Ancient Christian No 22

281,1 |A54
Augustinus
St. Augustinus

v-22 56-00052
ffl of free choice

281 a A54 v.22 56^00052
Augustinus $3.25
St. Augustinus-the problem of
free choice

t-ff

ST. AUGUSTINE

THE PROBLEM
OF FREE CHOICE

DE LIBERO ARBITRIO

ANCIENT CHRISTIAN

THE WORKS OF THE FATHERS IN TRANSLATION

EDITED BY

JOHANNES QUASTEN, S. T. D.

Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

JOSEPH C. PLUMPE, PH. D.

Pontifical College Joseph inum
Worthington, O.

No. 22

WESTMINSTER, MARYLAND

THE NEWMAN PRESS

LONDON

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.
1955

ST. AUGUSTINE

TRANSLATED AND ANNOTATED
BY

DOM MARK PONTIFEX

Monk of Downside Abbey
near Bath, England

WESTMINSTER, MARYLAND

THE NEWMAN PRESS

LONDON

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.

1955

THE NEWMAN PRESS

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First published in U.S.A. 1955
First published in Great Britain 1955

Permissu Superiorum 0. S. B. Nihil obstat: J. QUASTEN, cens. dep.

Imprimatur, PATRICIUS A. O'BoYLE, D.D., Archiep. Washingtonen.

d. 6 Mail 1955

COPYRIGHT 1955 BY REV. JOHANNES QUASTEN AND REV. JOSEPH C. PLUMPE

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BY YORK COMPOSITION CO,, INC., YORK, PA.

CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION 3

1. PURPOSE OF THE BOOK 3

2. THE DE LIBERO ARBITRIO AND MANICHAEISM 6

3. THE DE LIBERO ARBITRIO AND PELAGIANISM 9

4. IMPORTANCE OF THE DE LIBERO ARBITRIO 13

5. EVODIUS 15

SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION 16

THE CHIEF QUESTIONS DISCUSSED 25

TEXT 35

BOOK ONE 35

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 35

WHAT Is SIN? 38

TEMPORAL LAW AND ETERNAL LAW 44

A MIND is THE SLAVE OF PASSION THROUGH ITS OWN

CHOICE 49

JUST PUNISHMENT 58

SIN is THE NEGLECT OF ETERNAL THINGS 67

BOOK Two 74

WHY HAS MAN BEEN GIVEN FREE CHOICE? 74

THE EVIDENCE OF GOD'S EXISTENCE 80

IN TRUTH WE FIND GOD 107

EVERY PERFECTION COMES FROM GOD 121

FREE WILL is GOOD 128

THE CAUSE OF SIN is NOT POSITIVE BUT NEGATIVE. 136

BOOK THREE 138

THE CAUSE OF SIN LIES IN THE WILL 138

GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE 142

To FORESEE SIN is NOT TO CAUSE IT 149

WHY DOES GOD NOT PREVENT UNHAPPINESS? 165

HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS IN THE END ARE BOTH JUST 178

v

vi CONTENTS

PERVERTED WILL Is THE CAUSE OF EVIL, AND IT Is USE-
LESS To LOOK FURTHER 189

IT Is OUR FUTURE DESTINY WHICH Is IMPORTANT. 201

THE SUFFERINGS OF YOUNG CHILDREN 208

THE SUFFERINGS OF ANIMALS 210

THE FIRST MAN'S SIN 212

THE DEVIL'S SIN 217

THE SUPREME VALUE OF JUSTICE, TRUTH, AND WISDOM 219

APPENDIX: Retract. 1.9 221

NOTES 229

To THE INTRODUCTION 231

To BOOK ONE 234

To BOOK Two 245

To BOOK THREE 267

INDEX 285

ST. AUGUSTINE

THE PROBLEM
OF FREE CHOICE

DE LIBERO ARBITRIO

Augustine, Retractationes 1.9.1, 6: While we were still staying at
Rome, we wished to debate and trace out the cause of evil. Our
plan of debate aimed at understanding by means of thorough
rational inquiry so far as, with God's help, discussion should
enable us what we believed about this question on divine author-
ity. After careful examination of the arguments we agreed that
evil occurred only through free choice of will, and so the three
books resulting from this discussion were called The Problem of
Free Choice. I finished the second and third of these books, as
-well as I could at the time, in Africa, after I was ordained priest
at Hippo Regius. . . . This work begins with the words, *I
should like you to tell me: is not God the cause of evil?'

INTRODUCTION

I. PURPOSE OF THE BOOK

Saint Augustine (354-430) wrote the De liber o arbitrio
between the years 388 and 395, thus beginning it when he
was thirty-four years of age and finishing it when he was
forty-one. This we know from his Retractations, com-
posed towards the end of his life, in 427, and in which he
reviewed all his previous writings. 1 He tells us that the
De libero arbitrio was a record of discussions which he
carried on when he was at Rome, that is to say, when he
was at Rome after the death of his mother Monnica and
just before his return to Africa. He adds, however, that
he did not write it all at Rome, but finished the second and
third books in Africa after he had been ordained priest at
Hippo Regius. This, no doubt, is the reason why Evodius
says very little after the beginning of the third book, leav-
ing St. Augustine to speak almost without interruption. It
is noticeable, too, that the number of theological, as op-
posed to philosophical, questions which are raised, increases
in the third book, reflecting the development of Augus-
tine's interests.

To appreciate the place which the De libero arbitrio
holds among St. Augustine's writings and in the develop-
ment of his thought, we must bear in mind the course of
his spiritual and intellectual history. Though brought up
at first as a catechumen in the Catholic Church, he joined
the Manichees when he was nineteen years old, and con-
tinued as a Manichee for ten years. Two things seem to

3

4 INTRODUCTION

have specially attracted him in their teaching, their answer
to the problem of evil and their materialist philosophy.
Their belief that evil was an independent principle, the
rival of good, appealed to him at this time as a solution to
the difficulty of evil, and he welcomed their philosophy
because he found it impossible to conceive of a spiritual
substance. When the Manichaean teaching ceased to sat-
isfy him, he*went through a short agnostic phase in which
he turned to Academic scepticism as the only refuge, but
it was at this time that he went to Milan and came under
the influence of its bishop, St. Ambrose. The teaching of
Ambrose on the Old Testament greatly impressed him, and
he also began to make a deep study of the Neo-Platonic
philosophy, chiefly from the works of Plotinus. It was
through this study of philosophy that he finally freed him-
self from the Manichaean influence, for he became con-
vinced that the existence of a spiritual substance was
conceivable, and that the problem of evil could be solved
without supposing evil to be a positive, independent prin-
ciple. He had reached this stage in the year 385, and in
the next year he decided to become once more a catechu-
men in the Catholic Church. Henceforward Scripture
and theology absorbed his attention to an increasing extent,
and philosophy came to interest him only in so far as it
affected theology. During the remainder of his life his
writings covered almost the whole vast field of theology,
his energies being focussed especially by the two chief
controversies which occupied him after his return to
Africa. First, there was the schism of the Donatists, which
forced him to study the question of the Church and its
government, and then his struggles with the Pelagians led
him to study the question of grace and predestination.

INTRODUCTION 5

These were the two main subjects on which he worked,
but in addition there were numerous other questions of
theology on which for particular reasons he was called
upon to give his views.

With this outline before us, let us return to the De libero
arbitrio. St. Augustine started to write it in 388, two years
after his conversion to Catholic Christianity, when the
problems connected with the Manichaean religion were
still vividly before his mind. Thus the De libero arbitrio
was written, as we are told in the Retractations, to answer
the Manichaean objection to Christianity that, since the
presence of evil is undeniable, it is inconceivable that God
can be both almighty and infinitely good. 2 Augustine dis-
cussed the problem with Evodius and, no doubt, his other
friends at Rome, and resolved to write down and publish
the conclusions to which they came. They argued, as he
makes clear, not merely from the motive of refuting the
Manichees, but also with the aim of understanding in their
own minds a truth received on faith, of finding a solution
which would satisfy reason.

Being a record, at least in the earlier part, of discussions
which actually took place, the book does not follow a clear
logical course defining the precise subject to be examined
and then working it out according to a prearranged plan.
Tt often moves in a rather confusing way from one point
to another, and, although the question of evil is the dom-
inant idea, many other problems are introduced as the argu-
ment proceeds.

As will be remarked again below, St. Augustine con-
tinued to feel that the De libero arbitrio was an effective
piece of work, for he mentioned it fairly frequently in his

6 INTRODUCTION

later writings. About the year 405, for example, he rec-
ommended Secundinus the Manichee to read it. 3

2. THE DE LIBERO ARBITRIO AND MANICHAEISM

The Manichaean religion was founded by Mani about
the middle of the third century A.D. Mani, born in the
year 216, came from the land of Babylon, and taught in
the new empire of the Sassanians with no opposition from
the king. Though he was put to death (crucified) in 277
by another king who came to the throne, yet his religion
spread, first all over the East, and in the next century over
the Roman Empire. It continued to exist with varying for-
tune until the thirteenth century, when it seems to have
died out almost entirely at the time of the Mongol inva-
sions.

The religion of the Manichees was dualistic. 4 It held
that there are two Principles, the Light and the Dark, and
three Moments, the Past, the Present, and the Future.
Light and Dark are two absolutely different eternal Exist-
ences. In the beginning they were separate, but in the
Past the Dark attacked the Light, and some of the Light
became mingled with the Dark, as it still is in the world
around us in the Present. To Mani the idea of Light was
connected with all that was orderly and intelligent, and the
idea of Dark with all that was anarchic and material. In
the realm of Light dwelt the Father of Greatness, and in
the realm of Dark a race appropriate to it. Evil began
when the Dark invaded the Light. The Primal Man was
called into being to repel the invasion of the Light by the
Dark, but he was overcome. He called on the Father of
Greatness, and the Powers of Darkness were conquered,

INTRODUCTION 7

but the damage had to be repaired, and our world is the
result of that process. Adam was produced containing
both Light and Dark. J esus ' appeared to him, and made
him taste of the tree of knowledge, and so revealed to him
his misery. Man can become free by continence and
renunciation, and can join in the work which God is doing
in the universe.

In the Present the Powers of Light have sent Prophets,
of whom the most important, and the last before Mani, was
Jesus Christ. Mani regarded himself as an apostle of
Christ, and it seems that Manichaeism should be thought of
rather as a Christian heresy than an independent religion.
The world will end with the second coming of Jesus, who
will judge all men by their treatment of the Manichaean
Elect. To Mani, however, the ultimate antithesis was not
between God and Man, but between Light and Dark.
The only hope for man was that his Light particles, not his
whole personality, should escape at death from the prison
home of the body. The Manichees did not regard God as
personal or transcendent, but as composed of the Light
substance. They believed that the Fall occurred before
the existence of this world, and was its cause.

The Manichaean church was made up of the Elect and
the Hearers. The Elect were the true Manichees, but their
renunciations were severe, and their numbers were few.
All Manichees were vegetarians, but the Elect abstained
also from wine, from marriage, and from property, possess-
ing food only for a day, and clothes only for a year.
Among them were women as well as men. The Elect
were already Righteous, and did not practice their asceti-
cism in order to become Righteous.

The Manichaean religion was an attempt to explain the

8 INTRODUCTION

presence of evil in the world. It was pessimistic in so far
as it held that no improvement could come until this world
was abolished, but yet it maintained that in the end Light
would be stronger than Darkness and that all that was good
would be gathered into the domain of Light. Though
there would always exist a region of Dark, it would never
again invade the region of Light.

Such is the account of Manichaeism as given by Prof.
Burkitt, but it seems probable that the form with which
St. Augustine came in touch had more of a Christian ap-
pearance than the form just described. G. Bardy says it
appeared as a kind of gnosticism, more logical and simple
than its predecessors. In Africa in particular, he says, it
had been influenced by its prolonged contact with Cathol-
icism. 5

St. Augustine was a Manichee for nine years. The
Manichaean solution of the problem of evil was utterly
different from that of the Catholic Church, since it ac-
cepted the principle of evil as eternal, as independent of
the principle of good. When, therefore, St. Augustine left
Manichaeism, he had to think out the problem of evil
afresh, and to do so against the background of the Catholic
conception of God as the Being upon whom all creation
depends, and to whom there is no rival eternal principle of
evil. How, then, if this is so, can evil arise? How can we
avoid making God responsible for evil, if He is the source
of all that exists? Plainly these were questions which the
Manichees could use with effect against the Catholics, and
Augustine set himself in the De libero arbitrio to answer
them. A number of different problems arise in the course
of the discussion, but this is the central question which
gives unity to the whole work.

INTRODUCTION 9

The De libero arbitrio, it should be noticed, is only one
of a whole series of books which St. Augustine wrote
against the Manichees. He carried on the controversy for
many years, one of the most noteworthy of the series being
his reply, written in the year 400 to his former associate,
Faustus of Milevis. 6

3. THE DE LIBERO ARBITRIO AND PELAGIANISM

Pelagianism takes its name from Pelagius, who was a
contemporary of St. Augustine, living from ca. 360 to ca.
420. Little is known of his origin except that he came
from the British Isles. He always remained a layman, but
led the life of a monk, though without, as it seems, belong-
ing to any community. He is said to have been unemo-
tional and calculating, and to have lacked depth of
character. He considered that the appeal to grace discour-
aged religious fervour, since it made men look only to
God's help, whereas fervour was stimulated by the belief
that all depended on the individual's own free will.

He came to Rome at the beginning of the fifth century,
and his ideas were adopted by a younger contemporary,
who was probably Italian, Coelestius. The latter ex-
pressed the views of his master more explicitly. After the
sack of Rome by the Goths in 410 Pelagius and Coelestius
crossed to Africa, where Pelagius once or twice met St.
Augustine. Before long, however, Pelagius decided to
leave Africa and go to Palestine. Coelestius, who had
remained in Africa, was condemned by a local synod, and
then went to Ephesus. In 41 5 Pelagius was accused by St,
Jerome, to whom St. Augustine had written, but was
acquitted by a synod of bishops who examined the case.

io INTRODUCTION

The African church appealed to Rome, and the pope,
Innocent, supported the condemnation of Pelagianism, as
also did his successor, Zosimus, after some earlier hesitation.
The emperor also approved the action of the pope, and the
whole church, eastern and western, agreed in denouncing
Pelagianism as a heresy.

The Pelagian teaching 7 may be summed up as follows:

(a) It rejected the doctrine that through grace we are
predestined to be children of God, and maintained that
without the help of grace man can fulfil all divine com-
mands.

(b) Pelagius yielded so far as to say that grace was
given, but explained that it was given only that man might
do right more easily; in other words, he still maintained
that man could do right without grace, but in that case
with more difficulty than when grace was received.

(c) He still maintained that grace was nothing else than
the free will we have received from God. God helps us
by His law and doctrine to learn our duty, but not to carry
it out. Thus we receive knowledge from God, but not
the charity whereby to live rightly.

(d) He disapproved of prayers for the conversion of
sinners and similar intentions, on the ground that it is free
will which makes us good, and grace is given in accordance
with our merits.

(e) The Pelagians denied that children are involved in
original sin. They held that baptism only had the effect of
admitting children to the kingdom of God.

(f ) Even if Adam had not sinned, he would, they main-
tained, have been subject to death.

Thus the logical consequence of the teaching of Pela-
gius, though he did not himself draw out this consequence

INTRODUCTION 1 1

in full, was the denial of the atonement and of the central
doctrines of Christianity. According to Pelagius the will
is free, in the sense of free to choose right or wrong on any
occasion, independently of what its previous acts may have
been. There is no such thing as original sin, since sin is
always a matter of will and never of nature: the individual
will is the ultimate determinant of conduct.

Semipelagianism was an attempt to find a way between
Pelagianism and St. Augustine's doctrine of predestination,
as it appeared to the Semipelagians. 8 The movement
spread fairly widely in north Africa and southern Gaul.
It proposed the compromise view that man's nature was
damaged by the fall, but that in man's regeneration the
divine will and the human will co-operated. It was con-
demned because it retained the essential principle of Pela-
gianism, that man has of himself some power to do good,
and so is an ultimate determinant of his good. When
Semipelagianism was condemned, so also was the doctrine
of predestination to evil.

What, then, is the connection between Pelagianism and
the De libero arbitrio, since this book was written be-
tween the years 388 and 395, and therefore before the rise
of Pelagianism? The subject dealt with by the De libero
arbitrio was bound up with the subject of the Pelagian
controversy, and a number of sentences in the De libero
arbitrio were claimed by the Pelagians as supporting their
doctrine. It was natural that they should seem to have
grounds for this. St. Augustine was writing to defend the
Catholic doctrine that God was the source of everything
outside Himself, that evil had no independent existence
and yet that evil was not caused by God. He traced evil
to sin, and sin to free will, and therefore stressed the indi-

1 2 INTRODUCTION

vidual responsibility which free will implied. He drew
out his argument with no special reference to grace, be-
cause that was not the subject he was concerned with. A
few years later, however, Pelagianisni arose, and then the
question took on a new aspect. It was no longer necessary
to stress free will to explain, against the Manichees, that
God was not the cause of evil, but it was now necessary to
stress the limitations surrounding human free will to ex-
plain against the Pelagians, that God was the cause of all
good. As a natural consequence of these circumstances
certain passages in the De libero arbitrio appeared to sup-
port the Pelagians, and in the Retractations Augustine is
at pains to make the situation clear, and to show that in
fact his words, far from supporting Pekgianism, were
compatible with all that he said later about grace. 9 There
is indeed no contradiction between Augustine's earlier
views as expressed in the De libero arbitrio, and his later
views, when the Pelagian controversy had forced him
to work out a theory of grace and combine it with his
assertion of free will. From his earliest years as a
Catholic he accepted the doctrine of grace, and he always
continued to assert that the will is free. The only differ-
ence is that in his earlier writings he had no need to stress
so plainly the need of grace. This is not to say that St.
Augustine's solution of the problem of free will and grace
is without difficulty, but only to say that there is no con-
tradiction between his early and later views. Certainly he
believed this to be so, since, even when the Pelagian con-
troversy broke out, he found no need to retract what he
had written in the De libero arbitrio^ and indeed he claimed
that in some places he and Evodius debated as though they
were already arguing against the Pelagians. All he found

INTRODUCTION 1 3

it necessary to do in the Retractations was to add further
explanations and cautions.

In the Retractations he deals very carefully with the De Libero
Arbitrio, upon which the Pelagians had specially fastened as in-
consistent with his later theories; but he does not find it necessary
to add any safeguards to the definition of sin which he had given
in that treatise. 10

4. IMPORTANCE OF THE DE LIBERO ARBITRIO

Reference has already been made (5 f.) to St. Augus-
tine's later mention and recommendation of the present
work, for example, to Secundinus the Manichee. In the
year 396 he writes to St. Paulinus of Nola that he is send-
ing him the three books De libero arbitrio. A mutual
friend, Romanianus, it seems, had been in possession of the
earlier part of the treatise. 11 Almost two decades later, in
415, Augustine notes in a letter to St. Jerome: 1 wrote
certain books on The Problem of Free Choice. These
went forth into the hands of many, and many have them
now.' 12 The importance attached to the treatise by the
writer himself and by his contemporaries, is obvious. A
very recent scholar terms it a work which is the high-
water mark of his philosophical writing.' 13

But another modern reader might easily take up the De
libero arbitrio and be disappointed when he came to read it.
Seeing the title, he might suppose he would find a discus-
sion of the kind which a modern book on free will would
contain an analysis of the psychological circumstances in
which choice is exercised, an examination of the conclu-
sions to which determinism leads, an argument to show
that free will involves no contradiction, and so on. The

14 INTRODUCTION

De liber o arbitrlo contains little on such subjects, when
considered apart from theology, and indeed its primary
object is not so much to discuss free will for its own sake
as to discuss the problem of evil in reference to the exist-
ence of God, who is almighty and all-good. The very
opening words give us the main subject: C I should like you
to tell me: is not God the cause of evil?' Thus, though it
does not seek to solve many of the questions to which free
will may give rise, the De libero arbitrio deals, nevertheless,
with a subject which lies at the heart of all theological
thought, the problem of evil. Moreover the views which
St. Augustine expresses in it were views which in the main
he clung to throughout his life, as he is at pains to make
clear even in his last years. 14

There is another reason why the book is one of Augus-
tine's more important works, in spite of its having been
written early in his life and being comparatively short. The
reason is that it contains the fullest exposition in any of his
writings of an argument, based on reason and not on reve-
lation, for the existence of God. Moreover in framing the
argument he necessarily deals with some of the deepest
problems of philosophy, and thus we find here much of
great interest on questions of knowledge, in particular on
Augustine's theory of 'illumination.' This is sufficient to
rank the book high, but many other matters are mentioned,
and treated with lesser, though often with considerable,
thoroughness.

We may add that the De libero arbitrio contains several
passages as fine, in their own way, as any that St. Augus-
tine wrote. An obvious example is the praise of truth and
wisdom in the second book.

INTRODUCTION 1 5

5. EVODIUS

The De libero arbitrio is a dialogue, and, unlike many
dialogues in literature, it is based on a series of discussions
between real men. This is clear from Augustine's own
words at the beginning of the pertinent section in the
Retractations While we were still staying at Rome, we
wished to debate and trace out the cause of evil' as well as
from other references which he makes elsewhere. More-
over we know a certain amount about Evodius, and it is of
interest to set this down, as he plays so large a part in the
book. He is referred to in the Confessions, when St.
Augustine says that Evodius was a young man of his own
city of Tagaste, and joined his circle of friends at Cassi-
ciacum. He tells us that Evodius had been in special mili-
tary service, and had been converted and baptised. 15 He
mentions him again in the course of his account of Mon-
nica's death. 16

Evodius returned to Africa with Augustine and was
made bishop of Uzala, near Utica, in 396 or 397, remaining
its bishop till his death in 424. He wrote a number of
letters to Augustine on theological problems, to which we
have Augustine's answers. 17

The text used is that of the Benedictine edition, re-
printed in Migne's Patrologia latina 32.1221-1310. The
De libero arbitrio had not yet appeared in the Vienna
Corpus, but is to appear soon, edited by Professor William
M. Green of the University of California. Yet the pres-
ent version is indebted to this recension: Professor Green
most kindly and generously supplied a list of some of the

1 6 INTRODUCTION

more important changes he proposes to make, even before
a selection of these appeared last year: 'Textual Notes on
Augustine's De libero arbitrio' Revue de philologie de
litterature et d'histoire anciennes 28 (1954) 21-29 (con-
cerning the editorial history of the present work by Augus-
tine, see also Prof. Green's 'Medieval Recensions of
Augustine/ Specidum 29 [1954] 531-34). It is also a
pleasure to express my appreciation of the help I received
from Professor J. Burnaby of Trinity College, Cambridge,
and Professor A. H. Armstrong of Liverpool University.
I must record, too, the debt I owe to the French translation
and notes of P. Thonnard, in the Bibliotheque Augus-
tinienne, Oeumes de Saint Augustin, i re Serie, Opuscules
6: Dialogues philosophiques 3. De Tame a Dieu (Paris
1941) 123 ff. Likewise I have seen the following modern
translations of the De libero arbitrio: J. H. S. Burleigh, in
The Library of Christian Classics 6: Augustine, Earlier
Writings (London 1953) 102-217072 Free Will; R.
McKeon, in Selections from Medieval Philosophers i:
Augustine to Albert the Great (New York 1929) 1 1-64
On the Free Will (2.1-46 only); C. J. Perl, in Aurelius
Augustinus' Werke in deutscher Sprache i: Die fruhen
Werke des Heiligen AugustinusDer freie Wille (Pader-
born 1947). C. M. Sparrow, St. Augustine on Free Will
(Richmond, Va., 1947), has not been available to me.

SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION

Book i

1-4 Evodius opens the discussion by asking whether
God is the cause of evil. Augustine replies that
God is not the cause of our doing evil, though He

INTRODUCTION 17

is the cause of our suffering evil in just punish-
ment; the cause of our doing evil is free will.
Evodius wishes to know how a man learns to sin,
and Augustine answers that, teaching and under-
standing in themselves being good, there can be
no teacher of evil as such. This brings Evodius
back to the question, how we do evil if we do not
learn it. Augustine admits the difficulty, which is
nothing else than the problem: If God is the
Creator, why is He not responsible for sin?
5-10 We must begin by asking what sin is. Augus-
tine argues that it does not consist in doing what
you would not like done to yourself, because some
sin consists in doing to others precisely what you
wish done to yourself. Is passion at the root of
sin? Evodius agrees that this seems true, but
Augustine raises a difficulty. Passion is evil desire,
and a man might commit murder in order to live
without fear, thus acting through a desire which
in itself is good. Why, then, is the murder
wrong? Not merely because it is in fact con-
demned, but because the murderer wished (if this
was his motive) to live without fear in order to
live a bad life. Evodius can now see that passion,
or blameworthy desire, is love of those things
which we can lose, yet not wish to lose.
11-15 Augustine, however, feels that further discus-
sion is necessary. Does a man act without passion,
who kills another in self-defence? Is the law
which permits this just? Evodius suggests that the
law may have been issued without passion, to fulfil
eternal justice, and in any case it may be carried

1 8 INTRODUCTION

out without passion, if it is just. Yet this is not
wholly satisfactory: How can we justify killing
an assailant in order to defend temporal posses-
sions, which are not wholly in our power? May a
human law be right, and yet conflict with a higher
law? Augustine replies that a human law may be
right at one time, and cease to be right when cir-
cumstances change; such a law may be called tem-
poral law as opposed to eternal law, which consists
in principles that never change. All that is right
in temporal law is derived from eternal law, and
eternal law is that whereby it is just that every-
thing should have its due order.

16-22 What is due order in man? Man excels beasts
through reason and understanding, through having
a soul; he has characteristics which he shares with
the beasts, but he has others by which he excels
them, and these others are themselves of varying
grades of excellence. When reason is in control
and keeps the higher above the lower, man is in
due order, and is wise. Moreover, since the
weaker cannot overcome the stronger, the wicked
cannot make the virtuous wicked, nor can a just
soul make the virtuous wicked, because to do this
it would have to become wicked itself, and there-
fore weaker. Hence, since there is nothing more
excellent than a rational and wise mind except
God, nothing can make a mind the slave of pas-
sion except its own choice. A mind is justly pun-
ished for such a sin by becoming the slave of
passion.

23-30 Evodius wonders why anyone who is wise

INTRODUCTION 19

should choose to become foolish, and how we,
who have never been wise, can justly be punished
for becoming foolish. Augustine replies that un-
doubtedly some people have a good will, though
others have not: the will is in our power. Thus
we can see what are the virtues of prudence, for-
titude, temperance, and justice. A man, who
values his own good will, has these virtues and is
happy. Unhappy men do not get what they
want, namely, a happy life, because they do not
wish for what accompanies it, right conduct.
31-35 To return to the question of eternal and tem-
poral law, some people love eternal things, some
temporal Happy men, loving eternal things, live
under the eternal law, while the unhappy are
under the temporal law, yet even so cannot escape
the eternal law. The eternal law bids us love
eternal, and not temporal, things, while the tem-
poral law bids us love things we can only possess
for a short time. The temporal law can inflict
punishment only because we love things which
can be taken away against our will. The things
themselves are not to be blamed when wrongly
used, but only the people who use them wrongly.
We set out to discover what wrongdoing is: it is
the neglect of eternal things, which we cannot lose
if we love them, and the pursuit of temporal
things, which can be lost. Why do we do
wrong? Through the free choice of will. Why
does God give us this power? We will discuss
this another time,

2O INTRODUCTION

Book 2

1-7 Evodius asks why God has given man free
choice of will, and Augustine answers that it was
given because man cannot live rightly without it.
Evodius objects that justice is given to man that
he may live rightly, and yet he cannot misuse jus-
tice: why was it right that we should be given free
will, which we can misuse? Augustine asks how
he would convince an unbeliever of the existence
of God. Evodius says he would appeal to the evi-
dence of those who knew the Son of God on
earth. Augustine agrees that we should begin by
belief through faith, but should then go on to try
and understand. He puts forward three points
for discussion: (i) the evidence for God's exist-
ence, (2) whether all that is good is created by
God, (3) whether free will is good.

7-27 (i) Even if a man should doubt whether he
exists, this proves that he exists, since otherwise he
could not doubt. It is clear that we exist, that we
live, and that we understand, and these are in
ascending order of importance. Further, we have
bodily senses, each of which has its proper object,
and there must be an inner sense which distin-
guishes between them. The beasts have this inner
sense, but they do not have rational knowledge,
which we possess and which governs the senses.
It is by reason that we know we have reason. The
inner sense judges the bodily senses, and reason
judges the inner sense; if the reason sees something
eternal and unchangeable above itself, this must
be God. Now each of us has his own bodily

INTRODUCTION 2 1

senses, but the objects of sense are common to all
who perceive them, except when they are changed
and become the private possession of the man who
perceives them. Is there anything which all who
reason see in common, and which remains the
same whether seen or not seen? Evodius suggests
mathematical truths. Augustine agrees, and goes
on to show that numbers are not seen with the
bodily senses, since the bodily senses cannot see
the meaning of 'one,' nor the law and truth which
govern numbers. Then he turns to wisdom itself.
Though men have different views about what it is
wise to aim at, all seek a happy life, and think
wisdom consists in this.

28-39 This leads to the question whether there is one
wisdom, shared in common by all. Such asser-
tions as that we ought to live justly are absolutely
true, and present in common to all who see them,
and those principles in which the virtues appear
are concerned with wisdom. This makes Evodius
ask what is the connection between wisdom and
the truths of mathematics. Augustine replies that
it is a difficult problem, but points out that it is
certainly plain that both are unchangeably true,
and therefore that unchangeable truth exists. The
truth, in which we see so many things, must be
higher than our minds, because it does not change,
as do our minds, and because we do not judge
truth, but judge in accordance with it. Thus,
Augustine declares, we have found something
higher than our minds and reason, and he breaks
into an eloquent passage in praise of truth, which

2 2 INTRODUCTION

is the same as wisdom. The conclusion is, since
we have found in truth something higher than our
minds, either this is God, or, if there is anything
more excellent than truth itself, then this is God.

40-47 (2) Augustine next shows that, though we have
not yet attained to wisdom, yet we have the idea
(notio) of wisdom sufficiently before our minds
to make us seek it. How is this? Because wisdom
has left traces in her works by means of numbers.
Every beauty in the creature reveals wisdom; yet
nothing can give itself its perfection, if it does not
possess it. Body and soul are given the form
which perfects them by a form which is unchange-
able and eternal. Whatever we observe worthy
of praise, should be referred to the praise of the
Creator. Evodius therefore agrees that God
exists, and all good things come from God.

47~53 (3) They go on to discuss the third point,
whether free will is good. Augustine argues that
the bodily organs are good, although they can be
used wrongly. It is better to have that without
which we cannot live rightly than not to have it.
There are three kinds of good things we can
possess: the virtues, which we cannot use wrongly,
are the great goods; bodily goods are the least; and
the powers of the soul are the middle goods. These
latter may be used either rightly or wrongly.
The will, which is a middle good, can cling to the
unchangeable good, to truth and wisdom, and
thereby man can possess the happy life. Thus by
the will, though it is a middle good, we can obtain
the principal human goods. Evil is turning away

INTRODUCTION 2 3

from the unchangeable good to changeable goods,
and, since this is done freely, the punishment
which follows is just.

54 Finally, Augustine asks what is the cause of this

turning towards evil. He answers that there is no
positive cause, since it is due to defect, but never-
theless it is under our control. Though we fall by
our own will, we cannot rise by our own will,
and therefore believe that God will help us.

Book 3

1-3 Evodius returns to the last question: What is

the cause of this movement, by which the will
turns to changeable good? Augustine replies that,
since the will does not turn to evil of its own
nature, as can be seen from the fact that we blame
it for so doing, the cause must lie only in the will.

4-8 Evodius agrees, but raises the question how the

will can be free, if God foreknows what it will
do. Augustine argues that our will lies in our own
power, and God's foreknowledge of an action
does not mean that it is not due to the will. God
may foreknow that we shall be happy, but plainly
we shall be happy through our own will and not
against it. God has foreknowledge of our control
of our own will.

9-23 Evodius admits this, but asks how it can be just

for God to punish sins which He foresees will be
committed. Augustine answers that to foresee a
sin is not to cause it; God does not compel the will
to act in a certain way by His foreknowledge, and
therefore justly punishes sins. Indeed God de-

24 INTRODUCTION

serves the highest praise for creating even sinners,
since, even when they sin, they are higher than
the bodily light for which He is rightly praised.
Nor should we say that it would be better if sin-
ners had never lived, since it is good that lesser
things should exist as well as greater. We cannot
truly conceive anything better in creation, which
has escaped the Creator's thought. Even sinners
who will not repent are more excellent than crea-
tures which lack free will, and the beauty of cre-
ated things is graduated from the highest down to
the lowest. If anyone should say he prefers not to
exist rather than to exist unhappily, he should re-
member that men do not wish to die; they wish to
exist, though not to exist unhappily, and should
be thankful that their wish for existence is granted.
We are in our own power, and, if it is just that
we should be unhappy because we have sinned,
we should praise the Creator for this. All exist-
ence is good, and it is contradictory to say we
prefer non-existence to unhappy existence. When
a man kills himself, this is due to a natural desire
for rest, not to a desire for non-existence.
24-35 Since God is almighty and good, why does He
not prevent any creature from being unhappy?
Creatures are arranged in fitting order from the
highest to the lowest, and souls which are un-
happy through their own fault, contribute to the
perfection of the whole. God deserves praise for
all. Are we, then, to conclude that there would
be a lack of perfection if we were always happy?
The perfection of the whole demands the exist-

INTRODUCTION 25

ence of souls, but not of their sins, and unhappi-
ness, when justly imposed as a punishment, makes
the unhappy soul harmonise with the beauty of
the whole. When man fell through his own sin,
it was just that he should be in the power of the
devil, but the devil was justly overcome. Augus-
tine goes on to speak of God's government of
creation, of His power to govern it even should
the highest angels fall, and of the praise which is
due to Him for the excellence of creation, and
His justice towards it.

36-46 He turns to a fresh point. Every nature, that
is, every substance, is good, and the Creator is
praised when the creature is praised, and even
when the creature is blamed, since it is blamed for
not tending towards the supreme good. All vice
is against nature, and by blaming the vice we
praise the nature, and so praise the Creator of
every nature. If a soul does not pay the debt it
owes by doing what it ought to do, it will pay by
suffering what it ought to suffer: whatever the
issue, it is just and the Creator deserves praise.

47-59 Evodius agrees that the Creator is not respon-
sible for our sins, but returns to the question, why
some sin by their free will, while others do not,
though all have the same nature. Augustine re-
plies that perverted will is the cause of evil, and it
is useless to look further. There are acts deserving
blame which are done in ignorance, but these are
the punishment of sin; to err unwillingly, and to
be unable to refrain from acts of passion is not
natural to man in his original state. Why should

2 6 INTRODUCTION

we suffer for the sin of Adam and Eve? We are
only to blame ourselves if we fail to make use of
the help God gives us, but it was not just that the
first man should have descendants better than
himself. In this connection Augustine discusses
the origin of man's soul.

60-65 It ' 1S by practising faith in this life that we shall
attain eternal truth, and it is our future destiny
that is important. If we fail to make progress
through our own fault, we are rightly punished,
but a soul is not responsible for defects arising
from its own nature. At first there must be im-
perfections in the soul for which it is not respon-
sible, but God will gradually bring about its
perfection, if it does not itself refuse.

66-68 What are we to say of the sufferings of young
children, who die before they can gain any merit?
Augustine declares that, in relation to the whole,
nothing is created without a purpose. He says
there is a pious belief that children who die after
baptism, but before reaching the age of reason,
benefit from the faith of those who have been
baptised. Moreover by the suffering of their
children grown-up people are corrected, and we
must remember that, once suffering is past, it is
nothing to the sufferer. Besides, who knows
what compensation God reserves for such chil-
dren?

69-70 Those who ask questions about the sufferings
of animals do not understand what is the supreme
good; they wish everything to be such as they
suppose the supreme good is. Beasts are by

INTRODUCTION 27

nature mortal. In the suffering animal we can see
how everything seeks unity, and shuns division
and corruption: everything proclaims the unity
of the Creator.

71-74 If the first man was wise, how did he come to
sin, whereas, if he was foolish, is not God the
cause of his sin? Neither of these suppositions is
true. His sin was committed freely, since he was
capable of recognising the command given him.
When he left the heights of wisdom, during this
period he was neither wholly wise nor wholly
foolish.

75-76 How, then, did the devil sin? The soul can
will to take pleasure in its own power, and to
produce a false imitation of God. The devil fell
through pride.

77 For the sake of justice, and of unchangeable

truth and wisdom we should despise all temporal
goods.

THE CHIEF QUESTIONS DISCUSSED

(References are given to the book and the section, omit-
ting the chapter)
/ What is wrongdoing?

1. Wrongdoing does not consist in failing to do to
another what you would like done to yourself,
since in some cases we ought to fail to do so. Nor
does it consist in doing what is usually condemned

(i.6f.)-

2. Passion (libido) is the source of evil, and passion

is evil desire (1.8).

28 INTRODUCTION

3. When reason or mind or spirit controls the irra-
tional motions of the soul, then man is governed
by the eternal law (1.18).

4. Every nature as such is good, and all vice consists
in going against nature (3.36-38).

5. To do wrong is to neglect eternal things and seek
temporal things (1.34).

2 Is God responsible for sin? How can the created
will be free, and not determined?

1 . There are two kinds of evil: doing evil and suffer-
ing evil. God is the cause of the second, but not
of the first, which is due to the sinner's free will

d.i).

2. We are not taught to do evil, because teaching as
such is good (1.2-4).

3. Nothing equal or higher or lower can make us
slaves of passion, and the cause must be free
choice (1.21).

4. We have a will, and desire good things (1.25).
The will is in its own power (1.26), and through
the will we can gain happiness (1.29).

5. Everyone desires happiness, but if we become un-
happy, it is because we do not desire what accom-
panies happiness, that is, a life of right conduct
(1.30). We do wrong through free will (1.35).

6. Why does God give us free will? Because with-
out it we could not do right (2. i f .) .

7. What is the cause of evil action? Evil is defect,
so nothing causes evil as such (2.54).

8. Evil is not due to nature, because we only become
slaves of passion through free will (3.2 f.). Every
nature in itself is good ( 3.36-3 8) .

INTRODUCTION 29

9. The soul is bound to pay what is due to the Cre-
ator. If it does not pay by acting justly, it must
pay by the loss of what it refuses to use well, by
unhappiness (3.44). Summary (3.50).

Argument for the existence of God

1 . One reason for accepting the existence of God is
belief, based on the evidence of the New Testa-
ment (2.5).

2. Have we any reason based on understanding?
To begin with, we cannot deny our own exist-
ence (2.7).

3. Man exists, lives, and understands, in ascending
order of importance (2.7).

4. There must be an inner sense to distinguish be-
tween the bodily senses (2.8).

5. The inner sense ranks above the bodily senses be-
cause it governs them (2.8).

Reason judges the inner sense (2.9, 13).

6. Reason is the highest element in man's nature
(2.13). If the reason sees something eternal and
unchangeable, and itself as lower, then this must
be God. God, it is true, is higher than every-
thing, but if this is not God, then what is still
higher is God (2.14),

7. So we must show there is something higher than
reason. Now our senses are distinct and belong
to each individual, but the object perceived is
common to all, if we do not change it into our-
selves (2.19).

8. Is there any object perceived by the reason of
each of us, yet which is common to all, and un-
changed by being perceived? The truths of

30 INTRODUCTION

mathematics (2.20). These cannot be perceived
by the bodily senses, for the bodily senses per-
ceive the changeable, while the truth of 7 + 3
= 10 is eternal (2.21). The senses cannot per-
ceive 'one' (2.22). Though there is no limit to
number, we know what is true of all of them.
We do so by 'an inner light, unknown to the
bodily sense' (2.23).

9. Is the same true of wisdom? What is wisdom?
We have the idea impressed on our minds from
the beginning, or else we could not wish to be-
come wise (2.26). Is wisdom the same for all
men? (2.27).

10. Certain assertions (e.g. 'the better should be pre-
ferred to the worse') are true and common to all
who see them (2.28). These are 'illuminations'
(2.29), in which the virtues appear, and the more
a man conforms to them, the more wisely he lives.
Like the laws of number they are true and un-
changeable (2.29).

11. Therefore there exists unchangeable truth, con-
taining all those things which are unchangeably
true (2.33). It is other than the minds of each of
us (2.33), and higher than our minds because we
judge in accordance with it (2.34) .

12. The supreme good, happiness, is known in the
truth, and this truth is wisdom (2.35 f.). Our
freedom consists in submission to the truth
(2.37). Truth itself is God, or if there is any-
thing more excellent, that is God (2.39).

13. Body and soul are given their forms by a form
which is unchangeable and everlasting (2.45).

INTRODUCTION 3 J

Does evil spoil the beauty of creation?

i . We ought not to think it would have been better
if sinful souls had never lived (3.13). They are
blamed in comparison with what they might have
been. Even the sinful soul is higher and better
than the light which we see with our eyes (3.12).

2. God has shown His goodness in creating that
being whose sins He foresees (3.14). Such is
God's goodness that He does not refrain from
creating that being which will persist in sin

3. The creature is more excellent which sins by free
will than that which has no free will (3.15 f.).

4. When unhappy, a man does not wish to die, and
should be grateful for existence (3.18). When,
through unhappiness, a man kills himself, it is
owing to a natural desire for rest (3.23).

5. Creatures are arranged so fittingly in order, that
it is wrong to wish the lower to be like the higher
(3.24) . The perfection of the whole comes from
both lesser and greater (3.25).

6. Provided that the souls are not lacking, in spite of
the unhappiness of sinners the whole is perfect.
If sinners were happy, there would be injustice
(3-26).

7. The Creator is praised through the blame given
to sinners (3.37). God made creatures of every
kind to give beauty to the whole, whether they
sinned or not (3.32).

8. It is the nature of some things to decay, and they
could not exist otherwise (3.42 f.).

Does God's foreknowledge contradict man's free
will?

INTRODUCTION

1. God has foreknowledge of every event (3.4).

2. If God foreknows that someone will be happy,
this does not mean that he will be happy against
his will, but through his will (3.7).

3. Our will is in our power and is free. God's fore-
knowledge does not take away our freedom

(3.7).

4. Foreknowledge of an event does not cause the
event, though it implies that it is certain. There-
fore God's foreknowledge is compatible with free
action (3.10).

Why do children suffer?

1. When suffering is past, it is as nothing to those
who have endured it (3.68).

2. Everything is created with a purpose. There is
no state half-way between reward and punishment
(3-66).

3. The sufferings of children may be of value in
correcting their parents (3.68).

4. Who knows what compensation is reserved for
the children who die before they can commit sin,
yet who suffer (3.68)?

Why do animals suffer?

1. People who complain of this, do so because they
want everything to correspond with their false
notion of the supreme good (3.69) .

2. It is unreasonable to wish that animals which are
by nature mortal, should suffer neither death nor
corruption (3.69).

3. The suffering of animals shows how everything
strives for unity and against the loss of its unity,

INTRODUCTION 3 3

and therefore that everything is created by the
supreme unity of the Creator (3.69 f.).
Did the souls of men exist before joining the body?

1. Whether the souls of men pre-existed, and
whether they lived in a state of wisdom is a great
mystery (1.24).

2. There are four opinions about the origin of souls
after Adam and Eve (3.59):

1 i ) that they come by generation;

(2) that a new soul is created when each person
is born;

(3) that God sends souls which have pre-existed
elsewhere, into the bodies of those who are
born;

(4) that souls come down of their own will.
We should not lightly accept any of these opin-
ions.

Is the penalty for original sin just?

1. To err unwillingly and to be unable to refrain
from acts of passion are not natural to man, but a
punishment (3.52).

2. What we do against our will is not our fault

(3-53).

3. Such actions are called sins because they are de-
rived from the first sin, which was committed
freely (3.54).

4. It was not right that the first man should have
descendants better than himself, but it was right
that his descendants, if they turned to God, should
be given help (3.55).

5. The answer partly depends on the question of the
origin of souls (3.56).

34 INTRODUCTION

6. Even if a soul has at the beginning a state which
another has after living wickedly, it has no small
good, and can, with the Creator's help, perfect
itself (3.56).

10 How can we explain evil, when it is not due to the
creature's free will?

1. It is the nature of temporal things to decay, and
unless this happened, one thing could not succeed
another (3.42 .)

2. Creatures are arranged fittingly in order; there is
no reason for the lower to be made like the higher,
for each has its proper place (3.24).

BOOK ONE
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

l.i Evodius\ should like you to tell rne: is not God
the cause of evil? a

Augustine I will tell you, if you explain what
kind of evil you mean. We use the word evil in
two senses, one, of doing evil, and the other, of
suifering evil.

E.I want to know about both.
A. If you know or believe God is good and it
would be wrong to think otherwise He does not
do evil. Again, if we admit God is just and it
would be wicked also to deny thisHe both re-
wards the good and punishes the bad. Now these
punishments are evils to those who suffer them.
Consequently, if no one is punished unjustly as
we must necessarily believe, since we believe every-
thing is ruled by God's providence God is cer-
tainly not the cause of the first kind of evil, but He
is the cause of the second kind.
. Then there is some other cause of that evil
which God is not found to be responsible for?
A. Certainly there is; it could not come about
without a cause. But if you ask what it is, the
question cannot be answered. There is no single
cause, but everyone who does wrong is the cause
of his own wrongdoing. If you are not convinced,
remember what I said just now, that wrongdoing

35

3 6 ST. AUGUSTINE

is punished by God's justice. It would not be
punished justly, unless it were done wilfully. 2

2 .1 should not have thought anyone sins without
having learnt to do so. If this is true, I want to
know who it is from whom we have learnt to sin.
A. Do you think that teaching is a good?

. No one could say that teaching was an evil.
A. Might it be neither a good nor an evil?
E.I think it is a good.

A. Quite right, for knowledge is given or stimu-
lated by it, and no one learns anything except
through teaching. Do you agree?
. I think only good is learnt through teaching.
AThen be careful not to say that evil is learnt.
Learning and teaching go together. 3
JE. How can man do evil, if he does not learn it?
A Perhaps because he turns away from, because
he abandons, his teaching, which is the same as his
learning. But however that may be, it is undoubt-
edly clear that since teaching is a good thing, and
teaching and learning go together, evil cannot pos-
sibly be learnt. If it were learnt, it would be part
of teaching, and so teaching would not be a good.
But you yourself grant that it is. Therefore evil is
not learnt, and it is useless to ask from whom we
learn to do evil. If evil is learnt, we learn what
ought to be avoided, not what ought to be done.
Hence to do wrong is nothing else than to disobey
our teaching.

3 E.I think there are really two kinds of teaching,
one by which we learn to do right and another by
which we learn to do wrong. When you asked
whether teaching was a good, my love for the good

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 37

absorbed my attention, and I only thought of that
kind of teaching which is concerned with doing
good. So I answered that it was a good. Now I
realise that there is another kind of teaching, which
I am sure is unquestionably evil, and I want to
know its cause.

A. Do you think at least that understanding is a
pure good?

E.l think it is plainly good in the sense that I do
not see what can be more excellent in man. I could
not possibly say that any understanding was evil.
A. When someone is taught but does not under-
stand, could you suppose he has learnt anything?
E. No, of course I could not.
A. Then, if all understanding is good, and no one
learns anything unless he understands, it is always
good to learn. For all who learn understand, and
all who understand do what is good. So if anyone
wants to find the cause of our learning anything,
he really wants to find the cause of our doing good.
Give up, then, your wish to discover a teacher of
evil. If he is evil, he is not a teacher; if he is a
teacher, he is not evil.

2.4 E. Well, then, as you have succeeded in making
me agree that we do not learn to do evil, tell me
how it comes about that we do evil
A. You are inquiring into a problem which
deeply interested me when I was quite a young
man; it troubled me so much that I was worn out
and driven right into heresy. So low did I fall, and
such was the mass of empty fables which over-
whelmed me, that, if God had not helped me be-
cause I longed to find the truth, I could not have

3 8 ST. AUGUSTINE

escaped, or recovered the primary freedom to
search. As I made great eff orts to solve this prob-
lem, I will explain it to you in the way I finally
worked it out. God will help us, and make us
understand what we believe. We can be sure that
we are treading in the path pointed out by the
Prophet who says: Unless you believe you will not
understand* We believe that everything which
exists is created by one God, and yet that God is
not the cause of sin. The difficulty is: if sins go
back to souls created by God, and souls go back to
God, how can we avoid before long tracing sin
back to God? 5

WHAT IS SIN?

5 . You have now put in plain words a problem
which troubles my mind a great deal, and which
has driven me on to this discussion.
A. Do not let it depress you, but go on believing
what you believe. We cannot have a better belief,
even if we do not see the reason. The true foun-
dation of a devout life is to have a right view of
God, and we do not have a right view of God
unless we believe Him to be almighty, utterly un-
changeable, the creator of all things that are good,
though Himself more excellent than they, the
utterly just ruler of all He has created, self-
sufficient and therefore without assistance from any
other being in the act of creation. It follows from
this that He created all out of nothing. Of Him-
self He did not create, but has begotten that which
is equal to Himself. This we call the only-

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 39

begotten Son of God, whom, when we try to ex-
press ourselves more plainly, we term the Power of
God and the Wisdom of God, through which He
made all things which He made out of nothing.
Having stated this, let us try with God's help in
the following way to understand the question you
wish to examine.

