.  The  Ohoorkas  occupied  the  village  of  Chilzina  and 
the  near  heights,  thus  making  our  left  flank  secure.  J[^2SL£2i^' 
however,  until  after  gix^Q!chKJLJJiaL±ha,firingJn^fl(]i  f^<>  raffia  nf 
"musketry  being  iijy'ifgftBffJlil^iy  the  gunners  on  the  Baba  Wali  Kotal 
Snng  over  the  breaks  in^^Kc<|uet^pill  upon  th^^  and  2nd 

fin^sdes.  The^Sffi  SilGSis  have  nad  one  man  killed  and  four  or 
five  wounded — a  very  slight  loss  indeed,  considering  the  heavy 
fire  they  were  exposed  to.  Xhe  reconnaissance  has  been  a  fgreat 
Btncofflfl^  for  we  have  ascertaipft<^  \^^^  A^^^  ^^  folding  Fir  Paimal  in 
"^•^"trthi  ^"^  ^^^  ^^  least  five  guns  in  position  there.  To-morrow 
we^jJljUffict  an  attack  on  his  T^g^^J^^^iA^^.  ^P;!^  ^  i^aimal 
|s  captured,  we  can  take  the  Bata  ^atCKotaf  m  reverse.  TThe 
firing  from  that  Kotai  iias  only  resulted  in  ^ghtening  a  few 
mules,  most  of  the  shells  not  bursting.  Our  picqnets  are  likely 
to  be  kcnt-wcll  awake  by  the  sharp-shooters  of  Ayub,  who  are  in 
^^Sewduurds  skirting  the  HeratJB(fia(^« 


Gandahab  Gantonscents,  Srd  September. 

had  demonstrated  that  Ayub  Khan  had  with  Jum  &-  laiag^  body  ■■■ 
of  l&en  anxious  to  meet  our  force  at  the  earliest  oppnrtiMiflij 
The^picquets  of  the  60th  Bifles  holding  Earez  Hill  were  fired 
into 'all  night  by  small  parties  of  the  enemy,  who  took  shelter 
behind  the  rocks  on  the  northern  slope  of  the  hill,  and  among 
the  orchards  and  enclosures  below.  From  what  we  have  since 
heard  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Afghan  army  were  much 
elated  with  the  afiiair  of  the  previous  day,  and  did  not  at  all  under- 
stand that  our  object  had  been  merely  to  draw  them  a  little  from 
their  position,  so  as  to  feel  our  way  cautiously  before  delivering  a 
decisive  attack.  We  have  been  told  that  they  looked  upon  our  re- 
connaissance as  an  attempt  to  force  the  left  of  their  position  by  way 


5o8  The  Afghan  M'ar,  1879—80. 

of  Pir  Paimal,  and  consequently  made  up  their  minds  that,  having 
failed  in  that  quarter,  we  should  next  turn  our  attention  to  the 
Baha  Wali  Kotal.  I  do  not  know  whether  I  have  already  ex- 
plained quite  clearly  the  relative  positions  of  our  own  and  Ayub 
Khan*s  army,  and  I  will  therefore  once  more  sketch  the  ground  on 
which  the  action  took  place. 

Taking  the  city  of  ^:"/^j?fl^°T  ^'tgalfc^Mii  f  pninli  frfl^p  which  the 
beariugs_m%y  hft  fixPil.  th^m  h'^s^  t^  thn  "f^^jy^-w^st^  at  a  distance 
of  between  laM>^.Mid-4luea<».  ml^,anrvig8i|ftf^^8^^^w^^  be 

considered  an  offshoot  frnm  thft  flhitf  rringfl  tffijifljfjg^yfi^^ 
north  and  forming  tl^e^astem  HuniilOT])!  1  ftf  ■tha  Acgnjjlflji  Jiltly 
Due  north  of  the  city  is  a  break  in  the  cbief  range  known  as  the 
Murcha  Kotal,  which  leads  into  the  rich'  Argandab  Valley  beyond. 
The  hills  to  the  south-west  from  this  Kotal  are  a  good  deal  broken 
and  are  generally  extremely  precipitous.  At  some  pre-bistoric 
period  there  has  been  a  great  convulsion,  in  which  the  range  has 
been  shattered  and  a  series  of  half-isolated  ridges  and  detached 
hills  formed.  Thus,  frgm  ^^^  Mtii./»ViQ  1^1,^1.  in  a  south-westerly 
direction,  stretches  a  high  ridge,  then  a  slight  dip,  then  a  rounded 
hill  rising  to  a  height  of  nearly  1.5QQ  ffl^f.  (Irnnwn  \^^  \\^p.  name 
of  the  Brig^^fl  ^^'^r)j  ^^^^  "'^^°  nfttilKftHy  seai-ped.  then  a  rapid 
fall  and  a  break  in  the  continuity  of  the  ridge^which  allows  a  road" 
to  pass  over  the  range  at  a  moderate  incline.  The  Kotal  tEils 
formed  is  known  as  the«6aba  Wali,  and  as  the  crow  flies  it  lies 
exactly  two  miles  and  a  half  from  the  north- west  bastion  of  the 
city.  ^'^  itifl  p"*^^^*-"  ^"^nt  nrn  nnPQ  Iqw  rQllinjy  hills  on  which 
Ayul^  Khan  usually  stationed  a  cavalry  picquet.     From  the  Saba 

Wflli  Trnf.n1  |^|]ft  i-j^oTA  ^(Inftlly  rifiAs  nprfti'n  nnf.il  U.g  big^^°^    P^"^" 

are  1,200  feet  above  the  plain  ;  it  never  loses  its  precipitni^s  ghar- 
jicter.  and,  looked  at  from  Candahar,  appears  quite  inaccessible 
on  its  southern  face.  It  stretches  about  a  mile,  always  in  a  south- 
westerly direction  from  tEe  Kotal,  and  then  ends  abruptly  in^he 
plain,  there  being  a  sheer  fall  of  several  hundred  feet  at^ts 
'western  end.  It  is  here  that  the  ^ap  occurs  ibrou^n  whl6&  lliB 
road  from  Candahar  to  Herat  passes,  and  the  canals  from  the 
^r^andab  are  conducted  which  supply  water  to  tbe  citv  ana  ttre 
^ip^bnnrinc  rii*>g^g  Looking  from  Candahar  westwards,  one 
the  right  the  precipitous  ridge  Known  as  the  l^r  i^aiiiill 


The  Position  before  Candakar.  509 

Hill,  and  on  the  left  another  liigli  rid^A    nvftrlnnlring  f.liA  jyina  of 

old  Candahar.  The  intermediate  space  has  in  the  background  a 
striking  conical  hill  and  various  other  disrupted  masses  thrown  off 
from  the  higher  ridges.  The  foreground  is  simply  a  network 
of  orcbfty<^g,  ffar^^^ns.  and  walled  enclosures,  between  which  and 
the  city  walls  lie  the  cantonments  built  by  us  forty  years  ago. 
"^2r!^^^"^^^r  ^^^^  ftlfltT  Hrfij  vp^fK  g,000  yards  soutk  of  theTPir 
Rimal  Ri<^gftr  ^  dfttached  ridge  which  would  serve  as  a  screen  to 
any  force  making  a  demonstration  against  the  Kotaj.  or  attempt* 
in£  a  turning  movement  round  by  way  of  the  Argandab  canals. 
'J^e  eaptAm  porf  nf  fl^jfif  ffnbsidiarv  ridye  is  known  as  j^iggget 
Hill,  a  picquet  being  generally  posted  upon  it  as  a  guard  to  the 
cantonments  and  to  watch  tJie  Kotal ;  while  the  remainder  of  the 
ridge  is  called  Karez  Hill,  from  tlie  springs  found  a  httieTg"the 
south  of  it.  Both  these  hills  are  within  range  of  tieid-guns 
placed  on  the  Kotal.  but  troops  endamped  beneath  them  on  the 
southern  side  are  well  sheltered.  The  walled  enclosures  previ* 
ously  mentioned  cluster  very  ^b^^^-kly  on  either  side  of  the  Her^t 
Jtoad,  and  with  the  orchards  give  good  cover  to  the  troops  en^sagipfid 

abon^  them.       Snfib    an    ftnftampniflnk    wftg    fnrnnflil    hy    aAnoiK>1 

Roberts  on  the  afternoon  of  the  31st  August ;  the  ftrj  pri^oilft 
(General  Macye^or)  being  across  the  Herat  Road  and  in  tm^t  ^f 
the  westernmost  point  of  Karez  Hill ;  the  1st  Brigade.  (General 
Macpherson)  coming  next  on  his  right  below  the  low  line  of  rocks 
rnnnrrting  thn  two  liilln,  nnrl  thn  ?ind  Brigade- general  Baker) 
being  half  a  mile  in  rear  of  T>i<}qi]flt.  TTill  vlwA  ^lose  to  the  western 
pftHTTtT^Jhft  ftanfcQniu<^|)tfl.  fienerftl  Roberts  had  taken  up  his 
head^^quarters  in  Rahim  Dil  Khan's  house,  formerly  used  as  the 
habitation  of  the  Royal  Engineers.  This  house  was  in  rear  of 
the  Iflt  and  2nd  Brigades,  and  the  enemy  tried  to  get  its  range  ; 
but  only  one  blind  shell  was  pitched  within  the  walls  of  the 
garden.  A  telegraph  office  was  opened  in  one  of  the  lower  rooms, 
the  wire  being  laid  from  the  Candahar  citadel,  to  enable  direct 
communication  to  be  kept  up  with  the  city.  On  the  evening  of  \ 
the  Slst  the  plan  of  attack  was  finally  decided  npnn.  its  myn  ) 
features  beinp;  a  heavy  y^pnnniulft  ^^  ilAmrniafiH^firm  nf  infftnlyy  \  ^V 
against  the  Baba  WaU  "K^^^^l,   ^^TiiloTfliA  laf  on^  Or.;j  ]^ricr^"^     Y /^ 

were  to   force   the   en^myV  "'ff^^    by  wi^y  nf  Pir  Pajpriftl^  falfA  \\^a       \ 


5IO 


The  Afghan  War,  1879—80- 


Kotal  in  reverBe.  and  then  ^torm  Aynb'g  **  entrenAed ''  oamp  at 
Mazra,  two  miles  or  faore  np  the  Arppndab  Valley,  Th^  Bombay 
brigade  of  cavalry  were  to  watch  the  Mnrohft  Kotfll  while  annflral 
Bgberta>  cavalry,  nnder  cnmmftnd  nf  aeneml  ffnfh  ftftTlg^f  ^^^^ 
{qOTOSS  th^  i^rff'^tii^iih  Rivftr  uxx^  teak,  nff  the  pnAmy'a  rafrAitf.  WAat- 

ward.  It  may  be  as  well,  now,  to  mention  that  the  cavalry  conld 
not  get  direct  to  the  river  as  was  expected ;  tjafl  village  of  fihimli- 

fruTi,  wl^frth  f.hfly  ha/l  fnnTiil  ilAOArfAil  m  f.hfl  rT'^YIftllfl  f'rjfii  and 
♦.hrnngli    whiP.h  thAj  \\^h  tn  pugfl^  having  beOP  «tr|]pffly  ncnnpied  by 


the  enemy  dnring  the  night.     This  village  was  in  the  midst  of 
the  orchards  lying  westward?  nf  TC^yez  Hilly  and  it  showed  great 
enterprise  on  the  part  of  Avnb  to  occnpy  it  after  oar  reconnaissance 
TiadJieen  mflde. 

The  brigades  tol^  off  to  make  the  turning  movement  roond  the 
Kr  Paimal  Ridge  mnatered  the  f'olloWlnfl[  Btf 6n3^  (indP^g 
officers)  at  roll-call  on  the  morning  of  the  l^st : — 


1st  Bbigade,  commanded  by  Gbnbbal  Maophebson. 


9-8,  B07&I  Artillery  (siz  aorew 

92od  mghlanders  . 

2nd  Ghoorkas. 

28rd  Pioneers. 

24th  Punjab  Infantry      . 


gans) 


Total  strength 


218  officers  and 

501 

99 

411 

99 

600 

» 

861 

99 

.2,091 


2nd  Bbigadb,  commanded  by  Genebal  Baesb. 

No.  2  Mountain  Battery  (six  guns)   .        •        .        .  200  officers  and  men. 

72nd  Highlanders 561      „ 

2nd  Sikhs 495      „ 

8rd  Sikhs 441      „ 

5thGboorkaa 477      ,, 

2nd  Beluchis 444      ,, 


Total  strength 


2,618 


The  8rd  Brigade,  commanded  hy  General  Macgregor,  was  held 
in  reserve  on  its  own  camping-gronnd.  Its  strength  was  as 
follows  : — 


The  British  Forces. 


511 


8rd  Bbioadb,  oohmandbd  by  (^enebal  Maogbboor. 

ll-9»  Boyml  Artilltry,  Hoantain  Batteiy  (dx  gmui)    .  126  officers  and  i 

2.60th  Klfles 517      „  „ 

4thGhoorkM 516      „  „ 

16Ui8ikhi 498      ,,  ,, 

25Ui  Pnigab  Infantiy 526      „  ,, 

Total  atrengUi .        •       .  2,188 

From  the  Candahar  garrison  the  following  troops  were  detailed 
by  General  Primrose,  and  from  this  list  and  that  which  follows, 
the  strength  of  the  garrison  when  relieved  can  be  made  out : — 


Corps. 

BritUh. 

Native. 

OflBcars. 

Men. 

DiTinonal  Staff     

6 

_ 

Caralrj  Brigade  Staff       

8 

— 

— 

iBt  Brigade  Staff 

2 

— 

— 

2iid  Brigade  Staff 

2 

— 

— 

B-B,  Royal  Hone  ArtiUeiy         

6 

189 

— 

C-2,  Royal  Artffleiy         

5 

135 

— 

5-11,  Royal  Artillery       

8 

92 

— 

2-7th  FnsilierB      

18 

876 

— 

66tb  Regiment      

11 

229 

— 

1st  Grenadiert  Native  Infantry 

8 

— 

152 

4th  RiJiea  Natire  Infantry           

4 

— 

885 

19tli  Native  InfiMitry       

6 

— 

508 

28th  Native  Infantry       

8 

— 

400 

No.  2  Company  Sappen 

1 

— 

88 

Poena  Horae          

4 

— 

125 

SrdScindHorae 

4 

— 

410 

3rd  Bombay  light  Cavalry          

5 

— 

218 

Total 

81 

971 

2,186 

The  total  strength  of  this  force  of  Bombay  troops  amounted  to 
a  little  oyer  8,220,  with  fourteen  gnns,  Tiz.,  four  40.poander8, 
foor  9-pounder  Horse  Artillery,  and  six  9-pounder  field-guns. 

There  weite  left  in  garrison  in  the  citadel  and  guarding  -the  city 
tbe  following  troops : — 

2-7th  Fuaiiliers— two  officers,  182  men ;  66th  Regiment — twa 
officers,  14j6  men ;  Ist  Grenadiers — one  officer,  162  men  ;  and 
80th  Natifve  Infantry  (Jacob's  Rifles) — ^three  officers  and  880 
men ;  or  /a  total  of  768  officers  and  men. 


1 


512  The  Afghan  War,  1879— 8a 

^r  liTfiflpn  brfflK'*"*^'^  "^  "^'f^*  ■f.u»i>^  .^.i  n»i  i^^^^  \^^^  fc|^py 
were  ready  for  tfafl  hft^^  ^^j'**  ^^"^  i^^#Aiii>  ^^i^^i^  Sir  F.  Boberts 
moved  his  head-quarters  to  Earez  Hill,  Bahim  Dil  Khan's  house 
being  allotted  for  the  day  to  General  Primrose  and  his  Staff.  Cap- 
tain Straton  had  established  heliographic  stations  at  various  points, 
linking  the  force  together  wherever  it  should  move,  the  three  chief 
stations  being  on  Earez  EUll,  the  roof  of  Bahim  Dil  Khan's  house, 
and  on  a  spur  commanding  the  Herat  Boad  above  the  village  of 
Ghilzina,  near  old  Candahar. 

T]ifl  flTiAmy  Vift(1  hflfln  firing  intflrm|ttftttt1y  both  from  the  Baba 
Wali  Kotal  and  the  Gnndigan  direction  from   '^'^y^rftfth,  '^^^  ^'<^ 
looked  as  if  they  w^re  full  of  figl^t  ^rxA  r\^\,  jnrlinti  tt  tV^'*^  yr^ 
infar  issue  with  us,     Onr  nriginal  plan  bad  to  be   Romewhat  modi- 

jftll  f^Tin'ngf/^  AynK  TTliftTi  nrhia  grAnftrftlinflirp^    f,|^f|  Moi'l.  TTofi^nllo^ 

^auuALBidge.  f|nnJigftn  \\^A  lift^||  occupied  ^irinff  *^^  "igtlti 
and  the  order  that  ftnrg^'"  noirQiiy  ipUii  f|^p|  f^nr  gnm^  ^f  "P-ij, 
''^  Tlii^^  (escorted  by  two  companies  of  the  7th  Fasiliers  and  four 
companies  of  the  28th  Bombay  Native  Infantrv).  should  form  up 

i^^onjhe  low  jiill  ft^ovpi  ♦I^q  trillog/^  /»nnlil  Tinf  Vin  Ai»,rrigd  nut  Thft 
movement  was  attempted,  but  it  was  at  once  seen  that  the  place  must 
be  cleared  by  our  infantry  before  cavalry  could  hope  to  ^et  past. 

^The  moYAmAnfja  nf  f.Tifl  finvftlry  nn  nnr  Ifift.  which  were  to  havo  been 

simultaneous  with  tbosft  of  tV>A  fwn  ftffAPlring  hrigftilAfl^  yaar^  fliATA. 

fgrft  /IaUja/I^  General  Gough  having  to  take  his  brigade  some 
eight  miles  round  before  he  could  strike  the  Argandab  Biver. 

Thifl  wflQ  nnn  fnwnnfl  mnilifipftf.inn  nf  nnr  pUna^  ftpd   a    SeCOud    WaS 

that  the  village  of  Mnllab  SnliiMail^  r^y^  ft  inw  TTinnni^  hftt^f^" 
fCflrp^  Hill  Rn<^f.liA  Pjr  P**^''^*'^  ^^'^Pf^i  ^°^  t/>  b^  taken  first  by 
General  M<i/».p}iArBnn^H  BngitilA^  hh  «nmA  hnnilrAilnnf  AfgViana   lift^ 

established  themselves  in  it  after  nightfall  the  previous  jav,   JBnt 

iill  thiH  wftfl  knnwn  In^^g  hftfnrA  Generfll   Rnbf^rtfi    Tnoyed  to  KareZ 

j;^'ll,  ai]d  pypparftf-ions  were  made  accordingly.  General  Boss  had 
command  of  the  infantry  attack,  and  dii*ected  General  Macpherson's 
Brigade  to  move  forward  through  the  gap  between  the  Picquet 
and  Karez  Hills,  clear  the  village  of  Mullah  Sahibdad  in  their  left 
front,  and  then  pass  on  under  the  Pir  Paimal  Bidge,  woddng  their 
way  between  the  canals  along  the  lower  slopes.      Geneiid  Baker 

\ 


\ 


The  Battle  of  Candahar.  5 1 3 

was  ordered  to  take  his  brigade  oat  to  the  left  of  Earez  Hill, 
Bkirmish  throagh  the  orchards,  clear  GuDdigan  village,  and  all 
the  enclosures  about  it,  and  join  hands  with  the  1st  Brigade  in 
the  final  movement  round  the  Pir  Paimal  Ridge.    Macpherson*s 
Brigade  wasjft  bn  thn  brignitin  nf  tlirrntiinnj  nn  it  wnfl  moving  on 
aninner  line,   and   would   prnbably   first    reach  the   Pir  Paimal 
^vilG^e  on  the  northern  slope  of  the  ridge,  to  capture  which  would 
ensure  thfi  Pf^^bn  Wnlj  ff otnl  bfinc  tnVftn  in  r^y^ivT^      The  actiyn 
commenced  soon  after  nine  o'clock  by  our  demonstration  against 
tbftt-JB^iaK     in  !kalacha-i-±laidar,  near  our  old  cavalry  lines  and 
some  2,200  yards  ^^  the  Baba^  Wali^  Kotal,  Brigadier-General 
Burkows  bad   in   poaition.four  4Q-pounder  breech-loading  Arm- 
strong giyis,  with^our  companies  of  the, 7th  fusiliers,  the  4th 
and'^lQth  Bomlj^ty  Infwitry,  and  some  Sappers,   ^ix  guns-o£  C-2, 
B. A.,  were  alsg  in  po^itioa  at  the  Childukhteran  \illa^e,  between 
Karez^and  the  Picquet  Hills.     Brigadier-(jleneral  Daubeny,  with 
four  companies  of  the  66th  Foot  and  four  companies  of  the  28th 
lombay  Infantry,  was  holding  a  line  between  Chilzina  on  the  left 
\d  Picquet  Hill  on  the  right ;  the  latter  hill  being  crowned  by 
D  companies  of  the  1st  Grenadiers.     Further  away  on  the  right 
igadier- General  Nuttall  was  watching  both  the  Baba  Wali  and 
ircha  Kotals  with  the  8rd  Scind  Horse,  8rd  Bombay  Light 
valry,  and  the  head-quarters  of  the  Poena  Horse.     TH^ia  madg. 
^nml  ^iapl<^Y^^  form  on   oil*  ^'^'fl^^j  ""^   '^ti  ^'^^  *  M  prfiff^"**)Y 
?  49-r''11T1flPV?  h^g**"   °   '^'g^^'^nB  fif^nnnnade   of  the  Baba  Wali 
>taj.     The  shells  seemed  to  burst  with  fifieat  accuracy,  buj  the 
r?ft    g^*^°   ^^    ^^'^   ^Ti£.infij  in   pncifmn    4>iava    upsweyed^bravelv 
ouprh.  the  Rhells  showing  that  two  breech- W^jflg  ArmRf.mnpr 
PQUnderS    and    one    €\^     nnr    own    HnrRft    Arf.iljpry    g""*"    ^^''^^ 

jnnf^4  ^n  t^**  P^^P  There  was  much  stir  and  excitement 
long  such  of  the  enemy  as  could  be  seen  on  the  hills,  but  this 
iS  greatly  increased  when  the  guns  of  C-2  began  shelling  the 
lage  of  Mullah  Sahibdad.  Bullets  from  Martini  and  Snider 
les  could  be  heard  singing  overhead,  as  if  the  Afghan  marksmen 
ed  long  shots  in  the  direction  of  the  battery ;  but  the  enemy  in 
e  village  kept  well  under  cover,  and  when  six  guns  of  the  screw 
itery  also  opened  upon  the  houses  from  just  in  front  of  the 
irez  Hill,  the  shelling  was  so  continuous  that  no  one  dared  show 

L   L 


514  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

himself  beyond  the  walls.  Under  cover  of  this  fire  Qeneral  Boss 
began  the  infantry  moyement.  General  Macpherson  moved  the 
2nd  Ghoorkas  and  92nd  Highlanders  oat  to  the  right  and  front  of 
the  village,  the  28rd  Pioneers  (who  had  furnished  an  escort  to  the 
screw-guns),  and  the  24th  Punjabees  following  the  leading  regiments 
as  supports.  At  the  same  time  General  Baker  got  his  brigade 
into  motion  and  entered  the  orchards  and  enclosures  which  shut 
him  out  from  Gundigan.  ^  <^ 

