Cavalry in war and peace

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X

CAVALRY
IN WAR AND PEACE

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CAVALRY

IN WAR AND PEACE

BY GENERAL
FREIHERR VON BERNHARDI

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY

MAJOR G. T. M. BRIDGES, D.S.O.

4T9 (ROYAL IRISH) DRAGOON GUARDS

WITH A PREFACE BY

GENERAL SIR J. D. P. FRENCH

G.C.B., G.C.V.O, K.C.M.G.

• *♦,»•■•

« « « s -

U.S. CAVALRY ASSOCIATION

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANS

1910

w

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-3

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u<5'

PREFACE

A LL British soldiers will welcome this excellent
translation by Major Bridges of a new work
by General von Bernhardi, whose intimate know-
ledge of cavalry and brilliant writings have won
for him such a great European reputation.

Some prominence has lately been given in
England to erroneous views concerning th6 arma-
ment and tactics of cavalry. General von Bem-
hardi's book contains sound doctrine on this
subject, and will show to every one who has an
open mind and is capable of conviction by reasoned
argument how great is the future r61e of cavalry,
and how determined are the efforts of the great
cavalry leaders of Europe to keep abreast with
the times, and to absorb, for the profit of the
arm, every lesson taught by experience, both in
peace and war.

In all theories, whether expounded by so
eminent an authority as General von Bemhardi
or by others who have not his claims to our

259827

vi PREFACE

attention, there is, of course, a good deal that
must remain a matter of opinion, and a question
open for free and frank discussion. But I am
convinced that some of the reactionary views
recently aired in England concerning cavalry
will, if accepted and adopted, lead first to the
deterioration and then to the collapse of cavalry
when next it is called upon to fulfil its mission
in war. I therefore recommend not only cavalry
ofl&cers, hut officers of all arms and services, to
read and ponder this book, which provides a
strengthening tonic for weak minds which may
have allowed themselves to be impressed by the

dangerous heresies to which I have alluded.

« ♦ ♦ ♦ «

Is there such a thing as the cavalry spirit, and
should it be our object to develop this spirit, if
it exists, to the utmost, or to suppress it?
General von Bernhardi thinks that this spirit
exists and should be encouraged, and I agree
with him. It is not only possible but necessary
to preach the Army spirit, or, in other words, the
close comradeship of all arms in battle, and at
the same time to develop the highest qualities
and the special attributes of each branch. The
particular spirit which we seek to encourage is
different for each arm. Were we to seek to

PREFACE vii

endow cavalry with the tenacity and stiffness of
infantry, or to take from the mounted arm the
mobility and the cult of the offensive which are
the breath of its life, we should ruin not only
the cavalry, but the Army besides. Those who
scoff at the spirit, whether of cavalry, of artillery,
or of infantry, are people who have had no
practical experience of the actual training of
troops in peace, or of the personal leadership in
war. Such men are blind guides indeed.

Another reason why I welcome this book is
because it supplies a timely answer to schoolmen
who see in our South African experiences, some
of which they distort and many of which they
forget, the acme of all military wisdom. It is
always a danger when any single campaign is
picked out, at the fancy of some pedagogue, and
its lessons recommended as a panacea. It is by
study and meditation of the whole of the long
history of war, and not by concentration upon
single and special phases of it, that we obtain
safe guidance to the principles and practices of
an art which is as old as the world.

It is not only the campaigns which we and
others have fought which deserve reflection, but
also the wars which may lie in front of us. General
yon Bernhardi doe^ not neglect the lessons of

viii PREFACE

past wars, but he gives the best of reasons for
thinking that the wars in South Africa and
Manchuria have little in common with the con-
ditions of warfare in Europe. We notice, as we
read his book, that he has constantly in his mind
the enemies whom the German Army must be
prepared to meet, their arms, their tactics, and
their country, and that he urges his comrades to
keep the conditions of probable wars constantly
before their eyes.

It passes comprehension that some critics in
England should gravely assure us that the war
in South Africa should be our chief source of
inspiration and guidance, and that it was not
abnormal. All wars are abnormal, because there
is no such thing as normal war. In applying
the lessons of South Africa to the training of
cavalry, we should be very foolish if we did not
recognise at this late hour that very few of the
conditions of South Africa are likely to recur.
I will name only a few of them. The composition
and tactics of the Boer forces were as dissimilar
from those of European armies as possible. Boer
commandos made no difficulty about dispersing
to the four winds when pressed, and re-uniting
again some days or weeks later hundreds of miles
from the scene of their last encounter. Such

PREFACE ix

tactics in Europe would lead to the disruption
and disbandment of any army that attempted
them.

Secondly, the war in South Africa was one for
the conquest and annexation of immense districts,
and no settlement was open to us except the
complete submission of our gallant enemy. A
campaign with such a serious object in view is
the most difficult that can be confided to an army
if the enemy is brave, enterprising, well-armed,
numerous, and animated with unconquerable
resolve to fight to the bitter end. I am not
sure that people in England have ever fully
grasped this distinctive feature of our war with
the Dutch B/cpublics. Let me quote the opinion
of the late Colonel Count Yorck von Wartenburg
on this subject. In his remarkable book ** Napoleon
as a General," Count Yorck declares that if, in
the campaign of 1870-71, the absolute conquest
and annexation of Prance had been desired,
German procedure would not have been either
logical or successful, and that the Germans would
have failed as completely as Napoleon failed in
Spain. But Count Yorck shows that when plans
have a definite and limited object in view —
namely, to obtain peace on given conditions — the
situation is altered, Count Yorck shows that

X PREFACE

the German plans in 1870-71 were perfectly
appropriate to this limited aim, and that they
were therefore successful. The very serious task
which British policy imposed upon British strategy
in South Africa must never he forgotten.

Thirdly, we did not possess any means for re-
mounting our cavalry with trained horses, such
as we are endeavouring to secure hy our new
system of cavalry dep6ts and reserve regiments.
After the capture, in rear of the army, of the
great convoy by Do Wet, our horses were on short
commons, and consequently lost condition and
never completely recovered it.

Lastly, owing to the wholesale and repeated
release of prisoners who had been captured and
who subsequently appeared again in the field
against us, we were called upon to fight, not,
as is stated, 86,000 or 87,000 men, but something
like double that number or more, with this
additional disadvantage, that the enemy possessed
on his second or third appearance against us
considerable experience of our methods, and a
certain additional seasoned fitness.

Nevertheless we are now invited to throw
away our cold steel as useless lumber owing to
some alleged failures of the cavalry in South
Africa, Were we to do so, w^ should invert th^

PREFACE xi

r61e of cavalry, turn it into a defensive arm, and
make it a prey to the first foreign cavalry that
it meets, for good cavalry can always compel
a dismounted force of mounted riflemen to mount
and ride away, and when such riflemen are caught
on their horses they have power neither of offence
nor of defence and are lost. If, in European war-
fare, such mounted riflemen were to separate
and scatter, the enemy would be well pleased,
for he could then reconnoitre and report every
movement and make his plans in all security.
In South Africa the mounted riflemen were the
hostile- army itself, and when they had dispersed
there was nothing left to reconnoitre; but when
and where will these conditions recur ?

Even in South Africa, grave though were the
disadvantages under which our cavalry laboured
from short commons and overwork, the Boer
mounted riflemen acknowledged on many occasions
the moral force of the cold steel, and gave way
before it. The action at Zand River in May
1900 was a case in point, and I only quote a
personal experience because the venerable maxim
that an ounce of practice is worth a ton of theory
has still a good deal to be said for it. The r61e
of the Cavalry Division on the day to which
I refer was to bring pressure to bear on the ri^ht

xii PREFACE

flank of the Boer army in order to enable Lord
Roberts to advance across the river and attack
the main Boer forces. Having crossed the river
to the west of the Boers, we determined, with
the inner or easterly brigade, to seize an important
kopje lying on the right flank of the Boer position,
and, pivoting upon this, to throw two brigades
against the right flank and rear of the enemy.

The Boers told off a strong force of picked
mounted riflemen to oppose this movement, which
they expected. The kopje was seized by the
inner brigade, and the brigade next to it made
some progress; but the Boer mounted riflemen
attacked the flank brigade to the extreme west,
and began to drive it back. I galloped from
the kopje to the outer brigade with the thought
that either every idea which I had ever formed
in my life as to the efficacy of shock action
against mounted riflemen was utterly erroneous,
or that this was the moment to show that it
was not. On reaching the outer brigade I
ordered it to mount and form for attack. All
ranks were at once electrified into extraordinary
enthusiasm and energy. The Boers realised what
M''as coming. Their fire became wild, and the
bullets began to fly over our heads. Directly
the advance began, the Boers hesitated, and

PREFACE xiii

many rushed to their horses. We pressed forward
with all the very moderate speed of tired
horses, whereupon the whole Boer force retired
in the utmost confusion and disorder, losing in
a quarter of an hour more ground than they
had won during three or four hours of fighting.
A cavalry which could perform service like this ;
which held back, against great numerical odds,
the Dutch forces at Colesberg; which relieved
Kimberley; which directly made possible the
victory at Paardeberg by enclosing Kronje in
his entrenchments ; which captured Bloemf ontein,
Kroonstadt, and Barberton, and took part success-
fully in all the phases of the long guerilla war
and in countless drives, can afford to regard with
equanimity the attacks of those who have never
led, trained, nor understood the arm to which

I am proud to have belonged.

« « « « «

I have already, in an introduction to another
book by General von Bernhardi, expressed my
high sense of the general soundness of his
teaching. Were I to do full justice to the
merits of this new work, I should be compelled
to make long extracts and to repeat matter which
every reader will perhaps do better to search for
and select for himself. But I would invite

xiv PREFACE

particular attention to the general's remarks on
the subjects of reconnaissance, the cavalry fitght,
the combination of fire and shock, the divisional
cavalry, the r61e of the strategical cavalry,
training, and organisation. The masterly summary
of the qualifications which should be possessed
by squadron and patrol leaders is, in particular,
an extremely valuable contribution to the study
of a most important subject.

The general does not always agree with the
Regulations of his own Array, and he is specially
in conflict with them when he recommends raids
by cavalry corps against the enemy's communi-
cations. My opinion upon this point is that
every plan should be subordinate to what I
consider a primary necessity — namely, the absolute
and complete overthrow of the hostile cavalry.
So long as that cavalry remains intact with its
moral unshaken, all our enterprises must of
necessity be paralysed. The successful cavalry
fight confers upon the victor the command of
ground, just in the same way that successful
naval action carries with it command at sea.
For eflFective enterprises in either sphere command
is absolutely necessary, and can only be obtained
by successful battle, whether on land or sea.

I agree generally with the German Regulations

PREFACE XV

when they suggest that raids against communi-
cations should not divert cavalry from their true
battle objective, and consequently I must venture
to differ from the author on this point, though
I do not approve of all that the German
Regulations say concerning the employment of
cavalry in battle. The opinion which I hold
and have often expressed is that the true role
of cavalry on the battlefield is to reconnoitre^ to
deceive^ and finally to support. If the enemy's
cavalry has been overthrown, the r61e of recon-
naissance will have been • rendered easier. In
the rdles of deception and support, such an
immense and fruitful field of usefulness and
enterprise is laid open to a cavalry division
which has thought out and practised these rdles
in its peace training and is accustomed to act
in large bodies dismounted, that I cannot bring
myself to believe that any equivalent for such
manifest advantages can be found even in the
most successful raid against the enemy's com-
munications by mounted troops.

I entirely agree with General von Bernhardi's
conclusion that very important duties will fall
to the lot of the divisional cavalry in war, and
that the fulfilment of these duties has become
more difficult of late years. The necessity for,

xvi PREFACE

and the value of, divisional cavalry are often
not properly appreciated. What the strategical
cavalry is to the Army in the greater sphere, the
divisional cavalry is to the division in the lesser.

Most cavalry soldiers of good judgment will
agree with the lucid arguments of the author
on the suhject of cavalry armament. It is
suggested to us, by critics of the cavalry, that
the lance is an impediment to dismounted action.
If this difficulty ever existed, it has been over-
come by the method of carrying the lance which
has been adopted and practised with marked
success for the past two years. It is also
objected by the same critics that a thin bamboo
pole, carried by the side of a mounted man,
will hinder him in reconnaissance and reveal
his. position to the enemy. The mere statement
of this argument absolves me from the duty
of replying to it.

General von Bernhardi very wisely says that
it is not a question whether cavalrymen should
fight mounted or dismounted, but whether they
are prepared and determined to take their share
in the decision of an encounter and to employ
the whole of their strength and mobility to this
end. In our training during the last few years
I have endeavoured to impress upon all ranks

PREFACE xvii

that when the enemy's Cavalry is overthrown,
our cavalry will find more opportunities of using
the rifle than the cold steel, and that dismounted
attacks will be more frequent than charges with
the arms blcmehe. By no means do I rule out
as impossible, or even unlikely, attacks by great
bodies of mounted men against other arms on
the battlefield. But I believe that such oppor*
tunities will occur comparatively rarely, and
that undue prominence should not be accorded
to them in our peace training, to the detriment
of much more solid advantages which may be
gained by other means.

I think that every one who reads this book
will understand that the sphere of action of
cavalry is steadily widening, and is, at the same
time, making increased demands as the years
go on upon all ranks of the arm. Those who
wish to recall what cavalry has done in the
past, should read and re-read ^^ The Achievements
of Cavalry," by Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood,
one of the very few soldiers in the Army who
has taken part as a combatant in European
warfare. Sir Evelyn Wood's war record probably
surpasses that of any other officer in the Army.
His knowledge of horses and his horsemanship
are second to none, and though seventy-two years

b

xviii PREFACE

ot age, he is still one of the hardest and
straightest riders to hounds in England. It
should be a constant encouragement to the
cavalry that such an experienced and sagacious
leader should entertain such a firm faith in the
destinies of an arm, with which he is so thoroughly

conversant.

« « « « «

A few words in conclusion. We hear it said,
and see it written, that we ought not to accept
any guidance from military Europe, because
our own experience of war has been so con*-
siderable that we can learn nothing from Europe
which we do not know better ourselves. The
truth is, that since* the Crimean War we have
had little or no experience of the kind of effort
which will be required of us when next we meet
the trained army of a European Power. In
deluding ourselves with the false notion that
our campaigns of the last fifty years represent
the sum of military wisdom, we merely expose
our ignorance and conceit, and do our utmost
not only to cause disaster, but to invite it.

The cavalry soldier must not be misled by
these appeals of ignorance to vanity. Let him
continue to study profoundly the training, tactics,
and organisation of the best foreign cavalry.

PREFACE xix

Let him reflect long and deeply upon the opinions
of such acknowledged authorities as Field-Marshal
Sir Evelyn Wood and (Jeneral von Bemhardi.
Let him keep himself ahreast with every change
in the tendencies of cavalry abroad, so that he
may help us to assimilate the best of foreign
customs to our own. Finally, let him realize
the great intellectual and physical strain that
modem war will impose upon the cavalry, and let
him preserve the mens sana in corpore sano, that
equable balance between study and action, which
alone will enable him to rise superior to every
difficulty in the great and honourable calling
to which he belongs.

J. D. P. French.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

TN placing this translation of General von
^ BemhardVs work at the service of the officers
of the Army, I take the opportunity of drauAng
attention to the educational value of the large
quantity of military literature published abroad^
particularly in France and Oermawy. Translations
into English of works of this kind are rare and
often so belated as to have lost much of their value
by the time they are produced.

Modem developments in merms of communication
and intercourse are daily bringing us into closer
touch with the Continent of Europe, and there can
be no doubt that the rising generation of officers
would do well to make themselves masters of the
not over'd{fficult art of reading French and
German, that they may be able to appreciate such
works and keep themselves abreast of the times*
They will find such knowledge of the greatest
service, not only in the profession of arms, but in
the course of everyday life.

My thanks are due to Major W. H. Chreenly,

D.S.O., 12th Lancers, for his kind and able

assistance in correcting proofs.

T.B.

CONTENTS

PAO*

INTRODUCTION 1

The altered r61e of oavaliy in modem war, p. 1 ; reconnais-
sance from balloons, p. 3 ; action of the independent cavalry
in battle, p. 4 ; want of war experience and tradition, p. 5 ;
modem oaTalrj in a transition stage of development, p. 5 ;
theoretical forecast and peace experience, p. 6; regcdations,
p. 8 ; aim of this work, p. 9.

FIKST PART: EMPLOYMENT IN WAR THE

BASIS FOR TRAINING 11

Overwhelming importance of the army cavalry, p. 11 ; recon-
naissance and action, p. 11 ; seoority, p. 13 ; reports, p. 13 ;
tactical value of the divisional cavalry, p. 14 ; interior economy
of the divisional cavalry, p. 16 ; conclusions as to the divisional
cavalry, p. 17 ; fundamental difierences in the various r61es of
cavalry, p. 18 ; general considerations of training, p. 19.

A. Reconnaissance, Screening, and Raids .19

I. reconnaissance by the army cavalry .19

Offensive character of the reconnaissance, p. 19.

1 . The Main Body of the Army Cavalry . . 20

The advance in separate columns, p. 21 ; concentration for
battle, p. 21; reasons for separation of columns, p. 22;
measures for concentration, p. 22 ; reconnoitring squadrons
and zones, p. 23; change of reconnaissance zones, p. 27;
division into zones, p. 28 ; relief of reconnoitring squadrons,

zxiii

{

xxiv CONTENTS

p. 29 ; importanoe of reports, p. 81 ; establishment of a proper
system of reporting, p. 32 ; collecting stations, p. 33 ; difficulties
of reporting on the move, p. 33.

2. Reconnoitrvng Squadrons .... 34

Difficulty of their task, p. 34 ; their conduct in friendly and
hostile country, p. 36 ; method of advance, p. 36 ; length of
marches, p. 37 ; establishment of patrol system, p. 38 ; number
of distant patrols, p. 39 ; strength of distant patrols, p. 39 ;
relief of distant patrols, p. iO ; communication with distant
patrols, p. 41 ; instructions to distant patrols, p. 42; leaving
news, p. 43; preserving ooomiunication by a fight, p. 43;
conduct of the squadron in the face of superior hostile
cavalry, p. 44 ; arrangements for close and security patrols,
p. 46 ; communication with neighbouring squadrons, p. 46 ;
cyclists and motors with patrols, p. 47 ; the reconnoitring
squadrons at night, p. 47; the service of security while
halted, p. 48; communication at night, p. 49; sifting in-
telligence, p. 49.

3. Diatamt Patrola 50

Instructing the distant patrols, p. 60; patrols in friendly
and. hostile country, p. 51 ; the advance towards the enemy,
p. 51 ; the advance in '* bonds sucoessifs," p. 61 ; method of
observation, p. 62; breaking through the enemy's screen,
p. 53 ; the most favourable time for observation, p. 54 ; plan
of the patrol, p. 55 ; division of the patrol, p. 56 ; adhering to
the road indicated, p. 67 ; conduct against hostile patrols,
p. 57 ; conduct against superior force of cavalry, p. 58 ; con-
tents of messages, p. 58 ; time of dispatch, p. 60; number of
messages and their dispatch, p. 60 ; single orderlies or patrols
with messages, p. 61 ; accommodation of a patrol at night,
p. 63 ; communication with the reconnoitring squadron, p. 64 ;
conduct of a patrol which has lost communication, p. 66.

4. Close ReconrvaisBance and Reconnaissance

d/wrvng the Fight 66

Transition from the distant to the close reconnaissance,
p. 66; the army cavalry on the wing of the army, p. 66;
conduct of reconnoitring squadrons, p. 67 ; principal task in
close reconnaissance, p. 68; the decisive battie with the
enemy's cavalry, p. 68 ; position of the army cavalry, p. 68 ;
action and strength of close patrols, p. 69; sending in in-
formation, p. 70 ; conduct during the night and supply, p. 71 ;
reconnaissance on the battle field, p. 72.

CONTENTS

PAOB

U. RECONNAISSANCE BY THE DIVISIONAL CAVALRY. • 73

Compariflon with the reoonnaissance by the army cavalry,
p. 73 ; variety of duties devolving on the divisional cavalry
with an army, p. 78 ; divisional cavalry on a front covered by
the army cavalry, p. 74; divisional oavalry acting indepen-
dently on a front, p. 75 ; method of advanoe, p. 76; the fight
as a means of reconnaissance, p. 76 ; reconnoitring sqoadrons
of the divisional cavalry, p. 77 ) reoonnaissance by patrols
alone, p. 77 ; cycUa^ as a reporting centre, p. 79 ; close
reconnaissance, p. 79; importance of early reconnaissance
daring the deployment, p. 80 ; reports as to the country, p. 81 ;
the divisional cavalry of a force operating independently,
p. 81 ; reconnaissance daring the fight, p. 82 ; arrangements
for reconnaissance by the cavalry commander, p. 88; oom-
manication between the divisional cavalry and its patrols,
p. 83; disposal of the cavalry on both flanks of a force
fighting independently, p. 84.

m. THE SCREEN 85

Importance of screens, p. 85 ; offensive screens, p. 86 ;
screens formed by the divisional cavalry, p, 86; defensive
screens, p. 88; difficulty of breaking through a soreen,
p. 90 ; the divisional cavaby in a defensive screen, p. 91.

IV. RAIDS 92

Importance of the commanications of a modem army and
their interruption, p. 93 ; General Stuart as an example,
pi 95 ; increased value of raids, p. 96 ; principles for carrying
out raids, p. 97 ; measures to be taken against the hostile
communication troops, p. 99; composition of the force
destined for a raid, p. 99 ; conduct of the leader towards his
own army, p. 100 ; qualities of the leader, p. 101.

B. The Action of Cavalry 101

I. general 101

The grouping of principles, p. 101 ; the modem character
of the cavalry fight, p. 103; attack and tuming movement,
p. 108 ; defensive and offensive with the rifie, p. 106 ; cavalry
at Mars la Tour, p. 106; dismounted action in battle,
p. 108 ; interchangeable relations between mounted and dis-
mounted action, p. 109 ; Staart as a teacher, p. 110 ; tradition
and progress, p. 111.

xxvi CONTENTS

PAOB

II. ATTACK AND DEFENCE 112

The principle of mobility in mounted or dismounted action,
p. 112 ; the offenBive on foot, p. 113; the defensive fight and
the dismounted offensive according to the spirit of the reg^ola-
tions, p. 114 ; necessity of making the army cavalry indepen-
dent, p. 116 ; the regulations and the rapidity of dismounted
attacks, p. 117 ; offensive leading of the defensive fight,
p. 119.

lU. CAVALRY IN COMBAT AGAINST THE VARIOUS ARAIS

MOUNTED AND DISMOUNTED .120

Close order in the attack against cavalry, p. 120; close
order and lines in the days of Frederick the Great and
Napoleon, p. 120; experiences of peace manoeuvres, p. 122;
close touch and the second line, p. 122 ; the rally after a mdl6e
and tactical handiness, p. 123 ; the regulations concerning
dose order in the attack and the second line, p. 124 ; absolute
necessity for close touch in the charge and for second line in
the attack against cavalry, p. 126 ; altered conditions in the
fight against firearms, p. 126 ; the attack in lines against
infantry, p. 127; necessity of looser order in the attack
against infantry, p. 127 ; the attack against artillery, p. 128 ;
regulations concerning lines and touch, p. 129 ; the advance
in line or in two or more lines, p. 130 ; the advance in line by
signal, p. 182; guiding principles for dismounted action,
p. 133 ; led horses in defence, p. 133 ; led horses in attack,
p. 135; mounting after the fight, p. 136; dismounting with
three-quarters of the men, p. 136 ; reinforcing the firing-line
from the horse-holders, p. 139.

IV. THE FIGHT OF THE INDEPENDENT CAVALRY . .141

Variety of such combats, p. 141 ; grouping of principals
according to typical situations, p. 142.

I. The Baitle of EncouTder .... 143

Collision of cavalry detachments in a purely cavalry fight,
p. 143 ; collision in conjunction with the other arms, p. 144 ;
necessity for early deployment, p. 144 ; the disadvantages of
advancing too quickly, p. 145; the position of the leader
during the advance, p. 146; forming a decision on scanty
information, p. 147 ; forming a decision when the enemy is
unexpectedly met, p. 147; method of deployment, p. 147;
arrangements for deployment while advancing in separate
columns, p. 148 ; importance of the order for concentration

CONTENTS xxvii

PAOB

and deployment, p. 149 ; special importance of the arrange-
ments for the advance guard, p. 150; the artillery during the
deployment, p. 161 ; gradual employment of force, p. 152 ;
passage of defiles, p. 164 ; change from a delaying action to a
decisive offensive, p. 156; use of the artillery and machine
guns in decisive attack, p. 167 ; turning movements to avoid a
severe fight on foot, p. 169 ; conduct in the face of superior
hostile forces of all arms, p. 159 ; conduct of the leader in
battle, p. 160 ; issue of orders, p. 161 ; boldness a factor of
success, p. 163 ; arrangements for pursuit and retreat, p. 164.

2. AUadc of Localities 165

Necessity for considerable numerical superiority, p. 166 ; the
mounted and dismounted reserves, p. 166 ; seizure of a posi-
tion as a base of attack, p. 167 ; conduct of the artillery and
machine guns, p. 167; importance of defining the front of
attack and clear orders for the fight, p. 168 ; cohesion and
energy of the attack, p. 168 ; conduct of the attack, p. 169 ; the
assault, p. 171 ; distance at which the assault should take place,
p. 172 ; the fire surprise, p. 173 ; swords or bayonets, p. 173.

3. The Defenfice 176

The defence with an offensive in view, p. 176 ; defence with
an offensive counter attack, p. 177; passive defence, p. 178.

4. Breaking off the Fight^ Betreat^ omd Pur-

suit 179

The decision to break off a fight, p. 179 ; conditions under
which it is easier to do so, p. 180; sacrifices necessary to
break off a fight either in defence or attack, p. 180; the
retreat after an attack, p. 181 ; conduct of the commander
during a retreat, p. 183 ; the retreat after breaking away from
the enemy, p. 184 ; breaking away from the enemy in a cavalry
combat, p. 184; considerations as to the fire of artillery in
pursuit, p. 185; determining a point for rallying, p. 185;
arrangements for the rear communications, p. 185 ; the
pursuit, p. 186.

V. THE ACTION OF CAVALRY IN BATTLE . .188

The difference in the leading of cavalry in independent
action or in the main battle, p. 188 ; concentration of the
cavalry mass, p. 191 ; choice of leaders, p. 192 ; understanding
between the army commander and the cavalry commander,
p. 193 ; independence of the cavalry commander, p. 193.

xxviii CONTENTS

1. The Army Cavalry an the FlanJc of the

Battle 194

Position in front of the flank of the army, p. 194 ; reconnais-
Mtnce, p. 195; eafety, p. 196; method of advance, p. 196;
conduct of the artillexy and machine guns, p. 197 ; conduct
after a suocessf nl fight against the enemy's cavalry, p. 198 ;
taking part in the hattle, p. 199*; great charges prohably
infrequent, p. 201 ; activity in rear of the enemy's fighting
line, p. 202; combination of fire action and shock, p. 208;
necessity of realising modem conditions, p. 203.

2. The Army Cavalry as a Reserve behind the

Front 204

Disadvantage of this position and waiting attitude, p. 204 ;
the advance to the attack, p. 206; the form of the attack,
p. 206 ; deployment, p. 207 ; conduct of batteries and machine
guns, p. 208; taking part in a fight where there is no
possibility of the charge, p. 209.

3. Pursuit and Retreat 210

Decisive pursuits very rare, p. 210 ; reasons for this, p. 210 ;
necessity for early preparation, p. 212 ; principles for cavalry
pursuit, p. 214 ; pursuit during the night, p. 216 ; frontal
pursuit and keeping touch, p. 216; the army cavalry in
the pursuit, p. 216 ; cavalry in the retreat, p. 217.

4. The R6le of the Divieionat Cavalry .218

A lesser sphere of activity in consequence of numerical
weakness, p. 218 ; conjunction with the army cavalry, p. 218 ;
dismounted action, p. 219; action in pursuit and retreat,
p. 219 ; action with an independent infantry division, p. 219.

VI. DEPTH AND 1(GHEL0N 220

Modem estimation of Echelon, p. 220; ^helon in the
cavalry of Frederick the Great, p. 220 ; origin of the modem
^helon, p. 221 ; true value of the ^helon, p. 221 ; increased
importance of ^helon in the new regulations, p. 222 ; change
of front to a complete flank in the new regulations, p. 226 ;
various duties of depth and tohelon, p. 226; disposition
of troops according to these duties, p. 227 ; flank attack and
forward Echelon, p. 227 ; offensive value of forward Echelon,
p. 228; its defensive importance, p. 228; tehelon in a
division, p. 229 ; tehelon in a battle of encounter, p. 230.

CONTENTS

PAOB

VII. FORMATIONS FOR MOVEMENT 232

Influence of artillery on cavalry formations, p. 232 ;
extension, p. 233 ; considerations of artillery effect on all the
cavalry formations, p. 233; the regulations and the cavalry
formations, p. 233 ; discussion of the formations for movement
laid down, p. 236; calls, p. 237; protection to the front,
p. 238 ; the regulations provisional, p. 238.

Vm. THE VARIOUS UNITS IN THE FIGHT . . 239

Capabilities of the various units, p. 239; the squadron,
p. 239 ; the regiment, p. 240 ; the brigade, p. 241 ; the
division, p. 243 ; the cavalry corps, p. 244 ; the will to conquer
and the offensive, p. 246.

SECOND PART : THE TRAINING OF CAVALRY

IN PEACE 247

Preparation for war as the fundament of training, p. 247 ;
increased necessity for practical individual training, p. 248 ;
object of the individual training of man and hone, p. 249 ; good
riding and shooting an important factor in military training,
p. 249 ; dead and living discipline, p. 260 ; method of training,
p. 250 ; important duties of superior officers and their bearing
towards the troops, p. 251 ; troops* gradual progress and
training, p. 251; special importance of the training of re-
mount and of recruit, p. 252; simultaneoas progression of
training of man and horse, p. 252; special importance of
field-training, p. 253 ; impossibility of keeping cavalry up to
the same standard all the year round, p. 254 ; necessity for
a uniform standard of training, p. 255 ; necessity for dividing
the regulations for war and peace training, p. 256.

A. Individdal Training, and Training in Squads . 257
1. Training of the Horse 257

Necessity of a new manual, p. 257 ; training of the horse,
p. 257 ; further training of backward horses, p. 257 ; recruits'
horses, p. 259 r distribution and training of older horses,
p. 260 ; training as a cavalry horse, p. 260 ; exercises in the
field, p. 261.

I

CONTENTS

PAOB

2. Equitation 262

Early commencement of instruction, p. 262 ; necessity for
a new manual of equitation, p. 262 ; riding instruction of the
recruit, p. 263 ; collective training in military riding, p. 264 ;
riding on the curb alone, p. 266.

3. Training with the "arryie blam^e" . . 267

Necessity for new instructions, p. 267; the fight with a
lance, p. 267 ; training with the sword, p. 268.

4. Training in Musketry 268

Early commencement of training in musketry, p. 268 ;
instruction with the rifle, p. 269 ; objects of this instruction,
p. 269; progress of training, p. 269; training by files and
groups, p. 270; special training of subordinate leaders,
p. 271 ; training of lance-corporals as section leaders, p. 272 ;
training of range estimators, p. 272 ; instruction in shooting,
p. 273 ; training of the musketry instructors, p. 273.

5. GyTnnasticSj Foot-drill, and General Instruc-

tion 274

Importance and object of this branch of service, p. 274 ;
gymnastics, p. 275 ; foot-drill, p. 275 ; general instruction,
p. 276 ; instruction in field-training, p. 276.

«

B. Field Training 279

1. General Remarks 279

Difficulties of field training, p. 279 ; systematic progress of the
training, p. 280 ; importance of the personal question, p. 282 ;
training of the prospective leaders on modem lines, p. 282 ;
theoretical instructions in the officers* riding-school, p. 282 ;
training of the officer's eye for country, p. 283 ; systematic
instruction of all officers up to field rank, p. 284; further
training of the regimental officers, p. 285; instruction in
patrols, p. 285 ; instruction of under-officers, p. 286 ; practical
field exercises, p. 287.

2. Traiming at Manxmhvres .... 287

Necessity of manoeuvres for cavalry, p. 287 ; the service of
outpost cavalry, p. 288; rejoining of the outpost cavalry,
p. 290 ; reconnaissance during manoeuvres, p. 291 ; certain
procedure recommended for manoeuvres, p. 292 ; unjustifiable
demands of leaders on the service of information, p. 296;

CONTENTS xxxi

PAOl

disadvantages for the leaders themselves, p. 296 ; importance
of a thorough training in the service of information, p. 297 ;
conduct of divisional and army cavalry in manoeuvres, p. 298 ;
the r61e of army cavalry in manoeuvres, p. 299; pursuit in
manoeuvres, p. 300.

3. Larger Reconnaissance Exerdaea . . . 301

Hints to be gathered from earlier proposals, p. 301 ; im-
portance of exercises in screening, p. 302 ; want of experience
in this direction, p. 302 ; superiority of the defensive screen,
p. 302; difference between reconnaissance and defensive
screen, p. 302; main principles for the offensive and de-
fensive screens, p. 303; reconnaissance from balloons in a
screen, p. 304; representing the enemy at reconnaissance
exercises, p. 305 ; representation and conduct of the divisional
cavalry in such exercises, p. 805 ; detailing umpires, p. 307 ;
representing a column of an army, p. 307 ; duties of umpires,
p. 308; difficulty in manoeuvres of placing oneself in the
real war situation,' p. 309; transmission of information at
manoeuvres, p. 310; the use of technical means of trans-
mission, p. 310 ; contents and messages, p. 312 ; economy of
force, p. 312 ; importance of the fight for reconnoitring pur-
poses, p. 312; reconnoitring organs in manoeuvre, p. 314;
framing exercises, p. 315 ; importance of personality, p. 316 ;
not too many maps, p. 317; detailing leaders at these
exercises, p. 317.

C. Tactical Training 317

1. General Remarks 317

The importance of the squadron in the scheme of training,
p. 317; dealing with horses, p. 318; exercises in the field,
p. 318 ; riding with all four reins in one hand and rising in
the stirrups, p. 319 ; the front, p. 319.

2. Training of the Squadron .... 320

Troop-drill, p. 320; preliminary exercises for the charge,
p. 320 ; jumping and climbing, p. 321 ; drill of the squadron in
close formation, p. 322 ; discipline at drill, p. 323 ; necessity
for long, steady movements and importance of drill at the
gallop, p. 324 ; making use of the country, p. 324 ; training
to the attack, p. 325 ; the rally, p. 328 ; further training in
the use of the lance, p. 329 ; training in dismounted action,
p. 329; falling out of the leader and bringing up the led

CONTENTS

TAOU

hone, p. 330; farther training in squadron drill, p. 330 ;
judging distance and mosketry, p. 331 ; dismounted action
against infantry, p. 331.

3. Begi/merUal Travning . . 332

Object and time allowed for drill, p. 332 ; special importance
of movements necessary in the tight, p. 333 ; normal forma-
tions and drill for the fight, p. 333; giring order, p. 334;
cohesion and independence of squadrons, p. 335 ; reconnais-
sance and exploration, p. 337 ; fancy deployments, p. 337 ;
training of subordinate leaders, p. 337 ; practice in dismounted
action, p. 338.

4. Brigade Traimmg 339

Object and arrangement of exercises, p. 339 ; training in
dismounted action, p. 340 ; tactical training of leaders, p. 340.

5. Divisional a/nd Corpe Training . . 341

Object and general arrangement of exercises, p. 341 ; specially
important principles in individual trainings p. 342; repre-
senting the enemy : freedom of movement, p. 343 ; difficulties
of arranging exercises for a oavalry corps and problematic
value of such exercises, p. 344 ; exercises for the corps on the
drill ground, p. 846 ; their transfer to the field, p. 346.

THIRD PART: ORGANISATION .... 349

The collective organisation of the cavalry, p. 349 ; difficulty
of altering the existing organisation, p. 350 ; weakness of the
cavalry division in comparison to its duties, p. 362 ; formation
of cavalry corps in war, p. 363; supply and ammunition,
p. 354; number of divisions, p. 365; requirements for war
and for training, p. 356 ; our cavalry too weak, p. 366 ; creation
of cyclist battalions, p. 367 ; necessity for arrangements for
keeping the cavalry up to strength, p. 358 ; disadvantage and
distribution of the purchased horses, p. 359 ; training of the
purchased horses, p. 360; necessity of suiting organisation for
training to the demands of war, p. 361 ; enlaiging the sphere
of activity of the Inspector General, p. 362; regulating the
conditions between the Inspector General and the commands,
p. 362; further duties for the Inspector General, p. 363;
establishment of the Inspector General as an authority, p. 364.

CONCLUSION 366

*

I J '

INTRODUCTION

rPHE great changes which have taken place
■*- in military science since the year 1866 have
forced all arms to adopt new methods of fighting.
It was, first and foremost, the improvement in
the firearm which wrought the transformation
of the battlefield and called forth an increased
demand for cover against the murderous effect of
fire. The infantry sought safety in sparser for-
mations and in utilising the smallest accidents
of the ground for cover, while the artillery
adopted armoured shields, covered positions, and
indirect methods of fire. It was only the cavalry
that could not keep pace with these develop-
ments. Forming a conspicuous target, capable
of being concealed only behind considerable in-
equalities of the groimd, it could indeed seldom
find cover within the range of the enemy's fire.
As, at the same time, its strength in comparison
to that of the great armies of the present
day has sensibly diminished, it might be con-
cluded that its particular value in battle had

1

• • • ♦ .a

• ••• • • : :• •./

• • _• <

■ «

• • •

• • • •««-.^.."^"_«

2 INTRODUCTION

decreased considerably in possibility and im-
portance.

This conclusion is thoroughly justified, but
not altogether in the way that one is inclined
to assume. For one reason, the cavalry is now
supplied with an excellent firearm, which its
mobility enables it to employ against the most
sensitive parts of an enemy's line of battle.
For another, the composition of modern armies
offers, as I have frequently said, many new
possibilities of success. NeWly raised levies,
such as will often have to take their . place in
the great armies of the day, cannot possess the
same steadiness as standing permanent' troops.
They are, according to experience, very sensitive
to moral impressions, and will often enough,
when shaken in battle, offer a tempting and
suitable object of attack to the cavalry. At the
same time, the fact remains that, by rea^son of
its relative numerical weakness, cavalry can no
longer retain its former importance in the battle,
and that the manner of its intervention in the
fight must often be of a very different nature
from what it has been in the past.

On the other hand the duty of cavalry in
the sphere of reconnaissance has increased in
importance. For all strategical movements the
main body of the modern army demands consider-
ably more time and, generally also, comprehensive
preparatory measures. If, therefore, intelligence

INTRODUCTION 3

as to the disposition of the enemy is to be of use in
operations, it follows that it must be procured at
the earliest possible moment. Whoever gets the
earliest and best information possesses nowadays a
far greater advantage than formerly, when, with
the small armies of the day, movements and com-
binations of force could often be successfully
carried out in the immediate presence of the
enemy's army. These are indeed still possible in
occasional cases and where sufficient depth of for-
mation is maintained, and it is this circumstance
that has made early and full intelligence, com-
bined with successful screening of one's own
movements, one of the most important factors
of success.

There are people who, in fancy, already see
cavalry replaced in this r61e by an air fleet.
Such prophets cannot, however, be treated seri-
ously. The air cruisers will not be designed for
all the possibilities of war. In the period of
concentration and in fortress warfare they would
doubtless be able, even in their present condition,
to render excellent service. Whether they can be
adapted for use in a war of movement remains to
be seen ; but, even if they can in time be of more
service for war than at present appears to be the
case, their capabilities in this direction will al-
ways be limited. They can only observe at night
under favourable conditions — such things, for
example, as large detrainments of troops or

4 INTRODUCTION

bivouacs with fires burning. They are under all
circumstances dependent upon the weather. By
day the air fleet of the enemy will seek battle
with them in order to hinder their reconnais-
sance. Hostile artillery will be particularly
dangerous to them, and will be able, thanks to
the developments in modern ordnance, to wage
successful war against them. All detachments
cannot possibly be supplied with airships, owing
to the great cost and enormous apparatus entailed,
and their usefulness will therefore only be realised
with the larger formations. Finally, one or the
other of the air fleets will be driven from the field,
or rather from the air, and that side which meets
with defeat will be deprived of all means of
reconnoitring unless it can rely on its cavalry.
So in the most modern war the cavalry remains
the principal means of reconnaissance. Its activity
may indeed be supplemented by airships, but
will never be replaced by them.

These circumstances, however, necessitate a
new r61e for cavalry. It must drive the hostile
cavalry from the field, a cavalry which M'^ill
do all in its power to secure its own army
against intrusion. It will find this cavalry
reinforced not only by horse artillery and machine-
guns, but also by cyclist battalions, mounted and
other infantry, and will therefore have to be
prepared, in order to properly carry out its
service of exploration, to fight against detach-

INTRODUCTION 5

ments of all arms. But the same thing will also
happen when it seeks to veil the movements of
its own army, or to undertake some enterprise
against the enemy's communications, or to defend
its own against similar hostile raids. Our cavalry
thus finds itself face to face with totally new
duties of a most real kind, towards the carrying out
of which it has no previous experience to help it.

In the wars of Frederick the Great and of
Napoleon, as well as in the German war of
Unification, there is a total absence of analogy
from which to draw conclusions that can be
practically applied. The wars in South Africa
and Manchuria, on the other hand, reveal con-
ditions which have very little in common with
those of a European war such as the German
cavalry will have to fight. Nowhere can the few
experiences of cavalry action gained in these wars
be immediately applied, and there are but few
bases for the formation of judgment as to what
is practical and possible under modern conditions.
The same may be said to hold good of the Eusso-
Turkish war. The most interesting and instructive
campaign for the service of modern cavalry appears
to be the American war of Secession, which is,
however, almost unknown in Germany, where
there is a lack of opportunities to study it.

There is, therefore, for our cavalry a want of
any sort of tradition for that r61e which it will be
expected to carry out in the next war, and this

6 INTRODUCTION

want will be the more felt as it will in the future
be expected to deal with a number of technical
methods of communication which are as a whole
still almost unknown, and as to the actual war
value of which no judgment can yet be formed.
Up to now, also, cavalry training as carried out
since the war of 1870-71 has been unable to
create a sound foundation for preparation for war.
Left far behind in the march of military progress,
in tactics as well as reconnaissance it has been
led so far from the right way that it would have
been unable to stand the test of serious war.
Nor have we yet fully extricated oiirselves from
these trammels of the past.

For the mong^nt, therefore, our cavalry finds
itself in a state of transition. The demands which
modern war will make upon it have not yet
penetrated into its flesh and blood, that is to say,
their extent and range have not yet been clearly
grasped by the arm, nor have we yet by any
means succeeded in breaking . loose from the
fetters of the past. Views based on antiquated
assumptions are often apt to survive and to
influence training as well as leading.

This is particularly the case as regards re-
connaissance. In tactics, too, the cut-and-dried
methods of bygone days are clearly not yet for-
gotten, while for enterprises against the enemy's
communications there is a want both of practical
training and theoretical instruction.

INTRODUCTION 7

This state of affairs must be regarded as a
great evil, as at the outbreak of a war there
will no longer be time to collect experiences.
From the very first day onward the greatest
demands will be made upon the cavalry, not only
as regards intentions, but performances. On the
achievements of the cavalry in the early days
of the war will depend to a considerable extent
the success of the first great decisive encounter.

We must therefore be prepared to meet these
great demands when war breaks out. Only a clear
recognition of the necessities and the possibilities
of manoeuvre and training can secure us this
preparation. There remains, then, nothing for
us — with no practical war experience to go on —
but to create the groundwork of our methods of
training from theoretical and speculative reflec-
tion. With all the means of intellect and fore-
sight, we must endeavour to discern the probable
course of the war of the future and regulate the
methods of training accordingly.

Peace exercises based upon such clearly defined
principles must serve as a further guide to what
is possible and practical. They cannot, it is true,
afford realistic results, as they lack the effect of
weapons, the hostile country, the thousand causes
of friction, and the moral factors of serious war.
They can, however, be regarded as practical
guides in many directions and will help us to
evolve methods unattainable by pure theory : for

8 INTRODUCTION

instance, in increasing the capabilities of the
troops, improving the practical arrangements for
communication, the transmission service, the
patrol system, and the like. Only these peace
experiences must not be overrated, but subjected
to continual criticism by the light of what would
be practical in war.

It thus remains our chief duty to get a clear
and just idea of the r61e that cavalry will play in
a future war, in order to clear the mind fully
on this point, and so be able further to build
upon the foundations of sound reasoning.

The new Cavalry Drill Regulations,^ in which
I had the honour and pleasure of collaborating,
have undertaken the creation of these fundamental
principles of the independent r61e of cayalry.
Their teachings, however, have as yet by no means
penetrated into the ranks. The new Drill Regu-
lations have endeavoured to give new rules for
the tactical employment of cavalry, which have
not yet sujficiently eslablish'ed their value, even
on the manoeuvre-groimd. As yet the troops are
only endeavouring to get accustomed to them.