3.6 Your problem is to find the cause of our wrong-
doing, and therefore we must first discuss what
doing wrong means. Explain your view about
this. If you cannot cover the whole subject in a
few short words, at least give some examples of
wrongdoing, and tell me what you think.
E. Adultery, murder, and sacrilege are examples.
It would take too long to make a complete list, and
I could not remember everything. All agree that
these are wrongdoings.

A .First tell me why you think adultery is wrong.
Because the law forbids it?

E. No, it is not wrong because the law forbids it;
the law forbids it because it is wrong.
A. If someone tried to confuse us, dwelling on the
pleasures of adultery and asking why we thought
it wrong and to be condemned, surely you do not
think we ought to take shelter behind the authority
of the law, when we desire not only to believe, but
also to understand? I agree with you, and believe
most firmly, and preach the belief to all peoples and
nations that adultery is wrong. But now we are
endeavouring to grasp firmly with the understand-
ing what we have received on faith. Reflect,
therefore, as carefully as you can, and tell me on
what grounds you regard adultery as evil.

ST. AUGUSTINE

.1 know an act to be evil, which I should not
allow in the case of my own wife. Whoever does
to another what he would not like done to himself,
surely does wrong.

A. If a man's passion was so strong that he offered
his own wife to another, and freely allowed her to
be seduced by him because he wished to have the
same licence with this man's wife, do you think he
would be doing no wrong?
E. Of course, a very great wrong.
A. He is not sinning against the principle you
mentioned; he is not doing what he would not like
done to himself. You must find another reason
for your conviction that adultery is wrong.
".! think it wrong, because I have often seen men
condemned for this crime.

A. Are not men often condemned for good
deeds? To save you further reference read
history as you have it on God's own excellent
authority. You will soon see what a bad impres-
sion we should get of the Apostles and all the
martyrs, if we thought that condemnation was a
sure proof of wrongdoing; all were condemned for
confessing their faith. So if everything which is
condemned is evil, it was evil at that time to believe
in Christ and to confess His faith. But, if every-
thing that is condemned is not evil, you must find
another reason for teaching that adultery is wrong.
JS.I do not see any answer to this.
A. Well, possibly passion is the evil in adultery.
Your trouble is that you are looking for the evil in
the outward act, that we can see. I will prove that
passion is the evil in adultery. If a man has no

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 41

opportunity of living with another man's wife, but
if it is obvious for some reason that he would like
to do so, and would do so if he could, he is no less
guilty than if he was caught in the act.
E. Yes, that is perfectly clear. I see now that
there is no need of a long argument to convince me
that this is true of murder and sacrilege, and indeed
of all sins. It is plain that nothing else than passion
is the principal element in this whole matter of
wrongdoing.

4.9 A. Do you know that there is another word for
passion, namely desire? 6
.-Yes, I do.

^4- Do you think there is any difference between
this and fear?

. I think there is a very great difference between
them.

A. I suppose you think this because desire seeks
its object, while fear avoids it.
E.-Yes.

A. If someone kills a man, not through desire of
gain, but through fear of suffering some evil, will
he still be a murderer?

. Yes indeed, but it does not follow that this act
will be free from the motive of desire. If he kills
a man through fear, he certainly desires to live
without fear.

A. Do you think it is a small good to live without
fear?

JE.It is a great good, but the murderer cannot
possibly gain this by his crime.
A. I am not asking what he can gain, but what he
desires. 7 He certainly desires what is good if he

42 ST. AUGUSTINE

desires to live without fear, and therefore the desire
is free from blame. Otherwise we shall blame all
who love what is good. So we must agree that we
cannot point to evil desire as the dominant motive
in every murder; it would be false to say that the
dominance of passion constitutes the evil in every
sin. If so, there might be a murder which was not

a sin. 8

E. If to kill a man is murder, this may happen
sometimes without any sin. When a soldier kills
the enemy, when a judge or an executioner kills the
criminal, or when a weapon flies from a man's
hand inadvertently and by accident, I do not think
they sin by killing a man.

A. I agree, but they are not usually called mur-
derers. Answer this question. If a slave kills his
master because he is afraid of being tortured, do
you think he should count among those who kill a
man, without actually deserving to be called mur-
derer?

. I think this is quite a different case from the
other. The former act lawfully or not unlawfully;
the latter are sanctioned by no law.
10 A. Again you appeal to authority. But you must
remember that the task we have undertaken is to
understand what we believe. We believe in the
law, and so we must try, if we possibly can, to
understand whether the law which punishes this
act does not punish it wrongly.
". It certainly does not punish it wrongly, for it
punishes a man who deliberately kills his master;
this is quite unlike the other examples.

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 43

A. Do you remember you said a few minutes ago
that passion was the dominant motive in every evil
act, and was the cause of its being evil?
.E. Yes, I remember.

A. Did you not also agree that the man who de-
sires to live without fear does not have an evil
desire?

E. I remember that too.

A. It follows that when a master is killed by his
slave through this desire, he is not killed through a
desire that we can blame. Therefore we have not
yet discovered why this action is evil. For we are
agreed that evil deeds are always evil simply be-
cause they are done through passion, that is,
through a blameworthy desire.
E. I begin to think he is condemned wrongly. I
should not have the courage to say this, if I could
find any other solution.

AHave you persuaded yourself that such a crime
ought not to be punished, before considering
whether the slave wished to be freed from fear of
his master in order to indulge his own passions?
The desire to live without fear is common both to
all good and to all evil men. But the important
point is that good men seek it by turning away
their love from things which they cannot possess
without danger of losing them, while evil men try
to remove obstacles, and settle down to enjoy these
things, and consequently live a life of crime and
wickedness, better called death-
. I am coming to my senses again. I am very
glad that I know clearly now what that blame-
worthy desire is which we call passion. I can now

44 ST. AUGUSTINE

see it is love of those things which each of us can
lose against his will

TEMPORAL LAW AND ETERNAL LAW

5. 1 1 So now I suggest we should inquire whether
passion is also the chief motive in acts of sacrilege,
which we often see committed through supersti-
tion. 9

A. We must not be in too much hurry. I think
we ought to discuss first whether an open enemy
or a secret assassin can be killed without any pas-
sion in defence of life, liberty, or honour.
E. I cannot imagine that men act without passion
when they fight for things they would be unwill-
ing to lose. If they cannot lose them, why need
they go to the length of killing a man in their de-
fence?

A. In that case the law is not just which authorises
a traveller to kill a robber in self -protection, or any
man or woman to kill an assailant, if possible before
the violence has been carried out. The law also
orders a soldier to kill the enemy, and if he refuses
to do so he is punished by the military authorities.
Can we possibly call these laws unjust, or rather
no laws at all? A law which is not just does not
seem to me to be a law. 10

1 2 E. I see pretty well that a law which gives its sub-
jects " permission to commit lesser crimes in order
to prevent greater ones, has a good defence against
an accusation of this kind. It is a much lesser evil
for the assassin than for the man who defends his
own life, to be killed. It is far more dreadful that

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 45

an innocent person should suffer violence than that
the assailant should be killed by the intended vic-
tim.

When a soldier kills the enemy he is enforcing
the law, and so has no difficulty in carrying out his
duty without passion. The law itself, which is
issued to protect its subjects, cannot be convicted
of passion. If its author issued it in obedience to
God's will, that is, to fulfil eternal justice, he may
have done so without any passion at all. Even if
he issued it out of passion, it does not follow that
the law need be carried out with passion, because
a good law can be issued by a man who is not good.
For example, if a man, having reached supreme
power, should take a bribe from an interested
party, and decree it unlawful to carry off a woman
even for marriage, the law will not be evil because
its author is unjust and corrupt. Therefore the
law which, to protect its citizens, lays down that
force shall be met with force, can be obeyed with-
out passion, and the same may be said about all
servants who are subject to any higher power
rightly and properly.

But I do not see how the other men we men-
tioned can be without blame because the law is
without blame. The law does not force them to
kill, but leaves it to their own discretion, and so
they are free not to kill anyone in defence of those
things which they can lose against their will, and
for this reason ought not to love. Some may per-
haps doubt whether the soul's life is by any means
taken away when the body perishes, but, if it can
be taken away it is of no value, while if it cannot,

46 ST. AUGUSTINE

there is no reason for fear. And as for chastity,
everyone knows that it is rooted in the soul itself,
since it is a virtue; it cannot, therefore, be taken
away by the violence of an aggressor. Whatever
the man who is killed was going to take away is not
wholly in our power, and so I do not understand
how it can be called ours. I do not, therefore,
blame the law which allows such men to be killed,
but I do not see how I am to defend their slayers.
13 A. I find it much harder to see why you try to
defend those whom no law holds guilty. 12
. No law may find them guilty, if we speak of
those laws which are familiar to us and which are
made by men. I rather think they may come
under a stronger and entirely secret law, if every-
thing is controlled by Divine Providence. How
can they be free from sin against Divine Provi-
dence, if they are stained with human blood in
defence of things which ought to be despised? So
I think that that law which is issued for the gov-
ernment of a people rightly allows these acts, while
Divine Providence punishes them. The law which
governs a people concerns itself with the control
of conduct sufficiently to keep the peace among a
rough population, so far as this can be achieved by
man. This other kind of fault has different pun-
ishments which are suited to it, and I think wisdom
alone can save us from them.

-4. I thoroughly approve of this distinction of
yours; although it is incomplete and imperfect, yet
it is full of faith and of ideals. The law which is
decreed to govern states seems to you to permit
much and to leave it unpunished, though it is pun-

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 47

ished by Divine Providence. Rightly so. Because
a law does not do everything, it does not follow
that what it does do is to be blamed.
6.14 I propose now that we examine carefully how
far evil deeds ought to be punished by that law
which controls peoples in this life. Then let us
examine what remains to be punished necessarily
and secretly by Divine Providence.
E. Yes, I should like to do this, provided we can
reach the end of such an enquiry. I think it will
go on for ever.

AHave some courage; use your reason with
confidence in God. Whatever difficulties may
threaten us, they are cleared away and all becomes
smooth with God's help. So raising our thoughts
to Him and seeking His help, let us examine the
problem before us. First, tell me whether that
law which is put forth in writing, is for the good
of men living this present life.
E. Obviously it is. Peoples and states are made
up of such men.

A. Do these peoples and states belong to that class
of things which cannot perish or change? Are
they altogether everlasting, or are they subject to
time and change?

E Unquestionably they belong to the class of
things subject to time and change.
A. Then, if a people is well-disciplined and ob-
servant of social good, and such that every indi-
vidual puts public before private interest, is not
this people rightly granted by law authority to
elect its own officials to govern its affairs, that is,
the affairs of the state?

48 ST. AUGUSTINE

JE.~ Certainly.

A. If the people gradually deteriorates and prefers
private to public interest, and sells its vote for
bribes, and is corrupted by ambitious politicians,
and puts into power criminals with no sense of
honour, would not any honest man of sufficient
influence who is left be justified in depriving this
people of self-government, and in putting them
under the authority of a few honest men or even
of one? 13

E. Quite justified.

A. Well then, although these two laws seem to
contradict one another, one giving the people self-
government, the other taking it away, and although
the latter is issued in such a way that both cannot
be in force at the same time in the same state, surely
we shall not say that one of them is unjust, and
ought not to be decreed?
E.-No.

A. Then, I suggest we call that law temporal law,
which, though just, can be justly changed in course
of time.

E.By all means.

15 A .Will not any intelligent man regard that law
as unchangeable and eternal, which is termed the
law of reason? 14 We must always obey it; it is
the law through which wicked men deserve an un-
happy, and good men a happy life, 15 and through
which the law we have said should be called tem-
poral is rightly decreed and rightly changed. Can
it ever be unjust that the wicked should be un-
happy and the good happy, or that a well-disci-
plined people should be self-governing, while an

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 49

ill-disciplined people should be deprived of this
privilege?

. I see that this law is eternal and unchangeable.
A. I think you also see that men derive all that is
just and lawful in temporal law from eternal law.
For if a nation is justly self-governing at one time,
and justly not self-governing at another time, the
justice of this temporal change is derived from that
eternal principle by which it is always right for a
disciplined people to be self-governing, but not a
people that is undisciplined. Do you agree?
. I agree.

A. Therefore, to explain shortly as far as I can the
notion which is impressed on us 1S of eternal law,
it is the law by which it is just that everything
should have its due order. Tell me if you disagree.
. I have nothing to say against this; it is true.
A. Since there is this single law, from which all
temporal laws for human government derive their
various forms, I suppose it cannot itself be varied?
E.l see that it is quite impossible. No power, no
circumstances, no calamity can ever make it unjust
that everything should have its due and perfect
order.

A MIND IS THE SLAVE OF PASSION THROUGH
ITS OWN CHOICE

7a6 A. Well then, now let us see what is due order in
man himself. A nation is made up of men bound
together by a single law, and this law, we have said,
is temporal.

50 ST. AUGUSTINE

Tell me: are you absolutely certain that you are
alive?

. There is nothing more certain that I know of.
A. Well, can you distinguish between living and
knowing that you live?

E. I know that no one, unless he is alive, knows
that he is alive, but I do not know whether every-
one who is alive knows that he is alive.
A. How I wish that you knew, instead of merely
believing, that animals lack reason! Our discussion
would soon pass beyond this problem. Since you
say you do not know, you involve us in a long
argument. The point is not of such a kind that we
can leave it out, and still be able to reach our con-
clusion with the rational precision I feel to be
required.

Tell me this. We often see beasts tamed by
men, not only the beast's body but its spirit so
quelled that it obeys a man's will instinctively and
habitually. Do you think it at all possible that any
beast, whatever its ferocity and bulk and keenness
of sense, should turn round and try to subdue a
man to its will, though many beasts can crush his
body by open or secret attack?
. I agree that this is quite impossible.
A. Very good. Tell me also, since it is clear that
man is far surpassed by many beasts in strength and
the various functions of the body, what is the
quality in which man excels, so that no beast can
control him, while he can control many beasts? Is
it what we usually call reason or understanding?
E. I cannot think of anything else, since it is some-

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 51

thing in the soul by which we excel the beasts. If
they were without souls, I should say we excelled
them through having a soul. But, since they do
have souls, what better word than reason can I use
to denote what is lacking to their souls, and makes
us superior to them? For it is no insignificant
thing, as everyone realises.

A. See how easily a task is accomplished with
God's help, which men think very difficult. I
confess I had thought that this problem, which I
find we have solved, might hold us back for as long
again as we have already taken over the discussion.
So now let me run over the argument, so that you
can keep it in mind. I think you are aware that
what we call knowledge is nothing else than per-
ception through reason.
JE.-Yes.

A.~- Therefore a man who knows he is alive does
not lack reason.
. That follows.

A. Beasts live, and, as has now been shown, 17 are
without reason.
E.-~ Yes, clearly.

A. So now you see you know what you said you
did not know, that not everything which lives
knows that it lives, though everything which
knows that it lives necessarily lives.
17 E.I have no doubt about it now; carry on with
your plan. I am satisfied that to live and to know
that we live are not the same.
A. Which of these two do you think is the more
excellent?

52 ST. AUGUSTINE

JE. Plainly to know that we live.
A, Do you think that to know that we live is
better than life itself? Or do you perhaps under-
stand that knowledge is a higher and purer form of
life, since no one can know unless he has under-
standing? 1S What else is understanding than a life
brighter and more perfect through the very light
of the mind? So, if I am not mistaken, you have
not preferred something else to life, but a better
life to a less perfect life.

E. You have fully grasped and explained my own
view provided that knowledge can never be evil.
A. I think it cannot be, unless we give the word a
new meaning, and use knowledge for practical
experience. It is not always good to have such
experience; we can, for instance, experience pun-
ishment. But how can knowledge in the proper
and pure sense of the word be evil, since it is pro-
duced by reason and understanding?
E. I follow the distinction: go on with your argu-
ment.

8.18 A. What I want to say is this. Whatever it is by
which man is superior to beasts, whether mind or
spirit or whether either of them is the correct
term 10 (we find both in Sacred Scripture), if this
governs and controls all the other elements of
which man is composed, then man is duly ordered.
We see that we have much in common not only
with beasts, but also with trees and plants, for we
see that nourishment, growth, generation, health,
are characteristic also of trees, which belong to the
lowest grade of life. We recognise too that blasts

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 53

have sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, often more
keenly than we have. Or take strength, vigour,
muscular power, swift and easy movement of the
body, in all of which we excel some of them, equal
some, and are surpassed by some. We are cer-
tainly in a common class with the beasts; every
action of animal life is concerned with seeking
bodily pleasure and avoiding pain.

There are other characteristics which beasts do
not seem to share, yet which are not the highest
qualities of man, as for example, laughing and jok-
ing. If we judge rightly, we shall judge that this
is characteristic of human nature, but of the lowest
part of it. Then there is love of praise and glory,
and ambition: though the beasts do not have these
passions, we must not suppose that we are better
than the beasts because we have them. When this
craving is not subject to reason, it makes us
wretched. Yet no one thinks that he ought to be
preferred to someone else in wretchedness. When
reason controls these motions of the soul, a man
must be said to be in due order. It ought not to be
called due order, or order at all, when the better is
subordinated to the worse. Do you not think so?
. It is clear.

A. When reason, or mind, or spirit controls the
irrational motions of the soul, then that element is
ruling in man which ought to rule in virtue of that
law which we have found to be eternal.
. I understand and agree.

9.19 A. Therefore, when a man is established and or-
dered in this way, do you not think he is wise?

54 ST. AUGUSTINE

E. If not, I do not know who else is to be thought

wise.

A. I suppose you also know that very many men

are foolish.

jE.That too is quite obvious.

A. If folly is the opposite of wisdom, since we

have found out who is wise, you now know who is

foolish.

E. Everyone can see that a man is foolish, if his

mind is not in control.

A. Then what must we say, when a man is in this

state? Does he lack mind, or is the mind, though

present, not in control?

. I think, the second of these.

A. I should like you to tell me by what evidence

you are aware that a man has a mind which does

not exercise its control.

E. Please do this yourself: it is too hard a task for

me. 20

A. At least you can easily remember, what we
said a few minutes ago, 21 how beasts are tamed and
broken in to serve men, and how men would suffer
the same from beasts, as we have shown, unless
they excelled them in some way. We did not
trace this superiority to the body; it showed itself
in the soul, and we found no other name for it but
reason. Later we remembered it was called also
mind and spirit. But if reason and mind are dis-
tinct, we certainly agree that only mind can use
reason. Hence it follows that the man who pos-
sesses reason cannot lack mind.
E.I remember this quite well, and accept it.

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 55

A. Then do you think that those who tame beasts
can be such only if they are wise? I call those
wise who truly deserve the name, that is, who are
controlled by mind, and who are disturbed by no
power of passion.

. It is absurd to think that men who go by the
name of animal tamers are like this, or even shep-
herds or herdsmen or charioteers, all of whom, as
we see, control tame animals and when they are
untamed break them in.

A. There then you have plain evidence which
makes it clear that a man has a mind, even when it
is not in control. Such men as these have a mind,
for they do things which could not be done with-
out a mind. It is not in control, 22 for they are fool-
ish, and, as we know, the mind is in control only
in wise men.

. It amazes me that, when we discussed this
earlier on, I could not think how to answer.
lO.zo But let us continue. We have now discovered
that human wisdom consists in the control of the
human mind, and that it is also possible for the
mind not to be in control.

A. Do you think that passion is more powerful
than mind, though we know that eternal law has
granted mind control over passion? I certainly do
not think so. There would not be due order if the
weaker governed the stronger. So I think mind
must have more power than desire, from the very
fact that it is right and just for it to control desire.
. -I think so too.
A. Surely we do not hesitate to prefer every vir-

56 ST. AUGUSTINE

true to vice, so that virtue is stronger and more
dominant, just as it is better and nobler?
. Undoubtedly.

A. It follows that no wicked soul overcomes a
soul which is armed with virtue.
. Quite true.

A. I think you will not deny that any soul is bet-
ter and stronger than any body.
. No one denies this, who sees and it is obvious
that a living substance is better than a non-living
substance, or one that gives life better than one
that receives it.

A. Much less, then, does any body whatever
overcome a soul endowed with virtue.
E.-Plainly.

A .Then surely a just soul, and a mind which
keeps its proper and rightful control, cannot de-
throne and subdue to passion another mind which
keeps control with the same justice and virtue?
. Certainly not; not only because the same ex-
cellence is present in both, but also because the
former will fall from justice, and become a wicked
mind, if it tries to make another mind wicked, and
by that very fact will be weaker.
21 A. You have understood the point well. It re-
mains for you to answer, if you can, whether any-
thing seems more excellent to you than a rational
and wise mind.

E.I think nothing except God.
A. That is my opinion too. But the problem is
difficult, and now is not a suitable time to try and
understand it thoroughly. Let us hold the conclu-

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 57

sion firmly on faith, but not attempt a full and
precise examination.

11 For the moment we can recognise that, what-

ever kind of being 23 rightly excels a virtuous mind,
cannot possibly be unjust. Therefore not even
this, though it may have the power, will force
mind to serve passion.
E. Everyone would at once accept that.
A So we conclude that, since what is equal or
superior does not make a mind the slave of passion,
if it is in control and virtuous, on account of its
justice, while what is inferior cannot do this on
account of its weakness, as our argument has
shown, therefore, nothing makes a mind give way
to desire except its own will and free choice.
E. I see that this is quite conclusive.
22 A. It follows that you think such a mind justly
punished for so great a sin.
. I cannot deny it.

A. Well, surely that punishment should not be
thought a light one, which consists in the mind
being ruled by passion, being robbed of its store of
virtue, being dragged hither and thither, poor and
needy, now judging false for true, now defending,
now attacking what before it approved, and in
spite of this running off into fresh falsehood, now
withholding its assent, and often frightened of
clear reasoning, now despairing of finding any
truth at all, and clinging closely to the darkness of
its folly, now striving for the light of understand-
ing, and again falling back through exhaustion.
Meanwhile the passions rage like tyrants, and

58 ST. AUGUSTINE

throw into confusion the whole soul and life of
men with storms from every quarter, fear on one
side, desire on another, on another anxiety, or false
empty joy, here pain for the thing which was loved
and lost, there eagerness to win what is not pos-
sessed, there grief for an injury received, here
burning desire to avenge it. Wherever he turns,
avarice can confine him, self-indulgence dissipate
him, ambition master him, pride puff him up, envy
torture him, sloth drug him, obstinacy rouse him,
oppression afflict him, and the countless other feel-
ings which crowd and exploit the power of pas-
sion. Can we then think this no punishment at all,
which, as you see, all who do not cling to wisdom
must necessarily suffer?

JUST PUNISHMENT

23 E. In my opinion this punishment is a great one,
and entirely just, if a man, being established on the
heights of wisdom, should choose to come down
and be the slave of passion; but I am doubtful
whether there can be anyone who has wished, or
wishes, to do so. We believe that man was so
perfectly formed by God and established in a life
of happiness, that only of his own will did he come
down thence to the troubles of mortal life. Yet
while I hold this firmly by faith, I have never
grasped it with my understanding. If you think
careful inquiry into this problem should be put off,
you do so against my will.
12.24 But the problem which worries me most is why

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 59

we should suffer grievous punishments of this kind,
seeing that, though admittedly foolish, we have
never been wise. How, then, can we be said to
suffer these punishments deservedly, for having
abandoned the fortress of virtue, and chosen to be
slaves of passion? I should certainly not agree to
your putting it off, if you can discuss this problem
and explain it.

A. -You say that we have never been wise, as if it
was a manifest truism. You are only thinking of
the time since we were born into this life. But,
since wisdom is in the soul, whether the soul lived
in another life before it was joined to the body,
and whether at one time it lived in a state of wis-
dom, is a great question, a great mystery, to be
considered in its proper place. 24 Yet this does not
prevent us from clearing up, so far as possible, our
present problem.

25 I am asking you whether we have a will.
E. I do not know.
A. Do you want to know?
. I do not even know this.
A. Then you must ask me nothing more.

.4. Because I ought not to answer your questions,
unless you want to know what you ask. Also un-
less you wish to become wise, I ought not to dis-
cuss the subject with you. Finally, you could not
be my friend, unless you wish me well. Reflect,
too, whether you do not yourself will that your
life may be happy.
. - 1 agree it cannot be denied we have a will.

60 ST. AUGUSTINE

Now go on, and let us see what you conclude from
this.

A.* I will do so; but tell me first whether you are
conscious of having a good will.
.- What is a good will?

A. -A will by which we seek to live rightly and
virtuously and to reach the height of wisdom.
Now see whether you do not seek to live rightly
and virtuously, or whether you do not have a
strong desire to be wise, or can really venture to
deny that we have a good will when we wish for
these things.

E.-I do not deny any of this, and therefore I
agree that I have not only a will, but now that I
have a good will also.

A. I want you to tell me how much you think this
will is worth. Do you think that riches or honours
or bodily pleasures or all these together bear any
comparison with it?

JS. God forbid anything so stupid and wicked.
A. Should it then be only a small joy to us that
we have something in the soul, I mean this good
will, in comparison with which these things I have
mentioned are utterly worthless, yet to gain which
we see countless men accepting every toil and
danger?

. It ought to be a joy to us, and a very great joy
indeed.

A. Do you think that those who lack this joy
suffer a small loss in being deprived of such a good?
Z?.- A very great loss.
26 A. I think you now see that it lies in the power of

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 61

our will whether we enjoy or lack this great and
true good. What is so fully in the power of the
will as the will itself? 25

When a man has a good will he has a possession
which is far to be preferred before all earthly king-
doms and all bodily pleasures. But if a man does
not possess it, then he lacks that which is more
excellent than all good things not under our con-
trol, and which only the will of itself could give
him. And so, when he judges himself wretched if
he loses the glory of fame, great wealth, and any
bodily goods, will you not judge him wretched,
even though he abounds in all these things? For
he clings to things which he can very easily lose
and not possess while wishing to do so, but he lacks
a good will which is beyond all comparison with
these, and which, though it is so great a good, needs
only to be desired in order to be possessed.
. That is very true.

A. Therefore it is right and just that foolish men
should be made wretched in this way, although
they were never wiseobscure and mysterious
though this latter point is.
E.l agree.

13.27 A. Now consider whether prudence seems to you
to consist in the knowledge what to seek and what
to avoid.

E. I think it does.

A. And is not fortitude that state of the soul in
which we despise all misfortunes and the loss of
things not resting in our power?
. I think so.

62 ST. AUGUSTINE

A. Then do you. agree that temperance is that
state of soul which controls and checks desire in
regard to those things which it is shameful to
desire?

E. That is certainly my view.
A. And what else are we to say about justice than
that it is the virtue by which each man is given his
due?

. That is what I think about justice. 26
A. Then the man who has a good will, the excel-
lence of which we have discussed at such length,
will love this alone, his most precious possession,
will delight in this and make it his joy and pleasure,
realising fully its value, and that he cannot be
robbed of it against his will. Surely we cannot
doubt that he will be opposed to all that conflicts
with this one good?

. Most certainly he must be opposed to it.
A. Can we suppose such a man is not endowed
with prudence, who sees that this good should be
sought for and everything avoided which conflicts
with it?

E. I think no one can see this without prudence.
A. Quite right. But why should we not grant
him fortitude? 2T He cannot love and value highly
all these things not under our control. They are
loved through an evil will, and he is bound to resist
an evil will as the enemy of his most precious good.
Since he does not love these things, he does not
grieve at their loss, but altogether despises them.
We have declared and admitted that this is the
work of fortitude.

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 63

. Yes, we must certainly grant him fortitude. I
know no one who could be more truly said to have
fortitude than the man who is perfectly resigned
to the lack of those things of which it is not in our
power to gain possession. We have concluded
such a man must necessarily do this.
A. Now consider whether we can deprive him of
temperance, since this is the virtue which checks
passion. What is so opposed 2S to a good will as
passion? Hence you can understand that the man
who loves his good will resists his passions by every
means, and fights against them. Therefore he is
rightly said to have temperance.
. Go on: I agree.

A. There remains justice, and I certainly do not
see how such a man can lack this. If he possesses
and loves to possess a good will, and resists, as I
have said, what is opposed to it, he cannot wish evil
to anyone. It follows that he harms no one, and
this can only be the case, if he gives to everyone
his due. You remember, I think, that you agreed
when I said this was the concern of justice.
E. I remember. I accepted your account of the
four virtues just now, and agree that all of them are
present in the man who values highly and loves his
own good will.

28 A.-- What then prevents us from admitting that the
life of this man is praiseworthy?
E. Nothing at all. The whole argument points to
this, and in fact requires it.

A. Well, can you possibly help thinking that a
miserable life ought to be avoided?

64 ST. AUGUSTINE

. That is emphatically my opinion; I think it

certainly ought to be avoided.

A. And you do not think a praiseworthy life

ought to be avoided?

. No, I think decidedly that it ought to be aimed

at.

A. Therefore a life which is praiseworthy is not

miserable.

E.~ That follows.

A. So far as I can see, nothing now prevents you

from agreeing that that life which is not miserable

is the life of happiness.

. Obviously.

A .We hold, then, that a man is happy who loves

his own good will, and who despises in comparison

with this whatever else is called good and can be

lost, while the desire to keep it remains.

. Yes, our former conclusions lead to this, and

we must agree.

A. You have a clear grasp of the question. But I

should like you to tell me whether to love one's

own good will, and to value it as highly as we have

said, is itself good will.

j. Yes, it is.

A, But if we are right in judging the one man

happy whose will is good, shall we not be right in

judging the other man unhappy whose will is bad?

. Quite right.

A. Then what reason is there for doubting that,

even though we were never wise before, yet by

our will we deserve, and spend, a praiseworthy and

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 65

happy life, and by our will a life that is shameful
and unhappy? 29

E.l agree that we have reached this conclusion by
arguments which are certain and undeniable.
29 A. Also consider another point. I think you re-
member our definition of a good will: it was, I
believe, a will by which we seek to live rightly
and virtuously.
E. I remember.

A. Then, if through our good will we love this
good will itself, and cling to it, and prefer it before
all things which we cannot be sure to keep because
we want to, the result will be, as reason has shown,
that these virtues will dwell in our soul. To pos-
sess them is to live rightly and virtuously. Hence
it follows that whoever wishes to live rightly and
virtuously, if he wishes so to wish in preference to
the goods which are but passing, acquires this
great possession with such ease, that to wish for it
is the same as to possess what he wished. 30
E. Really, I can hardly keep myself from crying
out for joy, when a good so great and so easy to
gain is suddenly set before me.
A. This very joy, which is caused by winning
this good, if it supports the soul calmly, quietly,
and steadily, is called the happy life, unless you
think the happy life is different from taking joy in
goods which are true and certain.
E. That is my opinion.

14.30 A. Quite right. But do you think that anyone
does not by every means desire and long for a
happy life?

66 ST. AUGUSTINE

. Undoubtedly everyone desires it.
A. Why then does not everyone gain it? We
agreed that men deserve a happy life by their will,
and also an unhappy life by their will, and deserve
it in such a way as to receive it. But here a diffi-
culty arises, and unless we scrutinise it carefully, it
will tend to upset the clear reasoning we worked
out before. For how does anyone of his own will
endure an unhappy life, though no one at all wishes
to live unhappily? Or how does a man through
his own will gain a happy life, if so many are un-
happy, and all wish to be happy?

Does it come about because to desire good or
evil is different from deserving something through
a good or bad will? For those who are happy and
who ought also to be good, are not happy because
they wished to live happily the wicked also wish
this but because they wished to live rightly, which
the wicked do not wish. Therefore it is not sur-
prising that unhappy men do not get what they
want, namely, a happy life. They do not also
want that which accompanies it, and without
which no one is worthy of it or gains it, that is to
say, a life of right conduct.

For the eternal law, to the consideration of
which it is now time to return, has settled this with
unchangeable firmness; it has settled that merit lies
in the will, while reward and punishment lie in
happiness and misery. 31 And so, when we say that
men are wilfully unhappy, we do not mean that
they wish to be unhappy, but that their will is such
that unhappiness is the necessary result, unwilling

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 67

though they are. Hence this does not contradict
our former conclusion, that all wish to be happy,
but not all are able so to be. Not all wish to live
rightly, which is the only state of will that deserves
a happy life. Have you any objections to this?
E. No, I have none.

SIN IS THE NEGLECT OF ETERNAL THINGS

15.31 But now let us see how this is connected with
the problem we were going to discuss about the
two laws.

A Very well. But first tell me about the man
who loves to live rightly, and so delights in it that
not only is it right for him but also pleasant and
agreeable. Does he not love this law, and hold it
most dear to him? For by it he sees that a happy
life is given to a good will, and an unhappy life to
an evil will.

E. He loves it with all his heart and strength since
he lives as he does in obedience to this law.
A Well, when he loves this law, does he love
something which is changeable and temporal, or
something which is firm and everlasting?
E. Certainly, something which is everlasting and
unchangeable.

A. Do those who persist in their evil will, at the
same time desire to be happy? Can they love that
law by which such men rightly earn unhappiness?
E. I think they cannot.
A. Do they love nothing else?

68 ST. AUGUSTINE

. They love very many things, those things in
gaining or keeping which their evil will persists.
A. I suppose you mean wealth, honours, pleasures,
physical beauty, and all the other things which
they may be unable to gain though they want
them, and may lose against their will.
. Yes, those are the things.
A. You do not think these last for ever, do you,
for you see they are subject to time and change?
. It would be sheer madness to think so.
A. Then, since it is clear that some men love eter-
nal things while others love temporal things, and
since we agree that there are two laws, one eternal
and the other temporal, if you have a sense of fair-
ness, which of these men do you think should be
subject to the eternal law, and which to the tem-
poral law?

. Your question seems easy. I think that happy
men through their love of eternal things live under
the eternal law, while the temporal law is laid upon
the unhappy.

A. You judge rightly, provided you keep con-
stantly in view what reason has very clearly shown,
that those who serve the temporal law cannot
escape the eternal law. Through it we have main-
tained that every just effect, every just change is
brought about. You understand no doubt that
those who cling to the eternal law with a good will
do not need the temporal law.
E. Yes, I understand.
32 A. So the eternal law bids us turn away our love

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 69

from temporal things, and turn it back, when puri-
fied, towards things that are eternal.
. Yes, it bids us do this.

A. What else then do you think the temporal law
orders but that, when men cling with their desire
to those things which can be called ours for a short
time, they shall possess them by that same right by
which peace is maintained in human society, so far
as is possible in such affairs?

The things I mean are, first, the body and what
are called its goods, such as sound health, keen
senses, strength, beauty, and so on, some of which
are necessary for the useful arts, and therefore of
more value, others of which are of less value.
Then there is freedom, though indeed there is no
true freedom except for those who are happy and
cling to the eternal law; but here I mean that free-
dom by which men think they are free, when they
do not have other men as their masters, and which
is desired by those who wish to be released from
any human masters. Then parents, brothers, wife,
children, relations, connections, friends, and all
who are joined to us by some bond. Or again the
state itself, which is usually regarded as a parent;
honours, too, and distinctions, and what is called
popular favour. Lastly, money, under which
single term is included everything of which we are
rightful masters, and which we are regarded as
having the power to sell and give away.

How this law assigns to each man his share, it
would be a long and difficult matter to explain,
and one plainly not necessary for our purpose,

70 ST. AUGUSTINE

We need only notice that the power of this law to
enforce itself does not extend further than to take
away and confiscate as a punishment those things
or a part of them. Hence it brings pressure to
bear through fear, and to gain its end turns and
twists the souls of the unhappy people for whose
government it is fitted. For, while they fear to
lose these things, they exercise in their use a certain
restraint suitable to hold together such a society as
can be composed of men of this kind. This law
does not punish the sin which consists in loving the
above objects, but the sin which consists in taking
them wrongfully from other people.

So consider whether we have now finished the
task you thought would be endless. We set out to
inquire how far the right of punishment extended
of that law by which earthly peoples and states are
governed.

E. I see we have finished the task.
33 A. Do you see also that there would not be any
punishment, whether wrongly inflicted, or in-
flicted by the sanction of the above law, unless
men loved those things which can be taken away
against their will?
Z?. I see that too.

A. Now, one man makes good use and another
bad use of the same things. The man who makes
bad use, clings to them and is attached to them by
his love, that is to say, is subject to things which
ought to be subject to him. He makes those things
of service to himself, for the control and good
management of which he himself ought to be of

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 71

service. On the other hand, the man who uses
them rightly shows indeed their value, but not for
himself. They do not make him good or better,
but rather are made good by him. Therefore he
is not attached to them by love of them, and does
not make them, as it were, members of his own
soul as would happen if he loved them lest, when
the time comes for their amputation, they may in-
fect him with painful corruption. He is fully their
master, ready to possess and control them when
there is need, and still more ready to lose them and
not possess them. This being so, surely you do not
think silver or gold are to be condemned because
some men are avaricious, 32 or food because some
men are greedy, or wine because some men are
drunkards, or beautiful women because some men
are fornicators and adulterers, and so on, especially
as you see that a doctor makes a good use of heat,
and a poisoner a bad use of bread?
. It is quite true that not the things themselves
are to be blamed, but the men who make a bad use
of them.

16.34 -<4- Very well. I think we now begin to see what
is the power of eternal law, and how far temporal
law can go in inflicting punishment. We have
distinguished precisely enough the two classes of
things, eternal and temporal, and the two classes of
men, those who love and seek for eternal things,
and those who love and seek for temporal things.
We have agreed that it lies in the will what each
man chooses to seek and attach himself to, 33 and
that the mind is not cast down from its position of

72 ST. AUGUSTINE

control, and from its right order, except by the
will. It is plain too that the thing is not to be con-
demned when a man uses it wrongly, but the man
himself who uses it wrongly. Let us return now,
I suggest, to the question proposed at the beginning
of this discussion, and see whether it has been
solved. We set out to ask what wrongdoing is,
and with this end in view we have conducted the
whole discussion.

Therefore we are now ready to turn our minds
to the question whether wrongdoing is anything
else than the neglect of eternal things, which the
mind enjoys of itself and perceives of itself, and
which it cannot lose when it loves them, and the
pursuit, as though they were great and wonderful,
of temporal things, which are perceived by the
body, the lowest part of man, and the possession of
which can never be assured. In this one class all
wrongdoing, that is, all sin, seems to me to be
included. I am anxious to know what you think
about it.

35 ., What you say is true, and I agree that all sins
are included in this one class, and consist in turning
away from godly things which are truly lasting,
and in turning towards things which are change-
able and insecure. Although these latter things are
constituted rightly in their own order, and attain
a certain beauty of their own, nevertheless it shows
a corrupt and disordered soul if we are given over
to their pursuit, seeing that by divine disposition
and right the soul is given power to control them
at its will.

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK ONE 73

And now I think that other problem is also
cleared up and settled, which we decided to con-
sider after the question what wrongdoing is,
namely, the question why we do wrong. Unless I
am mistaken, the argument has shown that we do
wrong through the free choice of our will. But I
want to know whether that very free choice, by
which we have concluded that we have power of
sinning, ought to have been given us by Him who
created us. Without it apparently we should not
have sinned, and there is danger that through this
line of argument God may be thought the cause
even of our wrongdoing.

A. Have no fear of this. We must, however, find
some other opportunity of examining the question
more carefully: now it is time to bring the present
discussion to an end. I want you to believe that
we have, as it were, knocked at the door of great
and hidden questions which we must search out.
When with God's help we begin to enter their
sanctuaries, you will certainly recognise what a
difference there is between this discussion and
those which follow, and how far more excellent
are the latter, not only in the intelligence required
to examine them, but also in the profundity of their
content and in the clear light of their truth. Only
let us have a right spirit, so that Divine Providence
may allow us to keep to the course we have marked
out, and to reach the end.

E.l will do what you wish, and willingly fall in
with your proposal.

BOOK TWO
WHY HAS MAN BEEN GIVEN FREE CHOICE?

l.i . Now explain to me, if you can, why God has
given man free choice of will. For if man had not
received this gift, he would not be capable of sin.
A. Do you know for certain that God has given
man this gift, which you think ought not to have
been given?

. As far as I thought I understood in the first
book, we have free choice of will, and we only sin
as a result.

A. I remember too that this became clear to us.
But my present question is whether you know that
God gave us the gift which plainly we have, and as
a result of which plainly we can sin.
E. No one else gave it, I think. We are created
by God, and from Him we deserve punishment if
we sin, or reward if we act rightly.
A.I should like to be told whether you know this
also because it is evident or whether you believe it
freely on authority without knowing it.
. I agree that at first I accepted authority on this
question. Yet it is surely true that whatever is
good comes from God, and that whatever is just is
good, and that sinners are justly punished, and
those who do right justly rewarded. The conclu-
sion from this is that God makes sinners unhappy
and those who do right happy.

74

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 75

A. I do not deny this, but I ask the second ques-
tion, how you know we are created by God. You
have not explained this, but only that from Him
we deserve punishment or reward.
E. I see that this other point also is clear, only
because we have already established that God pun-
ishes sins. For indeed all justice comes from Him.
It is not the work of justice to punish strangers, in
the same way that it is the work of goodness to
help strangers. Hence it is clear that we belong to
Him, because not only is He supremely kind in
giving us help, but also supremely just in punishing
us. So, from what I asserted and you agreed,
namely, that all good comes from God, we can
also conclude that man is created by God. Man
himself is something good in so far as he is man, for
he can live rightly when he so wills. 1
A. Obviously, if this is true, the question you pro-
posed is solved. If man is something good and
cannot do right except when he so wishes, he ought
to have free will, without which he could not do
right. Because sin occurs through free will, we
must not suppose God gave man free will for the
purpose of sinning. It is a sufficient reason why it
ought to be given, that man cannot live rightly
without it.

We can understand that it was given for this
purpose, because, if anyone uses it to sin, God pun-
ishes him. This would be unjust if free will had
been given not only that man might live rightly,
but also that he might sin. How could a man be
punished justly, if he used his will for the very

7 6 ST. AUGUSTINE

purpose for which it was given? Since, however,
God punishes the sinner, what else do you think
He says but: Why did you not use your free will
for the purpose for which I gave it you, that is, to
do right? Then, if man lacked free choice of will,
how could that good be brought about, which con-
sists in the due maintenance of justice by the con-
demnation of sins and the honouring of good
deeds? It would not be a sin or a good deed, un-
less it was done wilfully. Hence punishment and
reward would be unjust, if man did not have free
will. There must be justice both in punishment
and in reward: it is one of the good things which
come from God. Therefore it was right that God
should give free will to man.

2.4 . I agree now that God gave it. But I ask you:
do you not think that, if it was given for the pur-
pose of good conduct, it ought not to have been
possible to misuse it for sin? It is not possible to
misuse justice itself which has been given to man
that he may live rightly. Can anyone live wrongly
through justice? And in the same way no one
would be able to sin through his will, if his will had
been given for the purpose of good conduct.
A. I hope God will grant that I may be able to
answer you, or rather that you may answer your-
self, instructed by that truth within you, which is
the source of all instruction. 2 I want you to tell
me shortly if you know for certain that God gave
us free will, the matter about which I asked you
whether we should say that the gift ought not to
have been given us, which we agree has been given

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 77

by God. For, if It is doubtful whether He has
given it, we are justified in asking whether it is a
good gift. Then, if we find it is a good gift, we
shall find also that it is the gift of Him who is the
giver of all good things to man. 3 If, however, we
find it is not a good gift, we shall realise that He
did not give it, since it is wicked to blame Him.
On the other hand, if it is certain that He gave it,
we must agree that, in whatever form it has been
given, it ought not to have been withheld or given
in any other way than that in which it has been
given. For He gave it, whose act we cannot by
any means be justified in blaming.
., I hold this firmly by faith, but, as I do not hold
it as a matter of knowledge, let us examine it as
though it were altogether doubtful. In view of
the fact that it is doubtful whether free will has
been given for the purpose of good conduct, since
by means of free will we can sin, I see it becomes
doubtful whether it ought to have been given us.
For, if it is doubtful whether free will was given
for the purpose of good conduct, it is also doubtful
whether it ought to have been given. Hence it
will be doubtful too whether God gave us free
will. For, if it is doubtful whether it ought to
have been given, it is doubtful whether it has been
given by Him whom it is wrong to suppose gave
anything which ought not to have been given.
A. At least you are certain that God exists.
E.~ Even this I hold for certain not through direct
perception, but through belief.
A. Then, if one of those fools of whom Scripture

7 8 ST. AUGUSTINE

records, the fool said in his heart: there is no Godf
should say this to you, and should refuse to believe
with you what you believe, but should want to
know whether your belief is true, would you have
nothing to do with this man, or would you think
you ought to convince him in some way of what
you hold firmly especially if he should seriously
wish to know, and not obstinately to dispute it?
. Your last remark tells me clearly enough what
answer I ought to make to him. Though quite
unreasonable, he would certainly admit that I
ought not to argue with a crafty and obstinate man
about so great a matter, or indeed about anything
at all. Granting this, he would first beg me to
believe that he was an honest inquirer, and in the
present affair concealed no trickery or obstinacy.
Then I should show, what I think is easy for
anyone, that he wishes another person, who does
not know it, to believe what he himself knows
concerning the secrets of his own soul, and there-
fore that he in his turn would be much more
reasonable if he believed in God's existence on the
authority of all those writers who have testified
that they lived with the Son of God. They have
recorded that they saw things which could not
possibly have happened, if there were no God.
He would be very foolish if he blamed me for be-
lieving these writers, seeing that he wished me to
believe him. He would find no reason for refusing
to imitate what he could not rightly blame.
A So, on the question of God's existence, you
think it is sufficient that our decision to believe

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 79

these witnesses is a prudent one. Why, then, I
want to know, do you not think that we ought
similarly to accept the authority of these same men
with regard to those other matters, which we re-
solved to examine as being uncertain and quite
unknown, without troubling about further investi-
gation?

The reason is that we want to know and
understand what we believe.

A. You remember rightly what we cannot deny
we asserted at the beginning of our former discus-
sion. 5 Unless belief and understanding were dis-
tinct, and unless we ought to start by believing any
important question of theology which we wish to
understand, the Prophet would have been wrong
in saying, unless you believe, you will not under-
stand* Our Lord Himself also by word and deed
urged those whom He called to salvation, first to
believe. Afterwards, when He spoke of the gift
itself which He would give to believers, He did
not say, 'This is eternal life, that they may believe/
but, This is eternal life, that they may know Thee,
the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou
hast sent. 7 Then He says to those who already
believe, Seek and you shall find, 8 for what is be-
lieved without being known cannot be said to have
been found, nor can anyone become capable of
finding God, unless he has first believed what
afterwards he is to know.

Therefore in obedience to the Lord's commands
let us seek earnestly. What we seek at His exhor-
tation we shall find also from His teaching, so far

8o ST. AUGUSTINE

as these matters can be found in this life and by
persons such as ourselves. We must believe that
these things are seen and grasped more clearly and
perfectly by better men even while they dwell in
this world, and certainly by all good and devout
men after this life. We must hope that so it will
happen to us, and we must desire and love these
things, despising what is earthly and human.

THE EVIDENCE FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE

3.7 Let us then, I suggest, examine the question in
the following order: first, how it is clear that God
exists; 9 secondly, whether whatever is good, in
whatever degree it is good, is created by Him;
thirdly, whether free will is to be counted among
good things. When we have decided these ques-
tions, it will be plain enough, I think, whether it
has been given rightly to man.

So, in order to start from what is clearest, I ask
you first: Do you yourself exist? Are you perhaps
afraid that you may be mistaken, when asked this
question? If you did not exist, you could not pos-
sibly be mistaken. 10
. Go on rather to the next point.
A. Then, since it is clear that you exist, and since
this would not be clear to you unless you were
alive, it is clear also that you are alive. Do you
understand that these two statements are quite
true?
E. Yes, I understand that at once.

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 81

A. Then this third point too is clear, namely, that
you understand.
E. It is clear.

A. Which of these three do you think is the most
important?
E. Understanding.
A. Why do you think so?

E. There are these three, existence, life, under-
standing: a stone exists, and an animal lives. I do
not think a stone lives or an animal understands,
but it is quite certain that a person who under-
stands, also exists and lives. Therefore I do not
hesitate to judge that in which all three are present
as more important than that which lacks one or
two of them. For what lives, certainly exists, but
does not necessarily understand: such, I think, is
the life of an animal. It certainly does not follow
that what exists also lives and understands, for I
can agree that corpses exist, but no one would say
that they lived. Far less does what is not alive
understand.

A. We hold, therefore, that of these three two are
lacking in a corpse, one in an animal, and none in
a man.
. True.

A. We hold also that in these three that is most
important which man has in addition to the two
others, namely, understanding. Since he has this,
it follows that he exists and lives.
E. Yes, we hold this.
A. Now tell me whether you know you have the

82 ST. AUGUSTINE

ordinary bodily senses, sight, hearing, smell, taste,

and touch.

.-! do.

AWhat do you think is the proper object of the

sense of sight? That is, what do you think we

perceive when we see?

. Any bodily thing.

A. Surely we do not perceive the hard and the

soft when we see?

E.-No.

A. What then is the proper object of the eyes,

which we perceive through them?

. Colour.

A. What is it of the ears?

. Sound.

A-What of smell?

. Odour.

A- What of taste?

. Flavour.

A-What of touch?

. Soft or hard, smooth or rough, and many other

such things.

A. Do we not perceive by touch and sight the

shapes of bodily things, that they are large or small,

square or round, and so on? Does it not follow

that these cannot be assigned specially to sight or

touch, but must be assigned to both?

E.l understand.

A. Then do you understand also that the different

senses have their proper objects which they report,

and that some have objects in common?