To  follow  the  movements  of  General  Macpherson*s  Brigade  first : 
the  92nd  and  2nd  Ghoorkas  had  orders  to  ''  rush  "  the  village 
without  a  halt,  and  they  carried  out  their  orders  to  perfection. 
It  was  the  turn  of  the  Ghoorkas  to  lead  the  brigade,  and  they 
were  first  out  into  the  open,  skirmishing  rapidly  forward  under 
Colonel  Battye  and  going  straight  for  the  southern  front  of  the 
village.  The  92nd  under  Colonel  Parker  worked  round  to  the 
right,  never  pausing  and  doing  but  little  in  the  way  of  returning 
the  enemy's  fire,  which  now  became  very  rapid,  the  Afghans 
appearing  on  the  roofs  of  the  houses  and  lining  every  available 
wall.  C-2  and  6-8  batteries  renewed  their  shelling  over  the  heads 
of  our  men,  and  this  had  a  good  moral  effect,  as  the  roofs  of  the 
houses  were  swept  by  shrapnel.  At  half-past  ten  the  village  had 
been  carried  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  the  Ghoorkas,  having  the 
shortest  distance  to  cover,  entering  first  from  the  Earez  Hill  side, 
while  the  92nd  rushed  in  from  the  opposite  side.  A  stubboin 
resistance  was  ofiered  to  their  advance,  the  92nd  losing  several 
men  killed  and  wounded;  among  the  latter  being  Lieutenants 
Menzies  and  Stewart.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Battye  of  the  2nd 
Ghoorkas  was  slightly  wounded  on  the  right  shoulder,  but  he 
continued  to  lead  his  men.  The  village  was  full  of  ghazis,  who 
sold  their  lives  dearly,  many  shutting  themselves  up  in  under- 
ground chambers  and  firing  upon  our  men  as  they  passed.  Some 
200  Afghans  were  killed  in  this  village  alone.  Lieutenant 
Menzies  had  a  narrow  escape.  After  he  had  been  wounded  he  was 
placed  in  an  empty  room,  for  the  sake  of  shade  and  comfort,  when 
a  ghazi,  hidden  in  an  inner  room,  rushed  out,  cut  down  one  of  Uie 
guard,  and  slashed  Menzies  over  the  head  and  back.  The  fanatic 
was  killed  before  he  could  do  any  further  mischief.  C-2  and  6-8 
batteries  advanced  when  the  village  had  been  taken,  and  were 


The  Battle  of  Candahar.  515 

soon  again  in  action,  firing  at  the  lower  slopes  of  the  ridge  and 
into  such  bodies  of  Afghans  as  coold  be  seen  in  the  enclosores  in 
front.  So  many  men  remained  hidden  in  the  village  that  Lien- 
tenant-Colonel  Battye  remained  with  some  of  the  Ghoorkas  to 
clear  them  ont ;  and  two  low  hills  north  of  the  Tillage  had  also  to 
be  cleared  by  part  of  the  brigade,  as  the  enemy,  scattered  about, 
occupied  them  in  considerable  numbers.  But  the  main  advance 
could  not  be  delayed  for  these  considerations,  and  the  92nd  and 
two  companies  of  the  2nd  Ghoorkas  (under  Major  Becher),  with 
the  23rd  Pioneers  and  24th  Punjab  Native  Infantry  in  support, 
disregarding  a  few  shells  from  the  Baba  Wali  Eotal,  moved 
towards  the  south-western  end  of  the  ridge  above  them.  They 
soon  became  involved  in  dry  water-cuts,  orchards,  and  enclosures, 
every  yard  of  which  had  to  be  sUrmished  through,  while  a  smart  fire 
was  poured  down  upon  them  from  the  crest  of  the  ridge  where  the 
enemy  mustered  in  force.  General  Macpherson  told  off  picked 
marksmen  to  keep  down  this  fire  from  above,  and  their  steady 
shooting  checked  it  to  a  great  extent.  Leaving  Major  White  with 
the  leading  companies  of  the  92nd  and  Major  Becher  with  his 
Ghoorkas  to  continue  their  hard  fight  round  the  corner  of  the  ridge, 
I  must  turn  now  to  the  2nd  Brigade,  which  had  penetrated  into 
the  maze  of  walls,  trees  and  water-cuts  on  the  left  of  General 
Macpherson's  line  of  advance.  :3  r  s 

General  Baker,  upon  moving  out  to  the  left  of  the  l^rez  Hill, 
had,  in  his  first  line,  the  72nd  Highlanders,  under  Colonel  Brown- 
low,  and  the  2nd  Sikhs,  the  latter  being  on  the  right.  In  the 
next  line,  in  immediate  support,  were  the  6th  Ghoorkas  (in  rear 
of  the  72nd),  No.  2  Mountain  Battery,  and  the  8rd  Sikhs  (in  rear 
of  the  2nd  Sikhs),  with  the  2nd  Beluchis  in  reserve  and  escorting 
the  Field  Hospital.  I  have  indicated  the  work  which  lay  in  front 
of  the.  brigade,  which  had  to  work  its  way  through  walled  orchards 
and  gardens,  where  it  was  difficult  to  keep  touch,  and  where  at 
times  the  men  could  only  see  a  few  yards  on  either  hand.  But 
the  work  was  done  splendidly,  the  order  of  the  day  bdng  to  keep 
moving,  and  when  once  engaged  to  go  steadily  onward  until  the 
ridge  should  be  turned.  The  right  wing  of  the  72nd  Highlanders, 
mnder  Major  Stockwell,  carried  orchard  after  orchard;  but  one 
check  occurred  where  Captain  Frome's  company,  resting  for  a 

L  L  2 


5i6  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

moment  in  a  dry  watercourse,  was  subjected  to  a  terrible  enfilad- 
ing fire  from  a  loopholed  wall  which  the  2nd  Sikhs  were  trying  to 
turn  on  the  right.  Captain  Frome  and  several  men  were  shot 
down,  and  just  when  the  fire  was  hottest  Colonel  Brownlow  came 
up.  He  was  on  foot,  and  had  just  entered  the  watercourse,  and 
was  ordering  a  rush  forward  to  be  made  when  he  was  struck  in 
the  neck  by  a  bullet  and  mortally  wounded.  He  was  dragged  a 
little  under  cover,  but  died  in  a  few  minutes.  His  second  in 
command.  Major  Stockwell,  hearing  of  his  death,  hurried  to  the 
watercourse  where  Captain  Frome' s  men  were  lying  under  such 
shelter  as  they  could  get,  and  forming  them  up  round  a  protecting 
elbow  of  the  channel  made  a  rush  at  the  wall.  Once  under  the 
loopholes,  the  men  were  safe;  and  the  defenders  of  the  wall 
beginning  to  waver,  the  Highlanders  placed  the  muzzles  of  their 
rides  through  the  loopholes  frpm  outside  and  poured  a  few  volleys 
into  the  enclosure,  completely  demoralizing  such  of  the  enemy  er 
remained.  From  this  isolated  struggle,  which  cost  the  72nd  so 
dear,  an  idea  of  the  severity,  of  the  fighting  may  be  formed.  The 
right  wing  of  the  72nd  and  the  2nd  Sikhs  were  forced  by  the 
enemy's  tactics  to  cover  so  much  ground  to  the  right  that  they 
left  Gundigan  on  their  left  rear ;  but  the  left  wing  of  the  High- 
landers under  Major  Guinness,  and  the  5th  Ghoorkas,  under 
Captain  FitzHugh,  cleared  it  with  ease  ;  so  shaken  were  the  men 
left  to  defend  it  by  seeing  their  fellows  running  from  the  orchards 
beyond.  General  Baker's  right  had  cleared  the  densest  part  of 
the  gardens  a  short  distance  in  advance  of  the  92nd  on  the  right, 
but  no  sooner  did  they  come  a  little  into  the  open  than  the  masses 
of  the  enemy  in  front  tried  to  "  rush  "  them ;  while  three  gons 
in  position  at  the  foot  of  a  high  hill,  Kharoti  Ridge,  north  of  the 
Pir  Paimal  Ridge,  opened  fire  upon  them.  Some  of  the  ghazis 
actually  charged  into  the  ranks  of  the  2nd  Sikhs,  but  could  make 
no  impression.  The  72nd,  seeing  a  large  body  of  men  preparing 
for  a  rush,  fixed  bayonets  and  charged  out,  completely  dispersing 
the  armed  mob  in  front  of  them.  One  ghazi,  more  resolute  than 
the  rest,  was  shot  by  a  sergeant  at  five  yards'  distance.  Cap- 
tain Murray  had  just  given  the  word  to  charge,  and  had  leaped  out 
of  a  ditch  with  his  men,  when  he  was  struck  in  the  shoulder  by  a 
bullet  fired  from  the  ridge  and  severely  wounded. 


The  Battle  of  Candahar.  5  j  7 

The  92dcI  Highlanders  and  Major  Becher's  Qhoorkas  were  now 
in  alignment  with  the  right  of  General  Baker's  Brigade,  and  the 
time  had  come  for  the  final  rash  roand  the  ridge.  The  enemy's 
right  rested  on  the  northern  slope  of  Pir  Paimal  Ridge  and  ex- 
tended  across  a  basin  (it  can  scarcely  be  called  a  kotal)  between  that 
ridge  and  the  high  Kbaroti  hill  to  the  north  already  referred  to. 
Behind  the  northern  hill  the  large  canals  and  watercourses  from 
the  Argandab  Biver  mn,  the  river  itself  being  a  few  hundred  yards 
beyond  the  series  of  channels.  It  was  in  this  basin  that  Ayub's 
army  made  its  final  stand.  It  had  no  real  entrenchments  to  line, 
but  a  deep  water-cut  12  feet  broad,  with  banks  2  or  3  feet  high, 
and  with  cultivated  fields  in  front,  served  as  an  excellent  defence. 
The  banks  had  been  ingeniously  loopholed  for  rifle-fire.  There 
were  two  camps  of  twenty  or  thirty  tents  each  in  rear  of  this 
channel.  The  first  was  well  away  to  General  Baker's  left  under 
the  northern  hill,  and  in  it  were  three  guns  ;  the  second  was  in  the 
middle  of  the  basin  and  had  two  guns  in  position.  The  village 
of  Pir  Paimal  was  on  the  slope  some  distance  to  the  left  front  of 
the  second  camp  and  right  in  the  path  of  Maopherson's  Brigade. 
The  latter  were  moving  in  an  inner  circle  close  under  the  ridge, 
while  General  Baker's  troops  had  to  work  well  round  to  the  left 
so  as  to  close  with  the  guns  under  the  northern  hill  and  block  all 
escape  from  the  basin  in  that  direction. 

The  action  from  this  point  can  best  be  understood  by  following 
the  movements  of  the  92nd  Highlanders  and  2nd  Ghoorkas. 
They  rounded  the  south-western  face  of  the  Pir  Paimal  Bidge^ 
and  succeeded  in  capturing  the  village  of  that  name  by  a  series 
of  "  rushes  "  and  by  turning  the  walls  on  the  right.  Major  White, 
with  the  leading  companies  of  his  regiment,  then  found  himself 
face  to  face  with  some  thousands  of  men,  who  seemed  determined 
to  make  a  final  stand  about  their  two  guns  in  the  basin.  The 
plan  of  our  attack  was  for  the  two  brigades  to  sweep  steadily  up 
the  basin  in  line ;  but  General  Macpherson  saw  that  as  he  had 
advanced  so  far,  and  there  was  a  tendency  among  the  enemy  to 
surge  forward  in  overwhelming  numbers,  there  was  nothing  for  it 
but  to  continue  his  advance.  Whenever  the  92nd  and  Ghoorkas 
halted  and  tried  volley-firing  the  enemy  ceased  to  retire,  and 
began  skirmishing  back  to  the  places  from  which  they  had  been 


51 8  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

dnyen.  The  28rd  Pioneers  had  also  worked  up  on  the  left  to  aid 
the  Highlanders,  and  Major  White  got  his  men  together  for  a 
charge.  The  enemy  had  tried,  by  taming  the  water  into  another 
and  a  dry  channel,  to  check  our  advance ;  but  this  was  a  complete 
mistake.  Onr  men  were  faint  from  thirst,  and  they  welcomed  the 
water  as  giving  new  life  and  strength.  Major  White  rode  along 
the  front  of  the  watercourse  in  which  the  Highlanders  were  lying 
under  cover  and  called  out  to  them :  ^'  Highlanders,  will  yon 
follow  me  if  I  give  you  a  lead  for  those  guns  ? ''  There  was  but 
one  answer — a  ringing  cheer,  and  the  next  moment  the  men  were 
rushing  across  the  open  ground  led  by  tbe  pipers,  playing  the 
SlogaUy  while  Major  White  rode  serenely  on  in  front  drawing 
upon  himself  a  terrific  fire.  The  guns  were  in  rear  of  a  water- 
course with  high  banks,  and  sheltered  by  this  the  A^hans  fired 
rapidly  and  well.  A  small  building  protected  their  right,  and 
some  800  or  400  riflemen  lying  on  the  slopes  of  the  Pir  Paimal 
Hill  poured  in  a  heavy  cross-fire  upon  the  92nd.  But  the  High- 
landers were  not  to  be  checked,  and  though  upwards  of  forty  men 
of  the  leading  companies  fell,  killed  or  wounded,  they  parried  the 
guns  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  Major  White  leaped  into  the 
watercourse  some  yards  ahead  of  his  men,  and  found  that  his  horse 
could  not  climb  up  the  steep  bank.  He  therefore  remained  quietly 
watching  the  enemy  firing  almost  into  his  &ce,  one  Afghan 
deliberately  aiming  at  his  head  at  a  few  yards'  distance.  This 
man  and  some  ghazis  were  killed  where  they  stood,  Major  White 
getting  his  horse  out  of  the  ditch  just  as  the  Highlanders  jumped 
into  the  water.  The  artillerymen  had  deserted  their  guns  some 
time  before,  and  had  left  both  pieces  double-shotted.  A  story, 
which  is  well  found  if  it  be  not  true,  is  told  of  a  Ghoorka  who 
had  attached  himself  all  day  to  the  Highlanders.  He  managed  to 
reach  one  of  the  guns  first,  and  leaping  up  on  it  he  waved  his 
cap  and  cried  in  Hindustani  : — *'  This  gun  belongs  to  my  regi- 
ment— 2nd  Ghoorkas !  Prince  of  Wales's!  "  Then  he  thrust  his 
cap  down  the  muzzle,  in  order  that  there  might  be  no  dispute 
as  to  future  ownership.  The  brilliant  charge  of  the  92nd,  ably 
seconded  by  Major  Becher  and  his  two  companies  of  the  2nd 
Ghoorkas,  with  the  23rd  Pioneers  rushing  up  in  support,  was  one 
of  the  leading  incidents  of  the  day,  the  rapidity  of  the  whole 


Defeat  of  Ayub  Khan.  519 

afiTair  being  almost  as  startling  to  General  Boberts  and  Qeneral 
Boss  as  it  mnst  have  been  to  the  enemy.*  The  mass  of  men, 
said  varioasly  to  have  numbered  from  8,000  to  10,000,  who  had 
gathered  in  the  orchards  and  been  driven  into  the  basin  and 
towards  the  rear  of  the  Baba  Wali  Kotal,  were  hopelessly  broken 
by  the  steady  wave  of  men  which  swept  them  backward.  General 
Baker's  brigade  harried  them  whenever  they  tried  to  cling  to 
cover  in  the  lower  watercourses,  and  the  92nd  were  driven  like  a 
wedge  between  them  and  the  slopes  of  the  ridge,  smashing  into 
their  midst  when  they  tried  to  rally  at  the  two  guns,  and  utterly 
breaking  what  little  cohesion  they  still  possessed.  The  first  stream 
of  the  fugitives  poured  out  from  the  orchards,  and  made  for  the 
Argandab  in  the  direction  of  Kokaran,  many  of  them  falling  into  the 
hands  of  our  cavalry ;  the  next  stream  poured  back  into  Ayub's 
camp,  carrying  the  news  of  the  defeat,  and  attracting  to  them 
the  escort  of  the  guns  on  the  Baba  Wali  Kotal.  The  last  two  shots 
fired  by  these  guns  were  in  the  direction  of  Earez  Hill ;  the 
first,  pitched  three  hundred  yards  short  of  where  General  Boberts 
was  sitting  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  did  not  burst,  while  tiie 
second  went  whizzing  overhead  far  into  the  gardens  beyond.  The 
screw-guns  of  6-8  battery  fired  a  few  parting  rounds  at  the  fugi- 
tives making  for  Mazra,  and  then  Macpherson  halted  his  brigade 
and  formed  up  his  regiments  at  the  foot  of  the  northern  dope 
of  the  Pir  Paimal  Bidge.  Gftnt^ral  Baker  had  called  a  halt  aoma 
time  before^  anv  serious  firing  directed  against  hia-^fighting_Uno 
having  ceased  when  the  orchards  had  been  cleared,  and  the  line 
had  swung  round  to  make  the  turning  movement  round  the  ridge. 
Nearly  all  the  enemy,  so  far  dealt  with,  had  been  irregulars,  and 
the  bayonet  charge  of  the  72nd  had  checked  whatever  latent 
ghazi-ism  there  might  be  among  them.  During  the  halt  the 
fighting  line  of  the  2nd  Brigade  was  reformed  as  follows : — 5th 
Ghoorkas  on  the  left,  8rd  Sikhs  in  centre,  and  2nd  Beluohis  on 
the  right.  The  72nd  and  2nd  Sikhs,  with  Swinley's  Mountain 
Battery,  were  in  rear,  replenishing  their  ammunition  pouches.  In 
this  new  order  the  2nd  Brigade  advanced  at  about  11*45,  and  as 
they  came  into  the  open  between  the  two  ridges,  a  half  battalion 

*  Major  White  was  recommended  for  the  ^etoria  Oroes  for  his  gallaiitry  on  this 
oocadon. 


520  The  Afglian  War,  1879—80. 

of  the  3rd  Sikhs,  under  Colonel  Money,  moved  oflf  to  the  left  to 
hold  the  point  of  the  northern  hill  overlooking  the  Argandab 
Biver.  The  three  guns  and  the  twenty  or  thirty  deserted  tents  in 
the  advanced  camp  at  the  foot  of  this  hill  fell  into  the  hands  of 
Colonel  Money,  whose  later  movements  I  will  refer  to  presently. 
The  rest  of  the  brigade  changed  direction  to  the  right,  and 
marched  up  the  basin,  the  72nd  taking  the  place  of  the  5th 
Ghoorkas  in  the  first  line.  Only  stray  shots  were  fired  by  ghazis, 
who  had  perched  themselves  on  the  hills.  The  action  was  really 
at  an  end.  General  Boss  had  joined  the  advanced  infantry 
brigades,  and  General  Boberts  was  also  coming  round  the  ridge 
with  General  Macgregor's  reserve  brigade.  A  spur  running  down 
from  the  hill  on  the  left  flank  of  the  Pir  Paimal  basin  hid  Mazra 
from  view ;  but  as  the  leading  troops  of  General  Baker's  Brigade 
passed  over  this  spur,  they  saw  a  mile  before  them  Ayub's  chief 
camp,  with  all  the  tents  standing  in  regular  rows.  Fugitives 
were  rushing  out  of  the  camp,  and  200  or  300  cavalry  were 
moving  oflf  among  the  trees  beyond.  The  72nd  Highlanders  and 
2nd  Beluchis  reached  the  camp  a  little  before  one  o'clock,  the  drd 
Sikhs  (half  battalion)  close  at  their  heels,  jvhile  General  Macpher- 
son  also  moved- his  brigade  leisurely  forward  in  the  same  direc- 
tion. The  72nd  advanced  a  mile  beyond  Mazra  village,  and  fired 
dropping  shots  at  such  runaways  as  were  still  within  range.  But 
the  powers  of  flight  of  an  Afghan  are  marvellous,  and  as  no 
cavalry  were  at  hand  most  of  the  enemy  made  good  their  escape. 
Colonel  Money,  with  his  half  battalion  of  3rd  Sikhs,  had  found 
that  beyond  the  point  he  was  sent  to  occupy  was  another  hill, 
giving  a  more  commanding  position.  He  pushed  on  with  some 
If  0  men  to  this  point,  and  to  his  surprise  looked  straight  down 
over  the  village  of  Baba  Wali  into  Mazra  and  the  enemy's  camp. 
At  that  time  it  was  packed  with  men,  and  ho  sent  back  word  to 
jreneral  Baker  asking  for  reinforcements,  as  he  could  not  venture 
upon  an  attack  with  his  handful  of  Sikhs.  It  was  too  late 
for  any  regiments  to  be  re-directed,  and  Colonel  Money  had  to 
watch  veith  much  chagrin  the  flight  of  the  Afghans  led  by  a 
large  number  of  cavalry,  probably  Kizilbashes.  However,  he 
came  upon  five  guns,  including  a  24-pounder  howitzer,  placed 
on  the  slopes  of  the  hill  near  Baba  Wali  village,  so  that  his 


Defeat  of  Ayub  Khan.  521 

half  battalion  held  eight  pieces  in  their  possession.  When 
General  Boberts  and  his  Staff  rode  through  Mazra  in  advanceTTf 
Macgregor^s  iJrigade  ihe  rout  of  Ayub*8  army  was  complete,  and 
nothing  remained  but  the  cavalry  pursuit.  In  four  hoars  onr 
force  had  s^&lCfif  Ad  tne  nitnerto  vicionous  Afghan  army,  driving 
them  from  a  position  they  had  chosen  deliberately,  and  with  a  full 
knowledge  of  our  strength,  and  capturing;  their  c^w^p  ftff  it  ^^^^^ , 
as  well  as  thirty-one  guns  and  two  of  our  own  Horse  Artillery 
9-pounder8.  No  more  brilliant  ending  of  the  rapid  march  from 
Cabul  could  have  been  wished,  and  the  vindication  of  our  military 
prestige  is  now  full  and  complete.  Liftnti^pftTif.  ]\fm»lftiiie  was  found 
to  liftVAKAflp  mnydgred  by  his  guards,  and  this  incident  has  em- 
ffiT^f^r^  nfln'fl  hatV^^  ^f  thft  ATg^anw.  That  the  Afghans 
did  not  anticipate  defeat  is  proved  by  the  appearance  of  their 
camp ;  not  a  tent  was  struck,  not  a  saddle-bag  carried  away ;  all 
the  rude  equipage  of  a  half-barbarous  army  was  left  at  our  mercy 
— the  meat  in  the  cooking  pots,  the  bread  half-kneaded  in  the 
earthen  vessels,  the  bazaar  with  its  ^%e«-pots,  dried  fruits,  flour 
and  com — just  as  it  had  been  deserted  when  the  noise  of  battle 
rolled  up  from  Pir  Payaal.   J^ 