It is also obvious that practical drill instruc-
tions, at least for tactics, can only give general
principles, and cannot be too definite, lest they
should thereby tend to limit the independence

* " Exerzier-Reglement fur die Kavallerie," part of which has been
translated and published by the General Staff, War OflSce. These
Begulations are frequently referred to throughout this woyk.— T|iA.N8,

INTRODUCTION 9

of headers in the thousand varied happenings of
war.

It is quite another matter for him who is not
called on to make regulations, but whose task is
rather to clear the understanding, to stimulate
independent thought, and to encourage the troops
themselves to form correct judgments. Thus will
be moulded the efficiency which will enable the
soldier to act in the presence of the enemy
according to the Regulations, with full freedom
of thought, not after the letter, but the spirit,
and even perhaps, in many cases, the intention
of them.

From this point of view I have set forth my
views and reflections. It seems to me, above
all things, important to discuss those points
which will be new to cavalry in a future war,
and in so doing to touch on many matters of
training which long years of experience have
convinced me are practical. May I by these
hints contribute towards the formation of fresh
traditions for the training of the arm that will
march with modern conditions, that will break
away for good from all half -measures and obsolete
views, and thereby clear the way towards a proper
conduct of the cavalry in war, and to the winning
of fresh and imperishable laurels I

Where I have occasion to touch on views
formerly expressed and set forth in my various
writings, I find no reason to retract any of

10 INTRODUCTION

them. In certain directions they have naturally
developed further, and have become more pro-
gressive under the impress of the whole of
modern development and the latest experiences
of war. On the whole, however, I adhere to my
opinions, and only seek to supplement and
develop them in order to suit them still better
to the practical needs of the arm. I hope they
may act as a stimulus and serve as a guide to
many a comrade in difficulties.

Part

EMPLOYMENT IN WAR THE BASIS FOR

TRAINING

rriHERE can be no doubt that the value and
-*• significance of cavalry in a future war will
be chiefly demonstrated in the action of the
army cavalry.^ The army cavalry alone, by virtue
of its fighting strength, will be able to carry
out the larger services of reconnaissance, to
operate against the enemy's communications, to
take part in the tactical decision with a force
commensurate with modern conditions, or to
carry out a pursuit.

Reconnaissance occupies a prominent position
amongst these various duties. There will not be
a battle every day. Not in every fight will
considerations of ground and other circumstances
allow of the cavalry taking part in a great
decision as a mounted arm. Not always will an
effective pursuit by the cavalry mass be possible.
It must be remembered that in order not to

' The army cavalry corresponds with our independent cavalry.— Tkans*

a

12 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

render itself too weak to carry out its proper
r61e cavalry must not expose itself to heavy
loss in battle without sufficient reason. Only the
possibility of a very great success can justify
the risk of staking the whole cavalry force in
a decisive charge during the battle. It is true
that efforts will have to be made to drive the
hostile cavalry from the field to facilitate opera-
tions against the flank and rear of the enemy's
line of battle. But such operations will generally
be limited to fire action, and in a decisive battle
the weakness of the cavalry would probably
debar it from such undertakings. Engagements,
also, that are fought with a view to opening a
way for reconnaissance will not be of frequent
occurrence, and must only be expected during
occasional crises. They will, however, be of
decisive value for the whole future conduct of
the arm and its operative success. The same
may be said of raids against the enemy's com-
munications. Such undertakings may exercise
the greatest influence on the course of a cam-
paign, but can only be undertaken under specially
favourable conditions.

On the other hand, the everyday task of the
cavalry which goes hand in hand with all these
various engagements and enterprises is recon-
naissance proper carried out by reconnoitring
squadrons and patrols. This is the daily bread
of the cavalry, a duty that throughout a war

THE BASIS FOR TRAINING 13

should never cease to be performed, even if the
main body of the cavalry has been driven from
the field by the enemy. It demands, therefore,
the highest training, the wisest economy of force
and systematic arrangement, if it is not to become
ineflFective or useless.

In close and continual relation to the above
is the further task of safeguarding and screen-
ing the army. Reconnaissance itself provides a
measure of security, but it is always liable ta
miscarry, and can never secure the army against
hostile observation. Reconnaissance must there-
fore be supplemented by a special system of
security and screening which, however, demands
the most careful organisation, and greatly in-
creases the difficulty of husbanding limited forces
and of keeping the troops fit by not overworking
them.

Intimately connected to the services of security
and reconnaissance is that of communication,
which, owing to the great distances to be traversed
in modern war and the necessity of early trans-
mission of intelligence, has become, at the same
time, of the highest importance and of the greatest
difficulty. Here also is a daily duty for the
cavalry in which a thorough training is necessary.

All these considerations must be kept in view
in arranging the training, and a clear conception
should be formed as to what is to be aimed at
in great as well as small matters. Only thus

14 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

will results be obtained which will stand the test
of war.

It is only natural that in our army the
greatest stress is at present laid on the duties
of the army cavalry. These are so obviously new
and important for the arm that it is easy to
understand how more time is devoted to them in
peace training, and how the task of the divisional
cavalry has come to appear of less importance.
It might indeed be contended that the training
which the latter has hitherto received in garrison
and at manoeuvres would suffice for its needs.

It is my opinion, on the other handj that such
a conception is faulty. The importance of the
divisional cavalry has in no way diminished, and
one is not justified in assuming that any lesser
demands will be made upon its efficiency than
on that of the larger independent formations.
The exact contrary is the case, and I consider it
opportune now, when all interest is centred in
the army cavalry, to lay particular stress on the
extraordinary importance of the divisional cavalry.

As in the newest phases of military development,
the general value of cavalry, according to my
opinion, particularly in the organism of an army,
has increased, so also has that of the divisional
cavalry. Higher demands are made of it, and it
must therefore be capable of greater performances.

The circumstances of modern war demand that
great masses of mounted men shall be used as army

THE BASIS FOR TRAINING 16

cavalry and concentrated in the decisive direction,
thus weakening a great part of the front of the
army in cavalry, in order to ensure superiority
at the decisive point. It is in accordance with
the universal law of military success that a con-
centration of force at the decisive point can,
under most circumstances, only be ensured by a
corresponding weakening of force in other places.
The front of the army, therefore, can never be
covered throughout its whole length by the army
cavalry, but at the same time it will never be
possible to entirely denude of cavalry that front
or flank in front of which no army cavalry may
lie. This would be simply impossible, for every
body of troops, however disposed upon the strategic
front, requires cavalry for the service of close
reconnaissance, of security, and of screening against
surprise or against hostile observation.

Furthermore, even those bodies of troops in
immediate advance of which the great cavalry
masses are on the move require their own cavalry,
not only for the purpose of ensuring and main-
taining communication with the army cavalry,
but also that they may not be entirely denuded
of cavalry when, as the hostile armies approach
each other, the cavalry masses clear the front
and concentrate towards a flank.

Finally, it will not always be possible to detail
portions of the army cavalry to detached forces,
because it has other duties to fulfil and other

16 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

claims made upon it. Thus, for example, the
army of Manteuffel in the campaign against
Bourbaki had at its disposal none other but the
divisional cavalry.

The weak divisional cavalry, therefore, must be
prepared to carry out all the cavalry duties
which may arise from these conditions. Amongst
them particular mention must be made of the
outpost service, which, although shared with the
infantry, imposes a heavy burden on the divisional
cavalry. Any one wlxo has once been through
manceuvres knows how great the demands of this
service are, even in peace, in the exertions in-
volved and the time expended. In war these
exertions become at times considerable^ if less
frequent, for the critical days do not follow each
other so closely as in manoeuvres.

If we consider, moreover, how every cavalry
undertaking has increased in dijfficulty owing to
the greater size of modern battlefields and the
improvement in firearms, it will become clear
that the sphere of usefulness of the divisional
cavalry, even from the purely tactical point of
view, which up to now we have alone considered,
is a very extensive and important one.

This tactical activity is closely dependent upon
the whole interior economy of the division. These
few squadrons must furnish orderlies and despatch-
riders, which, in the case of the conduct of so
large a force as an infantry division, must mean

THE BASIS FOR TRAINING 17

a considerable drain on their strength. They
will often be deputed to collect supplies in
villages away from the roads, when the supply
columns fail and the places occupied do not
afford sufficient for the troops. Although it is
possible that other troops, such as infantry in
carts and bicyclists, may be used for this service,
it will never be possible to relieve the divisional
cavalry entirely of it. The relay service also
makes a greater demand on the strength than
is generally supposed. In the campaign of
1870-71 this cause contributed largely to the
weakening of the squadrons at the front. Nowa-
days every effort is made by means of technical
apparatus to relieve the cavalry, at least partially,
from this service. It would, however, be a
mistake to assume that the relay service of
cavalry can be everywhere replaced by telegraph,
telephone, signalling, bicycles, or motor. Circum-
stances will occur in war in which all these
methods of transmission, which are already in
themselves partially unreliable, must fail us,
especially where they are exposed to destruction
from the hand of the enemy. The proper per-
formance oi these interior services must never,
however, miscarry throughout the whole cam-
paign, and imposes therefore still higher and
more continuous demands on the efficiency of
the troops.
As the result of these reflections we may con-

2

18 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

•

elude that a series of very important duties will
fall to the lot of the divisional cavalry in war,
which cannot be carried out by any other troops
or in any other manner than by the divisional
cavalry. Further, that these duties have, on the
whole, increased in importance, and that their
fulfilment has become considerably more difficult
by reason of the conditions of modern war.

According to these conditions the importance
of the divisional cavalry must be judged. If the
decisive r61e in war falls essentially to the lot
of the army cavalry, yet must the duties of the
divisional cavalry be regarded as just as necessary
for the good of the army. Methods of training
must be adopted with these points in view, and
it must be quite clearly understood that in this
direction modern conditions have to be reckoned
with which demand thorough innovations.

As to the r61e of cavalry in the fight, we may
conclude from the above that it may be sharply
divided into two separate groups : firstly, in those
encounters where cavalry is acting as an inde-
pendent body, and will have to carry out recon-
naissance, the service of security and raids ; and
secondly, where cavalry will take part in a battle
in conjunction with the other arms. It is ob-
vious, after what has been said, that the first
group is by far the more important, and will
require particular attention as regards training.
We will endeavour in the course of this work to

f

THE BASIS FOR TRAINING 39

prove that this is the direction where the most
friction is to be overcome, and where by far the
most difficult part of our task will lie.

The chief considerations for training are natur-
ally evolved from the duties to be performed in
war itself. The services of reconnaissance and
security come first. The technique of these
services and the method of fighting necessary
for carrying them out must be fully mastered
by the troops right down to the individual soldier.
Next in importance come undertakings against
the enemy's communications, and the participation
in the battle which war will demand of our arm.
These are the matters which must be studied
by those who undertake to discuss methods of
training. We must be perfectly clear in our minds
what duties in the various spheres of action will
fall to the lot of the arm as a whole, to its
sub-divisions, or to its single members. The
relative importance of these duties must be our
guide in considering the essentials of training.

A. RECONNAISSANCE, SCREENING, AND RAIDS

I. RECONNAISSANCE BY THE AKMT CAVALRY

The very essence of cavalry lies in the offensive.
Mounted it is incapable of tactical defence, but,
in order to defend itself, must surrender its real
character as a mounted arm and seize the rifle
on foot. The service of reconnaissance, therefore.

20 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

must necessarily be carried out in an offensive
sense.

The idea of the offensive is not, however, meant
here in a narrow sense, such as seeking a tactical
battle, but rather that the reconnoitring army
cavalry must under all circumstances maintain
the initiative, use its activity against the enemy,
and impose its will upon him. It is by no means
its duty under all circumstances to seek out the
enemy's cavalry in order to defeat it. By such
conduct it would allow the enemy's cavalry to
dictate its movements. It must rather subordin-
ate all else to the particular objects of recon-
naissance, and advance in those directions which
promise the best fulfilment of the reconnaissance
needs of the Army Head Quarters. Should it thus
meet with the enemy's cavalry it must naturally
attack and overthrow it. On the other hand, it
can safely reckon that the more decisive the
direction in which it moves for the purposes of
reconnaissance, the more chance there will be of
meeting the enemy.

1. The Main Body of the Army Cavalry

The same principle holds good for the strategical
disposition. The old Cavalry Drill Regulations
laid down that the strength of the cavalry division
was to remain concentrated until the enemy's
cavalry had been driven from the field. This

MAIN BODY OF THE ARMY CAVALRY 21

considerably overstepped the bounds of re-
striction usually imposed by regulation, and at
the same time fettered the freedom of movement
of the cavalry in a way that, under certain cir-
cumstances, might have become most harmful.
The new Regulations have left out these
directions and indeed lay down that, in the
** advance to the fight," efforts must be made
to reunite columns that are advancing separated
before collision with the enemy takes place (413).^
Here is expressed a principle which, if rightly
understood, is certainly justified, but which, on
the other hand, might give rise to misunder-
standings.

It must first be pointed out that it is by no
means always desirable to unite columns that
are separate before the fight. It may, for
example, very easily happen that a detachment
in favourable country will be able to occupy a
superior force of the enemy, and thus, by re-
maining dispersed, ensure superiority at the
decisive point. If, however, by the " concen-
tration of columns " a mutual approach is under-
stood, which ensures a concentric co-operation
of divided groups against a common enemy whose
direction of march is more or less known, then

' *^When advancing in separate columns^ .special meaRures must
be taken to insure the cohesion of the forward movement. Every
endeavour must be made to unite the columns before collision with
the enemy ; for a junction on the field of battle will seldom succeed,
if only on account of the rapid course of the cavalry combat."

22 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

the principle is an excellent one. If, on the
other hand, it is intended that single columns
should he so closely concentrated that the division
as a tactical whole can he thrown into the fight,
it appears to me that it goes too far, and might
easily lead to harmful dogmatism. Thus read,
the regulation appears to me to be the more
dangerous, as exercises in a limited space en-
courage the concentrated employment of the
larger cavalry bodies in the fight, and their
approach and deployment from formations of
assembly or intermediate formations, for which
brigade columns are usually chosen.

It must be remembered that it is always much
more dij£cult and dangerous in the presence of
the enemy to separate a cavalry mass for the
fight than to concentrate it from a not too wide
separation for common action against the enemy.
In the first case the danger must be run of sur-
rendering **the proud rights of the initiative"
to the enemy, and of being obliged to attack
eccentrically; while in the second case one is in
possession of the exterior lines, and, with them,
the most favourable directions for attack.

The regulation quoted should therefore result
only exceptionally in a complete tactical con-
centration. The wish, however, to fight concen-
trated must never lead to a concentrated advance
unless circumstances dictate such an operation
as practical. Leaders of the larger reconnoitring

MAIN BODY OF THE ARMY CAVALRY 23

bodies will have, rather, continually to consider
how they may best fulfil the task of the moment
in the most practical way without allowing
themselves to be bound by preconceived theo-
retical views. This must be their course of
action, and will often enough lead to the advance
in separate columns. The breadth of reconnais-
sance-zones will often demand such procedure.

Along the whole front, troops must be in a
position to support the reconnoitring bodies which
have been pushed forward. This will not always
be possible from a single point on account of the
distances involved. It will at times be necessary
to break through the hostile screen when it is
met by force of arms, without first being able
to judge where this can most easily or most
advantageously be accomplished. Again, complete
information will not perhaps be to hand of the
presence and the direction of march of the
hostile cavalry, so that the concentration of force
upon a single road will not appear at all
desirable. It must also be borne in mind that
the masses of cavalry have not only to act as
fighting bodies, but at the same time to play
an important part in the system of obtaining
information. Communication must be main-
tained with the Head Quarters, as well as
with the reconnoitring squadrons and certain
independent patrols. In the latter case particu-
larly, great difficulties will often arise. A cavalry

24 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

leader must continually ask himself which is the
shortest and safest means of communication with
the reconnoitring organs on the one hand and
with the army following him on the other, and
how it can be maintained when hostile detach-
ments pervade the intervening country. All
these are circumstances which would lead to the
adoption of an advance in separate columns.

The universal principle must always hold good
for cavalry, that when a decisive struggle is in
prospect all possible strength must be concentrated
for it. On the other hand, it must be perfectly
clearly understood that in a future war many
varied and often contradictory demands will be
made upon the arm. It will not always be
possible to meet them all from the one point of
view — that of uniting all possible strength before
the commencement of a fight ; the less so as
in reconnaissance the fight is only the means to
an end, the knowledge of the enemy being the
essential. It remains for the genius of the leader
to make his preparations in full freedom, and to
solve the task confided to him in his own way.
To hamper active operations by regulation is
always a great evil.

The danger which lies in separation of force is
not so great for cavalry as might appear at first
sight, on account of the mobility and adaptability
of the arm. For, although the Regulations lay
down that on account of the rapid conduct of a

MAIN BODY OF THE ARMY CAVALRY 26

cavalry fight the concentration of separate columns
upon the field of battle can but seldom be suc-
cessfully accomplished, this view can only be
admitted in the case of the mounted combat. I
am of opinion that it cannot be so difficult under
ordinarily favourable circumstances to bring about
such a concentration. With reliable reconnais-
sance early intelligence of the presence of the
hostile cavalry should be to hand. It should then
be often still possible to concentrate the separate
columns according to circumstances, either for-
wards, backwards, or to a flank, and finally to
unite them for the fight with sufficient room and
time, and in an effective direction for attack.
If, however, a portion of the advancing cavalry
mass should come into imforeseen collision with
superior hostile cavalry, it must fall back in a
direction which will lead to concentration of force.
In order . gradually to lead up to, and at the right
time to achieve, such a concentration from a
divided advance, without falling into the error of
a too close tactical concentration, presupposes that
the leader is an artist in the conduct of his arm.
Such an undertaking is much easier where not
only moimted combat, but fire action is taken into
Consideration. In such a case that detachment
which comes first into collision with the enemy
would be able to defend itself in some strong
position or behind some naturally defensible
locality until the rest of the main body came up.

26 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

Good communication between the several por-
tions is in all such cases an important factor.
If necessary it must be eflFected by the help of
the guns. Generally speaking, it will facilitate
and prepare communication if the separately ad-
vancing columns are kept informed as to the rate
of march, so that each column can at any moment
calculate where the others will be in a given
time if nothing unforeseen occurs. This also
enables information to be sent by the shortest
route to points which can to a certain extent be
previously determined.

The arrangements for the advance form at the
same time the foundation for the action of the
actual reconnoitring organs and the complete
establishment of the reconnaissance system.
Directions for this will be found in the ** Field
Service Manual." It is laid down that recon-
noitring squadrons will be pushed forward from
the various groups of the army cavalry, and will
be allotted zones of reconnaissance in the direc-
tion of the enemy. The reconnaissance itself will
be carried out by patrols.

The breadth of these zones must continually
alter according to circumstances.

If it be necessary to reconnoitre on a broad
front with a comparatively weak cavalry, very
wide zones will often be necessary. On the other
hand, the closer the system of reconnoitring
squadrons can be established, the more reliable

MAIN BODY OF THE ARMY CAVALRY 27

the manner in which reconnaissance will be
carried out, and the easier will it be to hamper
the enemy's efforts at gaining intelligence. If
the ** Field Service Manual '* lays down a certain
breadth as normal, this naturally only indicates
that, under ordinary circumstances, squadrons oil
a wider front would no longer be in a position
to carry out their duties to the full ; nothing
more. The frontages laid down should never
lead either to the perceptible weakening of the
fighting value of a force by sending forward too
many reconnoitring bodies, or, on the other hand,
to the inability of the reconnoitring organs to
cover the space demanded by the strategical
situation. A well-considered allotment of areas
is therefore of special importance, and a matter
for the higher leader to decide. For the arrange-
ments for reconnaissance inside the zone appor-
tioned to him, the squadron leader is, on the other
hand, correspondingly responsible. It is at the
same time laid down that no squadron should
interfere in a neighbouring zone.

Although in these measures the principles for
the reconnaissance may be sought, it must be
clearly understood that the original allotment of
zones cannot always hold good. This arrange-
ment is only practicable and suitable so long as
the opposing armies are f rontally approaching each
other. As soon as the directions of march form
an angle with each other the conditions alter.

28 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

When information has been obtained as to the
enemy's position and that the direction of his
advance is not directly at right angles to our
front, or if the direction of march of our own
army changes, it may be necessary to make
repeated changes in the zones of reconnaissance.
The manner in which this can best be done is
a matter which experience alone can show us.
The change of zones will often be possible in con-
junction with the recall of detached squadrons
and the sending forward of fresh ones in a new
direction, or during the relief of reconnoitring
squadrons.

When the gradual advance of the hostile army
takes place and the army cavalry endeavours
to clear the front and to draw away to a flank,
or when the columns of both armies group them-
selves for the tactical decision and concentrate
more or less from their march formations, the
allotment of zones must utterly fail.

An allotment of zones, also, cannot always be
recommended, that is to say, not where it can
be foreseen that it cannot be carried into opera-
tion. Such a case might happen if an enemy
moved across the front on a more or less distinct
flank march. The reconnoitring squadrons would,
perhaps, in such a case be better employed in
keeping touch with the various groups of the
hostile army than by tying themselves down to
a systematic reconnaissance in zones.

MAIN BODY OF THE ARMY CAVALRY 29

The conditions of war are everywhere so
changing and full of movement that a single
concrete scheme will never suffice, but each case
must be judged upon its own merits. The allot-
ment into zones, therefore, laid down in the ** Field
Service Manual " must be regarded as but a
foundation for the methods to be adopted, and
will perhaps only attain its full effect during the
first concentration of opposing armies, when the
hostile groups deploy along a land frontier on
a wide front. During operations the original
scheme must of necessity be subjected to continual
alterations and transformations.

Let us now further consider the relief of re-
connoitring squadrons. It is out of the question
that such squadrons should remain continually
in touch with the enemy. Such a procedure
would very soon paralyse the strength of men
and horses. The relief, however, cannot, naturally,
be arranged and carried out at any given moment.
It requires preparation, as the whole patrol
system must be drawn in and replaced by a
fresh one. The relief will doubtless best take
place after a great tactical crisis. At such
times the reconnoitring squadrons will partly
have been driven back on to the cavalry mass,
and partly will be in position with their patrols
near them in flank and rear of the enemy, whence
they can be comparatively easily brought in. A
great tactical decision also which creates a new

30 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

situation demands fresh measures for recon-
naissance and a different arrangement of the
reconnoitring organs. Whether it will then be
possible to mathematically divide the ground
into sections need not here be decided.

Under certain circumstances it will be ad-
visable to detail reconnoitring squadrons to watch
the various groups of the hostile army. If we
take the campaign of 1870 as an example of a
concrete case^ the battles of Spicheren^ Mars la
Tour, and Gravelotte afforded natural periods
for the relief of reconnoitring squadrons and
the fresh allotment of reconnoitring zones for
the First and Second Armies, and later the
battle of Sedan. For the Third Army, first of
all, the battle of Worth. Cases may of course
occur when the reconnoitring period between the
battles is too long, and a relief becomes necessary
in the interim. The case of the Third Army is
a good example of this.

A reconnaissance from Worth to Sedan could
never have been carried out by the same recon-
noitring squadron. A relief was absolutely neces-
sary. According to my judgment, the best time
for this would have been the days during which
the great wheel of the Third Army towards the
north was completed. During these days fresh
reconnoitring squadrons would have had to be
thrown forward in the new line of march, while
those which had advanced in the original direction

MAIN BODY OF THE ARMY CAVALRY 31

could, according to the situation, have been
gradually drawn in. Strong patrols would have
been sufficient in that direction.

In any case it is clear that the question of the
relief of reconnoitring squadrons is extremely
important and cannot be solved by routine. It is
a matter for consideration whether it would not
be of advantage for the " Field Service Manual '*
to touch on these questions as well as on the
circumstances under which a departure from the
system of allotment of zones might be desirable.
I am inclined to think this desirable, as otherwise
the extremely practical dispositions therein laid
down are apt to lead to a lifeless formalism.

The important service of transmission will
naturally be deeply influenced by all these
conditions.

I have already expressed the opinion that the
importance of this service with regard to the
increased extent of the reconnoitring rayons may
even lead the main body of a division, for ex-
ample, to advance in separate columns, in order
to shorten the routes of information and to afford
a not too distant support for the reconnoitring
organs. The Head Quarters will often be more
quickly informed if the news comes direct from
detachments themselves than if it had first to be
collected at one point.

If it has become so necessary to accelerate the
service of communication, it is all the more so

32 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

to ensure that the system of reports should be
properly ordered. In the main body of the army
cavalry it is a matter of keeping up communi-
cation on the one hand with the army following,
on the other with the advanced squadrons. In
both these respects the application of technical
means of communication must be considered before
all else.

Communication to the rear is fundamentally
the task of wireless telegraphy. But the system
of information to the front must be otherwise
arranged for.

Communication with the reconnoitring squadrons
can practically never be carried out by wireless
telegraphy. Here efforts must be made to work
with the light-signal apparatus/ or to employ
cyclists or relay lines to facilitate and accelerate
the service of transmission. A combination of
all these means, and the use of the cavalry
telegraph, if need be, will be found advisable. In
friendly country the population can often be used
to keep up communic£^tion or to send messages.

The employment of single cyclists or motor-cars
is, on the other hand, not advisable. Without
taking into account the fact that they are tied to
the roads, and, having no fighting value, will often
fall an easy prey to the enemy, technical defects
occur so often in the machines that they cannot

* The lamp used by night and day in the German Army, com-
bining the functions of our heliograph and lamp.

MAIN BODY OF THE ARMt CAVALRY 33

be classed as a reliable means of communication,
particularly in hostile country. Should the dis-
tance between the reconnoitring squadrons and
the main body become very great, or if cir-
cumstances arise which render direct communi-
cation between them too long a matter, or
if it is desired to provide several avenues of
communication, a collecting station can be formed
for reports : this will keep up connection, and
must be secured by a detachment of sufficient
strength. It is erroneous to assume that such
collecting stations must always be used. They
often operate very unfavourably, especially when
armies are on the move, as they are for the
most part very local, and then do more harm
than good.

If there is a sufficient number of apparatus at
disposal, and if the collecting stations are suf-
ficiently secured, an effort should be made to
establish wireless communication from them to
the rear — a cipher being of course used to prevent
the enemy learning the contents of messages.
Otherwise the various means available must be
suited to the particular case, and used in com-
bination.

The system of communications thus forms a
complicated machine, formed of technical and
natural methods of transmission of great variety,
that will be difficult to maintain in an efficient
state, especially when an army is on the move.

3

34 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

It is obvious that these difficulties must be
augmented during the change of reconnoitring
zones or the relief of reconnoitring squadrons.
It will often be worth while to establish the
system of intelligence in a new direction, while
the available apparatus and telegraphs are still
in part maintained on the old lines. Only some
"system of auxiliaries" will meet these difficulties;
only troops to whom this service has been en-
trusted down to the smallest detail will be able
to discover these auxiliaries and properly employ
them. Otherwise the service of information must
miscarry.

2. Reconnoitring Squadrons

From the above considerations it must be already
clear that a great measure of resourcefulness, a
comprehensive grasp of the situation, clearness of
judgment, and a love of responsibility will be
demanded from the leader of a reconnoitring
squadron. Even in the simple advance in the
allotted zone clear understanding will be required
as to all the measures for the proper conduct of
the troops, and well-calculated boldness when the
enemy is met with.

There will, however, be difficulties to over-
come when the main body of our own cavalry
changes its direction ; when the concentration for
battle begins from the line of march, the cavalry
masses draw away to a flank, unexpected measures

RECONNOITRING SQUADRONS 35

of the enemy come to light, which had not been
counted upon when our own reconnaissance was
arranged ; or when our own cavalry is beaten, and
touch with it is completely lost. Under all these
circumstances the allotment of zones completely
loses its value, and the whole reconnaissance must
be arranged and ordered on some other system.
Squadron leaders will often in such cases act quite
independently and according to their own judg-
ment of the situation, and with an appreciation of
the probable action of neighbouring squadrons,
without, however, losing sight of the main objec-
tive. In such cases they will often report direct
to Head Quarters, and may then have to fall back
on the main army instead of on their own
division.

Every squadron commander can conclude from
these reflections what an unusually high standard
of military training, power of judgment, and initia-
tive will be demanded of him if he is properly
and successfully to carry out these duties. I hope
that all officers will be stimulated to apply them-
selves to these matters, so that a future war may
not find them unprepared.

It is a matter of the greatest importance for
the conduct of the squadron in general whether
it is acting in a friendly or hostile country.
While in the first case troops may ride through
towns, feed in villages, and count upon con-
siderable support from the inhabitants, in the

36 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

service both of security and information, in the
second they must always be prepared against
treachery or surprise, and behave as if they were
surrounded by a network of spies. Townships
are to be particularly avoided, and special pre-
cautions for safety must be taken, especially
while at rest.

In other respects the advance itself must in
both cases be carried out according to the same
principles.

Squadrons will generally advance in bonds
successifa, and upon those roads which appear
to them to be the most important for reconnais-
sance. If they are provided with the light-signal
apparatus, and can use it for communicating to
the rear, they must keep in mind during the
march itself the possibilities of being able to use
it, try it on the ground, and make a mental note
of points that are specially adapted for connec-
tion-stations. The whole plan of the day's
march must then be made with an eye to the
establishment of communication by this method.
Halting-places for rest or feeding horses must
be selected witli regard either to good cover or
to the view which may be had from them. In
order to be independent of the hostile population
it is advisable for the squadron to have its ration
and forage wagons with it. In case of an un-
successful collision with the enemy these may
indeed be lost. In any other case, how^ever, they

[

RECONNOITRING SQUADRONS 37

will always be at the disposal of the squadron.
On the other hand, in hostile country, if they
follow the squadron at too great a distance, they
will often fall a prey to the enemy. Under such
circumstances, if they are to be really protected,
a sufficiently strong escort must be left with
them, and this will react unfavourably upon the
strength of the squadron.

The efforts of reconnoitring squadrons to diminish
the distance between themselves and the enemy
as quickly as possible by undertaking excessive
marches, such as are frequently seen in peace,
are misdirected and unreal, and only tend to wear
out the horses. In peace manoeuvres, which
only last two or three days, and which have not
to be sustained by a number of lame and over-
tired horses, such proceedings are indeed possible,
but in war they are pernicious. A squadron
should be able to remain up to strength through-
out a campaign, and it must be remembered that
horses that go lame and are left behind will, at
all events in hostile country, be lost to the re-
connoitring squadrons for good. The patrols,
too, must be able to keep something in hand.
But, if the squadrons tax their capacity for
marching to the utmost, the patrols, which are
required to go still farther in advance, must be
completely exhausted. If the squadrons can
cover daily 26 miles and the distant patrols 35
to 40 miles, this will, I hold, be quite sufficient.

38 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

More than this, on an average, cannot be expected
of them. This does not of course preclude special
efforts to meet particular circumstances. It will
only be possible, however, to demand these efforts
when we learn how to calculate the average
length of march during which men and horses
can be kept fresh and efficient.

Although the choice of lines of advance and
the combined action of the reconnoitring squad-
rons are often weighty factors of success, yet on
the other hand, in order to obtain early and
sufficient intelligence of the enemy, it is of the
highest importance that the patrol system should
be properly ordered according to the needs and
probabilities of the situation. The " Field Service
Manual " gives the necessary principles for their
action. They must, it says, be sent forward along
tlie roads that the enemy is most likely to use.
By so doing, certain results must, under any
circumstances, be obtained. On the other hand,
it is a mistake to send forward single patrols
against a wide front. Under such circumstances
a patrol is always in doubt which way to go, will
probably divide, and cannot, at all events, be
everywhere. From such procedure, which is
unfortunately only too common, reliable results
cannot be expected, and it is never certain if
observation is being carried out in any given
direction. Such a faulty course of action usually
originates from a certain confusion of thought

RECONNOITRING SQUADRONS 39

on the part of the leader as to his own intentions
and his suppositions as to the enemy. A clear
appreciation of the situation ensures at the same
time a clearly defined course of action. If, how-
ever, no sort of idea can be formed as to what
the enemy is likely to do, the patrol system must
be extended, not only in those directions from
which the enemy may be expected, but in others
where it is possible that he may be met with.
Any turning movement on the part of the hostile
forces must, in this manner, be continually
guarded against.

The number of patrols sent out will, of couirse,
depend on the importance of the task. If the
strength of a squadron is insufficient to provide
them, it must be supplemented by patrols detailed
from other squadrons. The relief of such patrols,
also, may have to be carried out by the same
means. Cutting down the number of distant
patrols is to be avoided as far as possible.
Economy of force can be better attained by
careful husbanding of strength in the close
reconnaissance and service of security.

The strength of distant patrols should never
be arbitrarily laid down, as in this respect also
the circumstances must be taken into account.
Patrols which are far distant from the road upon
which the squadron is advancing, and which can
only be reached with difficulty, require a greater
degree of independence than those in the im-

40 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

mediate neighbourhood, which can be rapidly
supported or strengthened. The probability, also,
of meeting with superior hostile force demands
a greater proportion of strength. Under certain
circumstances a whole troop may be used as an
independent patrol. At the same time a wise
economy of force must be practised so that the
fighting and marching eflBciency of the squadron
does not suffer too much. To this end, quite
weak patrols must be made to suffice in directions
of secondary importance. A second in command
must be detailed to every patrol. There should
also be a supply of trained lance-corporals ready
to lead such patrols as may be required to carry
information to the rear.

The strength of patrols will depend largely
on the number of messages that they are ex-
pected to send in. As a general rule, in large
operations, not more than two messages will be
required from each patrol during the day. It
is only when the opposing armies approach each
other, and the distant patrols gradually become
close patrols, that it will be necessary to report
frequently on tactical events. The distances,
however, will then have so far diminished, that
a reinforcement of the patrols from the squadrons
would probably be possible if they have become
over- weak through transmission duties.

Like the reconnoitring squadrons, the patrols
require relief from time to time, as the same

RECONNOITRING SQUADRONS 41

patrol leader cannot be expected to remain in
continuous touch with the enemy.

The strength of patrols, therefore, will generally
have to be calculated according to the number
of messages and the number of days during
which the same men are required to be in
contact with the enemy. It is only when a
special fighting strength appears necessary that
these numbers should be exceeded. On the
other hand, the patrols in friendly country may
be made weaker than when in the enemy's
territory, as, in the latter case, it will scarcely
be possible to send in messages by single orderlies.

Careful preparation must be made for the relief
of patrols. Every patrol that is sent out must know
when, and approximately where, it can rejoin
the squadron. The relieving patrol should arrive
on the field of exploration before the original
patrol returns. The two patrol leaders should
meet where possible. All the patrols should
never be relieved at one time, as such a procedure
would tend to weaken the squadron too much.

The reconnoitring squadron must continually
endeavour to maintain communication with the
distant patrols which send in reports to it. As
the main body must always be careful to render
communication with the reconnoitring squadron
possible and to facilitate it, so is communication
with the patrols one of the most important duties
of the latter, It will often be necessary, when

42 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

the distances become great or the ground difficult,
to push forward relay posts to facilitate and
accelerate the service of transmission. These
posts must have a sufficiency of force assigned to
them. The squadron leader, further, must most
minutely instruct the patrols in anything that
can serve to assist the carrying out of their task,
and as to all arrangements for the transmission
of reports.

A patrol's instructions must be short and
clear, and must leave no room for doubt in the
patrol leader's mind as to what is expected
of him.

The instructions must contain : all that is
known of the enemy ; a statement of the general
situation, and of the system of reconnaissance,
as far as it may concern the patrol in question ;
an indication of the proposed march and the
objective of the squadron ; points where messages
as to the position of the squadron may be
deposited, in case it should be found necessary to
depart from the preconceived plan ; exact data
as to when and where the relieving patrol will
be sent and also when the patrol is to rejoin
the squadron.

Although such arrangements may not always
have the desired results, as all such dispositions
are liable to be disturbed by the action of the
enemy, they yet form a good groundwork on
which to build further, according to circum-

RECONNOITRING SQUADRONS 43

stances, and which can be suited to any altera-
tion of the situation. Such arrangements should
therefore never be neglected.

In manoeuvres, the leaving of such information
— for instance, under stones — in prearranged
places or localities that are easy to find, and
which must be determined by the map according
to the expected situation, will be found a valuable
exercise.

Communication will, as a rule, be best secured
if the reconnoitring squadron can succeed in
beating the hostile organs of reconnaissance and
security. We must not, of course, assume that a
squadron that has been thrown back and pursued
for a space will be rendered incapable of carrying
out its r61e. It will still try to support its patrols
as before. If, however, such successful combats
become numerous, a superiority will at length be
obtained, particularly on the main avenues of
communication, that will considerably facilitate
the task of obtaining and transmitting informa-
tion.

It must therefore be the ceaseless endeavour of
the cavalry to attack the enemy wherever found.
The reconnoitring squadrons in particular must
undertake the duty, not only of driving the
corresponding hostile squadrons from the field,
but. of endeavouring to intervene and assist
wherever the hostile reconnoitring patrols offer an
obstinate resistance. They must take every op-

44 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

portunity of fighting with the arme hlanche^ or
of attacking the enemy in some unfavourable
situation, perhaps by night. Dismounted action
for single squadrons advancing in hostile country
is generally dangerous, and, on account of the
weakness of the force, usually leads to failure. It
should never bo forgotten that for a successful
action on foot great numerical superiority is
indispensable.

Should the reconnoitring squadron come in
contact with the enemy's cavalry in strength, it
must be decided whether to fall back, or avoid it
by a detour in order to maintain under all circum-
stances communication with the distant patrols.
In the latter case, communication to the rear
becomes naturally considerably more difficult, and
it can only be hoped that the hostile cavalry will
be beaten by our own. Whatever decision is made
will depend upon the circumstances of the case :
the terrain, the distance from our own cavalry
and from the enemy's main body, as well as on
what is already known of the enemy, and on
what it is of particular importance to learn. It
will generally be most important, as well as
desirable, to maintain at all costs communication
with the distant patrols, as news must first be
procured before it can be sent back, and it will be
possible under certain circumstances to com-
municate over the enemy's head with the light-
signal.

RECONNOITRING SQUADRONS 45

In order to maintain the necessary fighting
strength of the squadrons under all circumstances,
as few men as possible should be detached. This
does not of course refer to the distant patrols.

The melting away of the squadron's numbers,
so often seen in peace, is generally a result of
the manner in which the close reconnaissance
is conducted. The close patrols are sent out
6 or 7 miles, often still farther, and, having
general instructions to remain in touch with the
enemy, seldom rejoin the squadron. Thus they
become lost to the squadron, and as the squadron
leader is not fully aware of their position he is
soon under the obligation of having to send out
a fresh patrol. This patrol is a less useful one
than the first, and if it brings in news of the
enemy the latter will often arrive simultaneously
with the news. The report often enough goes
first to the enemy about whom it is being made.
No reproach can be attached to any one concerned.
It lies in the nature of things and in the method
of apportioning duties.

In contradistinction to such procedure, it is, in
my opinion, in most cases quite superfluous to
arrange a close reconnaissance in addition to
the distant patrols. Close patrols weaken the
squadron, and can only, it appears, rejoin it with
difficulty, nor do they effect the necessary recon-
naissance. Every squadron must, on the other
hand, be continually surrounded by local patrols

46 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

for its own safety, closely connected with it, and
which, being in constant communication with
the squadron, secure it immediately from surprise
and, as far as their strength allows, attack and
break up hostile patrols. This measure will not
have the effect of M^eakening the squadron too
much. These patrols will require relief from
time to time, and accompany the march of the
squadron in its rayon in such a manner that a
second patrol can be sent out before the first
rejoins. They must, however, never be drawn so
far away from the squadron that they cannot
secure its immediate safety and beat off hostile
patrols.

If, in exceptional circumstances, patrols are sent
out in close reconnaissance, it is desirable that
they should work from one locality to another a
few^ miles in advance, so that it will always be
possible to get them back. Especial attention
must be given to this matter when operating in
the enemy's country.

Patrols to connect with neighbouring squadrons
are quite superfluous. They have little prospect
of carrying out their task in a practical way, and
must therefore be regarded as a useless expendi-
ture of force. The regulation of the movements
of the various reconnoitring squadrons as a whole,
and the dissemination of information regarding
them to each other, is a matter for the Head
Quarters of the main body.

RECONNOITRING SQUADRONS 47

Economy in patrols should never go so far as to
allow of cyclists, or indeed a single cyclist or
motor-car, being used for reconnaissance, as un-
fortunately repeatedly happens in manoeuvres.
Cyclists may be used for the purpose of maintain-
ing communication and bringing back reports. It
will not be possible to use them singly for these
duties, especially in the enemy's country, but
several will have to be sent together. Bound as
they are to the roads, they are quite unsuited to
patrol work. It is also inadmissible, at all events
in hostile country, to send bicycles or motor-
cars with patrols. They only become a burden to
the patrol as soon as it wishes to leave the road.
For the motor cyclist the question of petrol is
also an important one. Where will he replenish
his supply in hostile country ? Certainly not in
villages with a hostile population, unless a suffi-
cient show of force can be made.

The accommodation of reconnoitring squadrons
for the night also demands close attention. Such
accommodation must be chosen from quite different
considerations, according as the squadron is opera-
ting in a friendly or hostile country.

In any case, endeavour must be made so to dis-
pose the squadron that the chief avenues of com-
munication, at least, will be under observation,
and thus closed to the enemy's despatch-riders.
The horses also must be rested, that they may be
ready for the next day's work, for a tired squadron

48 EMPLOYxMENT IN WAR

cannot reconnoitre properly. In order that the
horses may really rest, they must he off-saddled,
and, to do this, the squadron must he secure
from surprise. This will not always he possihle,
hut endeavours must he made towards that end.
Should hostile detachments he in the neighhour-
hood, which is unavoidahle during critical days,
it will he necessary to he always ready for possihle
surprise, and to so arrange that the squadron can
speedily withdraw from its hivouac on the ap-
proach of the enemy. The measures taken for
safety must he directed to this end. It is also
sometimes desirable, in order to deceive the enemy,
to change the halting-place already occupied,
after darkness sets in. In friendly country, if an
attack is expected, it is often hetter to spend the
night in larger villages, where the inhabitants
themselves will co-operate in the service of
security. In the enemy's country, on the other
hand — where the hostility of the inhabitants is
to be reckoned with — the larger villages must
always be avoided, and accommodation must be
sought in single isolated farms, which, by their
position, are in a measure secure from surprise,
where the fighting force can be kept together,
where there is nothing to fear from the inhabi-
tants, and which can be quickly abandoned, if
possible, unobserved.

The service of security in such situations must
be carefully organised and must not consist merely

RECONNOITRING SQUADRONS 49

of guarding the immediate environs. It will
rather be advisable to push forward posts on the
chief lines of approach of the enemy, which will
be able to bring in timely news of his advance.
What degree of readiness for movement is main-
tained in such situations the circumstances of the
moment must dictate.

In this question of accommodation, attention
must also be paid to the service of communication.
It must be possible from the position selected
for the night to pick up communication with
our own troops and to receive the orders and
instructions which will naturally be expected
at the end of the day.

If the squadron is provided with the light-
signal apparatus it should remain in the neigh-
bourhood of high ground, from which it is thought
possible that communication may be picked up.
If instructions have been received to establish
communication by mounted orderlies or cyclists,
care must be taken that there are roads easily
found, even in the dark, by which they can reach
the main body, the reporting centre, or the relay
posts, as the case may be. The squadron's own
reports, too, will often not be sent ofiF before
evening, m order that all the events of the day
may be collated. This must be done in clear,
concise form, more especially where the means
of transmission is the telegraph or light-signal.

The sifting and collating of information re-

4

60 EMPLOYMENT IK WAR

ceived is therefore an important and very respon-
sible task, requiring continual practice. The
squadron leader must be able properly to judge
which of the reports received must be sent to
the army Head Quarters or to the cavalry com-
mander, and all superfluous matter must be
eliminated. All reports received should by no
means be transmitted. This would overburden
the service of tnmsmission to no useful purpose.

3. Distant Patrols

The duties of the distant patrols are just as
difficult as those of the reconnoitring squadron,
as they are continually brought face to face
with the necessity of forming independent de-
cisions, and, in order to act and report efficiently,
require a high degree of strategic insight. Apart
from the personal capacity of the officer com-
manding the patrol, a thorough training em-
phasising the essential points in its conduct is
necessary for the men.

I have already shown the lines on which
such instruction should be conducted. I would
here, however, like to add that the patrol leader,
if he is in any doubt, can clear up the situation
in his mind by cross-questioning himself. It
should never suffice to him that the authority
who set him the task veiled his responsibility
by general verbiage. The task must be definitely
determined ; whether negative reports are required

DISTANT PATROLS 61

or not, and when and where reports are to be sent,
more especially when touch has been lost with
the squadron. The complete instructions must of
course be confided to the second in command of
the patrol, and the general task to be fulfilled
to each member of it.

For the conduct of the patrol it is a matter
of still greater importance than for the squadron,
which has a certain fighting strength, whether
it is acting in its own or in hostile country. It
will have the same points to consider as in the
case of a squadron, but in hostile country its
conduct must be still more circumspect, while
in friendly country, where concealment is more
easy, its action can be correspondingly bolder.