. I understand this too.

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 83

A Surely, therefore, we cannot distinguish by
any of these senses what is the proper object of any
sense, and what all or some of them have in com-
mon?

E. Certainly not; they are distinguished by an
inner perception.

A. Can this be reason, which beasts lack? It
seems to me that by the reason we grant this, and
know that it is so.

E.I think rather we grasp with our reason that
there is an inner sense, to which everything is re-
ferred by the five ordinary senses. The faculty
by which the beast sees is different from that by
which it shuns or seeks what it perceives by sight.
The one sense resides in the eyes, but the other is
within, in the soul itself. By the latter animals are
either enticed to seek and seize, or are warned to
shun and reject, not only what they see but also
what they hear, and what they perceive with the
other bodily senses. This, however, can be called
neither sight, nor hearing, nor smell, nor taste, nor
touch, but is something else which presides over
all the rest together. While, as I have said, we
grasp this with our reason, I cannot precisely call
it reason, for plainly the beasts possess it.
A. I recognise this, whatever it may be, and do
not hesitate to call it an inner sense. But unless
that which is conveyed to us by the bodily senses,
passes beyond the inner sense, it cannot become
knowledge. Whatever we know we grasp with
our reason. We know, for example to say noth-
ing of other facts that colours cannot be perceived

84 ST. AUGUSTINE

by hearing nor sounds by sight. This knowledge
does not come to us from the eyes or ears, nor from
that inner sense which even the beasts do not lack.
We must not suppose that they know that light is
not perceived with the ears or sound with the eyes:
we distinguish these only by rational reflection and
thought.

E.I cannot say I am convinced about this. Might
not they recognise that colours cannot be per-
ceived by hearing or sound by sight, through that
inner sense which you admit they possess?
A. You do not think, do you, that they can dis-
tinguish between the colour they perceive, and the
power of sense in their eye, and the inner sense in
their soul, and the reason which marks out exactly
the limits of each?
E. No, certainly not.

A.- Well, could reason distinguish and define these
four unless colour was presented to it by the sense
of sight, and again that sense by that inner sense
which presides over it, and again that inner
sense by its own act, if there were no other inter-
mediary?

E. I do not see how else it could be.
A. Do you observe that colour is perceived by
the sense of sight, and that the sense of sight is not
perceived by itself? You do not see that you see
by the same sense by which you see colour.
E. Certainly not.

A. Try also to distinguish these. I think you do
not deny that colour is different from seeing
colour, and again from possession of a sense by

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 85

which, when colour is not present, we could see it,
if it were present.

. I distinguish between these, and agree they are
distinct.

A. You do not see with your eyes, do you, any of
these three except colour?
E.-No.

A. Tell me then how you see the other two; you
could not distinguish them if you did not see them.
E. I only know that a means exists; I know noth-
ing more.

A. So you do not know whether it is reason or
the vital principle, which we call the inner sense
and which presides over the bodily senses, or
something else?
E. I do not know.

A. Yet you know that these elements cannot be
defined except by the reason, and the reason can
only define what is presented for its examination.
E. That is certain.

.4. Therefore whatever else the faculty may be
by which we perceive everything that we know, it
is the servant of reason. It presents and reports to
the reason whatever it comes upon, so that what is
perceived may be able to be distinguished in its
proper sphere, and grasped not only by sense per-
ception but also by knowledge.
E. That is so.

A. The reason itself distinguishes between its
servants and what they present to it, and also rec-
ognises what comes between these and itself, and
it asserts itself to be their governor. Surely it does

86 ST. AUGUSTINE

not grasp itself except by means of itself, that is, by
the reason? Would you know that you possessed
reason unless you perceived it by reason?
. Perfectly true.

A. Then, since, when we perceive colour we do
not likewise by the same sense perceive the fact
that we perceive it, nor when we hear a sound do
we also hear our hearing, nor when we smell a rose
do we smell our smelling, nor when we taste some-
thing do we taste in the mouth our tasting, nor
when we touch something can we touch the actual
sense of touching: it is clear that the five senses
cannot be perceived by any of the five senses,
though they perceive all bodily things.
E. That is clear.

4.io A. I think it is clear also that the inner sense not
only perceives what is presented by the five bodily
senses, but also perceives the bodily senses them-
selves. A beast would not move itself by seeking
or shunning something, unless it perceived that it
perceived; and this it does not do in such a way as
to know, for this is the work of reason, but only in
such a way as to move, and it does not have this
perception by any of the five senses.

If this is still obscure, it will become clear if you
notice, for example, what takes place in any one
sense, say, in the sense of sight. A beast could not
possibly open its eye, and move it to look at what
it wants to see, unless it perceived that it did not
see with the eye closed or turned in the wrong
direction. But if it perceives that it does not see
when it does not see, it must necessarily perceive

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 87

that it sees when it sees. It shows that it is aware
of both situations, because, when it sees, it does not
turn the eye as a result of that desire through
which it turns the eye when it does not see.

Whether this vital principle, which perceives
that it perceives bodily things, also perceives itself,
is not so clear, except in so far as everyone who
asks himself the question realises that all living
things shun death. Since death is the contrary of
life, the vital principle must necessarily perceive
itself, seeing that it shuns its contrary. If this is
still not plain, leave it alone; we must not try to
reach our goal except by clear and certain proofs.

These facts are clear: bodily things are perceived
by a bodily sense; this sense cannot be perceived by
itself; but an inner sense perceives both that bodily
things are perceived by a bodily sense and also the
bodily sense itself; and, finally, all this and reason
itself is made known by reason, and grasped by
knowledge. Do you not agree?
E. Yes indeed.

A. Well then, tell me how the problem comes in,
which we wish to solve and have been working at
for all this time.

5. 1 1 E. As far as I remember, of those three questions
which we proposed just now so as to put this dis-
cussion into order, the first is now under consider-
ation, namely, how it can become evident to us
that God exists, even though we must believe it
with all possible firmness.

A. You are quite right. But I want you also to
notice carefully that, when I asked you whether

88 ST. AUGUSTINE

you knew that you yourself existed, it became
clear that you knew not only this but also two
other things.
. I notice that too.

A. Now observe to which of these three you rec-
ognise that every object of the bodily senses be-
longs: I mean, in what class of things you think
should be placed whatever is the object of our
senses through the agency of the eyes or any other
bodily organ. Should it be placed in the class
which merely exists, or in that which also lives, or
in that which also understands?
. In that which merely exists.
A. In which of these three classes do you think
the sense itself should be placed?
. In that which lives.

A Then, which of these two do you think is
better, the sense itself or its object?
. Undoubtedly the sense itself.
A-Why?

. Because that which also lives is better than that
which merely exists.

12 A. Well, do you hesitate to rank that inner sense,
which we have already discovered to be below
reason, and yet common to us and the beasts, as
higher than the sense by which we perceive bodily
things? You have already said the latter sense
should be ranked above bodily things themselves.
E.I should not hesitate for a moment.
A Again, I should like to hear why you do not
hesitate. You could not say that the inner sense
should be placed in that class of the three which

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 89

includes understanding, but you must place it in
that class which exists and Hves, without under-
standing. Even the beasts which lack understand-
ing have that sense. This being so, I ask why you
rank the inner sense above the sense which per-
ceives bodily things, though both are in that class
which lives. You have ranked the sense whose
object is bodily things, above such things just be-
cause they are in that class which only exists, while
the sense which perceives bodily things is in the
class which also lives. Since the inner sense is also
found to be in this class, tell me why you think it
is better.

If you say it is because the inner sense perceives
the other sense, you will not, I think, find any prin-
ciple which we can follow, 11 that every percipient
is better than the object it perceives. We might
have to conclude in that case that everything which
has understanding is better than the object it
understands. This, however, is false, since man
understands wisdom, but is not better than wisdom
itself. So consider why you think the inner sense
should be regarded as superior to the sense by
which we perceive bodily things.
E. Because I know it somehow controls and
judges the other sense. If the latter fails in its
duty, the inner sense exacts a kind of debt from its
servant, as we discussed a little time ago. The
sense of sight does not see that it sees or does not
see, and, because it does not see this, it cannot
judge what is lacking to it or what satisfies it. The
inner sense can make this judgment, for it warns

90 ST. AUGUSTINE

the soul of the beast to open its eye when shut, and
to do what it perceives needs to be done. Un-
doubtedly that which judges is better than that
which is judged.

A. Then do you notice that the bodily sense in
some way also judges bodily things? It is aff ected
by pleasure or pain when it comes in contact with
a bodily thing gently or harshly. Just as the inner
sense judges what is lacking to, or what satisfies,
the sense of sight, so too the sense of sight judges
what is lacking to, or what satisfies, colour. 12
Moreover, as the inner sense judges the hearing,
whether it is sufficiently attentive or not, so the
hearing in its turn judges sound, whether it is
gentle or loud.

We need not go through the other bodily senses,
for I think you realise now what I mean. The
inner sense judges the bodily senses; it approves
them when they respond normally, and exacts
what they owe it. In the same way the bodily
senses judge bodily things, welcoming a gentle
touch and resisting the opposite.
E. Yes, I see this and agree it is quite true. 13
6.13 A. Now consider whether reason in its turn
judges the inner sense. I am not asking now
whether you hesitate to call it better than the inner
sense, because I am sure you do call it better. Yet
I think now we should not even ask whether reason
judges this inner sense. For in regard to those
things which are below reason, that is, bodily
things and the bodily senses and the inner sense,
what else but the reason tells us how one is better

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 91

than another, and how reason is nobler than any of
them? This could not possibly happen, unless it
judged them.
. That is obvious.

A. So that kind of thing which not only exists,
but also lives, yet does not understand, such as the
soul of a beast, is nobler than that kind of thing
which only exists without living or understanding.
Again, that which includes existence, life, and
understanding, such as the rational mind of man, is
nobler still. I am sure you do not think that any-
thing nobler can be found in us, among those facul-
ties which make up our nature, than that which
we have placed third among the three? It is clear
we have a body and a vital principle which stirs
and quickens the body, both of which we recog-
nise to be present in beasts. It is also clear that we
have something else, the head or eye, so to speak,
of our soul, or whatever more suitable expression
can be used to describe the reason and understand-
ing. The beast does not have this in its nature. So
I beg you to consider whether you can find any-
thing which is higher than reason in man's nature.
. I see nothing at all which is better.
14 A. Well, if we can find something which you are
certain not only exists but also is nobler than our
reason, will you hesitate to call this, whatever it is,
God?

. If I could find something better than the best
in my nature, I should not necessarily call it God.
I should not like to call that which is above my

92 ST. AUGUSTINE

reason, God, but rather that which is above every-
thing else.

AThat is plainly right. God granted to your
reason this reverent and true opinion of Himself.
But I ask you: if you find there is nothing above
our reason except the eternal and unchangeable,
will you hesitate to call this God? You know that
bodily things change, and clearly the life which
animates the body has various moods and is subject
to change. Reason itself at one time strives after
the truth, and at another does not strive, sometimes
reaches it and sometimes does not; it is manifestly
proved to be changeable. If without using any
bodily means, if neither by touch, nor taste, nor
smell, neither by the ears, nor the eyes, nor any
sense lower than itself, but by its own self, the
reason sees something eternal and unchangeable,
and itself as lower than this, then it must confess
that this is its God.

E. I will confess clearly that to be God, which all
agree to be higher than anything else.
A. Very well. All I need do is to show that there
is a being of such a kind, and either you will admit
this being to be God, or, if there is anything higher,
you will grant that the higher being is God. 14 So,
whether there is something higher or whether
there is not, it will be clear that God exists, when,
with His help, I shall show, as I promised, that
there exists something higher than reason.
. Show, then, what you promise.
7.15 A.r- 1 shall do so. But I first ask whether my
bodily sense is the same as yours, or whether mine

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 93

is only my own, and yours only your own. If this
were not so, I could not see anything with my eyes
which you would not see.

Z?. I entirely agree that each of us have our own
senses, of sight or hearing and so on, though they
are in a common class. One man can both see and
hear what another does not hear, and with all the
other senses each man's perceptions can be differ-
ent. So it is clear that your sense is only yours,
and my sense only mine.

A. Will you make the same reply about the inner
sense, or will you not?

E. Yes indeed, the same reply. My inner sense
perceives my bodily sense, and yours perceives
yours. I am often asked by a man who sees some-
thing whether I see it also. The reason is simply
that I am conscious of my seeing or not seeing,
while my questioner is not.

A. Then I suppose each of us has his own reason?
It may be that I understand something which you
do not understand, and you may be unable to
know whether I understand, though I myself
know.

E. It is clear that each of us has his own distinct
rational mind.

1 6 A. You surely could not say that we each have
our own suns or moons or morning stars or such
like, though each of us sees them with his own
sense?

. I certainly should not say so.
A. Many of us can at the same time see the same
thing, though the senses of each of us are our own

94 ST. AUGUSTINE

distinct senses: with these distinct senses we see the
one object, and we all see it at the same time. It
may happen, therefore, although your sense and
mine are distinct, that we may not each see distinct
objects; one and the same thing may be presented
to each of us, and may be seen at the same time by
each of us.

. That is perfectly clear.

^_ We can also hear the same sound at the same
time, so that, although my hearing is distinct from
yours, yet the sound which we hear at the same
time is not distinct to each of us, nor is one part of
it received by my hearing and another by yours.
When a sound is made, the same sound and the
whole of it is present to the hearing of both of us.
. That also is clear.

17 A You may now notice what we say about the
other bodily senses too: as far as our present sub-
ject is concerned, they are not quite in the same
position as the two senses of sight and hearing, nor
are they quite different. You and I can breathe
the same air, and perceive what it is like from the
smell. We can both taste the same honey or any
other food or drink, and can perceive what it is
like from the taste, though this is one and the same,
while the senses of each of us, yours and mine, are
distinct to each of us. Though we both perceive
the same smell or the same taste, yet you do not
perceive it with my sense nor I with yours, nor by
any faculty which can be common to us both: my
sense is entirely mine, and yours is entirely yours,
even though we both perceive the same smell or

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 95

taste. It follows that those other senses are found
to have a characteristic similar to that of the senses
of sight and hearing. They are unlike them, so far
as our present subject is concerned, in that, though
we both breathe the same air with our nostrils, or
take the same food when we taste it, yet I do not
draw in the same part of the air as you, nor do I
take the same part of the food as you, but we take
different parts. Therefore, when I breathe, I draw
from the whole air as much as is sufficient for me,
and you draw another part, as much as is sufficient
for you. The same food is wholly taken by each
of us, 15 yet the whole cannot be taken bpth by you
and me in the same way that you and I both hear
the whole of a word simultaneously, and both see
exactly the same sight: different parts of food and
drink must pass into each of us. Is this not quite
clear?

. I agree it is perfectly clear and certain.
1 8 A. -You do not think, do you, that the sense of
touch is comparable with the senses of sight and
hearing in that respect we are now considering?
Not only can we both perceive by touch the same
bodily thing, but we can also both touch the same
part; we can both perceive by touch not only the
same bodily thing but the same part of it. It is not
the same with touch as with food, for you and I
cannot both take the whole of the food put before
us, when we are both eating it. You and I can
touch the same thing and the whole of it, not
merely different parts we can each touch the
whole.

96 ST. AUGUSTINE

. I agree that in this respect the sense of touch is
very much like the two senses mentioned before.
But I see that they are unlike in this, that both of
us can see and hear the whole of the same thing at
exactly the same time, while, though we can touch
the whole of a thing at the same time, we can only
touch different parts the same part only at differ-
ent times. I cannot touch the part which you are
touching, unless you move your hand.
19 A. Your answer is very acute, but you must see
this. Of all the things we perceive there are some
we both perceive together, and others we each per-
ceive separately. We each perceive separately our
own senses: I do not perceive your sense, nor you
mine. We each separately, and not both together,
perceive objects of the bodily senses, that is, bodily
things, only when they become our own in such a
way that we can make them change completely
into ourselves. Food and drink are examples, for
you cannot have a perception of the same part as I
have. Nurses may chew food and give it to chil-
dren, but, when they do so, if the food is tasted
and consumed and changed into the nurse's body,
it cannot possibly be brought back and offered as
food for the child. When the palate tastes some-
thing it enjoys, it claims for itself irrevocably a
part, however small, and makes this conform to the
nature of its body. Otherwise there would remain
no taste in the mouth, after the food had been
chewed and spat out again.

The same can be said of the parts of the air
which we breathe. For, though you may be able

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 97

to draw in some part of the air which I breathe out,
yet you cannot draw in that which has actually
nourished me; this cannot be given up. Doctors
tell us that we take nourishment even with our
nostrils. When I breathe, I alone can perceive this
nourishment, nor can I breathe it out and give it
up, so that you may draw it in with your nostrils
and perceive it.

When we perceive other sensible objects we do
not, by perceiving them, break them up and
change them into our own body. Both of us can
perceive them either at the same time or at differ-
ent times, in such a way that the whole, or the part
which I perceive, is also perceived by you. Ex-
amples of this are light or sound or bodily things
with which we come in contact, but which we do
not alter.
E.l understand.

A. It is clear, therefore, that those things which
we perceive with our bodily senses but do not
change, do not share the nature of these senses, and
consequently are common to us, for the very
reason that they do not suffer change and become
our personal and, so to speak, private possession.
E.I quite agree.

A. By our personal and, so to speak, private pos-
session, I mean that which belongs to each indi-
vidual and to no one else, 16 that which he alone
perceives in himself, that which belongs to his own
peculiar nature. But that which is common and, so
to speak, public, is what is perceived by all who

9 8 ST. AUGUSTINE

have perception, with no alteration or change in
itself.

. That is true.

8.20 A. Well, listen now, and tell me whether any-
thing can be found which all who reason see in
common, each with his own reason and mind. An
object which is seen is present to all and is not
changed for the use of those to whom it is present,
as in the case of food or drink, but remains incor-
rupt and entire, whether seen or not seen. Do you
perhaps disagree with this?

. No, I see there are many examples, though it is
enough to mention one. The law and truth of
number is present to all who reason. All calcu-
lators try to grasp their truth by reason and under-
standing; one man can do so more easily, one less
easily, one not at all. However, their truth pre-
sents itself equally to all who can grasp it. When
a man perceives it, he does not change it and make
it into his food of perception, as it were; and when
he makes a mistake about it, the truth does not fail
but remains entirely true, while he is in error in
proportion to his failure to see it.
2 1 A. Quite right. You are not unpractised in these
things, and I see you have quickly found your
answer. Yet, if someone were to tell you that
these numbers were impressed on our minds, not as
a result of their own nature but as a result of those
things we experience with the bodily sense, and
were, so to speak, images of visible things, what
would you answer? Do you agree with this?
, No, I could not agree. 17 Even if I perceived

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 99

numbers with my bodily sense, I should not as a
result be able to perceive with my bodily sense the
meaning of division or addition of numbers. By
the light of my mind I check the man who reaches
a wrong result in addition or subtraction. What-
ever I become aware of with my bodily sense,
whether heaven or earth or any bodily thing they
contain, how long they will last I do not know.
But seven and three are ten, not only now, but
always. There has never been a time when seven
and three were not ten, nor will there ever be.
Therefore I have said that this incorruptible truth
of number 1S is common to myself and to everyone
who reasons.

22 A. I do not dispute your answer; it is perfectly
true and certain. But you will easily see that the
numbers themselves are not perceived through the
bodily senses, if you reflect that every number
connotes a given amount of units. For example, if
one is doubled it is two, if trebled three, if it has
ten units it is ten. Any possible number is named
according to the units it possesses, and is called this
number.

But if you have a true notion of 'one/ you cer-
tainly find that it cannot be perceived by the
bodily senses. Whatever is the object of a bodily
sense is proved to be many, and not one, because it
is a bodily thing and so has countless parts. I need
not dwell on each small and indistinct part; how-
ever small such a bodily part may be, it certainly
has one part on the right, another on the left, one
above and another below, one on the far side and

ico ST. AUGUSTINE

another on the near side, parts at the ends and a
part in the middle. We are bound to admit this is
so, on however small a scale. Consequently we
grant that no bodily thing is perfectly one, yet all
these many parts could not be counted, unless they
were distinguished through knowledge of 'one.'

I look for 'one' in a bodily thing, and undoubt-
edly do not find it. I know indeed what I am
looking for, and what I do not find there; and I
know that it cannot be found, or rather, that it is
not there at all. While I know that a bodily thing
is not one, I know what 'one' is. If I did not know
'one,' I could not count 'many' in a bodily thing.
From whatever source I get my knowledge of
'one,' I do not get it through a bodily sense, for
through a bodily sense I only know a bodily thing,
which we can prove is not perfectly one.

Moreover, if we do not perceive 'one' by a
bodily sense, we perceive no number by that sense,
none at least of those numbers we distinguish with
the understanding. All of these are made up of a
given quantity of units, and the bodily sense can-
not perceive a unit. Half of any small bodily
thing, whatever size the half may be, itself has a
half. Thus there are two halves in a bodily thing,
yet they themselves are not perfectly two. But,
since the number we call two is twice what is per-
fectly one, its half, namely that which is perfectly
one, cannot in its turn have a half, or a third, or
any fraction, because it is perfectly one.
23 Then, if we keep the order of the numbers,
after one we see two, and this number, compared

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 101

with one, is found to be double. Twice two does
not come next, but three comes next, and then
four, which is twice two. This pattern runs
through all the other numbers by a sure and un-
changeable law, so that after one, that is, after the
first of all numbers (not counting the number
itself) the next is that which doubles it, for the
next is two. After the second number, that is,
after two (not counting this number itself), the
second is that which doubles it, for after two the
first is three, while the second is four, which
doubles two. After the third number, that is, after
three (not counting this number itself), the third
is its double, for after the third, that is, after three,
the first is four, the second is five, and the third is
six, which is double three. Similarly, after four
(not counting this number itself) , the fourth is its
double, for after the fourth, that is, after four, the
first is five, the second is six, the third is seven, and
the fourth is eight, which is double four. Through
all the other numbers you will find what you
found in the first two numbers, that is, in one and
two: whatever the number may be, counting from
the beginning, this same number being added to it
the number you reach is its double/ 9

How, then, do we recognise that this fact,
which we recognise throughout all numbers, is un-
changeable, sure, and certain? No one is aware of
all numbers with any bodily sense, for they are
innumerable. How, then, do we know that this
holds good throughout them all? By what idea or
image do we see so sure a truth so confidently

102 ST. AUGUSTINE

throughout innumerable instances, unless we do it
by an inner light, unknown to the bodily sense?
24 By these and many other such proofs those to
whom God has given the gift of reasoning and
who are not darkened by obstinacy, must admit
that the law and truth of number do not concern
the bodily sense, that they are unalterably sure, and
are perceived in common by all who reason.

Many other things may suggest themselves
which are presented in common and, as it were,
publicly, to those who reason, and which are dis-
tinguished by each man's mind and reason individ-
ually, and yet remain entire and unchangeable.
Nevertheless I was glad to hear that the law and
truth of number were the first to suggest them-
selves to you, when you wished to answer my
question. It is not without significance that in the
Sacred Books number is joined to wisdom, where
it is said: / and my heart went round about to
know and consider and seek wisdom and number
9.25 However, I ask you: what, in your opinion,
should we think of wisdom itself? Do you sup-
pose that each individual has his own individual
wisdom, or that one wisdom is present to all in
common, so that each man is wiser the more fully
he shares in it?

. I do not yet know what you mean by wisdom.
I see that men have different views as to what con-
stitutes wise action or speech. Soldiers think they
are acting wisely. Those who despise war and
devote their energies to farming, regard this as
preferable and believe they are wise. Those who

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 103

are clever at money-making think they are wise.
Those who pay no attention to, or set aside, all
this and all such temporal interests, and devote
themselves entirely to the search for truth that they
may know themselves and God, judge this the
great work of wisdom. Those who refuse to sur-
render themselves peacefully to seek and contem-
plate the truth, but rather endure the laborious
cares of public office in order to help their fellow-
men, and take their part in the just management
and direction of human affairs, think they are wise.
Those who do both of these things, and engage
themselves partly in the contemplation of truth,
and partly in active works which they regard as a
debt to society, think they are supremely wise. I
leave aside countless groups, each of which prefers
its members to others, and would like them alone
to be wise.

So, since our purpose is not to say what we be-
lieve, but what we hold with clear understanding,
I could not possibly make any reply to your ques-
tion unless besides holding by belief what wisdom
itself is, I know this by contemplation and by the
light of reason.

26 A. You do not think, do you, that there is any
other wisdom but the truth, in which we distin-
guish and grasp the supreme good? All those,
whom you have mentioned as following different
aims, seek the good and shun evil, but they follow
different aims because they have different opinions
about the good. If a man seeks what ought not to
be sought, he errs, even though he would not seek

ST. AUGUSTINE

it unless he thought it was good. But the man who
seeks nothing cannot err, nor can he who seeks
what he ought to seek.

Therefore, in so far as all men seek a happy life,
they are not in error. In so far, however, as any-
one does not keep to the way of life which leads to
happiness, even though he confesses and professes
that he wishes only for happiness, to that extent he
is in error. For error comes about when we follow
an aim which does not lead us where we wish to
go. The more a man errs in his way of life, the
less wise he is, for to this extent he departs from the
truth, in which the supreme good is distinguished
and grasped. When the supreme good is sought
and gained, a man is happy, and this we all un-
doubtedly desire.

Therefore, just as we agree that we wish to be
happy, so we agree that we wish to be wise, for no
one is happy without wisdom. No one is happy
without the supreme good, which is distinguished
and grasped in that truth which we call wisdom.
So, as, before we are happy, the idea of happiness
is nevertheless impressed on our minds for through
this idea we know and say confidently and without
any doubt that we wish to be happy so too, before
we are wise, we have the idea of wisdom impressed
on the mind. It is through this idea that each of
us, if asked whether he wishes to be wise, replies
without any shadow of doubt that he does so wish.
27 So, if we agree what wisdom is, I want you to
tell me whether you think wisdom is presented in
common to all who reason, as is the law and truth

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 105

of number, or whether you think there are as many
different wisdoms as there could be different wise
men. For each man has a different mind, so that I
can see nothing of your mind, nor you of mine.
It may be that you cannot explain the nature of
wisdom in words, yet, if you did not see it with
your mind in any way, you would not know at all
that you wished to be wise, and that you had a
duty so to wish a fact I think you will not deny.
ZL If the supreme good is the same for all, the
truth in which it is distinguished and grasped, that
is to say, wisdom, must be the same, shared in com-
mon by all.

A. Do you doubt that the supreme good, what-
ever it is, is the same for all men?
. Yes, I am doubtful about this, because I see
men taking pleasure in different things as their
supreme goods.

A. I should like no one to doubt about the su-
preme good, just as no one doubts that, whatever
it is, no man can become happy unless he gains it.
Since, however, this is a large question, and may
demand a long discussion, let us by all means sup-
pose that there are as many supreme goods as there
are different objects sought as supreme goods by
different men. Surely it does not follow that wis-
dom itself is not the same, shared in common by all
men, because those goods which they distinguish
through it and choose, are many different goods?
If this is your opinion, you may doubt that the
light of the sun is one, because we see in it many
different things. Of these many things each

106 ST. AUGUSTINE

chooses what to enjoy with his sense of sight. One
man likes to look at a high mountain and enjoy its
view, another a fiat plain, another a curving valley,
another green woods, another the level, restless sea.
Another takes together all or several of these beau-
tiful 21 things for the joy of looking at them. 22

The objects are many and varied which men see
in the light of the sun and which they choose for
their enjoyment, yet the light of the sun is itself
one in which the gaze of each beholder sees and
grasps an object to enjoy. So too the goods are
many and varied from which each man chooses
what he wants, and, seeing and grasping his choice,
constitutes it rightly and truly the supreme good
for his enjoyment. Yet the very light of wisdom,
in which these things can be seen and grasped, may
be one light shared in common by all wise men.
E. I agree that this is possible, and nothing pre-
vents the same wisdom being common to all, even
though the supreme goods are many and varied;
but I would like to know whether it is so. Because
we grant it is possible, we do not necessarily grant
it is so.

A. Meanwhile we know that wisdom exists.
Whether there is one wisdom shared in common
by all, or whether each man has his own wisdom,
just as he has his own soul or mind, we do not yet
know.
. That is true.

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 107

IN TRUTH WE FIND GOD

10.28 A. Well then, where do we see this fact which
we knowthat wisdom or wise men exist, and that
all men wish to be happy? I certainly should not
doubt that you do see this and that it is true. Do
you, therefore, see this is true in the same way that
you see your thoughts, which I am entirely igno-
rant of unless you inform me? Or do you see it to
be true in such a way that you understand it can be
seen to be true by me also, though you do not tell
me?

. Certainly in such a way that I do not doubt
you also can see it, even against my will.
A. Hence, is not the one truth common to both
of us, which we both see with our individual
minds?

E Quite clearly so.

A. I think you do not deny that we should devote
ourselves to wisdom. I think you grant this is true.
. I certainly do not doubt it.
A Can we deny that this is true, and one, and
common to the sight of all who know it, although
each sees it with his own mind, and not with yours
or mine or anyone else's? For that which is seen
is present in common to all who see it.
. This is undeniable.

A. Will you not also agree that the following
propositions are absolutely true, and are present in
common to you and me and all who see them: we
ought to live justly; the better should be preferred

io8 ST. AUGUSTINE

to the worse; like should be compared with like;
every man should be given his due?
. I agree.

A.- Could you deny that the incorrupt is better
than the corrupt, the eternal than the temporal,
that which cannot be injured than that which can
be injured?

. No one could deny it.

A. So everyone can call this truth his own, though
it is present without change to the sight of all who
are able to behold it?

. No one could truthfully say it was his own
property, since it is one and common to all, just as
much as it is true.

A. Again, who denies that we should turn the
heart away from what is corrupt and towards what
is incorrupt, that is, that we should love not what
is corrupt but what is healthy? When a man
admits a truth, does he not also understand that it
is unchangeable and present in common to all
minds which are able to see it?
E. That is perfectly true.

A. Will anyone doubt that a life is better, if no
difficulty can move it from a firm, virtuous pur-
pose, than if it is easily shaken and upset by the
troubles of this life?
E. Undoubtedly.

29 A. I will not ask any more questions about this.
It is enough that you see, as I do, and admit to be
quite certain that those principles and illumina-
tions, so to speak, in which the virtues appear, are
true and unchangeable and, whether separately or

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 109

all together, are present in common to the sight of

those who can see them, each with his own reason

and mind. But I do ask this question, whether you

think these are concerned with wisdom. I believe

that in your opinion a man is wise who has gained

wisdom.

E. That is certainly my opinion.

A. Well, could a man, who lives justly, so live

unless he saw what were the higher things he

should prefer to the lower, what were the like

things he should put together, and what were the

things he should assign as due to each?

E. No, he could not.

A. You will not deny, will you, that the man who

sees these things sees them wisely?

E.-No.

A. Well, does not the man who lives prudently

choose the incorrupt, and judge that it should be

preferred to corruption?

E.-Clearly.

A Then I suppose it cannot be denied that he

chooses wisely, when he chooses to turn his soul

to what no one doubts ought to be chosen?

. I certainly should not deny it.

A. So when he turns his soul to a wise choice, he

does so wisely.

. Most certainly.

A. -And the man who is deterred by no threat or

penalty from that which he chooses wisely, and to

which he is wise in turning, undoubtedly acts

wisely.

E. Beyond any doubt.

no ST. AUGUSTINE

A. So it is quite clear that those principles and
illuminations, as we have called them, in which the
virtues appear, concern wisdom. The more a man
uses them in living his life, and the more he passes
his life in conformity with them, the more wisely
he lives and acts. But nothing which is done wisely
can rightly be called distinct from wisdom.
E. Certainly not.

A Therefore the principles of number are true
and unchangeable; their law and truth are, as you
said, present unchangeably and in common to all
who see them. In the same way the principles of
wisdom are true and unchangeable. When I asked
you about a few instances of these, you replied that
they were manifestly true, and you grant that they
are present to the sight of all in common who are
able to behold them. 23

11.30 . I cannot doubt it. But I should very much like
to know whether these two, wisdom and number,
are contained in any one class, because you men-
tioned that they are coupled together in Holy
Scripture. Does one depend on the other, or is
one included in the other; does number, for ex-
ample, depend on wisdom, or is it included in wis-
dom? I should not dare to say that wisdom
depends on number or is included in number. Be-
cause I know many mathematicians, or account-
ants, or whatever they should be called, who make
wonderfully clever calculations, but very few, if
any, wise men; somehow or other wisdom appears
to me far nobler than number.
A. You speak of something at which I also often

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 1 1 1

wonder. When I meditate on the unchangeable
truth of number, and, so to speak, its home or sanc-
tuary, or whatever word is suitable to describe the
place where number resides, I am carried far away
from the body. 24 Finding, it may be, something
which I can think of, but not finding anything I
can express in words, I return, worn out, to famil-
iar things in order to speak, and I express in ordi-
nary language what lies before my eyes.

The same thing happens to me when I concen-
trate my thoughts with the fullest attention that I
can, on wisdom. I wonder much, since both of
these are established in the most secret and certain
truth, and in view also of the witness of Scripture,
which, as I have mentioned, couples them together,
I wonder very much indeed, as I say, why number
is of little value to most men, while wisdom is
precious to them.

The fact, however, surely is that somehow they
are one and the same thing. Yet, since Sacred
Scripture says about wisdom that she reacheth
from end to end mightily and ordereth all things
sweetly y 23 that power by which she reacheth from
end to end mightily perhaps signifies number, and
that by which she ordereth all things sweetly refers
directly to wisdom, though both belong to one and
the same wisdom.

Wisdom has given numbers to all things, even
the lowest and those ranked least of all; all bodily
things, though they are below everything else, pos-
sess these numbers. But it has not given the power
to be wise to bodily things, nor to all souls, but

ii2 ST. AUGUSTINE

only to rational souls. It is as if it has made its
dwelling among them, so that from there it may set
in order all those things, even the lowest, to which
it has given numbers. Therefore, since we judge
easily about bodily things as things belonging to a
lower rank than ours, and see the numbers im-
pressed on them are lower than we are, 26 for this
reason we hold numbers of little value. But, when
we begin, as it were, to mount upward, we find
that numbers pass beyond our minds and abide un-
changeably in truth itself.

Because few can be wise, while it is granted even
to fools to count, men admire wisdom but despise
number. Learned students, the further they are
removed from the grossness of earth, the more
clearly they see number and wisdom in truth itself,
and hold both precious. Compared with the truth,
not only gold and .silver and the other things for
which men strive, but even they themselves appear
worthless.

32 Number seems of little value to men, and wis-
dom precious, because they can count numbers
more easily than they can acquire wisdom. Do not
be surprised at this, for you see that men regard
gold as more precious than the light of a lamp,
though it is absurd to value gold in comparison.
But they honour more highly a thing much lower
because even a beggar lights his lamp, and only a
few have gold. I do not suggest for a moment that
wisdom is found lower when compared to number,
since it is the same; but it demands an eye capable
of discerning it. 27

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 113

Light and heat are perceived, fused together, so
to speak, from one fire, and cannot be separated
from each other; yet heat is communicated to what
is put near the fire, while light is diffused far and
wide. So too the power of understanding which
wisdom contains, heats what is closer to it, such as
a rational soul, but does not affect what is more
distant, such as bodily things, with the warmth of
wisdom; it only shines on them with the light of
number. Perhaps this is obscure to you, but no
analogy from a visible thing can be made applicable
in every respect to what is invisible.

Only notice this point, which is sufficient for
our problem and is apparent even to more lowly
minds such as our own. Although we cannot be
clear whether number resides in wisdom or is de-
rived from wisdom, or whether wisdom itself is
derived from number or resides in number, or
whether both terms can be shown to refer to the
same thing, yet it is certainly plain that both are
true, and true unchangeably.

12.33 Therefore you would by no means deny that
there exists unchangeable truth, containing all
those things which are unchangeably true. You
could not call this yours or mine or any man's, but
it is present and off ers itself in common to all who
behold unchangeable truths, like a light which in
a wonderful fashion is both secret and public. No
one could say that anything which is present in
common to all who have reason and understanding
belongs to the nature of one individual.

You remember, I think, our discussion a little

ii4 ST. AUGUSTINE

while ago about the bodily senses. 28 We decided
that the common objects of the sense of sight or of
hearing colours and sounds, for instance, which
you and I both see at the same time do not share
the nature of our eyes or ears, but are common
objects of perception.

So you would certainly not say that what you
and I perceive in common, each with his own
mind, shares the nature of the mind of either of us.
You could not say that what the eyes of two
people see at the same time is the eyes of either of
them; it is something else to which both of them
direct their sight.
. That is manifestly true.

34 A. Do you think that this truth, about which we
have been talking for such a long time, and in
which, though one, we see so many things, is
higher than our minds, or equal to them, or lower?
If it were lower, we should make judgments about
it, not in accordance with it. We make judgments
about bodily things because they are lower; we
often say not only that such and such is true of
them, but also that it ought to be. Similarly, not
only do we know that our souls are in a particular
state, but often that they ought to be. And in the
same way we judge about bodily things, and say,
It is not so bright as it ought to be,' or 'not so
square/ and so on; and of souls, c lt is not so ready
as it ought to be/ or 'not so gentle/ or 'not so vig-
orous/ according to the nature of our character.
In making these judgments we follow the prin-
ciples of truth within us, which we see in common.

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 115

No one ever makes these the object of a judgment.
When a man says that the eternal is superior to the
temporal, or that seven and three are ten, no one
asserts that it ought to be so, but, knowing it is so,
we rejoice to make the discovery without scrut-
inising and trying to correct it.

If this truth were on an equality with our minds,
it would itself be subject to change. Sometimes
our minds see it more clearly, sometimes less
clearly, and as a result they admit themselves to be
subject to change. The truth, however, abiding
in itself, gains nothing when we see it more clearly,
and loses nothing when we see it less clearly, but,
whole and sound, it gladdens with its light those
who are turned towards it, and punishes with
blindness those who are turned away from it.
Again, we judge about our own minds according
to the truth, though we can by no means judge
about the truth itself. We say, 'our mind under-
stands less than it ought,' or, 'it understands as
much as it ought.' But the mind ought to under-
stand more in proportion as it approaches, and
clings to, the unchangeable truth. Hence if the
truth is neither inferior to nor equal to our minds,
it can only be higher and more noble.
13.35 I had promised, you may remember, to show
you something higher than our mind and reason.
This thing is truth itself. Embrace it if you can,
and enjoy it; and delight in the Lord, and He 'will
give thee the requests of thy heart What more
do you ask than to be happy? What is happier

n 6 ST. AUGUSTINE

than the man who enjoys the firm, unchangeable,
most excellent truth?

Men declare they are happy when they embrace
the fair bodies, ardently desired, of wives and even
of harlots, and can we doubt of our happiness in
the embrace of truth? Men declare they are happy
when with parched throats they reach an abundant
and healthful spring of water, or when they are
hungry and discover a dinner or supper, richly
furnished. Shall we deny our happiness when we
are given the food and drink of truth? We often
hear men declare they are happy if they lie amid
roses and other flowers, or enjoy the sweet smell of
ointments. What is more fragrant, what more
delightful, than the inspiration of truth? Do we
hesitate to call ourselves happy, when so inspired?
Many place their lives' happiness in song, in the
music of lyre and flute: when these are missing,
they count themselves wretched; when these are
present, they are transported with joy. When the
truth, tuneful and eloquent in its silence, falls noise-
lessly, as it were, upon our minds, shall we seek
elsewhere for a happy life, and not enjoy that
which is so sure and so near at hand? Men take
delight in gleaming gold and silver, in glittering
gems and colours, in the light itself which our eyes
perceive in fire upon the earth, or in the stars, the
moon, or the sun; men take delight in the splendour
and graciousness of these things. When neither
poverty nor trouble keeps them from such enjoy-
ment, they count themselves happy and for these

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 1 1 7

things they wish to live forever. Are we afraid to
set the happiness of life in the light of truth?

36 Since the supreme good is known and grasped
in the truth, and since that truth is wisdom, let us
see in wisdom the supreme good, and grasp and
enjoy it. The man who enjoys the supreme good
is indeed happy.

The truth shows men all the things which are
truly good, and each man, understanding these
according to his capacity, chooses for his enjoy-
ment one or several of them. Among those who
choose an object to look at in the light of the sun
and who take pleasure in the sight, some may pos-
sess strong, healthy, vigorous eyes, and these men
are perfectly ready to gaze at the sun itself, which
also illuminates other objects in which weaker eyes
take pleasure. So too a strong, vigorous, mental
gaze, when it sees with certainty many unchange-
able truths, turns to the truth itself in which all
things are shown; to this it clings as though forget-
ful of all else, and in it enjoys all things together.
For whatever is delightful in other truths, owes its
delightfulness to the truth itself. 30

37 Our freedom consists in submission to the truth,
and it is our God Himself who frees us from death,
that is, from the state of sin. For truth itself,
speaking as a man with men, says to those who
believe in Him: // you continue in my word, you
shall be my disciples, indeed, and you shall know
the truth, and the truth shall make you free.** The
soul enjoys nothing with freedom unless it enjoys
it securely.

n8 ST. AUGUSTINE

14 No one, however, possesses securely those

goods, which he can lose against his will. But no
one loses truth and wisdom against his will, for no
one can be separated from them physically. That
which we call separation from truth and wisdom
is a perverted will, which loves lower things. No
one wishes for something against his will.

We have, therefore, in the truth a possession
which we can all enjoy equally and in common;
there is nothing wanting or defective in it. It re-
ceives all its lovers without stirring their envy; it
welcomes all, and is chaste with each. One man
does not say to another: go back and let me come;
take away your hands and let me embrace it. All
cling to it; all touch it at the same time. It is a food
which is never divided; you drink nothing from it
which I cannot drink. When you share in it, you
make nothing your private possession; what you
take from it still remains whole for me too. I do
not wait until you surrender the inspiration it gives
you before I can be inspired; no one ever takes any
part of it for his private use, but it is wholly com-
mon to all at the same time. 32

38 Therefore what we touch, or taste, or smell, are
less like the truth than what we hear and see.
Every word is heard wholly by all who hear it,
and wholly by each at the same time, and every
sight presented to the eyes is seen as much by one
man as by another at the same time. But the like-
ness is a very distant one. No voice sounds wholly
at the same time, since its sound is lengthened out
and protracted, and some comes earlier, some later.

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 119

Every sight off ered swells, as it were, over space,
and is not wholly everywhere. Certainly all those
things are taken away from us against our will, and
there are obstacles which prevent us from being
able to enjoy them.

For instance, even if the music of a singer could
last forever, his admirers would struggle and vie
with each other to hear him; they would crowd
each other, and the more numerous they were,
they would fight for seats, each one anxious to get
nearer to the singer. They would retain nothing
lastingly which they heard, and sounds would only
touch them and die away. If I wished to look at
the sun, and could continue to do so, it would leave
me when it sets, and so too a cloud would veil it
from my sight; and there are many other obstacles
through which I should lose the pleasure of this
sight against my will. And, granted I could see
forever the beauty of light and hear forever the
beauty of sound: what great thing would it be to
me, since I should share it in common with the
beasts?

But no thronging crowd of hearers keeps others
from approaching the beauty of truth and wisdom,
provided only there is a constant will to enjoy
them. Their beauty does not pass with time, nor
move from place to place. Night does not inter-
rupt it, nor darkness hide it, and it is not subject to
bodily sense. It is close to all its lovers throughout
the world who turn towards it, and for all it is
everlasting. It is in no place, yet nowhere is it
absent; from without it admonishes us, within it

i2o ST. AUGUSTINE

instructs us. It changes all its beholders for the
better; it is itself never changed for the worse. No
one is its judge; without it no one judges rightly.

Clearly, therefore, and undoubtedly it is more
excellent than our minds, for it is one, and yet
makes each separate mind wise and the judge of
other things, never of the truth.

15.39 If I showed there was something above our
minds, you admitted you would confess it to be
God, provided there was nothing else higher. I
accepted your admission, and said it was enough
that I should show T this. For if there is anything
more excellent, it is this which is God, but, if there
is nothing more excellent, then truth itself is God.
Whichever is the fact, you cannot deny that God
exists, and this was the question we set ourselves to
debate. 33

If you are influenced by what we have received
on faith through the most holy teaching of Christ,
namely, that there is a Father of Wisdom, remem-
ber that we have also received this on faith that
Wisdom, begotten of the eternal Father, is His
equal. We must ask no further questions about
this, but hold it firmly by faith.

God exists, and He exists truly and supremely.
We not only hold this, I think, by our faith as cer-
tain, but we also attain to it by a sure, though very
feeble, kind of knowledge. This suffices for the
question we have undertaken, and enables us to
explain the other matters connected with it. Or
have you any objections to raise?
. I accept this with a joy past belief, which I

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 121

cannot express to you in words. I declare it to be
most certain. My inner voice declares this, and I
desire to be heard by the truth itself, and to cling
to it. This I grant to be not only good, but the
supreme good, and the source of happiness.

EVERY PERFECTION COMES FROM GOD

40 A. Quite right. I too rejoice greatly. But, I ask
you, are we already wise and happy, or are we still
on the way towards this?

E.l think rather we are on our way towards it.
A How then do you understand those things
which you declare that you rejoice in as true and
certain? You grant that wisdom consists in under-
standing them. Can a foolish man know wisdom?
. He cannot, so long as he is foolish.
A .Then you must be already wise, or you do not
yet know wisdom.

E. I am certainly not already wise, yet I should
say I was not foolish, so far as I know wisdom. I
cannot deny that what I know is certain, and that
wisdom consists in this knowledge.
A. Tell me, please: will you not admit that the
man who is not just is unjust, and the man who is
not prudent is imprudent, and the man who is not
temperate is intemperate? Can there be any doubt
about this?

E.l admit that when a man is not just, he is un-
just, and I should make the same answer about the
prudent and the temperate man.

122 ST. AUGUSTINE

A. Why, then, is a man not foolish when he is not
wise?

E. I admit this too, that when a man is not wise,
he is foolish.

A. Now, which of these are you?
. Whichever you call me, I do not dare to say I
am yet wise. From what I have admitted, I see I
must draw the conclusion that I should not hesi-
tate to say I am foolish.

A. Therefore a foolish man knows wisdom. As
we have said, he would not be sure that he wished
to be wise, and that this was his duty, unless the
idea of wisdom was established in his mind. It is
thus that you have in your mind the ideas of those
things about which you answered each of my ques-
tions, the things in which wisdom consists, and in
the knowledge of which you rejoiced.
E. What you say is true.

16.41 A. What else, then, do we do when we endeavour
to be wise, but concentrate, as it were, our whole
soul with all the energy we can upon the object we
reach with our mind, and set our soul there, and fix
it firmly? We do this that the soul may not now
rejoice in its own individual self which has en-
tangled it in passing interests, but that, setting aside
all inclination to things of time and space, it may
grasp that which is always one and the same. Just
as the whole life of the body is the soul, so the
happy life of the soul is God. While we are en-
gaged in this work, and before we have finished it,
we are on the way.
We are allowed to rejoice in those true and cer-

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 123

tain goods, which gleam even in the darkness of
our present path. Is not this what Scripture tells
us about the conduct of Wisdom towards its
lovers, when they come and seek for it: she shall
show herself to them cheerfully in the ways and
shall meet them with all providence? 34 Wherever
you turn she speaks to you by means of the traces
she has left on her works, and calls you back
within, when you are slipping away into outward
things, through the very forms of these outward
things. She does this so that you may see that
whatever bodily thing delights you and attracts the
bodily senses, is subject to number, and that you
may ask whence it comes, and may return to your-
self, and understand that you could not approve or
disapprove what you perceive with the bodily
senses, unless you possessed within yourself certain
laws of beauty to which you refer all the beautiful
things you perceive outside. 35

42 Look at the sky and the earth and the sea, and
whatever shines brightly above or creeps below or
flies or swims. They have forms because they
have numbers. Take these away, and nothing will
be left. What is their source, but the source of
number? For, so far as they have being, they
have numbered being.

Artists, in whatever bodily forms they work,
have in their art numbers to which they adapt their
work. They move their hands and tools in their
art until that which is formed externally, conform-
ing to the inward light of number, is perfected so
far as possible, and, after being expressed by the

4 ST. AUGUSTINE

senses, pleases the inner judge who gazes upwards
upon number. Ask, then, who moves the limbs of
the artist himself. It is number, for they too are
moved according to number. If you take away
the work from his hands and take from his mind
the intention of exercising his art, and if you say
that pleasure moves his limbs, it will be a dance.
Ask what is pleasant in dancing, and number will
answer, It is I.

Look at the beauty of a graceful body: numbers
are held in place. Look at the beauty of bodily
movement; numbers alter in time. Go to the art
from which they come, search in it for time and
place; there is no time, no place. Yet number lives
in it. Number has no position in space nor dura-
tion in time. When those who wish to become
artists set themselves to learn their art, they move
their bodies in space and time, and their souls in
time; with the passage of time they become more
skilful.

Then pass beyond the soul of the artist, to see
everlasting number. Wisdom will now shine from
its inner dwelling, and from the very sanctuary of
truth. If your sight is still too weak and is re-
pelled, turn your mind's eye to that path where
she showed herself cheerfully. But remember that
you have put off the vision, to return to it when
your strength is greater,

43 Alas for those who abandon you as leader and
who stray in what are but your footprints, who
love the signs which you show but not yourself,
who forget your meaning, O wisdom, most gra-

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 125

cious light of a purified mind! You tell us without
ceasing your name and your greatness. Every ex-
cellence in a creature reveals you. By the very
beauty of his work the artist, as it were, suggests
to its admirer not to be wholly absorbed in it, but
so to glance at the work produced that he may re-
serve his attention for the artist who made it.
Those who love your works instead of yourself
are like those who hear a wise and eloquent
speaker, who listens too eagerly to the pleasant
voice and the carefully uttered syllables, but lose
that which matters most, the meaning of the
speaker, whose words are spoken only as signs.