But  to  describe  these  matters  more  in  detail :  When  our  troops 
found  themselves  in  rear  ofjgift  Tt^^^ft  Wft^i  F^^al  with  the 
enemy's  deserted  camp  Ivinf^before  them. all  opposition  was  at  an 
end,  and  our  work  wlii  to  collect  the  guns  wmcii  haa  Deen  aban- 
doned on  our  approach,  and  to  examine  tho  contents  of  Ayub's 
tents.  I  had  lingered  to  discuss  the  fight  with  Captain  Darvall, 
in  command  of  a  company  of  the  92nd  Highlanders,  guarding 
the  guns  White  had  captured,  so  that  the  1st  and  2nd  Brigades 
had  passed  on  when  I  rode  up  the  road  to  Mazra.  General  Mac- 
gregor  was  following  with  the  8rd  Brigade ;  but  by  this  time  we 
all  knew  that  tho  stories  furnished  by  our  spies,  relating  to  an 
entrenched  camp  and  a  defensive  position,  arranged  on  the  prin- 
ciples of  European  engineering,  were  fables.  The  8rd  Brigade  were 
balked  of  their  fight — for  the  60th  Bifles  and  the  regiments 
brigaded  with  them  were  to  have  assisted  in  the  final  attack  upon 
Mazra,  if  Ayub  had  taken  up  a  second  position.  Scattered  on  the 
open  stony  road  and  on  the  hill  slopes  were  bodies  of  men  killed 
by  our  volleys  when  the  Afghan  retreat  began.     There  seemed 


522  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

few  dead  men,  bnt  the  nuUahs  and  watercourses  could  have 
told  their  own  story;  for^^'t^l^ip  ihMv  a\\f\^ATm^  banks  were 
lying  clnsters  of  y^^'^-f>^  P^^fcfffintffl  ^^^  ^flf]  ^^Q^  foremosi  in 
pranks  ftll  day,  ^f  ^hf  ^UlTflrdly  ^^f^"^"-°  ^--  Ay»iv>^  ^^j  |^^^ 
fought  side  by  aide  yjtih  ^>^°^  ^^",  ^"^  Iqc^q^q  »^"*»^  ^flyn  ^ff- 
muC"  lifi""^'^"  •  ^"*  ^^^T  left  the  ghazi-led  mob  to  bear  the  brunt 
of  tke  attack,  and  took  to  flight  when  the  Pir  Paimal  Bidge  was 
turned.  The  most  desperate  spirits  seemed  to  have  been  killed, 
for  in  the  pouches  of  seyeral  men  whose  rude  waistbelts  I  examined 
there  was  not  a  single  cartridge  left.  The  rifles  of  such  as  were 
armed  with  Martinis,  Sniders,  or  Enfields,  were  taken  by  our 
soldiers  as  trophies ;  while  matchlocks  or  jhezaUs  were  broken  to 
pieces  and  cast  away.  One  man  killed  was  completely  equipped  in 
the  uniform  of  the  66th  Eegiment,  and  had  with  him  a  Martini  rifle 
and  bayonet.  A  number  of  men,  trying  to  preserre  some  form  of 
order  in  their  retirement,  were  clad  in  khaki,  and  at  a  distance 
were  actually  mistaken  by  one  of  our  own  officers  for  the  28rd 
Pioneers.  As  they  got  out  of  range  very  quickly  we  could  not 
secure  one  of  their  number  as  a  specimen.  Of  the  60  or  100 
bodies  which  I  myself  passed  at  close  quarters,  I  only  saw  some 
three  or  four  men  in  what  might  be  called  uniform.  These  had  on 
dark-coloured  jackets,  and  turbans,  surmounted  by  small  yellow 
pompons,  such  as  were  worn  long  ago  in  European  armies.  There 
were  also  men  shot  down  with  stray  portions  of  Indian  uniform 
upon  them,  but  they  were  plainly  peasants  or  villagers  who  had 
joined  Ayub  after  his  great  success.  It  is  said  that  Maiwand  was 
won  for  him  by  ghazis,  or  by  a  mob  of  rudely-armed  ryots  led  by 
those  fanatics;  and  one  certainly  saw  much  to  confirm  the 
idea  that  the  strength  of  an  Afghan  army  lies  in  its  irregulars. 
The  defenders  of  the  Mullah  Sahibdad  village,  the  men  who  tried 
to  ''rush'*  the  advanced  companies  of  the  72nd  in  the  orchards, 
the  mass  which  finally  was  broken  up  by  the  92nd  at  the  two 
guns — aU  these  were  white-clothed  peasants,  each  fighting  for 
his  own  band,  and  fighting  right  well  too.  They  were  seen  to 
kneel  down,  take  deliberate  aim  at  our  ranks,  and  fire  without  any 
sign  of  hurry :  having  fired  they  rose  to  their  feet,  retiring  at  a 
walk  and  re-loading  their  muzzle-loaders  coolly  and  calmly.  It 
was  these  undrilled   units   in   Ayub's    force  who  gave  us  most 


The  Enemas  Position.  523 

trouble,  and  who  were  killed  as  they  fell  back  before  our  steady 
advance. 

The  bodies  of  the  enemy's  killed  ceased  almost  entirely  as  soon 
as  the  spur  running  out  from  the  northern  hill  above  the  Baba 
WaU  village  on  our  left  was  passed.  This  spur  had  sheltered 
them  from  our  bullets,  and  the  shrapnel  from  our  40-pounders 
would  scarcely  reach  them  beyond  it.  The  road  to  the  Mazra 
camp,  from  this  spur,  was  at  first  strewn  with  the  accoutre- 
ments which  the  Afghans  had  thrown  away  in  their  flight. 
Thus  packets  of  Martini  and  Snider  cartridges  were  come  upon, 
with  stray  powder-flasks  and  ball-bags,  the  flight  having  become 
a  rout  as  our  brigades  pushed  up  the  Pir  Paimal  basin. 
A  few  hundred  yards  nearer  the  camp  were  the  guns  which  had 
been  withdrawn  from  the  basin  itself.  They  had  been  left  by 
the  artillerymen  just  as  they  had  come  out  of  action  :  here  and 
there  a  bag  of  powder  lay  near  the  muzzle,  as  if  a  gunner  more 
stanch  than  his  fellows  had  tried  to  load  his  piece  for  a  farewell 
shot ;  while  the  caissons  were  full  of  live  shell.  The  traces  lay 
stretched  out  along  the  road  where  they  had  been  dropped  when 
the  horses  were  taken  out,  and  we  could  imagine  the  gunners 
mounting  and  riding  off  before  our  cavalry  pursuit  began.  We 
were  delighted  to  see  one  of  our  own  Horse  Artillery  guns  standing 
on  the  road  none  the  worse  for  its  captivity,  and  word  was  sent 
back  for  a  team  to  remove  it  to  the  rear.  The  other  9-pounder 
lost  at  Maiwand  was,  as  conjectured,  in  position  on  the  Baba  Wali 
Kotal.  More  accoutrements  and  packets  of  ammunition  were 
found  scattered  near  the  first  line  of  tents,  and  once  within  the 
camp  we  could  see  how  hasty  had  been  the  flight,  and  how  little 
the  enemy  had  expected  a  crushing  reverse  in  a  few  hours.  Our 
reconnaissance  of  the  81st  seems  to  have  been  fatal  to  them ;  they 
looked  upon  it  as  a  first  success  for  their  own  arms,  and  had 
consequently  made  no  preparations  for  securing  an  orderly  retreat. 
Their  camp  was  pitched  in  a  very  orderly  way,  the  tents  being 
arranged  in  streets  with  their  front  looking  towards  Gandahar. 
The  rows  of  tents  stretched  away  fully  half  a  mile  in  rear  until 
the  small  village  of  Mazra  was  reached.  Ayub's  tent,  one  of 
the  kind  in  which  we  usually  hold  durbars,  and  large  enough  to 
have  accommodated  all  the  princes  of  the  Barakzai  family,  was  on 
the  right  of  the  camp  near  the  canal  which  carries  water  to  Can- 


524  The  Afglian  War,  1879 — 80, 

dahar.  A  handsome  carpet  still  covered  half  the  floor,  and  when 
the  Beluchis  first  entered  it  there  were,  I  believe,  many  evidences 
of  recent  occupancy.  Within  a  few  yards  of  it  was  a  small  tent 
with  a  small  enclosure  formed  by  upright  canvas  walls — the  zenana, 
in  fact,  wherein  the  Gabul  ladies  with  Hashim  Khan  had  lived. 
Ayub  himself  was  said  to  have  had  only  one  Kizilbash  concubine 
with  him.  In  this  tent  there  was  a  small  circle  of  carpet 
round  the  central  pole,  the  remainder  having  been  cut  away, 
probably  when  the  order  to  take  to  flight  was  given.  Another 
tent  near  Ayub*s  had  been  used  as  a  dispensary,  and  was  full  of 
native  drugs  and  of  the  hospital  stores  lost  by  General 
Burrows.  Some  of  our  native  doctors  were  busy  in  removing 
such  medicines  as  were  still  of  value.  Poor  Maclaine*s  tent  was 
forty  or  fifty  yards  away  on  the  bank  of  the  canal.  In  every  one 
of  the  common  tents  it  seemed  that  some  ten  or  twelve  men  had 
been  tenants,  and  the  strength  of  the  regular  regiments  must  have 
been  very  considerable.  Rude  screens  of  branches  and  boughs  of 
trees  had  also  been  raised  about  the  village,  no  doubt  by  the  host 
of  irregulars  swarming  in  the  camp. 

An  examination  of  a  few  of  the  tents  showed  a  vast  amount  of 
rubbish,  in  the  shape  of  clothes,  bedding,  cooking  vessels,  horse- 
gear,  and  miscellaneous  equipage,  with  vsAuable  stores  of  English 
ammunition.  Dried  figs,  grapes,  melons,  flour,  were  scattered 
about,  and  in  saddle-bags  and  wallets  were  all  kinds  of  ^'  portable 
property  "  more  or  less  valueless.  One  bag  which  I  saw  ransacked 
by  a  kahar,  contained  a  packet  of  Persian  books,  carefully  wrapped 
in  half  a  dozen  covers  of  cloth ;  a  store  of  raisins  and  a  bag  of 
flour  ;  a  silk  pugree ;  a  change  of  white  clothing ;  a  bridle  and 
stirrups  ;  a  purse  with  a  score  of  copper-pieces  in  it ;  a  pistol  and 
100  Enfield  cartridges.  The  ammunition  found  in  the  tents  must 
have  amounted  to  many  thousands  of  rounds.  Each  man  seemed 
to  sleep  with  packets  of  Martini  and  Snider  cartridges  at  his  side, 
while  the  packets  made  up  for  Enfields  were  in  heaps  in  odd 
corners.  One  large  tent,  which  had  evidently  served  as  the 
magazine,  was  filled  to  the  roof  with  bags  of  powder  and 
boxes  of  our  breech-loading  cartridges.  How  many  rounds  we 
lost  on  July  27th  I  do  not  know,  but  we  have  retaken  large 
quantities,  while  some  of  our  regiments  filled  up  their  pouches 
while  in  the  camp.    Brass  helmets,  kettle-drums,  some  of  the 


N 


His  Artillery  Captured.  525 

band  instmments  lost  by  the  66th,  bugles,  gold  aud  silver  laced 
coats,  were  among  our  loot,  and  some  boxes  of  Cabnli  rupees  were 
also  found.  But  important  above  all  were  the  thirty-one  guns  and 
our  two  Boyal  Horse  Artillery  9-pounders :  the  loss  of  these  will 
break  Ayub's  prestige,  for  when  he  returns  a  fugitive  to  Herat 
the  citizens'  first  question  will  be  concerning  the  artillery  he  took 
with  him  to  batter  down  the  walls  of  Candahar. 

I  returned  to  our  camp  behind  Karez  Hill  by  way  of  the  Baba 
Wali  Kotal,  and  founOAyub's  guns  still  in  position  on  tbe  plat« 
form  whence  they  had  nrea  upon  us.  He  himself  had  viewed 
the  capture  of  the  village  of  MuUah  Sahibdad  from  this  point. 
TTAfft  r>.ftflp4/lArft]^]^  ftUgifirnriiiff  "^"'"  hnd  ^een  s^pwn  :  sloping 
roads  had  been  cut,  up  which  the  guns  could  easily  be  taken,  and 
a  natural  line  of  rocks  had  been  well  utilized  as  a  screen  for  the 
pieces  placed  in  position.  There  were  no  embrasures  or  gunpits,  but 
the  guns  were  placed  so  that  having  been  fired  over  a  wall  of  rocks 
4  or  5  feet  broad  they  might  then  be  withdrawn  a  few  yards  below, 
reloaded  and  run  up  again  to  answer  our  fire.  Our  40-pounders« 
had  of  course  made  no  impression  upon  the  rock,  although  the 
shells  had  pitched  upon  the  wall  itself.  The  gunners  could  rest 
in  perfect  safety  when  not  firing,  as  a  space  had  been  cleared 
below  the  rocks  and  the  hill  sloped  sharply  downwards.  The 
narrow  road  over  the  Kotal  was  to  the  right  of  the  guns,  with 
rocks  overhanging  it  on  either  side ;  it  had  not  been  interfered 
with,  the  enemy  knowing  that  such  a  converging  fire  could  be 
brought  to  bear  upon  it  that  it  could  scarcely  be  forced.  There 
was  a  higher  position  above  where  the  9-pounders  and  the  two 
Armstrongs  were  posted,  and  here  a  7-pounder  mountain  gun 
was  found.  There  was  splendid  cover  for  infantry  lining  the  rocks, 
and  this  had  been  improved  wherever  practicable.  So  strong 
indeed  had  the  Eotal  been  made,  and  so  clear  of  all  obstacles  was  the 
slope  below — a  natural  glacis — that  to  have  attacked  in  this  direc* 
tion  would  have  been  to  court  heavy  loss,  if  not  a  disastrous  repulse. 

"^WO  fiftd  iinfii(?fi"^q  marred  the  succflfl»of  the  dar;  the  death 
ofCaptainStraton  and  the  murder  of  Lieutenant  MaclaSe,  who 
had  been  a  prisoner  in  Ayub'fl  liauds  uUice  the  eventful  i^7th  of 
July.  Colonel  Brownlow  and  Captain  Frome  died  gallantly  in 
action,  and  though  we  sorrow  for  the  loss  of  these  brave  men, 
there  is  the  consolation  that  they  were  at  the  head  of  their  regi* 


526  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

ments  and  in  the  fore-front  of  the  battle.  Bat  Captain  Straton's 
death  oocarred  at  a  moment  when  all  seemed  over,  when  we  had  but 
to  oonnt  our  losses  and  collect  our  Bpoils.  When  General  Boss 
had  joined  Macpherson's  Brigade,  halted  in  rear  of  the  Pir  Paimal 
Bidge,  the  shells  from  oar  40-poanders  were  still  coming  over  the 
Baba  Wali  Eotal,  endangering  the  safety  of  any  troops  pashing 
on  towards  Mazra.  It  was,  of  coarse,  all-important  to  stop  this 
shelling  of  the  Eotal,  now  virtaally  in  oar  hands,  and  the  easiest 
way  was  to  send  a  party  of  signallers  np  the  hillside  to  the  right 
of  the  Eotal,  whence  the  news  of  oar  rapid  saccess  coald  be 
flashed  down  below.  Captain  Straton  with  two  monnted  signallers 
was  with  the  brigade,  and  he  was  ordered  to  establish  a  station 
on  the  ridge  above.  Bat  as  there  were  a  few  ghazis  lingering 
abont,  two  companies  of  the  24th  P.N.I,  were  told  off  to  skir- 
mish well  in  front  of  him,  and  clear  the  gi*oand.  Before  they 
coald  move  off,  Captain  Straton,  a  man  with  no  sense  of  personal 
danger,  rode  slowly  np  the  slope  with  his  two  signallers.  He 
had  not  gone  more  than  60  or  60  yards  from  Generals  Boss  and 
Macpherson  when  a  shot  was  heard,  and  Captain  Straton  fell 
from  his  horse.  A  dark  figare  was  then  seen  to  rise  from  a  dip 
in  the  groand,  fix  a  bayonet  on  his  rifle  and  rash  forward.  The 
two  signallers,  men  .of  the  72nd  Highlanders,  had  dismounted  by 
this  time,  and  they  fired  at  40  yards'  distance,  bringing  the  Afghan 
down.  His  bayonet  had  passed  through  Captain  Straton's  coat, 
but  had  not  touched  the  body.  The  man  was  bayonetted  as  he 
tried  to  rise.  It  was  discovered  that  he  had  already  been  severely 
wounded,  and  could  not  have  hoped  to  escape ;  he  was  not  clad  in 
the  orthodox  white  of  a  true  ghazi,  but  had  on  a  sort  of  blue 
uniform,  which  seemed  to  indicate  that  he  was  a  regular  soldier, 
whose  fanaticism  had  prompted  him  to  shoot  the  first  officer  who 
passed  him.  The  bullet  from  his  rifle  had  passed  through  Straton's 
heart.  The  decease  of  Captain  Straton  is  a  great  loss  to  the  force ;  the 
perfect  way  in  which  he  had  controlled  the  signalling  was  universally 
recognized.  He  never  spared  himself  when  hard  work  had  to  be 
done,  and  the  soldiers  under  him  shared  his  enthusiasm.  General 
Roberts  always  relied  implicitly  on  him,  both  on  the  march  and 
in  action,  for  he  knew  that  if  it  were  possible  for  heliographing 
to  be  done  Captain  Straton  would  have  his  men  in  position  and 
his  instruments  at  work.     The  22nd  Begiment  have  lost  as  good 


Murder  of  Lieutenant  Maclaine.  527 

a  soldioT  as  ever  wore  sword,  and  there  is  a  gap  in  Sir  Frederick 
Roberts's  Staff  whioh  he  will  find  hard  to  fill.  The  second  inci- 
dent is  yet  again  on  different  lines,  for  the  mnrder  of  Lieutenant 
Maclaine  is  full  of  horror.  As  Sir  Frederick  Roberts  rode  into 
Ayab's  camp  word  was  brought  by  some  native  soldiers,  belonging 
to  Jacob's  Rifles  and  the  1st  Grenadiers,  who  had  been  prisoners 
with  Maclaine,  that  his  body  was  lying  near  Ayub's  tent.  Major 
Euan  Smith  was  sent  down  to  test  the  truth  of  the  story,  and 
found  the  sepoys  had  spoken  only  too  truly.  Poor  Maclaine,  with 
his  throat  cut  deeply  across,  was  lying  some  short  distance  from 
the  tent  in  which  he  had  been  confined,  about  40  yards  from 
Ayub's  own  tent.  The  story  told  by  the  sepoys  is  that  Ayub  fled 
at  eleven  o'clock  with  the  Gabul  sirdars,  leaving  his  prisoners  in 
charge  of  their  guard,  with  no  instructions  beyond  a  verbal  order 
that  they  were  not  to  be  killed.  Some  hour  or  more  after  this 
the  guard  rushed  into  the  tents  where  Maclaine  and  six  other 
prisoners  were  kept,  and  ordered  them  all  out,  as  they  were  to  be 
killed.  One  sepoy  was  shot  through  the  head,  and  Maclaine  was 
seized  by  several  Afghans,  who  threw  him  down  and  cut  his  throat. 
He  was  weak  and  ill  from  sickness  and  bad  food,  and  submitted  to 
his  fate  without  a  word.  Immediately  upon  this  there  was  a  great 
shout  that  the  English  were  upon  the  camp,  and  the  guard  fled 
without  touching  the  five  sepoys  remaining.  The  bitterest  rage 
is  felt  against  Ayub,  who  might,  by  confiding  the  officer  to  the 
Eizilbash  cavalry,  easily  have  ensured  his  safety.  For  the  future 
there  can  be  no  question  of  treating  with  a  prince  who  has  thus 
followed  the  worst  precedents  of  Afghan  history.  He  is  held 
responsible  for  Maclaine's  assassination  just  as  much  as  if  he  had 
witnessed  it,  and  our  only  regret  is  that  the  sirdar  did  not  fall 
under  the  sabres  of  our  cavalry  in  the  pursuit.  Maclaine's  body 
was  carried  into  the  Citadel  and  was  buried  with  military  honours 
yesterday  morning. 

Thi^  -fTflVftlry  pnrmiit  rfiflultf^d  i"  fl^M»w»-4fw»--r^.iii/>  ^Tiftmy  bdng 
kiUed^while  our  casualties  were  trifling,  only  two  officers,  Lieute- 
nant Baker,  of  the  8rd  Punjab  Cavalry,  and  Lieutenant  Chamber- 
lain, of  the  Central  India  Horse,  being  very  slightly  wounded : 
the  former  got  a  cut  on  the  hand  and  the  latter  had  his  sword- 
arm  bruised  a  little  by  the  point  of  a  tulwar.  General  Hugh 
Gough,  with  the  9th  Lancers,  8rd  Punjab  Cavalry,  8rd  Ben^ 


528 


The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 


Cavalry,  and  the  Central  India  Horse,  cat  off  groups  of  fdgitives 
who  had  crossed  the  Argandab  and  were  making  forEhakrez ;  bnt 
no  large  masses  of  men  were  encountered.  The  delay  in  not 
being  able  to  cross  the  Kokaran  ford  untU  eleven  o'clock,  of  course 
militated  against  the  pursuit  being  of  the  harassing  kind  it 
would  otherwise  have  assumed.  Once  the  river  had  been  forded 
the  cavalry  galloped  along  on  three  parallel  lines,  the  9th  Lancers 
forming  the  reserve.  The  Srd  Punjab  Cavalry  killed  over  seventy 
men  in  one  charge  alone.  General  Nuttall,  with  the  8rd  Scind 
Horse  and  Srd  Bombay  Light  Cavalry,  also  pursued  during  the 
afternoon,  up  the  Argandab  Valley  to  the  east  of  the  river^  kill- 
ing 100  stragglers.* 

Onr  Ini^ges  SO  far  as  they  have  been  ascertained  were,  on  August 
81st  and  September  1st,  as  follows: — 


Britiflh. 

W.A 

^_^ 

Officers. 

Bank  and  File 

MaiiTo. 

K. 

w. 

K. 

w. 

K. 

w. 

B-B,  Royal  Horse  Artillery        

— 

— 

— 

1 

— 

C-2,  Royal  Artillery       

— 

— 

— 

2 

— 

— 

6-8,  Royal  ArtUlery       

— 

— 

— 

1 



2 

Staff         

1 

— 

»— 

— 





2-60th  Rifles       

— 

— 

— 

2 

«_ 



72nd  Highlanders          

2 

2 

7 

20 





92nd  Highlanders           

— 

2 

14 

66 

— 

— 

Srd  Bengal  Cavalry        

— 

1 

— 

— 

1 

1 

3rd  Punjab  Cavalry        

— 

1 

— 

— 



5 

Central  India  Horse       

— 

1 

— 

— 



5 

2nd  Ghoorkas     

— 

1 

— 



10 

19 

23rd  Pioneers      

— 

1 

— 



2 

12 

24th  Punjab  Native  Infantry     

— 

— 

— 

— 

1 

10 

2nd  Sikhs            

— 

1 

— 

— 

8 

23 

8rd  Sikhs            

— 

^- 

— 





6 

4th  Ghoorkas       

— 

1 

— 



1 

5 

5th  Ghoorkas      

— 

— 

— 

— 

1 

2 

15th  Sikhs          

— 

— 

— 

— 

2 

4 

25 tb  Punjab  Native  Infantry     

— 

— 

— 





2 

Srd  Scind  Horse 

— 

— 

— 

— 



1 

Srd  Bombay  Cavalry       

— 

— 

— 

— 

1 

1 

2ndBeluchis       

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

1 

Total 

3 

11 

21 

92 

22 

99 

*  Six  hundred  and  forty-nine  bodies  were  afterwards  buried  on  the  Candabar  aide  of 
the  Pir  Palmal  Ridge.  The  enemy's  total  loss  must  have  been  about  1,200  killed,  and  a 
large  number  wounded. 