If long distances are to be covered, the patrol
should remain on the road until it reaches country
where an encounter with the enemy is likely.
The passage through large villages peopled by
hostile inhabitants is to be avoided.

Horses should not be fed, at least in hostile
country, in the neighbourhood of villages or on
the main road, but always in a safe place, and
a proportion of them only at a time. In friendly
country they may best be fed in the larger
villages, which the hostile patrols will avoid,
but should not halt on the main road.

When the locality is reached where a meeting
with hostile detachments may be expected, the
patrol should advance in bonds succeasifs. It

52 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

must, unfortunately, be admitted that such
methods appear to be quite foreign to most patrol
leaders ; at all events, they are seldom applied in
manoeuvres. Most of them ride forward with
praiseworthy speed along the road until they
collide with the enemy ; then, indeed, they begin
to observe him, without asking themselves whether
in war the result of such tactics would not have
already compromised their chances of success.
For if they are once discovered by the enemy
they may count on being relentlessly hunted and
pursued, so that there will no longer be, in most
cases, any further possibility of deliberate observa-
tion.

Very different indeed are the circumstances
when, from a well-chosen point of view, a patrol
is successful in detecting the enemy before coming
into immediate collision with him. The patrol
can then order the whole of its conduct according
to its knowledge of the enemy before it is dis-
covered, and has a very much greater prospect of
attaining good results.

We must lay down here, once and for all, that
the distant observation with the fflass is bv far
the most important ; it affords the best survey
over the general conditions, and a better possibility
of sending back a report safely and quickly. It
is just in this method of observation that, in
consequence of our peace conditions, patrols are
generally so badly trained. Again and again

DISTANT PATROLS 53

they fall into the error of approaching too close to
the enemy and, in order to see as much of him as
possible, let him march past them. They are
then compelled to send in their reports from
places which lie behind the belt of the hostile
service of security. The despatch-riders have
then to ride from the rear through the hostile
advance-guard, outposts, and patrol system.

In peace, where there are no bullets, and
prisoners may not be made, these methods lead
to the best results, and to their being employed
again and again, particularly if the superior com-
manders are inclined to praise such too complete
information instead of condemning it. In truth,
it is the worst system that could be conceived.
Properly speaking, such protracted observation is
only possible under certain circumstances; for
instance, if the outer flank of the enemy's advance
has been turned, then perhaps there might be a
chance of sending reports round the flank of the
hostile zone of security. It should, however, be
quite inadmissible for a patrol to remain in this
manner between the hostile columns of the
enemy's army. Unless it were unusually lucky,
it would quickly be detected and captured ; more
particularly, if the inhabitants were hostile.

It is quite another matter where a hostile screen
has to be broken through. This can generally
only be accomplished by fighting; and it is the
'first duty of the reconnoitring squadron to break

54 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

through the enemy's screen. Patrols also, which
in such a case have succeeded in getting behind
the enemy's outpost-line, cannot count upon
sending back messages as they please. It will
only be a question of a rapid offensive through
the screen towards the main body of the enemy.
The patrols will then be surrounded, and must
at once proceed to effect their return, and only
report what they have seen when they have
successfully broken back again through the
enemy's screen. Despatch-riders have, in such
a case, small prospect of getting through. The
less it is possible to observe and report, the more
carefully must the points for breaking through
be chosen, and attention must therefore be paid
to reaching good points of vantage that command
a view of places of probable importance.

The time chosen for observation is also of great
importance. The enemy can best be observed,
and his strength and intentions appreciated, when
he is on the move. Marches are generally under-
taken in the morning, and towards the evening
one may expect to find the enemy in quarters.
Under such circumstances observation is difficult.
The patrol leader must therefore arrange to reach
in the morning thoser points from which he expects
to be able to observe the enemy on the march.
He will then be obliged in most cases to . fall
back before the advancing enemy, and will en-
deavour to ascertain his halting-place and the

DISTANT PATROLS 55

approximate line taken up by his outposts. If
a distant patrol should be successful in obtaining
such information it m411 generally have done as
much as is expected of it. It is for the tactical
close reconnaissance to send in information as to
details. From the distant reconnaissance it is
only required to form the foundations on which
the Head Quarters can base its decisions. This
fact should be borne in mind while reporting
on the enemy.

These duties can for the rest be only carried
out under war conditions and against an enemy
who is working to the same end, if undertaken
in a regular and systematic way and with great
boldness.

The patrol leader, therefore, should generally
make his plan in the evening for the following
day. It will be desirable for him to study the
map very closely, and to impress on his memory
the main roads and especially points which appear
to be suitable for observation. He can thus
obtain an impression of the succession of stages
necessary for his iewivance, and judge how he can
best spare his horses without prejudicing the
success of the reconnaissance.

For a patrol to move en masse without scouts,
as unfortunately is often done in peace, is alto-
gether out of the question. In war such conduct
must often be paid for by the lives of the patrol
and the complete failure of the enterprise. A

56 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

point must always be sent so far ahead that the
patrol will not come under fire at the same time
with it. It should never happen that the point
collides unexpectedly with the enemy. A rear-
guard will also in most cases be found desirable.
Circumstances must determine how the flanks can
best be protected.

Should the patrol be obliged to ride through
country where it might be surprised, it will be
advisable first to make a halt and to send on
scouts. Manoeuvres have repeatedly proved that
the point is insufficient in such a case.

It is in most cases quite inadmissible, especially
in hostile country, to divide the patrol and to
arrange a meeting-place farther to the front. As
there will usually be at most but one map avail-
able, the detached party will find themselves in
the enemy's country without means of locating
themselves, probably unable to make themselves
understood by the inhabitants, and in any case
will run the danger of being betrayed by them.
It will not even be of much avail if they are
given some kind of sketch if they meet with
and are chased by the enemy.

I should therefore like to utter a warning
against the custom of such division of patrols in
peace w^hich could not be carried out in the
enemy's country. In friendly country they are
possible, but always dangerous. The various de-
tachments having insufficient fighting strength, the

DISTANT PATROLS 67

possibility of sending back information will be
reduced and a junction will always be doubtful,
while any collision with the enemy may make
it impossible.

There is another error into which patrols fre-
quently fall in peace manoeuvres, and that is, of
leaving the road assigned to them for observation
without sufficient reason, and of using other roads
upon which other patrols are working. Even
when a patrol has sure indication that it will
not meet with the enemy upon the road assigned
to it, it should still remain upon this road, and
send back definite negative information, even if
no instructions to this effect have been received.

On collision with the enemy's patrols, action
must be taken in as offensive a spirit as possible,
but after due reflection. Should a charge promise
any kind of success, the opponent must be at-
tacked in the most determined way. It will
also often be possible to defeat an enemy of
superior numbers by a carefully laid ambush.
Every success of this kind will increase our own
moral superiority, paralyse the enemy's recon-
naissance, and facilitate the transmission of
information. Before attacking, however, it
should always be ascertained whether the enemy
is followed by any close support which might
turn an initial success into a worse defeat. Thus
it does not, for example, promise success to attack
the point of an advancing squadron under the

58 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

apprehension that it is a single patrol. Making
prisoners and carrying them off, or sending them
back under escort from the patrol, is to be depre-
cated. They can generally be rendered harmless
by depriving them of their horses, arms, and
boots. Good captured horses, however, should
be always used, either to replace the tired cattle
of the patrol, or led with it in reserve.

Should the patrol meet with a superior force
of cavalry, it must endeavour to extricate itself
and to get round the enemy's flank. Under such
circumstances the ability to ride quickly and
safely across country will be of great service.
But it is important, as soon as the patrol is
in safety, that it should again reach the road
detailed to it, and also that the men should be
instructed as to how to avoid the enemy, when
carrying messages to the rear, without losing
their way.

When a patrol has been successful by judicious
riding, determined fighting, and clever avoidance
of the enemy, in obtaining information as to the
enemy, it is of the utmost importance what in-
formation is to be sent back, and when and how
it should be sent.

As I have already indicated abote, the patrol
must be perfectly clear as to what facts are
most important from the Head Quarters' point of
view. If the opposing armies are still so far
apart that a collision cannot be expected, only

DISTANT PATROLS 59

those matters that are of strategic importance
need be ascertained and transmitted : e.g. number
of the hostile columns, objective of the day's
march, any circumstances that lend themselves
to a conclusion as to alterations in the enemy's
direction of march or the combination of his
forces. In such a case there is no need for
information as to details. The closer, however,
the opposing armies approach one another, the
more does information which is of tactical sig-
nificance increase in importance. It is not always
advisable to confine oneself to reporting the bare
facts. It will often be desirable to indicate also
the process of reasoning by which the reporting
officer arrives at his impression, for this originates
from a number of imponderahilia which cannot
always be detailed in a report. When this is
done, it must be thoroughly and carefully con-
sidered how far this personal impression is de-
pendent upon facts, or if it does not rather rest
upon certain feelings, as to the cause of which
no clear account can be given. Should the
latter be the case, the personal point of view is
best left out. Preconceived opinions originate
but too easily in war, and may lead to a biassed
interpretation of reports, and, consequently, to
faulty dispositions. The facts must always be
weighed with sober impartiality. Only thus can
a true and definite appreciation be arrived at.
The same naturally holds good for those reports

60 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

which are sent in from the reconnoitring squadrons
or other reporting centres. The method in which
such information is sifted for passing on brings
into play, in a certain sense, personal conceptions.
It is therefore all the more necessary to reflect
seriously over their preparation.

It is imperative that any important information
should reach the Head Quarters of the army or the
Great Head Quarters as early as possible, at all
events, early enough to allow of the measures
rendered necessary by the enemy's movements to
be initiated and carried out. The patrol leader
must therefore consider the time requisite for a
wheel or other such movement of a modern army
in order to calculate what is the latest time, under
any circumstances, that his information must be
sent in. It is obvious, and has already been
demonstrated, that he should be instructed as to
the advance of his own army in order that he may
be able to appreciate these matters.

As already stated, it will, as a rule, be neces-
sary for a distant patrol only to send in two
messages daily. The first contact with the hostile
infantry must always be reported. It will
generally suffice if the direction of march of the
enemy and the march-objective reached by him
are reported. It will often be desirable to send
back only a single report, setting forth the events
of the day. On the other hand, the method of
despatch of such messages must be most carefully

DISTANT PATROLS 61

prepared. During the advance of the patrol the
leader must call the attention of his men, more
especially from any good look-out points, to
any prominent features passed. He must make
marks at difficult places, and where the main
roads have to he left, to assist them in finding
their way hack.

Reports should only he sent from some point
from which the despatch-riders have, at least to
a certain degree, a safe route, where they will not
have to pass through any hostile outposts, occupied ^
localities, or defiles. It is highly desirable to
continually instruct the patrol as to the route
to the rear, and as to its conduct under special
circumstances, and to give it a sketch of the
road. The latter should contain not only names,
which wQl not be of much use to the patrol, but
characteristic marks which may be used as points
of orientation, — forked roads and the like — to assist
the men in choosing the right road. Orderlies
should be told the general contents of messages
which they carry.

It is quite out of the question that in war, and
especially in hostile country, despatch-riders will
be allowed to ride about free from harm, as they
are unfortunately allowed to do in peace. The
endeavour to send many, and often superfluous,
messages by a few men always eventually leads
to the sending of single horsemen as despatch-
riders. Such a custom, which in war must lead

62 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

to disastrous consequences, cannot be too sharply
reproved.

Single orderlies, in hostile country, cannot be
sent, except where they know the district, and
where collision with the enemy's patrols is out
of the question. When long distances have to be
covered, there is also the danger that a horse may
succumb, or that the inhabitants may stop the
man. The fact that, in the Franco-Prussian War,
the custom of sending single despatch-riders
proved . itself generally, if not entirely, sufficient
must not be regarded as of great significance, as
at that time there was no question of having to
reckon with the opposition of hostile cavalry. In
a modern war it will certainly be different, and
we may be quite sure that the cavalry of each
army will strive its utmost not only to recon-
noitre, but also to prevent the enemy reconnoitring.
The distances to be covered, also, will be very
different from those of 1870-71.

The single despatch-rider, therefore, especially
in the case of the distant patrol, must be replaced
by a reporting patrol. This can best be formed
of three men, who can mutually support each
other, and, should they meet with the enemy,
have more chance of escape than a single horse-
man. For very important information, and
against strong opposition, several such patrols
must be sent by different routes. In friendly
country, where the population will give all

DISTANT PATROLS 63

possible support, the single despatch-rider can,
for short distances, be more often used, and the
reporting patrols can be made weaker according
to circumstances.

These circumstances must determine, as we
have seen, the strength of patrols, and the time
which they can stay out without relief.

Patrols must choose their accommodation for
the night with great care. It is obvious that for
them, as for the reconnoitring squadrons, it is of
great importance whether they are in their own
or hostile country.

In their own country it will often be safer to
seek shelter for the night in the larger villages,
because such places will, as a rule, be avoided by
hostile troops. It is, however, not only a question
of safety, but also of keeping the road confided
to them in sight during the night, and of
interrupting the transmission of the enemy's
intelligence, which will, like our own, be most
active after dark. His despatch-riders, however,
will most probably endeavour to avoid villages.
For the rest, patrols in their own country can
choose their accommodation freely according to
the situation, and can at least always get under
cover, even when in the neighbourhood of the
enemy.

In hostile country, however, the conditions are
different. Isolated and far distant from support,
the patrols run great danger, even from the

64 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

inhabitants themselves, and should never try to
spend the night in enclosed villages or farms.
If they wish to get cover for the night, they must
look for single houses close to the road, and take
measures that the inhabitants do not betray them
to any of the enemy's troops or to partisans that
may be in the neighbourhood. They must also
be careful to keep a good look-out and be ready to
get away at a moment's notice. They should not,
however, as long as it is possible, lose sight of the
road detailed to them until absolutely forced to,
but should watch it by an advanced post in order
to interrupt the enemy's transmission service.

When in the presence of the enemy, it will be
advisable not to seek shelter, but to spend the
night in woods, 6r at all events distant from
localities where forage or food has been requisi-
tioned. Horses may then be oif -saddled and fed,
singly or by groups, according to circumstances.
Special measures of safety are also necessary
under such circumstances.

It is of great importance to establish com-
munication with the reconnoitring squadron
during the night halt, and to adhere closely, when
it is at all possible, to any arrangements made
with it. It may very easily happen, as we have
seen, that the task of the reconnoitring squadron
may be changed, and that it may be required to
operate in new directions. It is, therefore, im-
portant that tlie patrols do not get lost to the

DISTANT PATROLS 65

squadron, but are in a position to receive fresh
instructions. The patrols can also utilise this
opportunity for receiving reinforcements if ne-
cessary.

The patrol may sometimes lose connection with
the squadron ; it will then be generally most
advisable for it to remain in observation of that
portion of the enemy which has been found upon
the road allotted to it. If this should entail a
change of direction, reports should be sent direct
to that portion of the army which is assumed
to be the nearest according to the general
situation. This must not, however, be regarded
as a hard-and-fast rule. It should rather be left
to the independent decision of the officer how he
will act in the particular case. Independence of
judgment and of character are of the highest
importance, especially when on patrol. These
qualities can, however, only be effective if cavalry
officers are instructed as to the conditions of
modern armies and are quite clear in theory as to
the duties and methods of conducting patrols.
It is to be hoped that they will in future realise
the obligation of applying themselves most
seriously to this branch of their important
duties, that they may be thoroughly prepared
and capable of the greatest effort when the
call to arms resounds in bloody earnest through
the land.

66 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

4. Close Meconnaisaance and Reconnaissance

during the Fight

Within certain limits determined by the various
crises of the fight the reconnoitring duties of
the cavalry are continuous. As the hostile
armies approach one another, distant exploration
merges into close reconnaissance, and from the
latter evolves the battle reconnaissance, when
the heavily charged thunder-clouds of war come
into collision, and the brazen dice of battle are
thrown.

Within these limits the arrangements made
for reconnaissance should not require fresh dis-
positions, but merely supplementing as they
gradually develop from strategical into tactical
measures. This is a matter for consideration
when detailing close patrols, as the tendency is
to be too prodigal of the scanty force at disposal.
When the army cavalry concentrates towards
the flank of the army, the detachments of it
which have been carrying out the reconnaissance
against the enemy's front must be gradually
relieved by the divisional cavalry. The army
cavalry will only be able to assist the divisional
cavalry in the close reconnaissance by the action
of those portions of it which may fall back behind
the front of their own army. In such a case all
should be placed under a single command, to
prevent useless expenditure of force and con-

CLOSE RECONNAISSANCE 67

tradictory orders. Whether the divisional cavalry
is to be reinforced by the army cavalry or vice
versa, or whether a separate sphere of action is
to be assigned to each, must depend on cir-
cumstances.

It will, however, seldom happen that the army
cavalry will fall back behind the front of its
own army. It will nearly always be most advan-
tageously placed on the flank of the army, and
will therefore only have to carry out such recon-
naissance as is possible from this position. Such
reconnaissance, however, is generally the most
important.

As already indicated, the reconnoitring squad-
rons will gradually fall back upon the army
cavalry itself, or upon the advancing columns
of the main army which will now be approach-
ing them. The reconnoitring squadrons on the
outer flank will, however, be well advised not
to join themselves at once to the main body of
the cavalry. They must rather seek to operate
against the rear of the enemy, who is already
deployed, or against his lines of advance, in order
to be able to report the presence of any approach-
ing hostile reserves as early as possible. As a
single example of this, had the French at Mars
la Tour acted in this manner they would very
soon have discovered the approach of Wedel's Bri-
gade and its approximate strength. They would
not then have been surprised by the attack of

68 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

this brigade nor would they have mistaken it
for the advance-guard of the Third Army. One
may well assume that after dealing with WedeFs
Brigade the French would, under such circum-
stances, have proceeded to undertake a general
offensive, and that the fortunes of the day might
have been with them.

The close reconnaissance before the decisive
battle must seek, above all things, to obtain an
idea of the grouping of the hostile forces. Herein
lie the conditions of success or failure. To this
end endeavours must be made tiO get far round
the front of the enemy and to observe as many
lines of approach as possible. Rapid and distant
patrol riding and the straining of every nerve
must be demanded in such cases.

>

When the whole force is to be employed, the
army cavalry must endeavour to pave the way
for these patrols. If it has been possible to defeat
the hostile cavalry before the decisive battle,
this will be comparatively easy. Otherwise,
every means must now be employed to bring
about this decision and to carry it to a successful
conclusion, as well as to deal with other troops
which may seek to cover the enemy's flanks.

That the position of the army cavalry for such
duties should not be in rear of a flank of its
own army need scarcely be emphasised. It should
rather strive with all energy to Schelon itself in
advance of the wing of its own army and to

CLOSE RECONNAISSANCE 69

maintain itself on the enemy's flank. It will
thus be in a position during the period of close
reconnaissance to support its own reconnoitring
organs and either to join the battle, or operate
against the flanks and rear of the enemy.^

As to the close reconnaissance patrols and the
combat patrols, as clear and definite orders must
be given them as to the distant patrols to
operate in certain particular, directions or block
certain roads. The arrangements for their return
or relief must leave no room for doubt if it is
desired to be independent of the discretion of
the patrol leader, and to be convinced that the
observation in all important directions is being
carried out.

It will often be necessary, especially during
the period of close reconnaissance in flank or
rear of the enemy, to make the patrols strong
enough to be able to fight their own way, for
it will generally be impossible to support them

* Compare " Unaer Kavallerie im nachsten Kriege " (** Cavalry in
a Future War," translated by Sydney Goldman), and paragraph
522 Cavalry Drill Regulations :

"During a battlcy it is the duty of the army cavalry to operate
against the enemy's flanks and rear, to attack his shaken infantry
and unprotected artillery, to protect the flanks of its own army, and
to prevent hostile reinforcements reaching the field of battle. Accord-
ing to the result of the encounter, it takes up the pursuit or covers
the retirement.

"For such activity, the army cavalry will find opportunities on the
/tanks of the battle field. A position in front of the flank of the
main body will facilitate the attack and, at the same time, con-
stitute a threat. This position is also well adapted for clearing up
the situation,"

70 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

from the rear. Should it be found impossible
otherwise to break through the thick screen of
the hostile service of security, whole squadrons
may operate as patrols, and must exert all their
endurance and speed to attain their object.

When a decision is impending, it is of the
greatest importance that the service of trans-
mission should be especially swift and sure, for
there will be but little time avaiU\ble in which
'to make fresh arrangements to meet any newly
ascertained movement on the part of the enemy.
It will be necessary under such circumstances
to supply even patrols with the light-signal
apparatus, even though there is a danger that
these may be lost. If they are able somewhere
from the rear of the hostile army to flash liack
an important message in time for it to be of use
they will fully have answered their purpose.
It will of course be impossible under such
circumstances to establish permanent stations.
Before the departure of a patrol the men must
be carefully instructed as to the point that will
most probably be chosen as a receiving centre,
and must make a mental note of its position on
the ground, and also of those places from which,
it is hoped to send back intelligence. They must
endeavour to escape the enemy's notice and to
avoid his pursuit. When necessary, they must
be prepared to fight for possession of that
point from which they expect to be able to

CLOSE RECONNAISSANCE 71

transmit reports. That any intelligence trans-
mitted by signal must also be sent to the rear
by a reporting patrol, goes without saying.

In such situations the activity of the cavalry
must be increased to the utmost, and their action
characterised by feverish energy. The last drop of
blood and the latest breath of man and horse must
be devoted to fulfilling the task of reconnaissance.

It is obvious that in such periods of crisis
cavalry cannot go into quarters for the night,
whether in friendly or hostile country. It will
be best for them to remain concealed in woods,
where they will, as a rule, be discovered with
diflBculty. For the rest, the night is the time
which will generally be used for transmitting
reports. In friendly country the assistance of
the inhabitants must be used for this purpose as
much as possible. The enemy must continually
find himself moving in the close meshes of a net
of hostile enterprise. In hostile country it will
be necessary to requisition supplies by force, but
this should never be done in the area in which
observation is required. Where requisitions have
been made in the neighbourhood of the enemy,
patrols should quickly move away, in order not
to be surprised, as Count Zeppelin was in the
Schirlenhof, before the battle of Worth.^

* On July 24, 1870, Captain Count Zeppelin, of the Wiirtemburg
General Staff, with a patrol of 3 Baden officers and 8 dragoons,
crossed the Rhine at Lauterburg, with orders to ascertain certain of
the French dispositions, Beaching Selzbach, after various encounters,

i

72 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

For the reconnaissance on the battlefield
itself — in contradistinction to the energetic action
in the flanks and rear of the enemy — officers pro-
vided with good glasses must be employed. The
scissors telescope, which no higher cavalry leader
should be without, should also be used for this
purpose. Observations should be made, when
possible, from some secure place, and endeavours
made to recognise the moment for action and
intervention in the battle. Observation carried
out by patrols from the front during the battle
of the measures taken by the enemy is unpractical
and only possible in peace, and is a procedure
that is the outcome of the requirements of leaders
lacking in determination, who wish to be con-
tinually informed down to the smallest details
about the enemy, instead of trusting with self-
confidence to the compelling force of their own
measures. Patrol service during the battle itself
is a matter for the infantry, and can be carried
out by no other troops.

and finding it occupied by French cavalry, the patrol took refuge on
the 25th in the little inn at Schirlenhof for a well-earned rest. Here
they were surprised by a squadron of French hussars, who had
received information of their presence from a boy at the inn. The
inhabitants having locked the Germans' horses into the stable,
nothing remained but to fight or surrender. The brave Germans
chose the latter course. Lieutenant Winsloe here killed was the
first casualty of the war on the German side. The whole patrol was
finally killed or captured, with the exception of Count Zeppelin
himself, who escaped on one of the French hussars* horses. This
officer succeeded after a nine hours' ride in winning his way back
across the frontier with valuable information,— fR^^s,

DIVISIONAL RECONNAISSANCE 73

II. RECONNAISSANCE BY THE DIVISIONAL

CAVALRY

Generally speaking, the conduct of the various
reconnoitring organs of the divisional cavalry
will be regulated according to the same principles
as hold good for the army cavalry. As for the
latter, so is it a matter of great importance for
the divisional cavalry whether it is acting in
friendly or in hostile country. Its methods, too,
must be regulated according to its distance from
the enemy. It will also endeavour to establish
a material and moral superiority over the hostile
cavalry. In its relative weakness, however, and
its distribution to the columns of the army
there must lie certain factors which will leave
their stamp upon the conduct of the divisional
cavalry.

First of all it is important what part the
division to which the cavalry belongs plays in
the general scheme. Various cases can be con-
ceived which may have no inconsiderable in-
fluence on the character of the reconnaissance
which the divisional cavalry must carry out

It may belong to a column which is advanc-
ing between others, and where it has but a
comparatively small front for reconnaissance
allotted to it. The army cavalry may be in
front of it. Or it may be given the task of
parrying out the fronts^l reoonnaissftUQe inde-

74 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

pendently. The latter case must be oonsidered
the most usual in a great army, when the con-
centration of the army cavalry in the decisive
direction takes place. Or again, it may belong
to the flank colunm of an advancing army, which
may or may not be covered by the army cavalry.
Finally, it may be part of an independently
operating, more or less detached force, and have to
perform all the cavalry duties for it. In the last
case it will generally be advisable to strengthen
it, if possible, from the army cavalry ; but in any
case its methods will necessarily be of a different
kind.

The most simple case is where the front upon
which the divisional cavalry finds itself is covered
by the army cavalry. It is then most important
to keep up communication with, and to be con-
tinually informed of the intentions of the army
cavalry, in order that the duties of reconnaissance
may be taken over whenever the army cavalry
is compelled to clear the front by a flank move-
ment or to uncover the flank. The reconnoitring
organs of the divisional cavalry must then be
sent forward early enough to effect a relief of
the corresponding detachments of the army
cavalry, so that the service of observation of
the enemy in the first line will not be intei'rupted.

Where the divisional cavalry cannot rely upon
the army cavalry for assistance in reconnaissance
the conditions are different.

DIVISIONAL RECONNAISSANCE 75

This leads to the question of the strategical
exploration . These duties — in contradistinction
to those of the army cavalry — will be distin-
guished by the fact that the divisional cavalry
cannot advance as an independent unit separated
from the mass of infantry, but must remain
in continual conjunction with the detachments
of the other arms to which it belongs. It is,
on the one hand, too weak to be able to
operate independently, and, on the other, is bound
to the column of the other arms by ties of
local service, which at any moment may make
fresh demands upon it. It will therefore not
be denied that the divisional cavalry, if it would
reconnoitre, must cleave to the infantry. Its
method of procedure wiU rather be to advance
from point to point with those portions of its
strength which can be spared from the local
service of the division. In so doing, it must
arrange for support in case of necessity during
the fight from the rear, and can rest at night
covered by the infantry outposts without being
compelled to march to the rear. To take its
own measures for security would make too great
demand upon its strength, and would quickly
deplete it. Only when the distance from the
enemy renders an attack out of the question
can the divisional cavalry remain in advanced
positions. This consideration, also, must have its
due influence on the method of advauce adopted.

76 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

The advance by stages from one point of
vantage to another, according to the map, or
from one defensible locality to another, will be
found advisable. The divisional cavalry, like
the reconnoitring squadrons, should always be
surrounded by a close screen of local patrols,
which will ensure its immediate safety and
concealment.

In this lack of freedom in the conduct of the
divisional cavalry two facts become apparent.
Firstly, that only in very rare cases will the
divisional cavalry be able to clear the way for
its patrols, as the army cavalry will continually
have to do. It is generally indeed too weak to
fight independently with any prospect of success.
It is also, as we have seen, locally dependent,
and cannot advance with full freedom even
where hindrances to the reconnaissance demand
its intervention. Secondly, only in exceptional
cases will it be feasible for the divisional cavalry
to immediately support its patrols by reconnoitring
squadrons.

If the army corps is marching in two columns,
the cavalry of each is obviously too weak to
push forward squadrons of this kind perhaps
several days' march ahead, and, when necessary,
to provide for their relief. Somewhat different
are the conditions of the advance of a corps
upon one road. If it is accompanied by columns
on eaph side, it will generally be possible to

DIVISIONAL RECONNAISSANCE 77

mass the greater part of the cavalry of both
divisions at the head of the corps, and it will
then at times be possible to push forward a
reconnoitring squadron. In the case of a flank
column, however, the cavalry of the rear division
will generally be occupied with securing the
flank, and Mdll therefore not usually be avail-
able for reinforcing the reconnoitring cavalry in
front.

The divisional cavalry will thus usually be able
to detail only weak patrols for the distant recon-
naissance, and these will often have to reckon
with superior hostile cavalry. At least the con-
ditions which obtain in the army of our probable
opponents compel us to make these presumptions.
The reconnoitring patrols of the divisional cavalry
must therefore rely chiefly on cunning and
speed in carrying out their duty, and will only
be able to attack under especially favourable
circumstances, where the enemy whom they meet
has no support behind him, or can be attacked
with obvious advantage. It is far more important
for them than for the patrols of the army cavalry
to gain contact with the enemy unsuspected,
and not to betray their presence. They must
always try first to get distant observation of the
enemy, as they will have no fighting support
behind them to help them to break through the
hostile screen of patrols and win their way to
the head of the enemy's columns. Their reports,

78 EMPLOYMENT IX WAR

also, will have to be brought back through the
enemy's cavalry.

. The distant patrols of the divisional cavalry will
therefore often be obliged, even in their advance,
to avoid the main avenues of approach of the
enemy, as upon them the enemy's cavalry is certain
to be met with. They must use secondary roads,
and as secretly as possible, a matter of consider-
able difficulty in unknown hostile country. To
avoid possible ambush they should retire by a
diflFerent road from that by which they advanced.
They will very rarely be able to get under cover
for the night, especially when in the enemy's
country.

Such duties can only be successfully carried
out, if at all, where the commander has at his
disposal a number of efficient officers and under-
officers, and horses trained to endurance and
cross-country work. In order to be able to
carry out their task properly, the men must be
clever, determined horsemen, well trained in the
use of their weapons, and resourceful. They must
also be absolutely reliable men, who will not
shrink from encountering odds when necessary.
In such patrols as these the cavalry spirit must
be developed to its utmost.

It is a somewhat easier matter if the divisional
cavalry is not confined to a purely frontal and
limited area, but can reconnoitre from the head of
a flank column. It will then get opportunities of

DIVISIONAL EECONNAISSANCE 79

obtaining observation by moving round the enemy's
outer flank. It will, however, only succeed in
obtaining and transmitting intelligence by wide
detours, and the demands on the endurance of
man and horse will be great in proportion. It is
obvious how necessary it will be, under such
circumstances, that the intelligence so hardly
won should at least be transmitted quickly and
safely. Some detachment must therefore be de-
tailed to perform the duties of the reporting or
communicating station usually formed by a re-
connoitring squadron. I see nothing for it but to
devote bodies of cyclists to this purpose, which
can be pushed forward as reporting centres on
the main avenues, and equipped, whenever pos-
sible, with the light-signal apparatus. A few
mounted men must be sent with them for scouting
purposes. Without these, they would be confined
to the roads for the close reconnaissance of the sur-
rounding country, a procedure which would not
suffice in the face of a determined enemy, especi-
ally in difficult country.

Besides the distant reconnaissance, the close
reconnaissance along by far the greater part of
the front of the army falls to the lot of the
divisional cavalry. As we have seen, the army
cavalry will only in exceptional cases be able to
support it in this task as, on the near approach
of the enemy, it will probably have occasion to
draw oflF to a flank. But nowadays this close

80 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

reconnaissance appears, by reason of the increased
distances and the greater range of firearms, to
have become considerably more difficult. Hostile
armies move to battle nowadays on a front of
50 to 100 miles.

That it has naturally become much more difficult
under such circumstances to estimate the enemy's
strength and to obtain the necessary knowledge
of his dispositions and of the ground, no further
proof is needed. It thus becomes possible for the
cavalryman in general to get no closer to the
enemy than his rifle will carry, and to be com-
pelled to observe him from a distance. There
should be no mistake about this.

The importance of observation has grown in
proportion to its difficulty. Troops nowadays have
to be deployed for the fight at long ranges, where
it is practically out of the question that a com-
mander will be able to survey the enemy and
the country with his own eyes, as was formerly
almost invariably the case. Should, for example,
the opponents be advancing towards each other
and still 5 miles apart, another 1;^ miles will
bring them into effective artillery range of each
other. If they are going to wait to deploy until
they reach this point, the deployment will have
to be completed under the fire of the enemy's
guns, a thing which, of all others, is to be avoided.
It therefore follows that in a battle of encounter
deployment should take place, at the latest.

DIVISIONAL RECONNAISSANCE 81

when still 5 miles distant from the enemy. It
is better to begin to draw the forces apart even
earlier, so that the army is already deployed
when it moves into the range of the enemy's
shrapnel.

Under these circumstances it will usually be
quite impossible for the leader to make his dis-
positions according to his personal observations.
He is, rather, almost entirely dependent in his
appreciation of the enemy on the reconnaissance
of the cavalry, and may find himself at a great
disadvantage if tliis should fail or lead him to
erroneous conclusions.

Reports as to the character of the country,
suitable positions for artillery, decisive localities
or points, thus increase greatly in importance,
and it is obviously most necessary for cavalry
officers to be able judiciously to appreciate such
matters and to report them clearly and intelli-
gibly. The tactical conduct, and at the same
time tactical success, will often be as dependent
on the tactical reconnaissance of the divisional
cavalry as- the strategical measures of the com-
mander-in-chief are upon the results of the
strategical exploration of the army cavalry.

Tactically and strategically the service of the
divisional cavalry is of equal importance if it
belongs to a force operating independently. In
such cases it will often be obliged to move with
more freedom than when employed in purely

6

82 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

frontal reconnaissance with the main army. For
rest, also, it will not always be able to seek the
protection of the infantry, but will frequently
have to be pushed out for the night on the
flanks, in order to secure the main body while
at rest from these directions, or the better to
observe the enemy. It should, however, never
lose its immediate connection with its force, and
will therefore not always be in a position to
measure its strength with any hostile cavalry that
may be met during the period of reconnaissance.

When the tactical decision is in prospect, or
when contact has been gained between the
opposing forces, the divisional cavalry must re-
double its efforts in reconnaissance. It is then
a matter for it to reconnoitre from the flanks,
and such reconnaissance can only be successful,
as in the case of the army cavalry, if those
portions of the country are occupied from which
it is possible to observe the movements and dis-
positions of the enemy.

It is quite wrong to hang on the flank of the
infantry, as is unfortunately often done in peace
manoeuvres, and to remain wherever possible under
its protection, and to expect to force recon-
naissance merely by sending out a number of
patrols.

In such a situation patrols have generally small
prospect of success. They will most frequently
come in contact with the hostile screen, which

DIVISIONAL RECONNAISSANCE 83

will prevent them gaining the decisive points
of the terrain, and can hinder the despatch-
riders but too easily from finding their way to
the rear. It is more than questionable under
such circumstances whether it will be possible
to gain any observation at all, or to send back
information in time to be of use. In these
moments of crisis, which will be of comparatively
short duration, rude force can alone avail, and
recourse must be had to the sword. The artillery
patrols, too, will only find it possible to recon-
noitre successfully under the wing of a victorious
cavalry. Their efforts will otherwise have little
prospect of success.

Speaking generally, the reconnaissance must
remain entirely in the hands of the cavalry
leader who arranges it. Should the commander-
in-chief interfere without due cause in his dis-
positions, he deprives him of responsibility and
interrupts that systematic conduct of the recon-
naissance which is absolutely essential if the
strength of the divisional cavalry is to be equal
to its task.

Reports, too, should, as a general rule, be sent
to that unit of the cavalry from which the
patrol is found, and which forms the reporting
centre of the patrol. On the other hand, it is
the duty of the cavalry leader to remain in com-
munication with the Supreme Command by using
all means at his disposal, even relays when neces-

84 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

sary, so that all reports may reach the latter by
the shortest route. Only exceptionally should
patrols report direct to the supreme command,
that is to say, when to send their messages
through their own cavalry means a useless detour
or a danger.

This particular method can, however, only be
carried out in practice if the patrol is in con-
tinual communication with the cavalry from which
it is found. This circumstance indicates also the
necessity for detachments that are not limited in
their zone of operation to advance during the
fight against the enemy's flank, so that they
may remain as close as possible behind their own
patrols, continually prepared to support them and
to hamper the hostile efforts at reconnaissance.

It does not appear advisable under such cir-
cumstances to unite all the available cavalry on
one wing. It is certainly obvious that its main
strength must be concentrated in what is con-
sidered the decisive direction, in order that it
may be as strong as possible on the field of battle.
This desire, however, should not go so far as to
denude one flank wholly of cavalry. This flank
would then be completely laid bare to the enemy's
observation, and would itself be deprived of the
possibility of ascertaining what was going on on
the enemy's side. It is much more advisable to
provide upon each flank a centre of reconnais-
sance, even if such consists of quite a weak

THE SCREEN 85

detachment of cavalry, which will act as a reserve
for patrols and a reporting centre. The offensive
cannot, of course, be undertaken on the flank
where the cavalry is weak, but reconnaissance
must be carried out by patrols of scouts, and
other action limited generally to keeping the
enemy's patrols at a distance.

III. THE SCREEN

The idea of the screen is first touched on in
the " Field Service Manual " of 1908 ; it is also,
however, demanded by the conditions of modern
war. For however important it may be to gain
early intelligence as to the enemy in order there-
by to be able to make the necessary dispositions,
it is naturally just as important to deprive him
of this advantage. Reflection and experience
have shown that although the measures of re-
connaissance considerably assist the screening if
the enemy's cavalry is defeated, they are not
of themselves sufficient to secure the army from
hostile observation.

The " Field Service Manual " sums up, I think,
the chief considerations as regards screening,
for the most part to the point, especially where
it deals with the defensive screen. There are
no war experiences in modern times of this
matter, and, according to my opinion, peace ex-
periences are not comprehensive enough to allow

86 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

of any appreciable amplification of the "Field
Service Manual."

At the same time I would draw attention to
some of the points which give occasion for further
research and reflection.

In the first place, I think that what the " Field
Service Manual " says as to oflFensive screens
requires some explanation. Strong cavalry will
be concentrated to keep the enemy at a distance
from our own army. In addition to this, strong
patrols and even cyclist detachments advance
along all roads in order to throw back the hostile
patrols. These arrangements can only apply,
as a rule, for portions of the armj/ cavalry.
They presuppose, especially if the front of the
modern army is to be screened, a mass of cavalry
which could with difficulty be found from the
divisional cavalry. By such methods, moreover,
as long as strong cyclist detachments are not
available for blocking the road communications,
a cause of dissension will always arise as to how
much strength can be used for blocking the roads
and how much concentrated for battle, all the
more so as the divisional cavalry can only with
difficulty be used in this kind of screen.

The latter must, as we have seen, remain more
or less locally tied to the division. The army
cavalry, however, if it will undertake an oflPensive
screen, must advance against the enemy, seek
him out; force him back as far as possible from

THE SCREEN 87

our own army, and endeavour to defeat him. For
this task complete freedom of movement is neces-
sary — not only for itself, but also for the screen
of patrols that will accompany it. The divisional
cavalry will thus generally only be able to form a
second screening line behind the veil formed by
the advancing army cavalry, and will not be in a
position to spare for it patrols for the blocking
of roads. Nor is it at all clear where the cyclist
troops mentioned are to come from.

I am therefore inclined to think that the pro-
cedure advocated by the " Field Service Manual "
can only be carried out in exceptional cases;
and it would perhaps be' advisable to alter it
somewhat.

The principal task of the offensive screen is,
according to my opinion, to defeat the hostile
cavalry; and for this object all available force
must be concentrated, for one cannot be too
strong upon the field of battle. Even such cyclist
detachments as are available will be best used
by bringing them up for the fight. The blocking
of roads, on the other hand, will, as a rule, be
only undertaken when the enemy's cavalry has
been beaten and thrown back. The screen of
patrols can then be strengthened. But it must
be quite clearly understood that troops are not
to be simply disposed in a cordon; but that a
sufficiently strong force must still remain in touch
with the beaten enemy in order to prevQilt him,

88 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

at all events, from taking up the offensive again,
and breaking through the screen.

Until this moment of victory over the hostile
cavalry the duties of screening must be left to
the reconnoitring organs and to the divisional
cavalry of the army which is following in rear
of them.

According to the principles laid down in the
** Field Service Manual " it is to the divisional
cavalry that the task invariably falls of screening
the movements of its division. I think that these
duties cannot always be clearly regulated accord-
ing to the idea of an offensive or defensive screen ;
they will more often be of a mixed nature. As
far as its strength will admit, the divisional
cavalry will endeavour to carry out the task by
pushing back, by fighting, the hostile recon-
noitring patrols and detachments before these
have succeeded in gaining observation. As it is
more or less locally confined to its own front,
and will certainly often have to do with an
opponent of superior strength, it will, on the
other hand, frequently be obliged to join battle
for favourable localities dismounted, supported
whenever possible by machine-guns and cyclists
from the infantry. In situations where the
divisional cavalry cannot undertake an offensive
fight against the superiority of the enemy, and
can find no points d'appui in the terrain, it must
try all the more to block the roads with patrols

THE SCREEN 89

which will attack all hostile patrols with the
utmost determination, and endeavonr to capture
their despatch-riders. The divisional cavalry
must show the greatest boldness and judgment
if it will carry out this task. The great import-
ance of its r61e in the army here again becomes
obvious.

The army cavalry will only undertake an
offensive screen when the army is advancing, and
where the country does not afford suitable localities
for the establishment of a defensive screen.

Such a screen (defensive), which can eventually
be pushed forward from one area to another, is
without doubt, as is emphasised by the "Field
Service Manual,^' of much more use than an
offensive screen.

Of great importance in a defensive screen is,
first and foremost, the nature of the obstacles on
which it is based. Watercourses and canals,
which can only be crossed by bridges, form the
best of these. Extensive woods, however, lend
themselves easily to the purpose. They are
doubtless, for cavalry patrols, a most unpleasant
obstacle, as view is restricted in them, and an
ambush may lurk behind every tree. In the
campaign of 1870-71 the German cavalry patrols
were, as far as I could ascertain, quite unable
to penetrate into the wood of Orleans and
that at Marchenoir. These woods, by their mere
existence, formed an effective screen.

90 . EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

To utilise woods for this purpose it will be
necessary, according to the circumstances, the
depth and nature of the wood, to post the fighting
detachments of the screening line either at the
exit of the defile on the enemy*s side or more
towards the defender's side on the inner edge of
the wood, if they can there find a good field of
fire. In any case the opposite edge of the wood
should be occupied by observation-posts ; in order,
in the first case, to get knowledge of and to
neutralise any hostile patrol which may, in spite
of all difficulties, have penetrated the wood, as
soon as they emerge ; and, in the second, to get
e^j'ly information of the entrance of hostile de-
tachments into the wood, and to be able to hinder,
report, and observe their further advance.

I think that penetration of such a screen is
generally considered to be easier than it really is,
especially if the defending cavalry is supported
by cyclists, machine-guns, and even artillery.
According to my opinion, reconnoitring squadrons
would only, under favourable circumstances, be
able to break through such a line that has
been well disposed, and, even if successful in so
doing, would find it even more difficult to return.
It should never be forgotten that to overcome
well-placed posts, defending themselves with fire
action, requires a great superiority of force ; that
a squadron can only overcome quite weak de-
tachments so placed, and will, if successful, very

THE SCREEN 91

soon find itself confronted by a superior force
of the enemy's reserves. Single patrols of picked
scouts^ may perhaps creep through, but their return
will be problematical unless they are strongly sup-
ported from the rear. It will therefore generally
require strong forces of the army cavalry to break
through a well-organised screening line composed
of moderately strong cavalry detachments, and
to maintain the breach so made long enough to
carry out the object of the reconnaissance. The
place where the screen is broken must in all cases,
even where the main body of the victorious re-
connoitring cavalry is obliged to advance farther,
be so strongly occupied that it will under all
circumstances remain open for the service of
transmission and for the eventual retirement.
' The greater the advantages of a defensive
screen, the more must the divisional cavalry
naturally endeavour to avail itself of it, in order
to compensate in some measure for its numerical
weakness. It will always seek, even during the
advance of the army, to choose such favourable
areas for an occasional halt, and to reach them by
advancing in hands successifs. Such procedure
will facilitate at the same time the carrying out
of its duties of screening and of warding off
hostile detachments by defensive action. In order
to secure the greatest possible effect for such
action a siniilar procedure as regards time and
space must be arranged with the cavalry of

92 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

neighbouring columns^ or ordered by superior
authority.

During the night, when it is not possible to
occupy advanced areas, the divisional cavalry
should try to assist the screen by being so disposed
that detached posts will lie on the main road in
advance of the infantry outposts and at crossroads
and defiles, with a view to capturing the enemy's
patrols. The erection of temporary obstacles,
particularly of wire, will considerably assist
this action. In friendly country the inhabitants
will be able to co-operate in this, and, by judicious
conduct and the procuring of timely and sufficient
intelligence, may be of great use to the force.
In erecting such obstacles it must always be
remembered that our own advanced patrols should
be warned of them, or that by some kind of pre-
arranged mark upon the road they should be made
aware of their presence when returning with
reports through their own line. It scarcely needs
to be emphasised that such measures should be
made use of by the army cavalry as well as by
the divisional cavalry, in order to increase their
own safety at night.