Woe to those who turn away from your light,
and love to linger in their darkness! It is as if they
turned their backs upon you, they are held fast in
the shadow cast on them by their works of the
flesh, and yet what delights them even there they
still receive from the brightness shed by your light.
But love of the shadow makes the soul's eye too
lazy and weak to endure your sight. Then a man
is wrapped more and more in darkness, while
he is inclined to seek \vhatever his weakness can
endure more easily. Gradually he is unable to see
what is supreme, and to think evil whatever de-
ceives his blindness or attracts his poverty, 36 or
pains him when held captive. In this he suffers the
punishment of his defection, and what is just can-
not be evil.

44 You cannot grasp with bodily sense or attention
of the soul any changeable thing you see which is
not possessed by some form of number: take this

126 ST. AUGUSTINE

away, and it falls back to nothing. Therefore
have no doubt that there is some eternal and un-
changeable form, in order that changeable things
may not cease, but, with measured movement and
distinct and varied forms, may pass through their
temporal course. 37 This eternal form is neither
contained, nor, as it were, spread in space, nor pro-
longed nor altered in time; it enables those other
things to receive their forms, and according to
their nature to realise and use the numbers proper
to place and time.

17.45 Every changeable thing must necessarily be able
to realise its form. Just as we call what can change
changeable, so I should call what can receive its
form 'formable.' Nothing can give its form to
itself, since nothing can give itself what it does not
possess, and indeed a thing is given its form, that it
may possess its form. Hence, if anything possesses
a form, there is no need for it to receive what it
possesses, but, if it does not possess a form, it can-
not receive from itself what it does not possess.
Nothing, then, as we have said, can give itself a
form. What more can we say about the change-
able character of body and soul? We said enough
earlier on. So we conclude that body and soul are
given their forms by a form which is unchange-
able and everlasting. To this form it was said:
Thou shah change them, and they shall be
changed. But thou an always the selfsame, and
thy years shall not fail. 38 By years which shall not
fail the inspired writer means eternity. It is also

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 127

said of this form that remaining in herself the same,
she reneweth all things

From this, too, we understand that all things are
ruled by providence. If everything which exists
would become nothing, were the form wholly
withdrawn, the unchangeable form itself is their
providence. For it makes all changeable things
subsist, and realise themselves and act through the
numbers proper to their forms. They would not
be, if it were not present. Every man advancing
on the way to wisdom, perceives, when he atten-
tively reflects on the whole of creation, that wis-
dom shows herself to him cheerfully on his way,
and comes to meet him in every act of providence.
He becomes the more eager to finish his journey,
as the journey becomes more delightful through
that wisdom, which he ardently longs to reach.
46 If, besides that which exists and does not live,
and that which exists and lives but does not under-
stand, and that which exists and lives and under-
stands, you find some other kind of creature, only
then may you say there is something good, which
does not come from God.

These three kinds of thing can be expressed by
two words, by calling them body and life. For
that life which is only life and has no understand-
ingof animals, for example and that life which
has understandingsuch as that of men are both
rightly called life. But these two kinds of thing,
that is, body and life, when regarded as creatures
(the Creator Himself has life, and this is supreme
life) these two created things, body and life, be-

iz8 ST. AUGUSTINE

cause, as we explained above, they are able to re-
ceive forms and because they fall to nothing if the
form is altogether lost, show well enough that they
derive their existence from that form which is al-
ways the same.

Therefore all good things, great or small, can
only come from God. What is greater among
creatures than the life which has understanding,
and what can be less than body? However defec-
tive they may become, and however near they may
approach towards non-existence, some form al-
ways remains if they are to exist at all But what-
ever form remains to a thing which is defective,
comes from that form which can have no defect,
and which does not allow even the movements of
things, whether the things are growing worse or
better, to escape the law of their numbers. Hence
whatever we observe in the nature of things to be
worthy of praise, whether we judge it worthy of
little or great praise, should be referred to the most
excellent, unutterable praise of its Creator. Have
you any objection to this?

FREE WILL IS GOOD

18.47 . I confess I am sufficiently convinced. There
is evidence, so far as is possible in this life and for
beings such as ourselves, that God exists and that
all good things come from God. Everything
which exists comes from God, whether it has
understanding and life and existence, or whether

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 129

it has only life and existence, or whether it only
has existence.

Now let us turn to the third question, whether
it can be shown that free will is to be counted
among good things. If this is proved, I shall not
hesitate to grant that God has given it to us and
that it ought to have been given.
-4- You have remembered correctly what we pro-
posed to discuss, and have been quick to notice that
the second question has already been settled. But
you should have seen that the third is also solved.

You said you thought free choice of will ought
not to have been given, because by it we sin.
Against your view I argued 40 that we could not
act rightly except by this free choice of will, 41 and
I claimed that God had given it rather for this pur-
pose. You replied that free will ought to have
been given us in the same way that justice has been
given, for we can only use justice for its right pur-
pose. This reply of yours forced us into that com-
plicated discussion in which I tried to prove to you
that good things, great and small, only come from
God. This could not be shown so clearly, unless
we first refuted the wicked opinion of the fool
who said in his heart, There is no God. 42 We
argued on so great a matter according to our poor
ability, but God Himself helped us over the dan-
gerous passage.

These two propositions, that God exists and that
all good things come from Him, we already held
with firm faith, but we have examined them so
carefully that the third point also becomes most

130 ST. AUGUSTINE

clear, that free will is to be counted among good
things.

48 In a former discussion we decided it was plain
that the body is a lower kind of thing than the soul,
and therefore that the soul is a greater good than
the body. If, then, we find among bodily goods
some which man can use wrongly, yet if we do not
say for this reason that they ought not to have been
given us, because we agree that they are good, it
will not be surprising if there are also goods in the
soul which we can use wrongly, but which, being
good, cannot have been given except by the source
of all good.

You see how much good the body lacks when it
has no hands; nevertheless a man uses his hands
wrongly if he does cruel or shameful acts with
them. If you saw someone without feet, you
would agree that an important good was lacking to
bodily perfection, and yet you would not deny
that a man used his feet wrongly if he used them to
harm someone or to dishonour himself. We see
the light with our eyes, and with them we distin-
guish bodily forms. This is the element of great-
est beauty in the body, and hence the eyes are
given the highest position, the position of honour,
and their use serves to guard the health and to assist
life in many other ways. Yet men often act shame-
fully through their eyes and make their eyes min-
ister to their lust. You see what good the face
lacks without the eyes, but when we possess them,
who else gave them than God, the giver of all good
things?

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 131

You value these bodily organs, and, disregarding
those who use them wrongly, you praise Him who
has given as such good things. So too free will,
without which no one can live rightly, must be a
God-given good, and you must admit rather that
those who use this good wrongly are to be con-
demned than that He who gave it ought not to
have given it.

49 E. First, I should like you to prove to me that free
will is a good, and then I should grant that God
gave it us, because I agree that all good things come
from God.

A. Did I not prove this to you with much labour
in our first discussion, when you agreed that all
beauty and every bodily form are derived from
the form which is supreme over all things, that is,
the truth, and when you agreed they are good?
Truth itself says in the Gospel that our very hairs
are numbered. 43 Have you forgotten what we said
about the supremacy of number and about its
power extending from end to end? It would be
sheer folly to count as good our hairs, which are
least in size and importance, and not to trace them
to their cause. God is the source of all good
things; the greatest and the least good things come
from Him, from whom comes every good thing.
It would be sheer folly in view of this to hesitate
about free will, without which even those who live
the worst lives grant that it is impossible to live
rightly.

Now answer, please, which you think is the bet-

132 ST. AUGUSTINE

ter in us, that thing without which we can, or that
thing without which we cannot, live rightly.
. Please forgive me; I am ashamed of my blind-
ness. As everyone knows, that without which
there is no good life is far nobler.
A. Will you deny that a one-eyed man can live
rightly?

jE.I am not so utterly mad.
A. -Since, then, you grant that the eye is a good
to the body, but that its loss does not prevent us
from living rightly, will you not hold that free will
is a good, since without it no one lives rightly?
50 Take justice, which no one uses wrongly. This
is counted among the highest goods proper to man,
and among all the soul's virtues which go to make
up a right and worthy life. No one uses wrongly
either prudence or fortitude or temperance. In all
these, as in justice itself which you mentioned,
right reason reigns, without which no virtues can
exist. And no one can use right reason wrongly.
19 These are great goods, but you ought to remem-

ber that, not to speak of great goods, not even the
least can exist except as coming from Him from
whom comes all good, that is, from God. That
was the conclusion of our earlier discussion, and
you willingly agreed many times.

The virtues, then, by which we live rightly, are
great goods, but all kinds of bodily beauty, with-
out which we can live rightly, are the least goods.
The powers of the soul, without which we cannot
live rightly, are the middle goods. No one uses
the virtues wrongly, but anyone can use the other

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 133

goods, the middle and the least, wrongly as well as
rightly. No one uses virtue wrongly, because the
work of virtue is the good use of those things
which we are capable of using wrongly. No one
makes a bad use when he makes a good use. Hence
the magnificent abundance of God's goodness has
furnished us not only with great goods, but also
with the middle and the least. His goodness
should be praised more highly for great than for
middle goods, more for middle than for least, but
for all more than if He had not given all.
5 1 . I agree. But, since we are discussing free will,
and since we see that it uses other things either
rightly or wrongly, I am puzzled by the question,
how free will is to be counted among those things
which we use.

A In the same way that we know by reason all
those things of which we have exact knowledge, 44
and yet reason itself is counted among the things
we know by reason. Have you forgotten that
when we inquired what is known by the reason,
you agreed that reason itself is known by reason?
Do not be surprised, therefore, if we use other
things by means of free will, that we can also use
free will itself by means of itself. The will, which
uses other things, in a certain way uses itself, just
as the reason, which knows other things, knows
itself. Memory not only grasps all other things
which we remember, but it also, since we do not
forget that we have a memory, in a certain way
retains itself within us; it remembers not only other

134 ST. AUGUSTINE

things, but also itself, or rather through memory
we remember other things, and also memory itself.
52 So, when the will, which is a middle good, clings
to the unchangeable good, not as a private posses-
sion but as common to allin the same way as the
truth, about which we have said much, however
inadequately then man possesses the happy life.
This happy life itself, which consists in the dispo-
sition of the soul when it clings to the unchange-
able good, is the proper and principal good for
man. In this He all the virtues which no one can
use wrongly. We understand sufficiently that,
though these are important and principal goods in
man, they are not held in common, but individ-
ually, by every man.

It is through clinging to truth and wisdom,
which is common to all, that all become wise and
happy. One man does not become happy through
the happiness of another man. When one man
imitates another in order to become happy, he
seeks to become happy by the same means by
which he sees the other has become happy, that is,
by means of the unchangeable truth which is com-
mon to all

Nor is one man prudent through another's pru-
dence, nor brave through another's bravery, nor
temperate through another's temperance, nor is a
man made just through another's justice. But he
becomes such by conforming his soul to the un-
changeable principles and illuminations of the vir-
tues, 45 which have incorruptible life in truth itself
and wisdom which is common to all. The model

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 135

this man has set up for himself, is endowed with
these virtues, and he has conformed and attached
his soul to their principles.

53 The will, then, if it clings to the unchangeable
good which is common to all, obtains the principal
and important human goods, though the will itself
is a middle good. But the will sins, if it turns away
from the unchangeable good which is common to
all, and turns towards a private good, whether out-
side or below it. It turns towards a private good
when it wishes to be its own master outside, when
it is anxious to know the private affairs of someone
else, or whatever is not its own concern, and below
it, when it loves bodily pleasure. Thus a man who
becomes proud, curious, and self-indulgent, is
caught up in another life, which compared to the
higher life is death. This life, however, is under
the rule of Divine Providence, which puts every-
thing in its proper place and assigns to everyone
his due.

So it comes about that those goods which are
sought by sinners are by no means evil, nor is free
will evil, which we have found must be counted
among certain middle goods. Evil is the turning
of the will away from the unchangeable good, and
towards changeable good. Since this turning from
one to the other is free and unforced, the pain
which follows as a punishment is fitting and just.

136 ST. AUGUSTINE

THE CAUSE OF SIN IS NOT POSITIVE BUT
NEGATIVE

20.54 Perhaps you will ask, since the will moves when
it turns from the unchangeable to the changeable
good, how this movement arises. The movement
is certainly evil, though free will must be counted
as a good, since without it we cannot live rightly.
The movement, the turning away of the will from
Lord God, is undoubtedly a sin but surely we
cannot call God the cause of sin? This movement
cannot therefore come from God. What, then, is
its source?

When you ask this question, if I answer that I
do not know, you will perhaps be disappointed,
but yet I shall be answering truly. For that which
is nothing cannot be known. Only keep firm your
sense of reverence towards God, so that no good
may occur either to your senses, your intelligence,
or your thoughts in any way, which you do not
acknowledge to be from God. Nothing of any
kind is to be found which does not come from
God. 46 Recognise God at once as author of every-
thing in which you see measure, number, and
order. If you take these entirely away, nothing
whatever will be left. You may say there remains
some incipient form, where you find neither meas-
ure nor number nor order. But, since, when these
are present, the form is perfect, you must not
speak even of an incipient form: it seems to stand
only as material to be perfected by the artist. For,
if the perfection of the form is a good, the begin-

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK Two 137

ning of the form must already be a good. When
all good is completely taken away, there will re-
main not even a trace absolutely nothing. 47 All
good is from God; therefore no kind of thing exists
which is not from God. Hence that movement of
turning away, which we agree to be sin, is a defec-
tive movement, and a defect comes from nothing.
Notice, then, what is its source and be sure it does
not come from God.

Yet, since the defect lies in the will, it is under
our control. If you fear it, you must simply not
desire it; if you do not desire it, it will not occur. 48
What greater security can you have than to live
that life in which nothing you do not desire can
happen to you? But, though man fell through his
own will, he cannot rise through his own will.
Therefore let us believe firmly that God's right
hand, that is, Our Lord Jesus Christ, is extended
out to us from on high; 49 let us await this help with
sure hope, and let us desire it with ardent charity.

If you still think any further question should be
asked about the source of sin I myself think there
is no need at all if you really think there is, we
must put off the discussion to another time.
E.I quite agree with your wish to put off the
further problems to another time. I should not
admit your view that the question is finished.

BOOK THREE
THE CAUSE OF SIN LIES IN THE WILL

l.i E.It is fairly clear to me that free will must be
counted among goods, and not among the least of
them, and therefore we are bound to agree that
God gave it, and that it was rightly given. If you
think this is a convenient time, I should like you to
tell me what is the cause of that movement by
which this will turns away from the unchangeable
good which is common to all, and turns towards
private goods, whether belonging to others or be-
low it, indeed to all changeable goods. 1
A. What need is there to know this?
E. Because, if the will which we are given, of its
very nature moves as it does, it cannot help turning
in this direction. There cannot be any fault, if
nature and necessity compel it.
A. Do you like this movement, or dislike it?
. I dislike it.
A. Then you blame it.
. Yes, I blame it.

A. So you blame an inculpable movement of the
soul.

. I do not blame an inculpable movement of the
soul. I do not know whether there is any fault
when it leaves the unchangeable good, and turns
to changeable goods.
A. Then you blame what you do not know.

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 139

Do not quibble about a phrase. Though I
said: I do not know whether there is any fault/
yet I really meant that undoubtedly there is a fault.
By my way of saying it I ridiculed any doubt about
a matter so clear. 2

A .You see what a certain truth it is, since it
makes you forget so quickly what you just said. If
that movement is due to nature or necessity, it can-
not deserve any blame whatever; but you hold so
firmly that it does deserve blame, that you think
doubt is absurd about a matter so clear. Why then
do you think you ought to assert, even perhaps
with some doubt, what you yourself demonstrate
to be plainly false? You said: c lf the free will
we are given of its very nature moves as it does, it
cannot help turning in this direction. There can-
not be any fault if nature and necessity compel it.'
You should have known for certain that the move-
ment is not due to the will's nature, since you are
certain it deserves blame.

E. I said that the movement deserved blame, and
therefore that I disliked it, and I have no doubt it
ought to be blamed. But I deny that the soul de-
serves blame, when this movement draws it from
the unchangeable good to changeable goods, if its
nature is such that the movement is necessary.
A.- Whose is that movement, which you agree is
certainly worthy of blame?

E.l see it is in the soul, 3 but I do not know whose
it is.

A. Do you deny that the soul moves with that
movement?

140 ST. AUGUSTINE

E.-No.

A. Then do you deny that a movement by which
a stone moves is a movement of the stone? I am
not speaking of the movement by which we move
it, or by which any other force moves it, as for
instance if it is thrown up in the air, but I am
speaking of the movement by which of its own
accord it falls back on the ground.
E I do not deny that the movement by which, as
you say, it turns and comes down to the ground
again is a movement of the stone, but I say it is due
to its nature. If the soul has the same kind of
movement, it is certainly natural, and it cannot
rightly be blamed for a natural movement. Even
if the movement leads to its destruction, this is
forced by necessity of nature. Thus, since we do
not hesitate to call this movement culpable, we
must absolutely deny that it is natural. Therefore
it is not like the natural movement by which the
stone moves.

A. Have we established anything in our two
earlier discussions?
E. Certainly, we have.

A. I think you remember we were fairly satisfied
in the first discussion that the mind becomes the
slave of passion only through its own will. 4 It can-
not be forced to a shameful act by anything above
it, nor by anything equal, for this would be unjust,
nor by anything below it, for this would be im-
possible. The movement, therefore, must be due
to itself, by which it turns its will to enjoyment of
the creature from enjoyment of the Creator. If

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 141

this movement is called culpableand to doubt this
is, in your opinion, absurdit is certainly not nat-
ural, but voluntary. In one respect it is like the
movement by which the stone comes down to the
ground again, because, as the one belongs to
the stone, so the other belongs to the soul; but in
another respect it is unlike, because the stone is not
able to check the movement by which it comes
down, whereas the soul does not move against its
will to leave the higher and choose the lower. 5
Hence the movement is natural to the stone, but
voluntary to the soul

Consequently if anyone says the stone sins be-
cause it falls down through its own weight, he is
not perhaps more stupid than the stone but he is
certainly considered mad. But we convict the
soul of sin, when we prove that it abandons what
is higher and prefers the enjoyment of what is
lower.

So what need is there to ask the source of that
movement by which the will turns from the un-
changeable good to the changeable good? We
agree that it belongs only to the soul, and is volun-
tary and therefore culpable; and the whole value
of teaching in this matter consists in its power to
make us censure and check this movement, and
turn our wills away from temporal things below
us to enjoyment of the everlasting good. 6
; E.I see; I almost feel and grasp the truth of what
you say. I am aware of nothing more surely and
deeply than that I have a will, and by it move to
enjoy something. Indeed I do not know what I

ST. AUGUSTINE

can call my own, if the will is not mine by which
I assert myself for or against something. So, if I
do wrong through my will, who is responsible
except myself? Since a good God has made me,
and I cannot do any good action except by my
will, it is fairly clear that it was given for this pur-
pose by the good God.

If the movement by which the will turns in dif-
ferent directions were not voluntary and under our
control, a man would not deserve praise or blame,
when he, as it were, turns the hinge of his will up
or down. 7 Nor would, it be at all necessary to
warn him to leave temporal and gain eternal good,
or to try to live well and not ill. Yet whoever
thinks that such advice should not be given to men,
ought to be banished from among men.

GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE

2.4 This being so, I am troubled exceedingly by the
question how God can have foreknowledge of all
future events, and yet how there can be no neces-
sity for us to sin. If anyone says an event can
happen contrary to God's foreknowledge, he is
attempting to destroy the foreknowledge of God,
and this is most inane and blasphemous.

Hence, if God foreknew that the first man
would sin and this must be granted by anyone
who agrees with me that God has foreknowledge
of all future events if, therefore, this is so, I do
not say that God should not have created him, for
He created him good, nor that his sin could in any

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 143

way be prejudicial to God, seeing that He created
him good. No, in creating him God showed His
goodness, and in punishing him He showed His
justice, and in saving him He showed His mercy.
So I do not say God should not have created him,
but I say this: since God had foreknowledge that
he would sin, it must have happened of necessity,
because God foreknew it would happen. How,
then, is the will free, when the necessity seems so
inescapable?

A. You have knocked vigorously. I hope God
in His mercy will come to the door and open it as
we stand knocking. 8 I think, however, that the
greater part of mankind is troubled by this ques-
tion only because they do not inquire in the right
spirit, and are quicker to excuse their sins than to
confess them.

Some 9 are glad to suppose that no divine prov-
idence presides over human affairs, and, abandon-
ing soul and body to mere chance, they deliver
themselves to be buffeted and torn by passions.
They deny divine justice and cheat the justice of
man; they think they can get rid of their accusers
through the help of Fortune. Yet they are accus-
tomed to mould or paint Fortune as blind, so that
they may be superior to her whom they believe is
their ruler, or may admit that these words and feel-
ings of theirs are equally blind. We can agree
without absurdity that all their actions fall out by
chance, since each is indeed a fall. However, I
think we argued sufficiently in our second discus-
sion against this foolish and unbalanced error. 10

144 ST. AUGUSTINE

Others, on the other hand, while not daring to
deny that God's providence governs men's lives,
prefer to commit the crime and the blunder of
supposing it is weak or unjust or evil, rather than
humbly to confess their sins.

All these people should let themselves be per-
suaded, when they think of that Being who is most
good, just, and powerful, that the goodness, justice,
and power of God are far greater than anything
they can conceive. They should understand, when
they reflect on themselves, that it would be their
duty to thank God, even if He had willed them to
be a lower kind of being than they are, and they
should cry out from the very depths of their
hearts: I said, O Lord, be Thou merctful to me.
Heal my soul, for I have sinned against Thee.^
Thus they would be led to wisdom by the sure
paths of God's mercy; they would not be puffed
up by success, nor depressed by failure in their
inquiries; knowledge would make them more ca-
pable of seeing, 12 and ignorance more restrained in
the search.

I am sure that you are already persuaded of this;
but notice how easily I answer so profound a prob-
lem, after you have made a few answers to my
questions.

3.6 This is no doubt what puzzles and troubles you,
:he apparent contradiction between saying that
God has foreknowledge of all future events, and
that we sin freely and not of necessity. If God
has foreknowledge that man will sin, then, you say,
man must necessarily sin. But if he must do so,

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 145

his sin is not a result of choice, but is rather a fixed
and inevitable necessity. You fear that the con-
clusion of this reasoning will be either blasphemous
denial of God's foreknowledge of all future events,
or, if this is impossible, admission that we sin of
necessity and not freely. Is there any other point
which troubles you?
. Nothing else at present.
A. So in your opinion everything foreknown by
God comes about of necessity, and not freely.
. I certainly think so.

A Pay attention, then, reflect and tell me, if you
can, what will be your will tomorrow to do
wrong or right?
E.I do not know.

A. But do you think God does not know?
. Certainly not.

A. Then, if He knows what you will will tomor-
row, and foresees what all men will will in the
future, whether they exist now or will exist, far
more does He foresee what He will do to the just
and to the unjust.

E.Of course, if I say God foreknows my actions,
I should say much more confidently that He fore-
knows His own actions, and foresees clearly what
He will do.

/!. Then are you not afraid of the retort that He
too will act of necessity and not freely, if every-
thing that God foreknows happens of necessity
and not freely?

. When I said that everything happened of
necessity which God foreknew, I was referring

146 ST. AUGUSTINE

only to what happens in creation, not to what hap-
pens in God Himself. Things do not happen in
God, but have eternal being.
A So God does nothing in His creation?
E. He has fixed once for all the order of events in
the created universe; He does not make new de-
cisions.

A. Does He not make anyone happy?
. -Certainly He does.

A .Then He is responsible, when the man be-
comes happy.
.-Yes.

A Then, if, for instance, you will be happy a
year from now, He will make you happy a year
hence.
.-Yes.

A So He foreknows now what He will do in a
year,

. He has always foreknown it. Now again I
agree that He foreknows this, if this is what will
happen.

7 A. Tell me, please: are you not His creature, or
will your happiness not occur in you?
E.O{ course I am His creature, and my happiness
will occur in me.

A. Therefore your happiness will occur in you
of necessity and not freely through God's action.
E. His will is my necessity.
A. So you will be happy against your will.
. If it was in my power to be happy, I should be
happy now. I wish to be happy now, and am not,
because it is not I but God who makes me happy.

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 147

A. The voice of truth speaks clearly in what you
say. You could not be aware of anything in our
power, if not of our actions when we will. Noth-
ing is so fully in our power as the will itself, for it
is ready at once and without delay to act as we
will. 13 We can truly say, we grow old 14 of neces-
sity and not of our own will; or, we are ill of
necessity and not of our own will; 15 or, we die of
necessity and not of our own will; and so in other
matters of the sort; but no one would be so mad
as to venture to say, we do not will of our own
will.

Therefore, though God foreknows what we
shall will in the future, this does not imply that we
do not make use of our will. With regard to hap-
piness, you said you do not make yourself happy,
as if I denied it. I say that when you will be
happy, you will be happy through your will and
not against it. Because God foreknows your
future happiness, and because nothing can happen
otherwise than as He has foreknown to deny this
would be to deny His foreknowledge it does not
follow that we must suppose you will not be happy
through your own will. This would be absurd,
and very far from true.

The foreknowledge of God, which is certain
even to-day of your future happiness, does not take
away your will to be happy, when you begin to be
happy. So too, if your will in the future is sinful,
it will not cease to be your will, because God has
foreknown what will happen.
5 I want you to realise how blind we should be if

148 ST. AUGUSTINE

we said: If God has foreknown my future will,
because nothing can happen contrary to His fore-
v knowledge, I must necessarily will what He has
foreknown. But, if this is necessary, I must admit
that I will of necessity, and not through my will.
How utterly foolish this would be! How could
it be true that nothing happens contrary to God's
foreknowledge, if He foreknows that something
will be willed, when nothing will be willed?

I pass over the equally monstrous assertion,
which I attributed just now to the same speaker: I
am bound to will in this way. He assumes neces-
sity, and tries to eliminate will. If he is bound to
will, how can he will, if there is no will?

If, instead of saying this, he says his will itself is
not in his power, because he is bound to will, we
shall confront him with your own words, when I
asked whether you would be happy against your
will. You replied that you would be happy al-
ready, if it were in your power, for you said you
willed it, but could not yet achieve it. I pointed
out that the voice of truth spoke in you, for we
cannot deny that we have the power, unless the
will is absent. But when we will, if the will itself
is absent, we do not will. If it is impossible that
we should not will when we will, the will must be
present when we will. Nothing else is in our
power, if not what is present to us when we will.
Our will would not be a will, if it were not in our
power. Moreover, since it is in our power, it is
free. What is not in our power, or may not be in
our power, is not fre$ to u$ t

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 149

Hence we do not deny that God has fore-
knowledge of all future events, and yet that we
will what we will. Since He has foreknowledge
of our will, that will must exist, of which he has
foreknowledge. It will be a will, because He has
foreknowledge of a will. Nor could it be a will,
if it were not in our power. So He has fore-
knowledge also of our power over it. My power
is not taken away by His foreknowledge, but I
shall have it all the more certainly because He
whose foreknowledge is not mistaken has fore-
known that I shall have it. 16

E.l do not deny any longer that all God has fore-
known comes about necessarily, and that He fore-
that our will remains free and in our power.

TO FORESEE SIN IS NOT TO CAUSE IT

4.9 A What, then, is your difficulty? Have you
forgotten what we decided in our first discussion?
Will you deny that no one compels us to sin, either
above us or below us or equal to us, but that we do
so through our own will?

. I do not venture to deny any of this. Yet, I
admit, I do not yet see how these two, God's fore-
knowledge of our sins and our free will in sinning,
knows our sins, yet at the same time in such a way
do not contradict one another. We must admit
God is just and has foreknowledge. But I should
like to know how it can be just to punish sins
which are bound to occur, or how future events
which He has foreknown, are not bound to occur,

150 ST. AUGUSTINE

or how we can avoid holding the Creator respon-
sible for what is bound to happen in His creature.

10 AOn what grounds do you think our free will
contradicts God's foreknowledge? Because it is
foreknowledge or because it is God's foreknowl-
edge?

. More because it is God's foreknowledge.
A. Is that so? If you foreknew someone would
sin, would he be bound to sin?
E. Yes, he would be bound to sin. I should not
have foreknowledge, unless what I foreknew was
certain.

A. Then it is not because God foreknows it that
what He foreknows is bound to happen, but only
because it is foreknowledge. If what is foreknown
is not certain, there is no foreknowledge.
E. I agree. But what does this imply?
A. It implies, unless I am mistaken, that you
would not necessarily compel a man to sin by
foreknowing his sin. Your foreknowledge would
not be the cause of his sin, though undoubtedly he
would sin; otherwise you would not foreknow
that this would happen. Therefore these two are
not contradictory, your foreknowledge and some-
one else's free act. So too God compels no one to
sin, though He foresees those who will sin by their
own will.

n Why, then, should not one who is just punish
what he does not compel, though he foreknows it?
Wheg^yetrfememSer past events you do not com-
pel them to have happened, and in the same way
God does not compel future events to happen by

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 151

His foreknowledge of them. You remember
actions you have performed, but you have not
done all the actions you remember, and in the same
way God foreknows everything of which He is
the cause, but He is not Himself the cause of
everything He foreknows. He is not the cause of
evil actions, but He is their just avenger.

So you may now understand how justly God
punishes sin, for He does not do what He knows
will happen. If He ought not to punish sinners
because He foresees they will sin, neither ought
He to reward those who act rightly, because
equally He foresees they will act rightly. Let us
then admit that His foreknowledge is such that He
is aware of all future events, and His justice is such
that sin, being voluntarily committed and not
brought about by His foreknowledge, is judged
and punished.

>.i2 Let us turn to the third point you raised, why
we must not hold the Creator responsible for what
happens necessarily in His creation. 17 We should
remember that principle of religion which tells us
clearly that we ought to give thanks to our Cre-
ator. 18 It would be most just to praise His profuse
generosity, even if we had been placed in a lower
rank of creation. Our soul, though corrupted with
sin, is higher and better than if it were changed
into the light seen by our eyes. And yet you see
how greatly souls, even when they have surren-
dered to the bodily senses, praise God for this
glorious light.
Therefore, do not be troubled by the blame

152 ST. AUGUSTINE

accorded to sinful souls, and do not say in your
heart it would have been better had they never
existed. They are blamed in comparison with
themselves, when it is realised what they would be,
if they had chosen not to sin. God, their Creator,
deserves the highest praise that men can render,
not only because He treats them justly when they
sin, but also because He has created them with so
noble a nature that, even when stained with sin,
they are in no way surpassed in dignity by bodily
light, for which He is also justly praised.
1 3 I want you to be careful, too, while perhaps not
going so far as to say that it would have been better
had they not lived, not to say that they ought to
have been made differently. For whatever reason
shows you with truth to be better, be assured that
God has made this, He who is the Creator of all
good things/ 9 It is not good reason but the vice of
envy, if you wish that the lower should not exist,
because you think something higher should be cre-
ated. It is as though, because you saw the heavens,
you wished there should be no earth. This would
be utterly wrong. You would rightly complain, if
you saw the earth had been created and the heavens
left out, because then you might say that it should
have been made in accordance with the idea you
could form of the heavens. Having seen that the
design you wished to produce for the earth has
been carried out, but is called the heavens instead
of the earth, I think that, as you have not been
deprived of something better, you should by no
means feel envious, when a lesser thing is made,
and earth exists.

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 153

Again there is such variety in the different parts
of the earth that we can think of no earthly beauty,
in its full extent, which God the Creator of all has
not produced, From the fairest and richest land
to the most barren and infertile, we pass so grad-
ually from one to another, that none can be called
bad except in comparison with that which is better.
So you climb through all the degrees of excellence,
until you reach the supreme kind of land, yet you
would not wish this to exist alone. 20 Now, what a
difference there is between the earth in all its ex-
panse and heaven! Between them come liquid and
air, and from these four elements are composed all
the many kinds and forms of things, countless to
us, but all numbered by God.

There may be something in nature which your
reason cannot conceive, but it is impossible that a
thing should not exist which you conceive truly.
You cannot conceive anything better in creation,
which has escaped the Creator's thought. The
human soul is by nature in contact with the divine
types on which it depends. When it says, this
would be better than that, it sees this in the type
with which it is in contact, provided it tells the
truth and sees what it says it sees. It should be-
lieve, therefore, that God has done what through
true reason it knows He ought to have done, even
though it does not see this in actual fact. Even
though man could not see the heavens with his
eyes, and yet by true reason concluded that a thing
of this kind ought to have been made, he should
believe this had happened, though he did not see it
with his eyes. He would 'not see in his thoughts

154 ST. AUGUSTINE

that it ought to have been done, unless he saw it in
those types through which all is accomplished.
What does not exist in them, one can no more
truly see in his thoughts than it can have true exist-
ence.

14 It is a common mistake, when something better
is conceived in the mind, not to look for it in the
right place. It is as though a man, grasping with
his reason perfect roundness, should be annoyed
not to find it in a nut, having never seen any round
object except this fruit. In the same way some
people see with perfect truth that a creature is
better if, while possessing free will, it remains al-
ways fixed upon God and never sins; then, reflect-
ing on men's sins, they are grieved, not because
they continue to sin, but because they were cre-
ated. They say: He should have made us such
that we never willed to sin, but always to enjoy
the unchangeable truth.

They should not lament or be angry. God has
not compelled men to sin just because He created
them and gave them the power to choose between
sinning and not sinning. There are angels who
have never sinned and never will sin. If you are
pleased by the creature which perseveres in the will
not to sin, you must not doubt that you are right in
preferring this creature to that which is sinful.
But, just as you prefer it in thought, so God the
Creator has preferred it in His ordering of things.
You must believe that such a being exists on high
in heaven. For if the Creator has shown His good-
ness in creating that being whose future sins He

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 155

foresees, He will certainly have shown His good-
ness in creating a being whom He foreknew would
not sin.

15 A sublime creature such as this has everlasting
happiness, enjoying forever its Creator, and de-
serving this by its constant will to uphold justice.
Then too the sinful creature has its appointed
place, for, though it has lost happiness through its
sin, it has not given up the power to recover hap-
piness. It excels indeed the creature possessed for-
ever by a will to sin; between the latter and that
other which is constant in its will for justice, this
stands in the middle, recovering its position
through the humility of penance.

Such is the generosity of God's goodness that
He has not refrained from creating even that crea-
ture which He foreknew would not only sin, but
remain in the will to sin. 21 As a runaway horse is
better than a stone which does not run away be-
cause it lacks self-movement and sense perception,
so the creature is more excellent which sins by free
will than that which does not sin only because it
has no free will. I should praise wine as a thing
good of its kind, and I should blame a man who
was drunk with this wine, and yet, while praising
the wine through which he was drunk, I should
rank higher the man whom I had blamed and while
he was drunk. So that which has been created a
bodily thing, deserves praise in its proper rank,
while those deserve blame who, through immod-
erate use of it, turn away from the perception of
truth. Yet even these, depraved and drunken, are

156 ST. AUGUSTINE

nobler than this other thing, laudable in its own
rank, greediness for which caused their ruin; but
not owing to their vices, but to the dignity of their
lasting nature.

1 6 Therefore the soul is always superior to the
body, and no sinful soul, whatever its fall, is ever
changed into a body; its nature as a soul is never
entirely taken away, and so it never ceases to be
superior to a body. Among bodies light holds the
first place. Consequently the lowest soul should
be ranked above the highest body, and while it is
possible that some other body ranks higher than
the body united to a soul, no body ranks higher
than the soul itself.

Why, then, should not God be praised, praised
indeed beyond utterance, since He has made souls
which will abide by the laws of justice, and has
made other souls which He has foreseen will sin or
even persevere in sin, for even these latter are bet-
ter than those creatures which cannot sin because
they have no rational and free choice of will?
These latter again are better than the brightest
splendour of any bodily thing whatever, a splen-
dour which some men worship, most erroneously,
as the substance of Almighty God Himself. 22

In the order of bodily creatures, from the choirs
of the stars to the number of our hairs, the beauty
of these good things is so graduated that it would
be foolish to ask why this or that exists. All
things are created in their proper order. How
much more foolish would it be to ask the same
question about a soul, since, in whatever degree its

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 157

beauty is lessened or maimed, without doubt it will
always 23 surpass in dignity any bodily thing!
17 Reason and utility have different standards of
judgment. Reason judges by the light of truth,
and with right judgment it puts the lesser below
the greater. Utility is influenced for the most part
by habitual convenience, and judges that to be
higher which truth proves to be of less value.
Reason ranks the heavenly bodies far above the
earthly bodies. Yet what carnal man would not
prefer that many stars should be lacking in heaven,
rather than that a single bush should be lacking in
his field or a single cow in his herd? Grown-up
people either disregard, or at least patiently await
the correction of, the judgments of children who
prefer the death of anybody and everybody, with
the exception of some few near and dear to them,
to the death of their sparrow; and that all the more
if the person in question frightens them, and a
sparrow is beautiful and sings. So too those who
judge ignorantly, praise God for lesser creatures,
since they appreciate them better with their bodily
senses, and praise Him little, if at all, for higher
and better creatures, or even try to blame Him and
suggest improvements, or believe He is not their
Creator. When men, who with the growth of the
soul have advanced towards wisdom, find this, they
should accustom themselves either to disregard
such judgments altogether, if they cannot correct
them, or to endure them calmly until they can cor-
rect them.
6. 1 8 This being so, we are far from the truth if we

158 ST. AUGUSTIXE

hold the Creator responsible for the sins of the
creature, even though what He foreknows is
bound to happen. You say you do not see how
you can help holding Him responsible for what is
bound to happen in His creature: but I on the
contrary do not find any ground and I assert none
can be found, indeed, none exists for holding Him
responsible for what is bound to happen in His
creature, coming about as it does through a sinful
will.

If anyone should say, I should prefer to have no
existence rather than an unhappy existence, I
answer: That is a lie. You are unhappy now, yet
you do not wish to die, only because you wish to
exist. Though you do not wish to be unhappy,
nevertheless you wish to exist. Be thankful that
you have your wish to exist, in order that you may
be delivered from the existence you have against
your wish. You exist according to your will, and
you exist unhappily against your will. But if you
are ungrateful for being granted your wish to exist,
you are rightly compelled to exist as you do not
wish. Therefore I praise the goodness of the Cre-
ator because you have what you wish, though you
are ungrateful for it; I praise the justice of what He
ordains, in that you endure ungratefully what you
do not wish.

19 If he should say, I do not wish to die because I
prefer to exist unhappily than not to exist at all, but
because I do not wish to be still more unhappy
after death, I reply: If this is unjust, you will not

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 159

be unhappy; but if it is just, let us praise Him by
whose law this will be the case.

If he says: How am I to know that I shall not be
unhappy, if this is unjust, I answer: If you have
power over yourself, either you will not be un-
happy, or you will be unhappy justly, because you
have governed yourself unjustly. Or else, having
the will and not the strength to govern yourself
justly, you are not in your own power, but in that
of no one at all or of someone else. If you are in
no one's power, this is either against your will or ac-
cording to your will; but it cannot be against your
will, unless some force has conquered you, yet no
force can conquer you if you are in no one's
power. And if through your own will you are in
no one's power, again we must conclude that you
are in your own. Thus, either you are unhappy
justly by governing yourself unjustly, or whatever
happens to you is according to your will, and you
have cause to give thanks to the goodness of your
Creator. If you are not in your own power, either
a stronger power or a weaker controls you. If a
weaker, it is your own fault, and your unhappiness
is just, for you could overcome a weaker power if
you wished. If a stronger power controls you and
you are weaker, by no means will you be right in
thinking so rightful a disposition unjust.

Hence it is quite true to say: If this is unjust,
you will not be unhappy; but if it is just, let us
praise Him by whose law this will be the case.
7.20 Let us suppose that he says: I prefer to be un-
happy than not to exist at all, because I already

160 ST. AUGUSTINE

exist. But if I could have been consulted before I
existed, I should have chosen not to exist rather
than to exist unhappily. Now it contributes to my
unhappiness that, although unhappy, I am afraid
of not existing. I am actually not wishing what I
ought to wish, for I ought to wish not to be rather
than to be unhappy. I admit that now I prefer to
be unhappy than not to exist; but the more foolish
this wish is, the more unhappy it is, and the more
unhappy, the more clearly I see I ought not to wish
it. I reply: Be all the more careful not to make a
mistake when you think you see the truth. If you
were happy, you would certainly prefer to exist
rather than not to exist. Now, however, when
you are unhappy, you prefer even to exist unhap-
pily than not to exist at all, while at the same time
not wishing to be unhappy.

So do your best to consider how great a good is
existence, which both the happy and the unhappy
desire. If you consider this carefully, you will
realise that you are unhappy in the degree in which
you fail to approach that which exists supremely,
that you prefer non-existence to unhappy existence
in the degree in which you fail to see that which
exists supremely, and therefore that you wish to
exist in spite of this because you depend upon Him
who supremely is.

21 If, then, you wish to avoid unhappiness, love
within yourself this wish to exist. The more you
wish to exist, the closer you will approach to that
which exists supremely; so give thanks now that
you exist. Granted that you are lower than the

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 161

happy: but you are higher than those things which
do not have even the will to be happy, though
many of these are praised by the unhappy. Every-
thing is rightly praised for the very fact that it
exists, for from the very fact that it exists, it is
good.

The more you love to exist, the more will you
desire eternal life and the more you will wish to
be so disposed that your inclinations be not tem-
poral, be not marked and branded with love for
temporal things. These temporal things have no
existence before they exist, and while they exist
they pass away, and when they have passed away

they will exist no more. When they are still in the

* *

future, they do not yet exist, and when they are
past, they are now no more. How then shall we
hold them lastingly, seeing that the beginning of
their existence is their passage into non-existence? 24
But he who loves existence appreciates these things
so far as they exist, and loves that which has eternal
existence. If his love of the former rendered him
unstable, he will be given constancy through his
love of the latter; and if he was weak through the
love of passing things, he will be made strong in
the love of what is lasting. He will stand firm,
and he will gain that very existence which he de-
sired when he feared non-existence, and when he
could not stand firm, being caught in the love of
passing things.

You should, therefore, be very pleased, and by
no means displeased, when you prefer even to be
unhappy than not to be unhappy, because then you

162 ST. AUGUSTINE

would cease to exist. If to this elementary will to
exist little by little you add further existence you
will rise upwards towards that which exists su-
premely, and thus you will check any such fall as
that by which the lowest in the scale of existence
passes into non-existence, carrying with it the
strength of its lover. Hence he who prefers not to
exist rather than to exist unhappily, since his non-
existence is impossible, must exist unhappily. But
he who has more love for existence than hatred for
unhappiness, should get rid of what he hates by
adding to it what he loves. When he begins to
exist in the perfection of his nature, he will not be
unhappy.

8.22 Notice how absurd and contradictory it is to
say: I should prefer not to exist rather than to exist
unhappily. A man who says, I should prefer this
to that, chooses something. But non-existence is
not something; it is nothing. Therefore you can-
not possibly make a real choice, when there is
nothing for you to choose. You say you wish to
exist, though you are unhappy, but that you ought
not to have this wish. What, then, should you
wish? Rather, you say, non-existence. If this is
what you should wish, it is better; but what does
not exist, cannot be better. Therefore you ought
not to wish it; and the feeling by which you do not
wish it, is truer than the supposition by which you
think you ought to wish it. Moreover, that which
a man chooses rightly as an object of desire, when
attained, must make him better. But he cannot

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 163

become better if he does not exist, so that no one
can be right in choosing non-existence.

Nor should we be troubled by the judgment of
those who through the stress of unhappiness have
killed themselves. Either they have sought to find
refuge where they supposed they would be better
off, and this is not unreasonable, whatever view
they may have held; or if they thought they would
cease to exist altogether, the false choice of people
choosing nothing will concern us much less. How
am I to follow a man who makes a choice, and
when I ask what he chooses replies, nothing? If
he chooses non-existence, he is certainly proved to
choose nothing, even though he be unwilling to
make this answer.

1 3 However, let me try to tell you my view on this
whole matter. No one, when he kills himself or
wishes to die by any other means, really feels, I
think, that he will not exist after death, even
though he may have some kind of opinion in the
matter. But opinion is derived from the error or
truth of reasoning or belief, whereas feeling takes
its strength from custom or nature. We can see at
once that a man's opinion may be different from
his feeling, because we often think we ought to
do one thing, while we should like to do something
else. Further, sometimes feeling is truer than opin-
ion, when the latter is derived from error and feel-
ing is based on nature. For example, often a sick
man likes cold water and finds it a relief, but be-
lieves it will do him harm to drink it. Sometimes
opinion is truer than feeling, as when he believes

164 ST. AUGUSTINE

the doctor's warning that cold water is harmful,
and yet likes to drink it. Sometimes both are true,
when something is good for you and you not only
believe this, but also like to have it. Sometimes
both are wrong, when something is harmful and
you believe it is good for you and you like to have
it. Right opinion usually corrects a wrong cus-
tom, and wrong opinion usually harms what is
naturally right; such is the power of the control
and supremacy of reason.

So when a man believes that he will not exist
after death, yet unbearable troubles make him long
heart and soul for death and he is determined to
embrace death, his opinion is false and utterly
wrong, but his feeling is a natural desire for rest.
But what is restful is not nothing; indeed it has
truer being than what is restless. Restlessness
changes our inclinations, so that one inclination
destroys another. But rest brings permanence, and
this is especially implied by saying a thing exists.
Thus when a man wills to die, all that he desires is
not non-existence after death, but rest. Though
he falsely believes he will cease to exist, his nature
seeks rest, that is, increase of existence. Hence,
just as it is utterly impossible that anyone should
take pleasure in non-existence, so it is utterly
wrong that anyone should be ungrateful to the
Creator's goodness for his existence. 25

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 165

WHY DOES GOD NOT PREVENT
UNHAPPINESS?

9.24 A man says: It would not have been difficult or
laborious for Almighty God to see to it that every-
thing He created should possess what its nature
requires, and no creature should be rendered un-
happy. Being almighty, He did not lack the
power to do this, and being good, He would not
grudge it. I answer that creatures are arranged so
perfectly in order from the highest to the lowest,
that envy alone would cause a man to say: That
creature should not exist; and it is envy if he says:
That should be different. For if he wishes it to be
like a thing of higher rank, it already exists, and is
such that nothing ought to be added, for it is per-
fect. If he says, I should like this too to have that
excellence, either he wishes to add to the higher
creature, though it is already perfect, and then he
will be extravagant and unjust; or he wishes to
destroy it, and then he will be evil and envious.

But if he says, I wish this did not exist, he will
still be evil and envious, since he wishes a thing not
to exist, though he is forced to praise what is
lower. 26 He might as well say, I wish there were
no moon, while he must admit that even the light
of a lamp, though far inferior, is beautiful of its
own kind, pleasant in the surrounding darkness,
convenient for use at night, and in view of all this
excellent in its own small way. To deny this
would be folly or obstinacy. How then can he
rightly go so far as to say, I wish there were no

1 66 Sr. AUGUSTINE

moon, when he knows he would be making him-
self absurd were he to say, I wish there were no
lamp? If instead of saying, I wish there were no
moon, he said the moon ought to have been like the
sun, he fails to realise that he is only saying, I wish
there were no moon, but two suns. In this he makes
a double mistake: he wishes to add to the perfec-
tion of things by desiring a second sun, and to
detract from their perfection by wishing to do
away with the moon.

25 Here he may remark that he makes no complaint
about the moon, because its lesser degree of bright-
ness does not make it unhappy; but in the case of
souls he is distressed not by the darkness of them,
but by their unhappiness. Let him carefully con-
sider that while the brightness of the moon does
not involve unhappiness, the brightness of the sun
is not concerned with happiness either. For
though they are heavenly bodies, yet bodies they
are in respect to this light, light which can be seen
by bodily eyes. But no bodily things in them-
selves can be happy or unhappy, though they may
be the bodies of happy or unhappy people.

The comparison drawn from the heavenly
bodies nevertheless teaches this lesson. When you
reflect on the difference in these bodies and see that
some are brighter than others, you are wrong to
wish the darker to be removed or made equal to the
brighter. If you look at each thing in its relation
to the perfection of the whole, you find that this
very variety of brightness helps you to see the
existence of everything. You find the perfection

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 167

of the whole is derived from the presence of both
great and small. So too consider the differences
between souls. You will find the unhappiness
which grieves you has this value: that those souls
which have rightly become unhappy because they
willed to be sinful, are not lacking to the perfec-
tion of the whole. It is wrong to say that God
ought not to have made them unhappy; indeed He
deserves to be praised for making other creatures
far lower than unhappy souls.

26 But one may not understand fully what I have
said and make this objection: If our unhappiness
completes the perfection of the whole, there would
be a lack of perfection if we were always happy.
Hence, if the soul only becomes unhappy through
sin, our sins must be necessary for the perfection
of the whole creation which God has made. How
then is it just that He punish sins when without
these sins God's creation would not attain its full
perfection?