N 


British  Casualties.  529 

This  gives  a  total  of  killed  of  all  ranks,  46,  wounded  202. 
Two  followers  were  killed  and  fifteen  wounded ;  twenty  horses  and 
three  mules  were  killed;  twenty-one  horses  and  three  mules 
wounded. 

The  list  of  officers  killed  and  wounded  is  as  follows : — 

Officers  Killed. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Brownlow,  commanding  72nd  Highlanders. 
Captain  Frome,  72nd  Highlanders. 

Captain  Straton,  2-22nd  Foot>  Superintendent  Army  Signal- 
ling. 

Officers    Wounded. 

Captain  Murray,  72nd  Highlanders. 

Lieutenant  and  Adjutant  Munro,  72nd  Highlanders. 

Lieutenant  Menzies,  92nd  Highlanders. 

Lieutenant  Stewart,  92nd  Highlanders. 

Major  WiUock,  8rd  Bengal  Cavalry. 

Lieutenant  Baker,  8rd  Punjab  Cavalry. 

Lieutenant  Chamberlain,  Central  India  Horse. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Battye,  commanding  2nd  Ghoorkas. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Bowcroft,  commanding  4th  Ghoorkas. 

Major  Slater,  2nd  Sikhs. 

Lieutenant  Chesney,  28rd  Pioneers. 

The  wounds  of  the  last  eight  officers  are  not  severe. 

The  death  of  Colonel  Brownlow  is  a  terrible  loss  to  the  72nd 
Highlanders,  and  indeed  to  the  army  generally.  Brave  to  a  fault, 
he  was  a  model  of  coolness  under  fire,  and  always  handled  his 
men  with  judgment  and  decision.  He  was  marked  for  future 
distinction,  his  tried  ability  in  the  field  raising  him  far  above  his 
peers.  His  untimely  death  will  be  felt  most  keenly  by  his  own 
officers  and  men,  to  whom  he  had  greatly  endeared  himself. 


M    M 


530  The  Afghan  War^  1879—80. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

CSandahar  daring  the  Siege— Improrement  of  the  Defences— Sketch  Map  showing  the 
Diaposition  of  the  Gimiaon— The  Attitude  of  the  Enemy— Their  Plan  of  Attack— 
Deh-i-Khwaja  Village  occupied  in  force  by  the  Afghans— The  Sortie  of  Aogukt  16th 
— Determined  Defence  of  the  Village — Retirement  of  the  Troops— Death  of  Qeneral 
Brooke — The  Sortie  falsely  called  a  *•  Sacoess  "—Description  of  the  Afghan 
Siege  Works— Engineering  Skill  shown  by  the  Naib  HafiznUa  Parallels— The 
Training  of  Guns  opon  the  Shikarpur  Gate— The  Afghan  Karei  Trenches  on  the 
South— Attempt  to  form  Breaching  Batteries— Explanation  of  the  Engineering 
Skill  shown. 

Candahak  Cantonments,  9tfc  September,  1880. 

Sir  Frederick  Roberts's  troops  were  so  soon  pushed  into  action 
after  their  arrival  at  Candahar,  that  the  state  of  the  city  on  the 
81st  August  and  the  evidence  the  enemy  had  left  behind  of  their 
late  uncomfortable  closeness  to  the  walls,  have  been  partly  for- 
gotten by  many  of  us.  When  we  rode  up  on  the  morning  of  the 
dlst  there  was  indeed  every  sign,  both  within  and  without  the 
^  walls,  that  an  enemy  had  been  at  the  gate.  Candahar  rises  out 
of  the  plain  quite  abruptly;  its  walls,  with  their  tower-like 
bastions,  obtruding  themselves  upon  one's  notice  in  rather  an  un- 
sympathetic way.  They  shut  out  from  view  everything  that  lies 
within  them,  except  the  tomb  of  Ahmed  Shah  and  the  tower  of 
observation  in  the  citadel.  No  point  of  'vantage  enables  one  to 
examine  what  the  walls  may  hide ;  not  until  the  gates  are  passed 
does  the  character  of  the  city  disclose  itself.  It  has  been 
^too  often  described  for  me  to  venture  to  sketch  its  two  broad 
roads  bisecting  each  other  at  right  angles  near  the  centre  of  the 
city;  its  citadel  guarded  by  a  deep  ditch;  its  high  walls  of  a 
breadth  sufficient  to  make  breaching  a  work  of  great  difficulty  even 
to  heavy  artillery,  and  its  narrow  gates,  guarded  each  by  flanking 
towers  which  stand  out  on  either  hand  of  the  doorway  as  if  the 
mud-work  of  the  walls  had  been  cut  through  and  folded  back 
to  admit  of  entrance  being  given.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  say 
that  the  defences  had  been  strengthened  during  the  siege  by 
such  contrivances  as  are  usually  employed  to  check  assaults  upon 


Defences  of  Candahar.  531 

walled  towns,  and  that  the  gaps  and  breaks  in  the  bastions  and 
parapet  had  been  filled  in  with  saiid-bags,  which  still  remain  in 
all  the  rongh-and-ready  state  in  which  they  were  hastily  piled  np. 
On  Angast  81st  our  first  view  of  Candahar  was  from  near  Deh-i- 
Khwaja,  the  village  against  which  the  sortie  of  the  16th  had  been 
directed.  We  did  not,  however,  enter  by  the  Cabal  Gate,  on  the 
eastern  face,  but  by  the  Shikarpor  Gate,  facing  southwards. 
It  was  here  that  the  outer  defences  had  been  made  strongest, 
as  the  enemy's  attack  in  force  was  expected  from  the  group 
of  villages  lying  to  the  south  and  south-west,  some  of  the  walled 
vineyards  and  gardens  of  which  were  within  800  yards  of 
the  south-west  bastion,  and  less  than  a  mUe  from  the  Shikar- 
pur  Gate  itself.  The  temporary  bazaar  outside  this  gate, 
established  for  the  benefit  of  our  force  marching  in  from 
Momand,  was  formed  amidst  the  ahattiA^  wire  entangle- 
ments, chevatLx-de-frise,  and  broken-down  walls  which  cumbered 
the  ground  and  would  have  impeded  the  rush  of  an  attacking 
force.  The  bastions  and  parapet  bristled  with  sand-bags,  over 
which  the  sentries  on  guard  looked  down,  no  doubt  with  hearty 
relief  as  our  troops  drew  up  and  piled  arms  preparatory  to  break- 
fiast.  And  yet  there  was  no  enthusiasm  shown  at  our  approach ; 
not  a  band  turned  out  to  play  us  in,  not  a  cheer  was  raised  to 
welcome  us.  Perhaps  we  had  been  so  near  for  the  last  few  days 
that  the  novelty  of  being  released  from  a  dangerous  situation  had 
passed  away  from  the  minds  of  the  garrison ;  perhaps — and  I  am 
afraid  this  is  the  more  likely  explanation — ^the  prevailing  tone 
among  General  Primrose's  troops  was  one  still  of  depression  and 
want  of  ^'  heart."*  The  reaction  had  not  set  in,  and  the  disas- 
trous defeat  at  Maiwand  and  the  sad  result  of  tlie  sortie,  were 
still  remembered  with  great  vividness.  There  had  been  undoubted 
demoralization  existing  within  the  walls  during  the  siege,  caused 
by  that  unreasoning  dread  of  an  enemy  which  always  arises  after 
defeat.  How  far  the  demoralization  spread  only  commanding 
officers  could  really  know ;  but  it  was  impossible  that  the  rem- 
nants of  a  beaten  brigade  could  be  brought  once  more  into  contact 
with  the  main  body  without  producing  some  ill-e£fect.    Letters 

*  On  Angnat.3rd  General  PrijBIfilift  irttnrmt^  fiftloael  ^_  John  that,  acting  «nder  the 
^TJoeof  hSa  brigadien,  he  assamed  chitf  politi<^l^athOTi^. 

M    M    2 


53^  Ttu  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

which  reached  us  after  we  left  Ehelat-i-Ghilzai  spoke  of  the 
"  long  faces  drawn,"  and  the  depression  of  which  they  were  the 
too  visible  sign.  And  yet  there  were  over  4,000  effective  soldiers, 
British  and  native,  under  General  Primrose's  orders.  One  panic- 
stricken  man  may  infect  a  hundred ;  one  panic-stricken  regiment 
an  army;  and  to  judge  by  the  stories  told  by  soldiers  of  the  garri- 
son to  our  own  men  of  the  Cabul  force,  there  was  a  tendency  to 
foster  the  ^'  ghazi  scare,"  and  to  nurse  and  nurture  it  until  it 
grew  to  formidable  proportions.  Thus  our  sowars  told  of  the 
terrible  Aimak  horsemen  who  feed  their  horses  on  raw  meat  and 
charged  with  such  effect  that  no  one  could  withstand  them ;  that 
our  cavalry  would  wither  away  before  the  flame  and  smoke  breathed 
from  their  horses'  nostrils.  Our  sepoys,  nearly  all  Sikhs  and 
Ghoorkas,  were  so  self-confident  that  they  made  no  secret  of  their 
desire  to  meet  the  much-bepraised  ghazi- ^^ :  they  were  warned 
that  they  did  not  know  what  the  local  ghazis'  fighting  powers 
were,  and  there  was  what  in  Western  life  would  be  called  **  head- 
shaking  "  at  our  rapid  movement  towards  the  Pir  Paimal  Bidge 
on  the  8l8t.  We  seemed  to  local  wiseacres  to  be  going  right  into 
the  jaws  of  death,  whereas  our  firm  belief  was  that  we  were 
rushing  into  the  arms  of  victory.  Our  men  were  impatient  to 
wipe  out  the  disgrace  which  had  fallen  on  our  arms. 

To  revert  to  the  appearance  of  the  city  when  we  formally 
relieved  it :  The  flanking  bastions  which  stud  the  wall  at  regular 
intervals  are  seventy  in  number.  They  are  really  circular  towers 
with  that  part  of  the  circumference  cut  away  which  looks  city- 
wards. As  they  were  in  a  wretched  state  of  repair  as  regarded 
their  upper  layers  of  sun-dried  mud,  there  was  much  to  be  done 
in  building  up  a  new  parapet  with  sand-bags,  and  their  appearance 
is  now  most  uncouth,  each  tower  seeming  **  top-heavy"  and 
suffering  from  an  excrescent  growth  which  may  yet  be  in  its  in- 
fancy. The  south-west  bastion,  overlooking  the  Shikarpur  viUage 
wherein  the  enemy  were  always  swarming,  was  strengthened 
greatly  by  these  means,  embrasures  being  left  through  which  our 
40-pounders  could  be  trained  to  the  east,  west,  and  south.  A 
fantastic  appearance  was  also  given  to  the  main  walls  of  the  city  by 
cutting  down  the  parapet  for  18  inches  at  points  equi-distant 
from  the  bastions^  and  placing  upright  sand-bags  to  fill  in  the  gap 


r.t. 


«««o» 


T*  Dtk  Ektmii*  900  jfmit 


SKBLETOR    PLAH    OF    lAIDAHAR. 


DIBPOtinOV  Of  OUVB. 


Oom. 
9-Pr,M,L.B.Gtm,0^ILA. 

9-iV. diUo ditto. 

9-IV. diUo ditto. 

40~Ft.  B,  L,  R.  Chm 

e-Pr.  S.  B.  Chtm. 

40~Pr.  B.  L.  R,  Chm 

9.JV.  if.  L.  B.  Gtm,  B^B„  B,EJk. 


..N.  B. 


im ... ) 

f-:::j 

a,  B.  Bttian  ...) 
Shikmmor  Omh  > 
5.  IT.BMttMi...) 


OlfflCM  OMDO.  f  AC!  . 

OmL  Etrudw  Obwf. 


9.iV. ditto diUo )  Aral  flblo ) 

9^Fr. diUo 0-2,  KA,...TcManm  Q^U, .  (  (M.  BlUt,  BM 

40.iV.  i^.  L.  &  (TiNi -)  if.  ir.BoiiioA  .. ) 

,)B9iffkQ€U, 


9.JV.  if.  L.  B,  Qwi^  B'B.,  BMJk. 

9-IV. ditto 

40.iV.  B.  X.  £.  Om 


..aTFj 

(HUM. 


B.W. 


Precautions  in  the  City.  533 

thns  made.  Ten  riflemen  were  told  off  to  man  each  of  these  gaps, 
which  were  10  feet  in  length.  The  necessity  for  thus  improving 
the  parapet  was  dae  to  the  defective  system  of  loopholing  in  vogue 
among  the  Afghans.  They  pierce  their  walls  with  narrow  slits, 
through  which  it  is  impossible  to  see  more  than  a  few  square  yards 
of  ground  below ;  and  at  night  not  an  object  can  be  seen  from 
nine-tenths  of  the  loopholes.  The  effect  of  combined  breech- 
loading  fire  would  be  minimized  if  rifles  had  thus  to  be  blindly 
fired  into  space ;'  whereas  by  giving  men  a  chance  of  seeing  over 
the  wall  and  grouping  the  defenders  into  tens  at  fixed  points,  their 
fire  could  be  always  well-aimed  and  kept  well  under  control.  To 
repel,  for  instance,  an  attack  of  5,000  or  6,000  men  led  by  ghazis 
determined  to  scale  the  walls  or  die  in  the  attempt,  fire  from  the 
ordinary  loopholes  would  have  been  thrown  away,  and  only  the 
cross-fire  from  the  nearest  bastions  could  have  told  ;  but  once  the 
defenders  could  fire  at  almost  any  angle,  through  the  ten-feet  gaps 
I  have  described,  the  ground  in  front  of  any  given  point  could  be 
swept  by  continuous  volleys.  Inside  the  city  one  could  not  fail 
to  be  struck  with  the  open  display  of  force  made  at  every  available 
point.  There  was  quite  a  crowd  of  European  soldiers  and  Bombay 
sepoys  filling  the  Shikarpur  Gate  as  General  Soberts  and  his  Staff 
entered  the  city,  and  nearly  every  man  seemed  to  have  his  bayonei 
fixed  or  sword  drawn.  No  doubt  Candahar  bears  an  ill-reputation 
for  ghazi-ism,  and  there  were  many  discontented  spirits  within  its 
walls  even  after  the  18,000  Pathans  had  been  turned  out ;  but  the 
display  of  naked  weapons  certainly  struck  us  poor  pilgrims  from 
quieter  Cabul  as  unusual  and  alarming.  Our  own  vevolvers  were 
comfortably  reposing  on  our  hips,  while  we  found  it  was  the  fashion 
to  carry  the  pistol  in  the  hand,  or  a  drawn  sword,,  or  a  hog-spear, 
or  a  bayonet  fixed  on  a  long  stick  a  la  ghazu  In  the  Chat  Soo, 
the  covered,  arched  bit  of  bazaar,  where  the  chief  roads  cot  through 
each  other,  were  more  men  with  drawn  swords  and  h%ed  bayonets. 
The  guards  at  the  gates,  at  the  entrance  ta  the  citadet  and  else- 
where, seemed  of  great  strength ;  bat  without  wishing  to  be  rudely 
critical,  one  could  not  help  feeling  that  numbers  were  necessary 
where  the  sepoys  were  of  such  poor  physique.  It  is  dangerous  to 
say  a  word  against  the  Bombay  regiments,  as  a  swarm  of  eager 
defenders  will  start  up  at  once  to  jastify  them  and  to  challenge  com- 


534  ^'^  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

parison  with  the  army  of  Northern  India.  Bnt  I  most  homhly 
Bubmit  that  the  weedy  under-grown  sepoys  of  on^  or  more  of  the 
regiments  now  in  Candahar  are  no  more  like  soldiers  than  a  stage 
army  is  like  those  '^  cnll*d  and  choice-drawn  cayaliers  *'  who  won 
Aginconrt.  I  have  not  seen  a  regiment  paraded,  and  I  do  not 
know  the  distinctive  dress  of  any  particular  regiment,  but  there  the 
men  were  before  my  eyes,  and  they  were  certainly  sorry  apologies  for 
sepoys.  The  appearance  of  the  citadel  was  as  warlike  as  that  of 
the  city  we  had  passed  through,  sand- bags  and  bags  of  flour,  &c., 
being  well  to  the  fore  wherever  there  was  a  gate  to  be  strengthened 
or  a  wall  to  be  made  more  imposing.  The  tower  in  the  citadel 
upon  which  Captain  Keyser,  of  the  7th  Fusiliers,  had  his  chief 
heliograph  station,  was  topped  by  a  circular  wall  of  bags  some 
five  feet  high,  and  from  this  point  there  was  a  good  view  of  all 
the  surrounding  country.  The  northern  wall,  with  the  Eedgah 
Gate,  looking  towards  Mazra,  had  its  complement  of  the  ever- 
repeating  sand-bags,  and  in  the  north-west  comer  bastion  was  the 
40-pounder  which  had  shelled  Picquet  Hill  and  our  cantonments, 
when  Ayub  rashly  pitched  his  tents  within  range. 

It  is  difficult  of  course,  after  a  lapse  of  time,  to  pick  up  the 
threads  of  a  story,  especially  when  that  story  has  for  its  moral 
indecision  and  disaster;  and  therefore,  in  dealing  with  events 
before  and  during  the  siege  of  Candahar,  I  have  to  guard  against 
being  led  away  by  the  hasty  criticism  or  loose  talk  of  irresponsible 
persons.  I  would  rather  leave  such  facts  as  I  have  gathered  to 
speak  for  themselves  than  formulate  conclusions  which  must  of 
necessity  be  based  upon  other  men's  evidence.  Not  having  seen 
vrith  my  own  eyes  movements  and  actions  which  had  most  serious 
results,  I  can  only  present  them  as  they  were  pictured  to  me  by 
eye-witnesses.  To  make  the  story  clearer,  reasons  must  b^  given 
for  certain  positive  moves  made  by  those  holding  authority  among 
the  besieged  garrison;  the  more  general  question  of  passive 
defence  being  governed  by  other  conditions,  such  as  the  wjoralt 
and  strength  of  the  force  at  the  Lieutenant-General's  disposal,  the 
numbers  and  capacity  of  the  enemy,  and  their  probable  intentions. 

Ayub  Khan's  forces  made  their  appf^t^HliUrr  ab""^  ^ifln^ahar  oiu- 
the^Tth  of  Auyist,  tf^^i  <^<^yR  ftfifilT^-^^  Maiwand  defeat,  aodjSQfilL. 
was  their-confidence  at  that  time  that  they  occupied  part  of  our 


The  Early  Days  of  the  Siege.  535 

cantonments,  and  pitched  their  camp  well  within  range  of  oar 
40-pounders.  They  were  soon  aware  of  their  error,  when  shells 
began  to  burst  even  in  the  Sorteep's  tent,  and  they  withdrew  to  a 
safer  distance,  and  set  to  work  in  a  less  obtrusive  but  more 
systematic  way.  Against  the  northern  face  of  the  city  wall,  and, 
for  the  most  part,  against  the  western  face  also,  they  could  do 
nothing ;  there  were  no  villages  or  enclosures  to  cover  their  move- 
ments. To  the  north  the  plain  is  covered  with  graves,  while  on 
the  west  there  is  a  clear  space  at  least  one  mile  in  breadth  between 
the  cantonments  and  the  Herat  Gate.  On  the  south-west  were 
groups  of  enclosures  with  high  mud  walls,  twelve  or  eighteen 
inches  thick,  guarding  the  orchards  and  vineyards  of  Shikarpur 
and  Deh  Haji  villages  which  lay  in  rear  of  them.  These  gave 
cover  to  their  sharp-shooters,  good  positions  for  their  guns,  and 
accommodation  and  food  to  any  large  body  of  inen  they  might 
mass  within  them.  The  deep  water-channels  of  an  open  harez 
were  also  available  as  shelter-trenches  and  first  parallels,  if  the 
Afghans  so  far  understood  the  art  of  war ;  and  altogether  the 
BU^arpur  Gate  and  the  south-west  comer  bastion  of  the  city  wall 
wftrq  jikeTyi^t^bH  mfitiacfid.  Ho^  admirably  the_ Naib  Hftfi ^"^^ «^, 
Vh^-OKa&aaiSjia  be  the  .guifiiJJK-SEylt  pI^T^^'s  army,  recognized^ 
-4haitdvantages  of  an  approach  ^''?^  thifl  ^^^^^^OR  \  *i^n]"  o^jViaj^n 
prepentlv.  There  was  open  country  (cultivated  fields  lying  fallow) 
facing  me  portion  of  the  southern  wall  to  the  east  of  the  Shikarpur 
Gate ;  but  there  were  many  low  walls  in  this  direction  also.  '  The 
eastern  face,  equally  with  the  Shikarpur  Gate  and  the  south- 
western line  of  defence,  might  be  looked  upon  as  attracting  an 
attack,  or  at  least  a  strong  demonstration,  owing  to  the  nearness 
to  the  Gabul  Gate  of  the  large  village  of  Deh-i-Eiiwaja.  The 
distance  in  a  direct  line  from  the  gate  to  the  village  walls  was  less 
than  1,000  yards,  and  the  intermediate  space  was  not,  as  on  the 
western  face,  clear  of  every  obstacle,  but  was  traversed  by  lands 
with  low  boundary  walls  and  by  a  water-channel  running  alongside 
the  road  leading  from  the  city  through  the  village.  Deh-i-Ehwaja 
covers  several  acres  of  ground,  and  as  each  house  has  an  inde- 
pendent door,  and  is  connected  with  its  neighbour  by  stout  mud 
walls,  the  place  presents  no  salient  point  to  a  storming  party 
where  a  position  could  be  seized  and  made  good.     In  the  hands 


1 


536 


TAe  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 


of  resolute  men  each  house  would  become  a  miniature  fort  to  be 
taken  before  the  next  one  could  be  approached.  I  suppose  this 
fact  was  known  to  the  ofBcers  who  were  responsible  for  the  attack 
ultimately  made  upon  the  place.  In  addition  to  the  cover  offered 
by  the  low  walls  between  the  village  and  the  eastern  wall,  there 
was,  a  few  yards  outside  the  Cabul  Gate,  a  pile  of  buildings  used 
as  a  %eraL  We  could  not  of  course  occupy  these,  and  we  had  not 
had  time  to  destroy  them.  They  would  have  formed  the  connect* 
ing  link,  and  a  very  strong  one,  between  Deh-i-Ehwaja  and  any 
party  told  off  to  assail  the  Cabul  Gate. 