IV. RAIDS

The idea of the raid has been taken from the
American War of Secession. Our new Begulations
designate such undertakings as '* Streifziige *'

RAIDS 93

(527)/ and do not appear to attach overmuch
importance to them. Their use is only advocated
if a superfluity of cavalry is at hand. They
should not, it is said, distract the cavalry from
their own duties or from co-operating in the
hattle (395).'

Whether one agrees with this estimation of the
value of such enterprises naturally depends upon
the view taken of the co-operation of cavalry in
the battle and the general conception of the con-
ditions of modern war. It appears to me that
the importance of such undertakings has increased
in the same measure as the value of cavalry on
the main battlefield has diminished.

The great size of modern armies renders it,
generally speaking, impossible for them to live
on the country. A modern army marching once
through the richest country will nowadays almost
completely exhaust its resources, and yet the
supplies carried will scarcely suflBce to feed the
columns during a protracted movement. Armies
are far more dependent than formerly on the
supplies from the rear — more, indeed, than in the

* "Enterprises of long duration by large bodies of cavalry
against the enemy's lines of communication separate them from their
principal duties. Such raids are to be undertaken only when cavalry
is redundant. Sufficient ammunition and supplies must be carefully
arranged for."

' " Attempts on the more distant hostile communications may
produce valuable results ; but they must not distract the cavalry
from its true battle objectives. In the event of an engagement,
co-operation with a view to victory must be the watchword of every
formation, wheth ^r great or small."

94 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

time of Frederick the Great. In those days, if
the bread-wagons ran short, it was possible to fill
up from the country. The armies were never
so great that this became impossible. The cavalry,
indeed, devoted most of its time to foraging, and
the soldier frequently bought his supplies, all
except his bread, on the spot.

Nowadays the circumstances are quite changed.
It is out of the question for the horses of the
modern army to find the necessary forage in the
country itself. That the men of the great armies
of the present day can supply themselves when
rations run out remains to be proved. On paper
it is indeed often possible, taking into considera-
tion the supplies available in peace ; but these
calculations cannot hold good for a real theatre
of war where concentration has claimed all
available resources.

Of the straits to which a great army may be
reduced when supplies really give out, the cam-
paign of 1812 in Russia is a good example.
There, even during the advance to Moscow,
Napoleon's army practically dissolved owing to
lack of supplies. Only some 90,000 men of the
mighty host arrived in Moscow ; only these
perished during the retreat. How fearfully the
Napoleonic armies suffered and melted away owing
to want of supplies gives cause for reflection.
In the armies of millions of the present day such
conditions become still more perilous. Matters

RAIDS 95

appertaining to ammunition are of equal import-
ance. The modern army carries enormous masses
of artillery with it. All the guns are designed
for a vast expenditure of ammunition, and the
rafale from covered positions and against covered
positions will indeed make this necessary. Modern
infantry, too, is armed in a manner that will entail
a prodigious expenditure of cartridges. The re-
placement of this expended ammunition is of vital
importance. Railways will have to be laid in
rear of the armies • to cope with these demands.
Long trains of wagons and automobiles will move
to and fro behind them. On every high-road
and in every railway-station magazines will
appear, and all operations must come to a
standstill and miscarry as soon as this great
organisation ceases from any cause to carry out
its functions.

I hold, therefore, that such circumstances render
a disturbance of the rear communications of an
army an important matter. It will often do the
opponent more damage, and contribute more to
a favourable decision of arms than the inter-
vention of a few cavalry divisions in the decisive
battle itself.

The one does not, of course, exclude the
possibility of the other. General Stuart, in
the campaign of Gettysburg, rode all round the
hostile army, broke up its communications, drew
hostile troops away from the decisive point, and

96 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

was yet in his place on the wing of the army
on the day of hattle. What this man performed
with cavalry and the inestimable damage he
inflicted on his opponent are worth studying. The
fortune of war, which lay in might and in the
nature of things, he could not turn. Nor could
he bring the advance of an army to a standstill,
because at that period and under those circum-
stances it was possible for the army of the North
to live, at least for a time, upon the country.
If we regard his achievement by the light of
modern conditions, we shall certainly not fall into
the error of underestimating the value of such
enterprises. If we compare it with the perform-
ances of cavalry upon the battlefield in the latest
war, we will be able to obtain a true impression
of the degree of importance of modern cavalry
action.

I am inclined to think that such enterprises
will be of altogether extraordinary significance in
a future war ; least so, perhaps, during the
earlier battles resulting from the concentration,
when it will be difficult to get round the flanks
of the enemy, but more so during the sub-
sequent course of operations. We have only to
imagine what the decisive consequences must
have been if General von Werder, and, later.
General von Manteuffel, had been in a position to
continually interrupt the rear communications of
the army of Bourbaki. In all probability the

feAlDS 97

latter must have capitulated long before it reached
the Swiss frontier, always granting that it was
successful in getting so far as the battle-field of
the Lisaine. The whole crisis of this campaign,
which was very nearly ending in the defeat of the
Germans, would thus possibly have been avoided.

There are plenty of examples of this. To indi-
cate only one from the history of the latest war,
I would call to mind the undertaking of the
Russians against the rear communications of the
Japanese army.

If this undertaking had been actually directed
against the only railway at the disposal of the
Japanese army, if it had been carried through by
throwing into the scale the whole fighting strength
of a really mobile and eflBcient cavalry, and if
it had thereby succeeded in interrupting the
supplies of the Japanese army for a period, the
whole course of the campaign might have been
changed. Victory in this tremendous conflict
hung continually in the balance, and it needed
but little more weight on either side to turn the
scale of the fortunes of war.

The importance of such raids in modern war
should not therefore, in my opinion, be under-
estimated. They are capable rather of exercising
enormous influence on the course of events.

Rules, however, cannot be laid down for their
conduct. The Regulations indicate, shortly, that
attention must be paid to the transport of

7

98 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

suflScient ammunition and supplies, and here^
indeed, move in the right direction. It is abso-
lutely indispensable that a cavalry mass destined
to carry out such an enterprise should be inde-
pendent of what it may find in the country and
be perfectly free of movement.

The supply and ammunition columns, however,
which accompany it, must also be so mobile that
they are able to follow the troops closely, even at
a rapid pace, as otherwise they will run the
danger of falling into the hands of the enemy.
The whole force designed for the enterprise must
be able to advance rapidly as a concrete whole,
and should not be allowed to take up too much
room. Resources found upon the enemy's lines
of communication and magazines captured must
be used for the sustenance of the troops as far as
possible. It will then be able to reserve the
supplies carried for critical times or for a further
turning movement. Any of the enemy's supplies
which are not used must be ruthlessly laid
waste. His railways and magazines, particularly
any important engineering structures, must be
thoroughly destroyed, the necessary explosives
being carried in sufficient quantities.

In contrast to Stuart's raids, however, one
must count on meeting not inconsiderable bodies
of the enemy's communication troops, which will
probably be capable of rapid reinforcement. This
entails corresponding preventive measures.

RAIDS 99

Hostile cavalry sent to secure the safety of the
communications will generally have to be attacked
in a determined manner. It may sometimes,
however, be more advantageous to avoid it by
rapid marching. For the rest, the factor of
surprise is of decisive importance. Should the
enemy early become aware of the approach, he
will generally be in a position to bring up fresh
forces, often by rail, and thereby imperil the
success of the whole undertaking. Under such cir-
cumstances a covered approach, perhaps by night,
careful screening, and the interruption of the
enemy's telegraph-lines and transmission service
are matters to which special attention must be paid.
It is also a matter of consideration in the attack on
communications and railways to destroy them at a
sufficient distance above and below the objective
by means of detachments deflected for that purpose,
so that the enemy may be prevented from bringing
up reinforcements. If the direction of the attack
is fixed upon and assured, and if approach and
deployment have been successfully effected unob-
served, the attack must from the first be carried
through with sufficient fire-power and energy to
allow the enemy no time for reflection.

It is therefore absolutely necessary that troops
engaged in a raid should be of sufficient fighting
strength to be able rapidly to break down any
resistance. The scanty strength of a division of
six regiments is much too small for such an

100 EMPLOYMENT IN WAU

undertaking in modern war. Stronger divisions
must be formed for the purpose, and strengthened
when necessary by cyclist battalions. An enter-
prise of this kind also requires thorough preparation,
especially by an extensive system of espionage
which will amplify the results of the cavalry
reconnaissance. Before such a raid is undertaken
all possible information must be to hand as to the
conditions in the rear of the hostile army. Mobile
light bridging equipment should accompany the
expedition, with the necessary complement of
mounted engineers. During the advance the
cavalry should be surrounded by a screen of
patrols, not too far distant from it, so that the
enemy will not too early become aware of the
expedition, and yet at the same time far enough
to guard against surprise. After a successfal
surprise the force should withdraw with the same
speed in order to escape from the enemy's counter-
measures. Finally, the chief safety of such en-
terprises lies in their daring.

The leader of such a raid should be minutely
instructed as to the advance and intended opera-
tions of his own army, so that he may be able
to calculate when and where the decisive collision
between the opposing armies will take place. He
must regulate his own movements accordingly.
As long as the two armies are still distant from
each other he can strike the enemy's communica-
tions far to the rear, destroying railways and

.J ^ -M m 9 *

RAIDS ---• ' 'lOl-

magazines. The nearer, however, the opponent
approaches to his own army, the more closely must
he endeavour to hang on the rear of the hostile
troops and to interrupt the supply of the immediate
necessities, that is to say, to destroy the supply
and ammunition columns of the army corps, and
to capture the provision and baggage wagons of
the troops. If circumstances demand, he must be
able to appear upon the battlefield itself on the
day of battle.

Keen perception and foresight, rapid decision,
and relentless energy are indispensable qualities to
the leader of such a raid. The ability to mystify
and mislead the enemy will greatly facilitate the
carrying out of the enterprise. A considerable
measure of cavalry ability is, at the same time,
necessary to ensure proper horse management. A
combination of all these qualities goes to form the
great cavalry leader, before whom, even in modern
war, lie great prospects of distinction, if he but
understands how to break loose from the routine
and pedantry of the day.

B. THE ACTION OF CAVALRY
I. G£NEEAL

As I have already indicated, the action of
cavalry in the fight may be divided, according
to its character, into two quite distinct groups ^ —

* Compare ** Cavalry in Future Wars," chapter on Tfictical Lead-
ing in Mounted Combats,

I • • • ♦ • •

• «•••• •

••''••*1<)S-- ''-S'lftPLOYMENT IN WAR

i.e. the fight of cavalry acting independently,
and to which is detailed only a small proportion
of the other arms ; and the intervention of cavalry
in the battle — in the great decision of the other
arms.

It has been proposed, even for the cavalry, to
divide tactical principles according to the idea
of the prearranged battle and the battle of en-
counter. I do not however think that this
grouping will meet the case. In a great battle
the fighting is always of a prearranged nature ;
in the fight of the independent cavalry it is
possible to distinguish between an encounter and
an arranged affair. On the other hand, the con-
ditions of prearranged action in a battle and in
an independent conflict of the cavalry are quite
different, and cannot be examined from a single
point of view.

The grouping, then, proposed by me is still that
which best corresponds to the actual circum-
stances. In this grouping, in the first case, the
cavalry appears as the chief arm, whose spirit and
character set the tone of the whole nature of the
fight ; in the second, it is merely an auxiliary, and
must conform to the law of the other arms in
great matters and small.

But the fight is deeply influenced, even in the
first case, by the co-operation of these other arms,
and I believe that only in exceptional cases will a
purely cavalry combat take place, at all events on

GENERAL 103

a large scale. Where squadrons, regiments, and
perhaps even brigades unassisted by the other
arms, come into collision with each other, the
charge may still often suflfice for a decision. But
where it is an affair of larger masses it will never
be possible to dispense with the co-operation of
firearms, and in .most cases a combination of
cavalry combat, of dismounted fighting and artil-
lery action, will ensue.

We must not conceal from ourselves the fact
that in a future war it will by no means be
always a matter of choice whether we will fight
mounted or dismounted . Rather, by himself seizing
the rifle, will the opponent be able to compel us
to adopt dismounted action. On our manoeuvre-
grounds the charge on horseback is always the
order of the day, even against artillery or machine-
guns. The umpires continually allow such attacks
to succeed, and the troops ride on as if nothing had
happened. Equally fearless of consequences do
they expose themselves to rifle-fire. But there are
no bullets.

In real war it is different. Even then many a
charge will naturally be successful, but victory
will mean such sacrifices that the troops will often
become too weak to carry out their further tactical
and strategical duties. Such losses will not be
incurred without necessity, and troops will give
way, where possible, or themselves adopt dis-
inouijted action, Tb^ last will often indeed be

104 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

necessary, as space and time will frequently be
wanting for a turning movement, and even if such
a movement were undertaken it would often lead
to a fresh obligation to fight on foot in another
place. This was repeatedly proved by the events
of the campaign of 1870-71. Again and again
was it necessary to detail infantry to the cavalry
divisions in order to brush aside by offensive
action resistance that hindered the advance of the
cavalry, and which could not be broken down even
by the horse artillery which accompanied it.

That the English in the South African war
were finally repeatedly successful in forcing the
mounted Boers back by turning movements with-
out actual attacks proves nothing for European
conditions. The explanation lies in the clumsiness
of the Boers, who were hampered for rapid move-
ment by their wagons and possessed no offensive
strength of any kind, at least during the decisive
portion of the campaign. Otherwise they could
easily have anticipated the efforts of the English
at a turning movement by the shortest line, or
would have been able by taking the offensive
to punish the dispersion that the turning move-
ment entailed. We must not fall into any mis-
conception of the fact that turning movements
always contain an element of danger and can
often bring about very unfavourable situations.
They lay bare our own communications or lead to
dangerous dispersion of force. Jt is necessary too^

GENERAL 106

not only to %ee behind the enemy, but also to
defeat him, in order to gain a free hand for
reconnaissance. To this end we will have to
attack, and often on foot, as we may be quite
sure that our possible opponent will use the
rifle.

Circumstances have distinctly altered since
1870-71. If we had at that time no real cavalry
opponent to face, we may yet be certain next
time of having to deal with a numerous and
determined cavalry who will quite conceivably
endeavour to meet us in shock action with the
amie blanche. There will always be dashing
soldierly natures everywhere who will make a
bid for success by risking all. Whether the
hostile cavalry, once beaten, will return to the
attack, is more than doubtful. I do not think so.

It lies deeply embedded in human nature that
he who feels himself the weaker will act on the
defensive. Both opponents will often endeavour
to exploit the advantages of the defensive. It
frequently happens during manoeuvres that the
cavalry endeavours to seize some commanding
position, and so force the enemy to attack it
under the fire of artillery posted there. The
other side, however, may make corresponding
endeavours. An indecisive artillery duel is the
usual result of such efforts. But if such action
is frequent in peace, how much more frequent
>«riU it be uftcjcr the pressure of responsibility

106 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

which war brings with it, especially where one
side is tactically the weaker?

It requires an enormous moral strength, per-
sonal influence over troops, and firmness of
character to be able to maintain the offensive
spirit, even after an unfavourable conflict, and
continually to invoke the ultimate decision anew.
In general, it may be relied upon that defence will
be carried out according to tactical defensive prin-
ciples, and that with the firearm. There can be
no doubt upon that point to those who have studied
human nature by the light of military history.

Our probable opponents, too, will certainly
often advance dismounted. At all events they
are endeavouring to strengthen cavalry divisions
by cyclist battalions and infantry, and perhaps
by mounted infantry, and thereby already show
a remarkable inclination to conduct the fight,
even of cavalry, with the firearm, and only to use
their horses as a means of mobility, as was the
custom of the Boers in Africa.

The r61e of cavalry in the fight will then ap-
parently consist of a combination of the various
methods of fighting. In explanation of this view
I would cite a well-known example.

The task of the German army cavalry in the
battle of Mars la Tour was to relieve the left
flank of the German army by a determined attack
against the right of the French, and thus to
bring the apprehended adyauQC qt the enemy tq

GENERAL 107

a standstill. It did not accomplish this task, but
was satisfied with trying conclusions with the
French cavalry ; but did not either win a decisive
victory over the latter nor reap the necessary
tactical benefit from the action. It certainly
maintained its superiority over the enemy, but
it made no attempt to interfere decisively in the
course of the battle itself. This honour was left
to the 1st Dragoon Guards.

But if we assume for a moment that this
cavalry, after driving the French from the field,
had made an attempt to operate further against
the right flank of the French army, Cissey's
Division, how would matters have stood?

The French infantry had occupied the Gr6y6re
Farm as a support to their right flank. The
Chasseurs d'Afrique, on the other hand, who
initiated the cavalry fight, retired after they had
been beaten by the 13th Dragoons in a northerly
direction, and occupied with dismounted fire the
southern edge of a small wood near Ville sur
Yron, which the French call Bois de la Grange
and the German official history Bois de Gr^y^re.
It is bordered on the south by the plateau of Ville
sur Yron. The dismounted Chasseurs here formed
an Echelon behind the right flank of the French
infantry.

How should the German cavalry have acted
under such circumstances in order to gain contact
with the right flank of the French infantry so

108 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

protected ? The strongly occupied Grey^re Farm
commanded the crossing of the Fond de la Cuve,
which stretches in a northerly direction from
Mars la Tour towards Chd^teau Moncel, while to the
north the wood occupied hy the Chasseurs limited
freedom of movement. What else remained but
a determined attack of both objectives and their
capture, and that on foot ? Artillery alone would
not have sufficed against the Grey^re Farm, for this
point would have had to be strongly occupied with
riflemen, and nowadays also with machine-guns,
before the crossing of the Fond de la Cuve which
the farm commanded, and which divided our cavalry
from the French infantry, could be accomplished.

We can thus see tliat even in the action of
cavalry in battle the combination of the several
methods of fighting can scarcely, if ever, be
avoided. In flank and rear, also, the opponent will
endeavour to secure himself by occupying points
of support as soon as he becomes aware of our in-
tention to operate in these directions. Our cavalry
must thus be continually prepared to pave the way
by dismounted action for the mounted combat.

Our new Regulations -mention quite incidentally
(390) ' that cavalry will often have to combine

* "By reason of its fire-arms, cavalry is capable also of dUs-
mounted action It is thus in a position — and especially so when
supported by horse artillery and machine-guns— to offer resistance
to detachments of all arms, or to cause them serious loss by
unexpected fire-action. Nor need it refrain from attack, should the
situation require it. It will often h^^ve to combiqe dismounted with
j3^ou|ited iictioiu"

GENERAL lOd

mounted and dismounted action, that "on occa-
sions " also, in combination with shock action,
dismounted cavalry must be ready to hold sup-
porting points to cover deployment or to co-
operate in the engagement (438)/

I do not think that this passing mention of the
importance of combination of the two methods of
fighting of the cavalry suflSiciently emphasises the
matter. After due reflection over all the circum-
stances appertaining to the question, I am, on the
other hand, firmly convinced that the mutual
relationship between the fight on foot and on
horseback will give the modern cavalry combat
its peculiar character. This relationship will
always have to be reckoned with, and all tactical
considerations must be guided by it.

In my opinion all the principles of cavalry
tactics should spring from this co-operation of the
several methods of fighting and not from its
attitude towards the various arms considered
separately. The modern battle suffers no division
of the action of one arm, or of one manner of
fighting from another. As every kind of country
has to be utilised for the fight, so also must the
most varied kind of action of the arms be taken

* " In combination with the cavalry combat, the fire effect of the
carbine may be employed on occasions. Thus the occupation of
paints'd^appid by portions of the advanced guard may often pro-
vide favourable and, at times, indispensable preliminaries to the
deployment of a division. The support of carbine fire may be
possible and useful even during contact."

110 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

into account. It must, of course, be clearly
established how these can best be applied against
the various adversaries — cavalry, artillery, or
infantry. Such reflections, however, can refer
only to tactical formations. On the other hand,
as soon as it becomes a question of tactical lead-
ing, such combination of all arms must, from
the first, be taken into account as war may
demand.

Military history affords us vivid examples of
such co-operation of the arms in a cavalry fight,
not, indeed, in a European theatre of war, but in
the Civil War in America. They are woven,
above all, round the heroic figure of General
** Jeb" Stuart, and if weapons and other circum-
stances of the time and place were different to
those obtaining in Europe to-day, the principle of
action has still remained the same.

"Soon after the outbreak of the war Stuart
distinguished himself as a cavalry leader, and his
strategical work in blindfolding the enemy and in
enlightening his own army has never been sur-
passed. As a cavalry tactician he is not only the
first, but hitherto the only, leader of the arm who
understood how to combine the effects of fire and
shock, how to render effective service in fighting
on foot without losing the power to strike on
horseback when opportunity offered."^

There, indeed, was a man worthy of emulation.

* " The Crisis of the Confederacy," by Cecil Battine.

GENERAL 111

We must, I think, be resolute in freeing our-
selves from all old-fashioned conceptions of those
knightly cavalry combats which have in reality
become obsolete owing to the necessities of modern
war. We do not in this need to break with our
ancient and honoured traditions, for the spirit
of tradition consists not in the retention of
antiquated forms, but in acting in that spirit which
in the past led to such glorious success. But this
spirit points to the road of progress and bids us
not allow ourselves to be urged by events, but,
hurrying before them, to gain a start in develop-
ment and therewith a decisive advantage over
our enemies. To maintain in the troops, under
modem conditions, the spirit of discipline and
independence, and of the greatest effort and self-
sacrifice, that is the old Prussian tradition, and
not the adherence to dead forms, which in our
history has been bloodily enough avenged.

This principle has been embraced in all the
other spheres of military development; it is
only the cavalry that has remained behind the
times.

In order to be able to deal with the functions
of the mounted arm in accordance with the old
Prussian principles, we must try to get a clear
and unprejudiced conception of the spirit of
the modern cavalry combat. We must look
forward and pierce the veil of the future
uninfluenced by the ghosts of the past. The

112 EMPLOYMENT iN WAR

probable events and conditions of the modern
battle must be our guiding star, and when we
have realised how the spirit of cavalry may
be adapted to them, how the results of modern
technical improvements in arms influence and
strengthen the action of the cavalry masses,
then alone can we lay down principles for the
conduct and tactics of cavalry in the fight.

II. ATTACK AND DEFENCE

Mobility is that prominent characteristic of the
cavalry on which the justification of its existence
is chiefly based. That it is able to come into
action rapidly at distant points, and to observe
the enemy while still afar oflF, makes it indis-
pensable in the composition of an army. Any-
thing that hinders its free mobility militates against
its purpose and its characteristics. Nothing,
therefore, is more justifiable or more in accordance
with its spirit than that it should endeavour to
preserve its mobility in the fight, and that mounted
shock action, therefore, should be regarded as
its proper r61e in battle. In this r61e, cavalry
is able not only to force a decision quickly, but
to continue its movement mounted, even from
the fight itself.

These advantages, inherent in the nature of
the arm, must not be expected in dismounted
action. Such action always entails delay and
hampers the movements of the troops, not only

ATTACK AND DEFENCE 113

by the method of operation, but also by the separa-
tion of the men from their horses. It is therefore
natural that cavalry should only undertake an
attack on foot when there is no prospect of
obtaining their object by shock action, or when
the latter would entail such sacrifice that it
might imperil the further successful action of
the troops.

The more, however, the disadvantageous factors
of dismounted action are realised and appreciated,
the more, in my opinion, will endeavours be made
to give it an offensive character, in order to
remove as quickly as possible obstacles which
hinder the free movement of the cavalry. All
delay and hesitation are in opposition to the very
spirit of the arm. To preserve its peculiar
element of mobility a rapid decision is imperative
in every situation.

Mounted, the cavalry knows only the charge
and has no defensive power, a circumstance which
strengthens its action considerably in carrying out
its offensive principles, by relieving the leader
of the onus of choice. On foot it is a different
matter. The application of the firearm, under all
tactical and topographical conditions, particularly
facilitates defence and enables it to appear, to a
certain extent, the stronger form of action.
Herein lies the reason why defensive action is
continually sought. All the more, therefore,
must it be kept in view that it is the offensive

8

114 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

on foot that the cavalry, will require. To operate
in combination with shock tactics to assist the
offensive, and pave the way for free movement
is, however, the real object of dismounted action.
It would perhaps have been better if the new
Regulations had upheld this principle a little
more definitely. In them, however, it is the
defensive strength which cavalry has gained in
dismounted action which is chiefly emphasised
(390),^ and the attack is only dealt with as a
method of fighting from which the troops " need
not shrink." Attention is certainly drawn
(455)^ to the various cases in which an attack
upon foot may be undertaken. That, however,
does not alter the fundamental utterance that
the dismounted fight will chiefly be undertaken
on the defensive. This interpretation is strength-
ened on reading in the directions for the action
of the army cavalry during operations that
"Especial additions to the force (cyclist detach-

* " By reason of its fire-arms, cavalry is capable also of dis-
motmted action. It is thus in a position — and especially so when
supported by horse artillery and machine-guns— to oflFer resistance
to detachments of all arms, or to cause them serious loss by unex-
pected fire-action. Nor need it shrink from attacking, should the
situation require it. It will often have to combine dismounted with
mounted action."

' "Cavalry will often be obliged to clear the way for further
activity by means of dismounted attack. Attempts also on the
hostile lines of communication (such as the capture of railway stations
or magazines, the destruction of important engineering works, or the
capture of isolated posts, etc.) will certainly involve such attacks.
On the battle field, however, dismounted cavalry will rarely be pushed
forward."

ATTACK AND DEFENCE 115

ments, infantry in wagons, etc.) are mainly
intended for tlie duty of strengthening local
resistance, or of overcoming such resistance on
the part of the enemy." The thought involun-
tarily occurs to the reader that in the spirit
of the Begulations such additions to the force
will be just as necessary in face of a serious
hostile resistance, in order to free the way for the
cavalry. We would, then, again find ourselves
in just the same state which the war of 1870-71
proved to be so undesirable, and the cavalry
would again find the wings of its mobility
clipped.

Tlie Regulations of course only intend to con-
vey on this point that, if such special additions
to the cavalry were forthcoming, the task men-
tioned would be their principal duty. It is,
however, a matter of significance that it is here
presupposed that infantry in wagons may be
detailed to accompany the strategic army cavalry.
If it were but a matter of cyclists, that would be
a quite different matter. But there cannot at
present be any question of this, as there is no
sufficient number of them in the army.

If the Regulations discuss these kind of possi-
bilities I fear that the demand for infantry will
very soon be heard from the army cavalry when
there is any question of a serious attack on foot,
and herewith the free action of the cavalry will
be limited once and for all.

116 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

Military history and theoretical reflection teach
us equally that the great masses of the army cavalry
must under all circumstances he independent, at
least for their offensive undertakings — that they
cannot rely, in any case for these, on the " occa-
sionaV support of infantry. For they would
thus find their mobility hampered, and themselves
tied to the very troops from which they expect
support, and would then be unable to carry out
those important duties which fall to their share.
The army cavalry, then, can only preserve its
necessary independence if it can rely upon its
own strength even in an attack on foot. It must
at any moment be prepared to throw all its force
into the conduct of a decisive attack. This is
a method of fighting from which not only should
it not '* shrink," but in which its dismounted
r61e essentially consists. When an attack on
foot has been determined on, it must, however,
be first perfectly clear that the results will justify
the sacrifice which such an attack, under any
circumstances, must mean — that is to say, the
expenditure not only in lives, but also in time,
which must both be regarded as lost in estimating
the further operative value of the force.

The new Regulations take this point of view
also into consideration, but in a manner that
gives cause for serious reflection. They would
limit the time expended in an attack on foot, and
during which the arm is deprived of its free

ATTACK AND DEFENCE 117

mobility, and therefore demand (456) ^ that, if
such an attack be found necessary, endeavour
must be made to carry it out toith the utmost
rapidity. Here is expressed a desire easy to
understand. But I do not think that the object
will thus be attained of limiting the time that
a dismounted fight demands. To carry an attack
rapidly through under modern conditions demands
the employment of overwhelming fire power and
numerical superiority.

In so far as the Regulations express the idea
that an attack should only be undertaken when
this superiority is assured, there is great justi-
fication for the definition laid down in para-
graph 456. But the cavalry must then generally
confine itself to the attack of quite weak hostile
posts, for even the division contains but an in-
significant number of rifles. But such limita-
tions, on the othei" hand, in no way take into
account the necessities of grave situations. The
army cavalry will often find itself in a situation
where a diflBcult attack must be carried through
without any overwhelming superiority, unless it
means to renounce the accomplishment of the
duties entrusted to it.

I do not think that we should interpret the

' "Cavalry must endeavour to bring dismounted attacks to a
conclusion with the utmost rapidity^ so that they may regain their
mobility at the earliest possible moment. It may also be of im-
portance to bring the encounter to a decision before the arrival of
hostile reinforcements."

118 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

wording of the Regulations in this sense. Taken
literally, great danger lies in them — the danger,
that is, of seeing in the wording of paragraph 456
a demand for the hastening of the conduct of
the attack. We should thus see ourselves pre-
vailed upon to carry out a necessary attack in
a precipitate manner without the necessary fire
preparation in order to fulfil the demand for
haste. In peace manoeuvres such conduct is
but too often seen. In war it must inevitably
lead to defeat. Under modern conditions of
weapons an attack does not allow of being
accelerated by force. It must take its own
time. We must not therefore deceive our-
selves into thinking that any voluntary accelera-
tion of the offensive fight is possible, but be
quite clear that every decision to attack on
foot signifies considerable loss in time as well
as men.

After considering these circumstances it would
almost seem advisable to alter the wording of
paragraph 456, to make it somewhat more precise,
and to eliminate the idea of acceleration of the
attack. Every trooper must be conscious that
from the moment he dismounts for fire action
he is no longer a cavalryman, but a foot soldier.
He must follow the laws of fighting on foot, and
can only reach his horse again by successful
action according to these laws. Then, certainly,
the dismounted troops must strive with all means

ATTACK AND DEFENCE 119

in their power to reassume their mounted r61e
with the utmost celerity.

The same holds good for the defence.

Cavalry will only undertake this when absolutely
obliged. It may be that the conditions of force do
not allow of the attack, or that the maintenance
of some locality is the chief object of the fight.
In the consciousness, however, that any hampering
of initiative and free movement is opposed to
the spirit of cavalry action, so must the defence —
if circumstances in any way permit — be carried
out with the idea of emerging as soon as possible
from the defensive r61e imposed, to regain freedom
of movement, and then to lay down the law to
the enemy. This can only be attained by con-
ducting the defence in an offensive spirit, that
compels the opponent to a decision in accordance
with our will.

This point of view does not, according to my
thinking, receive sufficient attention in the new
Regulations. Daring and initiative carry in them
the seeds of great success. The cavalry should
continually remember this, even in defence. On
the other hand, however, it must also be ready
when occasion demands to defend itself with the
utmost obstinacy to the last man. The resolute
defence of Sandepu by a Japanese cavalry brigade
against heavy odds gives us a gobd example to
follow. This action made the timely arrival of
the Japanese reinforcements possible.

120 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

III. CAVALRY IK COMBAT AGAINST THE VARIOUS
ARMS, MOUNTED AND DISMOUNTED

In the mounted combat against cavalry, every
effort must be directed towards, falling upon
the enemy at full gallop in a serried mass, and
thus to overthrow him. It is not sufficient to
succeed in coming to blows with the enemy. His
tactical formation must be destroyed, and he
must be rendered incapable either of evolution
or battle. And this must be done without losing
cohesion or power of command. The material
damage done to the enemy is a matter for the
mounted pursuit, which need only be carried
out by part of the troops, or, in default of this,
by shrapnel.

For the conduct of the purely cavalry fight
we should, in my opinion, rely upon men like
Frederick the Great, Seydlitz, and the prominent
Napoleonic cavalry leaders. In the relations of
cavalry to cavalry, nothing has altered since their
day, and the experiences of these men are, in their
lessons, just as applicable to-day as at the time in
which they lived. And what do they teach us ?

It is the serried formation of the attack that
is, above all else, to be aimed at. Frederick
the Great certainly changed his formation from
the three-rank to the two-rank line. This was
owing to his desire to render the troops more
mobile, and in some way to compensate for the

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 121

numerical superiority of his opponent. The
longer his experience of war, however, the more
did the king insist upon close formation in the
attack, and to the end that the attack should
lead not to a mel^e, hut to the breaking up of
the enemy by the impact of the solid mass.
Napoleon, whose cavalry was not so proficient
in the saddle, sought to obtain this result by
greater depth, while in the infrequent cavalry
fights of the present day it has become thoroughly
apparent that cohesion in the shock is the deciding
factor. At Mars la Tour the French Hussar
Brigade of Montaigu was overthrown by the
closely formed 13th Dragoons, after having made
an easy prey of the 10th Hussars, while the other
attacks only led to long and indecisive m616es.
Frederick the Great, in order to attain the
greatest possible cohesion, finally abolished all
intervals between the tactical units and required
the knee-to-knee riding. As, however, he was
perfectly well aware that, in spite of all
regulations, the ranks must open out while
crossing country, he would never allow the
enemy's cavalry to be attacked without a second
line following the first, not in Echelon, but directly
in rear of it, a measure which repeatedly proved
itself necessary, if not decisive. Napoleon's
cavalry leaders held that a still greater depth
was necessary owing to the looser riding of the
French squadrons. As far as I know, there is

122 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

no example of their attacking in large masses
without depth of formation. Peace experience
teaches us, that riding across country must
loosen cohesion, while the modern firearm obliges
us to take refuge in broken country, where the
closest touch cannot always be kept, and to
this end riding stirrup to stirrup has been intro-
duced. Is it, however, ordained that we should
attack in this formation and neglect the decisive
factor of the charge in favour of mobility, a
proceeding which is almost always seen in charges
at manoeuvres?

The disadvantages of such methods are certainly
not apparent in peace, as the troops do not come
into real collision, and rapidity and ability to
deploy receive therefore more attention than
cohesion in the attack. At inspections on the
drill-ground such cohesion is certainly demanded,
but at manoeuvres it is generally conspicuous
by its absence. In war I am firmly convinced
that such habits will be heavily punished.

I think, therefore, that we must return to the
principles of Frederick the Great, which up to
now have been neglected. In approach and
deployment we must indeed ride stirrup to
stirrup, and under certain circumstances in even
looser formation. But for the charge against
cavalry we need a closer formation, knee to knee
as of old, which can be eifected on the move
by word of command, as in France, where the

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 123

order ^^ Serrez les ranga ! *' is still in use. Besides
this, we require always a second line in the
Frederician sense, to assist, when necessary, in
maintaining cohesion, and to be ready to meet
the vicissitudes of the attack. This is a matter of
experience which allows of no misinterpretation.

Another point comes under consideration. Com-
manders always seem to be particularly desirous
of retaining close formation throughout the attack,
and of preventing the whole of the troops becoming
involved in a mel6e or pursuit. This originates
from the necessity of having to reckon with the
enemy's reserves, which may appear suddenly on
the field at the decisive moment to extricate their
beaten comrades. We must always be in a position
to meet them, and the rapid rally from the m616e
is therefore to-day diligently practised, in the hope
that the troops may quickly be got in hand ready
to be led against a fresh foe.

It is indeed astounding that we should give way
to such self-deception. Such rallies can only
appear possible if we disregard all the moral
forces which the fight sets loose. Whoever has
had experience of a single charge in war knows
what excitement possesses the men and what time
and trouble are required to tactically concentrate
troops that have once been launched to the attack,
and render them capable of evolution. In peace
this is delightfully easy after a little practice ; in
war it is an absolute impossibility.

124 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

We must therefore be perfectly clear in our
minds that only those troops which have not been
engaged in the m^l^e, those parts of the first
and second lines which have remained formed
during the charge, and the reserve which has
been held in rear, will be available to meet any
hostile forces which may suddenly appear.

Up to now our Regulations have followed the
teachings of military history in so far as they
provided for supporting squadrons behind the
front line in the attack against cavalry. The new
Regulations, however, not only retain the " stirrup
feeling," ^ even in the attack against cavalry, but
have also greatly limited the employment of sup- '
porting squadrons, and rendered it exceptional.
The Regulations practically ignore the use of
the second line in the attack against cavalry. To
preserve cohesion in the attack in spite of thi^,
the men in the rear rank are to advance into the
front rank in order to fill the larger gaps which
may there occur (106).^ This will lead under
certain circumstances to a loose, almost single-line

* " Biigelf iihling " as against " Knie an Knie " (knee to knee). —
Trans.

* ** As a rule, the squadron attacks cavalry as a single unit in
line. The shock must be affected with the maximum momentum in
two well-defined, well-closed ranks. Cohesion is above all things
necessary for decisive results. Every man must realize this, must
maintain his place in the ranks, and must keep close touch with his
neighbour.

" The two squadron flank guides will hold the squadron in towards
the centre. Small gaps in the front rank may be filled by closing in,
larger gaps by moving up the rear rank files."

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 125

attack against cavalry. These measures give
ground for some concern. They can scarcely lead
to any other end than to render steady riding
to the charge impossible, to create disorder, and
to deprive the already thin line of its force of
impact.

It appears to me to be very questionable whether
such directions could be carried out at all in
practice. They will most certainly not attain
the object which the Hegulations apparently
expect, that is to say, of securing cohesion in
the attack, and thereby a victory for one thin
attacking line. The necessity for a second line
under such circumstances appears all the more
obvious. The Regulations in this respect direct
(200)^ that, ** if the situation demands it, even
single squadrons can follow in column forma-
tion," also as an exception. This indicates a dis-
tinct divergence from the proven results of all
experience, and cannot, in my opinion, be even
theoretically justified.

Such dispositions cannot therefore be regarded
as jtistijiahle. I consider it to be my unavoid-

* " When attacking cavalry^ the regiments will, as a rule, be
employed in a line formation side by side ; this will prevent their
personnel from becoming mixed up. The necessary depth will be
supplied by the regiments themselves, and, in this case, it is usually
in the form of echelons. If the situation demands it, even single
squadrons can follow in column formation.

" The employment of several lines may be useful on occasions when
the situation demands rapid action from the leading regiment, and
circumstances will not permit of the rear regiments taking ground to
a flank."

126 EMPLOYMENT IN WAK

able duty to express myself clearly upon this point.
They in no wise alter the fact that to attack
the enemy successfully our cavalry must, where
its comparative strength in any way allows,
he fundamentally formed in two lines, and he
launched to the charge in the closest attack
formation, knee to knee. For it was thus that
the Prussian squadrons gained their laurels in all
the splendid victories of the Frederician and
Napoleonic wars.

At Mars la Tour, also, the success of the cavalry
fight was decided hy the 16th Dragoons, who
threw themselves into the m616e from the rear,
acting as a second line entirely in accordance with
the Frederician spirit. The 10th Hussars also
attacked as a second line ; and it was the cohesion
of the 13th Dragoons, as we have already seen,
that allowed them on two occasions rapidly to
secure a victory.

If the conditions of the fight of cavalry against
cavalry to-day have remained practically unaltered
as compared to those of the past, it is a very
different matter where the attack is against troops
armed with modern firearms, essentially infantry
and artillery.

In the old days, where infantry fought in serried
masses, standing up, and were only able to cover a
short distance to their front with a comparatively
slow fire, the cavalry were able, even as against
their own arm, to ride them down with shock

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 127

action in close formation. They were therefore
fully justified in attacking infantry in the same
formation and with the same cohesion as they
attacked cavalry. This has now changed. Nowa-
days, when infantry can cover the ground to a
distance of 1,500 or even 2,000 yards with a hot
and rapid fire, and offer in their wide extension
no sort of objective for shock action, an attack on
unshaken, steadily firing infantry, which has any
sort of adequate field of fire, is quite out of the
question. Only infantry whose morale has been
shaken, or which can be surprised at quite close
range, can still be charged with a prospect of
success. It is, then, no question of attack in
cohesion, but a matter of crossing as rapidly as
possible the zone swept by the enemy's fire in some
formation which will allow a portion at least of
the cavalry to escape its full effect.

These conditions may be fulfilled by the forma-
tion in lines. The first line must receive the fire,
and will thereby provide cover to some extent to
the lines behind and the possibility of reaching
the enemy without suffering too severely. It will
usually be no advantage to form the first line in
two ranks, as such a disposition would but increase
losses and the disorder caused by them. It will
be better, generally, that the leading line or lines
should consist of one rank at quite loose interval.
This is principally on account of the ground, as
the horses, in order to rapidly cover the necessary

128 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

distance^ must have room to gallops freely, and to
avoid such obstacles as may lie in front of them
or may be caused by losses in the leading line.

It is obvious, in my opinion, that such attacks
cannot be ridden home according to the same
principles that govern the attack against cavalry.
It is an arbitrary assumption that a line of cavalry
1,500 or 2,000 yards wide can cross country
stirrup to stirrup at the regulation pace of the
charge,^ as the Regulations demand. Not only
must the leading line ride at quite loose interval,
but the main attack must also have a looser forma-
tion than is here demanded. It is therefore
indicated that such extension should be laid down
in the Regulations, a view that I have already
earlier expressed.^ For it can in no case be
avoided, but is the outcome of the force of
circumstances. In the formation in lines, how-
ever, there is always room to open out, and
troops or squadrons may be used in single
rank.

The same principles that govern the attack
against infantry hold good for that against
artillery. Here also it is a matter of crossing the
zone of fire at a rapid pace in widely extended
order, or drawing the fire of the artillery by the
advance of the leading line, and of compelling

* The German cavalry use two paces at the gallop, 500 and 700
paces per minute, the pace being 80 cm. (32 in.X thus 14 J and 20j
miles per hour. — Trans.

* ** Gedanken zur Neugestaltung des Kav. Reglts.'*

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 129

it to repeatedly alter its elevation. To this end
it may perhaps at first be advisable to expose only
weak portions of the charging first line to the
fire of the guns, in order to disturb it, and to pave
the way for the success of the main attack. This
will have to ride in line, or perhaps better still in
squadron column, in order to make full use of the
unexposed portions of the ground. Thus in this
case, also, the leading lines in single rank extended
an4 loose riding in the changing formations of the
main attacking line are advocated.

The new Regulations arrive partially at the
conclusions inevitable from these reflections.
The attack in several lines, and the formation
of a first line in single rank for the attack
against fire action have been adopted by them
(113 and 174).^ In one point only, according to

* **A squadron must seek success against infantry, artUUry^
and machine-guns by means of surprise and flank attacks. If a
frontal attack is necessary, the zone of fire is best passed by in-
creasing the pace. The gallop will be resorted to early in the
advance, and the pace increased in the vicinity of the enemy.
Breathing spaces can be obtained under cover of the terrain. As, in
these cases, momentum of impact is not so important, it will be
sufficient if collision takes place at a rapid gallop.

"In order to minimize loss, it is advisable to let the advanced
portions of the squadron, or even the whole, adopt single rank
formation with wide intervals. By this means the hostile fire may
be broken up, and, on occasions, the dust raised by the troops in
open order may facilitate the attack of the portion of the squadron
remaining in close order.

"If it is a question of simultaneous attacks, either on a single enemy
from several directions, or on several distinct units of the hostile
force, action by single troops may be advisable.

"Hostile skirmishing lines will be ridden through, if there are other
detachments behind them to be attacked. Any form of attack may

9

130 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

my view, they do not take sufficient account of
the demands of reality, and this is in the matter of
extension. As before, the attack in close formation
against infantry which the Regulations advocate,
will be carried out and practised according to the
same principles as against cavalry. As before,
infantry firing lying extended under cover, as
also artillery, are to be charged in the same
method as cavalry advancing in close formation.
I think we have proved that the attendant
conditions of the two cases differ widely. If the
Regulations had but taken them into considera-
tion, the difference between the two methods of
attack would have thereby been made more in-

be employed against shaken, yielding infantry. Skirmishing lines
are best pursued in open order, which formation permits of the most
effective employment of cavalry weapons.

"If, during an attack, a squadron breaks into a battery or machine-
gun detachment, a portion of the men will be employed against the
personnel, a portion against the limbers. Captured guns or machine-
guns should be carried off ; but, if this is impossible, they will be
made unserviceable, or, at any rate, incapable of movement. Led
horses should also be made the objective in attacks on dismounted
cavalry.

**The principles laid down for action against cavalry can be applied,
mutatis mutandis^ in the matters of pursuit, mSleCy and rally.''

" Such attacks are carried out in accordance with the principles
of para. 113.

'* The strength of a regiment renders it impossible to attack the
objective in several lines. The officer commanding will give orders
as to whether the front line is to be in single rank, and as to
whether the rear lines are to be in a similar formation or in closed
double rank.

"In attacking infantry, the lines must not be at too great a distance
from one another. In attacking artillery, the distance between lines
is determined by the effective area of the burst of shrapnel (300
metres = 330 yds.)."

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 131

telligible to all officers from the first than could
be done by general instructions of this nature.