The answer is as follows. The sins themselves
or the unhappiness itself are not necessary for the
perfection of the whole; but the souls are necessary
as souls. If they so will, they sin; if they sin, they
become unhappy. If their unhappiness continues
after their sins have been removed, or if it even
precedes their sins, the proper order and direction
of the whole is truly said to be impaired. Again,
if sins are committed and there is no unhappiness,
the order of things is also stained with injustice.
When those who do not sin enjoy happiness, the
whole is perfect. When sinners are unhappy, the

1 68 ST. AUGUSTINE

whole is perfect in spite of this. Provided that
souls themselves are not lacking, whether those
which are made unhappy when they sin or those
which are made happy when they do right, the
whole, having beings of every kind, is always com-
plete and perfect. For sin and the punishment of
sin are not themselves substantial things, but they
are states of substantial things, the former volun-
tary, the latter penal. Now the voluntary state
when sin is committed is a shameful state. There-
fore to this is applied a penal state, to set it where
such may fitly be, and to make it harmonise with
the beauty of the whole, so that the sin's punish-
ment may make up for its shamefulness.
27 Hence it comes about that the higher creature
which sins is punished by lower creatures, because
these latter are so low that they can be raised in
honour even by wicked souls, and so can har-
monise with the beauty of the whole. What is so
noble in the house as man? And what so ignoble
and low as its drain? Yet a slave, found guilty of
some fault and set as a punishment to clean the
drain, gives it honour by his disgrace. Both of
these things, the slave's disgrace and the cleaning
of the drain, thus joined together and reduced to a
special kind of unity, have their part in the proper
management of the house, and combine to give the
whole the beauty of good order. If the slave had
not willed to do wrong, the work of the house
would have been carried on by other means, and
the necessary cleaning would have been done.
There is nothing lower in the scale of things

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 169

than an earthly body. Yet even a sinful soul gives
such honour to corruptible flesh that it conveys to
it a becoming beauty, and living movement. Such
a soul on account of its sin is not fit to dwell in
heaven, but is fit to dwell on earth for its punish-
ment. Whatever choice the soul makes, the whole
is beautiful and well ordered, each part fitting its
own place, whose Creator and Governor is God.
The noblest souls, when they dwell in the lowest
created things, honour them not by being un-
happy, for this they are not, but by their good use
of them. But if sinful souls were allowed to dwell
on high, it would be wrong, for they are not fitted
for things of which they cannot make a good use
and on which they cannot confer honour.
28 Therefore, though this orb of the earth is ap-
pointed to be the place of corruptible things, yet
it preserves as far as possible the image of what is
higher, and continues to show examples and traces
of this. If we see some great and good man, obey-
ing the call of honour and duty, allow his body to
be burned by fire, we do not call this a penalty for
sin, but a proof of courage and endurance.
Though the most horrible corruption consumes
the members of his body, we love him more than
if he suffered nothing of the kind. We are amazed
that the nature of his soul is not changed with the
changing body. When, however, we see the body
of a cruel robber consumed as a punishment in the
same way, we approve the lawful enforcement of
public order. Both men make these sufferings

170 ST. AUGUSTINE

honourable, but one does so by his virtue, the other
by his sin.

If we saw the good man, after being consumed
by fire or even before it, rendered fit to dwell in
heaven and raised to the stars, we should certainly
rejoice. But if we saw the robber and criminal,
whether before or after his punishment, still keep-
ing his evil will, raised to dwell in eternal glory in
heaven, should we not all be shocked? Hence
both of them can give honour to lower creatures,
but only one to creatures which are higher.

This bids us to notice that our mortal flesh has
been honoured both by the first man when he suf-
fered the punishment his sin deserved, and by Our
Lord, when in His mercy He delivered us from sin.
The just man, still abiding in justice itself, could
have a mortal body, but the wicked man cannot, if
he remains wicked, gain the immortality of the
saints, which is that of the angels in heaven. I do
not mean those angels of whom the Apostle says
Know you not that nve shall judge angels? 7 but
those about whom Our Lord says. , . for they
shall be equal to the angels of God. 28 Those who
desire to be equal with the angels through vain-
glory, wish the angels to be equal with them, not
themselves with the angels. 29 If they persist in so
willing, their punishment will be equal to that of
the apostate angels, since they love their own
power more than that of Almighty God. Because
such men have not sought God by the gate of
humility which the Lord Jesus Christ has shown
in Himself, but have lived in pride and without

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 1 7 1

mercy, they will be set upon the left side and it will
be said to them: Depart . . . into everlasting fire
which was prepared for the devil and his angels. 30
10.29 Sins arise from two sources, from a man's own
thoughts and from the persuasion of another, and
to this I think the words of the Prophet refer:
From my secret ones cleanse me, O Lord, and
from those of others spare thy servant. 51 Both are
voluntary, for our own thoughts do not lead to sin
against our will, while our consent to the evil per-
suasion of another is also due to our own will. Yet
to sin as a consequence of our own thoughts with-
out the persuasion of someone else, and, still more,
to persuade another to sin through envy and
treachery is graver than to be led into sin by an-
other's influence.

The justice of the Lord is observed when both
sins are punished. The matter was weighed in the
balance of justice when man was given into the
power of the devil himself, after the devil had sub-
dued him by his evil persuasion. It would have
been unjust that he should not rule over his cap-
tive. 32 The perfect justice of the supreme and true
God, which extends everywhere, could not pos-
sibly leave fallen sinners outside the scope of its
government. Because man sinned less grievously
than the devil, his salvation and restoration were
furthered by the very fact that he was delivered
to the prince of this world, that is, the lowest and
mortal part of creation to the prince of all sinners
and the lord of death, unto the mortality of the
flesh. Thus, frightened by his consciousness of

172 ST. AUGUSTINE

mortality, in fear of trouble and death from vile
and miserable beasts, even the very smallest, and
uncertain of the future, man has accustomed him-
self to check unlawful joys, and especially to crush
pride, by the seduction of which he was cast down
and which is the only vice to prevent the healing
power of mercy. What indeed has such need of
mercy as one who is unhappy, and what is so un-
worthy of mercy as one who is at once unhappy
and proud?

30 Hence it has happened that the Word of God,
through whom all things have been made, and in
whom all the happiness of the angels consists, has
stretched forth His mercy to our unhappiness, and
that the Word has become flesh and has dwelt
among us. 33 Thus it was to be possible for man to
eat the bread of angels, though himself not yet
equal to the angels, if the bread of angels should
itself deign to become equal with men. Nor did it
abandon the angels when it came down to us: at
the same time wholly theirs and wholly ours, it
feeds them from within by that which God is, and
teaches us from without by that which we are.
Thus we also are made fit by faith to receive it
like them as our food in the vision face to face.

The rational creature finds in the Word its most
excellent food and feeds upon it. The human soul
is rational. But it was held in mortal bonds in
punishment of sin, and was reduced to such low
condition that it strives to understand invisible
things by conclusions drawn from visible things.
The food of rational creatures has been made vis-

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 173

ible, not by changing its nature, but by putting on
ours, that it may recall us, who pursue visible
things, to itself invisible. Thus the soul which in
its inward pride had deserted Him, finds Him out-
side in His humility. By imitating His visible hu-
mility it will return to Him invisible and on high.
31 The Word of God, God's only Son, clothed
with man's nature, has subdued under man the
devil whom He has ever held, and ever will hold,
under His law. He has wrested nothing from the
devil by force, but has overcome him by the law
of justice. Having deceived the woman and over-
thrown the man by the woman, the devil claimed
all the descendants of the first man as sinful, and
therefore as subject to the law of death. He did
this from the wicked desire to harm them, yet by
lawful right. He claimed them so long as his
power held, until he slew the Just Man, in whom
he could point to nothing which deserved death,
not only because He was slain in spite of His inno-
cence, but also because He was born free from
passion. To passion the devil had made his prison-
ers slaves, so that he might keep in his power what-
ever was born of it, as the fruit of his own tree,
through a wicked desire to hold them, but by a
genuine right of possession.

Therefore he is compelled with full justice to
let free those who believe in Him and whom he
has most unjustly killed. By temporal death they
pay their debt, and by everlasting life they live in
Him who paid on their behalf a debt He himself
did not owe. The devil, however, could justly

174 ST. AUGUSTINE

have, as sharers with him in his everlasting damna-
tion, those whom he had persuaded to persist in
infidelity.

Thus man, who had become the devil's captive
by persuasion, and not by force, was not snatched
away from the devil by force; and man had justly
to endure the further humiliation of serving him
to whom he had given a wicked consent, but was
justly set free by him to whom he had given a
good consent. Man sinned less greatly by consent-
ing than the devil by persuading him to evil.
11,32 God therefore made all natures, not only those
which were to abide in virtue and justice, but also
those that were to sin. He created them not that
they might sin, but that they might add beauty to
the whole, whether they willed to sin or not. If
there had been no souls at the very summit of the
whole created order, such that if they chose to sin,
they would weaken and shatter the whole, a great
element would be lacking in creation; for that
would be lacking which would upset, if taken
away, the stability and harmony of things. Such
are the excellent, holy, sublime creatures, the
powers of heaven or above it, whom God alone
commands, and to whom the whole world is sub-
ject. If these creatures did not perform their just
and perfect duties, the whole could not exist.
Again, if there were no souls whose decision to
sin or not to sin would in no way alter the order of
the whole, an important element would also be
lacking. So there are rational souls, lower than the
higher souls in their function, but equal in nature.

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 175

There are many ranks still lower than these, but
worthy of praise, among the creatures of God
most high.

3 3 Therefore that kind of being has a higher func-
tion, whose sin and also whose non-existence
would impair the whole. That has a lower func-
tion, whose non-existence, but not whose sin,
would impair the whole. To the former is given
power to maintain all things, as its special function
necessary for the order of the whole. It does not
possess unchanging good will because it has been
given this function; but it has been given the func-
tion because He who gave it foresaw that its good
will would persist. It does not maintain every-
thing by its own authority, but by fidelity and
scrupulous obedience to the authority and com-
mands of Him from whom and through whom and
in whom all things have been made. 34

To the latter was also given, provided it did not
sin, the great function of maintaining all things.
But it was given this function, not as peculiar to
itself, but as shared with the former, since its own
future sin was foreknown. All spiritual beings can
join together without gain and separate without
loss. Thus the higher being would not find its
action made easier by this partnership, nor made
more difficult, should the other desert its function
by committing sin. Spiritual creatures, though
each may possess its own body, cannot be joined
or separated by position and physical association,
but by likeness or unlikeness of their inclinations.

34 The soul which is given its place, after sinning,

176 ST. AUGUSTINE

among the lower, mortal bodies, governs its body,
not altogether at its own choice, but so far as the
laws of the whole permit. Yet such a soul is not
for this reason lower than the heavenly body to
which even earthly bodies are subject. The ragged
garment of a condemned slave is much inferior to
the garment of a slave who has served well and is
highly regarded by his master; but the slave him-
self is better than any fine garment, for he is a man.
The higher being, then, keeps close to God, and
in a heavenly body, through its angelic power, it
also honours and governs an earthly body, obeying
the order of Him whose will it beholds in a manner
beyond expression. The lower being, burdened
with mortal limbs, directs with difficulty within
itself the body by which it is pressed down, and
yet honours it as much as it can. Upon other
bodies with which it comes in contact, it exercises
from outside a far weaker power, so far as it can.
12.35 We conclude from this that the lowest bodily
creature would not have lacked fitting adornment,
even though the being of which we have just
spoken, had not willed to sin. For that which can
govern the whole, governs also a part; but that
which can do less, cannot necessarily do more.
The skilful physician cures even the scab thor-
oughly; but, because he can deal with the scab
effectively, it does not follow that he can heal
every human ailment. Indeed, if we see a cogent
reason for holding that there ought to have been a
creature which never sinned and never will sin,
this same reason shows us also that it abstains from

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 177

sin through its free will, of its own accord and
unforced. Nevertheless, if it should sin though
it has not sinned, in accordance with God's fore-
knowledge of its sinlessness-yet, should it sin, the
inexpressible force of God's power would be
strong enough so to govern the whole that, by
rendering to all what is due and fitting, He would
allow nothing shameful or unbecoming to exist in
His whole dominion.

For, if the whole angelic creation had fallen by
sinning against His commands, without using any
of the powers created for this purpose, God would
govern all things by His own authority in a su-
premely befitting way. He would not on this
account view with hatred the existence of a spirit-
ual creature. Even towards bodily creatures, far
lower than spiritual creatures even when sinful, He
has shown such profusion of goodness that no one
can reasonably contemplate heaven and earth and
all visible things, so harmoniously formed and or-
dered according to their natures, without believing
God to be their author, and confessing that He
deserves ineffable praise.

On the other hand, even though there is no bet-
ter government for creation than when by the
excellence of their nature and the goodness of their
will the power of the angels governs all things,
even so the fall of all the angels would not have
deprived the Creator of the angels of means to
govern His dominion. His goodness would not
find it wearisome nor His omnipotence find it hard
to create others to set in the places deserted by

i 7 8 ST. AUGUSTINE

those who had sinned. If spiritual creatures, what-
ever their number, 35 were justly condemned, this
could not disturb that order of things which allows
for the condemnation of all who deserve it, in the
manner which is right and proper. Therefore,
wherever we turn our thoughts, we find that God
deserves ineffable praise the most good Creator of
all beings and their most just Ruler.

HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS IN THE END
ARE BOTH JUST

36 Finally, let us leave the contemplation of the
beauty of things to those to whom God has
granted the power to see it, and let us not presume
by mere words to bring them se to contemplation
of the ineffable. And yet, because of men who are
loquacious or weak or deceitful, 37 let us examine
briefly this important question.

13 Every nature which can become less good, is

good. A nature becomes less good when it is cor-
rupted. Either corruption does not harm it and it
does not become corrupt; or, if it is corrupted,
corruption harms it. If it harms, it takes away
some of its goodness and makes it less good. If it
deprives it entirely of all its good, what remains of
it cannot be corrupted, because there will be no
good left which corruption can remove; corrup-
tion cannot harm it in this way. That which cor-
ruption cannot harm cannot become corrupt.
That nature which does not suffer corruption is
incorruptible, and hence there will be a nature,

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 179

absurd though this is, which corruption makes in-
corruptible.

Therefore it is true to say that every nature, so
far as it is a nature, is good. For, if it is incorrupt-
ible it is better than the corruptible, while, if it is
corruptible, since corruption makes it less good,
undoubtedly it is good. Every nature is either
corruptible or incorruptible. Hence every nature
is good. By a nature I mean what we usually call
substance. Therefore every substance is either
God or derived from God, for every good thing is
either God or derived from God.

37 Having firmly established this as the principle
of our reasoning, listen to what I have to say.
Every rational nature, created with free will, if it
abides in the enjoyment of the supreme, unchange-
able good, is undoubtedly worthy of praise, and
every nature which strives to so abide is also
worthy of praise. But every nature which does
not abide in this and does not will to aim at this
end, in so far as it does not attain the end and does
not aim at it, is worthy of blame.

If, therefore, a created rational nature is praised,
no one doubts that its Creator deserves praise; and
if the creature is blamed, no one doubts that its
Creator is praised when it is blamed. For when
we blame the creature, because it does not will to
enjoy the supreme and unchangeable good, its Cre-
ator, without any doubt we praise the Creator.
What a good, then, is God! How far beyond
expression should every tongue, and how far be-
yond expression should every thought, extol and

180 ST. AUGUSTINE

honour Him, the Creator of all, without praise of
whom we can neither be praised or blamed! We
cannot be blamed for not abiding in Him, unless
to abide in Him is our great, supreme, and prin-
cipal good. How can this be so unless it is because
He is beyond expression good? What cause can
be found in our sins to blame Him, when there is
no blame for our sins which is not praise for Him?
3 8 Again, in the very things which are blamed it is
only the vice which is blamed; and there is no
blaming a vice without praising its nature. If what
is blamed is according to nature, it is not vice; it is
you who should be corrected, rather than what
you wrongly blame, that you may learn to give
blame rightly. Or if it is a vice and can be rightly
blamed, it must be against nature. All vice, from
the very fact that it is vice, is against nature. If it
does not harm nature, it is not vice; if it is vice
because it does harm, it is vice because it is against
nature.

But, if a nature is corrupted by another's vice,
and not by its own, it is unjustly blamed, and we
must ask whether that other nature is not cor-
rupted by its own vice, when its vice could corrupt
another's nature. What else is it to be vitiated
than to be corrupted by vice? A nature which is
not vitiated is free from vice, but that which cor-
rupts by its vice another's nature certainly has vice.
That nature is vicious, and is corrupted by its own
vice, by the vice of which another nature can also
be corrupted.

Hence we conclude that all vice is against

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 181

nature, even against the nature of that thing which
has the vice. Therefore, since it is only vice that
is blamed in anything, and since it is vice because
it is against the nature of that thing which has the
vice, nothing is rightly blamed for vice, unless its
nature is praised. Vice is only rightly displeasing
to you, because it makes vicious what pleases you
in the nature.

14.39 We must also notice this question: is it true that
a nature is subject to corruption by the vice of an-
other nature without any vice of its own? If a
nature with its vice approaches another nature with
a view to corrupting it, and finds in it nothing cor-
ruptible, it does not corrupt it. But if it does find
something corruptible it effects the corruption of
the other nature by the vice it finds in it. The
stronger is not corrupted by the weaker if it refuses
to be corrupted, but if it wills to be corrupted its
corruption begins from its own vice rather than
another's. Nor can an equal be corrupted by an
equal if it refuses. When a vicious nature ap-
proaches another which is without vice in order to
corrupt it, by that very fact it does not approach
as equal, but as weaker on account of its vice.

But if a stronger corrupts a weaker, either this
occurs through the vice of both, if it occurs
through the evil desire of both; or through the vice
of the stronger, if such is the superiority of its
nature that, even though vicious, it is still superior
to the lesser nature which it corrupts. Who
would be right in blaming the fruits of the earth,
because men do not use them well, but corrupted
by their own vice corrupt them by abusing them

1 82 ST. AUGUSTINE

for the purpose of luxury? Nevertheless it would
be folly to doubt that human nature, even when
vicious, is nobler and stronger than any fruit, even
when free from vice.

40 It is possible too for a stronger to corrupt a
weaker nature, and for this to happen through no
vice of either of them if by vice we mean what is
deserving of blame. Who, for instance, would
dare to blame a thrifty man who sought nothing
more from the fruits of the earth than support of
nature, or to blame these fruits themselves for
being corrupted when used as his food? We do
not, as a rule, use the word 'corruption' to express
this, because 'corruption' is a term used to denote
a vice.

It is easy to note this as of common occurrence,
that the stronger nature corrupts the weaker with-
out using it to satisfy its own needs. A case in
point is when in the order of justice guilt is pun-
ished. This is the principle expressed by the
Apostle when he says: If any man violate the
temple of God, him shall God destroy. 38 Or,
again, in the order of changeable things one gives
way to another according to the most suitable laws
given to the whole and adapted to the strength of
each part. If a man's eyes were too weak by
nature to bear the light and the sun's brightness
should injure them, we should not suppose the sun
did this in order to make up any deficiency in its
own light, or through any vice on its part. Nor
would the eyes themselves deserve blame because
they obeyed their master and were opened in face

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 183

of the light, or because they succumbed to the light
itself and were injured.

Therefore, of all forms of corruption only that
which is vicious is rightly blamed. Other forms
either should not be called corruption, or, not
being vicious, certainly ought not to be blamed.
As a matter of fact, the word vituperatio (blame)
is thought to be derived from the words vitium and
paratum, and to mean, what is prepared for, that is,
suitable for, and due to, vice alone. 39
41 Vice, I began to say, is only evil because it is
opposed to the nature of the thing which has the
vice. Hence it is clear that the nature of this same
thing whose vice is blamed is worthy of praise.
Thus we must agree that to blame the vice is noth-
ing else than to praise the nature of that thing
whose vice is blamed. Because vice is opposed to
nature, the malice of vice increases in proportion
to the decreased soundness of the nature. There-
fore, when you blame vice, you obviously praise
the thing whose soundness you wish for. And to
what should the soundness belong except to the
nature? A perfect nature, far from deserving
blame, deserves praise in accordance with the kind
of nature it is. What you see to be lacking in the
perfection of a nature, you call vice, showing
plainly enough that the nature pleases you, since
you blame its imperfection on account of your will
for its perfection.

15.42 So, if to blame vices is also to commend the
beauty and dignity of the natures which have the
vices, how much more is God, the Creator of all

184 ST. AUGUSTINE

natures, worthy of praise even in their vices!
From Him they derive their possession of a nature;
they are vicious in so far as they depart from the
art with which He made them, and they are rightly
blamed in so far as he who blames them sees the art
with which they have been made, and blames them
for what he does not see in them. And if the very
art by which all things have been made, that is, the
supreme unchangeable Wisdom of God, truly and
supremely exists as in fact it doesyou can see
whither that thing is bound which departs from
His art.

The defect, however, would not deserve blame,
unless it were voluntary. Please consider whether
you are right in blaming what is as it ought to be:
I think not; but rather what is not as it ought to be.
No one owes as a debt what he has not received, 40
and to whom does the debtor owe anything, except
to him from whom he has received it, and to whom
he therefore owes it? What is paid when money
is transferred to the heirs, is paid to him who made
the will. And what is paid to the lawful heirs of
creditors, is paid to the creditors themselves to
whom the heirs lawfully succeed. Otherwise it
would not be a payment, but a transfer or grant,
or something of this kind.

Consequently it would be most absurd to say
that temporal things ought not to decay. They are
placed in an order of things such that, unless they
decay the future cannot follow the past, nor can
the beauty of the ages unfold itself in its natural
course. They act in accordance with what they

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 185

have received, and they pay their debt to Him to
whom they owe their being, in accordance with
the measure of their being. If anyone expresses
grief at their decay, he should notice what he is
sayingyes, what he is saying in making that com-
plaintif he thinks it is just and prudently said. In
pronouncing those words, if he takes pleasure in
one part of the sound and refuses to let it go and
make the way for the rest (it is by sounds which
die out and are followed by others that speech is
composed), he will be considered a sheer madman.
43 Therefore no one rightly blames a failure in
these things which thus decay. They have re-
ceived no further being, in order that everything
may occur at its proper time. No one can say: It
ought to have lasted longer; for it could not pass
the limits assigned to it.

But it is in rational creatures that the beauty of
the whole creation reaches its fitting climax,
whether they sin or not. Now either they do not
sin, which it is quite absurd to say, for a sin is com-
mitted even by condemning as a sin what is no sin;
or their sins do not deserve blame, which is equally
absurd, for then we shall be on the way to praise
wrong actions and the whole purpose of the human
mind will be upset and life thrown into confusion;
or we shall blame an action performed as it ought
to be performed, and execrable madness will over-
take us, or, in milder language, most unfortunate
error; or, if we are forced, as we are, by true rea-
soning to blame sins, and to blame a thing rightly
only because it is not as it ought to be, then ask

1 86 ST. AUGUSTINE

what a sinful nature owes and you will find it owes
right action; ask to whom it owes this, and you will
find it owes it to God. For He who has given it
the power to act rightly if it wishes, has also given
it the power to be unhappy if it does not act
rightly, and to be happy if it does.
44 Since no one is above the laws of the almighty
Creator, the soul is bound to pay what is due.
Either it pays this by the good use of what it has
received, or else by the loss of what it refuses to
use well. Hence if it does not pay by acting justly,
it will pay by suffering unhappiness, for the word
'debt' applies to both. Thus what has been said
could also have been formulated as follows: If a
soul does not pay by doing what it ought to do, it
will pay by suffering what it ought to suffer.

There is no interval of time between these two;
the soul does not do what it ought at one time, and
suffer what it ought at another time. The beauty
of the whole must not be impaired even for a
moment; it must not contain the shame of sin with-
out the beauty of punishment. But the manifes-
tation of what is now punished in secret, and the
terrible sense of unhappiness this involves, is re-
served for the future judgment. Just as one sleeps
if he is not awake, so the man who does not do
what he ought to do, suffers immediately what he
ought to suffer, because so great is the happiness
derived from justice that to depart from it is to
enter upon unhappiness. There is no alternative.
Therefore, when as a result of deficiency of
being things decay, either they have not received

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 187

any further being and there is no fault (in the same
way that there is no fault if, while they exist, they
receive no further being), or else they refuse to be
what they had the power to be if they chose.
Since what they might have possessed is good, they
are guilty if they refuse it.

16.45 God owes no debt to anyone, because He gives
everything freely. If anyone should say God
owed him a debt for his merits, certainly existence
is not owed to him, for he did not exist to be owed
a debt. And what merit is there in turning to Him
from whom you derive your being, in order that
you may obtain further perfection from the source
of your very being? What payment have you
made beforehand, which you can demand back as
a debt? If you refuse to turn towards Him, He
loses nothing, while on your part, unless you turn
to Him and pay back the existence you have re-
ceived from Him, you lose Him without whom
you would be nothing and from whom you receive
your existence. If this happens, though you will
not cease to exist, will you not suffer unhappiness?
Everything owes to Him first, its existence as a
nature; secondly, the further perfection it can gain
if it wills what it has received the power to will,
all that it ought to be. No one is responsible for
what he has not received; but he is justly respon-
sible for not doing what he ought to do, and he has
a duty to perform if he has received a free will and
sufficient powers.

46 Therefore, when a man does not do what he
ought, this certainly is no fault of the Creator;

1 88 ST. AUGUSTINE

rather, it is a matter for His praise that the man
suffers what he ought. The blame the man re-
ceives for not doing what he ought is nothing else
than praise to the Creator to whom he owes the
debt. If you are praised when you see what you
ought to do, though you only see this in Him who
is unchangeable truth, how much more should He
be praised who has ordered you to will what you
ought to do, and has given you the power to carry
it out, and has not allowed you to refuse it unpun-
ished!

If everyone owes that which he has received, and
if man has been so made that he sins necessarily,
then his duty is to sin. 41 Therefore, when he sins,
he does what he ought to do. But if it is wicked
to say this, then no one is forced by his own nature
to sin, nor is he forced by the nature of anyone else.
No one sins by suffering what he does not will. If
he suffers justly, he does not sin by that which he
suffers against his will; but he did sin by that which
he willed to do, and by deserving to suffer thereby
what he did not will. If he suffers unjustly, how
does he sin? It is not a sin to suffer unjustly but to
act unjustly. But if a man is compelled to sin
neither by his own nature nor by that of someone
else, it remains that he sins through his own will.

If you wish to attribute the sin to the Creator,
you will clear the sinner because he did nothing
against the ordinance of his Creator. But if your
defence is sound, he did not sin, and there is noth-
ing to attribute to the Creator. Let us then praise

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 189

the Creator, if the sinner can be defended; let us
also praise Him, if he cannot. If he is defended
justly, he is no sinner, and so praise the Creator.
If he cannot be defended, he is a sinner in so far as
he turns away from the Creator, so praise the Cre-
ator.

Therefore, I can find no reason at all for attrib-
uting our sins to God, our Creator, and I assert that
no such reason can be found, and indeed that it
does not exist. I find that in these very sins He is
to be praised, not only because He punishes them,
but also because they are committed by departing
from His truth.

E. I accept most gladly what you say and approve
it. I agree it is quite true that our sins can in no
manner at all be rightly attributed to our Creator.

PERVERTED WILL IS THE CAUSE OF EVIL,
AND IT IS USELESS TO LOOK FURTHER

17.47 But I should like to know, if possible, why that
nature does not sin which God has foreknown will
not sin, and why that nature sins which God has
foreseen will sin. I do not now think that through
God's foreknowledge the one is forced to sin and
the other not to sin. Nevertheless, if there is no
cause, rational creatures would not be divided into
those which never sin, those which persist in sin,
and those between these extremes who sometimes
sin and sometimes turn to doing good. What
cause is there for their division into these three
classes?

190 ST. AUGUSTINE

I do not want you to reply that it is the will: it
is the cause behind the will that I am asking about.
There must be some cause which brings it about
that some never will to sin, that others always do
so, and that others do so on occasion, though all
have the same nature. The one point which seems
clear to me is that there must be a cause for this
threefold division of will in the rational creature;
but what the cause is I do not know.
48 A. Since the will is the cause of sin, and you are
looking for a cause of the will, if I can find this,
will you not look for a cause of the cause I have
found? What will satisfy these questions, what
will put an end to our hesitation and discussion?
You ought not to look further than the root. Do
not suppose that anything can be truer than the
sentence: The desire of money is the root of all
evil 42 that is, the desire for more than sufficiency.
That amount is sufficiency which each nature
demands for its preservation. Avaricetermed
philarguria in Greek, which echoes better the
origin of the word, for in olden times coins were
made of silver or more frequently an alloy of silver
does not apply only to silver or money; but it
must be understood to apply to everything which
is desired to excess, whenever a man wills more
than is enough. Such avarice is cupidity, and
cupidity is perverted will. Perverted will, then, is
the cause of all evil

If the will followed nature, it would preserve,
and would not harm nature, and so would not be
perverted. Hence, we conclude, the root of all

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 191

evil is not according to nature, and this is sufficient
answer to those who would accuse nature. But if
you look for the cause of this root, how can it be
the root of all evil? Such cause would be the root
cause, and if you found it, you will, as I said, look
for a further cause, and the inquiry will be endless.
49 Now what could precede the will and be its
cause? Either it is the will itself, and nothing else
than the will is the root, 43 or it is not the will which
is not sinful. Either the will itself is the original
cause of sin, or no sin is the original cause of sin.
Sin cannot be attributed to anything except to the
sinner. It cannot rightly be attributed to anything
except to him who wills it: 44 I do not know why
you should wish to look for anything further.

Again, whatever is the cause of the will, is either
just or unjust. If just, we shall not sin by submit-
ting to it; if unjust, let us not submit to it, and we
18.50 shall not sin. But perhaps it uses compulsion and
forces a man against his will? Need we repeat
ourselves over and over again? Remember all that
we said before about sin and free will. If it is dif-
ficult to keep it all in mind, do remember this sum-
mary. Whatever is the cause of the will, if we
cannot resist it, we do not sin by yielding to it; if
we can resist, we must not yield and we shall not
sin. Perhaps it tricks us when off our guard? We
must be careful not to be tricked. Or is the trick-
ery such that we cannot possibly be on our guard
against it? If so, there is no sin, for no one sins
when he cannot guard against it. Yet sin is com-
mitted, and therefore we can guard against it. 45

192 ST. AUGUSTINE

51 Nevertheless, some actions done in ignorance
are judged to be wrong and in need of correction,
as we read in the divine documents. For example,
the Apostle says: / obtained the mercy of God,
because I did it ignorantly; * 6 and the Prophet says:
The sins of my youth and my Ignorance do not
remember? 7 Actions done of necessity when a
man wills to act rightly and cannot, are also judged
wrong. Hence the words: For the good which I
will, I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I
do; and, To will is present with me, but to accom-
plish that which is good, I find not; 4S and, The
flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against
the flesh; for these are contrary one to another, so
that you do not the things that you would. 49 But
all this applies to men as they appear on the scene
after the condemnation of death; for if this does
not stand for man's punishment, but his natural
condition, then there is no question of sin. If man
has not lost his natural kind of being, and if he can-
not become better, he is doing what he ought when
he acts in this way. But if man would be good if
he were constituted differently, and he is not good
because he is in his present condition; if he has not
the power to become good, whether because he
does not see what he ought to be, or because he
sees and yet cannot be what he sees he ought to be,
then this is surely a punishment.

Now every punishment is a punishment for sin,
if it is just, and is called a penalty; but if the pun-
ishment is unjust, since no one doubts it is a pun-
ishment, it is imposed on man by an unjust ruler.

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 193

But it would be folly to doubt the omnipotence
and justice of God, and therefore this punishment
must be just, and be exacted for some sin. No
unjust ruler could have snatched man away from
God without His knowledge or taken him by force
against God's will, \vhether by threat or violence,
in order to inflict torture on him as an unjust pun-
ishment. No one can frighten God, or struggle
with Him. It remains, therefore, that this is a just
punishment resulting from man's condemnation.
52 It is not surprising that man, through his igno-
rance, does not have free choice of will to deter-
mine what he ought to do; or that, through the
resistance of carnal habits, which have become
second nature as a result of the element of unre-
straint handed on in human heredity, he sees what
he ought to do and wills it, but cannot accomplish
it. It is an absolutely just punishment for sin that
a man should lose what he refuses to use rightly,
when he could do so without any difficulty if he
wished. Thus a man who knows what he ought
to do and does not do it, loses the knowledge of
what is right, and the man who has refused to act
rightly when he could, loses the power when he
wishes to have it.

Indeed for every sinful soul there are the two
punishments, ignorance and difficulty. As a result
of ignorance error shames us, and as a result of
difficulty pain torments us. But to approve false
for true, so as to err unwillingly, and to be unable
to refrain from acts of passion on account of the
resistance and pain of the bonds of the flesh, are

194 ST. AUGUSTINE

not natural to man in his original state, but are a
punishment after his condemnation. When we
speak of a will free to act rightly, we speak of the
will with which man was created.

19.53 Here that problem raises itself, which is often
brought up with murmurings and mutterings: men
are ready to accuse anything else for their sins
rather than themselves. Thus they say: If Adam
and Eve sinned, what have we unhappy people
done, to be born in the blindness of ignorance and
amid the torments of difficulty, 50 first to err not
knowing our duty, and then, when the commands
of justice begin to be revealed to us, to will to fol-
low them, and to be powerless to do so because
some urge of fleshly concupiscence fights against
it?

My answer in brief is that these people should
keep quiet and cease to murmur against God.
They might perhaps be justified in complaining if
no one had ever conquered error and passion.
There is, however, everywhere present One who
in so many ways uses His creatures to call back the
servant who has abandoned Him, who teaches him
when he believes, consoles him when he hopes,
encourages him when he loves, helps him when he
strives, and hears him when he prays. It is not
counted to you as a fault that you are ignorant
against your will, but that you fail to seek the
knowledge you do not possess. Nor is it a fault
that you do not tend your wounded members, but
that you despise Him who wishes to heal them.
These are your own sins. No one is prevented

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 195

from knowing how valuable it is to seek the
knowledge which it is valueless not to possess, and
from knowing the duty humbly to confess his
weakness, so that when he seeks and when he con-
fesses he may be helped by Him who neither errs
when He gives help nor becomes weary of giving
it.

54 The wrong actions which are done in ignorance,
and the right actions which cannot be done in spite
of a good will, are called sins because they draw
their origin from the first sin which was committed
freely, and which brought about these effects as a
due consequence.

By 'tongue' we mean not only the member we
move in our mouth when we speak, but also the
results of the movement of this member, namely,
the form and connection of words. Thus we call
one the Greek tongue and another the Latin
tongue. In the same way by sin we do not only
mean what is properly speaking a sin, a sin com-
mitted freely and deliberately, but also what is
bound to follow as a punishment of such sin.

So too we use the word 'nature' properly speak-
ing of the nature which men share in common, and
with which at first man was created in a state of
innocence. We also use nature to mean that
nature with which we are born mortal, ignorant,
and slaves of the flesh, after sentence has been pro-
nounced on the first man. In the words of the
Apostle: We were by nature children of wrath,
even as the rest. 5 *
20.55 God, the supreme Ruler of creation, justly de-

196 ST. AUGUSTINE

creed that from the first pair we should inherit
ignorance, difficulty, and death, because they, as a
result of their sin, fell into error, tribulation, and
death. This was done that just punishment might
be made manifest at man's first origin, and merciful
deliverance at a later time. When the first man
was condemned, he was not deprived of the happi-
ness of having children. He was permitted to have
descendants, though carnal and mortal, that the
human race might in its own way be a beauty and
honour to the earth. It was not equitable that the
first man should beget children better than himself.
But if his descendants converted to God, it was but
proper that, showing this will, they should not be
hindered, but receive aid in overcoming the pun-
ishment which the perversion of their origin had
deserved. Thus too the Creator of things showed
how easily man could have kept his first condition,
if he had wished to do so, for his offspring was
even able to rise above the state in which he was
born.

56 Again, if only one soul was made from which
are derived the souls of all men who are born, who
can say that he himself did not sin when the first
man sinned? If, however, a soul is created sep-
arately at the birth of each man, it does not seem
wrong, but indeed quite reasonable and proper,
that the evil merited by the earlier soul should
belong by nature to the later, and the good mer-
ited by the later should belong by nature to the
earlier. How was it unworthy of the Creator, if,
in spite of all, He wished to show that a soul so far

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 197

surpasses a bodily creature in excellence, that the
highest degree of the bodily creature only reaches
the lowest degree to which the soul has fallen?
For the sinful soul became involved in ignorance
and difficulty, and this is rightly called punishment
because the soul was better before the punishment.
Even if, not only before sinning but from the very
beginning of life, a soul should have that state of
being to which another was reduced after living
wickedly, it still has no small good for which to
give thanks to the Creator, for even in its first be-
ginning its state is better than any bodily thing
however perfect. These are not ordinary blessings
not only that it is a soul, the nature of which is
more excellent than any bodily thing; but, more
than this, that it is capable, with the help of the
Creator, of developing itself, and, if it does its duty
earnestly, of acquiring and possessing the virtues
which will free it from painful difficulty and blind
ignorance.

If this is so, ignorance and difficulty will not be
a punishment for sin to souls at their birth, but an
encouragement to progress and a beginning of per-
fection. It is no small matter, before any merito-
rious action, to receive a natural power of judgment
by which wisdom is preferred to error, and rest to
difficulty, so that the soul may attain these ends not
indeed at birth but as a result of effort. But if a
soul refuses to do this, it will rightly be held guilty
of sin, because it has not made good use of the
power it received. Though born in a state of
ignorance and difficulty, yet it is not forced by any

198 ST. AUGUSTINE

necessity to remain in the state in which it was
born. Only Almighty God, and no one else, could
create such souls. For, though not loved by them
He gives them being, and because He loves them
He repairs their being, 52 and when loved by
them He perfects their being. He who gives being
to what has no being, gives happiness to those who
love the author of their being.

57 If, however, souls pre-existing in some secret
place assigned by God are sent to animate and gov-
ern the bodies of all the different persons who are
born, they are sent for the following purpose.
They are to govern rightly the body which is born
subject to the punishment of the first man's sin,
namely, liability to death, by using the virtues to
keep it in check, and by subjecting it to a proper
and lawful servitude, in order that they may pre-
pare for it a place where in due order and time it
may dwell incorrupt in heaven.

When these souls enter this life and endure the
putting on of mortal limbs, they must also endure
the f orgetfulness of their former life and the toil of
their present life. Ignorance and difficulty result, 53
which were the first man's penalty when death was
laid upon him that he might realise the misery of
his soul. These souls, however, find here a door
to their work of restoring incorruption to the
body. Thus, again, we only speak of this as sin
because the flesh, derived from a sinful forefather,
brings this ignorance and difficulty to the souls
who enter into it. Neither they nor the Creator
can be held responsible for these evils.

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 199

The Creator has given them the power to carry
out their burdensome duties well, and the path of
faith to guide the blindness arising from their lack
of memory. Above all He has given them the
power to make the following judgment. For
every soul agrees that it must strive to enlighten a
vain ignorance, and unceasingly endeavour to
carry the burden of its duty, to overcome the dif-
ficulty of doing right, and to implore the help of
the Creator in all its efforts. Whether from with-
out by law or from within by speaking directly to
the heart, He has ordered men to do their best.
He prepares the glory of the City of bliss for those
who vanquish him who led the first man into un-
happiness, overcoming by wicked temptation.
Such men submit to this unhappiness in order to
conquer the devil by the excellence of their faith.
For there is no small glory in the struggle, if the
devil is conquered and submits to the very punish-
ment by which he boasts he led man captive. If a
man is induced by love of this life to give up the
struggle, he will have no right to attribute the
shame of his desertion to the command of his king.
Rather, the Lord of all will set him where the devil
dwells, whose shameful service he so loved that he
deserted his true camp.

58 But if souls existing elsewhere are not sent by
the Lord God, but of their own accord come to
dwell in bodies, we can easily see that whatever
ignorance and difficulty result from the action of
their own will, the Creator is in no way to blarne.
Even if He had sent them Himself, since He did

200 ST. AUGUSTINE

not deprive them, despite their ignorance and diffi-
culty, of their freedom to beg, and seek and strive,
but was ready to give to those who beg, to show
light to those who seek, and to open to those who
knock, He would therefore be utterly without
blame. To zealous souls of good will He would
grant power to conquer ignorance and difficulty
and to gain the crown of glory. To the negligent
who wished to defend their sins on the ground of
weakness, He would not impute their ignorance or
difficulty. Because, however, they chose to remain
in that state rather than by zealous seeking and
learning and by humble confession and prayer to
gain truth and strength, He would assign them just
punishment.

21.59 There are these four opinions about the soul:
that it comes by generation, that it is newly cre-
ated when each person is born, that souls which
pre-exist elsewhere are sent by God into the bodies
of those who are born, or that they come down of
their own will. 54 We should not lightly accept
any of these opinions. Either this question has not
yet been worked out and decided by Catholic
commentators on Scripture, because of its obscu-
rity and difficulty, or if this has been done, these
works have not yet come into my hands. 55 At all
events, our faith must keep us from holding any-
thing about the substance of the Creator which is
false or unworthy of Him. For we journey to
Him by the path of pious devotion. If we hold
any false opinion about Him, we shall be carried
in the direction of vanity and not of happiness. If

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 201

we hold any false opinion about a creature, pro-
vided we do not accept it as known for certain,
there is no danger. We are not commanded to
seek the creature in order to become happy, but
the Creator Himself. If we hold any opinion
about Him which is wrong or false, we are de-
ceived by a pernicious error. For no one, if he
journeys towards what does not exist, or towards
what does not make him happy even if it does exist,
can reach the life of happiness.

IT IS OUR FUTURE DESTINY WHICH IS
IMPORTANT

60 For the contemplation of eternal truth, that we
may be able to enjoy it and cling to it, a path has
been provided through temporal things adapted to
our weakness: we must believe past and future
events, so far as is required by those who journey
to the eternal. This discipline of faith is authori-
tative, being governed by divine mercy. Present
events, so far as they concern creatures, are per-
ceived as transitory, through the movements and
changes of body and soul. We cannot have any
knowledge of these things, except in so far as we
experience them.

We should believe whatever we are told about
past or future on God's authority, with regard to
any creature. Some of these events happened be-
fore we could perceive them, some we have not yet
perceived with our senses. Nevertheless we must
believe them without any hesitation because they

202 ST. AUGUSTINE

help greatly to strengthen our hope and excite our
love, while they remind us of our salvation which
God does not neglect throughout the ordered suc-
cession of temporal events.

If any error puts on the mask of divine author-
ity, it can be refuted by the following test: is it
proved to believe or affirm that any beauty, even
though changeable, exists apart from God's crea-
tures, or that any changeable beauty exists in the
substance of God? Does it maintain that the sub-
stance of God is more or less than the Trinity?
The whole energy of the Christian is at work with
devotion and restraint to understand the Trinity,
and all his progress is concerned with doing so.
This is not the place to discuss the unity and equal-
ity of the Trinity, and that which is proper to each
Person. To mention certain facts about the Lord
God, the author of all things, the source of their
forms, 56 and their governor, facts which pertain to
sound faith and which form a useful support to the
purpose of one who is a child in these matters and
is only beginning to rise from things of earth to
those of heaven this is easy to do and many have
already done it. But to cover the whole of this
question, and so to treat of it that every human
intelligence will, so far as is possible in this life, be
satisfied with the clear reasoning, does not seem a
task which we ourselves, or indeed anyone, would
find easy, or lightly to be attempted even in
thought and far less in word.

Now let us carry out our plan of discussion so
far as God helps us and allows us to do so. With

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 203

regard to creatures, we must believe without any
hesitation whatever is told us concerning the past
or is prophesied concerning the future, if this can
foster sound religion and rouse us to sincere love
of God and our neighbour. We must defend it
against unbelievers, so that either their infidelity
may be crushed by the weight of authority, or that
they may shown so far as possiblefirst, that it is
not foolish to believe these things, secondly, that it
is foolish not to believe them. But we ought to
refute false teaching not so much about the past
and future as about the present, and especially
about unchangeable realities, and, so far as possible,
we ought to give clear proofs.

6 1 Certainly in the series of temporal events 5T we
should prefer looking forward to the future to in-
quiry into the past. In the Divine Books too the
story of past events prefigures, or promises, or wit-
nesses to, the future. Indeed, even in matters
which concern this present life, whether favour-
able or unfavourable, no one troubles about his
earlier state, but all anxiety concentrates upon
hopes for the future. As a result of some feeling
in the depth of our natures, past events, being over
and done with, are regarded as moments of happi-
ness or misery, as though they had never occurred.
What disadvantage is it to me not to know when
I began to exist, if I know that I exist now and hope
to exist in the future? I do not trouble about the
past, or think a false opinion about the past a disas-
trous error. I direct my course to my future, led
by the mercy of my Creator, If, therefore, I be-

204 ST. AUGUSTINE

lieve or think falsely about my future state, or
about Him with whom I shall be in the future, I
must be most careful to guard against this error.
The danger is that I may not make the necessary
preparation, or may be unable to reach the end I
have in view, if I confuse one thing with another.
If I were buying a coat, it would not affect me
adversely to have forgotten last winter, but such
would be the case, were I not to believe that cold
weather will be coming on. So too it will be no
hindrance to my soul if it forgets what it may have
endured in the past, provided it keeps carefully in
mind all for which it is urged to prepare in the
future. If, for example, a man was sailing for
Rome, it would not matter if he forgot the land
from which he set sail, so long as he knew whither
to steer from the place at which he was. It would
not help him to remember the land from which he
set out, if he made a mistake about the port of
Rome and was wrecked. In the same way it will
do no harm to me to forget the beginning of my
life, if I know the end where I can find rest. It
will not help me to remember or to guess the be-
ginning of my life, if I have an unworthy notion
of God Himself who is the sole end of the soul's
labours, and run upon the reefs of error.
62 These words should not make anyone think that
we are warning competent critics against consult-
ing the divinely inspired Scriptures whether soul
is generated from soul, or whether each soul is cre-
ated separately for the person whom it animates,
or whether souls are sent by divine command from

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 205

elsewhere to govern and animate a body, or
whether they put themselves there by their own
will. To examine an important question, reason
may demand that we consider and discuss these
things, or else leisure from more important matters
may be granted for study and research in these
fields.

I have mentioned this rather to prevent, on so
grave a question, unreasonable exasperation against
those who question one's opinion through doubt
which is perhaps too human. Also, if anyone can
find any clear evidence, he should not suppose an-
other person has abandoned hope of the future,
because he has forgotten his origins in the past.
22.63 Whatever the truth about this matter, whether
we must leave it aside altogether, or whether we
must put off its consideration to another time, we
are not prevented from seeing the answer to the
problem under discussion. We see that souls pay
the penalty for their sins, and that the majesty and
substance of the Creator remains unimpaired, just,
unshakeable, and unchangeable. Sins, as we have
already explained, are to be attributed to nothing
but to their own wills, and we must not look for
any further 5S cause of sins.

64 If, however, ignorance and difficulty are accord-
ing to nature, the soul starts from this condition to
advance and move towards knowledge and a state
of rest, until it reaches perfection in the life of
happiness. If of its own will it neglects its progress
in the study of higher things and in devotion,
though the opportunity for this is not denied it, it

206 ST. AUGUSTINE

is justly precipitated into worse ignorance and
difficulty, which is already punishment, and is
placed among lower beings by a right and proper
disposition of affairs.

A soul is not held guilty if its ignorance and in-
capacity result from its nature, but only if it does
not attempt to acquire knowledge, and if it makes
no sufficient effort to gain the power to act rightly.
It is natural for a child not to know how to speak
and to be unable to do so. Its ignorance of, and
difficulty in, speaking are no crime against the laws
of grammar; we even regard such things with
pleasure and affection. The child did not fail to
gain this power through any fault, nor did it pos-
sess this power and then lose it through any fault.
If our happiness consisted in eloquence, and it were
a crime to make a mistake in speaking, in the same
sense as in life certain actions are sinful, no one
would be blamed for childhood, because that was
the starting point in the acquirement of eloquence.
Clearly, however, he could be justly blamed if
through perversity of will he fell back into child-
hood or remained in it.

So too if ignorance of the truth and difficulty in
doing right are natural to man, and if this is the
condition from which he starts in his progress to
the happiness of wisdom and the state of rest, no
one has any right to blame happiness for its natural
origin. Yet, if a man refuses to make progress or
wilfully falls back from progress, it is right and just
that he should be punished.
65 The Creator of the soul always deserves praise,

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 207

for endowing it from its first beginning with the
capacity of gaining the supreme good, for helping
it to advance, for finishing and perfecting its prog-
ress, for justly condemning it according to its
deserts when it sins, that is, when it refuses to
raise itself from its original state to its perfection,
or when it falls back again after it has made prog-
ress.

The fact that at first it was not as perfect as it
received the power to become at a later stage, does
not mean that it was created evil. All the perfec-
tions of bodily things are far inferior to the soul in
its first condition, though a sound judgment would
count even these praiseworthy in their own way.
The fact that the soul does not know what it ought
to do arises from the fact that it has not yet re-
ceived this knowledge; but it will receive this, if it
makes good use of what it has already received;
and it has been endowed sufficiently to seek de-
voutly and diligently if it wills to do so.