Tha^nfimy  in  their  jg<r«ronfidenrfl»^r  by  wrongly  estimatix 
ogtlPiUtag  power  in  Afghanistan,  intendedtolFednW  the  garrison 
to,  weakness  by  starvation,  and  tflBTi  tCggsault  two^ 
the  irregulars  led  by  ghazis  being  anxious  lo  carry  the 

cutting  its  way  out,  the  villages  on  the  south  and  Deh-i-Ehwaja 
on  the  east  were  occupied  in  force,  and  earthworks  thrown  up 
along  the  line  of  hcurez  near  the  Shikarpur  group  of  villages. 
Guns  were  mounted  at  several  points  from  which  shells  were 
pitched  with  fair  accuracy  into  the  citadel  or  burst  over  particular 
bastions.  One  gun,  said  to  be  a  6-pounder,  was  placed  in 
Deh-i-Ehwaja,  an  embrasure  being  formed  by  cutting  through  a 
mud  wall  some  twelve  feet  high,  and  piling  up  on  either  side 
earth  and  the  debris  of  a  house  which  these  amateur  engineers 
demolished.  This  gun  did  little  or  no  damage  when  it  was  fired 
at  the  Cabul  Gate,  but  the  rifle  fire  from  the  walls  of  the  village 
seriously  annoyed  such  working  parties  as  were  sent  out  by  the 
garrison  to  destroy  the  low  walls  bounding  the  roads  through  the 
fields.  General  Primrose  at  last  ordered  that  no  more  parties 
should  go  outside  the  gates,  so  that  the  cover  existing  for  an 
attacking  force  was  left  intact.  Day  by  day  it  was  noticed  that 
Deh-i-Ehwaja  was  crowded  with  men,  and  suspicion  became  rife 
that  preparations  were  being  made  for  forcing  the  Cabul  Gate  and 
**  rushing  "  the  defences  on  that  side  by  a  swarm  of  irregulars.  Now 
the  word  *^  ghazi "  carried  dismay  into  the  hearts  of  many  of  the 
garrison — as  it  does  still  no  doubt — and  it  became  an  open  question 
whether  it  wasnot  time  to  breakthrough  the  inaction  which  prevailed, 
and  force  a  fight  on  a  small  scale  outside  the  walls.  It  was  impossible 


The  Sortie  by  the  Garrison.  537 

to  shell  the  place  effectaally,  as  three  of  oar  40-poanders  were  in 
position  on  the  north-west  and  southern  hastions,  and  our 
9-pounders  over  the  Cabul  and  Durani  Gate  could  not  hope  to  be 
of  any  great  use  against  thick  mud  walls  and  domed  houses.  The 
two  mortars  of  the  heavy  battery  might  plump  shell  into  the  midst 
of  the  houses,  but  they  would  not  scare  its  defenders  away.  The 
original  plan  of  the  sortie  was,  I  believe,  conceived  by  Major  Hills, 
rfn7;riafrrii^fjj^r"-|^yal  En^neers.  who  advised  that  a  partvof 
cavalry  should  be  «ft"^  ft"^^"  ^^^^  f^^rTy'nibming  bv  tJie  EeSgah 
flntrr  (farinf  Tinrth)  fi"^  "niih  iiuiml  in  pmmi  nf^he  village  of 
Kh^^'^ftbftd,  whicl^  sl^puld  the^  ^^  **  mwhiifl "  |"y  fT^me  506  or  5U0 
agfaptry.  Khairabad  was  within  400  yards  of  the  northern  walls 
of  Deh-i-Ehwaja,  and  the  latter  village  was  to  have  been  taken 
by  an  attack  in  rear,  where  it  was  probably  undefended.  The 
B-pounder  gun  was  to  be  spiked,  or  brought  away  if  time  allowed, 
and  the  loopholed  walls  fronting  the  city  were  to  be  destroyed. 
There  was  nothing  impossible  in  this  plan,  and  the  sortie,  if  at 
all  well  managed,  ought  to  have  proved  a  success.  But  certain 
modifications  were  made  whi^b  ppm'lftfl  all.  Ot^  tba  niorningr^^ 
tne  ifitb  ot  Anf2;uex,  B(ii)  sabres,  under  command  of  Brigadier- 
General  Muttall,  swept  round  in  rear  of  the  village,  and,  as  was 
expected,  the  men  in  Deh-i-Khwaja  began  to  leave,  seeing  their 
retreat  thus  cut  off.  The  usual  garrison  which  flocked  in  every 
morning  and  left  at  nightfall  had  not  arrived,  and  they  would 
probably  have  known  but  little  of  the  affair  until  afterwards,  if  a 
fiE^taLl2laA€ler  had  not  been  committed  before  the  infantry  went 

out.  This  was  a  cannonade  of  half  an  bn^^r^a  <1nrRtinn^  frn^?  tViA 
^jQundera  and  the  two  hpwitzfira.  General  Brooke,  commanding 
600  men  chosen  from  the  7th  Fusiliers,  19th  and  28th  Native 
Infantry,  asked  that  the  village  might  be  shelled  before  his  troops 
went  out.  The  unusual  noise  aroused  every  armed  man  in  the 
southern  villages,  and  even  those  further  away  on  the  east ;  and 
they  poured  out  to  see  what  was  the  meaning  of  the  cannonade. 
Tk^y  gpf^ti  If^rr^  r>Ali.]-yiiwnjn  gas  being  attacked,  and  they 
hastened  to  its  assistance.  In  the  meantime  our  cavalry  had  a 
splendid  chance  at  some  400  or  600  men  on  ground  which  could 
not  have  been  better  for  a  charge.  But  General  Nuttall  considered 
the  time  had  not  yet  come  to  use  his  sowars,  and  he  contented 


538  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

himself  with  following  the  enemy,  who  were  making  for  broken 
ground  on  the  soath.  Eventually  a  troop  was  ordered  to  charge, 
and  they  did  good  execution ;  but  the  fugitives  had  then  got  cover 
and  opened  a  smart  fire  upon  the  cavalry,  who  had  to  draw  off  a 
little,  particularly  as  more  men  were  pressing  up  from  the  Shikarpur 
villages.  In  the  meantime  the  half-hour's  cannonade  had  come  to 
an  end,  and  the  infantry  had  moved  out ;  such  men  as  still  held 
the  village  were  on  the  alert,  and  our  troops  were  met  by  a  heavy 
fire  from  the  long  line  of  loopholed  walls.  The  attacking  force 
was  divided  into  three  parties  of  about  200  men  each.  General 
Brooke  taking  the  centre  party,  whose  object  was  to  penetrate  the 
village  by  the  road  from  the  city,  while  the  other  parties  moved  off 
to  right  and  left.  It  was  this  central  party  which  suffered  the 
heaviest  loss.  They  rushed  along  the  narrow  road  with  a  dry 
watercourse  of  some  depth  on  their  left  hand,  passed  the  gun  and 
got  into  the  village.  But  they  were  little  better  off  than  before ; 
for  every  wall  was  loopholed,  every  door  blockaded.  All  they  could 
do  was  to  press  forward  and  watch  for  an  opportunity  of  seizing 
one  or  more  houses  in  rear,  whence  they  could  work  back,  clearing 
the  walls  and  courtyards,  so  as  to  allow  of  the  Sappers  demolish- 
ing the  outer  wall  facing  the  Cabul  Gate.  To  attempt  street  fight- 
ing was  hopeless,  as  our  men  could  see  no  enemy;  only  the 
muzzles  of  rifles,  many  of  them  breech-loading,  looked  down 
upon  them.  General  Brooke  forced  his  way  right  through  the 
place,  and  as  the  rear  walls  were  not  loopholed  his  party  had  a 
respite  for  the  time.  He  then  moved  along  towards  the  north, 
but  returned  when  he  could  find  no  point  which  served  to  give  him 
a  chance  of  making  his  hold  good.  The  party  to  the  left  under 
Colonel  Heathcote  did  not  enter  the  village  but  lined  the  walls  in 
the  fields,  keeping  up  a  heavy  fire  to  draw  off  the  defenders* 
attention.  On  the  right.  Trench  of  the  I9th  Bombay  Infantry 
had  got  possession  of  a  large  walled  garden  to  the  south  of  the 
village,  whence  he  drove  such  of  the  enemy  as  made  a  stand. 

Th«  SOrtie.waa ^'»^>*«fr™^tifihfid  by  Gf^nftr?^  Pn'mmgn  nna  fhn  qnTpann 

from  the^alls ;  but  owing  to  a  thick  haze  little  could  be  seen  of 
what  was  going  forward.  The  ^^tifinnna  fii^Sig  aTin'^Ar^  ^^  villflgg 
})ad  not  been  captured,  and  swarms  of  irregulars  could  now  and 
agdini^Srstinguished'running  across  the  open  country  as  if  making 


Its  Complete  Failure.  539 

for  Deh-i-Ehwaja.  General  Pripirog^  therefore  ordererl  t.lifl  trgj^a 
engaged  to  be  recalledy^and  directed  the  artillery  and  infantry  on 
the  walls  to  cover  the  retirement.  The  orders  were  passed  on  to 
Oeneral  Brooke.  The  two  parties  under  Colonel  Heathcote  and 
Trench  (killed  about  this  time)  began  to  fall  back,  leaving  the 
third  batch  of  200  men,  still  in  the  rear  of  the  village,  quite  un- 
supported. The  cavalry  also  made  for  the  Cabul  Gate ;  the  rifle 
fire  from  the  enemy,  who  were  following  them  up,  costing  them 
many  horses.  Qpr  retirement  was  the  signal  for  theadvanpe  gi 
Bvery  Afghan  whoj^d  VyM^rx  bfj]^  in  nli<»/>lr  Ky^|T|pgvS&y  in^the 
^pen.  The  garden  Trench's  party  had  held  was  occupied  by 
them,^nd  every  wall  in  the  fields  in  the  south-east  was  lined  with 
their  skirmishers.  For  General  Brooke  to  withdraw  safely  under 
such  conditions  was  almost  impossible.  He  tried  to  make  his 
way  back  by  the  road  leading  through  the  heart  of  the  village ; 
but  the  fire  from  the  loopholes  was  too  terrible,  and  he  turned  off 
to  his  left,  coming  out  into  the  fields  just  where  a  few  walls  gave 
cover  to  his  men  and  enabled  them  to  rally.  In  th J  confusion 
which  prevailed  his  party  were  mistaken  for  ''  ghazis,"  and  a 
40-pounder  began  to  shell  them.  Fortunately  the  shells  were 
too  high,  and  did  no  mischief.  No  supports  were  sent  out  to  aid 
him,  though  appeals  were  made  to  General  Primrose  to  allow 
skirmishers  to  line  the  low  walls  outside  the  Cabul  Gate  in  a 
south-easterly  direction.*  General  Brooke  had  supported  Lieu- 
tenant Cruickshank,  B.E.,  severely  wounded,  and  had  brought 
him  out  of  the  village.  They  rested  behind  a  wall  while  a  hand- 
fal  of  men  were  got  together  to  cover  their  retreat  towards  the 
walls,  still  a  thousand  yards  away.  But  the  fire  from  the  loop- 
holes was  too  heavy,  and  as  the  General  tried  to  cross  to  the 
shelter  of  another  wall  he  was  shot  down.  A  sergeant  of  the  7th 
Fusiliers  with  him  was  killed,  and  two  Bombay  Sappers  wounded, 
and  then  the  two  officers  had  to  be  left  to  their  fate.  Their  men 
were  harassed  by  continuous  fire  at  almost  point  blank  ranges, 
and  the  sortie  ended  by  forty  of  our  dead  being  left  on  the  ground, 
while  twice  that  number  of  wounded  were  received  within  the 
walls.     The  details  of  the  killed  and  wounded,  officers  and  men, 

*  The  wlthdr^&i^  of  the  origjnal  ropports  before  GenenJ  Brooke's  party  had  left 
^  village  was  the  fatal  mistaEe  of  the  day. 


540  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

are  given  in  the  despatches.  The  total  casualties  were  abont 
200 ;  and  this  sJiotL  story  of  how  the  sortie  was  made  and  how 
little  it  bore  the  character  of  a  **  success/'  which  1  see  it  has 
always  Deen  caued  by  General  Primrose,  may  help  you  to  apprc? 
ciaU  WLUI  occurred,  xbere  is  no  charge  against  the  soldiifBr 
kll  uru  ti&id  to  have  fought  well  and  to  have  shown  great  steadi- 
ness ;  but  the  departure  from  the  original  plan  was  fatal,  and  no 
supports  being  left  for  General  Brooke's  party  to  fall  back  upon, 
gave  the  enemy  the  chance  of  cutting  our  men  up  in  detail. 
There  are  other  features  of  the  sortie  which  I  have  no  doubt  men 
who  were  in  it  can  fill  up.  I  have  been  through  Deh-i-Ehwaja 
and  over  the  ground  outside,  and  I  can  fully  appreciate  how 
General  Brooke  failed  to  make  good  his  hold  of  the  village. 


Candahab,  Vhth  September. 

r^  T  i^yA  i^PfiAiniiA^  fii^i  Y idinii  (111 i|i  hy  \j^  KhftTl^fl  ffirf^" 

\  on  \\\t^  fiasfii]T  ^^^^  ^^  y^Rnflfthar^  and  tl^^  Bflftf*^  IBft4^  ^^  ^^gP'^^^ 
r  16th  against  the  Deh-i-Khwaja  village.  Major  Hills,  the  Engineer 
^  ofiScer  commanding,  had  warned"(jFeneral  Primrose  that  he  would 
not  be  responsible  for  the  safety  of  the  city  if  Deh-i-Khwaja  were 
left  untouched,  so  high  an  estimate  was  placed  upon  the  capacity 
of  the  enemy.  On  the  17th  the  guns  directed  against  the  city, 
more  apparently  for  the  purpose  of  annoying  the  garrison  than 
with  any  idea  then  of  systematic  bombardment,  were  the 
6-pounder  in  Deh-i-Khwaja,  an  Armstrong  breech-loader,  and  one 
of  our  Royal  Horse  Artillery  9-pounders  on  Picquet  Hill,  a 
6-pounder  in  an  embrasure  near  the  Head  Quarters'  Qrarden  fftcing 
the  western  wall,  and  another  6-pounder  in  a  garden  to  the  south- 
west, distant  1,100  yards  from  the  Shikarpur  Otite,  and  some- 
what nearer  the  south-west  comer  bastion.  The  guns  on  Picquet 
Hill  were  answered  by  a  40-pounder  in  the  north-west  bastion, 
and  their  fire  was  plainly  meant  to  make  the  citadel  as  uncom- 
fortable as  possible  for  the  troops  crowded  within  it.  One  of 
these  guns  was  silenced  on  the  16th,  and  was  believed  to  have 
been  dismounted.  The  6-pounder  near  the  Head-Quarters'  Gtu^en 
was  fired  at  uncertain  intervals  at  the  bastions  on  the  western 
face,  in  the  hope,  apparently,  of  injuring  whatever,  men  might  be 


Afghan  Engineering  Skill.  541 

on  duty  on  the  wall.  It  was  on  the  south-west  that  the  greatest 
pains  were  taken  by  Aynb*8  amateur  ''  engineers/'  and  here  the 
contour  of  the  ground  favoured  them  immensely.  TheTgroup  of 
Tillages  known  to  the  garrison  under  the  general  name  of  Shikar- 
pur  was  protected  by  many  walled  gardens  and  vineyards,  which 
had  in  their  front  two  deep  karez  water-channels,  then  quite  dry, 
as  the  canals  from  the  Argandab  Biver  and  local  springs  had  been 
blocked  so  as  to  cut  off  the  usual  water  supply  of  Candahar.  The 
karez  in  vogue  in  Southern  Afghanistan  is  different  to  that  we 
have  been  accustomed  to  further  north.  Instead  of  an  under- 
ground canal,  with  openings  at  stated  intervals,  wherefrom  the 
earth  excavated  is  thrown  up  in  mounds,  there  is  a  deep  open 
channel  cut  from  six  to  twelve  feet  deep,  along  the  banks  of  which 
the  earth  and  mud  are  thrown  up  so  as  to  form  a  formidable 
ditch.  The  stream  at  the  bottom  is  of  no  great  depth,  and  courses 
along  to  lower  levels  very  quietly,  no  rapid  fall  being  allowed.  There 
are  usually  minor  channels  running  out  from  the  main  karez^ 
unless  the  water  has  to  be  taken  to  a  level  several  miles  away 
from  the  original  spring.  The  Shikarpur  gardens  and  villages 
afforded  ample  cover  for  a  large  body  of  men,  and  the  karez 
channels  in  front  were  seized  upon  as  offering  ready-made  trenches 
in  which  to  form  batteries  and  a  line  of  breastworks  for  riflemen. 
The  ''  works  "  raised  by  the  enemy  still  stand  almost  untouched, 
and  a  few  days  ago  I  went  over  them  with  an  engineer  officer  who 
v^s  in  Candahar  during  the  siege.  From  his  explanation,  and  my 
own  observations,  I  may  be  able  to  give  a  fair  idea  of  the  engineer- 
ing skill  which  some,  at  least,  of  Ayub*s  officers  could  boast.  That 
nothing  came  of  this  attempt  to  raise  batteries  and  breastworks  is 
due  to  the  rapid  advance  of  the  relieving  force  from  Cabul,  the 
enemy  not  having  time  to  complete  their  lines,  and  being  forced 
to  abandon  the  siege  when  it  was  yet  in  its  infancy.  In  the  six- 
teen or  seventeen  days  they  were  at  work  they  made  very  credit- 
able progress ;  and,  left  undisturbed,  they  might  have  caused  the 
garrison  much  trouble  and  annoyance. 

It  is  believed  that  thA^  firat  p^n  (^f  f.hfl  Naib  Hafizulla.  who 
rfmtrnUatl  thn  ^phan  army,  was  to  raise  a  number  of  batteries  to 
play  upon  theSnikarpur  iiate  and  that  part  of  the  wall  lying 
between  that  gate  and  the    south-west  bastion ;  riflemen   were 


542  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

to  be  pushed  as  near  the  bastion  as  possible,  sheltered  by  pro- 
tecting walls  and  ditches  in  the  fields  ;  and  then  an  assault  was  to 
be  made  by  the  fanatical  irregulars  led  by  their  ghazis.  Scaling 
ladders  were  to  be  used,  and,  under  cover  of  a  terrific  fire  directed 
upon  the  defenders  of  the  southern  wall,  the  grand  attack  was 
to  be  delivered.  There  would  probably  have  been  other  attacks 
made  from  the  south-east  and  east,  and  the  ghazis  were  confi- 
dent of  success  after  their  victory  over  General  Burrows*s  Brigade. 
The  affair  of  the  16th  warned  Hafizulla  that  it  was  dangerous  to 
have  guns  exposed  to  a  sudden  sortie,  and  in  the  Shikarpur  direc- 
tion he  took  every  precaution  to  guard  against  an  attack  from  the 
garrison  being  successful.  Every  enclosure  had  its  walls  loop- 
holed  above  and  below,  to  give  a  double  line  of  fire,  and  along 
every  ditch  and  water-channel  clods  of  earth  were  piled  to  form  a 
low  projecting  parapet  for  the  men  lining  theml  The  ground  is 
much  broken  and  cut  up  in  every  direction,  mounds  of  eaj*th  being 
scattered  at  intervals  where  the  cultivators  had  been  compelled 
to  excavate  deeply  for  the  karez.  Biding  towards  the  outward  belt 
of  walled  vineyards  and  gardens — many  of  the  latter  containing 
trees  of  large  growth  and  thick  foliage — we  followed  the  narrow 
road  leading  from  the  city ;  and  at  about  1,000  yards  from  the 
walls  we  came  upon  what  our  engineers  would  call  the  trenches. 
These  were  the  upper  and  lower  channels  of  the  karez^  quite 
dry,  as  I  have  before  mentioned.  The  channels  were  connected 
by  narrow  cuttings  eight  feet  deep,  in  the  most  approved  manner, 
in  exact  imitation  of  the  zig-zag  way  in  which  parallels  are 
pushed  forward  in  civilized  warfare.  These  cuttings  were  not 
very  numerous,  it  is  true,  but  then  the  works  had  not  been  com- 
pleted. Instead  of  the  men  having  to  expose  themselves  by 
climbing  up  and  down  the  deep  banks  of  the  karez,  openings  were 
cut  leading  to  the  enclosures  and  villages  in  rear.  One  bend  of 
the  karez  left  the  line  exposed  to  flanking  fire  from  the  walls  of 
the  city,  and  to  negative  this  traverses  of  earth  and  mud  had 
been  built  up  at  every  20  feet.  This  portion  of  the  works  was 
very  skilfally  done,  the  parapet  in  front,  as  being  exposed  to  shell- 
fire,  being  two  or  three  feet  thick.  In  rear  of  these  ''  trenches  " 
were  the  batteries  in  their  half-completed  state.  The  low  mounds 
of  earth  I  have  spoken   of  were  out  down,  and  a  semicircular 


Naib  Hafizullas  Lines.  543 

space,  open  in  rear,  cleared  away,  the  eartb  being  banked  up  so 
as  to  form  a  substantial  parapet  facing  citywards.  Two  embrasures 
had  been  cat  through  in  each  battery,  branches  of  trees  being 
used  to  strengthen  them  and  allow  the  earthwork  to  settle  down 
into  solid  form.  The  parapet  and  its  protecting  embankment  were 
of  sufScient  strength  to  resist  the  heaviest  shell  that  could  be 
thrown  from  our  own  guns.  On  looking  through  the  embrasures 
in  one  battery  we  found  that  one  gun  could  be  trained  upon  the 
Shikarpur  Gate  and  the  other  upon  the  south-west  bastion.  Every 
thing  was  completed  in  this  battery,  and  the  marks  of  T^heels 
showed  that  a  field  gun  had  been  in  position.  A  little  to  the  right 
was  a  more  pretentious  battery,  plainly  meant  for  three  or  four 
guns,  judging  from  the  size  of  the  space  cleared.  The  ground 
was  sloped  gradually  down  to  the  fields  in  rear  of  these  batteries, 
and  cover  could  be  given  to  the  horses  and  drivers  belonging  to 
the  guns.  The  6-pounder  which  fired  daily  upon  the  walls  had  a 
snug  comer  to  itself  in  a  clump  of  trees.  The  embrasure  had  been 
made  very  ingeniously.  A  bank  of  earth,  12  or  16  feet  thick  at 
its  base,  had  been  built  up,  with  its  right  resting  on  the  trunk 
of  a  stout  tree  with  long  over-reaching  branches.  One  of  these 
branches,  which  stretched  out  at  right  angles  four  feet  above  the 
ground,  had  the  earthwork  piled  above  and  below  it,  so  that  it 
formed  a  strong  support  to  the  embankment.  There  were  two 
embrasures,  one,  as  usual,  pointing  upon  the  Shikarpur  Gate ; 
and  I  believe  the  gun  was  so  hidden  by  the  foliage  of  the  trees 
that  from  the  walls  it  was  difficult  to  detect  the  embrasures  except 
by  the  flash  of  the  gun.  Some  of  our  shells  had  been,  however, 
well  pitched,  the  trunk  of  the  tree  being  barked  and  splintered. 
The  gunners  were  quite  safe,  of  course,  unless  a  shell  actually 
burst  in  the  embrasure  itself,  which  was  extremely  unlikely. 
Standing  in  rear  of  the  earthwork  one  could  appreciate  the 
security  of  the  men  who  had  held  it,  and  with  what  impunity 
they  could  bang  away  at  our  bastions.  The  line  of  karez 
was  followed  in  a  westerly  direction,  and  all  along  its  banks  we 
traced  the  low  parapet  formed  of  clods  of  earth.  The  walls  of 
the  enclosure  had  their  rows  of  loopholes,  and  when  working 
parties  were  sent  out  from  the  city  three  days  after  the  raising  of 
the  siege,  they  found  that  good  cover  existed  to  within  800  yards 


-^Ili 


544  Tlie  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

of  the  corner  bastion.  There  was  always  lively  rifle-fire  going 
on  whenever  any  one  showed  on  the  parapet  of  the  city  wall,  bnt 
the  Afghans  outside  had  generally  the  best  of  the  position,  as 
they  were  quite  hidden  from  sight.  A  piece  of  open  ground  in 
rear  of  the  karez  between  two  enclosures  was  rather  a  dangerous 
place  for  them  to  cross,  although  1,000  yards  from  the  walls. 
Marksmen  with  Martinis  fired  volleys  whenever  they  saw  a  group 
hurrying  across,  and  the  bullets  generally  told.  Many  of  the 
walls  have  been  thrown  down  by  our  working  parties ;  and  in 
one  garden,  full  of  large  trees  casting  a  pleasant  shade,  is  the 
Field  Hospital  of  the  garrison.  Thence  we  passed  towards  the 
Head-Quarters*  Garden  (now  occupied  by  General  Phayre  and  his 
Staff)>  ftnd  had  a  look  at  the  embrasure  whence  a  6-pounder  used 
to  fire  into  the  city.  The  gun  was  placed  on  the  steep  bank  of 
the  main  hxrez,  and  was  banked  up  to  its  muzzle,  which  was  some 
ten  feet  above  the  bottom  of  the  water  cut.  There  was  broken 
ground  in  front,  intersected  by  irrigation  channels,  and  in  rear 
some  low-walled  enclosures  in  which  are  now  located  a  number 
of  our  transport  animals.  Here  my  interesting  journey  came  to 
an  end,  and  I  returned  to  ^qtmibeM  in  nnntnnmoatn,  fafuuiafely 
impresSSa  with  ihe  rude  evidences  of  the  enemy^s  smii.  it  was  at 
first  believed  that  a  European  adventurer  was  witn  Ayub  Khan, 
from  the  admirable  way  in  which  his  artillery  was  handled  and 
the  dispositions  made  for  investing  Candahar ;  but  this  idea  is  now 
exploded.  I^Ja  yorft  pr^ba^le  that  therejgfiifi^fflJHerat  men  who 
had  seen  s^^^'^^  ^'^  ^^^  Tnr]^jgh  army  in  Asia  Minor,  or  even  norlb 
of  the  Bosphorus,  in  the  late  war  against  Bussia.  These  men 
could  have  picked  up  some  idea  of  entrenchments  and  be  able  to 
apply  their  knowledge  under  the  direction  of  the  Naib,  the  only 
Afghan  General  who  seems  to  know  how  to  handle  his  men.M^thers 
there  may  be  who  have  learned  a  smattering  of  the  principles  of 
civilized  war&re  in  Persia  or  the  Bussian  Equates ;  but  in  an^ 
^oaojii^rnjyfl«ii  o  dfifiidfid  improvcmcut  in  their  methodto^^iat-of 
tEemen  we  fought  in  and  about  IJabui.  >  " 


The  Maiwand  Disaster,  545 


CHAPTER    V. 