The cavalry has now a demand made upon it
by Regulation which, although it can be met on
the drill-ground, will be impossible of fulfilment
in war. It will therefore be necessary to discard
in war what we have taken such pains to learn,
a thing which frequently happens in manoeuvres,
and even on the exercise-ground.

In the formation for attack and the deployment,
the Regulations follow the logical sequence of
their point of view that, in the attack upon
cavalry, no second line is necessary, and in this
matter adhere to the directions laid down in the
old Regulations. From my point of view, this
does not seem to correspond at all with the
necessities of the fight.

In my ** Reflections on the New Cavalry Drill
Regulations " I laid down " that it should always
be possible for cavalry to change from the
manoeuvre column straightway into attack forma-
tion with flank protection, without first forming
line, as hitherto has been deemed necessary."
In opposition to the Regulations I still hold
fast to this principle.

We have seen that the formation in lines is
the necessary one for all charges, and that an
attack in one line will only be possible in ex-
ceptional cases where weakness forbids the forma-
tion of several lines, or where the surprised and

132 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

demoralised condition of the enemy appears to
render a second line superfluous.

The logical conclusions resulting from these
reflections are that all column formations employed
in the approach march must keep in view first and
foremost the rapid adoption of the attack forma-
tion, and that deployment must in principle lead
to the formation in lines for attack. The complete
deployment in line of any units from the regiment
upwards can only be necessary in exceptional
cases. It can be formied from the attack formation
or direct from column when specially ordered.

Taking into consideration the rapidity with
which approach, deployment, and attack will
often follow each other, I would even advocate
that a trumpet-call, " Form for attack I " should
be laid down in the Regulations. The strength
of the various lines will generally have to be
ordered according as the objective consists of
cavalry or troops using fire action. It will not
always be possible to find time for detailed
arrangements, particularly during the rapid
vicissitudes of a cavalry combat. The trumpet-
call would then justify itself, and the lines
would be formed by the independent action of
squadron leaders, according to the formation the
troops were in and the expected breadth of
frontage of the enemy. It should be laid down
as a guide that of four squadrons one at least
should form a second line, and that an un-

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 133

protected flank should, when possible, be covered
by a squadron in 6chelon. The squadrons nearest
the enemy would form a first line, and the
remainder would act according to circumstances,
and either follow the first line, Echelon them-
selves in rear of it, or, when necessary, prolong
it. For the deployment into one line a special
call could be used.

For the conduct of the fight on foot the same
principles hold good as for the infantry. The
duties and conditions of the fight are similar,
and demand similar general tactical directions.
The arrangements for the led horses, however,
render the introduction and the conduct of the
fight considerably more difficult. There is also a
certain difference according as" the opponent is
infantry or cavalry.

For, in the first case, there is generally no
danger of a further turning movement, or of
threats against the led horses from the flank or
rear. In the greater number of cases when
arranging for the position and safety of the led
horses, only small hostile patrols need be expected.
An action may therefore generally be conducted
with more boldness under these circumstances than
when opposed to cavalry which might seriously
threaten the led horses by a moimted reserve.

These circumstances must be taken into con-
sideration when dealing with the principles for
the conduct of the led horses.

134 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

In defence, the measures required are compara-
tively simple. The conformation of the ground
usually chosen with a view to the peculiarities of
defensive action will often allow of the led horses
being kept close to the firing-line, where it will
also be possible to mount out of the enemy's range
and to withdraw from his fire under cover of the
ground. The led horses should only be left to
the rear if the position is to be maintained imtil
the enemy comes to close quarters, and then
should be, if possible, behind some fresh position,
where it seems likely that resistance may be
renewed. In defence, the led horses will
generally be left quite immobile,* though this
method should not be considered imperative. For
even in defence the led horses must be sometimes
kept mobile ; for instance, when it is necessary to
rapidly occupy on foot some locality in the
neighbourhood of which there is no suitable
position for the led horses. In such a case they
will have to be sent behind cover, which can only
be done if they are mobile. The horses will only
be kept in the immediate neighbourhood when it
is intended merely to bring oflF a fire surprise, and
not when carrying out an attack or making an
obstinate resistance (471-473).^

* i.e. with insufficient men to lead them. — Trans.

• "Cavalry may succeed in causing hostile detachments con-
siderable loss, and in upsetting their dispositions, by a surprise
appearance combined with an unexpected and simultaneous opening
of lire. By means of skilful use of ground and by reason of their

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 135

For the attack the conditions are diflFerent. The
troops must then he often completely separated
from their horses. It is therefore all the more
necessary that the latter should be secured against
all hostile attack. If, for instance, hostile cavalry
threatens, they must have a special escort. The
possibility of a reverse must be taken into con-
sideration when selecting the position for led
horses, and the retiring troops must be able not
only to mount, but to withdraw under cover.

It is of especial importance that the troops
should regain their mobility after an attack has
been carried out. When the led horses can be
moved, this is an easy matter. Where, however,
they are immobile, as will generally be the case
where full force has to be put into the fight, there
will be considerable loss of time unless it be
possible for the led horses to be brought up, part
at a time, by any mounted reserve that may have
been left in the rear. In spite of this disadvan-
tage, the desire to render the led horses mobile
should not be allowed to lead to the undertaking
of a dismounted action with insufficient numbers.

mobility, they can rapidly disappear and escape hostile fire action,
as soon as they have obtained the desired results."

"As many carbines as possibb must open fire simultaneously.
The leader must do his best to select such ground for the surprise
as will p3nnit of the horses being kept under cover close at hand.''

" Horse artillery and machine-guns are necessary to produce the
full eifect of fire. Occasionally the co-operation of the cavalry may
be limited to protecting the artillery while taking up a position,
wheQce it can suddenly open a rapid fire on the enemy."

136 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

This desire to regain the horses as rapidly as
possible is frequently to be observed at manceuvres,
and not only leads to dismounting and leaving the
led horses mobile, but is sometimes allowed to ex-
ercise too much influence on the question of where
the horses are to be left. In war this considera-
tion should never influence the conduct of the
fight, nor lead to the undertaking of a dismounted
fight in a half-hearted manner, or precipitately,
and thus paralysing the energy of the attack. It
should never induce a commander to keep his
horses too close to the battlefield and thereby
exposed to danger, in order that he may more
quickly regain them. If dismounted action has
been determined on, the main condition is that the
attack should be successfully carried out, and all
other matters must be subordinated to this end.

The precepts of the new Regulations do not,
to be sure, harmonise with this view. According
to them, even when led horses are not required
to be mobile, only three-quarters of the men
dismount, and each man will hold four horses
(366).^ The number of rifles will be greatly

* " At the command : * Dismount for dismounted action I * the
squadron dismounts. If the carbines are not already slung across
the back, they will be taken from the buckets.

" When double rank has been formed, the horse holders will take
charge of the horses. The horse holder of either rank is the left
flank file of each section (excepting the left flank guide). If there
is only one man in the rear rank of the left flank section of the troop,
he will hand over his horse to his front rank horse holder ; or, if the
latter is already in charge of four horses, to his neif;hbour. The

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 137

diminished by these measures (by about a
quarter) ; and it is not quite clear, at least
to me, what corresponding advantage is to be
gained. The measure is, however, so far-reaching
that it merits special criticism — the more so as
the Regulations themselves lay stress upon the
rapid energetic conduct of the fight, and at the
same time make such action more difficult by
weakening the numbers in the firing-line.

Will the horses thus retain a certain degree of
mobility ? This would be a mischievous delusion.
Even if such measures allow of short distances
being covered at a walk on the level drill-ground,
such a thing is out of question in the field and
in the proximity of a fight. How will one man
lead four horses, and at the same time carry four
lances ? A practical impossibility.

The Regulations also give no clear directions
as to how the lances are to be carried during these
evolutions. On the other hand, the number of
men formerly detailed fully sufficed for holding
the horses when it was not required to move
them. There seems therefore to be some other
reason for this measure.

horses in charge of a horse holder \vill be linked. Officers' horses
are held by trumpeters.

"Lances are laid on the ground— if in line, in the front of the ranks ;
if in column, on the Hanks— in such a manner that they cannot be
damaged by the horses.

"In the absence of a contrary order, the serjeant-major and the left
flank guides will remain with the led horses, in addition to the bor^e
bolder**,"

138 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

I have asked myself the question as to whether
the fact that more men are to be left with the
horses than formerly will perhaps make it pos-
sible to defend the led horses by dismounted
patrols. The directions contained in the Regu-
lations (368) ^ that hostile patrols must be kept
at a distance by single sentries posted by the
commander of the led horses indicates that such
was perhaps the intention. But it appears to me
that even this object cannot be attained in such
a way. The sentries, if they are to defend the
led horses from long-range fire in open country,
must be pushed forward in considerable numbers,
and very far, almost at rifle range. With single
sentries close at hand, no proper protection
is aflPorded, nor can posts be sent out 1,000
yards without giving them a strength which
the force cannot aflFord. If, however, the pro-
tection of the led horses in difficult country is
to be provided for, a few sentries will most
assuredly not suffice to prevent hostile patrols
approaching unobserved.

In order to properly protect the led horses they
must either be so disposed that they are actually
covered from the view and fire of the enemy.

^ *'The led horses will remain in the original troop formation.
Their leader must keep himself informed of the course of the
encounter, he must remember to keep off hostile patrols by means
of single sentries, and he must facilitate the rapid remounting of the
dismounted men by placing the horses in orderly formation, with
the troops and ranks separated."

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 139

or else secured by an escort strong enough to
prevent hostile action against them. Tertium
fwn datur.

Taking these things into consideration I cannot
regard the limitation of the number of rifles in
the firing-line imposed by the Regulations as
justifiable. It seems to me that here a sacri-
fice is made with no corresponding advantage
resulting.

This anxiety eeems also to have influenced, to
a certain degree, the text of the Regulations. In
paragraph 367 ^ the attempt is made to compensate
in some measure for the danger created by the
weakening of the firing-line. That is to say, the
squadron leader is allowed in either method of
dismounting (with half or three-quarters of the
men) to reinforce the firing-line, if the situation
demands, by diminishing the number of horse-
holders. But it seems to me that this arrange-
ment is not quite practicable, and does not
sufficiently take into account the difficulties that
will continually result therefrom in the conduct
of a real fight.

First of all, it must be regarded as extremely
hazardous to leave such measures altogether in
the hands of squadron leaders. Only consider,
for example, the case of a brigade commander

' " If, with due regard to the tactical situation, it can be done
without risk, the squadron leader is at liberty, when employing
either method of dismounting ^ to increase the number of his dis-
mounted men by decreasing the number of his horse-holders/*

140 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

who dismounts half his men in order to keep
his led horses mobile, and during the attack
makes the discovery that the horses cannot follow
because the squadron leaders have reinforced the
firing-line from the horse-holders ! Throughout
the Regulations there are no sort of directions
for limiting the initiative of the squadron leader
in such matters in the case of the larger bodies
of troops.

But if this is to be disregarded, what becomes
of the whole measure ? Is it to be determined
when dismounting that the number of horse-
holders is to be diminished, or are these men
only to be brought up in the course of the fight ?
Against the first method there is naturally nothing
to urge. But tlie second, also, is quite allowable
according to the letter of the Regulations. It
will, however, result in grave disadvantages.

If in defence the led horses are close to the
firing-line, such procedure is certainly possible,
but only, it seems to me, in this one case. If
fighting a defensive action where the horses must
be left far to the rear, or indeed in an attack,
how and when are these reinforcements to be
brought up ? It is generally in the middle of
a fight that the discovery is made that the troops
are insufficient. How is the order then to be
sent to the squadron leader that the few men
who can still be spared from the led horses are
now to advance ? Uow will these men be led

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 141

to the front, perhaps 1,000 or 1,500 yards, or
still farther ? How long will the squadron wait
for their arrival ? And in the end will it not only
be a matter of comparatively few men for each
squadron which will dribble gradually into the
fight ? These cannot be regarded as reserves,
but, at best, weak supports far in rear, which
can only be employed in the fight with difficulty
and loss of time, if at all.

I think, therefore, that what the Regulations
prescribe in this matter is not suitable for real
war, and that it would be better from the com-
mencement to employ all the men that are
considered necessary, and rather to dismount, as
before, and leave the led horses quite immobile,
than afterwards to allow single men to dribble
into the fight. As reaerveSy formed detachments
must be directed against the decisive points, and
not a few troops brought up to reinforce the
whole length of the line at the discretion of the
squadron leader.

IV. THE FIGHT OF THE INDEPENDENT CAVALRY

Such fights will occur during the offensive
reconnaissance of the cavalry, in screening, and
in enterprises against the enemy's communications
and lines of approach. Cavalry may also be
entrusted with the task of dispersing gatherings
of hostile partisans, of levying contributions on

142 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

a large scale in the enemy's country, and of
carrying out other similar undertakings. Serious
encounters must often be expected under such
circumstances.

It is naturally impossible to give tactical guides
and directions for all these irarious cases; each
problem, rather, will demand its own solution. At
the same time certain typical phenomena con-
tinually repeat themselves in all such combats,
for which general principles and rules for guidance
may be profitably set forth.

The fight will be either offensive or defensive.
In the offensive it will either be a matter, if the
enemy is also pressing forward, of the battle of
encounter, or else the attack against localities or
positions. In fighting against partisans, also, it
will more frequently be a case, as it was in France,
of a struggle for localities. In the defence, on the
other hand, localities, positions, or defiles will
have to be defended. Beyond these groups no
real fight can be considered with the exception
of surprises, which merit separate consideration.

It is therefore, in my opinion, advisable to
develop the tactical principles according to some
corresponding grouping of the material. Only
thus can clear and reasoned conclusions be
arrived at. For if we take all the various prin-
ciples evolved from different tactical situations
and jumble them illogically together, or discuss
them from points of view which are not closely

THE BATTLE OF ENCOUNTER 143

based on the probable happeniags of reality, we
run a danger of confusing the judgment instead
of clearing it.

1. The Battle of Encountei^

When lesser bodies of cavalry, unaccompanied
by the other arms, meet during a mutual advance,
it is essentially a matter of endeavouring to deploy
more quickly than the adversary, of surprising
him if possible while still deploying, and of
seizing the advantages of the terrain. It is by
good screening of the approach, superior recon-
naissance, a quick eye for the possibilities of the
ground, and rapid decision that here, as before,
superiority can be maintained.

It may happen in exceptional cases, under
modern conditions, that the larger bodies of
cavalry, accompanied by a proportion of other
arms, are unable at the moment of collision to
employ them — e.g. in close country. There may
then be a purely cavalry fight on a large scale,
and action must of course be taken according to
the tactical principles involved. I have laid down
these principles in detail in my book ** Cavalry in
Future Wars," and it is not necessary to repeat
them here. Early deployment, maintenance of
exterior lines, rapid decision, are, as regards the
leading, the important factors of success.

It is quite another matter where co-operation
of the other arms can be seriously counted on.

144 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

It is then chiefly the artillery which will set
its stamp upon the development of the fight,
and it will no longer be possible to act according
to purely cavalry tactical principles. A brigade
or division, in column of route, or even in several
formed columns, if exposed to the enemy's artillery
fire, will suffer such material and moral loss that
such formations, unless compelled by circum-
stances, are particularly to be avoided. Whoever
is obliged to effect the deployment of his force
under the enemy's guns casts from him one of
the most important elements of success.

It will therefore be necessary, when advancing
against the enemy, to adopt the approach forma-
tion, and to seek cover as soon as it is calculated
that the hostile artillery are within effective

range. In order rightly to calculate this moment

•

the enemy's probable advance must of course be
taken into consideration, and, as this may vary
greatly according to the pace adopted, it is
advisable in this respect not to be too optimistic,
but to be deployed rather too early than too late.
Taking into consideration the range of modern
artillery, the deployment should commence, there-
fore, in open country, at latest when some
6,500 yards from the enemy.* As this distance

' If I lay down that the deplojrment in the case of infantry columns
marching towards each other should begin at 8,500 yards, and in the
cavalry only at 6,500 yards, the reason is that the mounted arm
effects the necessary deployment much more quickly. The depth of
the column, also, is not such a decisive factor as in the case of infantry.

THE BATTLE OF ENCOUNTER 145

will diminish very quickly when the opponents
are both rapidly advancing, it will certainly be
advisable, if the knowledge of the situation in
any way allows, to take up the required breadth
of front still earlier.

I would here lay down that a too rapid advance
of our own troops, unless rendered necessary by
the situation, is in no way advantageous. It is
not generally a question of striking the enemy
as far to the front as possible, but of striking
surely, and of having sufficient strength in hand
to annihilate him in the pursuit.

A steady and well-thought-out advance should
therefore be undertaken; for a precipitate for-
ward movement distresses the horses quite
unnecessarily, renders an appreciation of the
situation more difficult, and generally allows of
no well-considered action. There is also another
reason for avoiding a too rapid advance. This is
the fact that in such a case the most important
reports generally come in when the force is
already in the immediate proximity of the enemy.
This disadvantage increases with the rapidity of
the advance, as a rapidly moving force will follow
more closely on the heels of its reconnoitring
patrols. To ride slowly forward and to give the
patrols time to send back reports will generally
lead to better information as to the situation, and
will allow of a better and quicker decision being
made. The enormous advantage may then be

10

i46 EMPLOYMENT IN WAfe

gained of being deployed earlier than the enemy,
and of gaining exterior lines from the beginning.

In spite of this, most cavalry leaders, especially
at manoeuvres, regard their task as a matter of
rapidly covering a certain distance, and see in
this the essence of the cavalry spirit. This is,
however, by no means so. Coolness, reflection,
economy of force in approach and deployment,
but that lightning-like decision and action at the
proper moment, which can only result from a
clear appreciation of the situation, alone make the
great cavalry leader. It is just because such
opposite qualities must be united in the soul of
one man that such leaders are so rare and so
difficult to recognise in time of peace.

When a collision with the enemy is in any way
in prospect, the commander must in principle
remain, during the advance, with the foremost
detachments of the advanced guard, in order that
reports may reach him as early as possible. When
in close proximity to the enemy he will often
be obliged to advance with a sufficient escort
from point to point, in order that he may be
able to study the ground from good points of
view, and, where possible, himself observe the
movements and dispositions of the enemy. He
will thus be in a position to make his preliminary
arrangements rapidly and effectively, to spare his
troops unnecessary marching, and to counteract
any imsuitable dispositions made by his sub-

THE BATTLE OF ENCOUNTER 147

ordinates. He must not, however, conceal from
himself that even the most effective measures of
reconnaissance may fail, and that he may be faced
by the necessity of coming to a decision without
full knowledge as to the enemy.

In such cases, when it can be estimated that
deploying distance from the enemy has been
arrived at, further reconnaissance should not be
waited for to assist decision ; but the initiative
must, under all circumstances, be maintained.
The leader, then, must act according to his own
judgment, and impose the law upon his opponent,
and yet be ready, by careful dispositions, to meet
unforeseen events.

It may happen that the opponent is unexpectedly
met with, and has gained an advantage in deploy-
ment. In such a case a forward deployment
generally leads to the dribbling up of the force,
hampered, as it will be, by the proximity of the
enemy. The deployment should therefore be
made either on the existing line of front or to
the rear, according to the distance from the
enemy, and should be covered, where necessary,
by the dismounted action of the advanced guard
and by artillery fire. Only thus can the lost
freedom of action be regained, as superior breadth
of deployment is the first and perhaps the most
important step towards the maintenance of the
initiative.

We must not, however, assume that this de-

148 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

ployment — in a cavalry division, for instance —
requires that the various brigades shall draw away
from each other at regulation intervals, and that
the division will, in this formation, advance
towards the enemy. This will generally be im-
possible; first, because it is usually advisable to
seek the cover of the ground in order to be secure
from possible hostile fire surprise, even when the
enemy's artillery is not yet located; secondly,
because the regulation frontage of deployment
of a cavalry division is much too narrow to allow
it to gain exterior lines, or to affect a concentric
attack. The deployment must rather be carried
out according to the demands of the situation at
the moment, without regard to regulation inter-
vals. The division commander will first of all
detail a reserve for himself. To this he will then
give the orders necessary for its conduct as well
as to the advanced guard, the various groups of
the main body, and the artillery and machine-
guns. The direction of march of the various sub-
divisions will thus be determined according to the
ground and the intentions of the commander, and
it will also usually be necessary, in order to keep
the troops well in hand, to order the advance by
stages, and to regulate the pace.

If the advance has been carried out in separate
columns, the action of the smaller columns must
be regulated before the deployment of the main
column. A certain loss of time will here generally

THE BATTLE OF ENCOUNTER 149

be found inevitable. The necessary preparations
must therefore be made early enough to ensure
that, if the juncture of a detachment with the
main body is intended, it will be possible to carry
it out before contact with the enemy is made.
It is a matter for especially careful and well-
considered action if one of the lesser columns is
to intervene from a flank direction in a fight
which is already raging, an operation which may
be of the most decisive importance, but difiicult to
effect in the rapid course of a cavalry action. If,
however, it is desired to reap the benefits of such
action, an endeavour must be made to gain time
by dismounted action for the arrival of the column
which is to strike the decisive blow. Such measures
will always be risky, but may lead to glorious
results.

The orders for the concentration and for the
deployment form the framework on which the
whole fight develops. They are therefore of
the highest importance. Faults committed here
can seldom be rectified later, and yet such orders
will generally have to be issued before touch with
the enemy is gained, except by patrols, and at a
moment when the main features at most of the
enemy's situation are known. Particular attention
must, as we have seen, be paid to his artillery.
No one will deny that herein lies the possibility
of misapprehension and failure, and that many a
leader will shrink from the necessity of such a

150 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

decision. He, however, who, in spite of the un-
certainty of the situation, succeeds in making up
his mind betimes has an obvious advantage. For
it is just in such a battle of encounter that success
will fall to him who knows how to avail himself
with rapidity and determination of the favourable
moment, who quickly possesses himself of im-
portant points and localities, and who anticipates
the enemy, as advocated above, in broadening the
front, and thereby in deployment.

Under such circumstances the dispositions made
for the advanced guard will be of the greatest
importance. Its conduct has often a deciding
influence on the issue of the whole fight.

If it be carelessly handled, this circumstance
may mean the loss of the initiative, and the com-
mander may find himself compelled to turn his
attention to the situation forced upon him by the
advanced guard, and to conduct the fight other-
wise than his own intentions and the general
situation demand. On the other hand, a too
careful employment of the advanced detachments
is apt to entail loss of advantages which might
be of decisive importance. The proper conduct of
such an advanced guard demands, therefore, an
unusually sure military instinct. Its commander
must always be instructed in a detailed manner
as to the intentions of the general, if he is
expected to handle his detachment successfully
according to them.

THE BATTLE OF ENCOUNTEE 161

It will often be advisable for the advanced
guard to occupy some point of support dis-
mounted, in order that the deployment and the
further tactical development may be undertaken
under cover of it. In such circumstances there
is no reason to shrink, when necessary, from
bringing the advanced guard back to some
suitable locality, if thereby full cover can be
afforded for the rear detachments or for separated
portions of the force that may be rejoining.
It will often be found desirable also, in the
critical moments of deployment, to strengthen
the resisting power of the advanced guard by
machine-guns. It may, however, on the other
hand, be equally advantageous for the advanced
detachments, on collision with the enemy, to
charge him recklessly in order to reap full benefit
from some favourable opportunity.

The handling of the artillery, particularly at
the moment of deployment, is of especial im-
portance. It may be a great advantage to bring
it into action before the enemy's artillery, in
order to profit by any carelessness of the hostile
troops in deployment and approach, and to sur-
prise their artillery when coming into position.
The conduct of the advanced guard must therefore
be influenced by the fact that a suitable position
must be assured to the artillery. Its fire will often
suffice to induce the enemy to show his strength
or to evacuate localities which he haa occupied.

152 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

As long as the strength of the enemy is un-
known and the possihilities of superior force have
to be reckoned with, it would be a great error
to stake the whole force as soon as contact has
been gained. This is often done on training-
grounds in quite a systematic way, because
there is always a tacit understanding that the
enemy is no stronger than one's own force. In
war such action might lead to the gravest
disasters.

If, therefore, complete uncertainty reigns as to
the enemy's strength, it will be better at first
to operate tentatively with a portion of the force
until an opinion can be arrived at as to whether
the decisive attack can be ventured on. Energetic
contact with the enemy by fire action will
generally soon clear up this point.

The view that a gradual and judicious em-
ployment of force is not in accordance with the
principles of cavalry action (430) * can only be
justified in the case of the pure cavalry combat
mounted. This, however, in my opinion, should
only be determined upon if the enemy's strength
is known, at all events to some degree. I do

^ "An attack in which troops are sent gradually into action in
smaU detachments, one after the other, is not in accordance with the
spirit of cavalry combat. A force large enough for the attainment of
the objective must, therefore, be employed from the very commence-
ment of the engagement. But not a man more ! No squadron
must be allowed to deal a blow in the air. Conversely, it is wrong
to commence an engagement with insufficient force, and thus to
leave the enemy with initial success."

THE BATTLE OF ENCOUNTER 153

not share the view of the Regulations that, if
uncertainty reigns as to the strength and in-
tentions of the enemy, freedom of action can be
preserved, even in the mounted combat against
cavalry, by the use of formations in 6chelon
(424).^ This is only possible by a protracted
action in which gradual reinforcements are used,
and only in such a manner can the enemy be
forced to disclose his strength and intentions.
A protracted fight, however, can only be carried
out by fire action. A mounted advance, whether
made in 6chelon or otherwise, cannot alter the
rapid nature of a cavalry fight, and will not allow
of sufficient time being gained to form a proper
appreciation of the enemy. Echelon formations
lead at best to eccentric attacks and thereby to
unfavourable tactical situations.

If the situation is to be cleared up by fighting,
fire action must be employed, and as soon as this
occurs, whether on the part of the enemy or one-
self, a gradual employment of force is not only
no disadvanta^ge, but is demanded by the circum-
stances. For at first the fight must be carried
out from depth ; the Napoleonic ** Je m'engage
et puis je vois " holds good ; one's own main
force will only be engaged when the strength
and intentions of the enemy become in some

^ *' Collisions of cavalry partake usually of the nature of battles
of encounter. In such cases, uncertainty as to the strength and
intentions of the enemy render necessary such echelon formations
as will preserve freedom of action."

154 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

measure known. It will, however, be advisable
in all cases to keep a strong reserve in hand
until prepared to advance to a well-considered
and planned attack.

The passage of defiles, also, is scarcely likely
to be undertaken in serious war in the manner
so often seen at manoeuvres. Here the chief
matter for consideration is generally to keep one
side as far from the defile as possible, in order
that the passage of the other may be possible.
Such tender solicitude is scarcely to be expected
of a real enemy, and it will, I opine, scarcely
occur to anybody in war to attempt a defile
without preparation, and to advance on the farther
side against an enemy whose strength, as is
generally the case in war, is unknown, thereby
running the danger of being thrown back on
the defile and of suflFering enormous loss. Such
a danger, to which the whole force is exposed,
would certainly only be incurred when the gravest
necessity compelled. What the Regulations say
in this respect (434) * has, to my mind, but a
limited practical significance.

Such directions would only be followed if the

* " If, on emerging from a defile, the enemy is not so close as to
necessitate an immediate attack with any available forces, a dej^loy-
ment at the halt offers certain advantages. It saves space towards
the front, and gains time— a matter of some moment in a critical
situation. On the other hand, it must be remembered that an
immediate deployment and advance inspires the troops with en-
thusiasm. A deployment at the halt may also take place when th^
intention is to make a surprise attack from a concealed position.'*

^

THE BATTLE OF ENCOUNTER 155

enemy were known to be still far distant and
approaching, where there is time and space
sufficient, and where the force is considered to
be at least a match for the enemy. Even then,
preparations should be made for a possible retire-
ment. In all other cases, however, a defile on
the far side of which the enemy is supposed to
be will only be crossed when the ground for
deployment on the far side is at least commanded
with fire in such a way that the enemy will not
be able, in case a retirement becomes necessary,
to pursue right into the defile.

It will therefore generally be advisable to
throw forward a few squadrons at a rapid
pace across the defile in order to occupy with
dismounted action points d^appui on the far
side, from which the foreground can be covered.
This will secure the passage of the main body
and arrest any possible pursuit It will often
be advantageous to provide such squadrons with
machine-guns. Artillery can most suitably come
into action on the near side of the defile, so that
it may be able to cover the country on the far
side with its fire.

Even if a defile occupied by the enemy has
been captured by fire action it is advisable, before
the main body crosses it, to secure a few points
d^appui in the foreground, in order to secure
the passage against counter-attack by the enemy's
reserve:

156 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

Such necessary care in the preliminaries of an
action, however, must in nowise lead commanders
to allow themselves to be forced to adopt a
defensive attitude or to abstain from decisive
attack. That is not the intention. Such measures
are only taken to clear up the situation, which
cannot generally be done in war without fighting,
and to diminish the risks of any further action
which may ensue. If the enemy has so far shown
himself that an appreciation can to some extent
be arrived at as to his strength, if he has
brought artillery into position, if perhaps he has
attacked our advanced guard, or by the action
of the latter has been forced to throw more
men into the fight, if, in short, it can be
determined that an attack has prospect of suc-
cess, then the decisive offensive must be under-
taken with all the force hitherto kept back.
Detachments, also, which have been dismounted
can then, according to circumstances, be with-
drawn from the fire fight and otherwise used.
The attack, especially when mounted, will usually
be delivered with greatest advantage from the
fiank, and must, as a rule, reach well out in order
to escape as far as possible the artillery and
machine-gun fire of the enemy. Whether it be
undertaken mounted or dismounted will depend
upon the attitude of the enemy and the attendant
circumstances. In either case it will be advisable
to husband a reserve as long as possible to meet

THE BATTLE OE ENCOUNTER 157

the vicissitudes of the fight, or to be used for a
bold stroke, when it is seen where a decision
may be arrived at.

If dismounted action must be undertaken, the
principles which govern the infantry attack hold
good. The fire of the artillery and, where
possible, the machine-guns must naturally be
utilised for the support of the attacking troops.
The dispositions for the action should, however,
never depend upon the possibility of finding a
good artillery position. The artillery must suit
itself to the circumstances, and come into action
wherever it can best co-operate in carrying out
the commander's intentions. It can often be
profitably employed in the protection of an ex-
posed flank. It will be of advantage to shelter
it behind some obstacle in order to save the
necessity of finding a detachment for its security.
Machine-guns may sometimes be advantageously
used for the protection of the artillery. It is
at the same time advisable that a specially de-
tailed cavalry escort should be dismounted for
this object.

A concentration of the batteries facilitates fire
command and measures for protection. A dis-
persion by groups allows a better effect against
the hostile artillery and usually affords a more
extensive field of fire. Machine-guns, which
must generally look for positions as far to the
front as possible, or, if they are protected, to a

158 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

flank, will usually be best concentrated in a
single fire position. They may, however, be
disposed by sections when occasion demands.
This principle holds good also for the- artillery.
Hard-and-fast rules must be avoided if the
many and varied demands of a cavalry fight
are to be met. The line of fire, however, of
artillery and machine-guns should never be
allowed to limit the movements of our own
cavalry.

In consequence of the peculiar nature of
the cavalry fight it will often be desirable to
keep the limbers with the guns. It may also
be an advantage not to bring the first-line
transport and a portion of the wagons on to
the field itself. For similar reasons the light
ammunition columns w^ill at the commencement
probably march with the baggage. Thus too it
will often be necessary for the machine-gun de-
tachments to keep their teams near the guns,
or to shoot from the carriage and to leave the
ammunition wagons in a safe place. All these
measures contain, however, the danger that
ammunition may not be at hand when wanted,
or that these indispensable supplies may fall
into the hands of hostile raiding parties. The
failure of ammunition may, especially in the
case of a protracted dismounted action, be of
decisive importance. Such will be especially the
case where the ground favours the use of the

THE BATTLE OF ENCOUNTER 159

rifle, or where the hostile cavalry is strengthened
by cyclists or mounted infantry and shows an
eagerness (natural under such circumstances) to
take advantage of such methods of fighting.

The cavalry leader will, under these condi-
tions, only undertake what must be an obstinate
combat when he cannot in any way avoid it, or
at least is not compelled to attack frontaliy. He
will rather endeavour, if the general situation
allows, to separate the hostile cavalry from the
less mobile infantry by repeated turning move-
ments and then to attack it when isolated. If
the hostile cavalry and horse artillery can be
driven from the field, the infantry detachments
will form an easy prey for the artillery or can
be surrounded. Under such circumstances, always
with due regard to the general situation, the
road on which the advance is being made may for
a time be abandoned and the turning movement
carried out with the whole force, if such a pro-
ceeding affords a favourable prospect of tactical
success. Such a movement threatens the enemy's
communications in the same way as it exposes
our own. Victory, however, will secure the latter
again, and will be the more decisive the farther
the enemy can be driven from his natural line
of retreat.

Should the cavalry meet a superior force of
all arms, such as might be pushed forward by
the enemy's army, to support the offensive of

160 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

his own cavalry or to serve as a pivot of
manoeuvre for them, a decisive battle must on
no account be undertaken with it.

When the Regulations (519) ^ demand that
endeavours must be made to force back such
detachments or to break through them, I think
that the tactical value of the arm is over-
estimated. I cannot conceive any real case in
which cavalry can break through hostile detach-
ments of all ajms. In my opinion the cavalry
will generally have to be content to make such
detachments deploy, by means of artillery fire,
and especially by fire action from a flank, and
thereby to lose time, to deflect them from their
line of march, and, by threatening their rear and
communications, prevent them from carrying
out their intentions. Bold measures are in
such cases the best, and will preserve to the
cavalry the possibility of continuing the dis-
tant reconnaissance in rear of the hostile
detachment.

As to the leading, in all such battles of en-
counter the commander's place, as has already
been indicated, is at the head of the advanced
guard. As soon, however, as contact has been

* " During operations, the army cavalry must seek to gain the
earliest f)Ossible insight into the situation and dispositions of the
enemy. It must endeavour, not only to drive the hostile cavalry
from the field, but also to press back advanced detachments of all
arms, or to break through and push forward to the vicinity of the
main body. Cavalry screen duties, also, may provide fighting for
the army cavalry."

THE BATTLE OF ENCOUNTER 161

gained he must, on the contrary, remain far
enough behind the fighting-line to be able to
watch his own troops and the enemy, and to
be easily found. He should not be wandering
about the battlefield, seeing everything and
arranging everything himself. Only where it
appears necessary to him to make a moral im-
pression should he place himself at the head of
an attacking force. He might, especially, lead
his last reserve into battle, and by his personal
example endeavour to inspire the troops to an
impetuous attack. Such cases, however, will
be very exceptional. It will always be most
important that the supreme commander retains
control over the whole of his troops, and can
receive messages and at decisive moments issue
orders and instructions to the force.

In the greater number of cases the commander
will personally neither reconnoitre the ground
whither he is sending a detachment nor yet the
enemy which it shall engage. He will scarcely
ever be able to give to single small units or even
to the directing brigade, if indeed he has detailed
one, the direction of attack. It will often be
impossible for changes in orders to reach troops
once set in motion in time to be of use, especi-
ally in a purely cavalry fight.

When the Regulations, in spite of this, declare
it to be indispensable that the leader himself
must be able to see if he takes the offensive

11

162 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

against cavalry (403)/ this is, under modem
conditions and large formations, in most cases
quite impracticable, even in manoeuvres. As a
rule the commander will only be able to in-
dicate the taskf and it must be left to the sub-
ordinate leaders to carry it out to the best of
their ability, according to the situation as they
find it on the spot. The situation during the
rapidly changing phases of the cavalry fight will
often be quite different from what was expected
when the tasks were allotted.

On the other hand, before the commencement
of the engagement, all subordinate leaders must
be informed as to the situation and the general
idea of the fight, also as to what duties each
one of the larger formations is to carry out ; so
that all may be in a position to act according
to the views and intentions of the commander if
circumstances should be found different from what
was expected. It will in most cases be desirable
to issue the order for deployment in such a way
that at least every brigade commander is informed
of the general situation, and then to give supple-
mentary orders for the fight which will be issued

* "The leader must select a station from which, while keeping
his own troops well in hand, he can obtain a good view of the sur-
rounding country, of the enemy, and of the progress of the battle.
He will either observe himself, or by means of officers sent out to
observing stations. These latter must maintain constant communi-
cation with him.

** Personal observation is always the best, and is essential in the
case ofoffemive auction against cavalry**

THE BATTLE OE ENCOUNTER 163

to all units. Whether in a battle of encounter
it will be always possible to detail a directing
brigade I very much doubt. One brigade will
often fight on foot, the other mounted, while the
change from the advanced-guard r61e to deploy-
ment for battle will generally render a handling
of the division according to rule practically im-
possible. The idea that, with an independent army
cavalry in the battle of encounter, one division
can in some measure be handled as on the drill-
ground, and can be put into the fight in proper
cohesion, must be dismissed. That is an error that
has grown upon the exercise-ground, and which
the conditions of modern warfare will not admit.

The more, however, that the method of leading
is compelled by the pressure of modern develop-
ment to change from tactical routine and adopt
a more or less strategic form, the more uncon-
ditionally is it demanded of subordinate leaders
that they be, even when independent, continually
conscious of the guiding tactical principles, and
endeavour to act in accordance with them.

The necessary consideration for the effect of the
enemy's fire should never lead to fainthearted
dispositions or paralyse the -idea of decisive of-
fensive action. If the result of the fight appears
doubtful, the most decisive measures must be
taken with rapidity and determination, and the
last reserve thrown into the fight, regardless of
consequences, in order to wrest victory from the

16i EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

enemy. For daring is in itself a mighty factor
of success, and one which exercises enormous
influence on the fickle Goddess of Fortune. The
calculated boldness of all, and the greatest initia-
tive within reasonable limits of subordinate leaders,
must give to the fight of the cavalry mass its
peculiar character.

It appears to me that this principle cannot be
too greatly emphasised when considering the
cavalry tactics of the present day.

If the fight takes a favourable course, the
commander will make timely preparations for an
effective pursuit, get control of any reserves still
intact, and take measures for the concentration
of strong bodies of his troops, so as to be prepared
for further tactical action. Artillery and machine-
guns advance rapidly— when necessary, on their
own initiative — in order to come to effective range
as soon as possible. Should the fight take an
unfavourable turn, the commander will first make
dispositions for these arms, unless they are to
remain in position and sacrifice themselves to
facilitate retirement. They will generally be
sent to the rear in good time to a previously
selected position. Only then will measures be
taken to extricate the troops involved with the
enemy, to concentrate them in a safe place, and
to make fresh dispositions. Should the enemy
pursue with but weak detachments, the offensive
should be renewed.

ATTACK OF LOCALITIES 165

2. Attack of Localities

The attack of an enemy who takes up a
defensive attitude can obviously only be carried
out dismounted. It must be a matter, therefore,
for careful consideration whether such an opera-
tion shall be undertaken or not. Considerable
numerical superiority is necessary to ensure
success. A reserve will ' be needed, which can
be used dismounted, to give the final decision at
the decisive point, or to meet unexpected events.
Besides this, it will be necessary in most cases
to make a detachment which shall provide for the
security of the led horses, for reconnaissance, and
for operating against the enemy's flank and rear.
It is the task of such a detachment to seek out
and overthrow the enemy's mounted reserve, that
it may then be able to co-operate in the main
attack. The expression ** Mounted reserve,'* used
in the Regulations to designate this detachment,
hardly corresponds with the r61e of these troops,
which will be offensive from the commencement.

Here also I find myself in disagreement with
the idea of the Regulations that the dismounted
reserve can be frequently detailed from the troops
which have remained mounted (460).^ The

* "As a general principle, a 'mounted reserve will be detailed.

"In special cases, the leader may detail a dismounted reserve^ which
he can make use of at points where, during the course of the battle,
the enemy's weakness is disclosed, or which are recognized aa deci-
sive objectives for the attack. It is often advisable only to detail
such a force, when it is required, from the troops which have remained
mounted."

166 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

mounted reserve must, as we have seen, operate
oflfensively. The Regulations themselves allot
this task to it by laying down that it shall
undertake operations against the enemy's flank,
his led horses, and his reserves (464).* It is,
however, not compatible with these duties that
the mounted reserve shall at the same time find
a dismounted reserve, which can only enter the
fight from the rear, and until then must remain
behind the fighting-line. Different troops must
be detailed from the first for both these duties,
otherwise neitlier of them will be properly carried
out

Should the cavalry commander not have at his
disposal sufficient force to meet all these demands,
he will generally be better advised to abstain from
the attack, and to endeavour to carry out his
mission in some other manner. An unsuccessful
enterprise not only entails unnecessary loss, but
tends to lower the moral value of the troops.
It is only when conscious of great moral and
tactical superiority, or when there is a prospect
of surprising the enemy, that an attack should
be dared without the necessary numerical pre-
ponderance.

* '^ The mounted reserve continues the tactical reconnaissance
and undertakes the protection of the led horses. It will also assume
the oifensive against a flank of the hostile position, whenever it is
possible to combine it with the above duties. When fighting dis-
mounted cavalry, it endeavours to drive the hostile mounted reserve
from the field, and to capture the led horses."

ATTACK OY LOCiOilTIES 167

The more difficult and serious such an under-
taking is, the greater efforts must be made to
gain at least a favourable base for attack, as
regards not only the direction of the attack but
also any special advantages of the ground. The
mobility of the troops renders rapid changes of
direction possible, such as are unknown to the
infantry. Unlike the case of the infantry, there-
fore, the line of advance and of attack need
not coincide. If thorough reconnaissance of the
enemy's position, and the ground in front of it,
is made in good time, it will often be possible
to change the base of attack even at the last
moment and to appear suddenly from an unex-
pected direction.

Therefore, even in the approach, the deploy-
ment, and the advance to effective range, the
ground should be carefully utilised in order that
cover from view and fire may be secured as
long as possible. It is also important to clear
the country where the approach and deployment
will take place of the enemy's patrols, and to do
everything possible to prevent his reconnaissance.

Artillery and machine-guns must come into
action in such a way that they will be able to
combine with the firing-line in concentrating an
overwhelming fire against the decisive points of
attack. The guns will generally be able to come
into action under cover, and to fire indirect
against the enemy in position. They will only

168 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

engage the enemy's artillery if the latter shows
itself in open or half-covered positions with the
object of turning its fire on the advancing attack.
Otherwise the fire of the artillery will be directed
against the enemy's firing-line or any mounted
detachments that are visible. It is of importance
that a sufficient quantity of ammunition should
be brought up, and that it should not be wasted
by random fire against invisible targets.

The orders for the fight must be issued with
great care and clearness, for, once the battle is
begun, it will not generally be possible to make
changes of disposition. The difficulty, also, of
changing the front of the fighting-line increases
in proportion to the size of the units employed.
It is therefore of the highest importance not
only to determine the front of attack before the
commencement of a fight, but also to give a clear
order allotting a definite task to each unit, which
should, when possible, be made known to all the
troops. Only if this is achieved will they be
able to act independently according to the spirit
of the orders.

When all preparatory dispositions have been
made, the attack should, if possible, be com-
menced simultaneously, unless circumstances
demand that some detachments take up the fire
fight before the others are ready to co-operate.
From the moment that the attack is commenced,
but one thought should inspire the troops ;

ATTACK OF LOCALITIES 169

^^ Forward against the enemy ^' cost what it may''
Pressing continually to the front, each must
endeavour to surpass his neighbour. Should
further advance be impossible without reinforce-
ments, the ground won must be maintained at
all costs, even against hostile counter-attack.

The strength of the first deployment of the
firing-line must depend on circumstances. In
any case the whole breadth of that part of the
enemy's front must be simultaneously engaged
which is able to direct its fire against the attack,
as otherwise the latter will be exposed to flanking
or cross-fire.

If the ground allows of a covered approach to
within effective range, a sufficiently thick firing-
line should be established at once. On the other
hand, where cover is scarce, it will sometimes be
advisable, when sufficient time can be spared, to
deploy at first only a loose, irregular firing-line,
which will offer a difficult target to the enemy,
or to remain at first under cover and gradually to
strengthen the firing-line in the same way until
it attains the strength necessary to commence the
attack. In the further advance, supports must
follow all the firing-lines, to make good losses,
keep up the ammunition supply, and to put new
moral strength into the fighting-line.

Open country in such cases demands increased
depth in order to minimise loss, while close
country requires that depth should be diminished,

170 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

and it will be found advisable to act accordingly.
Close formation can and must be maintained as
long as the terrain and the hostile fire admit.
It will of course be impossible to expose such
formations within range of the enemy's fire. The
advance will then consist of rushes, with pauses
for breath, of distribution into small units, and
the adoption of extended order. The nearer the
decision of the fight, the closer must the supports
follow, ready to co-operate.

In difficult country the order and cohesion of
units must not be lost. It is especially important
for the supports as well as the firing-line to
make use of any available cover, so that units
may be re-formed, ammunition supply regulated,
and that the officers may regain their influence
over the troops. This latter moral element de-
serves especial consideration.