If through ignorance of what it ought to do it is
unable at present to fulfil its duty, this also is a per-
fection it has not yet been granted. One part of it
has advanced to the higher stage of perceiving the
good it ought to do, 59 but another part is slower
and carnal and is not prevailed upon to share this
judgment. Thus difficulty itself urges the soul to
pray for help in the work of perfection from Him
who, it realises, caused the work to begin. Thus
it loves Him more, since not by its own strength
but by the mercy of Him whose goodness gave it
existence, it is raised to enjoy happiness. The

208 ST. AUGUSTINE

more it loves the author of its being, the more
firmly it rests in Him, and the more plentifully it
enjoys His eternity.

If the young plant of a tree should not be called
barren, though for some summers it bears no fruit
until in due time it becomes fruitful, why should
not the Creator of the soul be praised with due
devotion, if He has granted it an early period dur-
ing which by zeal and progress it may come to bear
the fruit of wisdom and justice, and if He has be-
stowed on it the honour of having the power, if it
wills, to tend towards happiness?

THE SUFFERINGS OF YOUNG CHILDREN

23.66 Those who do not understand these matters like
to bring forward the deaths of young children and
the bodily suffering with which we frequently see
them afflicted, as a means of discrediting the above
argument. What need was there of the child
being born, they ask, since it has departed from life
before it could gain any merit in life? How is it
to be counted in the judgment to come, seeing that
it neither finds a place among the just, having per-
formed no good action, nor among the wicked,
having committed no sin?

We reply as follows. In relation to the whole,
to the ordered connection of all creation in space
and time, no one whatever can be created without
a purpose. Not even the leaf of a tree is created
without a purpose. It is, however, purposeless to
ask about the merits of one who has gained no

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 209

merit. We need not fear that there may be a life
halfway between virtue and vice, a sentence of the
Judge halfway between reward and punishment.

67 In this connection, too, people will raise the
question: What benefit do children gain from the
sacrament of Christ's baptism, since they often die
after receiving it and before they can derive any
knowledge from it?

About this there is a good pious belief that the
child is benefitted by the faith of those who bring
it for baptism. This belief is supported by the
salutary authority of the Church, so that we may
all realise what benefit we have in our own faith,
seeing that it 60 can be used to do good to others
who do not yet have faith of their own. What
benefit did the widow's son gain from his own
faith, since, being dead, he had none? Yet the
faith of his mother helped to bring about his resur-
rection. 61 How much more probable is it that the
faith of another can help a child, whose lack of
faith cannot be imputed to it!

68 A more serious objection on the ground of
cruelty is often raised concerning the bodily suf-
ferings of children who have never committed sin
during their lives. If the souls which animate them
had no existence prior to their becoming human
beings, the question is asked, what evil they have
done to deserve suffering. As though innocence
could have any merit before a person has power to
do wrong!

But God does good in correcting adults when
their children whom they love suffer pain and
death. Why should not this be done, since, when

210 ST. AUGUSTINE

the suffering is past, it is as nothing to those who
have endured it? Those, on the other hand, for
whose sake this has happened, will either be better
men if they make use of their temporal ills and
choose to live better lives, or they will have no
excuse when they are punished at the future judg-
ment, if in spite of the sufferings of this life they
refuse to turn their hearts to eternal life.

Moreover, when the hearts of parents are soft-
ened by the sufferings of children, or when their
faith is stirred, or their pity roused, who knows
what ample compensation God reserves for these
children in the secret of His judgments? They
have not, it is true, performed right actions; yet
they have suffered without having sinned. Nor is
it to no purpose that the Church urges us to honour
as martyrs the children who were slain when
Herod sought the life of the Lord Jesus Christ.

THE SUFFERINGS OF ANIMALS

69 Those who put these specious questions, guided
by no zeal to examine such problems, but raising
trouble from the sheer desire to talk, will also dis-
turb the faith of the more simple by questions
about the pain and distress of animals. They ask
what wrong animals have committed, to deserve
such evils, or what good they can hope for, when
they are afflicted in this way.

They say this or have such thoughts because
they have no sense of justice in these matters.
They cannot appreciate the nature or the excel-

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 2 1 1

lence of the supreme good, and want everything
to correspond with their notion of what it is.
Apart from the highest celestial bodies which are
subject but little to corruption, they have no idea
of a supreme good. Therefore they make the un-
reasonable demand that the bodies of beasts shall
suff er neither death nor corruption, as if they were
not mortal, though they are in the lowest rank, or
were evil because the heavenly bodies are better.

Moreover, the pain suffered by animals enables
us to see a power in the souls of beasts, which is in
its way wonderful and admirable. It shows us how
their souls strive for unity in governing and ani-
mating their bodies. For what else is pain but a
feeling which resists division or corruption?
Hence it is clearer than day that such a soul craves
for unity and is tenacious of it throughout the
whole of its body. Neither willingly nor with in-
difference, but reluctantly and with a struggle, it
meets bodily suffering, and is distressed by the col-
lapse of its unity and soundness. Only the pain of
beasts makes us realise the striving for unity in the
lower living creatures. If we did not realise this,
we should not be sufficiently reminded that every-
thing is constituted by that supreme, sublime, and
ineffable unity of the Creator.

70 Indeed, if you consider the matter reverently
and with care, all beauty and every movement in
the creature claiming the attention of the human
mind, speaks to us and instructs us. With its var-
ious movements and tendencies, as with many dif-

2i2 ST. AUGUSTINE

ferent tongues, it hails us on all sides and bids us
recognise the Creator.

Of all the things that have no sense of pain or
pleasure, there is none that does not acquire
through a certain unity the beauty characteristic
of its type, or at least in some degree stability of its
nature. So too of the things that are sensitive to
the annoyance of pain or the attraction of pleasure,
there is none that does not by the very act of
avoiding pain and seeking pleasure, confess that it
shuns division and seeks unity. In rational souls
every desire of knowledge, in which their nature
takes pleasure, refers all it perceives to the test of
unity, and, when shunning error, shuns nothing
else than confusion and meaningless inconsistency.
What is it that troubles us in inconsistency but that
it has no sure unity? Hence it is clear that every-
thing, whether it inflicts harm or suffers harm,
whether it causes pleasure or is given pleasure, sug-
gests and proclaims the unity of the Creator.

But if ignorance and difficulty with which this
life must necessarily begin, are not natural to souls,
it follows that either they have been undertaken as
a duty or imposed as a punishment. Now I think
we have sufficiently discussed this subject.

THE FIRST MAN'S SIN

24.71 It is more important to inquire in what state the
first man was created than how his descendants
have been propagated.
Those who put the 'problem as follows think

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 2 1 3

they are framing it very cleverly. If the first man
was created wise, how was he seduced? If he was
created foolish, why is not God the cause of vice,
since folly is the greatest vice? As if human nature
might not receive some condition midway between
folly and wisdom, which could be called neither
folly nor wisdom! Only then does a man begin to
be foolish or wise and really deserve to be called
one or the other, when it becomes possible for him
to possess wisdom and when his will is guilty of
wicked folly if he neglects to gain it.

No one is so stupid as to call an infant foolish,
though it would be more absurd to want to call it
wise. An infant can be called neither wise nor
foolish, though it is already a human being. Hence
it is clear that human nature receives a middle
state which cannot rightly be called either folly or
wisdom. And thus if anyone were born in the
same state as those have who lack wisdom through
their own neglect, no one would be right in calling
him foolish, seeing that it was due to nature and
not to vice.

Folly is not any kind of ignorance of what we
should seek and what we should avoid, but it is
vicious ignorance. We do not call an irrational
animal foolish, because it has not been given the
power to become wise. Often, however, we apply
terms in a similar, but not in the same, sense.
Blindness is the worst affliction of the eye, but it is
not an affliction to young puppies, and blindness is
not the right term to use.
72 If, therefore, man was created such that, al-

ST. AUGUSTINE

though he was not yet wise, he could yet be given
a command with the obligation of obeying it, it is
not surprising that he could be led into sin.
Neither was it unjust that he should be punished if
he disobeyed the command, nor is His Creator the
cause of his vices, because the absence of wisdom
was not yet a vice in man, if he had not yet re-
ceived the power to possess it.

Nevertheless man had the means by which, if he
used them well, he could rise to what he did not
possess. To be rational is different from being
wise. By reason every man is made able to recog-
nise the command to which he ought to be faithful
and so carry out what is commanded. As reason
of its very nature makes us recognise the com-
mand, so the observance of the command makes us
gain wisdom; and what nature does in making us
recognise the command, this will does in making
us observe it. As the rational nature is, in a sense,
the merit of receiving the command, so observ-
ance of the command is the merit of receiving wis-
dom.

Now, from the time when man begins to be
capable of receiving the command, from this time
he begins to be capable of sinning. He sins in two
ways before he becomes wise, either by failing to
make himself fit to receive the command, or by not
observing it when he has received it. When he is
wise, a man sins by turning away from wisdom.
As a command is not received from him to whom
the command is given but from him who gives the
command, so wisdom is not received from him

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 215

who is enlightened but from him who gives the
enlightenment.

So, why should not man's Creator be praised?
Man is something good. He is better than a beast
because he is capable of receiving a command.
Man is still better when he has already accepted
the command, and better again when he has obeyed
it. He is best of all when he is happy with the
eternal light of wisdom.

The evil of sin consists in neglect either to grasp
the command, or to observe it, or to practise the
contemplation of wisdom. Hence we can under-
stand how the first man could be led into sin even
though he was created wise. Since this sin arose
from free will, punishment followed by a just law
of God. 62 Thus too the apostle Paul says: Profess-
ing themselves to be wise, they became fools. For
pride turns from wisdom, and folly follows from
this. Folly is a kind of blindness, as the same says,
. . . and their foolish heart was darkened. And
how is it darkened, if not by turning away from
the light of wisdom? How does it come to turn
away, except because man, whose good God is,
wills to be his own good as God is His own good?
Therefore Scripture says: My soul is troubled
within myself and, Taste, and you shall be as
gods. 65

73 Some who consider this matter are troubled by
this questiondid the first man fall from God
through folly, or was lie made foolish by falling?
If you reply that folly made him fall from wisdom,
he will appear to have been foolish before he fell

2i 6 ST. AUGUSTINE

from wisdom, so that folly was the cause of his
falling. Again, if you reply that he was made
foolish by falling, they ask whether he was foolish
or wise in causing himself to fall. If he was wise
in doing so, he acted rightly and committed no sin;
if he was foolish, folly, they say, possessed him al-
ready and made him fall. Without folly he could
not act foolishly.

Hence it is clear that there is a state between
those two by which a man passes from wisdom to
folly; and an act done in this state cannot be called
an act either of folly or of wisdom. In the present
life man can only understand this through what
contradicts it. For no mortal man becomes wise
unless he passes from folly to wisdom. If he makes
this passage foolishly, it would be most absurd to
call it a good action, while if he makes it wisely, it
is also absurd to say that he already possessed wis-
dom before he passed to wisdom. Hence we see
that there is a state between the two which can be
described in neither way. Thus when the first
man left the citadel of wisdom and passed to folly,
the passage was neither foolish nor wise. We find
something similar to this in sleep and waking: to
go to sleep is not the same as to be asleep, nor is to
begin to wake up the same as to be awake, but
there is a passage from one to the other. There is
this difference, however, that the latter actions are
for the most part involuntary, while the former is
always voluntary. It is for this reason that it justly
deserves punishment.
25.74 The will is not drawn to perform an action ex-

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 217

cept when an object is perceived. We have it in
our power to accept or reject something, but we
have no power to decide what the eye shall light
on. We must agree that the soul comes into con-
tact with both higher and lower objects in such a
way that a rational person takes what it chooses
from both, and deserves unhappiness or happiness
in accordance with its choice.

Thus in Paradise among the higher objects per-
ceived was the command of God, among the lower
objects, the temptation of the serpent. It was not
in man's power to determine what the Lord should
command, or what the serpent should suggest as a
temptation. But if he is established in the sound
state of wisdom, he is unshackled by any bond of
difficulty and free not to yield to the seduction of
the lower object perceived. We know this be-
cause the foolish themselves conquer such tempta-
tions when they are about to pass over to wisdom,
even though it is painful to renounce the deadly
pleasure of wicked habits.

THE DEVIL'S SIN

75 The question may be asked at this point: If two
objects were presented to man's consciousness on
either side, one the commandment of God, the
other the temptation of the serpent, how did
the suggestion come to the devil himself to do the
wrong which brought about his fall from his place
on high? Had no object appeared to his sight, he
would not have chosen to do what he did. If no

2i8 ST. AUGUSTINE

such idea had occurred to his mind, he could not
possibly have turned his thoughts to wickedness.
Wherefore, how did that thought, whatever it
was, come into his mind, of striving for what was
to change him from a good angel to a devil? The
will, if it wills at all, must will some object. It can-
not do this unless the object is presented from out-
side through the bodily senses, or comes into the
mind in some hidden way.

Therefore, we must distinguish two kinds of
objects which are perceived. One comes from the
persuasion of a will, as when man sinned by con-
senting to the devil; the other comes from things
which are presented in the natural course to the
attention of the soul, or the bodily senses. If we
ask what is presented to the attention of the soul,
it is not the unchangeable Trinity, for this cannot
be subject to examination but rather transcends the
mind. First, the soul itself is presented to the
attention of the soul, and so we become conscious
that we are alive. Secondly, the body, which the
mind governs, is presented; and that is why for any
action the soul moves the required member at the
required time. Finally, bodily things of every sort
are presented to the bodily senses.
76 The soul in contemplating supreme wisdom
which, being unchangeable, cannot be identified
with the soul also looks at its changeable self and
in some sense comes into its own mind. The reason
is simply that it is distinct from God, and yet is
something capable of causing itself pleasure after
God. It is better if it forgets itself through love

THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE: BOOK THREE 219

of the unchangeable God, or despises itself utterly
in comparison with Him. But if, so to speak, it
goes out of its way to produce a false imitation of
God, and to will to take pleasure in its own power,
then the greater it wishes to become the less it be-
comes in fact. And that is pride, the beginning
of all sin; and the beginning of the pride of man is
to jail off from God.

The devil added malevolent envy to his pride
when he persuaded man to share his pride, through
which he knew he was damned. Hence it was that
man suffered a punishment designed to correct him
rather than to destroy him, so that while the devil
showed himself a model of pride, the Lord should
show Himself a model of humility, through whom
we are promised eternal life. Thus the blood of
Christ having been offered for us after unutterable
distress and pain, we ought to follow Our Saviour
with such love, and be so enraptured by His
brightness, that no lower object may detach us
from so sublime a spectacle. If our attention
should be distracted by any lower desire, the ever-
lasting damnation and torment of the devil ought
to call us back.

THE SUPREME WORTH OF JUSTICE, TRUTH,
AND WISDOM

77 So beautiful is justice, so delightful is eternal
light, that is to say, unchangeable truth and wis-
dom, that, even though we were permitted to abide
in it only for one day, for this alone it would be

22o ST. AUGUSTINE

right and proper to despise countless years of this
life, though filled with pleasures and abundant
temporal goods. Real truth and feeling are ex-
pressed in the words, Far better is one day in
Thy courts above thousands* 7 They may also be
taken in another sense: a thousand days might
mean time and its changes, while one day means
unchangeable eternity.

I do not know whether I have failed to answer
any of your questions, so far as the Lord has
deigned to grant me power. Even if anything
occurs to you, the limits of this book compel me
to come to an end and to take some rest after our
discussion.

APPENDIX

ST. AUGUSTINE'S REVIEW (A.D. 427) OF
THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE

Retractations bk. i ch. 9

While we were still staying at Rome, we wished to de-
bate and trace out the cause of evil. Our plan of debate
aimed at understanding by means of thorough rational
inquiry so far as, with God's help, discussion should
enable us what we believed about this question on divine
authority. After careful examination of the arguments
we agreed that evil occurred only through free choice of
will, and so the three books resulting from this discussion
were called The Problem of Free Choice. I finished the
second and third of these books, as well as I could at the
time, in Africa, after I was ordained priest at Hippo
Regius.

2. In these books we discussed so many problems that
some questions arose, which either I could not solve, or
which required long consideration before they could be
decided, and these we put off. But whatever the answer
to these questions, or even if there were many answers,
when it was not clear where the truth lay, the conclusion
nevertheless came to this, that, whatever the truth, rightly
and obviously praise should be given to God. We under-
took this discussion because of those who deny that evil is
due to free choice of will and who maintain that God, if
this is so, deserves blame as the Creator of every kind of
thing. Thus they wish in their wicked error they are

221

222

APPENDIX

the Manichees to introduce a being, evil in nature, which
is unchangeable and coeternal with God. As this was
why we raised the problem, these books contain no ref-
erence to God's grace, by which He has predestined His
elect in such a way that He Himself makes ready the wills
of those among them who are now making use of free
choice. When there was any occasion for mentioning this
grace, it was mentioned in passing, not defended by care-
ful reasoning as if it was the main subject. It is one thing
to inquire into the cause of evil, another to inquire how
we can return to our former good, or reach one that is
greater.

3. Hence the recent Pelagian heretics, who hold a
theory of free choice of will which leaves no place for the
grace of God, since they hold it is given in accordance
with our merits, must not boast of my support. I said
much in these books in defence of free choice, which was
called for by the purpose of the discussion. In the first
book I said indeed that 'wrongdoing is punished by God's
justice,' and added, 'it would not be punished justly, unless
it were done wilfully' [ i . i . i ] . Again, when I showed that
a good will was so great a good that it was rightly pre-
ferred to all bodily and external goods, I said: 'I think you
now see that it lies in the power of our will whether we
enjoy or lack this great and true good. What is so fully
in the power of the will as the will itself?' [1.12.26].
And in another place: 'Then what reason is there for
doubting that, even though we were never wise before,
yet by our will we deserve, and spend, a praiseworthy and
happy life, and by our will a life that is shameful and un-
happy?' [1.13.28], Again, in another place: 'Hence it
follows that whoever wishes to live rightly and virtuously,

Retractations 1.9 223

if he wishes so to wish in preference to goods which are
but passing, will acquire this great possession with such
ease, that to wish for it will be the same as to possess what
he wished' [1.13.29]. Again, I said elsewhere: 'The eter-
nal law, to the consideration of which it is now time to
return, has settled this with unchangeable firmness; it has
settled that merit lies in the will, while reward and punish-
ment lie in happiness and misery' [1.14.30], And in an-
other place: 'We have agreed that it lies in the will what
each man chooses to seek and attach himself to' [1.16.34].
And in the second book: 'Man himself is something good
in so far as he is man, for he can live rightly when he so
wills' [2.1.2]. In another place I said 'that we could not
act rightly except by this free choice of will' [2.18.47].
And in the third book: 'What need is there to ask the
source of that movement by which the will turns from the
unchangeable good to the changeable good? We agree
that it belongs only to the soul, and is voluntary and
therefore culpable; and the whole value of teaching in this
matter consists in its power to make us censure and check
this movement, and turn our wills away from temporal
things below us to enjoyment of the everlasting good 7
[3.1.2]. And in another place: 'The voice of truth speaks
clearly in what you say. You could not be aware of any-
thing in our power, if not of our actions when we will.
Nothing is so fully in our power as the will itself, for it is
ready at once and without delay to act as we will' [3.3.7] .
Again in another place, If you are praised when you see
what you ought to do, though you only see this in Him
who is unchangeable truth, how much more should He be
praised who has ordered you to will what you ought to
do, and has given you the power to carry it out, and has

224 APPENDIX

not allowed you to refuse it unpunished!' Then I added,
'If everyone owes that which he has received, and if man
has been so made that he sins necessarily, then his duty is
to sin. Therefore, when he sins, he does what he ought
to do. But if it is wicked to say this, then no one is forced
by his own nature to sin' [3.16.46]. And again: 'Now
what could precede the will and be its cause? Either it
is the will itself, and nothing else than the will is the root,
or it is not the will which is not sinful. Either the will
itself is the original cause of sin, or no sin is the original
cause of sin. Sin cannot be attributed to anything except
to the sinner. It cannot rightly be attributed to anything
except to him who wills it' [3.17.49]. And a little later:
TSlo one sins when he cannot guard against it. Yet sin is
committed, and therefore we can guard against it'
[3.18.50]. Pelagius used this evidence of mine in a book
of his. When I answered this book, I chose for the title of
my book, The Problem of Nature and Grace.
-? 4. In these and similar statements of mine I did not
mention God's grace, as this was not the subject I was then
dealing with. Hence the Pelagians think, or may think,
that I held their views. They are wrong, however, in
thinking so. It is the will by which we sin and by which
we live rightly, as I explained in these passages. Unless,
therefore, the will itself is set free by the grace of God
from that slavery by which it has been made a servant of
sin, and unless it is given help to overcome its vices, mortal
men cannot live upright and devout lives. If this gift of
God, by which the will is set free, did not precede the act
of the will, it would be given in accordance with the will's
merits, and would not be grace which is certainly given as
a free gift. I have dealt sufficiently with this subject in

Retractations 1.9 225

other small works of mine, in which I have refuted these
recent heretics who oppose this view of grace. Yet even
in this book, The Problem of Free Choice, which was not
written against them at all, but against the Manichees, I
was not entirely silent about this grace of God, which
they attempt with unspeakable wickedness to deny. In
fact I said in the second book that, 'not to speak of great
goods, not even the least can exist except as coming from
Him from whom come all good things, that is, from God. 5
And a little later I stated: 'The virtues by which we live
rightly are great goods, but all kinds of bodily beauty,
without which we can live rightly, are the least goods.
The powers of the soul, without which we cannot live
rightly, are the middle goods. No one uses the virtues
wrongly, but anyone can use the other goods, the middle
and the least, wrongly as well as rightly. No one uses
virtue wrongly, because the work of virtue is the good use
of those things which we are capable of using wrongly.
No one makes a bad use when he makes a good use.
Hence the magnificent abundance of God's goodness has
furnished us not only with great goods, but also with the
middle and the least. His goodness should be praised
more highly for great than for middle goods, more for
middle than for least, but for all more than if He had not
given all' [2.19.50]. And in another place: 'Only keep
firm your sense of reverence towards God, so that no good
may occur either to your senses, your intelligence, or your
thoughts in any way, which you do not acknowledge to
be from God' [2.20.54]. I also said in another place:
'But, though man fell through his own will, he cannot rise
through his own will Therefore let us believe firmly that

226 APPENDIX

God's arm, that is, Our Lord Jesus Christ, is stretched out
to us from on high' [ibid.].

5. In the third book after the words which, as I have
mentioned, Pelagius quoted from my works c No one sins
when he cannot guard against it. Yet sin is committed,
and therefore we can guard against it' I added at once:
'Nevertheless some actions done in ignorance are judged
wrong and in need of correction, as we read in the divine
documents. For example, the Apostle says: I obtained the
mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly; and the Prophet
says: The sins of my youth and my ignorance do not re-
member. Actions done of necessity when a man wills to
act rightly and cannot, are also judged wrong. Hence the
words: For the good which I will, I do not; but the evil
which I will not, that I do; and, To will is present with
me, but to accomplish that which is good I find not; and,
The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against
the flesh; for these are contrary one to another, so that you
do not the things that you would. But all this applies to
men as they appear on the scene after the condemnation
of death; for if this does not stand for man's punishment,
but his natural condition, then there is no question of sin.
If man has not lost his natural kind of being, and if he can-
not become better, he does what he ought when he acts in
this way. But if man would be good if he were consti-
tuted differently, and he is not good because he is in his
present condition; if he has not the power to become
good, whether because he does not see what he ought to
be, or because he sees and yet cannot be what he sees he
ought to be, then this is surely a punishment. Now every
punishment is a punishment for sin, if it is just, and is called
a penalty; but if the punishment is unjust, since none

Retractations 1.9 227

doubts it is a punishment, it is imposed on man by an un-
just ruler. But it would be folly to doubt the omnipo-
tence and justice of God, and therefore this punishment
must be just, and be exacted for some sin. No unjust ruler
could have snatched man away from God without His
knowledge, or taken him by force against God's will,
whether by threat or violence, in order to inflict torture
on him as an unjust punishment. No one can frighten
God, or struggle with Him. It remains, therefore, that
this is a just punishment resulting from man's condemna-
tion' [3.18.50 f.]. And in another place I said: To ap-
prove false for true, so as to err unwillingly, and to be
unable to refrain from acts of passion on account of the
resistance and pain of the bonds of the flesh, are not nat-
ural to man in his original state, but are a punishment after
his condemnation. When we speak of a will free to act
rightly, we speak of the will with which man was created'
[3.18.52].

6. Thus, long before the Pelagian heresy arose, we de-
bated as though we were already debating against them.
For we stated that all good things come from God the
great, the middle, and the least goods; among the middle
goods is found free choice of will since we can use it
wrongly, but yet it is such that we cannot live rightly
without it. To use it well is at once virtue, and virtue is
found among the great goods which no one can use
wrongly. Because all good things, as I have saidgreat,
middle, and leastcome from God, it follows that from
God comes the good use of free will, which is virtue and
is counted among the great goods. Then I spoke of the
misery, justly inflicted on sinners, from which the grace
of God frees them, because man could fall of his own

228 APPENDIX

accord, that is, by his free choice, but could not rise in this
way. The misery, to which we are justly condemned,
involves ignorance and difficulty, which every man suffers
from the moment of his birth, nor is anyone delivered
from this evil except by the grace of God. The Pelagians
refuse to attribute this misery to a just condemnation,
since they deny original sin. Yet, even though ignorance
and difficulty were the original and natural state of man,
we ought not on this account to blame God, but to praise
Him. We argued this in the same third book. This dis-
cussion is to be regarded as aimed against the Manichees,
who do not recognise as Sacred Scripture the Old Testa-
ment, where the story of original sin is told. What we
read in the Apostolic Epistles they have the dreadful
effrontery to claim is a falsification of Scripture and not
the genuine record of the Apostles. But against the Pela-
gians we have to defend both deposits of Scripture, which
Scripture they profess to accept. This work begins with
the words, 'I should like you to tell me: is not God the
cause of evil?'

NOTES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACW Ancient Christian Writers (Westminster, Md

London 1946-).

CSEL Corpus scriptomm ecclesiasticorum latinorum (Vi-

enna 18 66-).

DTC Dictionnaire de theologie catholique (Paris 190 3-).

Green TN W. M. Green, 'Textual Notes on Augustine's De
llbero arbitrio? Revue de fhilologie de litterature
et d^histoire anciennes 28 (1954) 21-29.

PL J. P. Migne, Patrologia latina (Paris 1857-66).

Thonnard F. J. Thonnard, Bibliotheque Augustinienne,
Oeuvres de Saint Augustin, l re Serie, Opuscules 6:
Dialogues philosophiques 3. De Fame a Dieu (Paris
1941) 123 ff.

INTRODUCTION

1 Retract. 1.9.1 f. (cf. the Appendix).

2 Ibid. 1.9.2.

3 Contra Secundinum 11: 'The less anything is, so much the
nearer it is to nothing. When these defects are due to free will,
they are rightly blamed and called sins. But when these volun-
tary defects are followed by misfortune, trouble, grief, and pain,
all of which we suffer against our will, sins are rightly punished
by penalties, or washed away by devout practices. If you are
willing to consider this calmly, you will cease to accuse the na-
tures of things, and to make a charge against the substances
themselves. If you wish for a fuller or more complete discussion

23!

232 NOTES

of this matter, read my three books which have the title, De
Hbero arbitrio: you can find them at Nola in Campania, in the
hands of the excellent servant of God, Paulinus.'

4 This account is taken from F. G Burkitt's chapter 14 in The
Cambridge Ancient History 12 (Cambridge 1939) 504-514: 'Mani
and the Manichees.' See also, among others, H. C. Puech, Le
Manicheisme, son fondateur, sa doctrine (Paris 1949).

5 G. Bardy, 'Manicheisme,' DTC 9.2 (1927), 1841-95.

6 Contra Faustum Manichaeum (CSEL 25,1.249-797). On
Manichaeism and Augustine as its onetime ardent disciple, see the
chapters by J. J. O'Meara, The Young Augustine (London
1954) 61-115.

7 Cf. R. Hedde-. Amann, Telagianisme,' DTC 12.1 (1933)
675-715.
8 Cf. fi. Amann, 'Semi-Pelagiens,' DTC 14.2 (1941) 1796-1850.

9 See Retract. 1.9.2-6.

10 J. Bumaby, Amor Dei. A Study of the Religion of St.
Augustine (London 1938) 184.

11 See Augustine, Ep. 31.7.

12 Augustine, Ep. 166.7 cf. also below, n. 54 to the third book.

13 J. H. S. Burleigh, The City of God. A study of St. Augus-
tine's Philosophy (London 1949) 72.

14 Cf. De dono perseverantiae 26 f. (written 428-29): C I argued
against them [the Manichees] in my book about free choice, and
hence they think they have a complaint to make against me.
When the authority of Scripture was unavailing against such
perversity, I did not wish to give a complete solution to the very
difficult questions which occurred, for fear that the work should
be too long. I was able to prove by unanswerable arguments
(I actually did so, without definitely using Scripture, leaving aside
the truth of any part of it), that God should be praised in all
things, and that there was no need whatever to believe, as they
wish to do, that there are two coeternal substances of good and
evil confounded together.

Then, in the first book of the Retractations, a work of mine
which you have not yet read, when I came to review my book,
The Problem of Free Choice, I wrote as follows [extracts follow
from Retract. 1.9] .... This I said in the first book of the Re-
tractations, when I reviewed my book on free choice. Nor did
I only say what I have quoted about this book, but much more,
which I felt unnecessarily long to insert in what I am writing

INTRODUCTION 233

for you. This, I think, will be your judgment when you have
read it all. So in the third book about free choice I argued in
such a way about children that, even though the Pelagians were
right in saying that ignorance and difficulty, without which no
man is born, belonged to our original nature and were not pun-
ishments, nevertheless the Manichees would be refuted who wish
to hold that there are two coeternal natures of good and evil.'

15 Cf. Concessions 9.17; also the note to the same and to 8.15
by J. Gibb W. Montgomery, The Confessions of Augustine
(Cambridge 1908) 252, 218.

16 Ibid. 9.31.

17 These letters are the following numbers in the Augustinian
collection: Evod. to Augv- 158, 160, 161, 163; Aug. to Evod.
159, 162, 164, 169. H. Pope, St. Augustine of Hippo (London
1937) 121 f. (omitting some of the references), writes: 'His
[Evodius'] devotion to Augustine is touching. He writes him
long letters on doctrinal subjects and Augustine takes it for
granted that he has copies of his works such as the De Vera
Religione, De Quantitate Animae, De Libero Arbitrio, etc. In
fact in the two last-named Evodius was one of the disputants, as
Augustine reminds him: "You ask a lot of questions of a very
busy man, and what is worse, you seem to think the answers to
such questions can be dictated off-hand, though the problems
presented are so difficult that even when carefully dictated or
written the answers can hardly be brought within the grasp of
even such a mind as yours. . . . But if you will but recall points
that you know well, or at least, unless I am mistaken, did once
know well, though you may possibly have forgotten the discus-
sions we had together and which I committed to writing,
whether De Quantitate Animae or De Libero Arbitrio, you will
find there the answer to your questions" (Ep. 162.2, A.D. 415).
Only with an intimate friend could Augustine have indulged in
the above ironical remark about Evodius* intellectual capacity;
only to one knit to him in the closest friendship could he have
said: "See what (a long letter) a busy man like me has contrived
to write to a lazy man like you!" (Ep. 169.12).

'Evodius was certainly not dull-witted. For when trouble
arose in a certain monastery owing to the failure of the monks
to understand Augustine's teaching on grace and predestination
the Abbot, Valentinus, wrote to Evodius for counsel ... He
also had the privilege of a quasi martyrdom, for the Council held

234 NOTES

at Carthage on June 26, 404, sent him and Theodosius to Rome
to state the Catholic case against the enormities perpetrated by
the Donatists, and a later Council sent them on the same errand.
Petilian inveighed against these ambassadors . . . , but he was
careful not to say that his fellow Donatists had scourged and
grievously wounded them both on their return from their em-
bassy in A.D. 408. '

On Evodius see also J. M. Colleran's introduction to his trans-
lation of Augustine's De quantitate animae: ACW 9.4 f.

TEXT: BOOK ONE

1 C. J. Perl, Aurelius Augustinus: Der freie Wille (Paderborn
1947) 189, calls attention to the abrupt, almost brusque, character
of the question which introduces the present inquiry. Presup-
posed, so he states, are many detailed discussions of the Mani-
chaean theory that evil is an independent principle, eternally
existent and unchangeable in the presence of the good. Presup-
posed is the denial and refutation of such dualism there is only
one original and eternal principle, the good, God, the Creator
of all. Evil originated, physical and moral evil: it originated in
the free will of man. But the free will of created man was cre-
ated by God; and at this stage of the discussion the Manichee, in
the words of Evodius, is prompted to ask the fateful question:
Did not God, therefore, the Creator of all things, also cause and
create evil sin?

2 This is the first of the considerable number of passages in the
De liber o arbitrio which Augustine quotes (Retract. 1.9.3) as
claimed by the Pelagians in support of their doctrine.

3 We have used 'teaching 7 to translate the Latin discipline,
which is derived from discere, to learn.' The dictionary gives
for disciplina, as its primary meaning, 'instruction, tuition, teach-
ing, in the widest sense of the word,' and as a secondary meaning,
learning, knowledge, science, discipline.' The literal translation
of this sentence is, 'teaching (disciplma) is only derived from
learning (a discendo)? but if we use 'teaching' for discipline we
cannot bring out the meaning in English in a literal translation.

The argument of this passage is more easily understood if we
realise that disciplina means teaching in the widest sense, and is
therefore almost equivalent to education. We then understand
that it stands for something which is plainly good, and which
Evodius at once recognises to be a good. Moreover we must

BOOK ONE 235

remember that St. Augustine considered evil to be at root a de-
fect or failure, in itself negative rather than positive, and there-
fore in so far as teaching is positively given, he can argue that it
must be good, since teaching of evil would really be a failure to
teach.

4 Isa. 7.9, according to the Septuagint reading.

5 This is the main problem with which the De libero arbhrio
deals: we have to try to understand what we believe about the
origin of evil.

In many places throughout his works St. Augustine repeats in
one form or another the advice that we should believe first in
order to understand. The emphasis he lays on this principle, and
the influence it had on succeeding generations, e.g. on St. Anselm,
who also laid great stress on it, obliges us to examine its meaning,
At first sight it looks paradoxical, and has often been misunder-
stood. Are we urged to a blind faith, unsupported by evidence?

( 1 ) The first point we should notice is that St, Augustine cer-
tainly does not recommend a blind faith, when he says we should
believe in order to understand. He fully acknowledges that
evidence is, and should be, required, before the assent of faith.
This is plainly shown in many passages in his writings, and a few
examples may be given. 'Far be it that God should hate that in
us wherein He has created us higher than other living things.
Far be it, I say, that we should believe so as not to find the reason
or to seek it, since we could not ever believe, unless we had ra-
tional souls. ... If then it is reasonable that faith should precede
reason in regard to those great facts which we cannot yet grasp,
without doubt some degree of reason which makes us act in this
way, also precedes faith' (Ep. 120.1.3). Again: 'Understand,
therefore, that you may believe: believe that you may under-
stand. I tell you shortly how we carry out both without con-
tradiction. Understand my word, in order to believe it; believe
the word of God, in order to understand it' (Serm. 43.7.9).
Again: We believe those things which our senses do not per-
ceive, if the evidence for them seems adequate. . . . We are right
in saying we know not only those things which we have seen or
now see, but also those things which we believe, persuaded by
evidence or by witnesses suitable in any case' (Ep. 147.2.7-3.8).
Many other passages might be quoted (See E. Portalie, 'Augustin
(Saint),' DTC 1.2 [1903] 2338 f.), but these are sufficient to show
that St. Augustine required rational evidence to justify belief. In

236 NOTES

the De libero arbitrio, when in the second book he sets out to
prove the existence of God, he starts from the fundamental truth
of our own existence, fetienne Gilson points out that St. Au-
gustine's purely philosophic refutation of scepticism implies that
in his view reason can attain certain truths without the help of
faith (Introd. d F etude de S. Augustin [2 ed. Paris 1943] 41).

(2) Yet faith is the essential means, according to St. Augustine,
even for knowledge, if it is to have real value. We shall appre-
ciate this, if we follow his teaching about wisdom (sapientia).
Wisdom is the only kind of knowledge which is ultimately valu-
able, because wisdom alone will lead us to the perfect happiness
of the Beatific Vision. Thonnard (486 f.) gives a clear and use-
ful summary of his teaching.

In the De Trinitate (cf, esp. 12.15.25, 13.19.24, 14.1.1-3) St.
Augustine tells us that knowledge (scientia) is the work of the
lower reason, which looks at things from the temporal and human
point of view. By itself knowledge tends to make us enjoy
creatures as an end in themselves, and thus is a source of evil: it
leads to pride which is the primary sin. On the other hand,
wisdom is the work of the higher reason, and judges from the
point of view of the eternal types, the divine ideas. It is the fruit
of illumination given by the Word, and so implies absolute de-
tachment from self and creatures. The soul, however, which
possesses wisdom, does not give up knowledge, for we need
knowledge to guide us through temporal things on our way to-
wards eternal life. It is normally through the study of creatures
that we reach contemplation of the eternal truths, and thus knowl-
edge acquires a true value if it is used as a means to wisdom. In
addition to wisdom and knowledge there is spiritual understand-
ing, which lies between the other two, though nearer to wisdom.
Spiritual understanding perfects faith, and gives a true, though
imperfect, understanding of revealed truth. For it gives us tlie
whole truth, but in an obscure and veiled form. Spiritual under-
standing and wisdom reveal to us its meaning, the first rather in
a speculative form, the second in a fuller way, since it is inspired
by charity and unites us to God.

Thus St. Augustine teaches us to believe in order to under-
stand, because he means by understanding that grasp of truth
which is finally perfected in the Beatific Vision. It is never to
be forgotten that the Augustinian "intellect" is not the discursive
reason but the mind at worship': thus J. Burnaby, Amor Dei,

BOOK ONE 237

A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine (London 1938), 155.
A merely human and temporal understanding he regards as of
little value, because it does not lead us to the ultimate truth
wherein our final happiness lies. The faith which St. Augustine
refers to when he speaks of belief in this connection, is faith ac-
companied by charity and involving a moral and spiritual purifi-
cation. We must distinguish between the early stage of faith in
which the believer sees for certain that what he believes is true,
but does not yet understand at all clearly what it means, and the
later stage when he gains a fuller understanding. Tor faith has
its eyes by which in some way it sees that to be true which it
does not yet see, and by which it sees most certainly that it does
not yet see what it believes' (Ep. 120.2.8). Gilson puts this
clearly. To St. Augustine, he states (46), it is faith which tells us
what there is to understand, and faith which purifies the heart
and renders reason able to understand what God reveals. When
St. Augustine speaks of understanding, he always means the re-
sult of a rational activity to which faith opens the door. 'Under-
standing is the reward of faith. Therefore do not seek to
understand that you may believe, but believe that you may
understand' (In loan. Evang. 29.6). Again: 'Our hearts are
cleansed by faith that they may be able to be fit to see. For we
walk now by faith, not yet by sight 7 (Enarr. in P$. 123.2).
Finally, there is a well-known passage in which St. Augustine
sums up his teaching on this subject: 'Who does not see that
thought precedes belief? No one believes anything unless he has
first thought it should be believed. . . . Yet belief itself is noth-
ing else than thought accompanied by assent. For not everyone
who thinks believes; many think so as not to believe. But every-
one who believes thinks, and thinks by belief and believes by
thought' (De praed. sanct. 2.5).

(3) We must remember throughout that St. Augustine does
not use the terminology developed by the later theologians.
Thus St. Thomas makes a clear distinction between human faith
based on the authority of men, and supernatural faith based on
the authority of God, who reveals truths necessary for eternal
life. St. Augustine does not distinguish explicitly between these
two kinds of faith, but passes from one to the other without
clearly expressing the difference. He writes in this way in the
De magistro, for example, and also in the De utilitate credendi,
where he refers to the natural belief children have that their

238 NOTES

parents are really their parents, a belief based on evidence but not
on personal knowledge, and so goes on to argue the necessity of
divine faith before we can understand the things of God (see
Thonnard 484 f.).

(4) We should notice also that when St. Augustine discusses
the relation between faith and reason, he does not have in mind
precisely the same problems as are usually referred to in modern
discussions on this subject. Gilson points this out (op. cit. 41).
St. Augustine, he says, certainly agreed that there were truths,
such as the truths of mathematics, which could be known by
reason and not only by faith, but this was not quite the kind of
problem he had in mind when he discussed the relation between
belief and knowledge. Nor had he in mind the problem of the
precise degree and kind of certainty which should accompany
faith, in the form in which it is discussed at the present day.

(5) This brings us to the question which is often asked, and
which follows from the considerations just mentioned: does St.
Augustine have a system of philosophy to teach apart from a
system of theology? St. Thomas distinguishes philosophy as a
discipline which works on purely rational evidence, from the-
ology which works from revealed truth. To St. Augustine,
however, philosophy is love of wisdom, and its object is the
possession of that wisdom which will lead us to supernatural
happiness. Reason by itself, he maintains, cannot achieve this.
He does not make a distinction explicitly between the two dis-
ciplines; he is thinking nearly always of the problem of human
knowledge from the supernatural standpoint. Nevertheless his
writings contain many arguments which are based on purely
natural reasoning, and we can, if we like, pick them out, and
compose a philosophy of the natural, as opposed to the Christian
and supernatural order, even though St. Augustine did not do
this himself. To help us to understand St. Augustine's attitude
we may take an example from that part of the De Hbero arbitrio
in which he is discussing the proof for the existence of God.
Evodius first suggests the evidence from Scripture for God's exist-
ence as sufficient proof. Augustine accepts this, though he goes
on to argue from reason alone. What he seems to imply is that
faith in God, based on the evidence from Scripture, is reasonable,
but that by examining the purely rational argument we shall
deepen our understanding or what is involved (cf. Thonnard
499). Thus it is not only in regard to such doctrines as that of

BOOK ONE 239

the Trinity that faith precedes understanding, but even such a
doctrine as that of the existence of God, for which there are
rational grounds apart from faith, may be rightly accepted first
by faith. In short, St. Augustine has in mind the individual in
real life whose happiness consists in the attainment of super-
natural wisdom based on faith, but whose beliefs are partly based
on reason alone. For him in practice there is no separate domain
where only natural reason presides, although it is possible for him
to compose a system of natural reasoning, and to reckon up the
truths which can be accepted on this kind of evidence and apart
from faith.

F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy 2 (Westminster, Md.,
1950) 48 f., sums up the position as follows: 'It is not that Augus-
tine failed to recognise, still less that he denied, the intellect's
power of attaining truth without revelation; it is rather that he
regarded the Christian wisdom as one whole, that he tried to
penetrate by his understanding the Christian faith and to see the
world and human life in the light of the Christian wisdom. He
knew quite well that rational arguments can be adduced for
God's existence, for example, but it was not so much the mere
intellectual assent to God's existence that interested him as the
real assent, the positive adhesion of the will to God, and he knew
that in the concrete such an adhesion to God requires divine
grace. In short, Augustine did not play two parts, the part of
the theologian and the part of the philosopher who considers the
"natural man"; he thought rather of man as he is in the concrete,
fallen and redeemed mankind, man who is able indeed to attain
truth but who is constantly solicited by God's grace and who
requires grace in order to appropriate the truth that saves.'

6 We have translated the Latin libido by 'passion,' as perhaps the
nearest English equivalent, though 'passion' may suggest a merely
passive state whereas libido implies a positive and active force.
This latter characteristic is made clear in the following: There
is, first of all, a factor in the soul which Augustine calls libido or
cupiditas. It is the source of appetition, of desire in general; it
may even designate the act of desire. Care should be taken, by
those who are accustomed to some other type of psychology, not
to confuse this cupiditas with either sensual appetite or intel-
lectual appetite exclusively. It is not a faculty, at least not in the
precise Aristotelico-Thomistic sense, and it is not called into play

240 NOTES

by sensory perception alone, though it errs by choosing the
things of the senses rather than higher goods. In this respect
Augustine now unifies the appetitive part of the soul and uses
the term will (voluntas) to designate it' (V. J. Bourke, Augus-
tine's Quest of Wisdom [Milwaukee 1945] 91 f.).

To St. Augustine concupiscentia and libido 'signified a desire
already disordered and perverted, the flesh in revolt against the
spirit' (cf. Burnaby, op. cit, 59). It is clear that St. Augustine is
not here using cupiditas exclusively in a bad sense, since below,
in 1.4.10, he says that wrong actions are wrong because they are
done through libido, and adds that libido is a blameworthy
cupiditas.

7 The argument is that, just in so far as the murder is com-
mitted from the desire to live without fear, the motive is good,
though murder will not achieve this desire. Evil desire is not
the direct motive of this murder, because the desire which is its
direct motive is good. It is not libido or passion which makes an
action wrong. If this were so, there might be a murder which
was not a sin, since a murder might be committed from some
motive other than evil desire,

8 In the Benedictine edition there is a note to say that in pre-
vious editions confusion had occurred in some places in assign-
ing the text to the speakers. Here in these editions Augustine
continued to 'by killing a man,' while Evodius began again at 'I
agree,' and then Augustine again at 'Answer this question.' Such
mistakes were rectified by reference to the MSS.

9 This point is never in fact dealt with.

10 Here again there was a mistake in the earlier editions. The
whole passage down to 'does not seern to me to be a law' is as-
signed to Evodius, and Augustine continues 'I see pretty well'
until the beginning of 13. The sense and the MSS are against
this arrangement. Here, as in 9 above, Perl, op. cit., follows
the earlier tradition.

11 The word, translated here by 'subjects/ is popzilus, fopulus
or 'people' is used by St. Augustine in this and other similar pas-
sages for the people as a social body, and in contrast to the gov-
ernment. See Thonnard 492, who refers to the De civitate Dei
(esp. 2.21.2), where St. Augustine defines populus in this way.

12 In the earlier editions: E. I find it much harder. ... A.
No law may find them guilty. ... E, So I think that that law. . . .

13 These remarks of St. Augustine on popular government raise

BOOK ONE 241

the question of his political theory. He never wrote a special
work on this subject, but the circumstances of his life compelled
him to deal from time to time with particular aspects of it. From
these partial discussions it is possible to gather a fairly complete
general notion of his theory, with its emphasis on authority as
the foundation of society, on law and justice, on the relations
between Church and State. He was much influenced by Cicero,
whose De legibus he had carefully studied, but he did not merely
repeat Cicero's teaching; he adapted it to his Christian outlook.
God is the source of order and law not only in human life but
throughout the universe, and He gives to each thing its nature
and the opportunities it has to develop, directing it by means of
the temporal law, which may change, being adapted to changing
things, and which depends for its force on the unchanging eternal
law (see Thonnard 492 f.).

Thus we can see what was the place in St. Augustine's scheme
for a Christian state, but the question may be asked: how does
all this apply if the state is not Christian? We must not suppose
that in Augustine's eyes the non-Christian state is outside God's
purpose altogether. To quote Copleston, op. cit. 2.89: 'This does
not mean, of course, that in Augustine's eyes the State exists in
a non-moral sphere: on the contrary, the same moral law holds
good for States as for individuals. The point he wants to make
is that the State will not embody true justice, will not be a really
moral State, unless it is a Christian State: it is Christianity which
makes men good citizens. The State itself, as an instrument of
force, has its roots in the consequences of original sin and, given
the fact of original sin and its consequences, is a necessary insti-
tution; but a just State is out of the question unless it is a Chris-
tian State.' See also W, Cunningham, St. Austin and His Place in
the History of Christian Thought (London 1886) 192 f.; Gilson,
op. cit. 229 f.; J. Mausbach, Die Ethik de$ Heiligen Augustinus
(2 ed. Freiburg i. Br. 1929) 1.326-50.

14 The supreme type or reason which governs things: their
exemplar cause. The Latin word is ratio, for which there is no
satisfactory English equivalent, covering all its different shades of
meaning. St. Thomas, Summa theoL I-H Q. 93 art. 1., after
referring to this passage in the De libero arbitrio, says: 'As there
pre-exists in any artist the type (ratio) of those things which are
made by his art, so too in any ruler there must pre-exist the type
of the order of those things to be done by the subjects of his rule.

242 NOTES

As the type of the things to be made by an art is called the art, or
exemplar, of the things to be made, so too the type in the man
who rules the acts of his subjects acquires the character (ratio)
of law, if the other conditions are observed which we mentioned
above about the character of law in Q. 90. But God by His
wisdom is the Creator of all things; to them He has the relation
of the artist to the work of art, as was explained in I Q. 14 art. 8.
He is also the ruler of all the acts and movements to be found in
each creature, as was also explained in I Q. 103 art. 5. Hence,
as the type of the divine wisdom, in so far as through it all things
are created, has the character (ratio) of an art or exemplar or
idea, so the type of the divine wisdom, moving all things to their
due end, acquires the character (ratio) of law. Thus the eternal
law is nothing else than the type of the divine wisdom, so far as
it directs all acts and movements.'

15 We have translated beatus as 'happy,' but it should be re-
membered that beatus does not mean 'happy' in any restricted
sense; it means 'happy' in the fullest and highest sense. Cf.
Augustine's own De beata vita, and Gilson, op. tit. 1-10; also B.
Roland-Gosselin, 'St. Augustine's System of Morals,' in A Monu-
ment to St. Augustine (London 1945) 228-33.

16 This phrase, impressa nobis, should be noticed in connection
with St. Augustine's theory of knowledge which will be discussed
later on (see 245 n.2).