An  Account  of  the  Defeat  of  (Jenend  Burrows  at  Maiwand— The  Disaffection  among  the 
Wali's  Troops— Intrigues  between  Local  Sirdajs  and  Ayub  Khan— The  D-sertion  of 
the  Wali's  Infantry— General  Burrows  at  Qirishk— His  Orders— Ayub  Khan's 
Line  of  Advance  from  Parrah— The  Helmund  River  Pordable  at  all  Points— The 
Routes  from  Girishk  to  Candahar — Strategical  Importance  of  Girishk — Gent-ral 
Burrows'  Oonncil  of  War  on  July  16th — Retioement  of  the  Brigade  upon  Khuskl- 
i-Nakhad — Defectire  Cavalry  ReoonnaiBsanoes — Ayub  Khan's  Advance  upon  Mai- 
wand— His  Arrival  at  Sangbur — General  Burrows'  Movement  from  Khnsk-i-Nakhud 
to  intercept  the  Afghan  Army — The  Action  at  Maiwand — Comparative  Strength  of 
the  British  and  Afghan  Porces— General  Burrows'  First  Disposition  of  Attack — An 
Artillery  Duel — The  effect  upon  the  Brigade  of  acting  on  the  Defensive — Advance 
of  the  Afghan  Irregulars— The  Behaviour  of  Jacob's  Rifles  on  the  Left— Confusion 
among  the  Native  Troops— Defeat  and  Rout  of  the  Brigade— Ineffectual  Attempt  to 
make  the  Cavalry  Charge — The  Retreat  to  Candahar. 

Candahar,  18tft  September. 

From  such  sources  as  I  have  been  able  to  draw  upon,  I*  haye 
gained  a  fairly  exact  idea  of  the  circumstances  attending  General 
Burrows*  defeat  on  the  27th  of  July,  and  I  am  now  writing  what, 
perhaps,  is  the  first  unofficial  account  of  the  Maisukad-disaster^ 
Taking  up  the  story  from  the  mutiny  of  the  Wali's  troops  on  the 
14th  of  July,  it  would  seem  that  though  General  Burrows  suc- 
ceeded on  that  occasion  in  recapturing  the  6-pounder  smooth-bore 
battery,  there  was  not  that  severe  punishment  inflicted  upon  the 
mutineers  which  would  have  been  their  just  reward.  The  dis- 
affection in  the  Wali  Shore  Ali's  army  was  well  known  in  the 
British  camp,  and  decisive  measures  might  have  been  taken  for 
disarming  the  2,000  infantry  soldiers  before  they  had  fully  made 
up  their  minds  to  desert.  But  that  indecision  which  was  the 
ruling  power  in  the  Girishk  Brigade  was  all-powerful  even  in  the 
early  days  of  July ;  and  there  was,  perhaps,  also  the  feeling  in 
the  political  mind  that  it  was  too  early  to  acknowledge  how  mere 
a  shadow  the  Wali's  authority  was,  and  how  worthless  was  his 
so-called  army.  The  fact  that  Nur  Mahomed  Khan,  *'  the  Sur- 
teep,"   had    been  wholly  won  over  to  Ayub's  side,  must  surely 

N    N 


546  Tlie  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

have  been  known  to  the  Wali,  who  was  no  doubt  also  tempted  to 
throw  over  the  British.     One  of  the  Candahar  regiments,  even 
before  it  marched  to  the  Helmnnd,  was  greatly  disaffected  ;  bat  as 
the  Wali  had  officered  his  "  army"  from  this  particular  regime  nt 
there  was  a  disinclination  to  disband  it,   as  the  other  regiments 
might  have  given  trouble.     Thus  the  Surteep  was  allowed  full  scope 
to  work  out  his  plans,  and  his  subsequent  desertion  followed  in  the 
natural  order  of  things.   His  character  as  a  hospitable  entertainer  of 
British  officers  had  won  him  some  goodwill ;  but  there  were  those 
who  suspected  his  loyalty  to  us,  and  were  doubtful  of  his  relations 
with   Ayub   Khan.      For   months  there  must  have  been  secret 
correspondence  between  this  man  and  the  Herat  leaders,  who  were 
no  doubt  kept  fully  informed  of  all  our  movements,  and  furnished 
with  exact  details  of  our  local  strength.     That  such  a  truly  Afghan 
intrigue  should  not  have  been  detected,  proves  how  small  was  the 
sympathy  really  felt  for  us  in  Candahar,  and  the  question  arises 
was  the  Wali  unacquainted  with  the  plot  to  seduce  his  army  when 
the  occasion  served  ?    If  he  were  not,  he  must  indeed  be  an  excep- 
tion to  the  general  rule,  for  Afghan  sirdars  are  so  well  versed  in 
intrigue  that  they  can  usually  detect  danger  when  our  political 
officers  believe  all  is  going  smoothly  and  satisfactorily.    But  on 
July  14th  the  plot  came  to  a  head,  and  General  Burrows  found 
himself  left,  with  a  weak  brigade,  alone  on  the  Helmund.     Nomi- 
nally, he  had  been  supposed  to  act  in  support  of  the  Wall's  army ; 
but  this  farce  had  come  to  an  end,  and  his  position  was  defined 
only  too  clearly:  he  had  to  meet  single-handed  whatever  force 
Ayub  could  muster.     Our  late  ''  allies  "  were  in  the  ranks  of  the 
enemy ;  the  Wall's  army  had  ceased  to  exist ;  and  the  Surteep's 
desertion  would  probably  be  followed  by  the  rising  of  the  armed 
peasantry  of  Zamindawar  and  the  surrounding  districts,  for  the 
Sirdar's  example  could  not  fail  to  influence  ignorant  men.     If  a 
chief  of  such  importance  had  declared  for  Ayub,  surely,  it  would 
be  argued,  the  British  were  in  great  straits.     Now  comes  the 
moot  point  as  to  what  were   General  Burrows'  orders,  and  what 
expectation  he  had  of  being  reinforced  from  Candahar.     Regard- 
ing the  first,  I  believe  I  am  perfectly  right  in  stating  that  he  was 
ordered  to  *'  stop  Ayub  Khan  and  disperse  his  troops  if  possible." 
On  the  question  of  reinforcements  I  am  more  doubtful ;    but  I 


Preceding  Events.  547 

state  pretty  confidently  that  General  Primrose  had  decided  that 
Candahar  could  not  spare  another  regiment  to  strengthen  the 
Girishk  Brigade,  even  under  the  altered  conditions  reported  to 
him  after  the  mutiny.  General  Burrows  was  not  relieved  of  his 
task  of  stopping  Ayub/'  and  there  must  have  been  an  over-ween- 
ing confidence  in  the  mind  of  the  General  commanding  at  Can- 
dahar in  respect  to  the  fighting  power  of  the  regiment  with  his 
absent  Brigadier.  That  there  was  not  the  same  feeling  among 
the  officers  of  the  brigade  itself  is  now  well  known,  and  one  para- 
graph from  the  letter  of  an  artillery  officer,  dated  July  19th,  and 
published  soon  afterwards,  is  so  true  an  estimate  of  the  situation 
that  I  cannot  refrain  from  quoting  it.     He  wrote  : — 

<*We  are  now  waiting  for  Ajub  Khan,  wbo  is  about  30  miles  off,  with  thirty-six 
guns  and  about  6,000  men.  It  will  be  a  stiff  fight  if  be  comes  to  the  scratch,  as  this  is 
a  perfectly  open  coontry,  and  we  are  only  1,500  infantry,  500  sabres,  and  six  guns." 

This  forecast  of  a  "  stiflF  fight  '*  proved  only  too  true,  but  instead 
of  the  6,000  men  referred  to,  our  soldiers  had  to  meet  a  host  of 
irregulars  led  by  fanatical  ghazis. 

It  devolved  upon  General  Burrows  to  decide  what  course  would  be 
most  calculated  to  bar  Ayub's  progress,  and  on  July  15th  he  wisely 
called  together  his  commanding  officers  and  held  a  small  council 
of  war.  The  day  was  not  wasted  in  idle  discussion,  as  while 
opinions  were  being  exchanged  our  gunners  were  horsing  and 
equipping  the  captured  guns,  the  teams  of  which  had  been  used 
by  the  mutineers  to  aid  them  in  their  flight.  Many  considera- 
tions had  to  be  weighed  in  council.  First,  the  position  of  the 
enemy  the  brigade  were  bound  to  ''  stop  and  disperse  if  possible." 
Such  information  as  Colonel  St.  John  possessed  favoured  the 
belief  that  the  enemy's  cavalry  under  the  Naib  Hafizulla  were  still 
distant  80  miles  from  the  bank  of  the  Helmund,  and  that  the 
main  body  with  the  guns  was  several  marches  in  rear  of  this 
advanced  party.  Ayub's  line  of  advance  was  along  the  main 
Herat  Road,  and  he  would  probably  enter  the  Helmund  Valley 
near  the  Khoja  Baba  Peak,  a  high  point  of  the  range  of  hills  which 
run  parallel  to  the  course  of  the  river.  This  peak  is  80  miles 
in  a  bee-line  from  Girishk,  and  between  it  and  the  river  is  an 
open  plain,  waterless,  but  otherwise  quite  easy  for  a  force  of  all 

M   N    2 


548  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

arms  to  cross.  There  was  this  plain  still  hetween  the  brigade  and 
Ayub*8  advanced  cavalry,  so  that  the  two  forces  were  scarcely  "  in 
touch,"  more  particularly  as  it  was  imperatively  laid  down  in 
instructions  from  the  Government  of  India  that  the  Helmnnd 
River  was  not  to  be  crossed  under  any  circumstances.  General 
Burrows  was  to  wait  for  the  enemy  to  appear  before  him,  and  his 
council  of  war  had  to  decide  at  what  point  so  to  wait.  The  Hel- 
mund  is  usually  fordable  at  only  four  points  :  Sangin  on  the  south, 
Hyderabad,  Girishk  and  Kalabist  (at  the  junction  with  the  Argan- 
dab).  From  these  fords  four  roads  converge  on  Candahar  :  the 
northern  by  way  of  the  Malmund  and  Maiwand  Passes,  practicable 
for  wheeled  artillery  ;  the  two  central  passing  through  Khusk-i- 
Nakhud,  and  the  southern  route  via  Balakhana  and  the  Bnnd-i- 
Taimur.  Of  these  four  routes,  that  most  commonly  used,  on 
account  of  its  directness,  water  and  other  supplies,  is  the  road 
passing  through  Khusk-i-Nakhud  from  Girishk.  Hence  the  value 
of  Girishk  as  a  strategical  point  at  which  to  hold  in  check  an 
army  advancing  from  the  west  upon  Candahar.  But  that  stra- 
tegical value  had  almost  disappeared,  as  the  Helmund.  owing  to 
an  exceptionally  dry  season,  was  everywhere  fordable  for  men  on 
foot,  thus  allowing  Ayub  to  cross  it  wherever  he  might  choose  and 
avoid  Girishk.  Furthermore,  when  the  question  of  supplies  was 
entered  into,  it  appeared  that  the  brigade  had  been  quite  dependent 
upon  grain  and  forage  collected  by  the  Wali  and  stored  near  the 
fort  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  river.  What  supplies  had  existed 
on  the  13th  had  either  been  carried  off  or  destroyed  by  the  muti- 
nous regiments,  leaving  Girishk  practically  unable  to  provide 
longer  for  our  troops.  The  necessity  of  at  once  finding  supplies 
made  a  move  from  Girishk  unavoidable,  and  General  Burrows  and 
his  officers  had  determined  what  direction  should  be  taken.  The 
opinion  of  the  majority  favoured  a  retirement  to  Asu  Ehan, 
whence  all  the  roads  could  be  commanded  and  supports  easily 
drawn  from  Candahar.  This,  of  course,  took  it  for  granted  that 
Ayub  Khan  meant  to  march  direct  upon  Candahar  and  not  turn 
off  northwards  for  Ghazni  and  Cabul ;  and  the  retirement  was 
advocated  also  on  the  ground  that  the  brigade  was  not  strong 
enough,  unsupported,  to  meet  the  enemy  in  an  open  fight.  There 
was  a  bolder  proposal  to  move  northwards  to  Hyderabad,  retaining 


General  Burrows  Retires  to  Kushk-i-Nakhud.  549 

the  Helmnnd  as  our  adyanced  line,  bat  this  found  little  support. 
Finally  the  middle  course  of  a  partial  retirement  was  agreed  on,  the 
brigade  to  fall  back  instantly  upon  Khusk-i-Nakhud.  This  would 
place  General  Burrows  upon  the  central  road  to  Candahar,  and 
therefore  commanding,  to  a  certain  extent,  the  northern  and 
southern  routes ;  the  force  would  also  be  only  some  60  miles 
from  head-quarters,  whence  it  was  hoped  new  orders  would  be 
received,  and  possibly  reinforcements.  This  was  the  result  of  the 
little  council  of  war  held  at  Girishk,  and  it  seems  to  have  been 
just  and  reasonable.  To  have  stayed  at  Girishk  was  almost 
impossible,  as  supplies  were  exhausted :  to  have  moved  to  Hyder- 
abad would  have  involved  serious  risk  if  Ayub's  army  were  joined 
by  the  people  of  the  district;  while  to  have  fallen  so  far  back  as 
Asu  Khan  before  a  shot  had  been  fired  would  have  seemed  exces- 
sive timidity.  Ehusk-i-Nakhud  was  an  admirable  point  from 
which  to  watch  Ayub's  passage  of  the  Helmund,  and  thence  to 
ascertain  his  strength  and  probable  intentions. 

On  July  15th  a  night  march  was  made,  and  on  the  morning  of 
the  16th  the  brigade  encamped  on  their  old  ground  at  Ehusk-i- 
Nakhud.  On  the  following  days  the  troops  moved  two  miles 
nearer  to  Mis  Earez,  and  took  up  a  position  which  they  occupied 
until  the  morning  of  the  27th.  The  stores  were  placed  in  a  small 
waUed  enclosure,  and  the  baggage  laagered  up  ready  for  all  emer- 
gencies. Spies,  furnished  by  the  Wali,  were  busy  during  the  next 
few  days  in  bringing  news  of  Ayub's  movements.  Their  story 
was  that  the  Afghan  force  was  distributed  in  the  dry  river-bed 
between  the  Girishk  and  Hyderabad  fords  ;  it  made  no  signs  of 
moving  eastwards,  and  the  opinion  began  to  prevail  that  Ghazni 
and  not  Candahar  was  Ayub's  objective.  Reconnaissances  were 
made  every  day  by  General  Nuttall's  cavalry,  but  they  were  not  of 
the  kind  to  preserve  touch  with  an  enemy.  Thus  a  troop  or  so 
visited  Garmao,  Sangbur,  and  the  Bund-i-Taimar  daily,  as  if  for 
a  constitutional  ride,  baited  their  horses,  looked  around,  and 
returned.  Their  movements  were  so  beautifully  regular  that 
every  peasant  knew  at  what  time  to  expect  them.  Ayub's  move- 
ments were  never  really  watched  at  all,  though  sufficient  cavalry 
were  with  the  brigade  to  have  allowed  of  regular  outpost  work 
being  done,  instead  of  a  few  hours'  visit  daily  to  the  same  villages. 


550  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

It  was  not  until  the  21st  that  Ayub's  cavalry  pushed  forward  from 
the  Helmnnd  and  exchanged  shots  with  onr  reconnoitring  party 
at  Sangbur.     The  next  day  the  village  was  found  to  be  held  by 
them,  and  news  reached  camp  that  600  sowars  were  to  seize 
Maiwand  within  twenty-four  hours.     There  were  stores  of  grain 
lying  in  the  fields  about  Maiwand,  and  fearing  they  would  fall 
into  Ayub's  hands,  General  Burrows  ordered  a  squadron  of  cavalry 
to  destroy  the  grain.     They  had  only  gone  a  few  miles  bom 
Khusk-i-Nakhud  when  they  were  fired  upon  by  a  large  body  of 
Afghan  cavalry,  who  were  reconnoitring  our  position  with  some 
boldness.     Our  cavalry  scouts,  deceived  by  the  haze,  reported  that 
two  regiments  of  infantry  were  supporting  the  hostile  cavalry,  and 
the  Horse  Artillery  and  some  infantry  were  sent  out  from  Khusk- 
i-Nakhud.     It  turned  out  to  be  a  myth ;  there  were  no  Afghan 
infantry,  and  by  this  time  their  cavalry  were  retiring  in  perfect 
safety.     The  guns  certainly  fired  a  round  or  two  after  them,  but 
our  sowars  missed  their  chance  of  a  charge,  scared  by  the  report 
that  infantry  were  hidden  under  some  low  hills.     Sangbur  con- 
tained no  enemy  on  the  24th,  but  in  the  same  neighbourhood  on 
the  25th  two  of  the  Scind  Horse  were  killed,  the  Afghan  sowars 
being  again  on  the  move.     So  late  as  the  26th  it  was  believed  all 
Ayub's  guns  were  at  Hyderabad,  and  that  no  movement  in  the 
direction  of  the  Malmund  Pass  had  been  made.     The  Afghan  army 
was  then  believed  to  be  about  12,000  strong,  counting  regulars 
alone,  while  the  number  of  ghazis  and  irregulars  from   Zamin- 
dawar  was  said  to  be  very  large.     Ayub's  advance  could  not  be 
exactly  foreshadowed,  but  from  his  position  at  Hyderabad  it  was 
most  likely  that  he  would  try  to  reach  Maiwand  through  Sangbur, 
as  none  of  his  troops  were  reported  to  be  on  the  longer  route  vid 
the  Malmund  Pass. 

The  camp  at  Ehusk-i-Nakhud  was  once  more  aroused  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  26th  by  positive  news  of  a  demonstration  in  the 
Maiwand  direction,  that  village  having  been  occupied  by  200 
irregulars,  while  Garmao,  five  miles  away,  was  said  to  be  held  in 
strength  by  cavalry.  The  conclusion  arrived  at  upon  this  becom- 
ing known  was  that  Ayub  meant  to  occupy  Maiwand  by  a  sudden 
move  without  joining  battle  with  our  troops,  and  that  not  improb- 
ably he  would  thence  try  to  slip  away  through  the  Maiwand  Pass 


The  Race  for  Maiwand.  551 

80  as  to  place  himself  between  the  brigade  and  Gandahar.*  Spies 
also  led  General  Barrows  and  Colonel  St.  John  to  believe  that  the 
main  body  must  be  still  a  march  in  rear  of  the  cavalry  at  Garmao.f 
In  view  of  this,  it  seemed  important  to  seize  Maiwand  before  it 
coold  be  occupied  in  force,  more  particularly  as  the  brigade  had 
been  for  some  days  drawing  its  supplies  from  that  village,  and 
stores  of  grain  still  remained  in  its  neighbourhood  which  would 
fall  into  Ayub's  hands.  The  distance  from  Khusk-i-Nakhud  to 
Maiwand  was  twelve  miles,  and  a  rapid  march  to  the  latter  place 
might  anticipate  Ayub's  movements  and  enable  the  brigade  to 
clear  Germao  of  the  Naib  and  his  advanced  cavalry.  All  this  was 
of  course  on  the  supposition  that  the  main  body  of  the  Afghan 
army  with  the  thirty  odd  guns  was  well  in  rear  of  the  cavalry — an 
unfortunate  supposition  as  it  afterwards  turned  out,  but  one  due 
to  the  wretched  information  resulting  from  the  cavalry  '^  reconnais- 
sances.*' 

General  Burrows,  on  the  night  of  the  26th,  issued  orders  for 
the  whole  brigade,  baggage  and  stores  included,  to  march  at  day- 
break on  the  following  morning.  At  such  short  notice  the  large 
quantity  of  reserve  supplies  in  the  walled  enclosures  could  not  be 
got  out  in  time,  and  it  was  not  until  half-past  six  that  the  troops 
left  Khusk-i-Nakhud.  The  route  taken  was  along  the  right 
bank  of  the  Ehusk-i-!Nakhud  river-bed,  then  quite  dry.  There 
was  a  strip  of  cultivation  near  the  bank,  but  beyond,  on  either 
hand,  lay  arid,  stony  plains.  The  brigade  halted  at  eight  o'clock 
at  Mushak,  to  enable  the  baggage  to  close  up.  This  occupied 
half  an  hour,  and  then  the  march  was  continued,  the  next  place 
reached  being  Earezak.  Here,  for  the  first  time,  the  unexpected 
news  was  brought  by  our  spies  that  the  whdU  of  Ayub's  force  was 
on  the  left  front,  marching  on  Maiwand.      The  cavalry  were  sent 

*  This,  according  to  the  statement  of  Ajnb's  colonel  of  artillery  (now  a  prisoner  in 
oor  bands),  was  really  Aynb's  plan.     He  meant  to  readi  Sinjuri  by  forced  marches. 

t  In  justice  to  Colonel  St.  John,  I  mast  say  that  I  hare  since  learned  that  be  reported 
later  in  the  day,  to  Qeneral  Barrows,  that  the  ^hoU  of  Ayub's  army  was  at  Sangbor. 
This  report  was  disregarded  for  the  following  reason :  A  British  officer  of  the  3rd  Scind 
Horse  stated  that  he  had  visited  Sangbar  that  day  with  a  cavalry  patrol,  and  that  only 
a  few  irregalars  were  found  there.  Colonel  St.  John's  information  was  quite  correct,  as 
onr  prisoners  told  as  after  the  battle  of  Candahar.  What  rillage  did  (he  oflker  really 
reconnoitre  ? 