While feeling its way forward the firing-line
should avoid regular formation, and its rushes
should not be made in too small bodies, as such
a proceeding is apt to mask the fire of neighbour-
ing detachments. It will likewise generally
happen that some portions of the line are able
to advance under cover of the ground more rapidly
than others. These must then ask themselves the
question whether their isolated advance might not
lead to a reverse which would imperil the success
of the attack. On the other hand, the unceasing
pressing forward of all the various detachments is

ATTACK OF LOCALITIES 171

conditional to success. If localities exist in the
foreground which might serve as supporting points
for the further development of the attack, it
should be considered whether they should not be
occupied as rapidly as possible, and, where neces-
sary, secured against counter-attack by being
placed in a state of hasty defence. The advance
of neighbouring detachments may then be
facilitated from such points by energetic fire
action. Such points at the same time secure the
possession of the ground won and, under certain
circumstances, protect those portions of the
artillery and the machine-gun detachments which
may accompany the attack, according as circum-
stances dictate. In any case such a measure
(accompaniment by artillery and machine-guns)
brings moral support to the attacking-line, and
may at times prevent a defeat.

As soon as the firing-line has arrived within
assaulting distance its fire must be increased to
the utmost. All detachments in rear press forward
regardless of loss as soon as they become aware
that the first line is preparing for the assault.
At the trumpet-call " Rapid advance " ^ the whole
hurl themselves with the greatest determination
and with loud cheers upon the enemy. Any
reserves which may be still to the rear strain
every nerve to reach the advanced firing-line.
The assault should, if possible, be simultaneous.

* **Rasch vorwartia."

172 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

But the eflFort to secure this should never lead
to detachments waiting for each other. Where
a possibility is offered to single portions of the
force to penetrate into the enemy's position they
must advance independently, and all other de-
tachments must conform.

It is important that the assault should not be
begun too early, but that the firing-line should
work its way forward to the closest range before
rising for the final charge. The Infantry Drill
Regulations lay down 150 paces as a guide for
this distance in peace. That is a great deal too
much. I do not think that the firing-line,
especially in deep groimd or uphill, can *'rush"
forward in full marching order 150 paces after
having already carried out a lengthy attack.
These instructions of the Infantry Drill should
certainly be modified. Cavalry, however, should
not fall into this error. A premature assault may
imperil the success of the attack, because physical
force may fail, and the enemy's fire is given a
chance of regaining its full strength. The fire
weapon should rather be used up to the last
moment. The assault should take place only
from the closest possible distance, and this will
ensure success. For the rest, I may draw atten-
tion to the instructions laid down in the Cavalry
Drill for the dispositions for the attack and
for its conduct. On these points it coincides with
my view, and it would be superfluous here to

ATTACK OF LOCALITIES 173

repeat what lies therein. If I have gone into
the question of the conduct of the attack rather
more closely, it is to emphasise certain points
that are not prominent enough in the compressed
instructions of the Regulations, and which do not
generally receive sufficient consideration.

As to surprise fire action, also, the Regulations
contain all the essentials (471-473).^

I might, however, touch here upon another
matter which is connected with dismounted action,
i.e. the question of armament. It has often heen
proposed, and from influential quarters, to replace
the cavalry sword by some kind of a bayonet. If,
it is said, with a certain appearance of justifica-
tion, cavalry are to assault hostile positions on
foot, they must have some arme blanche for the
hand-to-hand fight, and this can only be a bayonet.
The war in Manchuria, where such melees re-
peatedly took place, is cited as a proof of the
necessity of such an armament. I cannot ally
myself with such proposals. As to the repeated

* "Cavalry may succeed in causing hostile detachments con-
siderable loss, and in upsetting their dispositions, by a surprise
appearance combined with an unexpected and simultaneous opening
of fire. By means of skilful use of ground, and by reason of their
mobility, they can rapidly disappear and escape hostile lire action,
as soon as they have obtained the desired results."

''As many carbines as possible must open fire simultaneously.
The leader must do his beat to select such ground for the surprise
as will permit of the horses being kept under cover close at hand."

** Horse artillery and machine-guns are necessary to produce
the full effect of fire. Occasionally the co-operation of the cavalry
may be limited to protecting the artillery while taking up a position,
whence it can suddenly open a rapid fire on the enemy,"

174 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

hand-to-hand fights in the Busso-Japanese war,
these took place principally because the Russians
found it impossible to evacuate their entrench-
ments in time, and that they took such full
advantage of cover that they were in some
measure surprised by the attacker. These ex-
amples can certainly not be adapted therefore to
the dismounted action of our cavalry. With them
it will never be a question of prepared positions —
which cavalry will, as a rule, neither attack nor
defend — ^but of actions resulting from a battle of
encounter. In such cases, however, as the ex-
perience of military history teaches us, a hand-to-
hand fight is quite exceptional. Even the struggle
for localities is fought out almost entirely with
the firearm. If the defence should consist of dis-
mounted cavalry and cyclists, it cannot as a rule
be assumed that such troops will allow the attack
to come to close quarters. They will more gener-
ally, as soon as the decision of the fire fight has
become clear, endeavour to reach their horses or
cycles and to escape the fire of the pursuit. As
a matter of fact, therefore, dismounted cavalry
would really only use the bayonet on foot in quite
exceptional cases, and it would only be justifiable
to introduce it if there were no attendant dis-
advantages. Such, however, is not the case. I
would regard the abolition of the present sword as
a great danger, calculated to seriously injure the
morale of the cavalry.

ATTACK OF LOCALITIES 175

Our lance is an excellent weapon for the charge,
but for single combat only in cases where the men
have freedom of movement. In the close turmoil of
the fight it is very difficult to handle with success ;
besides which, it easily becomes unserviceable on
striking an object too heavily. Should it pierce
a body at the full speed of a horse's gallop it will
generally bend on being drawn out (if indeed the
rider in his haste extricates it at all)^ and then
becomes unserviceable. In such a case the man
needs his sword. A short bayonet can never
replace this, and a compromise between a bayonet
and a sword would be of but little service. If the
sword is taken away from the cavalry soldier
he will be rendered in many cases weaponless.
There can be no doubt of this. And the con-
sciousness of this drawback would very soon be
felt by the troops and would damp their eager-
ness for the fight.

The case, then, is this. When confronted by a
hostile cavalry of any activity, the mounted com-
bat, the mfelee, at least for smaller detachments
and patrols, will be of almost daily occurrence;
while, as we have seen, the hand-to-hand fight on
foot must be most exceptional. To injure the
efficiency of the troops for their daily r61e for the
sake of such isolated occurrences I hold to be a
great mistake, and therefore hope that the arm
will be spared this fate.

176 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

3. Defence

As regards the principles of the defence, I
may draw attention to the instructions laid down
in the new Cavalry Regulations, which coincide
with my views in all essentials. There are,
however, still a few points to be raised which
seem to me of importance.

First and foremost, I think that it follows,
from the above arguments, that, in the case of
cavalry operating independently, engagements
may often take place which, with a generally
offensive intention, must be conducted at times in a
defensive spirit and with only part of the troops —
that is to say, where it is not the intention to act
on the defensive with the whole force, but to use
the defence only as a means of resuming the
general offensive later at the most advantageous
time. It will be possible, especially in the
battle of encounter, to defend favourable positions
or localities with the advanced troops, either to
gain time for the arrival of the main body, or
else to oblige the enemy to weaken his reserves,
against which the offensive is intended. This
combination of attack and defence will frequently
occur, I am convinced, even in the battle of
encounter.

In such cases the defence must endeavour to
deceive the opponent and to provoke the attack.
Efforts will be made, while putting but few

DEFENCE 177

men into the fight, to give the impression of
strength in the firing-line, and yet so to dispose
the troops that attack will not appear impossible,
if carried out in sufficient force. Groups of
men on a broad front, a liberal expenditure
of ammunition, and sometimes the holding back
of artillery and machine-guns, are the means
whereby the enemy may be thus misled.

But, even if the defensive on a large scale is
adopted because the force is considered too
weak to take the offensive in the open, the
guiding principle will still be, as I have already
indicated, to obtain a decision in the defensive
fight by an offensive counter- stroke, in so far
as the force and the circumstances of the ground
in any way permit. This is a fundamental
principle of the spirit of cavalry.

The force destined for the counter-attack should
accordingly be detailed from the first. Efforts
must be made, by using favourable country for
the defensive front and thus being able to occupy
it weakly, to spare every available man for the
counter-attack, and to compensate for the weak-
ness of the force in position by ample ammunition,
well-arranged cross-fire, and similar measures.
The troops designed to play the offensive r61e
must first be placed in reserve, withdrawn, as
far as possible, from view and fire of the enemy.
As soon as the situation is cleared up, they
will be placed in Echelon behind that flank

12

178 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

from which the counter-stroke will take place.
Whether this will be a mounted or dismounted
attack depends on the character of the ground
and similar circumstances. In any case a base
for attack outside the limits of the enemy's fire
must be reached^ and, where possible, by surprise.

It is therefore of the highest importance that
the enemy shall be prevented from gaining
observation as to the conduct of the reserve, in
order that its presence may eventually come as
a surprise to him. Hostile patrols must be
attacked with remorseless energy wherever seen,
and, if possible, put out of action. Those look-out
points, on the other hand, from which observation
can be made of tlie enemy must be occupied
early in the fight.

The cavalry will, as a rule, only undertake a
iDompletely passive defence, where the object of
the fight is to hold the crossing over some
obstacle, to defend isolated localities, or to gain
time. In such a case the question is one of the
obstinate defence of a definite object, sometimes
perhaps, also, of a retirement from one point to
another. Such an operation, however, is always
difficult to carry out on account of the led horses,
and should only be attempted in very favourable
country. It demands that the fight shall be
broken off — always a difficult matter, and, to
cavalry encumbered by their led horses, one of
considerable danger. The horses certainly render

THE FIGHT, RETREAT, AND PURSUIT 179

it possible, by making a proper use of the ground,
to withdraw more rapidly than could infantry
in the same case. On the other hand, however,
they tie the dismounted troops down to a definite
direction of retreat, and remounting, when
pressed by the enemy, is always a critical matter.

4. Breaking off the Fight, Betreat, and Pursuit

When it becomes apparent during the course
of a fight that success cannot ensue, the com-
mander must decide in good time whether he
will carry the engagement through or break it
off. To choose the right moment for the latter
operation is generally extraordinarily diflBcult,
even when it has been planned from the com-
mencement. To make the necessary dispositions,
also, demands great tactical skill. To continue
the fight with determination, perhaps till night-
fall, will often cost no greater sacrifice than the
breaking off of the engagement and the attendant
retreat.

Generally speaking, such engagements will only
be those which are fought out on foot. The
more open the country, the closer the enemy,
and the greater the number of troops which have
already been thrown into the fighting-line, so
much the more difficult will it usually be to
break off the fight. The circumstance also as
to whether the led horses are mobile or immobile,

180 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

and their position, will naturally influence the
decision. On the other hand, it is easier to ex-
tricate the force after some success has been
gained; whether it be that a hostile attack has
been repulsed, or that our own troops have made
a successful counter-stroke. History teaches us
that at such moments there is generally a lull,
during which the opponent is obliged to bring
up fresh troops or to make fresh tactical dis-
positions.

Even under such favourable conditions, how-
ever, it will generally be impossible to break
loose from the enemy without suffering heavy loss.

In defence, if the ground is especially favour-
able, it will certainly be possible at times to
extricate a force without considerable loss. If it
can rapidly withdraw from the firing-line and
retire covered from pursuing fire, the whole force
may under certain circumstances simultaneously
evacuate a position, that is to say, if the enemy
is still so far distant that he is unable to employ
pursuing fire until the defender has reached a
place of safety. How seldom, however, will such
be the case! Small detachments will generally
have to be sacrificed to secure the retreat of the
main body. This means that various especially
strong supporting points in the position will be
occupied, and the force will withdraw under cover
of them.

Military history offers us repeated examples

THE FIGHT, RETREAT, AND PURSUIT 181

where the attacker makes desperate endeavours
to overpower such points, and in so doing forgets
to pursue the withdrawing masses of the de-
fender's troops. This, for example, was the part
played at the hattle of Weissenburg by Geisberg
Castle and Schafbusch, and the chateau with its
enclosed park at the battle of Coulmiers. Under
cover of these points, against which all the
eflForts of the French were concentrated, the de-
fenders were able in both cases to withdraw so
slightly molested that even touch with them was
completely lost.

The defence of such supporting points, which
must be conducted with the utmost obstinacy,
frequently ends in capture, but the end gained
is worth the sacrifice. If the endeavour is made
to withdraw the whole line of defence simultane-
ously under circumstances where it is possible
for the attacker to bring to bear an effective
pursuing fire from the captured position, loss will
generally be much greater than that which would
be deliberately incurred in arresting the pursuit.

The conditions are similar in attack. At
manoeuvres certainly we see the attacker when
repulsed turn about, and, in a continuous retreat,
lay himself open to a pursuing fire, which would
mean absolute destruction. I do not think such
a manoeuvre possible in reality. As the advance
has been by stages, so must be the retreat. But,
whereas in the advance it was a matter of pressing

182 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

forward on a wide connected front, in order to
hold the whole of the enemy's position under
fire, and not of massing together where cover
could he obtained, the exact contrary is the case
in retreat, and the troops must seek any cover
that will shelter them from the fire of the pursuit.
Various strong points in the attack which have
already been taken and occupied must be obstin-
ately held during the retirement, and from them
a heavy fire poured into the pursuit to bring it
to a standstill. Care should be taken, even
during an advance, to keep such places well
supplied with ammunition, which can either be
taken forward to the captured position or be at
the disposal of the retiring troops.

I do not think that it will be possible in any

«

other manner to break off an attack which has
penetrated to within effective range of the enemy,
or to carry out a compulsory retreat without
disastrous loss.

The troops must fall back, obstinately contesting
the ground and continually recommencing fire
from any favourable position. The commander
must make careful preparations, even when ad-
vancing, that a possible retreat shall not lead to
disaster, but will be able to find prepared points
of support. All detachments, however, that are
outside the effective range of the enemy's fire,
and still capable of manoeuvre, especially artillery
and machine-guns, must from commanding posi-^

THE FIGHT, RETREAT, AND PURSUIT 183

tions bring fire to bear on those troops which
are harassing the retreat, regardless of the losses
they may themselves incur. In such a moment
everything must be subordinated to delivering
the retreating masses from that destruction which
the fire of the pursuit portends. Any advance
of pursuing cavalry, also, must be met by heavy
fire from such detachments, regardless of the
expenditure of ammunition.

A retreat, then, requires particularly intelligent
handling. The various detachments must be
provided with instructions that are clear and
definite. The commander must have his troops
well in hand, must arrange for the occupation
of any positions, decide which detachments
shall cover the retreat, dispose of the artillery
and machine-guns, determine the line of retreat
of the various units, with due regard to the
situation of their led horses, and arrange for
the occupation of the rallying position. He
should himself only leave the field when the force
has got clear of the enemy. He must then,
however, straightway attend to the rearrangement
of the tactical dispositions, and take the other
necessary measures. Any reserve still in hand
must be used to check the pursuit where possible
by a vigorous offensive. It. is just in such
situations that a determined counter-attack, even
by a weak force, makes the greatest impression
on the enemy.

184 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

As to the further conduct of the retreat after
a successful extrication, definite instructions are
naturally impossible. Everything depends on the
circumstances of the moment. The possibilities
of resuming the oflfensive must be borne in mind,
even during a retirement. To this end it is fre-
quently advisable to fall back partially towards
a flank. Gneisenau, after the defeat at Ligny,
directed the retreat on Wavre, in. order to be
able to take up the offensive again on the
following day, and thus supplied us with a
brilliant example well worthy of imitation even
where the forces engaged are but small.

If it is a matter of mounted combat, the break-
ing off of the actual fight is quite impossible.
Troops once engaged must carry the fight
through. Even when retreating from the mfelee,
fighting cavalry has no kind of means of ex-
tricating itself. It is then entirely dependent
on the enemy, and can only retire at the most
rapid speed. Reserves alone are able to bring,
the immediate pursuit to a standstill by inter-
vening in the running fight. Generally, however,
this will only end when the horses of the victor
are quite exhausted, or when the latter feels the
necessity of getting his troops in hand and forming
again for fresh duties. The further conduct of
the vanquished troops must depend on the con-
dition of the horses and the general situation. It
is of importance to withdraw beyond the reach of

THE FIGHT, RETREAT, AND PURSUIT 185

the enemy as soon as possible in order that full
freedom of action may be regained.

If the fire of the hostile artillery is to be feared,
it is advisable to retire extended without regard
to tactical formations, and making the best pos-
sible use of the ground. The troops will then
only rally again beyond the range of the enemy's
fire. The same naturally holds good for the
retreat from a dismounted action after the men
have remounted.

The commander will be well advised to inform
his senior subordinates, if not all the troops, before
the fight begins where the troops are to concen-
trate again in case of a reverse. The necessity
for such dispositions generally passes unnoticed
in peace, because pursuit is never thoroughly
carried out, and the beaten troops are not so
completely broken up as has repeatedly happened
in war in the past and will happen again. We
should not deceive ourselves in this matter,
as otherwise there is a danger of completely
losing control over the troops. Whoever expects
to be able to rally a beaten cavalry division
after a mounted fight by blowing the divisional
call lays himself open to bitter disappoint-
ment. If the enemy is pursuing with energy
this will only be possible in the very rarest
cases.

Before the commencement of the fight, arrange-
ments must also be made for the rear communica-

186 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

tion, as there will otherwise be a danger of losing
transport, and thereby ability to operate. Far to
the rear or close at hand are the two only possible
positions for it. In the first case an escort whose
strength will be dictated by the circumstances
will always be necessary.

It should also be remembered that wagons
should be able to turn round where they are
halted. If single teams are unable to turn about
on their own ground, it will be better to park
the whole of the transport in such a way that it
can easily be moved in any direction. It is then
also easier to protect it against attack. If there
is no fear of attack, the various columns may
turn off the road with intervals corresponding
to their length. It appears to mo to be of
especial importance to ' lay stress on these
circumstances because in peace exercises there
is no transport, and commanders consequently get
accustomed to paying little attention to it.

As regards the pursuit, it is necessary to differ-
entiate between a tactical and a strategical pursuit.
The latter must crown the success of the former.

In mounted action, the beaten opponent must
be kept at the point of the sword as long as the
strength of the horses holds out. Detachments
not immediately pursuing must be concentrated,
and must seek to regain their ability for
manoeuvre as soon as possible.

After a dismounted action on the defensive, the

THE FIGHT, RETREAT, AND PURSUIT 187

pursuit will first be taken up by rifle fire. Any
mounted reserve there may be should be launched
to the charge against the retiring enemy as soon
AS the pursuing fire begins to cease to be effective.
A victorious attack, on the other hand, must make
every endeavour to gain the position vacated by
the enemy, and to occupy ground from whence
an effective pursuing fire is possible. The bring-
ing up of the led horses will be of special import-
ance in this case. If they are immobile, a portion
of the men must be sent to the rear to bring
them up, while the remainder hold the captured
position. Any mounted reserves there may be
can often be employed to bring up at least a
portion of the led horses. Generally speaking,
however, all troops not already engaged must,
as we have already shown, take up the strategic
pursuit as early as possible. This will supple-
ment and complete the results of the tactical
pursuit.

Never to let the enemy rest, even when the
tactical pursuit has ceased, to prevent him re-
gaining his cohesion, to capture prisoners, horses,
and trophies, and, above all, to increase to the
utmost the moral effects of his defeat, is the task
before us. The immediate pursuit must therefore
be combined, wherever possible, with a parallel
pursuit commenced in good time. The latter
must nip in the bud every attempt on the part
of the retiring enemy to take up rearguard posi-

188 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

tions, by turning such positions and pressing
forward with reckless energy against the actual
lines of retreat. It must also endeavour to anti-
cipate the enemy in the occupation of any defiles
necessary to his retreat. At such times there
must be no thought of sparing horseflesh. Even
in this pursuit, however, the commander must
give a definite object and a rallying point for
the detachments following. He will otherwise,
by reason of rapidity of the movements in pro-
gress, risk losing control of at least part of his
troops, and of allowing them to go farther than
the strategical situation demands or admits. For
the rest, I may draw attention to the new Cavalry
Drill Regulations, the compressed instructions of
which contain much that is essential and coincide
generally with my views.

V. THE ACTION OF CAVALRY IN BATTLE

In the battle of all arms, cavalry must be
handled according to principles which are quite
different and almost diametrically opposed to
those which characterise its independent action
as army cavalry. For, in the latter case, not
only is the defeat of the enemy kept in view, but
another definite object has also to be pursued.
This object can only be attained if successful in
the fight, while an unsuccessful battle will
paralyse the activity of the cavalry, and may

THE ACTION OF CAVALRY IN BATTLE 189

cost the army the loss of its organs of reconnais-
sance. However daring its conduct then, it
should never be engaged in hopeless enterprises,
and should only undertake a fight where success
can be reckoned upon w^ith a certain measure of
probability.

If, therefore, the strength and intentions of the
enemy are not fully known, it will be better, as
we have seen, to guard against engaging the
whole force in such an uncertain enterprise.
Efforts should rather be made, as I have endea-
voured to show, to clear up the situation by a
careful feeling of the enemy and a gradual
engagement of force. Once possessed of this
knowledge of the situation, it will be possible
either to seek a decision or to break oft' the fight
in time to avoid the risk of incurring too con-
siderable a loss.

Quite different is the case in the main battle.
Here the objective is contained in the battle
itself. It is the destruction of the enemy that
is sought. It is not expected that each single
detachment engaged should be victorious, but
that the net result of the battle should be a
victory. The task of the various detachments is
only to engage and to destroy so much of the
enemy's force as lies within their power. This
naturally holds good for the cavalry. It is not
now demanded that each single action of the
cavalry should of itself be successful, but that

190 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

the general engagement of the cavalry should
have the greatest possible effect. A considerable
result may often be obtained by the attacking
cavalry drawing the enemy's fire upon itself for
a time, and thus affording the infantry the
possibility of gaining ground to the front, or of
re-forming and receiving reinforcements.

To break oflF the main battle is generally quite
out of the question. The very fact that the
battle has been begun betokens the intention of
carrying it through to a final decision, even
where the enemy has shown himself to be in
superior force. The various troops which advance
to the conflict need not therefore reflect whether
they have any special prospect of success, but
must strive for this success with all their power.
This means for the cavalry, in by far the
greater number of cases, always at leAst where
a charge is in prospect, the simultaneoua engaging
of its whole fighting strength^ naturally in
that tactical formation which the conditions of
weapons demand. If in its independent opera-
tions cavalry must be dealt with as a strategical
body, and thus employed in the fight, it is in
the main battle a purely tactical body, which
must be engaged en maase^ and not in detail.
This contrast appears, at least to me, to be an
obvious one. There is another that is equally
clear.

In independent operations it is the duty of the

THE ACTION OF CAVALRY IN BATTLE 191

cavalry, before all else, to defeat the enemy's
cavalry. Victory over the latter creates the
possibility of carrying out its proper task, that
of reconnoitring and screening, without being
involved in further fighting on a large scale. In
the main battle, however, it would be taking
quite a false view of its duty if it were to restrict
itself to driving the hostile cavalry from the field.
Victory over the latter has indeed a certain value,
as it paralyses its further action, but it will, in most
cases, be comparatively useless for the main issue
of the battle unless further consequences result
from it. A victory over the hostile cavalry only
receives its particular importance when by it the
possibility is gained of intervening in the decisive
encounter x)f the other arma^ and of acting
unhindered when, in the course of events, it
becomes a matter either of pursuit or of covering
a retreat.

Finally, in independent operations, even small
detachments can aim at great results, and a
division of force will frequently be indicated.
In the great battle, however, any considerable
effect can only be attained by the action of the
mass. The reason for this lies in the size of
modern armies.

It will be advisable to concentrate the mass
of the cavalry at what are considered the decisive
points, in order to be able to engage it simulta-
neously. Any frittering away of force upon

192 EMPLOYMENT IN WAE

the field of battle will strike the troops with
impotence. We have only to remember the
battle of Coulmiers, where the richest prospects
of success confronted a cavalry which achieved
nothing, because it did not act in concert. Where
great tactical units have to be concentrated
which are not under a single command, it will be
advisable that the laws of seniority be set aside,
and the command given to that leader from whom
the best performances are to be expected, even
though he be not the senior. In the cavalry,
more than in any other arm, success depends
upon the leader. Nothing is more rare than a
good cavalry leader, and it would therefore be a
great mistake to ignore such a one, and thus per-
haps to sacrifice the fortunes of the day to the
Moloch of Seniority. We should rather act like
Frederick the Great at Rossbach, when he placed
Seydlitz at the head of his cavalry, and we must
expect from Prussians to-day the same generosity
as Frederick 's generals showed in willingly serving
under their junior.

The best of leaders, however, will only be
capable of great performances if he is fully
acquainted with the intentions of the Head
Quarters and the idea of the battle. He must
therefore be not only closely informed before the
fight, but must remain throughout its progress in
continual communication with the Head Quarters,
and must be made aware of all dispositions and

THE ACTION OF CAVALRY IN BATTLE 193

at the same time must share its observations and
be in touch with its intentions. The German
cavalry would certainly have been able to fight
a more successful and connected action at Mars
la Tour, as at Coulmiers, if it had been better
informed as to the general situation, and had
thus been in a position to appreciate for itself
what was necessary and what was possible.

If, however, understanding between the com-
mander-in-chief and the leader of the cavalry is
established, and if full confidence in the judgment
and energy of the latter exists, he must be allowed
that necessary freedom and independence which
alone ensure successful action. On the other
hand, he should never wait for orders to inter-
vene, but must himself turn any favom^able
moments of the fight to account by rapid and
energetic independent action. Even if he is
definitely placed at the disposal of the commander,
he should not shrink at critical moments from
acting on his own responsibility, informing, of
course, his superior officer of his actions. As an
example of the relations between the supreme
command and the cavalry leader I would draw
attention to the conduct of King Frederick and
General von Seydlitz in the battle of Zorndorf.
The King felt the necessity of restoring the waver-
ing fortunes of the day by launching the cavalry
to the attack, but Seydlitz independently chose
the moment for the charge ; and success justified

13

194 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

them both. When, however, in the battle of
Kunersdorf, the General was compelled to order
the charge against his better judgment, the con-
sequences were a heavy defeat for the cavalry.

•

1. The Ai^iy Cavalry on the Flank of the Battle

I have already repeatedly indicated that the
most favourable position for the army cavalry
is to a flank and in advance of a flank of its
own army, and, where possible, of that flank on
which, in the battle of offence, the decision will
be sought, or, when in defence, the main hostile
attack may be expected/ The new Cavalry Regu-
lations adopt this point of view. It is therefore
superfluous to comment further on the advantages
of such a position. Unless the cavalry is going to
resign all claim to offensive action, this position
will compel it to seek battle. This may also
happen when the cavalry masses of hath sides
endeavour to take up such a position, and thereby
naturally come into collision, so that a sort of
battle of encounter results, but one, however, that
will bear quite a different character from the battle
of encounter in strategic operations.

There will already be a difference, in the fact
that the strategic approach and the tactical dis-
position in advance guard, main body, and reserve,
will be wanting. In the consciousness, moreover,

* " Cavalry in Future Wars," Part I. chap. v.

ON THE FLANK OF THE BATTLE 195

that, whatever the relative strength may be, the
decisive battle has, under any circumstances, to be
sought, it must be prepared for systematically.
The cavalry will therefore have to adopt a wider
front, or even deploy while farther from the
enemy, having to its front only the necessary
bodies for reconnaissance and security. The re-
connaissance must be of a double nature. Timely
measures must first be taken to ascertain whether,
on the probable lines of approach and communica-
tion of the enemy, further hostile forces, ammuni-
tion columns, or supply trains are hurrying to the
battle-field. Where the squadrons already pushed
forward have received the necessary further in-
structions, this reconnaissance will often develop
from the corresponding strategic measures. It
will, however, frequently be necessary to send
forward new organs of reconnaissance, even up
to the strength of squadrons, as is discussed
in the chapter on " Close Reconnaissance and
Reconnaissance for the Fight." Besides this
far-reaching exploration, immediate tactical re-
connaissance for the fight must also be ar-
ranged ; this will, in general, be directed against
such hostile troops as may be within tactical
reach, and must at the same time comprise re-
connaissance of the ground. This service must be
carried out by contact patrols and it is obviously
impossible to separate the two duties.

The reconnoitring organs suffice in such a

196 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

case for safety to the front. To the flank, how-
ever, local flanking patrols must be pushed out
during the advance. It may at the same time
be advisable, for the protection of the main
body, and as points of support for the reconnais-
sance, to occupy defiles and other important
places to the flank or front by dismounted de-
tachments up to the strength of a squadron or
more.

Screened by these various measures, the cavalry
mass now advances fully deployed for the fight.
It must be Echeloned so far from the flank of
the army that it cannot come under the fire of
its own infantry, and that it can, if in any way
possible, turn the outer flank of the hostile cavalry.
The latter may then easily become hampered in
movement by its own troops, and will have to
deploy eccentrically, a disadvantage under any
circumstances. Connection with our own army
must, naturally, not be lost, so that in case of
an unfavourable issue of the fight the cavalry
may not be completely severed from it. The
tactical dispositions, which should always be of
an elastic nature, must obviate this.

That depth must be maintained in so far as
it allows the necessary frontage, is easily under-
stood. In deploying concentrically the various
groups do not by any means need to be in touch,
as during the advance they will gradually ap-
proach each other. They can, or rather must.

ON THE FLANK OE THE- BATTLE 197

be disposed at wide intervals, and it is better
that these should be too great than that the
necessary depth should suflfer. A reserve must
always be detailed and at the disposal of the
commander, in order that he may retain his
influence over the decision and be ready to meet
the vicissitudes of the conflict. For the rest,
I would refer to the tactical principles laid
down in detail in my earlier work/

Artillery and machine-guns will generally be
able to remain effectively in action longest on
the inner flank, and in this position can also form
a connecting-link between the cavalry and the
flank of the army. Special circumstances, how-
ever, may, of course, lead to their employment
elsewhere. Their employment on the extreme
outer flank, however, so often seen in peace, is
to be guarded against. From such a position
they can indeed often bring an effective flank-
ing fire to bear, but are, on the other hand,
in great danger, especially when opposed to a
numerically superior enemy. Should the out-
come of the fight be unfavourable, they will
generally not only themselves be lost, but may
often contribute to the difficulties of the beaten
squadrons. Machine-gun detachments must be
pushed forward recklessly to within effective
range of the enemy, and should not shrink from
the danger of occasional capture.

' " Cavalry in Future Wars."

198 EMBLOYMENT IN WAR

Should the hostile cavalry be driven from the
field, it must be pursued with sufficient force to
prevent its rallying and re-forming, and to com-
plete its material and moral defeat. Should it
seek shelter behind occupied points of support,
farms, woods, and the like, these must be at-
tacked immediately by employing the greatest
possible fire power. It is a matter of absolute
necessity to gain possession of such points, as
they may otherwise stand in the way of further
action.

All portions of the cavalry not required for the
pursuit should endeavour quickly to regain their
tactical cohesion, that they may be ready for
further effort. If localities are at hand by the
occupation of which the ground won can be
secured, they must at once be garrisoned by dis-
mounted men. Artillery and machine-guns will,
in so far as they are not detailed for the pursuit,
or as they return from it, be brought into position
with a like object in view. Every effort must be
made to utilise to the full the advantages which
the different methods of action of which the arm
is capable confer, and thereby to minimise the
chances of defeat. To reckon toith the charge
alone iSy even on the field of battle^ out of date,
and calculated to limit the effect of cavalry
action.

If a position of readiness has at first to be taken
up, as will generally be the case until it is known

ON THE FLANK OF THE BATTLE 199

in what direction further developments will take
place, it must be as secure as possible from the
view and fire of the enemy, but must be one
from which immediate action can be taken. A
disposition in groups of units will generally be
the most suitable formation. What else is to be
done the circumstances of the various cases
must decide ; the indispensable condition is that
the cavalry should never be present and inactive
throughout the course of the battle. It must
in all cases prevent the enemy's patrols from
making observations as to the disposition of our
own army, while, on the other hand, its own
reconnaissance should never cease.

We should, however, be quite wrong to regard
such action as sufficient; rather must our whole
attention be devoted t6 participating in the
decisive battle, if in any way possible. With
this view the cavalry must be careful to en-
sure its own advance to that portion of the
ground where the decisive battle will probably
take place, so that the charge will not meet
with unexpected resistance and obstacles when
the moment comes to ride it home. When this
crisis of the battle approaches, the cavalry must
be ready to intervene, whether it be to complete
the defeat of the enemy and to facilitate the
victory of its own infantry, or to support the
latter in difficult situations.

Deployment in masses and depth, if possible

200 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

in several lines, is indispensable for such attacks.
The necessary tactical principles for this I have
endeavoured to develop in an earlier work.*
What I then said is to-day of even greater
weight. The outer flank must be secured by
reserves against the action of freshly arriving
hostile cavalry and the covering troops of the
enemy's artillery. Only when reconnaissance
has clearly shown that there are no more such
hostile troops at hand can the reserves be dis-
pensed with.

The attack will best take place from the flank,
and will then generally find a double objective
in the hostile artillery and any infantry that may
be farther to the front ; but both should be dealt
with simultaneously. There may also be a possi-
bility and a necessity of attacking from the rear.
Circumstances must decide this. In any case,
there should be no question of a gradual engage-
ment of a force, but the charge of the whole
mass must, even when disposed in lines, be
carried out in a simultaneous and preconcerted
manner.

The moment chosen for the attack is also of
great importance. As the crisis approaches,
endeavours must be made to get as close to the
enemy as possible, in order to shorten the distance
that will have to be covered in the charge. In
go doing, the protection of the ground must be

» " Cavalry in Future Waps."

ON THE FLANK OF THE BATTLE 201

used as long as possible for cover, at least from
view, without adhering to stereotyped tactical
formations.

However important and desirable it may be
to contribute to the great decision by a glorious
cavalry charge, it should be borne in mind that
the possibility of this will only occur in very
rare cases. The more cultivated and agricultural
the country in which the war takes place, the
rarer will be these opportunities, as the circum-
stances of the ground offer so many opportunities
for local defence.

If we consider the battles of the Franco-
Prussian, the Russo-Turkish, and the Manchurian
wars, we must soon admit that great cavalry
charges were practicable only in very isolated
cases. The peculiarities of the ground rendered
them impossible ; nor can this alter in the future.
If it is to the interests of the defence to seek
open country with a good field of fire, the
attacker, on the other hand, will endeavour to
choose ground for the attack which will give him
cover from fire and view. On the whole, the
possible European theatres of war are but little
suitable for charges, owing to the extent to which
they have been cultivated. We must not be
deceived in this matter by the experience of our
peace manoeuvres. For then suitable ground
has to be sought for the operation of the three
p<rms^ and coAsiderations of compensation make

202 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

it necessary to choose country as free from culti-
vation as possible.

War, however, knows no such considerations,
and we must not blind ourselves to the fact that
the opportunity for great decisive charges will
but seldom occur. The greatest imaginable error,
therefore, which the cavalry could possibly com-
mit would be to adopt a waiting attitude and
renounce all other kind of action, in order that
the possibility of a great charge might not slip
by unutilised. Besides the decisive attack, there
is another wide field of activity indicated by the
conditions of modern war, where cavalry can
operate without being compelled to renounce co-
operation in the decisive battle when circum-
stances will allow.

This sphere of activity lies in rear of the
hostile army. Here columns of supply of every
kind are streaming forward to the fighting-line.
Here are massed the hostile reserves, already
waiting for the decisive moment. Hero stands
the heavy artillery of the enemy in action, often
without an escort. And it is here that oppor-
tunities for decisive action must be sought.

If cavalry can succeed, especially in battles of
several days' duration, in interrupting the hostile
supplies from the rear, in surprising the enemy's
reserves with fire, causing him heavy loss and
compelling him to deploy against it, or if any
advancing portions of the enemy's army can be

ON THE FLANK OF THE BATTLE 203

brought to a halt and prevented from reaching
the battle-field at the right time, greater results
will probably be obtained than by a doubtful
charge. This is quite apart from the great moral
impression which such action must produce on
leaders and troops when the alarm suddenly
re-echoes from the rear, and the shrapnel of the
cavalry carries confusion and consternation
amongst the reserves and supports of the fighting-
line. The enemy's artillery, also, firing from
covered positions, and otherwise so difficult to
reach, may then fall a prey to a bold cavalry,
and will offer opportunities for a success of far-
reaching importance.

Such action must, of course, be conducted with
a due co-operation between mounted and dis-
mounted action.

Against intact hostile reserves the firearm will
be principally used, and endeavour must be made
to surprise them in the formation of assembly or
on the march. Against columns of wagons, also,
it will be well to commence with fire action, by
shooting down the horses of the leading teams,
and so bringing the columns to a halt. They
must then, however, be actually taken possession
of and taken away or destroyed, in so far as this
cannot be done by artillery fire.

The cavalry must therefore endeavour to be
ever active, and to co-operate unceasingly by
damaging the enemy and shaking his morale.

204 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

Great results can, however, only be obtained if
antiquated views, handed down from time im-
memorial, are discarded, and the dematids of
modern war and the capabilities of modern
cavalry arm recognised. It is not a question as
to whether we cavalry men are to fight mounted
or dismounted; but that we must be prepared

■

and determined to take part in the decision, and
to employ the whole of our great strength and
mobility to this end.

2. The Army Cavalry as a Reserve behind

the Front

The same principles hold good for those
portions of the army cavalry which find them-
selves behind the fighting-line, and not on the
exposed flank. Such a position is generally, in-
deed, undesirable, but may be the outcome of
circumstances.

The task before the cavalry is here naturally
quite a different one from when on the flank of the
army. The necessity, or even the possibility, will
in this case scarcely ever occur of having to deal
with hostile cavalry, and of opening thereby a
way for intervention in the decisive battle. It is
much more likely in this case to happen that the
cavalry will have to adopt a waiting attitude,
and see whether its engagement as a mounted arm
will be necessary. During this period of waiting,
the cavalry must remain beyond the range of

AS A RESERVE BEHIND THE FRONT 205

hostile fire, but as near the fighting-line as
intelligent use of the ground will permit. Its
position should never be chosen so far to the
rear that it cannot arrive on the spot at the
right time for the attack ; for the moments
which offer a favourable prospect for a charge
are often fleeting — they depend upon the tactical
situation and the moral condition of the opponent.
These conditions may, however, quickly change
if, for instance, reinforcements should arrive on
the field.

Thus, at Mars la Tour, when the 6th Cavalry
Division advanced in order to attack the obviously
shaken and retiring 2nd Corps of the French, it
struck, according to the account of the German
General StaflF, not this corps, but the intact Ga,rde
Grenadier Division of Picard, which had already
advanced in support, and the charge was frus-
trated.^

To be prepared to meet such conditions it will
generally be advisable not only to remain as close
behind the fighting-line as possible, but to prepare
for a rapid deployment to the front, so that a
disposition in groups, with the necessary deploying
intervals, may be adopted behind that part of
the fighting-line where the ground is especially

* According to the French General Staff history, this cavalry met a
battalion of the 25th Regiment of the 6th Corps, as well as the 3rd
Chasseur Battalion and a battalion of the 77th Reginient of the 2nd
Corps. At all events, the attack met, not retiring, but unshaken
troops.

206 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

adapted to a charge of large masses. If it can
be seen that the crisis of the fight is approaching,
and that the intervention of the cavalry may be
necessary, the latter should advance still closer
to the fighting-line, making, of course, full use
of the ground for cover, but no longer taking
heed of small losses.

The cavalry will advance to the charge in
order either to complete the defeat of an already
wavering enemy, and to capture his artillery, or
to relieve its own infantry exhausted in the fight
or suflFering from want of ammunition, when other
reserves have been used up, or have not yet
arrived on the spot. The attack will probably
always have to be conducted against an extended
front. Flanking and surprise attacks will rarely
be possible under such circumstances. It will
scarcely ever be practicable to carry out separate
attacks against the hostile infantry and artillery,
as in the case of a flank attack. The charge
will, rather, in by far the greater number of
cases, first strike the hostile line of infantry,
and must endeavour to ride through this, and
then to fall upon the enemy's artillery.

The formation for attack must be chosen to
correspond with, this point of view. A con-
siderable extension will be necessary for the
first line, so that, although the wings of the
attacking-line may be exposed to flanking fire,
the main portion of the front of attack will

AS A RESERVE BEHIND THE FRONT 207

only have to reckon with frontal fire, and the
enemy will not be in a position to direct a con-
centric fire against it. The great range of modern
weapons demands a very considerable extension
for this purpose if success is to be ensured.
Suitable ground, also, must be chosen for this
deployment. It will often allow, if rightly used,
of one or other flank finding cover. A previous
close study of the ground over which the attack
is to be made is therefore imperative for the
cavalry leader, even though it may entail personal
exposure to the enemy's fire.

Necessary, however, as this extension is, a
formation in depth in two or three lines is also
imperative if decisive results are to be gained
— this is, as I have already pointed out, the
formation especially necessary against firearms.
To lay down the distances which must be taken
up between the lines according as infantry or
artillery is the objective, as is done in the
Regulations, will naturally be impossible in
most cases, as both arms will have to be
reckoned with simultaneously. A mean distance
of about 250 paces would generally meet the
case.

It is obvious that not only the preliminary
deployment, but the formation for attack must
take place beyond the effective range of the
enemy's fire, for, once inside this zone, flank move-
ments can no longer be carried out, and nothing

208 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

else can be done but to gallop straight to the
front. As, however, our own infantry will have to
be ridden through in the charge, it is impossible
in such a case to attack in close order. The
first lines should therefore be of loose single-rank
formation, with wide intervals from man to man.
This is also to be recommended on the ground
that it will allow a greater breadth of front for
the same strength. Behind the leading lines
squadrons can then follow in column of troops,
which can easily ride through their own infantry,
and adapt themselves to the ground, utilising for
their advance the less exposed portions of the
terrain. In such dispositions there can naturally
be no talk of regular distances, and the circum-
stances of the case must decide.

If sufficient force is available, reserves must
follow behind the centre and in Echelon behind
the flanks. Their duty will be to turn against
hostile cavalry and other troops which may take
the advancing mass in flank or may threaten
a charge.

The batteries and machine-guns belonging to
the cavalry will usually remain at the disposal
of the cavalry commander, even during the great
battle. If a charge is launched it will sometimes
be advantageous to use them for flank protection,
for which purpose they may be temporarily held
back. Such cases, however, will be rare. The
commander will therefore have to consider

AS A RESERVE BEHIND THE FRONT 209

whether it is not more advisable to let them
take part in the general engagement, even when
the cavalry is not yet called upon to intervene.
For it must be clearly understood that in this
case, as in the other, where the cavalry is on
the flank of the army, there will seldom be an
opportunity for the charge, for reasons already
given.

As, however, the cavalry in the former case
should not remain inactive, even if there is no
opportunity for the charge during the decisive
battle, the same holds good where the cavalry
is placed behind the front of the army.

Having a less extensive field of action than
in the case of the cavalry on the flank, it is
all the more necessary, if there is no chance of
a charge, for it to act in the manner of a reserve.
The cavalry must not shrink, when necessity
demands, from employing its whole force in the
fire fight, disregarding for this purpose its purely
cavalry r61e, which may, perhaps, be resumed
later. The first essential is that victory shall
be won. To this end all available forces must
co-operate. We will find a good example to
follow in the battle of Fredricksburg and the
manner in which Stuart threw the whole of his
cavalry into the fight. The employment of
cavalry in the War of Secession in North America,
the study of which I have urgently recommended,
can here again serve us as a guide to follow.

14

210 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

3. Pursuit and Retreat

In critical study of military history there is
continual cause for complaint that after a
victorious battle no eflFective pursuit, with a few
brilliant exceptions, has ever taken place. These
complaints are justified. It must, however, be
conceded that a failure of the pursuit may
be traced in most instances to the force of cir-
cumstances.

As the day of battle draws to a close and the
decision has taken place, the victorious attacker
has generally accomplished a long march to the
battle-field and carried out an exceedingly ex-
hausting attack. The troops have perhaps all
been employed in the battle, down to the last
reserve. Ammunition, food, and water are often
lacking. It is therefore quite natural that the
mere physical energy required for a pursuit is
wanting. If, on the other hand, the defender
is successful, it is generally against a superior
enemy, or one that is thought to be superior.
With the greatest expenditure of moral and
physical force he has held his own. In the
evening of the day of battle, when the attacks
cease, he is still perhaps scarcely conscious of
his victory, and still imagines that the enemy
is endeavouring to turn his flank. He awaits
renewed onslaughts, and will be fearful of im-
perilling his success by leaving the positions

PURSUIT AND RETREAT 211

which he has maintained with such difficulty,
in order, on his side, to take up the oiBFensive.
It is therefore but natural that a pursuit should
at first remain in abeyance. If, however, it is
not carried out at once, the favourable oppor-
tunity is generally lost for ever.