17 Prof. Green TN 23 reads eminuit, 'as has appeared clearly,'
instead of emicwt.

18 Reading with the manuscripts and Prof. Green PN 23:
'quoniam scire' for 'quam scire.' For the distinction between
St. Augustine's use of knowledge and of understanding see notes
5 and 19; also note 2 to Book 2.

19 St. Augustine does not usually regard the soul's faculties as
distinct from the soul itself: he finds an image of the Trinity in
the soul because memory, understanding, and will make up one
single soul (De Trin. 10.11.18). Yet he has to distinguish differ-
ent functions of the soul, and his use of terms is not always clear.
Thonnard (493 f.) suggests the following classification:

First, there is the distinction between the vital principle which
St. Augustine simply calls vita or life, and which is common to
all living things on every level, and the two kinds of soul, anima
and animus, the first being common to man and animals, the
second peculiar to man. This last, the soul capable of reasoning,

BOOK ONE 243

has a higher part where wisdom resides and which is called mens
or mind. Anima, animus, and mens correspond roughly in
Plotinus to lower soul or 'nature,' higher soul, and intellect. The
line between the last two is sometimes so sharply drawn in
Plotinus as to make the intellect hardly part of our personality
at all, but elsewhere the distinction almost disappears.

Further, Augustine notes four degrees of knowledge. First,
there are the external senses which act by means of physical
sense organs. Secondly, the inner sense whose work is to direct
the activity of the external senses, and which is part of the anima
since it exists in animals as well as men. Thirdly, there is reason
in the strict sense, that is, the lower reason, which has the work
of arranging things in classes. Fourthly, there is the higher
reason, the understanding, intellectus or intelligently by which
the soul contemplates the eternal types or ideas and God Him-
selfthe faculty of wisdom.

Corresponding to these two higher levels of knowledge there
are concupiscence which follows lower reason, and will which
follows higher reason, and where resides the love of God.

I may quote here from an earlier translator and commentator
in the series-]. J. O'Meara, St. Augustine, Against the Academ-
ics: ACW 12. 169 n. 6:

In general he [St. Augustine] speaks of the anima (soul) as
that which with the body makes up the human composite (C.
Acad. 1.9; De ord. 2.6, 19); of the anlmits (spirit) as the intel-
lectual, as opposed to the sensitive or vegetative, part of the
anima (De ord. 2.6); of the mens (mind) as a faculty of the
animus (Epist. 3.4), which is capable of a lower discursive
function (De ord. 2.30, 38, 40, 50) called ratio (reason), and a
higher intuitional function (De ord. 2.17, 19, 41-42; Epist. 3.4;
8.2) called intellectus (intellection).'

20 In earlier editions Evodius continues until '. . . does not
exercise its control.' Then Augustine begins, 'Please do this
yourself . . . ,' and goes on, 'at least you can easily remem-
ber. . . .'

21 This refers to 16 and 17.

22 One of the earlier editions has 'they are not in control, 7 in
the plural. The singular, however, gives better sense: 'it (the
mind) is not in control.'

23 'Whatever kind of being': the Latin is natwa, a word which
St. Augustine uses fairly frequently later in the dialogue. He

244 NOTES

explains (3*13.36): 'By nature I mean what we usually call sub-
stance?

24 The question of the origin of souls is discussed later on
(3.20.5(^22.63).

25 This is one of the sentences which, as St. Augustine tells us
in the Retractations (1.9.3), was claimed by the Pelagians as sup-
porting their view. They took it to mean that the will could
choose good or evil entirely of its own power, without the need
of grace.

Notice the argument here. Augustine shows Evodius that he
has a will, and a good will, and that this is of supreme value.
Then he goes on to argue that it lies in the power of the will
whether we possess the supreme good or not, because nothing is
so fully in the power of the will as the will itself.

It may be well to keep the following distinctions in mind:

1. Will in a general sense is common to all living things, since
they all tend to act in their characteristic way, and make every
effort to do so.

2. When this effort is not impeded by any obstacle, the will
can be called free, but we must remember the sense in which we
are using the word 'free.'

3. The will of a rational being, who is conscious of himself,
controls his action in a far more complete way than does the will
of an animal, even though no choice is being made. This is an-
other sense in which we can call the will free.

4. The will may be free in both these two senses, and yet
not free in the sense that it has the power of choice. If an in-
tellectual being attains the supreme good which satisfies all its
desires, its will is free in the sense that no obstacle impedes its
action, and also in the sense that it is the conscious master of its
action, but it is not free in the sense of having the power of
choice, because, having every desire satisfied, there is no scope
for choice. Thus the blessed in heaven are supremely free, but
without choice as to the primary object of their conduct. Thus
another sense in which the will can be called free is the sense in
which it has the power of choice.

Now St. Augustine does not explicitly make these distinctions.
However, he uses will to mean that power by which we as ra-
tional beings and as Christians can love God and rejoice in Wis-
dom, and therefore he is always speaking of the will of a man
who is free in the sense of conscious of his own act and of the

BOOK ONE 245

object to which that act tends. Hence he is justified in saying:
What is so fully in the power of the will as the will itself?' For
a will in the sense he means must have the power of choice if
confronted with the possibility either of good or evil conduct.

26 Plato classified the virtues into wisdom, fortitude, temper-
ance, and justice. Aristotle described these same four virtues,
though with additions of his own. Cicero adopted the same list.
The first Christian writer to do so was St. Ambrose, who uses
(cf. Exp. Evang. Luc. 5.50, 62) the term 'cardinal virtues." St.
Augustine speaks of prudence instead of wisdom, but the meaning
is the same: 'the knowledge what to seek and what to avoid.'

27 Prof. Green reads tnbuvmus instead of tribucanus: 'why do
we not grant him fortitude?' instead of 'why should we not . . .?'

28 Prof. Green TN23 reads iniquum instead of inimicum:
iniquus in the sense of 'opposed, hostile, unfavorable' (properly=
inimicus) is found in Christian as well as classical authors,

29 St. Augustine notes in the Retractations (1.9.3) that this
sentence was claimed by the Pelagians as supporting their view.

30 Another sentence appealed to by the Pelagians.

31 So too with this sentence.

32 St. Augustine's views on material goods and their use, on
wealth and poverty, find very frequent expression, especially in
his sermons: cf. Mausbach, op. cit. 1.284 ff.; O. Schilling, Reich-
turn und Arrniit in der altkirchlichen Literatttr (Freiburg i. Br.
1908) 167-77.

33 Another passage quoted by the Pelagians for their teaching.

BOOK TWO

1 Another passage claimed by the Pelagians, as St. Augustine
tells us in the Retractations (1.9.3).

2 This phrase, 'the truth within you, which is the source of all
instruction,' raises the question of St. Augustine's theory of
knowledge, so important in connection with his argument for the
existence of God.

We may begin by noticing the principal other passages in the
De libero arbitrio which state his theory:

'The notion which is impressed on us of eternal law' (1.6.15).

'By what idea or image do we see so sure a truth [i.e. of mathe-
matics] so confidently throughout innumerable instances, unless
we do it by an inner light, unknown to the bodily sense?'
(2.8.23).

246 NOTES

'So, as, before we are happy, the idea of happiness is neverthe-
less impressed on our minds for through the idea we know and
say confidently and without any doubt that we wish to be happy
so too, before we are wise, we have the idea of wisdom im-
pressed on the mind' (2.9.26).

'The very light of wisdom, in which these things can be seen
and grasped, may be one light shared in common by all wise
men' (2.9.27).

'So too a strong, vigorous, mental gaze, when it sees with cer-
tainty many unchangeable truths, turns to the truth itself in
which all things are shown' (2.13.36).

'If you are praised when you see what you ought to do, though
you only see this in Him who is unchangeable truth. . , .'
(3.16.46)".

St. Augustine was interested in the problem of knowledge from
a particular point of view; it was with a particular aspect of the
problem of universals that he was mainly concerned. This prob-
lemat the centre of all philosophical thought considers the
question: how are we to explain the unchanging and necessary-
character of the universal ideas we use when the objects around
us, which we express by means of universals, are changing and
contingent? What is the source from which we obtain our
ideas? St. Augustine was especially interested in the source of
mathematical laws and of moral principles, as we can see in this
part of the De libero arbitrio. He did not, however, regard the
problem from the point of view of pure philosophy, and was not
writing a technical treatise on the subject, but was concerned
with theology. He discussed the question in the De magistro,
which he wrote in 387, and never changed his theory: he taught
that we cannot learn these ultimate principles from a human
master, but that we see them by an inner light.

This brings us to the difficulty in his theory: what exactly did
he mean by comparing truth to the light, and how did he con-
ceive that the action of God takes place when we see the truth?
We must remember the history of St. Augustine's intellectual de-
velopment. He adapted the Platonic philosophy which had so
deeply influenced him, and therefore approached the question of
our knowledge by way of a theory of illumination. Plato had
described the idea of good as the sun of the intelligible world
(Rep, 517 b), and St. Augustine followed in his steps with suit-
able modifications. 'I call upon thee, O God, Truth, in whom

BOOK Two 247

and for whom and through whom shine to the understanding all
things which so shine' (Solil 1.1.3). Again he speaks of God
and truths of human learning as related in a similar way to the
light and the earth which it illumines, and goes on to say that
these human truths cannot be understood, 'unless they are illu-
mined by something else as by their sun' (Solil. 1.8.15). E.
Portalie, art. cit., DTC 1.2.2334, gives a number of texts to show
the doctrine, and he stresses that St. Augustine compares the
need of the intelligence for God's light which is truth to the
need of the will for grace. According to St. Augustine man
acquires wisdom through illumination by divine truth; the eternal
types or ideas which are the object of wisdom, cannot be de-
rived from a reality perceived by the sense, nor from the soul
which is limited by ignorance and doubt. The human intelli-
gence must participate in some way in the subsistent truth in
which the world of ideas is fully realised. The divine action,
which is simply creative for other beings, is illuminative in regard
to the intelligence, and this is the explanation of the absolute and
universal character of our judgments (see Thonnard 477).

What, then, does St. Augustine mean by this illumination of
the human intellect? We can leave aside any pantheistic expla-
nation because it is clear that his system is not pantheistic. The
chief theories are the following:

1. That we see the divine ideas directly in God Himself; this
is to hold that St. Augustine is an ontologist. Portalie (ibid.
2335) gives two arguments against this:

(a) St, Augustine makes it clear that man does not enjoy the
direct vision of God in the present life, with the possible excep-
tions of Moses and St. Paul.

(b) God, regarded as the sun in relation to the soul, is not an
object of our knowledge but is the agent producing in the soul
that by which we have knowledge. The sun of truth impresses
on the soul the image of truth, a>s the seal is impressed on the wax.

Gilson says (The Future of Augustinian Metaphysics,' in A
Monument to St. Augustine 307): 'Whatever, then, the letter of
St. Augustine may be . . . , it cannot signify ontologism unless
it implies the negation of the entire thought of St. Augustine: the
doctrine of divine illumination is not the vision of the First
Cause, but the induction of the First Cause, starting from an
effect, namely truth. 7

He also points out (Introd. a S. Augustin 110 f.) that the

248 NOTES

metaphors of St. Augustine, however expressive they may be,
remain metaphors. If we had the direct vision of God, we should
not need to ask for any other proof than this of His existence.
In fact, St. Augustine gives a proof for the existence of God in
several places, and especially in the long argument in the De
libero arbitrio (2.3.7-2.15.39).

Copleston (op. cit. 2.61 f.) argues as follows: 'Now, how can
St. Augustine have supposed that such a man beholds the essence
of God, when in his spiritual doctrine he insists so much on the
need of moral purification in order to draw near to God and is
well aware that the vision of God is reserved to the saved in the
next life? . . . Happily we have to help us such texts as the
passage of the De Trinitate (12.15.24) where the Saint says that
the nature of the mind is such that, 'when directed to intelligible
things in the natural order, according to the disposition of the
Creator, it sees them in a certain incorporeal light which is sui
generis, just as the corporeal eye sees adjacent objects in the
corporeal light." These words seem to show that the illumina-
tion in question is a spiritual illumination which performs the
same function for the objects of the mind as the sun's light per-
forms for the objects of the eye: in other words, as the sunlight
makes corporeal things visible to the eye, so the divine illumina-
tion makes the eternal truths visible to the mind. From this it
would appear to follow that it is not the illumination itself which
is seen by the mind, nor the intelligible Sun, God, but that the
characteristic of necessity and eternity in the necessary and eter-
nal truths are made visible to the mind by the activity of God.
This is certainly not an ontologistic theory/ Nevertheless we
must remember that St. Augustine says in the De Hbero arbitrio
(2.13.36) that, just as men with healthy eyes can look at the sun
itself, so men with a strong mental gaze can turn to the truth
itself.

2. The scholastic explanation, following St. Thomas. Ac-
cording to this view to call God the light of the soul is simply to
say that He is the creative cause of the intelligence and the
source of all truth. It must be borne in mind that the Thomists,
basing themselves on Aristotle, hold that the soul has a power,
the intellects ctgens, which acts upon the object presented by the
senses and abstracts the intelligible element, i.e., the universal,
unchanging idea, Hence it is this power in particular which,

BOOK Two 249

according to their interpretation of St. Augustine, participates in
the divine light.

Portalie argues that this explanation is unsatisfactory, because
St. Augustine did not confine himself to so vague a theory. If it
were true, it would mean that St. Augustine never really dealt
with the problem of knowledge at all, though in fact it seems to
have been one of his main interests. According to this view all
St. Augustine is saying is: We know, because all knowledge is
an image of the divine ideas, and God has given us intelligence
to know them.' But the question is: how do finite creatures
perceive eternal truth? Plato says, by memory; Aristotle, by
abstraction; others, by innate ideas. St. Augustine would say
nothing.

Gilson also maintains (Intro d. 113 f.) that the theory of St.
Augustine is quite opposed to Aristotelian abstraction: the two
views explain differently the matter on which the intellect op-
erates. The soul, as having sense perception, is not, according to
Aristotle, higher than the body in so far as the body is perceived
by the senses, and therefore the body can act on the soul, and
produce the species from which the soul abstracts the intelligible
element. St. Augustine, on the other hand, holds that the soul
transcends the body, and he cannot therefore admit that what is
perceived by the senses is received as an object in the soul. St.
Augustine has no need in his theory for an intellectus agens, like
that of St. Thomas.

Copleston (op. cit. 2.63-65) criticises this theory, but does so
from a slightly different angle. 'It hardly seems possible, there-
fore, to reduce the illumination-theory to nothing more than a
statement of the truth that God conserves and creates the human
intellect and that the natural light of the intellect is a participated
light. . . . To say that St. Augustine was wrong in postulating
a special divine illumination and that St. Thomas was right in
denying the necessity of such an illumination is an understandable
attitude; but it seems to be carrying conciliation too far, if one
attempts to maintain that both thinkers were saying the same
thing, even if one affirms that St. Thomas was saymg clearly and
unambiguously what St. Augustine had said obscurely and with
the aid of metaphor. ... If the illumination has an idiogenetic
function, as I believe it to have in St. Augustine's view, then this
function has reference not to the content of the concept, as if it
infused that content, but to the quality of our judgment concern-

250 NOTES

ing the concept or to our discernment of a character in the
object, its relation to the norm or standard, which is not con-
tained in the bare notion of the thing. If this is true, then the
difference between St. Augustine and St. Thomas does not so
much consist in their respective attitudes towards abstraction
(since, whether Augustine explicitly says so or not, his view, as
interpreted above, would at least demand abstraction in some
form) as in the fact that Augustine thought it necessary to postu-
late a special illuminative action of God, beyond His creative and
conserving activity, in the mind's realisation of eternal and neces-
sary truths, whereas St. Thomas did not.'

3. Portalie (art. cit. 2336) argues that the true interpretation
of St. Augustine is the following. The soul grasps intellectual
truths, because God produces in it an image of them. In Scho-
lastic language this theory attributes to God the part which the
Aristotelian theory attributes to the intellectus agens, but of
course, it does not attribute the knowledge to a separate in-
telligence. The view is claimed to be supported not only by St.
Augustine's words, but also by his general theory, in which the
illumination of the intelligence is compared to the influence of
grace on the will.

Gilson (op. cit. 117 n. 2) criticises this view of Portali6 on the
ground that the Aristotelian doctrine of abstraction is quite for-
eign to St. Augustine's theory, and therefore that no question of
an intellectus agens can arise. We may add that the view seems
to suffer from the very defect which Portali6 urges against the
Scholastic interpretation; it does not make clear the precise rela-
tion between God's action and that of the creature.

4. Gilson himself (op. cit. 123 f.) reaches a different conclu-
sion. There is nothing, he says, empirical about the origin of
the notions which we owe to illumination. These notions have
no other content than the judgment by which they are ex-
pressed, e.g. justice is to render each man his due; wisdom is to
prefer the eternal to the temporal. St. Augustine often calls
these notions 'rules' according to which we judge. To say this
is to go as far as the writings of St. Augustine will take us, and,
if we go further, we must not make St. Augustine responsible for
our theories.

Such, then, are the main explanations given of St. Augustine's
theory of knowledge. The very fact that there is so much dis-
agreement supports Gilson's cautious conclusion. It seems that

BOOK Two 251

we must be content not to know how St. Augustine would have
dealt with many of the questions that can be asked about his
theory. At the same time the following points may be men-
tioned. The root difficulty in this matter is that we are aware of
certain aspects of reality which seem to belong to God, such as
necessity and freedom from change, and yet we do not know
God directly. Some theories try to escape the difficulty by say-
ing that these aspects of reality can be found in the finite world,
others that we know God directly. These theories, however,
seem to many minds unsatisfactory. Now we become in a true
sense what we know, and in a true sense what we know we are.
Therefore the problem is nothing else than the problem of the
relation between creature and Creator. If we agree that we
know God by natural knowledge in this life just in the way in
which He is present to us as cause, that is, if we agree that we
simply know God as cause, no more and no less, then, it may be
suggested, this makes possible a clear interpretation of St. Au-
gustine, even though it is not how St. Augustine himself put it.
God illumines our intellects by being present to us as cause; we
know the finite world not merely by itself alone, but as de-
pendent on its cause. We have an indirect and inadequate, but a
real, idea of God, that is, of absolute truth, derived from our
awareness of the cause as present to its effect. Truth is reality
as known, and the light of truth in which we know finite things
is nothing else than the cause which gives them being. Thus it
is not true to say that we only see objects in the light of truth,
and not the sun which gives them light. We do not see the sun
directly or adequately, but we do see it indirectly and inade-
quately; we see the Creator indirectly as cause, and we see crea-
tures directly as the effects of the cause. For further literature
on the subject see Gilson, op. cit. 332-35.

3 Apparently all MSS read #nimae= 'soul' for hommi= 'man'
of the editors since 1506. Green TN 25 points out that in
Biblical (and Christian) Latin anima commonly^ homo.

1 Ps. 52.1,

B That is, in 1.2,4.

Isa. 7.9, according to the Septuagint, The words have already
been quoted in 1.2.4. The Vulgate has 'If you will not believe,
you shall not continue.' In the De doctrina Christiana (1.12.17)
Augustine quotes both versions.

7 John 17.3.

252 NOTES

8 Matt. 7.7.

9 To appreciate St. Augustine's argument for the existence of
God, the reader should have in his mind the philosophic back-
ground of St. Augustine's thought. After Plato's death the
school of philosophy he had founded deteriorated, and, neglect-
ing his idealism, it came to deny the possibility of knowledge
altogether and to hold that only probability was possible. A
period of eclecticism followed: an inner light was regarded as the
guide to truth. Then Neo-Platonism arose at Alexandria, its
chief exponent being Plotinus, who greatly influenced St. Au-
gustine. Plotinus (205-270 A. D.) apparently was an Egyptian
of Latin name and Greek speech, trained at Alexandria under
Ammonius Saccas, and later teaching at Rome. After his death
his disciple, Porphyry, edited his writings, arranging them in six
books, or Enneads, each of nine treatises.

Plotinus (for the following see especially A. H. Armstrong,
An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy [Westminster, Md., 1949]
175-96) regarded the cosmos as having two movements, one of
outgoing or descent by which the higher produces the lower, and
another of ascent and simplification by which the soul passes up
through all the stages of being to final union with the First Prin-
ciple. This First Principle stands at the head of Plotinus' system;
it is transcendent, and is called the One, or the Good, or occa-
sionally God. Exactly what Plotinus meant is not altogether
clear, but the One or Good is beyond Mind and beyond Being,
and is the source of the Divine Mind, together with the World
of Forms which the Divine Mind contains. For Plato the One or
Good was itself a Form and a substance, containing all other
Forms, but for Plotinus it was transcendent and 'other.' The lines
of thought which led him to this conclusion are various. As to
the human soul's relation to the One, the passages in which he
suggests that it will become identified with the One are very
few, and his usual teaching is opposed to this.

The process by which the higher produces the lower is auto-
matic and necessary. Contemplation is the primary activity, but
production is the necessary reflex action of contemplation. The
product is always lower than the producer; the producer loses
nothing by giving forth the product. Plotinus usually describes
this process as emanation or radiation. It should be understood
that the two movements of outgoing and return are timeless and
simultaneous.

BOOK Two - 253

Plotinus' World of Forms differs a good deal from Plato's. Its
organic character as a single living reality is greatly stressed, and
there are Forms of individuals. The World of Forms contains
the archetypes of all individual things, past, present, or future.
In the Divine Mind- World the Forms are themselves living intel-
ligences, and so know and become one another without separa-
tion or division. The Forms are part of the Divine Life, and not
static objects of contemplation. The Divine Mind is ourselves
at our highest: we are only fully ourselves when we escape from
our limited ego, and pass beyond Soul to realise we are Divine
Mind in all its multiplex universality.

Soul emanates from Mind, as Mind emanates from the First
Principle, and Mind is the source of SouPs reality and of all that
is good and beautiful and intelligent in it. Mind receives the
First Principle, the One, according to its capacity, and this in-
volves a descent towards multiplicity. So too Soul receives Mind
according to its capacity. Mind is the realm of intuitive thought,
and soul of discursive thought, in which truths are known by a
process of reasoning. Soul is the link between the intelligible and
the material worlds, and is present in both, while material things
arc only represented in the intelligible world by their archetypes.

The relation of Universal Soul to individual souls is obscure,
but it seems that in some sense individual souls are part of Uni-
versal Soul, and can become universal by contemplation. The
soul is in the body by a law of the universe, not owing to a fall.
If the particular soul narrows itself to the selfish interests of a
particular body, it sinks down, but it can on the other hand rise
to the universality of transcendent Soul, and pass beyond Soul
altogether to its rightful place in the world of the Divine Mind.
Plotinus' levels of being are not rigidly separated, but are stages
in the unfolding of a single life.

The lower Soul or Nature, Soul immanent, is Soul at the low-
est level It produces the immanent forms of bodies, and Plotinus
describes these much as Aristotle describes his immanent forms.
But in Plotinus matter remains unchanged by the forms imposed
on it. Matter is evil; it is the principle of negation. Yet the
material universe is not evil, for it is the work of the higher soul,
being ruled by Nature which is its principle of order. It is the
best possible material universe. Material evil and suffering result
inevitably from the conflict whereby a degree of order is intro-

254 NOTES

duced. The wise man is beyond the reach of suffering because
he is detached, but the foolish only get what they deserve.

St. Augustine first came to know the works of Plotinus at
Milan just before his conversion, when he read parts of the
Enneads in a Latin translation. He was deeply influenced, and
in particular it was Plotinus who helped him to free himself from
Manichaean materialism: he came to realise that beings might
exist which were immaterial, and that God was altogether im-
material He thought, though mistakenly, that Plotinus' teaching
about the Divine Mind was the same as that of St. John about the
Divine Logos. Cf. P. Henry, Plotin et F Occident (Louvain 1934)
89 f., and passim for the preceding.

St. Augustine adopted much of the philosophy of Plotinus, but
modified it to fit the Christian faith. He got rid of its pantheistic
tendencies, and rejected the view of Plotinus that God's existence
was immediately evident, and needed no rational proof. See J. J.
O'Meara, The Young Augustine (London 1954) 131-55; the
same, 'Neo-Platonism in the Conversion of Saint Augustine,'
Dominican Studies 3 (1950) 334-43.

10 St. Augustine starts his argument with the consciousness we
have of our own existence, because this is clearer than anything
else. The present passage is not the only place where he makes
this the foundation of certainty; he says in the De Trinitate
(15.12.21): 'One who does not exist cannot be deceived, and
therefore, if I am deceived, I exist.' We are reminded of the
cogito ergo sum of Descartes, and there is a real resemblance be-
tween St. Augustine and Descartes in so far as they both find in
the same fact a truth which can be known directly and without
reference to sense experience. Yet there is a difference between
them. Descartes regards this as typical of a clear and distinct idea,
innate, and given us by God. St. Augustine regards it as one
among other truths which are not innate but seen by the light
in which we see all truths that we see. The truths of number and
the principles of wisdom, he goes on to explain, do not de-
pend on consciousness of the thinking self, but are also seen
clearly and independently. St. Augustine bases his philosophy
on the existence and perfection of the world as perceived by the
senses, and on the existence of the soul as knowing the external
world and also itself. See Thonnard 500 f. On St. Augustine's
conviction that we can attain certainty regarding certain facts
(his victory over Academic scepticism he expressed especially in

BOOK Two 255

his Contra Academicos), and his explanation of 'how it is that
we are able not only to know with certainty eternal and necessary
truths, but also to know them as eternal and necessary truths'
(theory of divine illumination), see also Copleston, op. cit.
2.51-67; Gilson, op. cit. 103-130, passim; M. C. D'Arcy, The
Philosophy of St. Augustine,' in A Monument to Saint Augustine
180-83; R. Jolivet, 'La doctrine augustinienne de rillumination,'
in Melanges augustiniens (Paris 1931) 382-502.

11 Folio wing the weight of the manuscript evidence (Green
TN 25), fidere for figere (= 'by which we can establish
that. . . .'

12 Some MSS have: 'Just as the inner sense judges whether our
sight is too weak or sufficiently strong, so too the sight itself
judges.

13 At this point of the argument we should notice how in cer-
tain important respects St. Augustine modified the theory of
Plotinus. Augustine added to the grades of being as described
by Plotinus, and maintained that all beings of every grade, and
not only the highest, are created by God and by God alone, in-
stead of each emanating from the grade above it. This was
clearly demanded by the Christian faith. Moreover, St. Augus-
tine introduced a new principle of distinction between the grades.
Evodius argues that existence, life, and understanding are in
ascending order of importance because life includes existence,
and understanding includes existence and life. St. Augustine then
proposes a new principle by which the higher can be distin-
guished from the lower: that which judges another is higher.
The reason he introduces this principle is that the inner sense
requires a standard by which we may be able to classify it: the
standard by which we recognise that what contains more is
higher than what contains less, does not help us here. This new
development is important because it implies in our knowledge,
not only sensible but more especially intellectual, a certain par-
ticipation in the divine exemplar ideas or types which govern cre-
ated things. These ideas have a twofold effect, one creative and
the other formal, guiding created things to their natural ends.
Our ideas and judgments participate only in this second effect.
We impose on lesser things a certain kind of order when we
judge them, but we cannot affect their existence. This new
principle is the means St. Augustine uses to argue to the existence
of God, because it enables him to show that there is something

256 NOTES

eternal and unchangeable which is higher than our reason, since
it governs our reason. See Thonnard 502 f .

14 St. Augustine does not make it altogether clear what he
means by these words, yet at the end of the argument (2.15.39)
he repeats: Tor if there is anything more excellent, it is this
which is God, but, if there is nothing more excellent, then truth
itself is God.' F. Cayre, in his book, Dieu present dans la vie de
f esprit (Paris 1951) 123 f., has an interesting comment. He says
St. Augustine's attitude is at first sight surprising, and different
explanations have been given. The simplest is that of P. Thon-
nard (503-505), who sees in the answer of Augustine a sort of
argument ad hominem. Cayre, however, maintains the answer
is provisional until Evodius understands from the argument
which follows that, if there is a being above our reason, that being
is God, because that being must be above all others. We must
not, he says, forget that the De libero arbitrio is a dialogue, and
that St. Augustine is a supremely skilful writer. He wishes to
present Evodius with a certain mystery so as to stimulate discus-
sion. In the end the matter will become clear of itself; it will be
enough to show that unchangeable Truth exists and is above our
reason, for this can be nothing else than God. Augustine is
setting himself to find in man something so great that what is
above it can only be God, and in doing this he replies to the
objection of Evodius. Thus the solution of this difficulty is to be
found in the whole argument that follows, which is an indirect,
but effective, answer to Evodius. Cayre refers to Gilson (op.
cit. 17), who points out that the whole discussion leads up to a
necessary, unchangeable, eternal Being, who must be greater than
all others, and must therefore be God. To show this, it is not
enough to reach a being above man, but we must show that there
is something in man of such a kind that what is beyond it can
only be God, and we find this in the Truth.

This explanation seems confirmed if we reflect on St. Augus-
tine's words shortly before, in the same section: 'But I ask you:
if you find there is nothing above our reason except the eternal
and unchangeable, will you hesitate to call this God?' By show-
ing that above our reason there is the eternal and unchangeable,
he shows that there can be nothing else still greater, for the
eternal and unchangeable must necessarily be supreme.

15 What does St. Augustine mean when he says the same food
is wholly taken by each of us? He has said above: 'We can both

BOOK Two 257

taste the same honey or any other food or drink/ and: 'Though
we both breathe the same air with our nostrils, or take the same
food when we taste it, yet I do not draw in the same part of the
air as you, nor do I take the same part of the food as you.' He
seems to mean, therefore, that the same food is wholly taken by
each of us, in the sense that it is wholly the same kind of food,
wholly, honey, for instance.

16 Prof. Green reads unusquisque nostrum sibi instead of uni-
culque nostrum soli: 'that which each of us is for himself.'

17 This shows that St. Augustine's theory of knowledge is not
one of intellectual abstraction, requiring an active power, the
intellectus agens, to abstract the idea from the object as received
by the senses cf. 22.

18 Another reading is: 'nature of number' instead of 'truth of
number.'

19 The literal translation of these last few words is: 'whatever
the number may be, counting from the beginning, the whole after
it is its double.' In view of what precedes the meaning must
apparently be that, whatever the number may be, if we add to
it the units of which it is made up, the total which results is its
double. The passage is recognised to be difficult.

20 Eccles. 7.26 (Sept.). The Vulgate has: / have surveyed all
things with my mind, to know, and consider, and seek out wis-
dom and reason.

21 Following, with Green TN 26, the difficult variant fulchra
for the better attested, but even more difficult plura.

22 Burnaby, Amor Dei 157, calls attention to St. Augustine's
'acute sense' of the beauty of nature.' For Augustine the beauty
of earth, sea, air, heavens, stars is 'almost unspeakable,' 'filling
with awe everyone who contemplates them' (Enarr. in Ps. 144.
15). The master Craftsman and Designer of the world has set
all its greatness and beauty before us that 'seeing what we can
see, we may love Him whom we cannot see, in order that one
day through the merit of our love for Him we may be enabled
to see' (ibid. 103.1.1). That the saint's interest in nature may
have been stimulated by his early study of Vergil, is observed by
J. P. Christopher, ACW 2.115 n. 113.

23 The following remarks may be helpful at this point.

1. First let us summarise this part of the argument. Augustine
wishes to show that there is something above our reason, not
changed by our knowing it. Evodius suggests the law and truth

258 NOTES

of number, among many other examples that might be given.
Augustine agrees, but asks whether numbers might not be in
some sense images of visible things and perceived by the senses,
Evodius replies that seven and three must always be ten, whereas
bodily things change. Again Augustine agrees, and gives another
argument in support. All numbers consist of so many units, but
no bodily thing is perfectly one since it has parts, that is to say,
is extended in space. Yet we know what perfect oneness is, or
we should not be able to say that it is not to be found in bodily
things. Moreover we know that certain laws hold good for
number even in instances when we cannot verify them. Such
truths we must recognise 'by an inner light, unknown to the
bodily sense' (2.8.23). There are many other such truths, and
wisdom is the truth in which we see the supreme good. The
'principles and illuminations in which the virtues appear' (2.10.
29) are the concern of wisdom.

2. It may be well to explain a little more fully the argument
that no bodily or physical things are perfectly one, since this is
one aspect of a principle which is central to all later Scholastic
thought indeed to all philosophical thought. Being and one are
at root the same, merely emphasising different aspects, because a
thing is a thing in so far as it is one thing in so far as a thing exists
or has being it exists as one thing. That which is perfectly one ex-
ists perfectly, and is without limitation or defect: it is the infinite,
God. For every dependent thing, since it is dependent, that is, a
creature, might cease to exist, or else it would be self-existent.
If it is liable to cease to exist, it cannot at any given moment have
all its possible existence, and therefore its existence is not an
absolute unity, not possessed all together without any distinction.
Only God, the creator and source of all dependent things, is per-
fectly one, being absolutely independent and self-existent.

How, then, does it come about that creatures can be called one
in any sense at all, if they are not perfectly one? The precise
way in which we shall answer this question will depend on the
detailed theory of metaphysics we accept, but, since existence
and oneness are at root the same, and since created things cer-
tainly exist, though in an imperfect and dependent manner, it is
plain that a created thing, even a bodily thing, is in some sense
one, not perfectly one, but imperfectly. Thus one is used
'analogically 7 of creatures and the Creator, partly in the same
sense and partly in a different sense. The creature 'participates'

BOOK Two 259

in the oneness of God. To put the matter in the way it has just
been put, is not to put it in St. Augustine's way, but it may help to
bring out the problem with which he was dealing.

3. The eternal truth of such a fact as that seven and three
make ten is another aspect of this same central philosophical
problem. As St. Augustine insists, it is only one example out of
many which show that we have some knowledge of the eternal
and unchangeable. Indeed every fact is eternally true; even the
most trivial fact which will never be repeated is eternally true.
Every created thing, even the lowest, participates in some way
not only in the being and oneness but also in the truth of the
eternal God. It should be noticed that it makes no difference to
this argument whether we interpret our knowledge that seven
and three make ten as analytic or as synthetic, since in either case
we reach a truth which is unchangeable and therefore, as St.
Augustine argues, a truth which, in so far as unchangeable, can-
not be derived from changing things. This is not quite the case
with his other example, that of mathematical principles which
apply even when we cannot verify them. St. Augustine's point
here is that such principles cannot be taken from bodily things.
But if the application of such principles can be explained because
the same pattern is seen to exist in countless different sets of
numbers, what we know is always the same pattern, and the
problem might be partly avoided. However, here too we should
in any case be confronted with an unchanging truth.

24 St. Augustine's fascination for number and his frequent at-
tribution of a sacred or mystical signification to certain numbers
is well-known. These play a particularly prominent role in his
sermons: see the numerous entries (for numbers from T to
'144,000') in M. Pontet, Uexegese de S. Augustin predicates
(Paris 1944), in Index des symboles' s. v. 'Nombres' (607 f.). Cf.
also A. Schmitt, 'Mathematik und Zahlenmystik/ in M. Grab-
mann J. Mausbach, Aurelius Augustinus: Die Festschrift der
Gdrres-Gesellsckaft zum 1500. Todestage des hi. Augustinus
(Cologne 1930) 353-366; also ACW 5.203 f.; 15.202 f., 229 f.

25 Wisd. 8.1.

26 Instead of infra n&s esse cernimis Prof. Green TN 26 reads
with certain MSS cernimus, futctmus etiam ipsos numeros infra
nos esse: 'on which we see numbers impressed, and think that the
numbers themselves are below us.'

27 The earlier editions (e. g. Erasmus) have: 'if an eye, able to

i6o NOTES

discern it, seeks for it.' Prof. Green reads id cerni possit in-
quirat instead of cerni possit inquirit: 'but it would demand an
eye capable of discerning it.'

28 In 15-19 of this second book.

29 Ps. 36.4.

30 This is one of the chief passages which might be claimed to
show that St. Augustine was an ontologist, since he speaks of
those with strong eyesight who are ready to gaze at the sun itself.
We have already mentioned reasons for not regarding St. Au-
gustine as an ontologist in any unorthodox sense (see n. 2 above).
For an account of the history of ontologism, beginning with V.
Gioberti (1801-1852), see especially A. Fonck, 'Ontologisme,'
DTC 11.1 (1931) 1000-1061; for Augustine claimed (with St.
Bonaventure) by the ontologists as their principal authority, cf.
ibid. 1003-1009; for the principles condemned by the Holy See in
1861, ibid. 1046 ff.

31 John 8.31 f.

32 Perl in his running commentary (214 f.) remarks that St.
Augustine's discussion has by now lost its character of dialogue
and that the long passage bears the traits of a lyric or hymn to
truth. Note the same encomiastic writing in the following para-
graph, which Gilson (Introduction 20 n. 1) terms the classical
text illustrating Augustine's view that 'the truth is independent
of the mind which it orders and which it transcends.'

33 To appreciate St. Augustine's argument for the existence of
God the following may be found useful:

1. What is the connection between the earlier part of the
argument in the De libero arbitrio and the final claim that truth
itself is God? Augustine believed that God is the direct Creator
of every grade of being: why did he not argue at once to the
source of even the lowest grade, without taking us up through
the lowest grades to the higher grades, and then declaring that
we could find God in truth itself? It was because in the eternal
truths as we perceive them there is a clearer image of God, and
Thonnard suggests (503) that it may also have been that he
doubted whether we could rise directly from the sensible world
to God. Plotinus held that the higher level explained the lower
level which was derived from it, and St. Augustine perhaps saw
no clear refutation of this, though he did not admit it. We can,
however, see a continuous thread running through the argument.
We start from the fact that we exist and know that we exist.

BOOK Two 261

This leads to the distinction between existence, life, and con-
sciousness. Then the inner sense is discovered, and, in assigning
to it its place, the principle is found that what judges is higher
than what is judged. This principle is employed to show that
truth is higher than our reason, though reason is our highest
power. Then comes the claim that in seeing truth we are aware
of the eternal truth which is God. It is at this last stage that we
are carried at once from the recognition of truth as higher than
ourselves to recognition of God as the source of truth, without
any clear definition of the relation of participated truth to its
source. But the thread running through the argument is there,
and we can see that each stage contributes to the whole, from
the certainty expressed of our own existence to the final conclu-
sion.

2. The argument which St. Augustine gives us here for the
existence of God is plainly not systematic in the sense that the
Thomist proofs are systematic, and a number of questions are
left unanswered which a modern discussion of the subject would
wish to find discussed. We must be content not to know pre-
cisely how St. Augustine would have dealt with these questions,
and be satisfied with what he does tell us. The central part of
the argument is this. Reason is the highest element in man's
nature. Above our reason is truth, because truth is eternal and
unchangeable, and because we judge according to the truth, but
never judge the truth itself. The supreme good is known and
grasped in the truth which we perceive. If there is anything
higher than truth it is God, but, if there is not, then truth itself
is God. Undoubtedly for St. Augustine the eternal and un-
changing truth is God.

We note that St. Augustine does not clearly and explicitly dis-
tinguish here between the truth in which we participate and
the source of truth which is God; he does not explicitly argue
from effect to cause, but, having led us on and prepared the way,
he claims that in knowing the truth we are aware of God. We
should like to ask what exactly is the relation between truth as
we know it and the absolute truth which is God, but he does not
satisfy us. Thonnard (504 f.) explains that by an act of intuition,
without dwelling on the process of thought which would take us
from participated truth to its source, St. Augustine asserts the ex-
istence of God. The image of God is so clearly reflected in the
principles of wisdom and number that we see both source and

262 NOTES

participation at a single glance. The method here described by
which God's existence is known does not exclude the process of
reasoning from participated truth to its source. Indeed, when
he has finished his main argument, and goes on to show that all
that is good comes from God, Augustine says: 'Nothing can give
its form to itself. ... So we conclude that body and soul are
given their forms by a form which is unchangeable and everlast-
ing' (2.17.45). This is not intended as a necessary supplement to
the main argument, but at least it shows that the more direct ap-
proach does not exclude the argument from effect to cause.
Thonnard (505) refers to De musica 6.12.36 (written 387-389):
'What, then, must we believe is the source from which the soul
receives that which is eternal and unchangeable but the one
eternal and unchangeable God?' On the other hand, Cayre
(op. cit. 134 f.) argues that St. Augustine's final assertion of the
existence of God is not intuitive in this sense, but is a conclusion
from the fact that our knowledge of the truth has been shown to
be inexplicable as derived from ourselves. Yet this seems hardly
satisfactory in view of the language St. Augustine uses.

Perhaps the solution, which allows for a measure of truth in
both views, is that St. Augustine means his argument to be a
process of analysis which proceeds by the laws of reason, but
which brings out gradually the full implication of what we are
aware of from the beginning in a more or less confused way;
that we do not start from a premise and then go on to find some-
thing in no way included in the original premise, but that we
make explicit what was originally implicit. If this is correct,
Augustine does use the method of intuition, but in a special sense;
he does argue from effect to cause, but in the sense that we find
that what we were at first aware of contains both effect and
cause. This seems borne out by St. Augustine's own words: 'So,
as, before we are happy, the idea of happiness is nevertheless
impressed on our minds for through this idea we know and say
confidently and without any doubt that we wish to be happy
so too, before we are wise, we have the idea of wisdom impressed
on the mind' (2.9.26).

3. We should notice the distinction between St. Augustine's
argument and the ontological argument as used by St. Anselm.
St. Anselm argues that we can conceive of that than which
nothing greater can be conceived; that that than which nothing
greater can be conceived must have existence or it would have

BOOK Two 263

something still greater than itself, and therefore that God must
exist. St. Augustine, it is true, agrees that God must be greater
than anything we can conceive, but he does not argue that there-
fore God must exist; he sets out to show that such a being must
exist because we are aware of truth.

34 Wisd. 6.17. This passage of Wisdom describes how wisdom
is easy to find, if it is sought for. St. Augustine does not follow
the literal sense when he speaks of the works of Providence as
means used by wisdom to reveal herself to us, though the gen-
eral sense is the same (see Thonnard 508). Cf. below, 45.

35 St. Augustine's first treatise, it will be remembered, dealt
with beauty De pulchro et apto. It was written during his
Manichaean years, when he was twenty-six or twenty-seven and
teacher of rhetoric at Carthage. It has been lost; in fact, around
the year 400 Augustine himself no longer had a copy of it (cf.
Coirf. 4.13.20). For the Christian Augustine's 'laws of beauty'
(pulchritudims leges), his thoughts on human reason conforming
to eternal, divine norms in its judgments on beauty, see his De
vera religione 29.52-43.81 (written ca. 390). Cf. Mausbach, of.
cit. 1.94-96; Perl 216-218.

36 Some MSS and the earlier editions have indignum, unworthy
or undeserving, instead of indigtm, poor or in want.

37 It may be useful here to give some explanation of the mean-
ing of form. In Greek philosophy the word (l&sct) came to be
used to answer the question: 'What kind of thing is it?' Thus
it came to mean the nature or essence of a thing. Everything
was considered to have a 'form' because everything is some def-
inite kind of thing. Gilson (Introd. 260) says that fundamentally
the words idea, forma, species, and ratio all have the same mean-
ing for St. Augustine. Things, he explains, always exist accord-
ing to St. Augustine in at least two different ways, in themselves,
that is, in their own nature, and in God, that is, in their eternal
types or ideas, and this double existence is simultaneous.

First, as to their existence in God. Plato in his theory of ideas
had thought of a 'form' primarily as a perfect type or example to
which imperfect individual things on earth attain in a greater
or less degree. Cf. e.g. Armstrong, op. cit. 36-41. Here Copies-
ton, op. cit. 59 f., offers the link to St. Augustine: 'The same
question which could be raised in regard to the Platonic theory
recurs again ... in regard to the Augustinian theory, namely,
"Where are these ideas?" (Of course we must remember, in

264 NOTES

regard to both thinkers, that the "ideas" in question are not sub-
jective ideas but objective essences, and that the query "where?"
does not refer to locality, since the ideas are ex hypothesi im-
material, but rather to what one might call ontological situation
or status.) Neo-Platonists, seeing the difficulty in accepting a
sphere of impersonal immaterial essences, i.e. the condition ap-
parently at least assigned to the essences in Plato's published
works, interpreted the Platonic ideas as thoughts of God, and
"placed" them in Nous, the divine mind, which emanates from
the One as the first proceeding hypostasis. (Compare Philo's
theory of the ideas as contained within the Logos.) We may
say that Augustine accepted this position, if we allow for the fact
that he did not accept the emanation theory of Neo-Platonism.
The exemplar ideas and eternal truths are in God. "The ideas
are certain archetypal forms or stable and immutable essences of
things, which have not themselves been formed but, existing
eternally and without change, are contained in the divine intelli-

fence" ' (for the text quoted cf. Augustine, De dw. quaest. 46.2).
ee also C. Boyer, Videe de verite dans la. philosophie de saint
Augustin (Paris 1921) 71-79; L. F. Jansen, "The Divine Ideas in
the Writings of St. Augustine," The Modern Schoolman 22
(1945) 117-31.

Then, as to the existence of things in their own nature, Thon-
nard (508 f.) notices the following points. In works later than
the De libero arbitrio St. Augustine distinguishes in God's action
on the world a twofold effect: creation, and the giving of forms
information. God draws the formless matter out of nothing,
and then gives it a form or particular perfection. There is no
temporal, but only a logical, priority of the one over the other.
The precise relation between the two is disputed.

A. Gardeil, La structure de fame et Inexperience mystique
(Paris 1927) 313-25, says that creation consists in the production
of formless matter which alone is taken from nothing, while the
real thing, constituted with its form and rendered intelligible, is
due to its participation in the ideas in God's mind. Gilson (op.
cit. 253-67), however, holds that the divine act of creation is in-
divisible, but consists in the production of two effects: it gives
the formless matter, and at the same time it gives the form.

This latter view appears to be supported by Augustine's state-
ment in the present paragraph, that a changeable thing would fall
back into nothing without a form. When God gives a living

BOOK Two 265

thing its form, He makes the thing participate in the exemplar
ideas or types in His mind, and exercises that kind of causality
which is exemplar. From this it follows that Augustine does not
think of the giving of a form merely as the reception of form in
matter. To him the giving of a form implies creation and par-
ticipation in the idea in God's mind. Thonnard goes so far as to
translate ]orma by perfection, because by receiving its form a
thing receives its perfection through participation in the divine
idea, and this is the same as creation. The originality of Augus-
tine's theory consists, he says, in combining in the notion of
participation that causality by which the form is given exemplar
causality, and that causality by which the thing is created effi-
cient causality.

38 Ps. 101.27 f.

39 Wisd. 7.27.

40 Instead of intulissem Prof. Green reads retulissem: 'I argued
in return.'

41 Another passage which, St. Augustine tells us in the Retrac-
tations, the Pelagians claimed as supporting them.

42 Ps. 13.1.

43 Cf. Matt. 10.30.

44 Literally: In the same way that we know by reason all those
things which we know so as to satisfy knowledge (ad scientiam)'

45 These 'illuminations of the virtues,' lumina virtutum, are the
exemplary ideas by which we should direct our lives; cf. 2.10.29.
Cf. Gilson, Introduction 169.

46 This is directed against the Manichaean view that evil is an
independent principle. Cf. R. Jolivet, Le probleme du mal
d'apres saint Augustin (Paris 1936), 28 ff.

47 Some of the MSS and the older editions lack the words, 'not
even a trace,' non quidem nonnihil sed. . . .

48 St. Augustine comes to one of the most crucial points of his
argument here the question: How can sin consist in a movement
away from God, since every movement is caused by God?
There can be no argument for God's existence which does not
depend in some form or other on the principle of causality, and
if we are to say that the creature can act without its action being
caused by God, does not the whole theistic position fall to the
ground? The more general objection which is often made
against free will, that if an action is free it must in the last analysis
be without any motive at all, is really the same difficulty.

z66 NOTES

Augustine's solution, which is an application of the principle
that evil as such is not positive but is a defect, has not perhaps
been given sufficient weight by later Scholastic philosophers over
the whole field of the problem of free will in relation to God. If
we can show and a good case can be made for doing so that
every choice lies between a better and worse line of conduct,
then freedom of choice can be explained without denying the
law of causality. We can say it consists in following the highest
motive or in following other motives which in varying degrees
are defective in comparison with the highest. Thus there is
always a positive motive for whatever action is chosen, but the
motives may vary in degree of perfection from the most ultimate
good which may involve a painful act at the moment to the most
immediate good" which, though pleasant at the moment, may lead
to ultimate pain. Choice is possible, and yet God determines all
that is positive in the act. He permits the will to fail in varying
degrees to cbrrespond with the varying degrees of imperfection
in possible motives. In so far as the will fails there is no cause;
it is just a lack of cause, a defect when it follows a lower motive.
Hence it is not a question of the will moving in one of two dif-
ferent and equally positive directions, but of the will acting up
to its full power or failing so to act in varying degrees, and there
is always a cause to account for its action so far as the action is
positive and not defective. There seems no reason why w T e
should not admit a negative priority on the part of the creature
over God's causality upon its conduct, since there is no before or
after in God. Cf. *M. Pontifex, The Existence of God. A Tho-
imst Essay (London 1947) ch. 5, where this theory is defended.