55^  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

out  to  reconnoitre,  and  found  large  bodies  of  horsemen  moving  in 
the  direction  indicated ;  bat  the  haze  and  mirage  prevented  onr 
sowars  making  any  estimate  of  what  force  was  covered  by  the 
cavalry.  This  was  about  10  o'clock,  and  yet  even  with  the  aid 
of  telescopes  little  could  be  seen  of  Ayub's  army.  Spies  reported 
that  the  guns  were  there ;  but  this  news  was  looked  upon  by  the 
General  with  great  mistrust,  natives  being  so  given  to  exaggera- 
tion. General  Burrows  moved  his  troops  at  once  rapidly  towards 
Maiwand,  meaning  to  occupy  one  of  the  large  walled  enclosures 
wherein  to  stow  his  3,000  baggage  animals  and  their  loads,  thus 
leaving  the  brigade  freedom  of  movement  in  attacking  the  Afghan 
army.  It  was  too  late.  Before  the  intervening  village  of  Munda- 
bad  was  gained,  a  large  number  of  white-clothed  figures,  irregulars 
who  follow  their  moollalis'  dictation  and  their  ghazis'  lead,  were 
seen  pouring  out  from  Maiwand  itself.  The  enemy's  cavalry 
ceased  to  retire,  and  along  the  slopes  of  the  low  hills  above  Garmao 
could  be  distinguished  masses  of  men  in  some  sort  of  organized 
formation.  The  haze  still  lay  over  the  country,  and  it  was  impos- 
sible to  make  out  in  detail  the  strength  of  the  army  thus  suddenly 
confronting  the  weak  brigade.  The  ground  on  which  the  action 
which  followed  was  fought  is  thus  described  to  me  by  an  officer 
present : — ''  A  small  stream,  rising  in  the  hills  immediately  north 
of  Maiwand,  formed  almost  the  only  drainage  line  intersecting  the 
barren  waste  in  our  front.  It  ran  successively  past  the  villages  of 
Mundabad,  Earezak,  and  Mushak,  eventually  disappearing  in  a 
karez.  Between  this  stream  and  the  dry  bed  of  the  Ehusk-i 
Nakhud  river  the  ground  was  level  and  cultivated,  dotted  occasion- 
ally with  high  walled  enclosures,  but  generally  open."  General 
Burrows  had  with  him,  approximately,  1,500  rifles,  650  sabres, 
and  12  guns,  of  which  6  formed  the  smooth-bore  battery,  manned 
by  one  officer  and  42  men  of  the  66th  Foot.  He  resolved  to  force 
the  fighting ;  and  four  guns  of  the  Horse  Artillery  Battery  (E-B) 
with  the  cavalry  crossed  the  dry  nullah  forming  the  bed  of  the 
Khusk-i-Nakhud  stream,  followed  by  the  66th  Foot,  1st  Bombay 
Grenadiers,  and  Jacob's  Rifles  with  the  smooth-bore  guns.  The 
baggage  crossed  in  rear  under  an  escort  of  two  companies  of  in- 
fantry, a  squadron  of  cavalry,  and  two  horse  artillery  guns.  The 
nuUah  having  been  crossed,  the  troops  advanced  about  a  mile  and 


The  Battle  Described.  553 

formed  up  in  line  in  the  following  order : —  66tli  Foot  on  extreme 
right,  gnns  in  the  centre,  with  a  wing  of  Jacob's  Bifles  and  the 
Sappers  as  escort,  Grenadiers  on  lefk,  a  wing  of  Jacob's  Bifles  in 
reserre  behind  the  gnns.  The  cavalry  were  at  first  on  the  extreme 
left  guarding  the  flank  of  the  Grenadiers. 

It  was  not  nntil  nearly  noon  that  the  action  began.  Lieutenant 
Maclaine  with  two  horse  artillery  guns  and  a  small  cavalry  escort 
galloped  out  on  the  extreme  left,  and  got  his  guns  into  action  at  a 
range  of  1,800  yards,  firing  shrapnel  at  the  Afghan  cavalry. 
General  Burrows  disapproved  of  his  boldness,  and  ordered  the 
guns  to  retire,  an  order  which  Lieutenant  Maclaine  was  very  loth 
to  obey.  However,  the  guns  were  withdrawn,  and  by  the  time 
they  had  resumed  their  place  in  the  line  the  enemy's  strength  had 
begun  to  be  developed.  Large  numbers  of  irregulars,  led  by  the 
usual  ghazis,  were  seen  swarming  over  the  low  hills,  and  they 
presently  moved  down  upon  the  66th,  evidently  meaning  to  turn  the 
right  flank.  To  check  this.  General  Burrows  ordered  his  right  to 
be  thrown  back  on  the  front  extended,  Ayub's  cavalry  being  on 
the  move  to  the  left  as  if  to  carry  out  a  flanking  movement  in  that 
direction.*  Accordingly  two  companies  of  Jacob's  Bifles  were 
sent  to  the  extreme  left,  while  the  remaining  companies  of  that 
regiment  and  detachment  of  the  Bombay  Sappers  and  Miners 
filled  up  the  gap  between  the  66th  on  the  right,  and  the  guns  in 
the  centre.  Two  guns  were  placed  in  position  to  support 
the  66th  on  the  right,  the  remaining  ten  between  the 
Grenadiers  and  the  main  body  of  Jacob's  Bifles.  Every 
rifle  was  thus  in  the  line  of  attack,  it  not  being  possible  to 
form  any  reserve  worthy  of  the  nrme  for  such  a  small  force. 
The  cavalry  (3rd  Scind  Horse  and  3rd  Bombay  Light  Cavalry), 
under  General  Nuttall,  formed  up  in  rear  of  the  left  centre  of  the 
line,  where  they  remained  during  the  action.  Our  guns  began 
shelling  the  enemy,  whose  artillery  did  not  reply  for  quite  half 
an  hour,  confirming  the  idea  that  Ayub's  guns  were  far  in  rear. 
By  half-past  twelve,  however,  this  delusion  was  cleared  away,  for 
some  five  batteries  opened  upon  the  brigade,  and  their  shells  fell 

*  MAJor-Q«neral  GreaTea,  AdjuUot- General  in  India,  in  his  remarks  upon  Geoer»l 
Barrows*  despatch,  points  out  how  fatal  it  was  to  form  op  with  both  flanks  tn  Vair 
before  an  enemy  rastlj  soperior  in  numbers. 


554  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

with  fair  accuracy.  The  effect  of  our  own  artillery  fire  could  not 
be  followed,  as  the  haze  continued.  Under  coTer  of  their  thirty  or 
more  guns  the  irregulars  advanced  to  within  600  or  700  yards  of 
the  66th ;  but  the  Martini  fire  from  the  latter  swept  them  down 
wherever  they  appeared ;  and  so  cowed  were  they  that,  planting 
their  standards,  they  sought  cover  in  a  dry  ravine,  firing  upon  our 
men  without  doing  much  damage.  Our  infantry  were  lying  down 
under  such  cover  as  the  ground  afforded,  and  two  of  the  smooth- 
bore guns  were  sent  to  the  left  to  shell  the  Afghan  cavalry.  Then 
came  the  fatal  mistake  in  the  action :  instead  of  following  the 
usual  tactics  which  our  generals  have  found  so  successful  all 
through  the  war — ^taking  the  initiative  and  attacking  with  his 
infantry — General  Burrows  entered  into  an  artillery  duel,  which 
lasted  for  two  hours.  The  brigade  had  twelve  guns  (six  of  which 
were  inferior  smooth-bores,  worked  by  volunteers  from  the  horse 
artillery,  and  infantry  men  trained  during  the  halt  at  Khusk-i- 
Nakhud)  the  Afghans  had  nearly  three  times  that  number,  and 
their  gunners  were  unusually  expert,  "They  soon  got  our 
range, "  says  an  officer  present,  "  and  shot  and  shell  came  crash- 
ing into  us."  Shrapnel,  round-shot,  and  afterwards  grape,  were 
freely  used  by  the  enemy ;  and  while  our  infantry  were  fairly  safe 
at  first,  the  horses  of  the  cavalry  and  the  gun-teams  suffered 
severely.  The  latter  had  to  be  renewed  constantly ;  and  it  was 
evident  that  in  a  trial  of  strength  with  artillery  the  brigade  was 
greatly  over-matched.  Little  did  our  men  know  that  the  Herati 
regiments  suffered  so  from  their  shell- fire  that  twice  they  retired, 
and  were  quite  ready  to  have  fled  at  the  first  direct  attack.  The 
enemy's  artillery  fire  was  so  well  sustained  that  casualties  soon 
began  to  be  reported  all  along  the  line.  Harris,  of  the  staff,  and 
Blackwood,  commanding  E-B  Battery,  were  among  the  first  hit : 
but  Blackwood,  after  having  his  wound  dressed  (he  was  hit  in  the 
thigh),  returned  to  his  battery — a  rare  example  of  true  bravery  and 
endurance.  The  want  of  water  told  heavily  upon  all  our  men,  and 
the  slackness  resulting  therefrom  was  only  too  plain — men  leaving 
the  ranks  to  get  water  from  the  nvllah  in  rear  or  from  the  water- 
carriers.  Our  three  regiments  were  still  out  of  range  of  any 
musketry  fire,  except  stray  shots  from  irregulars  ;  but  the  artillery 
fire  had  a  demoralizing  effect  upon  the  sepoys.     Jacob's  Bifles  are 


Panic  among  the  Native  Infantry.  555 

said  to  have  had  nearly  100  men  who  had  never  fired  ball-car- 
tridge, so  that  they  could  not  be  looked  npon  at  all  as  trained 
soldiers  whose  fire  could  be  relied  upon. 

At  about  two  o'clock  the  smooth-bore  guns  were  reported  as 
running  short  of  ammunition.  Sixty  rounds  per  gun  had  been 
made  up  since  their  capture,  and  with  these  they  went  into  action. 
There  were  no  reserres  to  fall  back  upon.  Captain  Slade  had 
taken  charge  of  these  guns,  but  returned  to  his  own  battery  when 
they  ceased  to  fire.  There  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  order  the 
four  six-pounders  and  the  two  howitzers  forming  the  battery  to  re- 
tire and  this  movement  was  at  once  carried  out.  No  sooner  did 
the  enemy  notice  that  half  our  guns  were  out  of  action  than  they 
advanced  along  their  whole  line.  Their  batteries  were  brought 
forward  in  the  boldest  manner,  and  some  of  their  guns  actually 
came  into  action,  on  the  right,  from  behind  a  depression  in  the 
ground  only  800  yards  from  our  infantry.  Two  or  three  thou- 
sand cavalry  manoeuvred  on  the  left  flank  of  the  brigade,  trying  to 
get  well  in  rear ;  while  on  the  right  a  large  number  of  mounted  men 
and  irregulars  on  foot,  who  had  made  a  wide  detour,  got  into  the 
villages,  and  were  firing  upon  the  baggage  escort.  The  66th  had 
still  the  ghazi-led  mob  in  front  of  them  in  check,  steady  volleys 
keeping  the  ground  clear.  At  this  time  the  casualties  all  round 
must  have  been  considerably  over  100,  while  many  horses  had 
been  killed. 

At  about  half-past  two  the  two  companies  of  Jacob's  Bifles  on 
the  extreme  left  began  to  waver.  Their  two  officers  had  been 
killed,  and  their  two  native  officers,  who  had  kept  them  together 
for  some  time,  had  also  fallen ;  there  were  none  of  the  enemy's 
infantry  near  them,  but  the  artillery  fire  had  demoralized  them ; 
and  the  last  straw  which  broke  the  back  of  their  courage  was  the 
retirement  of  the  smooth-bores  out  of  action.  They  thought 
such  a  move  could  only  mean  that  all  was  over,  and  they  broke 
their  ranks  and  fell  back  in  utter  confusion,  breaking  into  the 
ranks  of  the  Grenadiers,  who  had  up  to  that  time  been  steady. 
Their  bad  example  was  quickly  imitated,  and  the  Grenadiers  like- 
wise gave  way.  The  remaining  companies  of  Jacob's  Bifles 
shared  the  panic,  and  with  a  quickness  that  carried  consternation 
into  the  heart  of  every  European  officer,  all  the  native  infantry 


556  The  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

were  snrging  upon  the  66th.  The  Grenadiers  fought  hravely 
and  tried  to  form  square  but  could  only  get  into  a  Y  shape  with 
the  apex  towards  the  enemy :  in  the  milke  they  were  cut  down 
literally  **  in  hundreds.**  The  Sapper  detachment  under  Lieu- 
tenant Henn,  with  the  guns,  stood  bravely  to  their  post,  but  so 
small  a  party  could  not  hope  to  save  the  guns  without  immediate 
help.  Lieutenant  Henn  was  killed  after  behaving  most  gallantly. 
The  enemy  saw  their  advantage,  and  a  rush  of  irregulars  led  by 
ghazis  was  made  from  the  right  front.  The  guns  fired  canister 
into  the  mass ;  but  it  was  useless,  and  Slade  limbered  up  and 
retired.  Maclaine  remained  with  two  guns  firing,  until  the  ghazis 
were  actually  at  the  muzzles,  and  these  two  guns  had  to  be  left 
behind.  The  66th  were  broken  by  the  rush  of  sepoys  upon  them. 
The  confusion  was  hopeless,  many  of  the  sepoys  being  so  cowed 
that  they  allowed  the  Afghans  to  pull  them  backwards  from  among 
their  comrades  and  cut  them  down.  No  attempt  to  use  the 
bayonet  was  made  by  the  recruits  among  Jacob*s  Rifles,  who 
scarcely  seemed  to  know  that  they  carried  arms  wherewith  to  de- 
fend themselves.  A  cavalry  charge  was  ordered  ;  but  the  men 
were  out  of  hand,  and  though  two  squadrons  rode  out,  they  never 
really  charged.  One  of  their  officers  had  his  horse  shot,  and  the 
sowars  would  not  go  on,  but  veered  round  and  came  back  to  add 
to  the  disorganization  of  the  infantry.^  The  66th  and  the 
Grenadiers  rallied  twice  in  walled  enclosures  and  sold  their  lives 
dearly,  but  they  were  outnumbered,  and  could  not  help  to  check  the 
Afghan  advance.     Colonel  Galbraith  was  killed  outside  the  first 

*  Brigadier  Nattall  commanding  the  cavalrj  says  in  bis  despatch :  '*  I  ordered  the 
cavalry  to  form  line,  and  by  a  cbarge  stem  tbe  msb  of  ghazlB  on  tbe  infantry  ;  but  I 
bitterly  regret  to  have  to  record  that  altboagb  I  was  most  ably  seconded  by  the  officers, 
only  portions  of  the  3rd  Light  Cavalry  and  3rd  Scind  Horse  formed  ap,  and  we  charged, 
but  tbe  men  bearing  away  to  tbe  right  and  rear,  the  cbaige  was  not  delivered  home,  and 
was  but  of  little  effect.  All  sabsequent  attempts  made  a\  this  time  by  myself  and  the 
officers  to  induce  the  men  to  rally  and  face  the  enemy  failed.  The  men  seemed  totally 
demoralized  by  the  combined  effects  of  the  very  heavy  artillery  fire  which  had,  daring 
the  action,  killed  and  wounded  149  of  the  horses,  and  about  fourteen  per  cent,  of  the 
men  enga^t^d  in  tbe  front.  There  was  now  nothing  left  but  to  fall  back  on  the  rear- 
guHrd,  which  had  advanced  a  short  way  towards  us,  but  it  was  not  till  we  reached  the 
four  guns  Royal  Horse  Artillery,  brought  out  of  action  by  Captain  Slade,  that  the  men, 
throuvh  the  exertions  of  the  officers,  staff  and  myself,  were  formed  up  facing  the 
eneray.** 


The  Retreat  to  Candahar.  557 

enclosure,  and  the  66th  lost  nine  other  officers  killed.  Major 
Blackwood,  commanding  E-B  Battery,  was  also  shot  down,  one  of 
his  sahaltems  (Lieutenant  Osborne)  having  been  killed  in  the 
rush.  By  three  o'clock  the  brigade  had  been  routed,  and  the 
enemy  were  in  hot  pursuit.  Fortunately  that  pursuit  lasted  only 
two  or  three  miles,  the  enemy  returning  to  Maiwand  to  loot 
General  Burrows'  camp. 

The  following  extract  from   a  letter  from  an  officer  who  was 
engaged  in  the  action  may  well  close  this  sad  record : — 

"  When  I  realized  that  we  were  defeated,  and  had  to  retreat 
some  50  miles  to  Candahar,  my  heart  sank  within  me,  and  never 
shall  I  forget  the  agonies  of  that  fearful  night  march  without 
water,  hundreds  of  poor  wretches  lying  strewn  about  the  road 
calling  aloud  for  a  drop  of  water.  It  was  agonizing,  but  one  was 
obliged  to  steel  his  heart,  as  nothing  could  be  done,  we  all  being 
in  the  same  box.  The  order  to  march  on  Maiwand  from  Ehusk-i- 
Nakhud  was  only  given  at  10  p.m.,  on  the  26th  July,  and  the 
march  commenced  at  6.30  a.m.  (on  the  27th).  We  had  no  idea  that 
Ayub's  army  was  at  Maiwand  till  we  had  marched  half-way  there, 
and  then  we  only  half  believed  it :  however,  after  going  a  few 
miles  further  we  sighted  the  enemy  moving  towards  Maiwand. 
Our  troops  seemed  to  consider  that  they  would  have  it  all  their 
own  way,  and  advanced  very  boldly ;  but  the  demoralizing  effect 
of  thirty  odd  guns  and  the  being  outnumbered,  obliged  them  to 
retreat,  and  the  retreat  became  a  rout.  From  prisoners  lately 
taken  we  hear  that  we  inflicted  a  fearful  loss  on  the  enemy,  and 
that  if  we  could  only  have  brought  a  fresh  regiment  we  could 
have  won  the  day.  Our  heaviest  losses  were  during  the  retreat, 
as  all  the  villagers  on  the  line  of  route  turned  against  us.  I  was 
among  the  last  to  leave  the  field,  and  walked  half  the  way,  having 
given  up  my  pony  to -a  wounded  soldier.  I  was  not  fired  on  by 
the  villagers  till  within  six  miles  of  Candahar,  when  I,  with  two 
sepoys  and  the  wounded  soldier,  had  to  ascend  a  hill,  and  take 
refuge  behind  a  rock,  where  we  remained  a  good  while,  till  the 
country  was  cleared  by  the  cavalry  under  General  Brooke,  who  had 
come  out  from  Candahar  to  meet  us.  I  then  continued  my 
journey,  and  when  arriving  at  the  village  near  the  cantonments 


558  The  Afglian  War,   1879—80. 

Bome  10  European  and  15  native  soldiers  had  joined  me.  The 
native  soldiers  were  utterly  demoralized,*  and  I  could  not  get 
them  to  obey  me.  Some  100  or  150  Afghans  were  congregated 
on  a  little  hillock  commanding  the  road  to  Candahar,  and  seeing 
the  hesitation  of  my  party  they  streamed  down  the  hill,  yelling, 
and  I  was  obliged  to  fall  back  and  take  up  a  position  on  another 
hillock.  Then  the  native  soldiers  came  to  me  and  expressed 
their  opinion  that  we  ought  to  run  for  it.  However,  I  abused 
them,  and  made  them  lie  down  and  point  their  guns  towards  the 
enemy,  who  at  once  retreated  to  their  former  position.  I  felt 
perfect  confidence  in  the  European  portion  of  my  party,  and  if  I 
could  have  felt  the  same  in  the  native  I  would  not  have  minded 
an  attack  from  150  half-armed  Afghans.  When  General  Brooke 
returned  with  the  rear-guard  of  the  Girishk  column,  he  shelled 
the  hills  where  the  A%hans  were  collected,  and  we  marched 
peaceably  into  cantonments." 


CONCLUSION. 


I  HAVE  not  gone  into  the  details  of  the  movements  of  the  Cabul- 
Candahar  force  after  the  Battle  of  Candahar,  as  there  was  no 
furtiier  opposition,  and  the  military  programme  carried  out  was 
only  of  local  importance.  The  brigades  were  marched  back 
to  India  as  quickly  as  possible,  with  the  exception  of  the  9th 
Lancers  and  6-8  B.A.,  which  were  left  at  Candahar.  The  following 
letter,  written  in  Candahar,  will  throw  some  light  on  the  strategy 
of  the  action  on  September  1st : — 

Candahar,  20^A  September. 

There  is  but  one  opinion  here  as  to  the  unsoundness  of  the 
criticisms  upon  General  Boberts's  action  of  the  1st ;  it  is  that  the 
critics  have  jumped  to  conclusions  on  imperfect  reports,  having 
taken  the  first  meagre  telegrams  as  their  guide.  By  an 
incessant  study  of  small-scale  maps  they   gained   a   superficial 

*  The  8rd  Scind  Hone  only  lost  fourteen  men  killed  and  five  wounded  ont  of  260  men : 
they  had  forty-nine  boraes  killed  and  wounded.  There  were  thus  always  OTor  200  Mbret 
available  for  a  charge  in  this  regiment  alone,  but  the  men  were  out  of  hand. 