The beaten defender^ on the other hand,, has
often still a surplus of fresh troops. On the day
of battle he will generally have had no ex-
hausting marches to undertake. The battle has
not imposed nearly such heavy physical demands
upon him as upon the attacker. He has also
been able to supply himself during the fight
much better than the latter. To these factors of
advantage must be added the instinct of self-pre-
servation of the individual, which continually in-
duces afresh the desire to escape from the grasp
of the enemy. What can be more natural for the
beaten defender after a lost battle than to march
long distances, and thus successfully to evade
pursuit, unless it be immediately undertaken?
General von Goeben gave orders on the evening
of the battle of St. Quentin that all troops must
march five miles * the next day. But the French
had already covered a similar distance during
the night, and were no longer within reach.

The beaten attacker also may, after the battle,
no longer have at his disposal sufficient physical
force to carry out a further immediate march, but,

' Five German miles = 23 English miles.

212 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

as before the fight he was in superior force, or
considered himself to he so, it will not he necessary
for him to withdraw from the enemy as quickly
as a heaten defender. The reason for this lies in
the diflBculty which exists for the latter of taking
up the pursuit. The attacker can then utilise the
time after the hattle to secure himself in the
terrain and to re-form his units. He falls hack
on his reserves of supply and ammunition. Unless
he hai? suflFered a . destructive defeat, the pursuer
will generally find him the next morning again
in a condition to offer some resistance.

The factors of weakness, therefore, which allow
but seldom of an effective pursuit have their
origin in the nature of circumstances, and are
exceedingly difficult to cope with.

Energy and activity sufficient to this end are
only to be found in moments of the greatest moral
excitement, under the influence of overpowering
personalities, or under special conditions, such, for
example, as resulted after the battle of Waterloo.
In the future, however, we shall generally have to
reckon that these factors of weakness will prevail
and the pursuit fail unless it is prepared with
conscious intention in good time, and initiated with
energy.

Here will certainly be required careful leading,
good tactical judgment, and rapid decision.

Before all things, it is essential that any reserves
still available should be sent forward in the direc-

PURSUIT AND RETREAT 213

tions important for pursuit as soon as it is judged
that the hattle is won, and that their supply should
he arranged for before the pursuit begins.

I may cite the battle of Woerth as an example.
The 4th Cavalry Division stood at the disposal
of the commander. Observation troops were
sufficient in the direction of Hagenau and Zabern.
This cavalry mass was, however, only brought up
late in the evening, and arrived on the field too
late to take up the immediate pursuit, although
it had long been realised that a pursuit would
become necessary.

The infantry pursuit failed for diflFerent reasons.
At the end of the day, when success inclined to
the Germans, a fresh Wiirttemberg brigade arrived
upon the battle-field. Hot fighting still raged
about Froschweiler, in which the whole of the
Vth and Xlth Corps were involved. The Crown
Prince, with a right appreciation of the situation,
sent forward this brigade in a parallel pursuit
against the right wing of the French in the
direction of Reichshofen, where it could have
denied the exit at Zabern to the French. This
brigade, however, allowed itself to be deflected
from its objective, and involved in the fighting
round Froschweiler, the capture of which was no
longer of any real importance from the point of
view of the Head Quarters.

If the affair is practically decided, as was
the case at Woerth, the reserves still in hand

214 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

should no longer allow themselves to be drawn
towards the various foci of the battle, but must
be sent forward by the Commander-in-Chief with
boldness and determination in the now more
decisive directions of the pursuit.

The same reasons and principles hold good for
the pursuit by the cavalry.

The cavalry commander must continually keep
his finger on the pulse of the battle, and not
watch only that portion of the great drama which
is being played under his own eyes.

Should the scales of victory incline in favour
of his own army, if he considers that the interven-
tion of his cavalry will no longer be necessary to
complete the victory, he will often be well advised
to renounce his share in the decisive battle, at
least by a charge which would entail heavy loss,
and to husband all his force for the pursuit, and
to prepare and make dispositions for it. This
consideration is of especial importance for that
portion of the army cavalry which is concentrated
on the flank, as to it must chiefly fall the task of
pursuit.

Great attention should be paid, even during the
battle, to nursing the horses. They should be fed,
not from the small reserve of forage carried on
the saddle, but from wagons, which can be easily
sent to the flank of the army, emptied, and used
later for the transport of the wounded. It is of
great importance that these measures should be

PURSUIT AND RETREAT 215

taken in good time. The forage carried will be
needed during the pursuit, for supplies for the
horses cannot be reckoned upon in country where
armies have been on the move. It will even be
advisable to take forage wagons with the pur-
suing force itself. When the maintenance of
physical strength has thus been cared for, the
next step is to push patrols and squadrons rapidly
forward to reconnoitre the outer lines of retreat
of the enemy. While these have been ascer-
tained, the march in pursuit must be undertaken
without hesitation, and continued even during
the night. While daylight in any way allows,
attempts will naturally be made to attack the
withdrawing enemy in flank, and to carry disorder
into his columns. As soon, however, as darkness
falls and puts an end to the fighting, the march
should be continued on parallel lines throughout
the whole night, if possible in constant touch
with the enemy, in order that he may again be
attacked at dawn the next morning, or that his
retreat may be barred at defiles or other favour-
able places. The trophies of pursuit will rarely
fall into the hands of him who shrinks from
spending the night after the battle marching,
or neglects to prepare in every way for such
an operation.

Direct frontal pursuit by the cavalry will
generally yield but meagre results against the
masses of the modem army and the firearm of the

216 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

present day. Only when completely demoralised
troops are retreating in the open, and cannot be
reached by fire, will a charge be feasible.
Generally, however, the frontal cavalry pursuit
will be soon brought to a standstill by the
hostile occupation of localities, woods and the
like. Frontal pursuit is essentially a matter for
the infantry, who must press the retreating enemy
to the utmost. On the other hand, it is of
course the duty of the cavalry to maintain touch
with the enemy under all circumstances. With
this object in view it must continue the frontal
pursuit^ sometimes even without seeking to draw
on a fight^ by day and night. When the strength
of the infantry fails, it is the imperative duty of
the cavalry to continue to harass the foe. In
conjunction with the artillery it should be able
to inflict considerable losses on the opponent. In
the face of modem conditions, however, too great
results must not be expected from such action.

When the army cavalry undertakes a frontal
pursuit^ it will be advisable to divide it by
brigades, to which must be allotted the various
roads along which the enemy is retreating. To
each column must be assigned artillery, to enable
it to be continually at grips with the enemy.
Cases may also occur where, if the enemy's lines
of retreat are not too close together, it will be
possible to penetrate between them, and thus
strike all the terrors of a parallel pursuit to

PUESUIT AND RETREAT 217

the very heart of his army. The results that
might thus be gained will justify great risks.

As to the covering of a retreat, I may draw
attention to paragraph 518^ of the new Regula-
tions. All the essentials are here set forth in
compressed form. Under such circumstances the
cavalry must never renounce the offensive, as
the maintenance of morale when things are going
badly is imperative. Continual eflForts must be
made to confront the enemy, and to attack him
whenever possible withi the cold steel. Defensive
fire tactics, however, will of course be employed
whenever circumstances demand such action.
Thus, when it becomes no longer possible to
show a front to the pursuing cavalry in the open,
measures must be taken to block the routes upon
which his parallel pursuit is operating, by barri-
cading roads and occupying important points and
defiles, especially during the night, and thus to
secure the retreat of the army. Detachments to
which these duties are confided must be dis-
patched from the battle-field in good time, so
that they may be able, if possible, to arrange

' " Should the issue of the battle prove unfavourable, the cavalry
must strain every nerve to facilitate the retreat of the other arms.
It is just in such cases that they must assume a relentless offensive.
Repeated attacks on the flanks of the pursuing troops will produce
the best results.

"£ven temporary relief for the retreating infantry and a short
gain in time^may avert utter defeat* The cavalry which effects
this, will, though it gains no victory, retain the honours of the
day/'

218 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

their defensive measures by daylight. The more
obstinately they hold well-chosen points^ even at
the risk of being cut off and captured, the better
will they have done their duty.

4. The Role of the Divisiofhal Cavalry

The numerical weakness of the divisional
cavalry, and the variety of duties that fall to
its lot, considerably limit the development of its
fighting power. It will scarcely ever be able to
seek battle with the enemy's cavalry in an
offensive sense, nor in defence will it possess the
requisite numbers for an effective counter-stroke.
It is therefore all the more important that such
isolated favourable opportunities for the charge
as some fortunate chance may place in its way
should not be allowed to slip by. Every tactical
success raises the self-confidence of the troops,
and operates towards the attainment of moral
superiority over the enemy, even though he may
be numerically the stronger force.

In the battle of all arms, as soon as fighting
contact has been established with the enemy,
and the close and combat reconnaissance is thus
probably at an end, the divisional cavalry must
endeavour to gain touch with the army cavalry,
in order to strengthen the latter for the battle.
In so doing, it must not of course lose all con-
nection with its own infantry division. When
this cannot be done, and when no other chance

ROLE of the divisional cavalry 219

of mounted action oflPers, the divisional cavalry
must seize the rifle and act as an immediate
support for the infantry. Opportunities for such
action will occur more especially in defence, as
was proved by the cavalry of General Stuart.

After the battle it is the duty of the divisional
cavalry to advance in frontal pursuit, even though
no great results are to be expected from such
action. During a retreat after the battle it will
be continually in action as the rearmost detach-
ment, and must endeavour to arrest the pursuit
by occupying favourable positions with fire action.
Frequent opportunities for a charge on a small
scale may here occur.

Should the infantry division to which the cavalry
belongs be operating independently without army
cavalry, the divisional cavalry must act in accord-
ance with the principles laid down for the army
cavalry, as far as they apply and in so far as
its strength and other circumstances will allow.
Parallel pursuit may be possible under such con-
ditions.

In retreat, every effort within the power of the
cavalry must be made to protect the flanks of the
retiring division, and to arrest the pursuer by
sudden bursts of fire on every possible occasion.

There is for the divisional cavalry no such
wide field of possibilities as is open to the army
cavalry : it will be less often mentioned in dis-
patches. The tasks which fall to its share, how-

220 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

ever, are certainly immeasurably more arduous
and call for greater sacrifices. It will often be
confronted by the most important and dangerous
duties, for the fulfilment of which its means are
quite inadequate. Such duties can only be carried
out if the troops are capable of the greatest efforts
and determined to do great deeds, without the
impulse that the prospect of distinction promotes.

VI. DEPTH AND ECHELON

It is an astonishing fact that the Echelon, and
especially the rearward Echelon, should have won
for itself an importance in our cavalry tactics
which, in my opinion, is quite undeserved and con-
tradictory to the essence of cavalry action. It
is the more astounding when we consider that this
principle of Echelon formation is said to be based
on the tactics of Frederick the Great, which have
no connection whatever with the Echelon in its
present form.

Frederick the Great arranged his cavalry in
two lines, and within these lines the tactical
imits were on the same line of front. Detach-
ments destined to turn the enemy's flank were
attached in column to the outer flank of the
leading line. As far as I know, a mention of
6chelon can only be found in one place. In a
sketch that accompanies one of the Regulations
of July 25, 1744, a squadron of the second line
is shown thrown forward at half the distance

DEPTH AND ECHELON 221

between the lines and Echeloned on the first line,
with the obvious intention of securing the outer
flank of the first line against local turning move-
ments. Out of this one squadron the wliole of
our echelon system has grown. Here is the only
justification for claiming that the 6chelon of
the second line is of Frederician origin.

Nor, as far as I know, in the tactics of the
Napoleonic cavalry is there any trace of 6chelon
in the modern sense. We would do well to seek,
in this period of experience in great cavalry
battles, instruction for the conduct of cavalry
against cavalry, and not to sacrifice its lessons
for imaginary advantages.

According to all appearances, our modern
Echelon is but the offspring of peace require-
ments. The troops were required to be mobile
and capable of manoeuvre, and a division was re-
quired to perform the same stereotyped evolutions
as a regiment or a brigade. In the division the
Echelon of brigades met this requirement ad-
mirably, favouring as it did the change to line,
a manoeuvre which, on its part, was well suited
to the necessities of drill in a limited area, and
was regarded as the piece de rhiatance of all
cavalry divisional manoeuvres. Many a time
have I assisted at these tactical orgies !

We must not neglect the warning that, even in
manoeuvres, as soon as there is any kind of
approach to service conditions, such necessity for

222 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

change of front never — literally never — occurs.
Besides this, the Echelon formation has shown
itself to he quite unpractical where any real
tactical deployment is required oflP the drill-ground.
The question, then, of the circumstances for which
it is particularly designed does not appear as yet
to have heen definitely asked or answered. We
have heen content with general representations
that it increased the power of manoeuvre, and
thus added to our beloved stereotyped formations.
For years I have striven to clear up these views
and to establish their true worth. As long ago
as 1903, in my book ** Cavalry in Future Wars,'*
I wrote as follows :**... It is obvious that the
formations for approach and attack prescribed by
the (old) Regulations are as unpromising of success
as they well can be. While affording a possibility
of quickly presenting the same formation in any
direction, a feat of no possible advantage for war,
they seriously impede any deployment to the
front. If it is required to launch the first line
against the enemy's flank because this is its
shortest line, one at least of the following brigades
will be masked, and will be hampered in its
movements. If, again, it is desired to utilise one
of the rear brigades for a flank movement or any
similar purpose, the first line has to be checked
until the others reach the required position, or
else they will certainly arrive too late to co-
operate. Furthermore, the formations advocated

DEPTH AND ECHELON 223

render it more difficult to derive full benefit from
the configuration of the ground."

These deductions have remained, up to now,
uncontested. In spite of this, however, the new
Regulations uphold the point of view of the old
as regards Echelon formation in every way, and
even vest it with increased importance by con-
fiding to the Echelon the duties of the real second
line, i.e. of the supporting squadrons of the old
Begulations. In the regiment, as in the brigade,
depth is to consist in Echelon formation, and only
exceptionally is a real second line to be formed.
The Echelons are not only to protect the flank of
their own units, and turn against any portions of
the enemy's line that may break through, but are
also to turn the enemy's flanks (170 and 200).^ In

* ** As a rule, a single regiment attacks in line. It may, or may
not, be in Echelon. Only on exceptional occasions should one of the
squadrons follow as a second line.

" The officer commanding will bring the directing squadron into
the direction of the attack. The squadrons, each in close formation,
must be led so as to ensure combined action.

*'The echelons will envelop the hostile flank or ward off the enemy's
flank attacks ; they can also be used to prolong the front of the
regiment, or they can turn against portions of the enemy which have
broken through."

"When attacking cavalry ^ the regiments will, as a rule, be em-
ployed in a line formation side by side ; this will prevent their
personnel from becoming mixed up. The necessary depth will be
supplied by the regiments themselves, and, in this case, it is usually
in the form of Echelons. If the utuation demands^ even single
squadrons can follow in column formatio^i,

**The employment of several lines may be useful on occasions when
the situation demands rapid action from the leading regiment, and
circumstances will not permit of the rear regiments taking ground to
a flank."

224 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

the division, also, during the advance to attack
cavalry, Echelon formation will, " as a rule," be
ordered. The transition formation thus remains
with us not only in name, but in fact, only with
the difference that brigades provide for their
own depth and flank protection, thus, in fact,
being again in themselves Echeloned (223, 424,
425)/ Only when a closer knowledge of the
enemy is attained may the brigades come into
the same alignment from the commencement, and
assume the requisite frontage (426).*

^ '* When advancing to attack cavalry^ the divisional commander
will, as a rule, order the brigades into ickelon formation. Brigades
will make independent arra^igenients a$ regards formation in depth
and for flank protection,

'* As soon as the divisional commander has decided to attack, he will
arrange for the employment of the artillery and machine-guns ; he
will give the brigades their attack orders ; if necessary, he will give the
directing brigade the line of attack ; and he will detach his reserve.

*' The further execution of the attack will rest with the brigade
commanders."

** Collisions of cavalry partake usually of the nature of battles
of encounter. In such cases, uncertainty as to the strength and
intentions of the enemy renders necessary such Echelon formations as
will preserve freedom of action."

" l^he fomi of the ^helon will vary according to the objective and
to local conditions.

^* Should no certain information as to the advance and formation of
the enemy be forthcoming, a double Echelon is possibly the best. But,
should a flank rest on impassable, or on very open, country, which is,
however, covered by the fire of friendly artillery, only single echelon
is necessary. Echelon to the front may be rendered necessary by the
advanced guard situation. The above cases are given merely as
examples.

"As the situation is gradually cleared up, the flexibility of echelon
formations renders it ea.sy to attain the formation in which the attack
will be delivered."

' ^* Should it be possible to ascertain the hostile dispositions with
approximate certainty, the cavalry leader can h^lve his front rank

DEPTH AND ECHELON 225

In close connection with this modified transi-
tion formation, the " change to lines " has also
heen retained in fact, though no longer designated
as such. That is to say, th^ possibility of a
change of front " to the complete flank," i.e. at
right angles to the direction of march, is still
contemplated, (220),^ and to this end a fresh
formation of the division will generally be re-
quired, as well as a fresh directing brigade, which
takes up the new line of march, and to which the
remainder conform in the desired manner. It
•is apparently a matter of indifference whether
the brigades are called lines or brigades. It is,
and remains, a purely drill evolution of the
division in close formation, a complete change
of front to a flank, and is therefore something
that would certainly not occur in war if any
reasonable sort of information were to hand. If
it did occur, it would presuppose the entire failure
of reconnaissance and the corresponding incapacity
of the leader.

My cavalry instinct forbids me to share the tac-
tical principles that these views entail, and I will
therefore again endeavour to make clear that con-
ception of the matter which I hold to be correct.

units in line from the start, and deployed on the frontage upon
which he intends to attack. The advantage thus gained, if combined
with rapidity of movement, will often render it possible to deliver an
enveloping attack during the hostile deployment."

' ** . . .for greater changes of front, e.g. to the complete flank, it
will generally be necessary to re-form the division."

16

226 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

First, as regards the demands of the Regula-
tions that Echelon is to replace depth. In my
opinion, the conditions of reality have not in this
matter been taken into account. To be able to
meet a hostile squadron that has broken through
the line, the Echeloned squadron, if still in column,
must wheel into line, or if, as is probable, already
in line, must wheel, and then charge behind the
front of its own attacking-line. I consider this,
of itself, to be impracticable in the excitement of
the fight, a manoeuvre that can only be carried
out on the drill-ground. We have only to con-
sult any one who has had experience of a cavalry
attack to learn how difiicult it is to perform such
evolutions immediately before the chaise.

Then, again, what is our conception of such a
hostile squadron breaking through? It may be
expected to be accompanied by a simultaneous
rearward movement of a corresponding portion
of our own line, so that no clear objective for
attack from the flank would be likely to offer
itself. Such retirements of single portions of
the line can only be met and counteracted by
throwing in fresh forces from the rear ; such has
always been the experience in cavalry fights, as
far as the teachings of history show.

But there are other matters for consideration.
How can the squadron, Echeloned, for instance,
on the outer flank of a brigade, intervene when
this so-called rupture of the line takes place on

DEPTH AND :^CHELON 227

the inner flank P In the dust and excitement of
a cavalry fight^ will such a rupture, especially in
undulating country, be even noticed? What if
there is a simultaneous threatening of the other
flank, which the Echelon is obliged to meet P What
if the Echelon has advanced in an enveloping move-
ment ? Who is then to deal with the rupture
of the line ?

To go on trying to prove that the duties de-
volving on depth and Echelon cannot be met
by one and the same detachment, is like carrying
coals to Newcastle. The formation of a second
line in the fight against cavalry, regarded as
exceptional by the Begulations, should be made
an invariable rule, from which departure is
allowed only in exceptional cases, while safety
for the flanks must .be arranged for independently
of this.

Here again we come into collision with para-
graph 170 of the Regulations, which lays down
that an offensive flank attack may be undertaken
from a rearward Echelon ; as if such a manoeuvre
could possibly be carried out 1 Detachments
which are to turn the enemy's flank must,
during the approach, advance into alignment
with their own line separated from its flank by
the necessary interval, or else must be Echeloned
/onwards from the conmiencement.

Forward Echelon will generally be found to
correspond with the offensive spii^it of cavalry

228 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

better than the more defensive rearward Echelon.
It is usually more practical and protects the
flank better, while at the same time threatening
the enemy's flank and laying down the law to
him. Forward Echelon is a very useful tactical
cavalry formation, and deserves more attention
than the Regulations bestow upon it.^

On its offensive importance I need scarcely
enlarge. Troops in forward (^chelon are already
in a position which can only be reached after an
exhausting gallop by those in rearward 6chelon,
the position prescribed by the Regulations. They
will be in a position to frustrate any offensive
intentions of the hostile reserves, and will obtain
quicker and surer information as to the enemy
than will ever be possible at such a time by
patrols alone. That they may at times come in
contact with hostile troops in rearward 6chelon is
obvious. If the flank of these cannot be turned,
they must be dealt with fron tally. Local dis-
positions and a vanguard must provide security
against the action of hostile reserves.

Even in a defetmve sense the forward 6chelon
will often be more useful than the rearward.
The latter formation surrenders the initiative to
the enemy, and confines itself to parrying attacks,
always a disadvantage in a cavalry fight. For-
ward 6chelon, on the contrary, seeks to forestall

' "!^chelon to the front may be rendered necessary by the ad-
vanced guard situation.''

DEPTH AND ECHELON 229

the enemy in the offence. As to how it may
often he hotter adapted to warding off hostile
attacks than the rearward Echelon, I will give
an example.

A hody of cavalry, in the approach formation, is
advancing against the enemy, with hlind ground
on a flank, which would allow of the enemy's
covered approach, and which perhaps it has heen
impossible to reconnoitre. Attack or fire surprise
is feared from this quarter. How will the
cavalry protect itself? The modern tactician
would in most cases reply : " By an Echelon to
the rear." I do not think this would be suitable.
How is such a formation to give safety from fire
surprise, and to locate the enemy's advance and
arrest it until the main body can take counter-
measures ? The forward Echelon can here alone
avail. It comes to close q^uarters with the
enemy, attacks him before he can reach the
flank of the main body, and thus gains time
for defensive measures or retirement.

It is quite obvious that the cases for employ-
ment of the forward Echelon do not allow of being
formulated. I think, however, that we should
make much more use of this formation than is
at present the fashion. Properly applied, such
methods will ensure to us considerable superiority
over our opponents.

If we turn from this narrower tactical point
of view to the formations on a large scale where

230 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

6chelon is to be found — namely, the divisions-

here too the examination leads to no more favour-
able conclusions. I ask myself, when and under
what circumstances will such a formation be
advisable ?

During the approach to the battle of encounter
it is, as I have endeavoured to prove, quite
superfluous, and may even operate to our dis-
advantage. In this case, when total uncertainty
reigns as to whether the combat will be carried
out mounted or dismounted, or both, there can
be no question of any stereotyped tactical forma-
tion, either of units as a whole or of smaller
bodies within them. Here, as we have seen,
the battle will generally develop gradually, and
the fighting-line be fed from depth, imtil the
necessary information as to the enemy has been
gained and the decisive attack can be embarked
upon. Under such circumstances the brigades
advance according to the tasks allotted them,
and make their dispositions as circumstances
dictate. The depth that will be necessary can
obviously not be laid down, and can be attained
by Echelon neither in the division nor in its sub-
divisions. If the division should advance under
such circumstances in close formation Echeloned
within itself, the unnecessary danger would be
run of oflFering an ideal target to the enemy's
artillery (which must always be taken into
consideration), and at the same time of hamper-

DEPTH AND ECHELON 231

ing movement where circumstances demand the
greatest freedom in all directions.

If, on the other hand, the enemy's dispositions
are known before a collision occurs, the Regula*
tions themselves (426, see p. 224) allow that 6chelon
formation is superfluous, and that the advance
may be made in the deployed formation desired,
brigades being on the same frontage, if the
country and the character of the adversary offer
the probability of a charge.

And will it be different in the battle of all arms ?
In that case, if the army cavalry advances from
the wing of the army with the intention of attack-
ing the enemy's flank, what need will it have of
Echelon formations ? It is known that an attack
must be made under any circumstances. Further
information as to the comparative strength of the
enemy cannot and must not be waited for. All
available forces will be engaged in order to wrest
a victory, and must from the beginning be so dis-
posed that the enemy will be compelled as far
as possible to conform to our movements, and that
we may prepare the most favourable deployment
for attack in the manner discussed above. Must
we, then, advance with the division in close forma-
tion Echeloned within itself, in order to afford the
greatest possible target for the enemy's artillery ?
Are we to choose the pusillanimous formation of
the defensive Echelon, that we may perhaps be
obliged to approach and to deploy under the

232 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

enemy's eyes, incapable in this unwieldly forma-
tion of turning the ground to account ? I cannot
think that this is practical and believe that
modem artillery fire of itself suffices to make the
Echeloned division an impossibility and to banish
it for ever from the battle-field.

It must be added that should the unexpected
appearance of the enemy on a flank make it neces-
sary, rearward 6chelon is much easier to assume
from a formation of brigades on the same front
than is the line or attack formation from rearward
Echelon. It is only necessary for that part of the
line which is to be Echeloned to halt or decrease
the pace, and the echelon is soon formed. To
push forward units irom depth while on the move
means, on the other hand, a considerable and
indeed unnecessary expenditure of force.

VII. FORMATIONS FOR MOVEMENT

As the brigades in a modern division must, on
account of the eifect of artillery fire, be disposed
according to completely diiferent principles from
those of the past, so, too, must the formations
adopted by the various groups be chosen to suit
modern conditions.

Our new Regulations lay down that, if the
cavalry, after its preliminary deployment, has
to cross an extensive fire-zone, the subordinate
Jeaderjp are to phoose suph formations for their

FORMATIONS FOR MOVEMENT 233

units as will minimise the effect of the hostile fire,
and that, for this pm^pose, the configuration, of the
ground must be turned to the best advantage,
even though it should involve temporary departure
from prescribed intervals.

I do not consider these instructions, which, in
contradiction to the general principles of the
Regulations, give free play to the initiative of all
subordinate leaders, are sufficiently definite. They
appear to try to avoid giving a distinct designa-
tion to this manner of advance. Before the
publication of the Regulations it was known as
** extended formation." As such I have charac-
terised it in my brochure " Reflections on the
New Cavalry Regulations," published in ]908,
and it is to be regretted that this title was not
maintained in the Regulations, and with it also
the real essence of the whole formation. This
would, I think, have made the matter clearer. I
hold it to be of great importance that the adoption
of such formations should be ordered by higher
authority, as otherwise there must be a danger of
the troops getting out of hand.

In adopting these extensions it is not only a
question of ground actually under artillery fire,
but also of areas during the crossing of which fire
may be expected, to which, of course, the troops
should not be exposed. Whether such is the case
or not, the cavalry commander, who is observing
and receiving intelligence as the troops hurry for»

234 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

ward, is alone in a position to judge, and not each
subordinate leader. For this reason alone, unity of
action is absolutely necessary. So is it also from
another point of view. I need scarcely enlarge
on the picture of what would occur if each
subordinate commander, each squadron leader,
according to his individual judgment, were to
suddenly regulate the pace and formation of his
own volition, while it would be a matter of diffi-
culty to maintain proper control of the troops
if it were left to the squadron leaders to regain
alignment in their own time.

It is therefore imperative, to my mind, that
such extensions should not be left to the discretion
of the squadron leader, but ordered by superior
authority. Instructions as to pace should be
given at the same time, and the area indicated
where troops are to regain the formation ordered
and decrease the pace. These are points that
have escaped the notice of the Regulations.
Orders must also be given as to whether several
lines will eventually be formed. These will then
generally have to follow each other at shrapnel
distance. Only the choice of formation and line
of advance must be left to the subordinate leaders,
as they alone are in a position to judge of the
local effect of the hostile fire.

If such dispositions are to be made, all
commanders, down to squadron leaders, must
b^ instructed iii time, so th«^t they may hav§

FORMATIONS FOR MOVEMENT 235

already adopted the necessary formation on
reaching the dangerous zone. They must at
the same time be informed, in so far as can be
ascertained, from which direction artillery fire — ^for
this alone can be in question — is to be expected.

Should the artillery fire come from the front,
column of route will often be a suitable forma-
tion. It affords but a small frontage of target,
and facilitates use of the ground. If the artillery
fire is expected from a flank, the adoption of a
single-rank line will often commend itself. In
any case, in the larger formations, distances and
intervals must be adjusted so that one and the
same burst of shrapnel will not strike two
squadrons at once.

As the Regulations do not touch on these points,
I do not see how a proper understanding of them
can be awakened and cultivated in the troops,
imperative though this may be.

As a rule it will be by no means sufficient to
adopt formations for minimising the effect of
artillery fire only in special cases where such
fire is to be expected. The great range of
modern guns, and their capabilities of indirect
fire induced by improved means of observation,
and the possibility of bringing fire to bear on
large unseen targets with the aid of the map,
make it absolutely necessary, when entering
within possible effective range of artillery, to
adopt formations which will offer no favourable

236 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

mark. If this tends on the one hand, as already
remarked, to a premature deployment, it forces
us, on the other, to adopt formations which can
cross country easily and afford no easy target
for the artillery.

I have already shown in a former work^ how
well the double column^ answers this purpose,
and in what a comprehensive manner the prin-
ciple of independent squadron columns allows of
elaboration, to procure for the cavalry the greatest
imaginable freedom of movement.

The Regulations do not agree with these views.
They hold fast to the principle that deployment
must always be in line, and not in a succession
of lines, and that before this deployment the
squadron columns hitherto employed will generally
be replaced by some other formation.

The above remain the chief formations for
movement and deployment of the cavalry.
The employment of the " regimental mass and
brigade mass " ' has been limited, but the Regu-
lations give us nothing in their place. Nor,
on the other hand, is the flexibility of the
double column particularly emphasised; its use,
indeed, is in a certain sense limited. I see such

* "Reflections on the New Cavalry Regulations/'

' Two squadrons abreast in squadron-column at six imces' interval,
followed by two more at troop-frontage distance. When there is a
fifth squadron, it follows in the same formation in rear of the left. —
Trans.

• " Regiments- und Brigadekolonnen."

FORMATIONS FOR MOVEMENT 237.

limitation in the fact that the trumpet-call
^^ Double column!^' has been abolished. As, on
the other hand, the call ** Form regimental
mass ! " has been retained, it Joes not appear as
if the use of double column is to be further
developed, or allowed to replace the regimental
and brigade mass on the field of battle.

It is further laid down that the regimental
mass is to be used when beyond the range of the
enemy's fire, the brigade mass when concealed
by the ground, even on the battle-field, A de-
ployment is even allowed for from the brigade
in mass towards the flank, and that by a
wheel of the head of the columns. This pre-
supposes that such a column can be used in a
flank movement, which I regard as an impossi-
bility. A deployment from regimental mass
to squadron columns is also provided for. In
view of the great effective range of the modern
gun, I cannot think that movements in such
close formation right up to the moment of de-
ployment can go unpunished upon a modern
battle-field.

All these instructions contained in the Regula-
tions, and many others that take effect in the
same sense, cannot be regarded as practical. They
lead us to fear that the regimental and brigade
masses, in spite of all modern conditions, will
retain more or less their old importance. They
will serve as a pretext for many a hidebound drill

.238 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

enthusiast, of -which, alas I there are still many
among us. Upon the battle-fields of the future,
however, we will no longer dare to appear in such
formations, but only widely deployed and in thin
columns, in such dispositions indeed as will allow
of a rapid adoption of the attack formation, such
as we have discussed in detail above. I can only
hope that these views will, in the not too far dis-
tant future, come to be more generally recognised
and will find their way into the Regulations.

Finally, I would once again draw attention to
the idea of the " vanguard." * It receives but a
passing mention in the Regulations, and no ex-
planation of what is thereby meant. My opinion
is that it is indispensable to all flank movements,
and must continually be used, especially in the
oflFensive. It should therefore be provided for by
regulation in all deployments, and the troops
should be fully conversant with its use.

For the rest, the present Regulations, in spite
of all actual progress made, can only be desig-
nated as provisional, and give -rise to the hope
that it will be found possible to re-edit them
soon, above all as regards the stereotyped parts,
so that, fully prepared and up to date, we may
go forth with confidence to meet the events of
any future war.

» " Tetenachutz."

THE VARIOUS UNITS IN THE FIGHT 239

VIII. THE VARIOUS UNITS IN THE FIGHT

Having in the last chapter endeavoured to
elaborate tactical principles, and to give practical
hints, I will now shortly deal with the duties
of the various units, and endeavour to form an
impression of the performances that may be
expected of them in the fight.

When a squadron^ acting independently in
reconnaissance, as advanced guard, flank guard,
or divisional cavalry, finds itself obliged to attack,
it will, as a rule, employ its whole force simul-
taneously, whether it charges in line, knee to
knee, or uses a troop in single rank as first
line. If a troop has been thrown forward as
advanced guard, it must quickly clear the front,
and endeavour to join the squadron, so as to
strengthen it before the collision, and nat to
become prematurely involved in a disadvantageous
fight.

The squadron is generally too weak to carry
out an oflFensive fight on foot. There is also
no means of guarding the led horses but by
patrols. If they should become isolated during
the attack, there will be a danger of losing them,
especially in hostile country. A squadron must
therefore only determine on a dismounted attack
when such action is absolutely unavoidable. For
dispersing hostile patrols or armed inhabitants,
about a troop dismounted will generally suffice.

240 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

where there is no opportunity of surprising them
in the charge, or of enveloping them. A defen-
sive fight on foot must not be undertaken by
a single squadron unless absolutely necessary,
or when the led horses can be disposed in a safe
place in the immediate neighbourhood, where the
flanks cannot be turned, or where the arrival of
reinforcements can be relied upon.

A squadron attacking knee to knee is stronger
than a numerically superior enemy who charges
in looser formation and is not armed with the
lance.

The regiment of four or five squadrons is
numerically too weak a body to be able of itself
to carry out the larger strategical missions. It
will therefore operate in more or less close co-
operation with other troops, and will seldom be
called upon to fight independently. It may,
however, find itself for a time obliged to rely
upon its own fighting strength, whether acting
as divisional cavalry, as advanced guard, or as
a detachment from a larger force of cavalry.

If a fight is in immediate prospect, column
of troops must first be formed from column of
route, and a broader front, which will allow of
a rapid assumption of the attack formation, must
then be adopted according to the ground.

In the charge against cavalry the regiment
should only on rare occasions deploy all its
squadrons into line, but must, whenever practic-

THU VARIOUS UNITS IN THE FIGHT 241

able, detail one squadron to follow in second line,
and another in forward Echelon, to protect the
more exposed flank and to turn that of the
enemy.

It will also be possible for the regiment to
operate dismounted against weaker hostile detach-
ments. If relative strength allows, at least a
squadron should be detached to guard the led
horses and to carry out reconnaissance duties.
In the defence on foot, with ample ammunition
and every available rifle in the firing-line, the
regiment represents a formidable fighting force,
even when obliged to detach one, or even two,
squadrons, for reconnaissance and for the protection
of the flanks and the led horses.

In the fight of smaller bodies of all arms, a
regiment will frequently be able to intervene in
a most eifective manner by a timely charge, from
which considerable results may often be expected,
especially during pursuit of a retreating and
shaken enemy. In such cases the formation of
lines for attack will frequently be superfluous,
and a broad enveloping formation may be adopted.

The brigade of two regiments is numerically
too weak of itself to carry out strategical missions,
and to be able to engage in the independent
actions they demand. The heavy drains on its
strength which such missions generally entail
will usually weaken the fighting power so much
that the brigade will no longer be in a condition

16

242 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

to engage an opponent of any strength who may
have to be dealt with by mounted or dismounted
action, or the two in combination.

At the same time, circumstances may lead to
a brigade being forced to carry out an inde-
pendent r61e. It will then have to reconnoitre
with great care, so that it may only embark on
a decisive encounter with a full knowledge of
the situation. Otherwise, in view of its small
offensive power, it will run a great risk of
suffering defeat, especially when dismounted.

In the defence on foot, on the other hand, a
brigade may be regarded as an important factor
of strength, capable of successfully resisting an
enemy of considerable superiority, as long as its
flanks are protected and the led horses do not
require too large an escort.

On approaching the enemy, the brigade must
form column of troops from column of route in
good time and the regiments must be deployed on
the frontage and in the formations demanded
by the situation. In such cases a reserve must
always be detailed. The allotment of different
r61es in the fight to the various regiments or
groups will form the framework for the tactical
deployment. In all attacks the brigade or its
component parts must always adopt the formation
in lines. Where there is blind ground to a flank,
a forward 6chelon must be formed which will
co-operate concentrically in the charge. In the

TEtE VARIOUS UNITS IN THE EIGHT 243

attack on foot, too, it will often be advantage-
ous to Echelon detachments forward under due
protection, in order to envelop the enemy's
position.

In the combat of detachments of all arms,
and especially in pursuit, considerable perform-
ances must be expected of a brigade. A timely
charge or the employment of its fire power
in an effective direction may bring about a
decision.

The division of six regiments, under circum-
stances where its full strength can be employed
in the charge, represents, even against troops
using the rifle, a very considerable fighting power,
which can, if judiciously handled and launched
at the right moment, have a decisive effect, even
in a battle of armies.

In independent missions it must be remembered
that a complete regiment of four squadrons with
15 files per troop will represent 400 rifles at most.
In war, however, this figure will never be reached.
Wastage on the march and the provision of the
necessary detachments and patrols, weaken
squadrons very considerably. We must further
remember that in every great battle a mounted
reserve will always have to be detailed, while,
in addition to this, detachments such as recon-
noitring squadrons, escorts to transport, reporting
centres, and signal stations, will generally fail
to rejoin in time for the battle. Thus the

244 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

division will seldom actually be able to reckon
on more than l^OOO to 1,500 rifles in the firing-
line.

Even counting on the co-operation of artillery
and machine-guns, which the enemy will also
have at his disposal, this represents no great
oflfensive strength. It is therefore necessary to
be quite clear in our minds that only weak de-
tachments can be attacked with prospect of
success.

A cavalry division is greatly handicapped by
these circumstances in carrying out the rdle
which may be assigned to it in the course of
operations. The resistance of a body of equal
strength where circumstances demand a dis-
mounted attack can thus never be overcome.

Mounted, however, it is quite another matter.
A well-trained German cavalry division, handled
according to sound tactical principles and schooled
to charge in close formation, may attack even
a stronger enemy regardless of consequences.

Should the task at issue demand a larger force,
several divisions must be united in a cavalry
corps. In the battle of all arms such a corps,
either by the charge or by employment of its
fire power, may aim at decisive results. For
the conduct of independent strategic missions
fire power is an important factor. As in this
case the number of men detached, etc., will be
divided between the divisions, a strength of 3,500

THE VARIOUS UNITS IN THE FIGHT 245

rifles can at times be reached in a corps of two
divisions.

For the division, as for the corps, the framework
of the tactical deployment depends upon the
commander's tactical plan, so too does the allot-
ment of duties in the fight to the various units,
divisions, brigades, and regiments, or to the tacti-
cal groups, advanced guard, main body, reserve,
etc., and any attempt at retaining the command
in one hand is obviously out of the question.
Stress has already been laid on the necessity
for early deployment, and once this is effected,
the various subdivisions of the force must take
their own independent measures for carrying out
the r61es that devolve upon them.

On the other hand, neither in the fight of the
independent cavalry nor in the great battle should
a unit be allowed to become isolated in the combat.
The necessary combination must always be pre-
served. United action, however, is only possible
if subordinate leaders never lose sight of the
general purpose of the fight, and continually
bear in mind the necessary interchangeable re-
lations of the various tactical methods.

In war it will seldom be possible either to under-
take or to carry out the very best course of action,
but will generally be unnecessary, for we may
certainly count on numerous errors and vacilla-
tions on the part of the enemy, especially in the
case of cavalry warfare.

246 EMPLOYMENT IN WAR

It is of far greater importance that any plan
once undertaken should be energetically carried
through to a conclusion.

Success in war is fii'st and foremost a matter
of character and will. The indomitable will to
conquer carries with it a considerable guarantee
of success.

The determination to win, cost what it may,
is therefore the first and greatest quality required
of a cavalry leader — and the offensive is the
weapon with which he can best enforce his will.

Second Part

THE TRAINING OF CAVALRY

IN PEACE

npHE principles which I have endeavoured to
-^ develop in the last chapter afford, in my
opinion, sufiGLcient foundation upon which to
build up a system of peace training; for, the
the closer this approximates to war conditions
and the more thoroughly it prepares for war,
the better will it fulfil its object.

This point of view is apparently an obvious
one ; but attention has to be continually drawn
to it, as the usages of peace time have a habit
of pushing themselves more and more into
prominence, until they assume the appearance
of war conditions, and begin to be regarded as
such.

There is, of course, a wide divergence of
opinion as to what is suitable for war, and war
itself can alone decide which conception is the
true one. At the same time, certain assistance
can be drawn from a close study of military
history and from peace exercises cc^rriecl out

248 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

according to the fundamental principles of war.
That for which a use can never be found on
the manoeuvre-ground, or that which never
proves its desirability or utility there, may be
reasonably discarded as unsuitable for war.

Regarded from this point of view, our present
Regulations contain many instructions that appear
to be adapted only to drill-grounds, large and
small, and I cannot bring myself to recognise
them as adequately fulfilling the demands of
war conditions. They belong still to the equip-
ment of the past, and I would have wished not
to have met them again — at all events, not in
the Regulations. For the needs of war are so
real, so unmistakable, and so great, that to
adequately fulfil them will claim the whole of
the time available for training, and there will
be no kind of leisure to teach the troops things
which will scarcely find application in war, and
which must, under certain circumstances, tend
to confuse their judgment.

It need scarcely be emphasised that the
training of troops according to war conditions,
if it is to stand the test of war, must be based
in a uniform individual training of man and
horse. The individual eflBciency of man and
horse, necessary as it was in the past, is doubly
so in these days, when the r61e of cavalry no longer
finds its chief expression essentially in the battle
of masses, but rather in the duties of reconnais-

TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE 249

sance, patrols, the service of reporting, and the
divisional cavalry, in all of which the independent
action of every man as a dismounted rifleman
is required.

Individual training has therefore a douhle
object. Firstly, the horses must be so trained
that they will cross country quietly, surely, and
easily, with full marching kit, singly, or in close
order ; they must be obedient and tractable ; and
they must remain under complete control of the
rider, even in the most difficult country, at the
fastest pace, and in single combat. Secondly,
the men must not only acquire the knowledge
and readiness necessary for the performance of
their duties, but must be formed into bold,
determined, and reliable soldiers, who can think
for themselves and appreciate circumstances. To
hold his own in war the cavalryman must be
inspired by devotion, daring, and the spirit
of enterprise, and be possessed with the de-
termination to conquer the enemy whenever met
with.

One of the most powerful auxiliaries to such
a training is horsemanship. It steels the character
and promotes presence of mind and resolution.
Great stress should therefore be laid upon making
the men into bold horsemen. No opportunity
should be missed of furthering this end and of
inculcating self-confidence and independence in
the saddle, so thftt men y(}^X b? able to make

250 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

•

full use of their weapons without interfering
with their horses or losing control over them.
In the same manner the soldier must be trained
in musketry. He must have that complete con-
fidence in his weapon which can only be acquired
by the good shot. Bifle in hand, he must feel
himself superior to any adversary, and, even in
moments of the greatest danger, retain his presence
of mind and his will to conquer.

To attain such results, not only must manly
self-reliance be instilled into the hearts of the
men, but they must be supported by discipline,
which alone can make them into soldiers. Not
that dead discipline inculcated by drill, which
results in the performance of duty uncon-
sciously and by habit, but a living discipline to
which the men submit with full confidence in
the excellence of the Regulations and the
superiority of their officers ; which allows a man
to be proud to be a soldier, and to do his duty
under all circumstances without superintendence,
even when left alone with his task ; the discipline
which ensures the straining of every nerve in the
cause of duty, and expects faithfulness, even unto
death.

To promote these qualities in men and troops —
for the latter have their own moral existence —
must be the main object of all peace exercises.
Above all must the spirit be kept superior to
the form. Exorcises should never be allowed tq

TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE 261

lapse into routine, but continual attention must
be paid to the individuality of man and horse,
and to the full development of their capabilities.

Especial care is necessary in the selection and
training of all superiors. The good training of
troops in peace depends upon them and the spirit
with which they are inspired. In war, moreover,
the performances of the troops are first and fore-
most dependent on the manner in which they are
led. It must therefore be earnestly urged that
all leaders thoroughly master not only the letter,
but the spirit of the duties they have to carry
out, so that they may be capable of independent
action in accordance with the intentions of the
higher leading when definite instructions and
orders fail to reach them. Success in battle, as
in field-training, depends to a considerable degree
upon the initiative of subordinate leaders. The
officer should also cultivate certain personal
human relations with his men, for these form the
strongest weapon of discipline, and one which
will not fail at the most critical times. Such per-
sonal relations also form, as experience has always
shown, the best means of furthering training.

In this spirit must instruction progress in
logical sequence from the easy to the more
difficult without lapses into pedantry. It will
follow its successive stages right up to the train-
ing of division and corps. Yet the perfection of
the individual training must never be lost sight

252 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

of, even during the exercises of these larger
formations.