It is surprising that St. Augustine did not apply this principle
even more fully than he did, and use it, for example, when he
discussed the foreknowledge of God in the third book. There is
no doubt, however, that it was always in his mind. In the City
of God (12.6 f.) he expresses it very clearly:

'If the further question be asked, what is the efficient cause of
evil will, none is found. It is the will itself which makes the ac-
tion evil, but what is it that makes the will evil? And thus evil
will is the efficient cause of the evil action, but of the evil will
there is no such cause. ... Let no one, therefore, look for the
efficient cause of the evil will; for it is not efficient, but deficient:
this will is not productive of an effect, but it is a defect. Defec-
tion from that which supremely is, to that which is in a less

BOOK Two 267

degree, this is the beginning of an evil will. But to seek to dis-
cover the causes of these defections causes, as I have said, not
efficient, but deficient is tantamount to endeavouring to see
darkness or hear silence.'

49 One of the passages mentioned in the Retractations (4) by
St. Augustine as showing his teaching on grace even at the time
when he wrote the De libero arbitrio, and as refuting the Pelagian
theory.

BOOK THREE

1 We are brought back again to the question which was dis-
cussed at the end of the second book. It was argued there that
a defect as such can have no cause, but Augustine does not refer
again to this argument. Now he sets to work to show that, since
an evil act is culpable, it must be due to the free will of the sinner,
and therefore that no one else is responsible. This argument
does not contradict the previous argument, but supplements it.

2 Evodius is trying to get out of his former words, 'I do not
know whether this is any fault,' by claiming to have spoken
ironically. In fact, it seems, he had meant his words seriously,
and during Augustine's reply he thinks of yet another answer,
namely, that the movement deserves blame, but that the soul it-
self does npt. We may perhaps see in this passage a record of
the actual discussion; it seems hardly possible that such a subtle
incident would have been invented.

3 Prof. Green reads iam cmimo instead of in animo: 'now I see
it is in the soul.'

4 The reference is to 1.11.21.

5 There is another reading, love (diligat) the lower/ instead of,
'choose (deligai) the lower.'

6 This is another passage mentioned in the Retractations (1.9.3)
as claimed by the Pelagians to support them.

7 The meaning of the passage seems to be that if the move-
ment of the will were not voluntary, it would, so to speak, swing
loosely as on a hinge, It is curious that Augustine uses the
phrase 'when he turns the hinge of his will,' since the point is
that the agent would not control the movement.

8 Pulsasti vehementer: misericordia Dei adsit (var.: Pulsasti
vehementer misericordiarn Dei. Adsit) aperiatque pulsantibus.

9 Prof. Green reads out instead of alii: 4 Or they are glad. . . .'

10 The reference is to 2.17.45, and to the passage which follows.

268 NOTES

11 Ps. 40.5.

12 There is another reading, 'more capable of living ( ad vtven-
dum), instead of, c more capable of seeing (ad videndum)?

13 These words were claimed in their favour by the Pelagians.

14 There is another reading, 'we live (vivimus) of necessity.'

15 Prof. Green TN 26 f. restores this second example: out,
non vohtntate infirmanwr, sed necessitate.

16 It seems worthwhile to give some consideration to Augus-
tine's discussion of the problem of God's foreknowledge of the
creature's freely chosen acts in the light of the two chief lines
of solution which have been proposed by Catholic theologians
since his time.

First, there is the Thomist theory. This theory, as its chief
feature, emphasises the absolute dependence of the creature on
God, and, working from this side, tries to find a place for free
choice of the creature's will. It holds that God premoves man's
will with absolute certainty to the course He designs for it, but
it combines with this the claim that, since God's power is infinite,
He can do so in such a way that the mode of man's action is free.
In this system there is no difficulty about God's foreknowledge
of the future, but it is hard to see, as has often been pointed out,
how man can remain free if God premoves his will with absolute
certainty. Is it not of the essence of freedom of choice that it
shall not be thus premoved?

The Molinist system, first advocated by Molina (1535-1600)
and developed by Suarez (1548-1617), seeks to avoid this diffi-
culty, and starts from man's freedom and then tries to fit in God's
causality. Its explanation is that God knows all the ways in
which a creature would act freely in every conceivable set of
circumstances, and hence what a creature would freely choose
to do if given a particular set of circumstances. How does God
have foreknowledge of this? There are three ways, the Molinists
say, in which God has knowledge of the acts of creatures: by
'simple intelligence,' by which He knows things merely as pos-
sible, by the 'knowledge of vision,' by which He knows what
will actually happen, and by 'middle knowledge,' scientia media,
by which He knows what would occur if certain conditions were
fulfilled. The Molinist theory, therefore, is that man is free, but
that this does not contradict God's supreme authority, because
God, knowing what each man would freely do in any circum-
stances, brings about the circumstances and gives His concurrence

BOOK THREE 269

as He Himself sees fit, and consequently His providence remains
supreme. It may be objected that man's freedom is scarcely
safeguarded if he will infallibly act in a particular way in given
circumstances, and that it is difficult to understand what can be
meant by saying that God knows how a man would freely choose
to act in circumstances which have not actually arisen, because,
if the choice is free, it is only determined when it is in fact made
and not before.

G. H. Joyce, Principles of Natural Theology (London 1951)
544, puts the theory in a form which meets some of the objec-
tions: Where . . . the acts of free agents are concerned, the
case is different: for the Divine decree must be such as to allow
for liberty of choice. Here recourse is had to $cie?itia media.
God foresees the alternatives presented to the created will in
each individual contingency, and foresees likewise which alterna-
tive the creature will freely choose, provided the choice be
rendered possible by the concurrence requisite for its realization.
That particular concurrence, and not another, He has decreed
from all eternity to give. He would have decreed otherwise, had
His foreknowledge shown Him that the created agent's choice
would take another direction. The future free volition of the
creature determines which shall be the concurrence destined for
it. Yet we may say with truth that when the moment for action
comes, God offers to the will a concurrence for any one of the
various possible alternatives. Did He not do so, it would not be
really capable of taking any other course than that which it
actually chooses.'

Would St. Augustine agree with either of these theories? He
argues that man's will is free, in the sense that God is in no way
responsible for causing evil acts, but that God foreknows how
man will act. He reconciles the two statements by arguing that
foreknowledge does not imply that God is the cause of sin, since
it would be impossible to foreknow a sin: it would not be a sin
if it was caused by being foreknown. To some extent, therefore,
St. Augustine would seem to tend towards the Molinist view, in
so far as he affirms man's freedom of choice and denies that God's
foreknowledge takes away this freedom. But Augustine was
forced by the Pelagian controversy to work out his ideas on the
subject more fully than was the case when he wrote the De
libero arbitrio. Thonnard (510) points this out, and shows that
St. Augustine's theory of grace took him in the opposite direction

270 NOTES

from Molinism. St. Augustine came to hold that freedom is
never so perfect as when it is entirely under the creative influ-
ence of God: 'What will be freer than the free will when it can-
not serve sin?' (De corr. et grat. 32). Here, however, as in
other places, he seems to make no clear distinction between free-
dom of will in the sense of choice between more than one possi-
ble line of action, and freedom of will in the sense of absence of
any obstacles to the action desired. But in any case Augustine's
theory, as it developed, tended to emphasise God's providential
control of man's action, and to start from this side of the prob-
lem, as does the Thomist theory.

It is perhaps surprising, as has already been pointed out, that
St. Augustine did not make more use of the important principle
which he advocated at the end of the second book. There he
dealt with the question, what causes an evil movement of the
will, and he replied that, since in so far as evil it is nothing but a
deficiency, in so far as evil it has no cause. This seems relevant
to the problem of God's foreknowledge if taken in conjunction
with another point which though well known to all schools of
theology, deserves more emphasis than is usually given it. Speak-
ing strictly there can be no foreknowledge in God because in
Him there is no before or after but only one indivisible act, the
eternally present. God sees temporal things as successive, but
sees them all together in the single moment of eternity. This
surely gives a key to the problem. Man sins by free choice, and
God is not responsible; God sees this sin from eternity, and yet
by seeing it does not cause it. He sees and permits the defect in
the creature, which has no cause outside the creature because it is
negative and not positive; God limits His creative act in regard
to the creature according to the defect which He sees and per-
mits.

17 In 9 Evodius asked three questions: how it could be just to
punish sins wiiich are bound to occur, or how future events if
foreknown are not bound to occur, or why the Creator is not
responsible for what is bound to occur. Augustine has dealt
with the first two questions, and now turns to the wider question
of God's providence.

St. Augustine's teaching on providence was largely influenced
by the teaching of Plotinus. Plotinus maintained that we should
not try to judge things by taking any one thing in isolation from
the rest, but that they must each be taken in their relation to the

BOOK THREE 271

whole, when we shall see that the defects of individual things do
not prevent their harmonising with the beauty of the whole.
The hierarchy of beings which exist has the same effect of pro-
ducing beauty in the whole. If there were no variety but all
were equal, the universe would be less well governed. Even the
wicked have their place and their beauty in relation to the whole,
just as in a play each character is given his part by the author in
order to make up the beauty of the whole play.

Although St. Augustine was much influenced by Plotinus, he
did not merely repeat his views, but adapted them to the Chris-
tian faith. Providence to Plotinus was the work of the Logos
which was an emanation from God, while to St. Augustine it was
the work of the Three Persons of the Trinity performed in crea-
tion. Again, Plotinus held that unhappiness on earth was due to
the misdeeds of souls in a former existence, and this was of course
denied by St. Augustine. Again, Plotinus rejected any idea of
the Redemption, since justice, he supposed, acted like a natural
force and could not be frustrated by any act of free will. Hence
for Plotinus prayer and the grace of God play no part in man's
salvation: in so far as this is not already eternally achieved (man's
highest self, his VOTJC 7 does not 'come down* but remains eternally
in its state of perfection), man must work it out for himself by
his own efforts; no additional help will be given beyond the di-
vinity already in him by nature. So the only kinds of prayer
which Plotinus can recognise are purely contemplative prayer
with no element of .petition in it, or a magical operation (to
which alone he gives the name 'prayer' though it is not really
prayer in our sense at all) which produces an automatic, un-
willed response from inferior divinities within the visible cosmos
in virtue of the universal sympathy. Such a theory made it hard
to explain mora} evil. Augustine, as against this, firmly main-
tained the freedom of the will and its responsibility, basing on
man's freedom his explanation of the existence of sin. Thus he
did not have to deny the presence of moral evil, but, while rec-
ognising it, yet detached it froin any causality on the part of
God. In spite of the presence of evil, praise he maintainedis
due to the Creator for all things. Providence is the work of God,
carried out through the Redemption by which man is saved from
his sins. See Thonnard 511-14; also R. Jolivet, Le frobleme du
mal tfapr&s Saint Augustin (Paris 1936) appendix: *S. Augustin
et Plotin' (esp. 149 ff.).

NOTES

18 Instead of regula ilia pietatis facile commovebit, Prof. Green
prefers the reading regulam illam pietatis facile non movebit, 'will
not easily* disturb that rule of piety. . . .'

19 Augustine says, Tor whatever reason shows you with truth
to be better, be assured that God has made this.' He is applying
his theory that we know truth by divine illumination, and argues
therefore that what we see clearly by divine illumination to be
true must actually exist, and have been created by God. We
have seen how St. Augustine was influenced by Neo-Platonism
in his teaching on providence, and here we have another manifes-
tation of the same influence. Thonnard says (514) that St.
Augustine gives us in these words the formula of a philosophical
optimism, that is to say, that St. Augustine teaches that the actual
world is the best possible realisation of such a thing as our world.
St. Augustine does not suggest that the world is the best possible
in the sense that God could not have made anything better of a
different kind, but only that it is the best realisation of the par-
ticular purpose aimed at in the creation of the world. He rec-
ognises that God did not create the world from any necessity but
of His free will, and therefore that we cannot look for any
further cause for its creation beyond God's will to create it.
The world is one possible form of creation out of other possible
forms, and God was not bound to create the most perfect thing
possible indeed no most perfect thing in the absolute sense is
conceivable.

Thus the explanation of this sentence in which Augustine says
that whatever we can truly conceive as better must exist, depends
on the theory of exemplar ideas in the mind of God: 'You cannot
conceive anything better in creation, which has escaped the
Creator's thought. The human soul is by nature in contact with
the divine types on which it depends. When it says, "This
would be better than that," it sees this in the type with which it
is in contact, provided it tells the truth and sees what it says it
sees' (later in this same section) . These exemplar ideas or types are
not merely models, but through them God exercises creative as
well as formal causality on everything in the world. They are
also the source of all intelligibility of Slings. We can start from
the perception of these exemplar ideas, and thus deduce what
must actually exist; for, according to St. Augustine, what we
conceive as better must be created in actual fact.

BOOK THREE 273

20 Another reading is: 'you would not wish this to be heaven'
(caelum for solimt).

21 The arguments with which St. Augustine meets objections
to the doctrine of eternal punishment may be summed up as
follows:

1. Sin which deserves eternal punishment is committed by the
free choice of the sinner, and God is in no way responsible.
What cause can be found in our sins to blame Him, when there
is no blame for our sins which is not praise for Him?' (3.13.37).
The nature which God creates is good, and any defect arising in
it is due solely to the free will of the creature. 'If this is unjust,
you will not be unhappy; but if it is just, let us praise Him by
whose law this will be the case' (3.6.19).

2. Souls, even when they are sinful, are higher than the high-
est things which do not have life. 'Our soul, though corrupted
with sin, is higher and better than if it were changed into the
light seen by our eyes' (3.5.12); and, 'The soul is always superior
to the body' (3.5.16).

3. The perfection of the whole is realised, provided none of
the souls that are required for it are lacking. 'Provided that souls
themselves are not lacking, whether those which are made un-
happy when they sin or those which are made happy when they
do right, the whole, having beings of every kind, is always com-
plete and perfect' (3.9.26). 'You will find the unhappiness which
grieves you has this value: that those souls which have rightly
become unhappy because they willed to be sinful, are not lacking
to the perfection of the whole' (3.9.25).

4. Therefore, in spite of the state of unrepentant sinners, the
whole is perfect. 'When sinners are unhappy, the whole is per-
fect in spite of this' (3.9.26); and, 'Such is the generosity of God's
goodness that He has not refrained from creating even that crea-
ture which He foreknew would not only sin, but remain in the
will to sin' (3.5.15). This is true because punishment sets right
the ugliness of sin. Tor sin and the punishment of sin are not
themselves substantial things (naturae), but they are states (af-
fectiones) of substantial things, the former voluntary, the latter
penal. Now the voluntary state when sin is committed is a
shameful state. Therefore to this is applied a penal state, to set
it where such may fitly be, and to make it harmonise with the
beauty of the whole, so that the sin's punishment may make up
for its shamefulness' (3.9.26). Also, 'He created them not that

274 NOTES

they might sin, but that they might add beauty to the whole,
whether they willed to sin or not' (3.11.32).

What are we to think of these arguments? We can agree that
if the responsibility rests with the man who by his free will has
chosen to sin, and if he deserves such punishment, then no ob-
jection can be raised on the score of justice. But the rest of the
argument seems less convincing. It depends on two contentions
that the important thing for the perfection of the whole is the
presence of the full number of souls required, and that the in-
fliction of punishment on guilty souls restores their harmony
with the beauty of the whole. The difficulty here is to see how
a sinful soul can be anything else than ugly and a blot on the
beauty of the vsholecorruptio optimi pessima. The fact that
the guilty soul is punished does not seem to make it cease to be
ugly; all it seems to do is to prevent it from enjoying a happiness
or beauty to which it has no right. Perhaps the heart of the
difficulty is to see how the souls of the blessed can be utterly
happy when they are aware of other souls who are tragic failures,
and, however justly, are unhappy and ugly. Does not complete
happiness require awareness of nothing that is not completely
happy and beautiful? This is presumably, from one point of
view, the difficulty St. Augustine had in mind, since he seeks to
show that the whole is perfect and beautiful in spite of sinners.
It may be questioned whether his solution is satisfactory.

It is of interest in this connection to read the long discussion
of eternal punishment in the 21st book of the De civitate Dei.
There St. Augustine says that Scripture compels us to accept the
doctrine of eternal punishment, but that, without necessarily
agreeing, he will not oppose those who think the punishment of
hell may through God's mercy be made less than is deserved (cf.
ch. 24; also Enchir. 29.112, with note to same in ACW 3.144 n.
370).

22 This alludes to Manichaeism. See above, the Introd. 2.

23 Semper, omitted by Prof. Green.

24 See Burnaby, op. cit. 37: Tor Augustine, creation de nihilo
is simply creation, and creatureliness means a being which is not
God's and therefore not unchangeable. His whole conception of
moral good and evil is dynamic: man's soul is in the making and
cannot stand still. Righteousness is its movement towards in-
tegration, sin its movement towards disintegration a verging ad
nihilim, an "unmaking." Change is the rule of temporal exist-

BOOK THREE 275

ence, changelessness is the quality of the eternal, the limit towards
which the creature may approximate.'

25 Perl (231) rightly terms this entire section with its fiction
of a debate on suicide 'a masterpiece of psychology.' The theo-
logical aspects of suicide, even its sinfulness, are left aside: self-
destruction involves an illusion and mistake, a wrong evaluation
of existence and non-existence, a misinterpretation of natural
feeling (sensus) and opinion (opinio). Better known is St. Au-
gustine's broader treatment of the problem of suicide in the light
of pagan and Christian morality, in the first book of the City of
God: 1.16-27 (cf. also 19.4, refutation of the Stoic teaching on
the matter). Besides adducing celebrated examples among the
ancient Romans Lucretia, Cato he adverts to Christians, virgins
who chose suicide to preserve their chastity in times of persecu-
tion and, as was charged by the opposition, in some instances
were venerated in the Church as martyrs. While he refrains
from passing judgment on such persons, he is uncompromising
in rejecting suicide in any case whatsoever. See V. J. Bourke's
presentation of the subject: Augustine's Quest of Wisdom (Mil-
waukee 1945) 251 f. For further patristic material, also on sui-
cide in time of persecution, see A. Michel, 'Suicide,' DTC 14.2
(1941) 2739-49; C. Schneider, Geistesgeschichte des antiken
Christentims (Munich 1954) 1.503.

26 Prof. Green reads quean instead of qua.: 'since he wishes a
thing not to exist, which he is forced to praise, though lower.'

27 1 Cor. 6.3.

28 Luke 20.36.

29 This means that those who through vainglory desire equality
with the angels do not desire to be raised to the level of the
angels, but desire that the angels should be lowered to their level

Prof. Green TN 27 omits angelos in 'non ideo volunt aequales
esse angelis, sed angelos sib?: the difficult c sed sibf is found sug-
gestive of 'sed sui iuris esse}

30 Matt. 25.41.

31 Ps. 18.1 3 f.

32 St. Augustine's teaching on the devil's rights should be no-
ticed. He says it would have been unjust that the devil should
not rule over his captive, that the devil claimed all the descendants
of Adam by lawful right, but that when the debt was paid, justice
required that he should let them go.

These thoughts of the devil having rights and of a debt paid

276 NOTES

to him bring to mind much modern discussion of a formidable
body of patristic antecedents in the matter. First, there is the
'rights' theory which finds in some of the Fathers, with Irenaeus
the first to offer it, an ascription to the devil of rights of posses-
sion over captured humankindrights either freely conceded to
him by God after man's fall, or acquired and held by him even
in strict justice. Conjoined with this is the 'ransom' theory,
based primarily on language in Origen and claiming full expres-
sion in the redemptive theology of the Origenist St. Gregory of
Nyssa. This theory sees in Christ's redemption of mankind a
ransom of our souls from the captivity and bondage of Satan.
The theory as proposed by certain authors in the nineteenth
century finds in the Fathers the concept of Christ's ransom de-
veloped to the full and extreme of a contract entered into by
God and the devil, whereby the soul and blood of Christ were
surrendered to the devil as a pawn or price for giving up captive
mankind. It was, therefore, to the devil, not to God, that Christ
offered the supreme sacrifice on the Cross!

For a brief on these theories and an appraisal of the relevant
patristic texts (as found also in Sts. Basil, Gregory Nazianzen,
Ambrose, Jerome, etc.), cf. J. Riviere, The Doctrine of the
Atonement (tr. by L. Cappadelta, London-St. Louis 1909) 2.111
ff.; also, for Irenaeus: F. Vernet, 'Iren6e (Saint),' DTC 7.2 (1923)
2479-81; J. Lawson, The Biblical Theology of Saint Irenaeus
(London 1948) 197 f.; for Origen: R. Cadiou, Origen. His Life
at Alexandria (tr. by J. A. Southwell, St. Louis-London 1944)
300 f.

As for St. Augustine, besides the reflections already seen and
remaining to be seen in De libero arbitrio, there are scattered
throughout his works a number of other reminders of his wres-
tling with the traditional rights-and-ransom speculation on the
defeat of Satan through the Saviour's redemption of man. What
is perhaps his most 'suspicious' statement occurs in his work On
the Trinity, in a lengthy discussion (13.12.16-15.19) of the Re-
deemer's deliverance of man from the power of the devil. The
sentence reads ( 19): 'In hac redemptione tanquam pretium pro
nobis datus est sanguis Christi, quo accepto diabolus non ditatus
est, sed ligatus: ut nos ab eius nexibus solveremur, nee quemquam
secum eorurn quos Christus ab omni deblto liber indebite fuso
suo sanguine redemisset, peccatorum retibus involutum traheret
ad secundae ac sempiternae mortis exitium.' However much

BOOK THREE 277

this passage may smack of the old ransom idea, it is rightly em-
phasised by E. Portalie, 'Augustin (Saint)/ DTC 1.2 (1903) 2371
f., that it must be studied and weighed in its entire context (note
in the sentence itself the use of the word tanquarn^zs it were'!).
Such study of the entire discussion, Portalie finds, shows: c l. The
devil has no right over us, and what is styled his right was merely
a permission granted by God to punish sinners; he was the ex-
ecutioner, not the master. 2. Hence, no ransom was due to
him, and God's forgiveness of our sins immediately resulted in
our being set free. 3. This forgiveness might have been granted
gratuitously without any reparation, but it was more seemly that
Divine Justice should be fulfilled and that the devil should lose
his power through his injustice; such was the plan of the Passion'
(tr. by Cappadelta, op. cit. 149 f.).

These conclusions are further borne out and amplified in nu-
merous passages elsewhere in Augustine. He knows of no pact
or negotiation between God or Christ and the devil, but only of
Christ mediating between man and His Divine Father: cf., e.g.,
Enchir. 28.108; De praed. sanct. 30.15; De nat. et grat. 2.2. Fallen
man was delivered from the power of the devil, not because the
devil was in some way bargained with and placated or satisfied,
but because Christ satisfied God and reconciled us with Him:
cf. Enchir. 14.49; De civ. Dei 1.22; De Tr'm. 4.13.17; Serm. 26.3;
etc. If in the passage cited above Augustine states equivalently
that Christ redeemed or ransomed us from the devil, he elsewhere
too says in figurative and dramatized language that Christ re-
deemed us from the slavery of sin (Serm. 30.1), that He re-
deemed us from hell (Serm. 314.4), from death (De nat. et grat.
24.26), etc.; cf. Portalie, loc. cit.; also Riviere, Le dogme de la
redemption chez Saint Augustin (3. ed. Paris 1933); Thonnard
516 f.

Riviere, Doctrine of the Atonement 150 f., observes regarding
the soteriological language here used by Augustine and his
language certainly deserves very special attention in his discus-
sions of these matters that 'Saint Augustine is inclined to use
the common vocabulary associated with the ransom theory. In
this he was not only making a concession to the received lan-
guage, he was also endeavouring to explain it away. He retains
indeed the traditional expressions, but only after having first
emptied them of their contents and explained them in accordance
with his own system. His only reason for thus paying any at-

278 NOTES

tendon to the old theory was that it was widespread in the Chris-
tian community; his intention was, not to adopt but to adapt it.'

33 Cf. John 1.3 and 14.

34 In the phrase 'from whom and through whom and in whom
all things have been made' St. Augustine alludes to the Three
Persons of the Trinity. 'From whom,' a quo, refers to God the
Father considered as the ultimate cause of creation; 'through
whom,' per quern, refers to God the Son, the Word, considered
as the means through whom all has been done; 'in whom,' in quo,
refers to God the Holy Spirit, considered as the sanctifier in
whom the union of all with their cause takes place. Thonnard
(517) suggests the paraphrase: '. . . of Him by the power of
whom, according to the wisdom of whom, in the goodness of
whom all has been made.'

35 Five of the early MSS read 'whatever their function' (quan-
tilibet muneris) .Occasionally among the Fathers, including St.
Augustine, we find speculation regarding the number of angels.
They are very numerous (Dan. 7.10, Luke 2.13, etc.), but can an
approximation be made of their great number? Some, interpret-
ing the parable of the lost sheep (Matt. 18.12-14, Luke 15.3-7),
identify the single lost sheep with fallen man, and the ninety-nine
that had not strayed, with the angels. This proportion of 99: 1 is
thought of by St. Hilary, Cormn. in Matt. 18.6; by St. Ambrose,
Exp. Evang. Luc. 7.210; and so too by St. Augustine, Coll. c.
Max. 9. Again, some writers proposed that the chosen among
men were to fill the places left by the fallen angels: see Augustine,
Enchir. 9.29 ( = ACW 3.37; cf. 123 n. 73), and De civ. Dei 22.1.
Augustine grants, Enchir. ibid., that the men saved may exceed
the vacancies they fill. Gregory the Great, on the other hand,
equates the number of the elect with that of the faithful angels:
cf. In Evang. horn. 34. Concerning the subject, cf. G. Bareille,
'Ange d'apres les Peres/ DTC 1.1 (1903) 1205 f.

36 Here the sense requires omission of the words 'qui non pos-
sunty a late interpolation carried by the Maurist editors (Green
TN 27 f.).

37 This refers to Manichaeism.
38 1 Cor. 3.17.

39 Augustine's etymology of vituperare, vituperatio, as con-
sisting of vitium+parare, 'preparing (= charging, imputing) a
fault (defect, vice, etc.),' still appears as acceptable as any: cf. A.

BOOK THREE 279

Walde, Lateinisches etymologisches W drier buch (3. ed. Heidel-
berg 1954) s. v.

40 Thonnard (522) explains the connection of thought here as
follows. The idea of a debt suggests to Augustine the idea of
what is due in justice, and hence he considers providence in its
relation to evil from a fresh point of view. The thought is
threefold. First, there is the point that temporal things when
they decay, do not fail to give what they owe because decay is
natural to them. Secondly, there is the point that a creature with
free will, w r hen it does what is right, pays what is due and praise
should be given to the Creator. Thirdly, if it does not do what
is right, by its punishment justice is fulfilled and again praise is
due to the Creator. Thus Augustine reaches the general con-
clusion, aimed at in this part of the book, that God deserves praise
in all circumstances, even though creatures choose to sin.

41 Another sentence claimed in their favour by the Pelagians.

42 1 Tim. 6.10. In the following St. Augustine hints at the very
obvious etymological sense of the Greek word qpdaQY'UQ^( cpAsiv
= to love -f- Servos = silver) = 'love of silver.' When in
the following lines he describes the Latin avaritia as an 'excessive
desire' of anything, he reflects the root meaning: av-ere = to
'desire vehemently.'

43 Prof. Green reads recedetur instead of receditur: '. . . and
nothing else than the will 'will be the root.'

44 Another sentence which the Pelagians claimed in their sup-
port.

45 Yet another sentence which the Pelagians claimed.

46 1 Tim. 1.13.

47 Ps. 24.7.

48 Rom. 7.19 and 18.

49 Gal, 5.17.

50 'Difficulty' is perhaps the nearest equivalent to the Latin dif-
fiozdtas, but it is not wholly satisfactory. The word implies here
the presence of obstacles to a moral agent.

51 Eph. 2.3.

52 The words, 'and because He loves them He repairs their
being,' are found in the earlier editions, but apparently not in the
MSS.

63 Instead of consequitur Prof. Green reads consequetur: 'will
result. 7

54 Certain questions with regard to the origin of men's souls

280 NOTES

puzzled St. Augustine throughout his life, and he never became
convinced what was their true solution. Let us start with what
seemed quite clear to him. He had no doubt that the soul can-
not be an emanation from the divine substance, that no soul can
be derived from a body or from an animal soul (this applying to
the souls of Adam and Eve as well as to the rest of mankind),
that any theory is false which speaks of a former life in which
souls, pure spirits, have for their sins deserved to be exiled in hu-
man or animal bodies, that is to say, any theory of metempsycho-
sis; and, finally, that neither the soul of Adam nor of his
descendants can come from an immaterial substance created on
the first day. The problem which puzzled him was concerned,
not with the soul of Adam, but with the souls of Adam's de-
scendants. If a man's soul came by propagation from his parents,
how are we to explain individual personality, while, if each soul
is created by a separate act, how can we explain its contraction
of the guilt of original sin? If each is created separately, is it
created when each body is formed? If so, how are we to account
for the words of Genesis in which God is described as resting on
the seventh day, since on this theory creation would go on dur-
ing the whole course of human history? If each soul was created
at the beginning of the world and united by God to the body at
the appropriate time, or if each was created at the beginning of
the world and is united by its own act to the body, what is its
state before it joins the body? Regarding the problem and the
principal passages see Portalie, DTC 1.2.2359-61; Gilson, op. cit.
66-68, 94-96 (pre-existence) ; Copleston, op. cit. 2.79 f.

The origin of the souls, besides occupying Augustine on nu-
merous occasions, is treated by him in a separate work of four
books: De anima et eius origine (written ca. 419, or perhaps as
late as 423/24 so H. Pope, Saint Augustine of Hippo [London
1937] 380). Particularly interesting and instructive is a long
letter (= Ep. 166) to St. Jerome of the year 415, bearing the
title, De origine cmimae hominisa veritable treatise on the prob-
lem. In this letter ( 1) Augustine, 'an old man,' approaches the
'much older' man for light on the problem whose solution he has
sought over many years and the principal burden of which is
stated clearly. It is extracted briefly here.

'Some years ago,' writes Augustine (7), 'I wrote certain books
on The Problem of Free Choice. These went forth into the
hands of many, and many have them now. There I brought up

BOOK THREE 281

four views on the soul's incarnation: 1) that all other souls are
generated from the one given to the first man; 2) that for each
and every person a new soul is made; 3) that souls already in ex-
istence somewhere are sent by God into the bodies, or 4) enter
them of their own will. I thought it necessary to treat these
views in such a \vay that, regardless of which of them might be
true, I was not to be hindered in my purpose to oppose with all
my might those the Manichaeans who attempt to lay upon God
the responsibility for a nature ruled by its own principle of
evil. . . .*

Jerome apparently held the second view, that God creates each
soul for each newborn individual (8). But he has not solved
for Augustine the difficulty in Genesis, of God resting on the
seventh day. Jerome, in turn, has sent enquirers to Augustine to
seek solution of the problem, which is still full of difficulties for
Augustine (9): for instance (10), if souls are individually cre-
ated, day after day, whence the sin of infants that they should
require remission of it in baptism? These souls, post-created,
are tied to flesh derived from the vitiated flesh of the first sinner
Adam: is it just on the part of the Creator to expose them and to
deliver them over to condemnation on such basis of guilt?
Thousands of infants die without baptism is their condemnation
on such ground just?

Some objections to creation of the soul at birth, Augustine ex-
plains (11-15), can be met 'But when I am confronted by the
penal problem of the little ones, I am embarrassed, believe me,
by great difficulties, and I am utterly lost for an answer.' And
here it is not merely the eternal punishments of infants in the
afterlife, but the sufferings and miseries that are theirs in the few
days they live, that disconcert Jerome's enquirer (16). Further,
there are those who never attain to the use of reason idiots or
imbeciles: if individual souls are created for such, how are we to
reconcile with divine justice the transference to these of the
primeval penalty (17)?

Augustine continues for some paragraphs more on the subject
of infants suffering in this life (present to his mind, we must not
forget, is the uncertain lot of infants in antiquity the practice of
infanticide and exposition of infants, the tragic fate of the off-
spring of slaves, etc.) and the fate of infants dying unbaptized.
He quotes at some length (18) from a passage in the De libero
arbitrio (3.23.68) which we shall read some pages farther on:

282 NOTES

here he had suggested that we do not know 'what ample com-
pensation God reserves for these children in the secret of His
judgments. 7 But Augustine admits to Jerome (20) that this is
only a conjecture and at best a partial answer, certainly not ap-
plying to the great numbers who die without baptism. Regard-
ing these 'if by a separate creative act of God each receives his
soul at birth, why are they doomed to punishment if they die in
infancy without the sacrament of Christ? That they are doomed
if they so leave the body, is testified both by Holy Scripture and
by the Holy Church' (25).

We know from the Retractations (2.45) that St. Jerome,
pleading lack of leisure, did not make answer to St. Augustine's
difficulties. Some few years before his death, in the same Re-
tractations (1.1.3), Augustine confessed: 'As regards its (the
soul's) origin, by which it comes to be in the body, whether it is
from that one man who was first created, when man was made
into a. living soul (1 Cor. 15:45), or whether in like manner for
each individual an individual soul is created, I neither then knew,
nor do I know now.'

55 St. Augustine held that no error was possible in the Bible:
if a reader thinks he has found a false statement, either the read-
ing is wrong, or the interpretation is wrong, or the text is
wrongly understood (C. Faust. Man. 11.5). He admits that for-
getfulness may occur in the writer and one name may be con-
fused with another (De cons. Evang, 3.7.30). As to the authority
of the different versions, he considers the Septuagint inspired,
and both Hebrew and Greek texts inspired even in the parts
which one or other lack (De civ. Dei 18.42 f.). He claimed
liberty of discussion in regard to the Latin texts: he often quotes
the so-called Itala, often the ancient African texts, sometimes St.
Jerome's Vulgate. Concerning the interpretation of Scripture his
principles were: first, prudence, so that he denounced rash inter-
pretations which would bring the word of God into ridicule;
secondly, that every meaning which is found by a reader and is
good and true, even though not intended by the writer, is the
intention of the Holy Spirit (De doct. Christ. 3.27.34). See
Portalie, DTC 1.2.2342 f.; for extensive study, M. Pontet,
Uexegese de S. Augiistin predicateur (Paris 1944) 1-383.

53 The Latin word here translated 'source of their forms' is
formator.

BOOK THREE 283

57 There is another reading, 'in the misery of temporal events'
miseria for serie.

58 Another reading has 'deeper cause' interior instead of ul-
terior.

59 Instead of quod recte facial Prof. Green TN 28 prefers
the reading recti facti: '. . . the good of right action.'

60 Folio wing Prof. Green (28) who excises aliena (= the faith
'of another'), an early interpolation, between potest and <ac>-
commodari*

61 Cf. Luke 7. 12-15.

62 Instead of iusta divina. lege poena consecuta est Prof. Green
TN 29 reads iustam divina lege poenam consecutam: 'From
this it is understood that . . ., and (that) since this sin was done
in free will, by divine law a just penalty followed after it.'

ft3 Rom. 1.22 and 21.
64 Ps. 41.7.
e5 Gen. 3.5.

66 Ecclus. 10.15 and 14.
67 Ps. 83.11.

INDEX

INDEX

Academic scepticism, 4; 254

Adam, and Eve, 7, 276, 280

adultery, 39

affectio, and ncttura, 273

Alexandria, birthplace of Neo-
Platonism, 252

Amann, ., 232

Ambrose, St., 4, 245, 276, 278

Ammonius Saccas, 252

angels, 172

anima, animus, 242 f., 251

animals, 32, 83, 210 ff.

Anselm, St., 235, 262 f.

Aristotle, 245, 249

Armstrong, A. EL, 16, 252, 263

Augustine, St., summary of his
life, 3 ff.; purpose of De lib.
orb.,, 13 f.; his argument for
God's existence, 29, 80 ff.,
260 ff.; his view of the devil's
rights, 275 ff.; of eternal
punishment, 273 f.; of faith
and reason, 235 ff.; of the
foreknowledge of God, 142
ff., 268 ff.; relations with
Manichaeism, 6 ff.; the ques-
tion of ontologism, 248, 260;
his view of the origin of
souls, 279 ff.; relations with
Pelagianism, 9 ff.; his po-
litical theory, 241 f.; his
theory of 'illumination,' 14,
30, 245 ff.

Coll C. Max, 9: 278; Conf.,

15; 4.13.20: 263; 8.15: 233;
9.17: 233; 9.31: 233; C.
Acad., 243, 254; 1.9: 243; C.
Faust. Mm., 232; 11.5: 282.
C. Secund. 11: 231; De an. et
eius orig^ 280; De civ. Dei,
232, 274; 1.16-27: 275; 1.22:
277; 2.21.2: 240; 12.6 f.: 266;
18.42 f.: 282; 19.4: 275; 22.1:
278; De corr. et grat. 32:
270; De cons. Evang. 3.7.30:
282; De doctr. christ. 1.12.
17: 251; De dono persev. 26
f.: 232; De mag. 237, 246;
De mm. 6.12.36: 262; De not.
et grat., 224; 2.2: 277; 24.26:
277; De ord. 2.6: 243; 2.17:
243; 2.19: 243; 2.30: 243;
2.38: 243; 2.40: 243; 2.41-42:
243; 2.50: 243; De praed.
sanct. 2.5: 237; 30.15: 277;
De pulch. et apto, 263; De
quant, an., 233 f.; De Trin.
4.13.17: 277; 10.11.18: 242;
12.15.24: 248; 12.15.25: 236;
13.12.16-15.19: 276; 13.19.
24: 236; 14.1.1-3: 236; 15.12.
21: 254; De utiL cred., 237;
De vera rel, 233; 29.52-43.
81: 263; Enarr. in Ps. 123.2:
237; 144.15: 257; Enchir.
9.29: 278; 14.49: 277; 28.108:
277; 29.112: 274. Ep. 3.4:
243; 8.2: 243; 31.7: 232;

287

z88

INDEX

120.1.3: 235; 120.2.8: 237;
147.2.7: 235; 147.3.8: 235;
158: 233; 159: 233; 160: 233;
161: 233; 162: 233, 162.2:
233; 163: 233; 164: 233;
166.7: 232; 169: 233; 169.12:
233. In loann. Ev. 29.6: 237;
Retract., 3 f., 12 f., 15, 232,
265; 1.9: 221 ff. ; 1.9.1, 6: 2;
1.9.2-6: 232; 1.9.3: 234, 244;
2.45: 282; Serm. 26.3:277;
30.1: 277; 43.7.9: 235; SoliL
1.L3: 247; 1.8.15: 247.

Babylon, 6

baptism, of infants, 209, 281
Bardy, G., 8, 232
Bareille, G., 278
Basil, St., 276
Beatific Vision, 236
becttus, 242
Bible, and error, 282
Bonaventure, St., 260
Bourke, V. J., 240, 275
Boyer, C, 264
Burkitt, F. C, 8, 232
Burleigh, J. H. S., 16, 232
Burnaby, J., 16, 232, 236, 240,
257, 274

Cadiou, R., 276
Carthage, 234, 263
Cassiciacum, 15
Cato, 275
causality, 265 f.
Cayre", F., 256, 262
children, sufferings of, 32, 208
ff.; natural belief of, 237 f.

Christ, 40, 120, 137, 170, 219,

276, 277

Christopher, J. P., 257
Church and State, 241
Cicero, 241, 245
Coelestius, 9
Colleran, J. M., 234
concupiscentia, 240
contemplation, 252
Copleston, F., 239, 241, 248 f.,

255, 263, 280
Corinthians, 275, 282
Cunningham, W-, 241
cupiditas, 239

dancing, 124

Daniel, 278

D'Arcy, M. C, 255

Descartes, 254

devil, the, 217 ff., 275 ff.

difficulty, difficultas, a term im-
plying presence of obstacles
to a moral agent, 194, 206 f.,
279

disciplina, 234

Donatists, 3, 234-

Ecclesiasticus, 257, 283

Ephesians, 279

Eve, and Adam, 280

evil, 31; cause of, 189 ff., 271;

Manichaean principle of, 234
Evodius, 5, 12, 15, 17 ff., 233 f.,

240, 243 f., 255 f., 270

faith, 77, 201, 235 ff.; of elders
benefits child offered for
baptism, 209

INDEX

289

Faustus the Manichee, 9
Fonck, A., 260

form, 42 if., 252 f., 263 ff., 282
fortitude, 61, 245
Fortune, 143

free choice, why given to man,
74 ff.

Galatians, 279

Gardeil, A., 264

Genesis, 280 f., 283

Gibb, J., 233

Gilson, E., 236, 237, 238, 241,
247, 249 ff.

Gioberti, V., 260

God, evidence for existence of,
14, 78 ff., 238; foreknowl-
edge of, 142 ff., 268 ff.

good, supreme, 105, 117

Grabmann, M., 259

grace, and free will, see Pela-
gianism

Greek, 195

Green, W. M., 15, 231, 242,
245, 251, 257, 259 f., 265,
267, 272, 279, 283

Gregory the Great, St., 278

Gregory Nazianzen, St., 276

Gregory of Nyssa, St., 276

happiness, 104
Hedde, R., 232
Henry, P., 254
Hilary, St., 278
Hippo Regius, 3, 221

ignorance, 194, 206 f.

'illumination,' theory of, 14,
245 ff.

infants, punishment of, bap-
tism, of, etc., 280 ff.

Innocent I, Pope, 10

intellectus, 243

intellectus agens, 248, 250, 257

intelligeritia, 243

intuition, 262

Irenaeus, St., 276

Isaias, 235, 251

Itala, 282

Jansen, L. F., 264
Jerome, St., 9, 13, 276, 280 ff.
John, St., 251, 254, 260, 278
Jolivet, R., 255,265,271
Joyce, G. H., 269
justice, 62 f., 132, 143, 219 f.,
245

knowledge, 14, 77, 236, 242,
245 ff. See illumination'

Latin, 195

law, temporal and eternal, 44 ff.

Lawson, J., 276

libido, 27, 239 f.

Lucretia, 275

Luke, St., 278, 283

man, the first, 212 ff,

Mani, 6 ff., 232

Manichaeism, St. Augustine a

Manichee, 3 f.; Manichaean

religion, 6 fT.
Manichees, 222, 233, 281
Matthew, St., 252, 275, 278

290

INDEX

Mausbach, J., 241, 245, 259, 263

McKeon, R., 16

mens, 243

Michel, A., 275

Molina, 268

Monnica, St., 3, 15

Montgomery, W., 233

Moses, 247

murder, why wrong, 42 ff .

?iatura, and substance, 243 f.;
and affectio, 273

nature, every nature good,
179 ff.

Neo-Platonism, 4, 252, 254,
264, 272

Nola, 232

number, 98 ff., 124; Augus-
tine's fascination for, 259

O'Meara, J. J., 232, 243, 254
ontologism, 248, 260
optimism, philosophical, 272
Origen, 276
original sin, 33, 241

Paradise, 217

passion, 27,41, 44 f., 50 ff., 239

Paul, St., 247

Paulinus of Nola, St., 13, 232

Pelagians, Pelagius, 9 ff., 222,

232, 233, 234, 244 f., 265, 267
Perl, C. J., 16, 234, 240, 260,

263, 275
Petilian, 234
Philo, 264
philosophy, 238

Plato, 245 f, 249, 252, 263 f.

Rep. 517b: 246
Plotinus, 4, 252 ff., 255, 260,

270 f.
political theory, Augustine's,

240 f.

Pontet, M., 259, 282
Pontifex, M., 266
Pope, H., 233, 280
populus, 240
Porphyry, 252
Portalie, E., 235, 247, 250, 277,

280, 282
Providence, Divine, 46 ff., 71,

127, 135, 143; according to

Plotinus, 270 f.
prudence, 61 f.
Psalms, 251, 260, 265, 275, 279,

283

Puech, H. C, 232
punishment, eternal, 273 f.;

just, 57 ff.

ratio, 241 f., 263

reason, 29, 83 ff., 133, 157, 238,

261

Redemption, 271
Riviere, J., 276 f.
Roland-Gosselin, B., 242
Romanianus, 13
Romans, 279, 283
Rome, 3, 5, 221, 234

sacrilege, 44
Schilling, O., 245
Schmitt, A., 259
Schneider, C, 275

INDEX

2 9 I

Scripture, interpretation of, 282
Secundinus the Manichee, 6, 1 3
Semipelagians, 11, 252
sense, inner, 83 S.
Septuagint, 235, 251
sin, nature of, 67 ff.; cause of,

136 ff., 265 IF.; original, 33
soul, origin of, 279 ff.; always

superior to body, 156
Sparrow, C. M., 16
state, Christian, 241
Stoics, 275
Suarez, 268
suicide, 275
superstition, 44

Tagaste, 15

temperance, 62, 245

Theodosius, 254

Thomas of Aquin, St,, 257 f.,

241, 249 f.
Thonnard, F. J., 16, 231, 236,

240, 242, 247, 254, 256, 279
Timothy, St., 279
Trinity, the, 218, 238, 242, 271,

278

truth, 30 f., 103, 107 ff., 134,
219 f., 246, 251

understanding, 57, 81 ff., 237,
242

unhappiness, why not pre-
vented by God, 165 ff.

Utica, 15

Uzala, 15

Valentinus, 233
Vergil, 257
Vernet, F., 276
virtue, 132
vituperatio, 183, 278
Vulgate, the, 251, 257, 282

Walde, A., 279

will, free will is good, 131

wisdom, 102 iL, 154, 215, 219

f., 245, 245
Wisdom, Book of, 259, 265,

265
Word of God, the, 172 f.

Zosimus, 10

ANCIENT CHRISTIAN WRITERS
THE WORKS OF THE FATHERS IN TRANSLATION

Edited by
J. QUASTEN, S. T. D., and J. C. PLUMPE, PH, D.

1. THE EPISTLES OF ST. CLEMENT OF ROME AND ST. IGNA-

TIUS OF ANTIOCH. Trans, by JAMES A. KLEIST, S. J., PH. D.

2. ST.TuGUSTOTC, THE FIRST CATECHETICAL INSTRUCTION.

Trans, by JOSEPH P. CHRISTOPHER, PH. D. Pages vi 4 171. 1946.

3. ST. AUGUSTINE, FAITH, HOPE, AND CHARITY. Trans, by

Loxns A. ARAND, S. S., S. T. D. Pages vi 4 165. 1947.

4. JULIANUS POMPERIUS, THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE. Trans.

by SR. MARY JOSEPHINE SUELZER, PH. D. Pages vi 4- 220. 1947.

5. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE LORD'S SERMON ON THE MOUNT.

Trans, by JOHN J. JEPSON, S. S., PH. D. Pages vi 4 227. 1948.

6. THE DIDACHE, THE EPISTLE OF BARNABAS, THE EPISTLES

AND THE MARTYRDOM OF ST. POLYCARP, THE FRAG-
MENTS OF PAPLAS, THE EPISTLE TO DIOGNETUS. Trans.
by JAMES A. KLEIST, S. J., PH. D. Pages vi 4 235. 1948.

7. ARNOBIUS, THE CASE AGAINST THE PAGANS, Vol. 1. Trans.

by GEORGE E. McCRACKEN, PH. D. Pages vi 4 372. 1949.

8. ARJSTOBIUS, THE CASE AGAINST THE PAGANS, Vol. 2. Trans.

by GEORGE E. McCRACKEN, PH. D. Pages vi 4- 287. 1949.

9. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE GREATNESS OF THE SOUL, THE

TEACHER. Trans, by JOSEPH M. COLLERAN, C. SS. R., PH. D.
Pages vi -t- 255. 1950.

10. ST. ATHANASIUS, THE LIFE OF SAINT ANTONY. Trans, by

ROBERT T. MEYER, PH. D. Pages vi 4- 155. 1950.

11. ST. GREGORY THE GREAT, PASTORAL CARE. Trans, by

HENRY DAVIS, S. J M B. A. Pages vi 4 281. 1950.

12. ST. AUGUSTINE, AGAINST THE ACADEMICS. Trans, by JOHN

J. O'MEARA, D. PHIL. Pages vi 4 213. 1950.

13 TERTULLIAN, TREATISES ON MARRIAGE AND REMAR-
RIAGE: TO HIS WIFE, AN EXHORTATION TO CHASTITY,
MONOGAMY. Trans, by WILLIAM P. LESAINT, S. J., S. T. D.
Pages viii H- 196. 1951.

14. ST. PROSPER OF AQUITAINE, THE CALL OF ALL NATIONS.

Trans, by P. DE LETTER, S. J., S. T. D. Pages vi 4 234. 1952,

15. ST. AUGUSTINE, SERMONS FOR CHRISTMAS AND EPIPH-

ANY. Trans, by THOMAS C. LAWLER. Pages vi 4 249. 1952.

16. ST. IRENAEUS, PROOF OF THE APOSTOLIC PREACHING.

Trans, by JOSEPH P. SMITH, S. J. Pages viii 4 233. 1952.

17. THE WORKS OF ST. PATRICK, ST. SECUNDINUS, HYMN

ON ST. PATRICK. Trans, by LUDWIG BIELER, PH. D. Pages vi 4

18. ST. GREGORY OF NYSSA, THE LORD'S PRAYER, THE BEATI-

TUDES. Trans, by HILDA C. GRAEF. Pages vi 4- 210. 1954.

19. ORIGEN, PRAYER, EXHORTATION TO MARTYRDOM. Trans.

by JOHN J. O'MEARA, D. PHIL. Pages viii 4 253. 1954.

20. RUFINUS, A COMMENTARY ON THE APOSTLES' CREED.

Trans, by J. N. D. KELLY, D. D. Pages viii 4 166. 1955.

21. ST. MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR, THE ASCETIC LIFE, THE

FOUR CENTURIES ON CHARITY. Trans, by POLYCARP SHER-
WOOD, O. S. B., S. T. D. Pages viii 4 284. 1955.

22. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE. Trans, by

DOM MARK PONTIFEX. Pages vi 4 291. 1955.

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