Conclusion.  559 

knowledge  of  the  Argandab  Valley,  and  were  fully  convinced  that 
the  proper  mode  of  directing  the  attack  would  have  been  to  throw 
an  intercepting  force  3Q  or  40  miles  in  rear  of  Mazra,  and  then 
to  have  attacked  Ayub  from  Candahar — no  doubt  by  way  of  the 
Pir  Paimal   village.      They   point   their   arguments   by   adding 
that  our  cavalry  pursuit  was  really  inoperative,  as  only   400   of 
the  fugitives  were  killed,  while  the  great  mass  escaped.    Admitted 
that  after  we  had  rolled  them  back  from  Pir  Paimal  the  great 
majority  got  oflf  scot-free,  this  by  no  means  proves  that  a  weak 
brigade  could  have  cut  oflf  their  retreat;  for  it  seems  to  be  for- 
gotten that  not  one,  but  many,  roads  were  open  to  them,  while  the 
mountainous  nature  of  the  country  on  the  higher  reaches  of  the 
Argandab  was  all  in  favour  of  trained  hill-men  such  as  Afghans 
always    are.     Their    cavalry    and   many   thousands    of  footmen 
made  straight  for  the  Ehakrez  Yalley,  knowing  well  that  once 
the   range   of  hills,    eight   miles   west   and    north-west  of  the 
Argandab,  was  reached,  they  were  quite    safe.      There   was   no 
necessity  at  all  for  their  retirement  northwards    up  the  Argan- 
dab— or  rather  north-eastwards — and  it  is  quite  an   open   ques- 
tion if  any  brigade  we  could  have  spared  would  have  even  seen 
many  of  the  fugitives.     General  Boberts's  first  and  greatest  duty 
was  to  induce  Ayub  Khan  to  give  him  battle,  and  not  to  cause 
a  scare  in  his  camp  by  premature  strategical  movements,  SO  or 
40  miles  up  the  Argandab  Yalley.     It  may  not  be  known,  also, 
that  when  the  infantry  was  encamped  near  Shar-i-Safa,  one  march 
from  Bobat,  on  August  27th  the  news  from   Candahar    led   us 
to  believe  that  Ayub  might  possibly  forsake  Mazra  and  try    to 
escape  in  the  Ghazni  direction  by  way  of  the  Argandab  stream. 
General  Boberts  at   once   recognized   the   necessity  of  barring 
any  movement  in  force  in  this  direction,  and  a  column  of  about 
2,000  men  was  told  off  to  march  by  way  of  Bori,  and  Dala,  and 
block  the  road  up  the  Argandab.     But  when  heliographic  commu- 
nication with  Candahar  was  opened  up   later  in  the    day,   and 
Colonel  St.  John's  reports  showed  that  Ayub  was  busy  strengthen- 
ing his  position  at  Mazra,  the  order  given  for  the  column  to  move 
out  was  at  once  countermanded.    It  was  known  that  the  Afghan 
force  was  mainly  composed  of  men  from  Zamindawar,  Candahar, 
and  Herat — the  Cabuli  element  being  very  small,  and  the  Eizil< 


560  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

bashes  and  Eohistanis  being  already  in  treaty  with  Colonel  St. 
John  to  desert  at  short  noftice.  The  main  body  of  real  fighting 
men,  therefore,  would  seek  safety  in  flight,  after  defeat,  not 
northwards  towards  Khelat-i-Ghilzai,  bnt  to  the  west  and  north- 
west, where  the  hills  offered  them  shelter  until  they  could  regain 
their  homes.  This  line  of  flight  was  really  taken ;  but  as  our 
cavalry  brigade  under  General  Hugh  Gough  could  not  reach  the 
Eokai*an  Ford  until  Gundigan  and  the  orchards  about  had  been 
cleared  by  General  Baker's  Infantry  Brigade,  Ayub  Khan  and 
his  cavalry  escort — leaving  Mazra,  it  should  be  remembered,  at 
11.30  A.M. — had  easily  covered  the  seven  or  eight  miles  of  ground 
between  the  river  and  the  slopes  of  the  hills  bounding  the 
Ehakrez  Yalley  on  the  south.  Besides,  the  tactics  of  the  fugitives 
were  such  as  to  neutralize  any  pursuit  or  the  action  of  any  inter- 
cepting force :  hundreds  took  refuge  in  the  villages,  buried  their 
arms,  or  hid  them  securely  away,  and  came  out  to  greet  our  troops 
in  the  guise  of  harmless  peasants.  If  these  had  been  slaughtered 
in  cold  blood  the  cavalry  would  have  returned  with  the  report 
that  not  300  or  400,  but  1,300  or  1.400  of  the  enemy  had  been 
killed.  I  do  not  make  this  statement  on  my  own  unsupported 
authority,  but  on  the  direct  testimony  of  cavalry  officers  engaged 
in  the  pursuit.  Thus  the  9th  Lancers  gave  chase  to  a  large 
number  of  men  evidently  in  full  flight.  On  coming  up  with 
them,  the  Lancers  found  these  fugitives  without  arms,  and  though 
there  could  be  no  reasonable  doubt  that  they  had  hidden  their 
weapons  some  little  time  before.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Bushman 
ordered  his  men  to  spare  their  lives.  The  Lancers  rode  among 
them,  and  if  any  man  had  been  detected  with  a  knife  or  pistol  he 
would  probably  have  paid  the  forfeit  of  his  life.  In  other  in- 
stances small  bands  were  hunted  into  villages,  and  when  the 
cavalry  rode  up  men  appeared  holding  little  children  in  their  arms, 
and  prayed  for  mercy.  What  was  to  be  done  to  an  enemy 
resorting,  to  such  manoeuvres  ?  Our  cavalry  could  not  take 
prisoners  as  they  had  to  continue  the  pursuit :  and  these  units 
of  the  Mazra  army  were  shown  that  mercy  which  they  refused 
to  our  men  retreating  from  Maiwand ! 

Again,  any  intercepting  force  thrown  into  the  Argandab  Valley 
could  not  hope  to  co-operate  with  the  force  attacking  from  Can- 


Conclusion.  561 

dahar;  they  would  have  been  a  detached  corps  of  observation, 
merely  watching  for  Afghans  fleeing  into  their  arms.  First  of  all 
they  must  have  been  sent  completely  away  from  our  main  body 
either  at  Shar-i-Safa  or  Bobat  in  order  to  cross  the  hills  by  the 
only  available  kotal  near  Dala  (between  30  and  40  miles  above  the 
Baba  Wali  Kotal) ;  for  the  Murcha  Kotal  was  held  in  force  by 
Ayub.  They  could  not  approach  to  within  20  miles  of  Mazra,  for 
a  further  advance  would  have  been  to  court  an  attack  by  over- 
whelming numbers,  while  "General  Eoberts  was  marching  from 
Bobat  to  Candahar.  The  safety  of  2,000  men  would  have  been 
endangered,  while  the  only  object  they  could  have  gained  would 
have  been  the  interception  of  a  few  hundred  of  Cabulis,  who 
would  probably  have  taken  to  the  precipitous  hills  and  escaped  in 
the  night.  The  Argandab  Valley  narrows  greatly,  30  or  40  miles 
above  Mazra,  and  cavalry  would  have  been  worse  than  useless 
with  the  intercepting  (?)  column.  It  cannot  be  urged  with  too 
much  emphasis,  that  Ayub  Khan's  line  of  retreat,  if  his  army 
were  defeated^  was  in  the  Khakrez  direction,  for  his  men,  in  their 
slack  disclipine,  would  make  for  their  own  villages  and  not  rush 
off  at  a  tangent  towards  Khelat-i-Ghilzai.  All  Afghan  '^  armies, " 
so-called,  and  Ayub's  was  perhaps  more  worthy  of  respect  than 
any  we  have  yet  met,  have  a  power  of  dispersion  which  is  un- 
rivalled. Organized  pursuit  against  them  is  almost  impossible : 
unless  every  mountain  path  and  torrent  bed  within  50  miles  could 
be  searched  at  once. 

General  Boberts  has  had  more  experience  in  Afghan  warfare 
than  any  other  of  our  commanders  ;  and  his  tactics  were  based  on 
sounder  principles  than  those  advocated  by  critics  unversed 
altogether  even  in  the  details  of  past  actions.  To  say  Pir  Paimal 
could  have  been  carried  with  fewer  troops  than  those  engaged  is 
to  beg  the  whole  question.  The  action  of  Ahnfed  Khel  proved 
that  when  fanaticism  is  at  red-heat,  5,000  or  6,000  men  may 
charge  right  into  our  ranks.  Would  it  have  been  wise  to  have 
dispensed  with  General  Macgregor's  brigade  (some  2,000  strong) 
as  a  reserve  in  case  of  such  another  charge  down  from  the  Baba 
Wali  Kotal  upon  General  Macpherson's  right  flank  ?  And  yet 
General  Macgregor  had  about  the  number  of  men  which  would 
have  been  absorbed  if  the  much- talked  of  ''  intercepting  column  *' 

o  o 


562  TJie  Afghan  War,  1879—80. 

had  been  waiting,  30  or  40  miles  up  the  Argandab  Valley, 
ignorant  of  what  was  happening  at  Candahar.  It  may  be  urged 
that  there  were  4,000  men  of  the  Candahar  garrison  at  General 
Roberts's  disposal ;  but  it  would  have  been  unwise  to  ask  much  of 
a  garrison  still  suffering  from  the  shock  of  the  terrible  disaster  at 
Maiwand,  and  only  half-realizing  that  they  were  no  longer  be- 
sieged within  the  walls  of  Candahar.  That  I  am  not  exaggerat- 
ing the  depression  prevailing  in  the  Bombay  Division,  will  be  clear 
from  the  fact  that  General  Primrose,  on  the  evening  of  the  blst 
August,  personally  stopped  a  string  of  .mules  which  were  leaving 
the  citadel  with  bread  and  barley  for  the  Bengal  troops.  Our 
reconnaissance  was  returning,  and  there  was  certainly  heavy  rifle- 
fire  beyond  Earez  hill,  while  the  enemy's  guns  on  Baba  Wali 
Kotal  were  also  adding  to  the  din.  Our  troops  were  holding 
Picquet  Hill,  and  our  camp  was  within  2,500  yards  of  the  Eedgah 
Gate,  out  of  which  an  officer  in  the  Commissariat  Department  was 
conducting  the  little  convoy.  Between  that  convoy  and  **  danger  " 
were  some  10,000  picked  men,  nearly  all  British,  Sikhs,  and 
Ghoorkas ;  but  the  "  risk  "  of  allowing  the  bread  and  grain  to  be 
carried  a  mile  and  a  half  was  pronounced  "  too  great  "  by  General 
Primrose  himself.  The  Commissariat  officer,  knowing  food  was 
needed  in  camp,  managed  to  gain  permission  to  take  on  the  mules 
laden  with  bread,  and  he  saw  nothing  to  disturb  him  on  the  road. 
The  ground  between  the  north-western  bastion  and  the  nearest 
wall  of  cantonments  (1,200  yards  away)  is  as  bare  as  the  Sahara, 
and  it  was  not  likely  the  enemy's  cavalry  picquet  below  the  Baba 
Wali  Eotal  would  have  charged  out  a  couple  of  miles  to  capture 
the  mules,  even  if  they  had  seen  them.  The  story  is  told  not  to 
detract  from  General  Primrose's  judgment  and  ability,  but  to 
illustrate  the  unhealthy  feeling  and  want  of  tone  in  the  garrison, 
in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  brave  and  resolute  men  to  vripe  out  the 
recollection  of  Maiwand  and  Deh-i-Ehwaja  from  the  minds  of 
their  fellows. 

I  have  tried  to  write  without  undue  dogmatism  :  but  I  may  have 
been  betrayed  into  laying  too  great  a  stress  upon  "  probabilities,  " 
viz.,  that  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat  would  be  towards  Ehakrez 
and  not  up  the  narrow  Argandab  Valley,  and  that  Ayub's  irregulars 
might  have  furnished  a  band  of  desperate  men  led  by  ghazis  to 


Conclusion,  563 

make  a  counter-attack  from  Baba  Wali  Kotal.  I  have  carefully 
avoided  any  reference  to  the  entrenched  camp  of  Ayab  at  Mazra, 
which  oar  spies  assured  us  existed,  and  which  General  Macgregor's 
Brigade,  fresh  and  untouched  by  fire,  were  intended  to  storm  if 
Generals  Macpherson  and  Baker  had  been  checked  in  their  pro- 
gress. I  think  these  probabiUties  were  justified  fully  so  far  as 
the  retreat  is  concerned,  while  the  knowledge  that  we  had  all  our 
forces  concentrated  behind  Karez  and  Picquet  Hills  may  have  pre- 
vented the  masses  of  men  about  the  Baba  Wali  Eotal  (in  the  earlier 
part  of  the  day)  from  making  a  counter-attack.  If  there  is  one 
part  which  criticism  may  fairly  seize  upon,  and  which  our  own 
Brigadiers  would  be  the  first  to  acknowledge,  it  is  the  want  of 
cavalry  with  General  Boss  when  the  72nd  and  2nd  Sikhs  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  92nd  and  2nd  Ghoorkas  on  the  other,  rolled 
back  the  enemy  at  the  turning-point  of  the  Pir  Paimal  spur.  The 
basin  leading  towards  Mazra  and  the  open  ground  due  west 
towards  the  Argandab  was  covered  with  men  in  full  flight,  and  500 
sabres  could  have  swept  into  them  with  terrific  effect.  It  is,  I 
believe,  an  axiom  that  no  division  shall  now  go  into  action  without 
one  regiment  of  cavalry  attached  to  it,  but  all  through  the  war  we 
have  brigaded  all  our  cavalry,  and  on  several  occasions  the  want  of 
500  troops  to  follow  up  rapidly  an  infantry  attack  has  been  severely 
felt.  Witness  in  particular  the  first  action  of  Charasia,  when 
the  Afghans  fled  towards  Indikee ;  and  the  storming  of  the  ridge 
leading  up  to  the  Takht-i-Shah  Peak  when  the  open  ground  beyond* 
Beni  Hissar  was  black  with  fugitives.  General  Hugh  Gough  and 
his  splendid  cavalry  brigade  of  1,600  sabres  and  lances  did  all 
that  men  could  do  to  gain  the  Eokaran  Ford,  and  cut  up  such 
bodies  of  men  as  they  could  overtake ;  but  if  one  regiment  had 
been  spared  from  that  brigade  tp  have  followed  up  our  infantry 
advance  there  would  have  been  rare  work  for  the  troops  about  Pir 
Paimal.  The  answer,  of  course,  to  this  is  that  the  network  of 
orchards  and  walled  enclosures,  with  intersecting  channels,  seemed 
to  shut  out  cavalry  from  participating  in  that  part  of  the  action ; 
there  was  no  one  as  usual  to  tell  us  of  the  grand  open  ground 
when  the  ridge  was  turned. 


APPENDIX. 


Thc  following  information  Ib  ^terired  from  tmstworihy  sonrods,  and  may  be  of  some 

interest : — 

TaiiU  of  Heights  above  mean  Sea-levd, 

Yoot 

Oabnl  Plain 5,840 

Lattabnnd  Kotal .7,400 

EataSang 5,000 

Jogdollaok  Kotal 5,200 

Gnndamak 4,500 

Fattebabad 8,095 

Jellalabad 1,950 

Table  of  Mareheifrom  Jumrood  to  Cabul, 

The  corrected  road  distanoes  are  :«> 

MOaa. 

Junrood  to  AH  Masjid 8*80 

All  itosjid  to  Londi  Kotal 10-50 

Lnndi  Kotal  to  Dakka 12  00 

Dakka  to  Basanle 1110 

Basaole  to  Barikab 9*98 

Barikab  to  Jellalabad 17.76 

Jellalabad  to  Rosabad 12'88 

Roeabad  to  Suf ed  Sang 16'12 

Safed  Sang  to  Peswan  Kotal 12'75 

Peswan  Kotal  to  Jngdollock  Fort 10*50 

Jngdnllnok  Fort  to  Sei  Baba 1000 

Set  Baba  to  Lattabund 9*50 

LatUbnnd  to  Bntkhak 9*50 

Batkhak  to  BaU  Hissar 9*20 

Total  .  .  16009 

Transpobt  fob  thb  Imdiah  Armt. 

The  transport  arrangements  hare  always  been  tke  great  stumbling-block  when  war 
has  been  declared  in  India,  and  in  the  hope  that  something  will  be  done  to  form  a 
permanent  establishment,  I  republish  the  following  letter,  written  in  Sberpnr  on  Jone 
15th,  1880 :— 


566  The  Afghan  War,  1879 — 80. 

15a  June. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Low,  of  the  Idth  Bengal  Lancers,  Ohief  Director  of  Tmisi>ort 
with  the  Oabol  Force,  has  suggested  a  plan  for  establishing  a  pennanent  transport  ser- 
vice, the  details  of  which  I  will  try  to  explain.  He  adyocates  a  system — ^tbe  expense  of 
which  should  be  moderate  in  time  of  peace,  and  not  extravagant  in  time  of  war— which 
should  admit  of  rapid  expansion  when  war  breaks  opt,  and,  most  important  of  all,  which 
should  allow  of  the  animals  being  employed  for  ordinary  purposes  of  commerce  in  peace 
time,  yet  always  be  ready  to  fall  into  their  places  when  the  State  requires  them.  Oolonel 
Low  takes  an  army  of  86,000  of  all  amiB  with  fifteen  dsys*  food  as  the  unit  to  be 
treat«>d,  this  beins  about  the  strength  of  a  force  which  is  likely  to  be  mobilized  in  case 
of  war  breaking  out,  and  he  believes  that  under  his  system  transport  for  such  an  army 
could  be  raised,  at  any  time,  in  a  fortnight. 

Taking  the  mule  as  the  only  transport  animal  in  the  "first  line,"  he  calculates  that 
70,000  mules  (of  which  number  1,028  would  be  spare  animals)  would  be  required  for 
the  86,000  men,  the  estimate  being  as  follows : — 

Mules. 

7,000  British  In&ntry 16,485 

1,500      „       Cavalry 6,036 

2,800  Artillery  and  Engirfeers 11,267 

4,000  Native  Cavalry 9,900 

21,000     „       Infantry 26,384 

Total    68,972 
Spare  animals      1,028 

Grand  total    70,000 

This  calculation  is  made  on  the  Oabul  scale  of  baggage,  and  each  animal  would  have  to 
carry  two  maunds  only ;  allowanoe  is  made  for  forage  and  gndn  also  being  carried. 
The  70,000  mules  required  would  be  looated  in  the  three  Presidencies,  in  the  following 
proportion  :  Bengal,  85,000  ;  Bombay  and  Madras,  17,500  each.  Regarding  Northern 
India,  it  is  calculated  that  the  N.-W.  Provinces  would  furnish  9«750,  Oadh  750  and 
Rohilkund  2,000.  The  Punjab  would  be  responsible  for  27,500.  The  system  of  main- 
tenance would  be  the  division  of  all  the  country  into  a  certain  number  of  districts ;  as, 
for  instance,  the  N.  -W.  Provinces  into  thirteen,  and  the  Punjab  into  twenty,  each  of 
which  won  Id  have  a  fixed  number  of  mules  ready  for  the  State  when  occasion  might 
arise.  Colonel  Low*s  explanation  of  the  organisation  he  would  create  is  so  dear,  that  I 
will  give  his  own  words.  He  sajs : — "The  districts  would  all  have  been  numbered  off 
in  the  transport  books,  and  I  will  suppose  I  am  visiting  the  Rawalpindi  or  Na  20  dis- 
trict. The  first  village  I  enter,  might  have,  perhaps,  fifteen  mules,  nine  of  which  were 
over  three  and  under  fourteen  yean  old.  To  the  ownera  of  these  animals  I  would  say  : 
'  Gk)vemment  will  give  you,  through  me,  one  rupee  per  month  for  each  of  these  animals. 
Government  does  not  want  them  now  and  may  never  want  them  at  all.  Keep  them, 
therefore,  and  use  them  as  you  have  been  accustomed  to.  All  that  GK)vemment  asks  is 
that  you  will  agree  to  give  the  use  of  the  mules  in  time  of  war.  Ton  must  bring  them 
with  their  saddles,  &c.,  arranging  among  yourselves  that  at  least  one  man  shall  accom- 
pany every  three  mules.  On  Government  calling  for  the  mules,  you  will  receive  war 
rates  of  pay  from  that  day  till  the  animals  are  discharged,  when  they  will  revert  to 
peace  rates  of  one  rupee  per  month.  This  present  agreement  is  to  last  twelve  months, 
after  which  notice  of  three  months  on  either  side  may  end  the  bargain  :  the  one  pvovito 


Appendix,  56; 


b^ing  tbat  wbeD  Goyernment  haa  called  for  the  serrioe  of  the  molei,  the  notice  cannot 
be  given  until  the  mules  are  discharged.  Meanwhile  the  mnlei  most  be  branded  with 
the  district  mark  '  B  20  ;  *  and  here  is  Bs.  S6,  the  rst  quarterns  payment  in  advance/  " 
Colonel  Low  states  that  from  his  personal  knowledge,  and  from  opinions  expressed  by 
native  gentlemen,  he  is  convinced  the  people  would  eagerly  accept  such  a  system,  as  it  is 
one  which  they  could  easily  understand,  and  is  quite  in  keeping  with  their  customs  and 
traditions. 

Then  comes  the  all-important  question  of  cost.  Regarding  the  permanent  establish- 
ment, Colonel  Low  suggests  that  a  Director,  who  would  have  control  all  over  India, 
should  be  appointed  with  staff  pay  of  Rs.  1,000  per  month.  His  subordinates  in  Bengal 
would  be  two  superintendents  (Rs.  500  each),  and  four  assistants  (Rs.  150  to  200) ; 
in  Bombay  and  Madras  just  half  this  establishment.  There  would  also  be  a  number  of 
native  officers,  and  non-commissioned  officers,  and  five  sowars  would  be  told  off  to  each 
district  The  staff  in  Bengal  would  cost  Rs.  9,210  per  month  (in  peace  time),  in  Bom- 
baya  and  Madras  Rs.  4,030  each,  or  a  total  of  Rs.  17,270  for  establishment.  The 
premium  to  owners  of  Re.  1  per  animal  would  be  Rs.  70,000,  making  a  grand  total  of 
Rs.  87,270.  When  war  broke  out,  the  staff  would  be  available  for  Instant  service  at 
their  normal  pay,  while  the  owner  of  each  animal  would  receive  his  Rs.  12  per  month, 
inall  Rs.  8,40,000,  or  a  total  expenditure  on  service  of  Ra  8,57,270.  To  put  the 
matter  in  simpler  form.  Colonel  Low  remarks  :  — "  If  we  suppose  a  period  of  four  years 
in  which  there  was  war  for  four  months,  the  cost  would  be : — 

Rs. 
44  months*  peace,  at  Rs.  87,270  per  mensem  .     87,29,880 

4  months*  war,  at  Rs.  8,57,270  per  mensem  .     88,29,080 

Total    70.58,960 

This  is,  in  round  numbers,  £700,000;"  and  Colonel  Low  significantly  adds:— "This 
can  no  doubt  be  compared  with  transport  expenses  in  the  last  campaign  " — an  allusion, 
perhaps,  te  the  enormous  compensation  we  had  to  pay  to  camel-owners  for  animals  lost 
or  killed.  The  second  line  of  transport  in  a  campaign.  Colonel  Low  considers,  should  be 
wheeled  carriages,  a  certain  number  of  carts  being  always  kept  ready  at  stations  near 
the  bases  of  supply,  such  as  Multan,  Rawalpindi,  &c.  With  this  scheme,  and  no  doubt 
several  others  before  them,  it  will  be  strange  if  the  Qovemment  does  not  once  for  all 
make  up  its  mind  to  an  expenditure  in  peace  time  upon  transport  service  :  it  may  seem, 
for  the  time  being,  money  wasted,  but  any  one  seeing  the  accounts  of  the  present  war 
cannot  help  being  convinced  that  a  permanent  transport  would  have  saved  the  country 
many  lakhs  of  rupees.  , 


THE    END. 


WoodfsU  and  Kinder,  Printers,  Milford  Une,  Strand,  London,  W.C. 


wlP 


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