Especial importance must therefore be attached
to the training of remount and recruit. Faulty
and incomplete instruction in these early days will
show its ill- effects throughout the whole period
of service. Faults that creep in during this
period can seldom be completely eradicated,
still less is it possible to compensate for them
by collective training. Throughout the whole
period of service, therefore, continual search must
be made for any such faults, in order that they may
be corrected before it is too late. The view that
the period of individual training ceases with the end
of the winter months must be abandoned. The
young horses especially must continue their train-
ing according to the stage of proficiency reached.

The training of man and horse must progress
simultaneously, the one supplementing the other.
Similarly, too, the training in riding and in
musketry should go hand in hand and receive
equal attention from the commencement.

For the rest, the importance attached to the
various branches of training, and the time devoted
to them, should be measured according to their
actual value in war.

In tactical training it should never be lost sight
of that in modern war the chief duty of cavalry
will consist of reconnaissance and screening ; that
the cavalry fight, in by far the greater number

TRAINING Oi* CAVALRY IN PEACE 253

of cases, is not only a means towards the destruc-
tion of the enemy, but has also another and
distinct object, that of observing and reporting
the enemy *s dispositions and movements. Every
endeavour must therefore be made towards turn-
ing the cavalry into good reconnoitring troops
which will not fail, even in the most difficult
situation, to keep the Head Quarters supplied with
information.

For the same reason it is recommended that the
drill period be not too sharply divided from the
field-training period, as is, unfortunately, too
often the case. It is still the custom for the
squadron leader to go on leave during the im-
portant part of field-training. This is quite
wrong, as drill is much easier to teach than field-
training. Field-training and drill must go hand
in hand, drill and field-training days being inter-
changeable wherever practicable. Such procedure
also helps to keep the horses fit, affording, as it
does, an opportunity for recovery from lesser
injuries received in field-training.

Finally, I should like to utter a warning against
endeavouring to keep troops up to the same
standard of war training throughout the year.
There are still senior officers who are not content
unless field-training begins again immediately after
manoeuvres and cavalry are detailed to assist at
all sorts of infantry exercises, thus often im-
bibing quite false notions of war. Nothing does

264 TRAINING OP CAVALRY IN PEACE

so much harm to cavalry training as proceedings
of thijs kind.

The troops should certainly not go to sleep in
winter. After a certain period of rest it is abso-
lutely necessary that the cavalry be allowed
some time that can be devoted entirely to indi-
vidual training, and during which nothing else
is undertaken, while the horses are given an
opportunity of recovering from the fatigues of the
summer. This is the period from the date of
joining of the recruits until about the middle or
end of January. During this period are laid the
foundations of an efficient cavalry. If the instruc-
tion in riding is continually interrupted during
these months the training of the horses must
eventually suffer lamentably.

Later on in the winter, practice in patrol work,
and even a few field exercises on a larger scale,
will be less harmful, as the older horses should
by then have regained their condition. But field-
training must on no account be over-done during
the winter, for it must always be borne in mind
that good horsemanship is the necessary prelimi-
nary to all other cavalry work.

As regards the various branches of training, I
am of course conscious that there is not much
to say that is new on the subject, and that,
having already discussed many of the essentials
in earlier works, it will be difficult to avoid
repetition.

TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE 255

If, in spite of this, I deal more closely with
this subject, I do so with a distinct object in
view.

I will endeavour, in accordance with the demands
of modem war, to give a short survey of the course
of practical training in the cavalry, and at the
same time to discuss certain important questions
which do not seem to have received sufficient
attention in the arm. I hope thereby to do some-
thing towards bringing about a uniformity of the
principles of training in the cavalry. It is not
the intention to limit the initiative of the various
commanders; that will find ample scope in the
individual dealings with man and horse, in indi-
vidual arrangements of duties, and in the spirit
in which these matters are carried out. I should,
however, like to do something towards rendering
the same general principles uniform and the
same instructions evervwhere eifective. In the
different regiments of our army, horsemanship
and field-training stand on entirely diiferent
planes. In drill, too, there are wide differences
in the demands made on the troops, and in the
method of their fulfilment, the latter being often
very indifferent.

If we are to expect great performances from
the arm in war, and if we are going to depend
upon it, every part must be of uniform value,
trained in one school of thought towards a single
end.

256 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

I have therefore been, and still am, of the
opinion that it would be advisable to add to the
Regulations a special chapter containing a number
of fundamental instructions for training, and not,
as has unfortunately again been done, to put
these instructions together with instructions for
war in one volume, which is intended to determine
the methods of peace training. The separation
of the manoeuvre regulations from the " Field
Service Manual '* offers an instructive analogy.
Nowhere is to be found in one place on the one
hand what is required for war, and on the other
what is required for peace. The instructions for
peace training are defective and disconnected.
Indeed the exigencies of peace training appear to
have frequently influenced the framing of the
instructions for war.

I hope that my work may assist in supplying
this want of a single training-manual, which must
be the more deeply felt, as even the various hand-
books are no longer up to date. I also believe
that my views will be welcome to those senior
officers who are not cavalrymen, and will assist
them in their appreciation of the arm and of its
performances. At the same time, I hope they
will serve to lead the various training theorists
into the right way, and, far from limiting proper
initiative, tend solely towards ensuring a uni-
formity in training. A wide field of action is here
opened for the Inspector-General of Cavalry.

TEAINING OF THE HORSE 257

A. INDIVIDUAL TRAINING AND TRAINING

IN SQUADS!

1. Training of the Sorse

The breaking and training of the horse still
officially follows the standards of the " Reit-
Instruktion." It is, however, no longer possible
to adhere to these instructions in every particular.
Owing to the better bred and generally improved
class of remount nowadays obtainable, the period
of training can be considerably curtailed, while,
on the other hand, a higher standard of training
may be demanded of the horse. Even if the
principles of the " Reit-Instruktion " are applic-
able in general, the book is so clumsy, pedantic,
and unpractical, that, from the point of view
of the training of horses alone, a revision of
the work is urgently required. Such instruc-
tions should be written in a manner so generally
comprehensible, and be considered so practical,
that every young officer will take them daily in
his hand and use them for guidance, while the
under-officers should also be able to understand
and make use of them.

Such is not the case with our present "Reit-
Instruktion." I do not think there are many
officers who have read it through. Its contents
survive rather from being transmitted than from
being studied and applied.

' Compare "Cavalry in Future Wars.*'

17

258 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

Having regard to the departures from the
" Reit-Instruktion," rendered necessary by al-
tered conditions, I think the course of training
of the horse should be somewhat as follows.

As soon as the young remounts join^ they
should be put in work. It should be en-
deavoured, in the time between their distribution
to squadrons, and the beginning of the period of
winter training of the following year, to break
them completely, so that, in the last winter
before taking their places in the ranks, they
require only to have their balance assured and
their preliminary training perfected; and that
the next winter at latest they may reach the
sunmiit of their training in Section lib. Great
care must be taken to prevent single, especially
backward, horses remaining behind the rest in
this preliminary stage, though in the case of
horses of difficult temperament or faulty struc-
ture this will sometimes be unavoidable.

Such remounts, which are thus imperfectly
trained or balanced, should on no account take
their place in the ranks, but must be further
trained by good horsemen, even throughout
summer. The disadvantage of drilling with a few
files short is not so great as that which accrues
to the squadron if a remount is backward in its
training, or becomes assured in its faults. Such
faults can never be quite corrected, and the horse

' About the beginniDg of October.

TRAINING OP THE HORSE 259

remains a burden to the squadron, and cannot
be used for the training of recruits in riding.
Good and accurate drill, too, is only possible
with thoroughly trained horses.

This principle, that only thoroughly trained
horses may be placed in the ranks^ must, to my
thinking, be carried out quite unconditionally.
It forms the necessary foundation upon Mrhich
alone we can build with success.

The essence of the training is to continually
improve upon the individual training of the
horse. Efficiency in the squad must be the
result of good individual training. Even after
the conclusion of the course this must be re-
membered, and continual care taken to check
any inclination to tricks, excitability, or stubborn-
ness that may show itself. Exercises in inde-
pendent riding and leaving the ranks should
therefore be frequently repeated ; it is thus
that the existence of any faults of breaking can
best be detected, for it is only a thoroughly
trained horse that will submit himself completely
to the rider's will. Lance exercises mounted
should also be carried out daily in winter, either
before or after the ride, chiefly in order that the
young horses may become accustomed to these
weapons.

It is of especial importance to endeavour to
promote all the horses of Class lib in the follow-
ing year to Section I la while the recruits' horses

260 TRAINING OP CAVALRY IN PEACE

will be perennially supplied from the animals that
up to then belonged to the latter section. Only
in this manner is it possible to ensure a con-
tinual supply of fresh, pliable horses for recruits,
and it is only upon such horses that men can
be taught to ride well. Not always, however,
can these desirable conditions be realised. There
will be horses which, from faults of structure,
temperament, or the like, can never be placed in
Section Ila. This must not prevent us from
carrying out the principle as far as lies in our
power. We must abjure the habit of only placing
in Section Ila the best trained and most com-
fortable horses irrespective of their age. This
reacts upon the recruits, and consequently on the
efficiency of the squadron.

The horses taken away from recruits' rides will
then come into Section lid, while in Section lie will
be found the rest of the old horses and those that
require a refresher course of training under ex-
perienced horsemen. Difficult horses must, as I
have already said, be taken in hand throughout
the whole summer. Only the squadron leader
who keeps individual training in view throughout
the entire year will be able to bring his squadron
to a high state of efficiency.

Generally speaking, the actual breaking in of
the horse should be completed by the end of
February or the beginning of March, according to
climate. Prom this period onwards it is desirable

TRAINING OF THE HORSE 261

that the horses should be exclusively prepared
for the part they have to play in the service,
and trained to go in the ranks and to adopt the
regulation paces. The drill gallop may thus be
gradually developed. The horses must acquire
the habit of going in the ranks properly balanced,
without fighting against the bit. This is of the
utmost importance for all drill. Only a squadron
in which no horses are rushing, but all go freely,
with heads bent and backs arched, can remain
continually under the full control of its leader.

At this period must be practised the picking
up and maintaining of a given direction, the
passage of natural obstacles, and the increased and
extended gallop. Exercises at a rapid pace must,
however, be undertaken with the greatest care.
A horse should never be allowed to get out of
hand, but must be collected, and not lean on the
bit. Preliminary exercises in thrusting at marks
with the lance may now be commenced. Any
charging or rushing on the part of the horse at
these exercises must be checked. It is also ad-
visable to carry out this part of the training,
where possible, across country, or on the drill-
ground, or at least in open manages.

Great importance must be attached to accus-
toming all horses (including remounts), as soon as
they have reached a certain standard of training,
to go across country as independently as possible —
i.e. without appreciable assistance from the bridle

262 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

— and to gallop over various kinds of ground and
surmount natural obstacles.

In these exercises more importance should be
attached to scrambling than to jumping. Jump-
ing, however, must also be diligently practised,
especially over wet and dry ditches, as it is fre-
quently necessary in the field.

2. Equitation

Instruction in equitation must be commenced
as soon as the recruits join the squadron.^

This branch of training must follow the pro-
visions of the " Reit-Instruktion," at all events as
regards the commencement These instructions,
however, must be regarded as quite obsolete, and
good training of recruits, such as is nowadays
necessary, cannot possibly be expected if they
are followed. This part of the training really,
therefore, no longer follows any particular in-
structions, and discretion reigns supreme. One
thing alone is certain, and tliat is, that much
more can be expected than the Regulations pre-
scribe, if there is a supply of fresh and well-
trained horses for the recruits to ride.

This branch of the instruction needs regenera-
tion before all else. The present system results
in producing dull and unintelligent riders and
stubborn horses, and does more harm than good.
It requires fundamental alterations.

' l6t October.

EQUITATION 263

Training begins on the saddle without stirrups,
or upon numnahs fastened to the saddle-blanket.
The gallop must be commenced a few days after
the beginning of the course. As soon as the rider
has acquired a certain firmness of seat, an en-
deavour must be made to make him apply the leg.
The bending lesson is best adapted to this end.
The men will, of course, be naturally unable to
accomplish it at first, but' it is recommended that
the necessary instructions be given for the bending
lesson as soon as they have grasped the idea of
the use of the leg. The requisite feeling will
then be experienced. Their self-confidence will
also be increased if they are allowed to ride in
the same manner as the older soldiers. With
well-trained recruits' horses this can be quite easily
done, as experience has proved, and accelerates
instruction in a surprising manner. The collected
paces, also, must be commenced as soon as possible,
so that the recruits will come to recognise at
an early stage the feeling of collected movement
and of control over the horse's quarters. Rising
in the stirrups and the change from one leg to
the other must be frequently practised as soon
as the young riders have been given stirrups.
Jumping should be commenced early in the course.
In order, however, that the men should attain the
necessary confidence for this, they must be restricted
to small obstacles during the whole of the recruits'
QoursQ. AH stiflfAess qf sqat is to be aivoided.

264 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

The recruits must learn from the beginning to
conform to the movements of the horse while
jumping, to ease the weight on the quarters when
taking-off and to sit down again gently on landing.

The whole training must be based upon the
individual instruction of the young rider. The
riding in the ranks should also be the result of
good individual training. It is a wrong principle
to allow recruits to ride continually in the open,
although it is one that is frequently followed.
It is rather advisable to keep them in the riding-
school as much as possible, at all events in the
first part of the course, and, if there should be
a dearth of riding-schools, to allow Sections I la
and I Id to work at times in the open. Riding
in the school, where the walls assist the still
weak outer leg, and where the riding of the horse
into the corners demands the use of the inner,
tends to more rapid progress than riding in
the open, although the latter develops the
independence of the man. A judicious blending
of the two would seem, therefore, to be indicated
for the later periods of instruction in equitation.
It may also be advisable under certain circum-
stances to allow the squads to work in the open
for a part of the ride and in the school for the
rest. In very cold weather the men will learn
practically nothing in the open.

If the recruits' horses are reasonably good, the
training on the bridooi). can in this way be fiiushed

EQUITATION 265

by Christmas, and it should be feasible by this time
to practise in rides the bending lesson at a trot,
the collected paces and the reversed canter,^ while
independently the men should be able to ride
their horses property at any ridingnschool pace.
I myself can lay down, as the outcome of expe-
rience, that such results may be attained without
any insuperable difficulty. The rides should not, of
course, last for more than three-quarters of an hour.

After Christmas the recruit rides should be
given the bit. Efforts should be made to finish
the actual training of the recruit, as of the
remount, by the end of February or the begin-
ning of March. By this time the same standard
of school riding as of individual riding and jump-
ing should be demanded of all squads. The
horses and men should all be up to the same
standard. I have, for instance, seen this uniform
standard practically reached in the 10th and 11th
Hussars. Such results can, therefore, be attained.

After the conclusion of this inspection, real
military horsemanship must be proceeded with.
All the men of the squadron must, to this end,
be mounted upon the same horses which will
have to carry them during the summer. Singly
and in small squads, they will also be further
trained in the regulation paces, as well as in the
use of their weapons on horseback.

' ** Kontergalopp," with the horse bent to the side opposite to the
leading leg.

266 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

The greatest importance must be attached to
keeping the horses properly balanced, and not
allowing them to fight against the bit; in the
gallop especially, the horse must be expected
to move with his nose down and back arched,
with a light feeling of the bridle. All the men
must be made to recognise the correct *^ feeling."
Turns must be made by the aid of balance,
without assistance from the bridle. As I have
already laid down in discussing the breaking of
the horse, the fulfilment of these conditions
forms the absolutely necessary basis for accurate
drill in close formation. If the men are pre-
pared in this way, a high standard of training
in the squadron may be reached comparatively
quickly — an economy of time which must act
in favour of the rest of the training for the
field.

One point more in relation to training in equi-
tation. I have formerly, influenced perhaps by
General von Krosigk, attached a certain amount
of importance to the training on the bit. Ex-
perience has induced me completely to alter this
view. The men must, of course, learn to ride
with one hand — but with all four reins in that
one hand. The bridoon assists to lighten the
somewhat heavy handling (which, in the case of
our soldiers, cannot always be avoided), and keeps
the horse's mouth fresher. The men, too, do not
become so heavy-handed when they freq^uently

TRAINING WITH "AEME BLANCHE" 267

have all four reins in one hand. Continual riding
on the bit alone would very soon have a harmful
effect upon the horse's suppleness.

3. IVaining with the " Arme Blanche "

This branch of training follows the instructions
given in the " Vorschrift fiir die Waffenubungen
der Kavallerie." But these instructions, also, are
in urgent need of revision. They should be made
simpler and more practical, and must keep the
immediate object continually on view.

The drill laid down for the lance, for example,
can only be regarded as an exercise to accustom
the men to the weapon. No one could fight in
this manner in war. How this is to be done,
our men are not really taught; and yet the
lance is the cavalryman's most important weapon.
It should be put in the hand of the recruit,
mounted and dismounted, as early as possible.
It is to be recommended that the men carry
their lances on all parades, and be given a
few exercises witl^ the lance before any other
work, in order to strengthen the arm. Lengthy
exercises with the lance induce fatigue without
attaining the object of gradually strengthening
the muscles of the arm and furthering efficiency
in handling the weapon.

By a gradual advance, a thorough mastery of
the lance on foot can be attained in the first
winter of service. Mounted, only exercises pre-

268 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

liminary to the actual thrusts should he under-
taken in the first winter. The perfecting of the
men in thrusting at fixed marks and at a moving
opponent can host he undertaken during the
summer^ so that the men may he already masters
of their horses hefore they undertake these exer-
cises. On the other hand, the older soldiers should
be practised in the use of the lance throughout
their whole service subsequent to the recruits*
period. It must, however, be remembered that
lance exercises moimted, and particularly single
combat, can only be undertaken on thoroughly
trained and reliable horses, as any less well-
trained animal is rendered yet more difficult
thereby.

The training in the use of the sword must
be limited to the few exercises that are prescribed
for it, but must not be wholly neglected. In a
m616e the man will often have to rely upon this
weapon.

4. Training in Musketry

The recruit's training in musketry must begin
immediately he joins. From the very commence-
ment the importance that is attached to the rifle
in war must be impressed on him. By a judi-
cious conduct of this branch of instruction it
will be easy to induce the men to take an
interest and a pleasure in it.

Training with the rifle must be limited to its

TRAINING IN MUSKETRY 269

use as a weapon. Besides the manual exercise
necessary for guard mounting, loading and un-
loading must, above all, be frequently practised.

When the man has thus been taught to handle
his rifle, an advance may be made to the real
tactical training. The result to be aimed at is
that the soldier should become an independently
thinking and self-reliant rifleman. The de-
termination of the soldier to hit the mark, and
the faithful endeavour to do his best unobserved
and unaided, are the essence of success in dis-
mounted action. To this end, self-confidence,
judgment, and boldness must be inculcated in
the young rifleman, and must be continually
strengthened throughout the course of his service.

In the first winter period it should be possible
to train all recruits in dismounted work up to
movements in troops. The individual man has
first to learn the simplest ideas of the instructors,
appreciating country and making use of the
ground, seeing and recognising targets (training
of the eye), judging distances, and setting sights.
The practical training in these matters will
progress the more rapidly, the sooner the recruits
are taken out into the open.

When the recruit has attained the necessary
standard in loading and aiming drill, this must
be undertaken in the open against service targets.
Rapid loading, quick and accurate setting of
the sight, rapid and easy adoption of the firing

270 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

position, steady aiming and pulling the trigger,
even against targets which are only visible for
a short time, must be practised in all positions.
It must be explained to the men what objects
on the ground offer cover from view or cover
from fire, and how they may be utilised as rests
for the rifle.

Picking up of targets and observing while
lying down, must be especially practised. To
this end the varying degrees of visibility of
targets, according to the colour of clothing in
relation to background and light, must be ex-
plained. This can be done by placing an enemy
in various positions, and the men can be
taught at the same time the difference between
attack and defence and the peculiarities of the
two. The man must be taught how he can creep
forward towards the enemy. He must be able,
by a proper use of the smallest declivities of
the ground and of cover, to work his way forward
bending or creeping as invisible as possible, even
in open country.

Training for the firing-line must be prepared
for in files and groups. Here must be taught
the various methods of skirmishing, rallying,
movements at close and extended intervals, the
advance by rushes or by creeping, taking up a
position, loading in all positions and when on the
move, aiming with various sights in all positions
and from behind cover, methods of fire, ceasing

TRAINING IN MUSKETRY 271

fire, passing orders, and recognising the various
signs and signals.

During the training in groups and larger de-
tachments the exercises must take place primarily
in the open. The essence of the actual dis-
mounted fight can at first he hest explained
by using small squads of trained men for demon-
stration purposes. When the recruit then takes
his place in the firing-line he learns to take heed
to his neighbour and to keep his leader con-
tinually in sight. He must also understand how
to cross all possible kinds of obstacles.

The men must also be taught to recognise and
independently to adapt themselves to conditions
of the fight which demand an increase in the
rate of fire, and therefore preparation for a larger
expenditure of ammunition. They must also be
practised under conditions where fire direction
fails, so that their independent action may be
tested. They must be taught early how to conduct
themselves of their own initiative in such cases.

Especial care is necessary in the training of
subordinate leaders, and especially of group
leaders. The latter must be practised in the
use of the telescope, for picking up marks and
for observation of fire effect, in rapid and accurate
judging of medium ranges, as well as in words
of command. It is especially important that they
should understand how to explain clearly to the
men the target and the portion of the target at

272 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

which they are to shoot. Points which lie beyond
the target should never be given to mark those
limits, but only those, if possible, which can be
distinguished in the target itself. This is especially
necessary in the case of an extensive firing-line,
as points of direction which lie behind the
opponent appear to be in a different position
with relation to the enemy from every point of
our own line. All subordinate leaders must carry
out their duties in those positions, that is, standing
or kneeling, whlah the fire of the enemy would
render necessary in war. Stress must be laid upon
this, as leaders naturally endeavour to raise them-
selves in the firing-line, in order to get a better
view and better control of their command. When
under fire, this is of course impossible, and orders
could only be passed from man to man or be made
known by the example of the leader. Besides
all the under-officers, as many corporals as possible
must be trained as group leaders. For this purpose
the most capable of the recruits should be noted
during their recruits period, and trained pro-
gressively in an especially thorough and compre-
hensive manner. They may be placed together
after Christmas in one squad.

During the exercises by troops, the troop
leaders should be assisted by two or three range
estimators. Those men should be trained for this
duty who have a talent for it. To attain a com-
bination between range estimators and firing line

TRAINING IN MUSKETRY 273

that would be serviceable in real war demands
special practice.

All time spent in training in the open and
in tactical exercises will, however, be thrown
away if the men cannot shoot. This must
be emphasised throughout the whole course.
Where possible, musketry should be spread over
the year, if circumstances do not demand that
field-firing be held early in the season. With
this exercise, musketry comes to an end. The
number of cartridges allotted for these exercises
is unfortunately, in my opinion, much too small.
No real standard of tactical efficiency can be
thereby attained.

Musketry should be carried out in general with
great seriousness. In the cavalry, however, there
is a want of well-trained instructors, and most
regiments are even reduced to borrowing infantry
under-officers and officers to assist in their
musketry training, who are then also employed
to teach the rudiments of the dismounted fight.

This is a state of things that cannot last, and
every endeavour should be made to render the
cavalry self-supporting in this direction. The
smaller cavalry schools must make it their busi-
ness to train junior officers as good musketry
instructors, and at the field-officers* course in
Hanover measures should be taken to ensure that
those who are going to command regiments shall
be given another opportunity of learning the

18

274 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

essentials of this branch of service thoroughly
and in detail. If the course at the School of
Musketry could be enlarged to take cavalry
officers, it would soon form a sound means of
spreading the right principles in the cavalry,
which would communicate itself to the under-
officer^.

5. Otftnnastics, Foot-drill y and General

Instruction ^

The object of gymnastics is to make the men's
bodies supple, to train the muscles, and to develop
courage and self-reliance.

Foot-drill gives the man the necessary military
bearing, and compels him to control his limbs
properly, thus furthering discipline and the instruc-
tion in those movements which are necessary to him
when dismounted for garrison duty and parades.

General instruction conveys to the man a know-
ledge of all the various matters necessary to the
performance of his duty, and has, besides, the
especially important object of furthering his
intellectual and moral development, and improv-
ing his general education in national and military
history, matters so necessary to the soldier.

The amount of time and trouble devoted to
the various branches of instruction detailed above
must be in accordance with their relative im-
portance.

* " Dienstunterricht," literally " Service Instruction.''

CENEIlAL iNSTfetJCTtOlf if6

Physical training must progress continuously
from the commencement of his service, as the bodily
activity thereby cultivated is indispensable to the
man, both mounted and dismounted. This training
should follow the instructions in the **Turnvor-
schrift,"^ but the men should be allowed to get
on to voluntary exercises as soon as possible,
as the deadly dull system of the prescribed ji4w
exercises is calculated to deprive them of that
pleasure and interest in the course, without which
good results cannot be expected. Especial im-
portance must be attached to vaulting exercises
with the living horse — not only with the vaulting
girth, but saddled and in full marching order.
The rapid mounting and dismounting, so often
necessary in war, can be considerably facilitated
by these means. A new edition of the " Turnvor-
schrift " on these lines is urgently required.

Instruction in foot-drill should be limited to
the attainment of the standard of proficiency
absolutely necessary. It should, under all cir-
cumstances, end with squadron drill, and should
only be practised in larger formations for cere-
monial purposes. The latter should be limited
to the minimum required for parade. Foot-
drill should begin without arms. Side-arms
must only be given to the recruits when they
can assume the proper position, and can march
and turn correctly. According to their indi-

^ *' Manual of Physical Training."

m TRAINING 01? CAVALRY IN PEACSl

vidual progress, the recruits will take their places
in the ranks, and, later, in a troop of two
ranks made up of several groups. Under-officers
should be used as flank men of the front rank
of the troop.

" General instruction " ' must comprise all
duties, and, from the day the recruit joins, must
progress in harmony with practical demonstra-
tions, which it will explain and amplify. Care
must, of course, be taken during the " General
Instruction " lesson not to waste time in en-
larging on things which the man learns by
practice, such as guards and stable duties, or to
weary him by making him learn by heart dull
theoretical complicities as to his duties and the
like.

Such procedure can only tend to dull the
intelligence.

Every effort must, on the contrary, be made
to cultivate the power of individual thought
and to widen the horizon. It is impossible to
go too far in this direction, as the intellectual
advancement of the men is of assistance in all
branches of training, not only directly in the
greater ease with which they assimilate know-
ledge, but more especially indirectly by increasing
their powers of judgment.

Instruction in field-training is, of course, of
great importance. It is a common fault to
commence with detailed instructions, instead of

GENERAL INSTRUCTION 277

first presenting to the men a general representa-
tion of war and its necessities. The recruits
can thus only grasp with difficulty the general
connection of a matter which up to now has
been entirely foreign to them, and the instruc-
tion culminates in a mechanical committal to
memory of matters the truths of which do not
dawn on the understanding until later on when
practice has made them clear. The exact opposite
of this procedure should be aimed at. The man
must be able to enter at once on his practical
course with his understanding cleared, and try
to confirm ior himself by practice the knowledge
gained. It is therefore advisable, during the
winter, to devote the time allotted for theoretical
instruction in field-training to elementary ex-
planations of the necessary tactical ideas after
the manner of the war game, either on the map,
or by the aid of sand models, and care must be
taken even here to deal with distances that corre-
spond to service conditions. The garrison field-
days later on in the year accustom the men too
much to short distances and minor situations,
such as in nowise correspond with the conditions
of modern war, and often render the further
training, carried out under service conditions,
a matter of greater difficulty. It should rather
be the aim of theoretical instruction and of
garrison field-days to pave the way for further
training.

278 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

The course can be made especially instructiye
if the teacher is in a position to enliven his
lectures by means of real, war experiences and
events. This demands considerable historical
knowledge. Unfortunately there is no purely
cavalry work in our literature suitable to this
purpose. A cavalry history of the war of
1870-71 would be a mine of lore for the study
of cavalry matters if it could be made to go
into details without at the same time losing
sight of main principles. The General Staff
history contains an extraordinary amount of very
interesting and instructive matter on the very
points in question. The regimental records also
offer us much that could be utilised for instruc-
tional purposes, but the matter is unfortunately
widely spread over various volumes and difficult
to collect. It would be a grateful task to amass
the available material into an historical instruction
manual.

The fundamental principles for instruction in
field-training must, of course, be instilled into
the recruit. The teaching should, however, be
deliberate in its progress, and convey the
essentials to the pupil in due detail, so that the
result may be complete clearness and sureness of
knowledge. In the following years of service the
material may be developed and extended as far
as the intelligence of the men will allow.

FIELD-TRAINING 279

B. FIELD-TRAINING

1. General

Instruction in reconnaissance and screening,
as well as in the service of reporting, forms the
most difficult part of cavalry training, not only
because in peace exercises, especially in small
garrisons, it is difficult to create the conditions
under which such duties would have to be carried
out in war, but also because we are face to face
with a new matter which demands a knowledge
from our training personnel with which it is not
equipped.

Almost all our cavalry commanders, both
regimental and brigade, have grown up in the
views and traditions of the past, and find a diffi-
culty in adapting themselves to the necessities
of the present. Our whole cavalry organisation
no longer corresponds to the demands of modern
war, and our larger exercises are arranged accord-
ing to views which are no longer applicable.
The young cavalry officers are thus being brought
up on lines that have become too narrow to
prepare them properly for the demands of war.
Towards their theoretical training for their pro-
fession, also, they receive but little assistance,
as the commanders who should conduct this
training are not themselves fully prepared for
the task, and are ignorant of how to undertake
it. ;They have often but a hazy conception of

280 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

the larger strategical combinations^ whilst military
history and the lessons of war are generally but
little studied.

All the efforts, therefore, which I have made in
earlier writings towards this end, have in a great
measure fallen upon barren soil, and at the pre-
sent time the cavalry knows no systematic train-
ing to assist it in the solution of those problems
which will fall to its daily lot in war, and upon
which, before all else, rests its efficiency as an
arm. We have, it is true, a new ** Field Service
Manual," and the number of annual reconnaissance
exercises has somewhat increased ; but the whole
of the cavalry can by no means take part in them,
and the foundations for a systematic construction
of the whole course of training are not as yet
laid down.

Endeavour should be made to add to the winter
theoretical work some practical training of the
squadron in its duties as a reconnoitring squadron,
as part of a screen, in outpost duties with the
independent cavalry, and as divisional cavalry.
This training should include instruction as to all
technical means of communication, a knowledge
of which should be common property to the whole
of the cavalry. The squadron should be inspected
in this branch of training just as it is in drill,
for herein lie its most important duties. After
this inspection these subjects should be practised
in the regiment and then in the brigade, for

FIELD-TRAINING 281

which formations also there should be inspec-
tions by higher authority.

Finally, the whole training must culminate
in a double event — first, manoeuvres ; secondly, an
annual reconnaissance exercise on a large scale
for the whole of the cavalry. How such exer-
cises may best be arranged, and how there is no
need to adhere to the boundaries of corps' areas
or to the established tactical formations, I have
already given my opinion.^ Up to now but little
has been done in this direction. Tradition and
force of habit are difficult to overcome, and even
senior officers — corps and division commanders —
do not always supply the necessary inspiration,
as this branch of instruction often lies outside
the limits of their own education. The Inspector-
General of Cavalry should continually show fresh
initiative in this matter, and endeavour in every
army corps, in direct co-operation with the Corps
Commander, to guide the instruction into uni-
formity of method. If events are left to follow
their own course, improvement can only be extra-
ordinarily slow.

But even if we are successful in instituting a
uniform system in the whole realm of training,
we must not expect to reach the desired end
too quickly, but only after years of continued,
purposeful, and consecutive effort. The evil
is deep-seated, as has already been gftid; for

* ** Cavalry in Future Ware,'>

282 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

the available instruments of training have in
many cases themselves grown up under the ban
of antiquated red-tape notions, and cannot be
expected all at once to become the vehicles of
modem thought.

The personal factor will therefore be a weighty
one. What strength of personality is possessed by
those promoted to fill the commands of regiments
and brigades, as well as the position of Inspector,
will be of great importance. But this is a ques-
tion that I, naturally, must not discuss. I think
that the procedure indicated, according to my
view, may be gathered from what has gone
before.

It is, on the other hand, of great importance
that the rising generation of officers and under-
officers should be trained in a modem school of
thought.

I have frequently drawn attention to the
necessity of educating young cavalry officers for
their duties, and I believe that such special
education can best be obtained in the small
officers' riding-schools that are now springing
up. It is regrettable that at the officers' riding-
school at Paderbom, which is in other respects
admirably organised and conducted, no attention
is paid to the theory of reconnaissance, and all
the time is devoted to the practical side of the
question. I feel convinced that the curriculum
might easily and with advantage be made tq

FIELD-TRAINING 283

include theoretical and scientific instruction for
the young oflficers. This system has already been
adopted in the Swedish army.

Three subjects should be introduced — ^viz.
strategical lessons, to give officers an insight
into the movements of modern armies, on which
they may have to report when commanding
patrols ; military history, with particular reference
to cavalry work, which should give them an
idea of the conditions and difficulties of real
warfare, and compensate for the want of practical
experience ; and, as a final preparation for their
career, the strategical and tactical employment
of cavalry in war, according to modern principles.
At the same time, scientific and practical instruc-
tion should be given with regard to the technical
appliances of the transmission service ; all cavalry
officers should know how to handle these appli-
ances, and not only the selected few who have
attended telegraphy courses. :

During stafif-rides,^ which will form part of the
course at the riding-schools, the officers should
be trained properly to appreciate the ground, with
a view to its suitability for attack and defence.
I have already drawn attention to the importance
of this ** eye for country " for patrol commanders,
as the result of an engagement may frequently
depend on the commanding officer having obtained
correct reports as to the possibilities of the terrain.

» " Uebuhgsritten.'*

284 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

It is never really safe to use maps drawn to a
scale of 1 in 100,000 for tactical purposes; and,
having been for many years in charge of topo-
graphical work, I can speak with some authority
on this subject.

The instructions for carrying out this course
are a nlatter for the Inspector-General, in con-
junction with the Chief of the General Staff. It
really seems preposterous that the work of recon-
naissance, which is about the most important
factor in strategical operations, should have been
hitherto left in the hands of absolutely untrained
men. The experiences of the wars of 1866 and
1870-71, which only gave very meagre results
as regards reconnaissance work, point the moral
clearly.

All young cavalry officers should, of course,
attend these schools, and possibly even cavalry
captains and senior lieutenants. The more ad-
vanced of them, at all events, who are likely to
rise in the service, should be sent to Haffiiver to
attend a further course. Final preparation for
the rank of regimental commander would take
place at the field-officers' course in Hanover, and
here the theoretical instruction would conclude

m

with a systematic training in the planning and
conducting of reconnaissances and similar exer-
cises, while at the same time a refresher course
in kindred subjects would be undergone.
The fact of the matter is that the cavalry officer

PIELD-TRAINING 285

of to-day requires a better general military educa-
tion than any other officer, not only for his own
efficiency in time of war, but also to enable him
to train his subordinates on modern lines.

All this theoretical instruction of officers must,
of course, be supplemented by tactical exercises
and staff-rides conducted by the General Staff, in
which all officers should take part. Exercises in
judging ground should also be continued. For
none of the branches of the service is this system
of education more important and more necessary
than for the cavalry, as its efficiency in the field
during peace exercises cannot well be tested
satisfactorily, certainly much less so than that
of the other arms. The main points with which
the latter are concerned are marching and fight-
ing, and these can be learnt by practice, whereas
the conditions for a reconnaissance on a large
scale cannot be properly reproduced. During
staff-rides also, which are much more useful than
war-games, outposts and screening under modem
conditions can be discussed.

With regard to the training of officers for
patrol work, which is so absolutely necessary, I
would refer the reader to my statements in
" Cavalry in Future Wars " and ^* Organisation
und Ausbildung der Kavallerie." The principal
point is the ** Patrol Rides," which were suggested
by me, and have proved eminently successful
wherever introduced. These rides should not.

286 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

however, be carried out only occasionally, at the
discretion of the regimental commander, but
systematically and progressively, so that as many
as possible of the different systems of patrols
can be tried. They should be inspected by the
brigadier. When the regiments of a brigade are
not quartered together, the number of "official
journeys " allowed to the brigadier for his in-
spections should be increased; the present number,
which is sufficient for the other arms, is calcu-
lated only for riding and drill inspections, and no
account is taken of the fact that field-training
inspections should be added in the case of the
cavalry, where it is of far greater importance
than in the infantry.

As officers are trained in the regiment, so
should under-officers be trained in the squadron.
The captain himself should, under the supervision
of the regimental commander, systematically
direct the whole training. The patrol-rides of
the under-officers can commence towards the end
of the winter. During the staff-rides, outposts
and screening duties should be discussed in the
field, in connection with the '^ Field Service
Manual," so that the under-officers may be fully
trained before the practical work in the squadron
begins. The regimental commander, however,
should see that the training is properly and
uniformly carried out. In this way only can
complete mutual understanding be arrived at.

FIELD-TRAINING 287

As regards the practical exercises in the field,
these should represent typical situations, as far as
possible, according to a carefully prepared plan.
The number of exercises carried out is of minor
importance, and the objects aimed at. should be
to present conditions of actual warfare, and to
see that the problems and distances correspond
to modern conditions as far as possible, and, in
general, to clearly indicate the principles of
modem war. The usual childish exercises, where |
the two sides confront each other at close range,
and which end with a charge of two troops, do
far more harm than good, as they are calculated
to create quite an incorrect impression of the
principles of warfare. For the rest, all exercises
should reproduce, as far as possible, the ideas
and conditions which I have endeavoured to ex-
plain in the chapter on reconnaissance and raids.

2. Training at Manceuvres

If manoeuvres are to be of real value to the
cavalry, care must be taken to demand nothing
of the troops but what would be required of them
in war, and to adhere strictly to the spirit of
the new ** Field Service Manual." This has not
as yet, at any rate in the cavalry, become part
and parcel of the system. The new names have
certainly been adopted, but the spirit of the old
Regulations still pervades the dispositions of
commanding officers of the cavalry, and the

288 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

conduct of the arm itself. This is most apparent
in outpost duty, where demands are made on
the outpost cavalry, especially in regard to recon-
naissance, that in nowise correspond to the
teachings of the " Manual " ; and this is the more
unfortunate, as the economy of strength demanded
in the " Field Service Manual '* is absolutely
necessary if the divisional cavalry, in particular,
is to be prevented from failing soon after the
commencement of a war.

The duties of outpost cavalry are limited to
watching a strip of country to the front, and
possibly on the flank, of the line of infantry out-
posts, and to carrying messages between the
different sections of the latter.

Standing patrols are the most useful for observa-
tion work. In the case of an enemy close at
hand, they should be in touch with him, and
should, if there be no close-reconnaissance patrols,
watch his flanks as well; however, with proper
dispositions this should be unnecessary. The
standing patrols would, in any case, have to be
in a position to detect and report any advance
on the part of the enemy's outposts and any
movement of the enemy denoting an advance or
retirement. If the enemy, however, is so far away
as to be out of touch with the cavalry cordon,
reconnaissance work beyond this line should be
carried out by those portions of the divisional
cavalry that are not assigned to outpost duty.

TRAINING AT MANOEUVRES 289

If, on the other hand, the outposts on either side
are in close touch, reconnaissance to the front
should be carried out by infantry patrols. It may,
however, be advisable under certain conditions
to let weak mounted patrols follow such infantry
patrols to covered positions for carrying messages,
or to employ them dismounted in the place of the
infantry.

If these arrangements are not strictly adhered
to, it very easily happens, during manoeuvres, that
reconnaissance work is carried out by the re-
connaissance patrols in the daytime, but at night
by the outpost cavalry. In the morning the
latter is then scattered in all directions and
cannot be collected again. Such dispositions are
also entirely opposed to the teachings of the
" Field Service Manual," and are unsuited to
conditions of real warfare.

In time of war the reconnaissance patrols
naturally continue their work of observation
during the night, and consequently they need
not be relieved by patrols of the outpost cavalry.
In peace time, on the other hand, it is still
considered remarkable if the patrols remain in
touch with the enemy at night, and those that
do so have been dubbed '' sticky patrols." Those,
also, which should really be in touch with the
enemy throughout the night usually get under
cover, and have been known to spend a com-
fortable night in excellent quarters.

19

290 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

In making arrangements with regard to out-
post cavalry, attention should he paid to reducing
the distance which messages have to be carried.
In this respect, horses are not always sufficiently
considered. When outpost companies are pushed
out far to the flank, it would usuallv be well to
observe the instructions of the "Field Service
Manual," and to detail small detachments of
cavalry to the companies for their independent
use, as this will prevent considerable waste of
strength. It will often be necessary, on the
other hand, to protect unsupported flanks of a line
of infantry outposts by special detachments of
the divisional cavalry that do not form part of
the outpost cavalry. Such detachments would, if
possible, find housing for themselves and be self-
protecting, though they might, under certain cir-
cumstances, be given a small force of infantry
for local security.

It is most important that the outpost cavah'y
should be concentrated in good time in the
morning before the commencement of the march
or of the engagement, and that they should
retire in formed order on the divisional cavalry.
This requires careful preparation and instructions;
some practical method must be found which will
overcome the difficulties that now present them-
selves. The various squadron commanders must
act in conjunction with the officers commanding
the outposts. All the higher officers, and those

TRAINING AT MANCEUVRES 291

directing the manoeuvres, must, however, always
keep this matter in mind, so that the present
system, which offers such serious disadvantages,
may not become so customary as to be carried
on in time of war.

Having examined the flaws still to be found
in our outpost system, and which are likely to
adversely affect the arm in war, we find, on
turning to the sphere of reconnaissance, that such
defects are even more prevalent.

The arrangements that are us\ially made in this
matter often draw on the strength of the cavalry
in a manner quite out of proportion to the de-
mands of actual war, and weaken the squadrons
to such an extent as almost to destroy their
fighting value. The weak point is, in the main,
as follows :

It is usual for every order given by a command-
ing oflicer to direct that a reconnaissance should
be carried out, even though the previous order
may have given instructions for one in the same
direction. The cavalry obeys these orders, and
sends out fresh patrols each time the order is
repeated. As the patrols are always told to
keep in touch with the enemy, and as, on
account of peace conditions that obtain, nobody
thinks of relieving them, they collect in one
direction, whilst the squadron becomes weaker
and weaker.

I consider that every effort should be made

292 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

to combat this 1)ad habit. Care should be taken
not to send out unnecessary patrols, and to call
in, from time to time, those that have been sent
out, or, where necessary, to relieve them. I
believe that this would be possible if the following
rules were observed.

If an order has been given which entails a
reconnaissance in a certain direction, it is un-
necessary that this should be repeated in a sub-
sequent order. Other directions rather, which
are indicated by reason of the altered conditions,
should l)e brought to notice, and reference made
to the reconnaissance already despatched. Under
no circumstances, however, should a cavalry com-
mander be induced, on receiving instructions to
reconnoitre in a certain direction, to send a patrol
to a point where he knows his patrols to be
already in touch with the enemy. The necessary
economy of strength can only be effected by
leaving the command of the patrol service entirely
in the hands of the cavalry commander^ who must
be responsible to his superior officer for the carry-
ing out of the reconnaissance w^ork entrusted to
him. The superior officer should only interfere
if he discovers obvious mistakes, or if other cir-
cumstances render such a step aljsolutely necessary.
He must, for his part, see that orderlies and report-
ing patrols, that come in ^remain with his staff, and
that they are sent back to the squadron when
opportunity offers, so as to be available for fight-

TRAINING AT MANCEUVRES 293

ing purposes. This should be made a standing
order at manoeuvres.

All patrols that are sent out must receive
definite orders as to how far they are to advance
in any given direction, how long they are to
reconnoitre in that direction, and when they are
to return. If, at the expiration of such a period,
renewed reconnaissance is found necessary in the
same direction, relieving patrols should be de-
spatched in good time, i.e. before the first patrols
have returned ; and these fresh patrols should, if
possible, meet the returning ones, in order to
exchange notes regarding the enemy. For this
purpose the outward and homeward routes of the
patrols should be prearranged as far as circum-
stances permit.

In mancBuvres, when one officer takes over
command from another, he must inquire as to
the arrangements made for reconnaissance work,
and must take measures accordingly.

When a fresh squadron is sent out on recon-
naissance, due notice must be given to the
squadron to be relieved. The two officers com-
manding must act in conjunction, so that the
officer being relieved can draw in his patrols and
the relieving patrols of the new squadron be sent
out in good time.

It should also be remembered that, in time of
war, close reconnaissance would gradually develop
from distant reconnaissance, and would not, as a

294 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

rule, require any fresh dispositions such as are
usually found necessary at manoeuvres.

During all exercises, especially when a long
advance is heing made and distant patrols are
not actually sent out, the commanding officers
should be furnished by the directing staff with
such information as these patrols would in all
probability have obtained. They should also be
told which of the distant patrols may be assumed
to be in touch with the enemy, and which have
either returned or been captured or wiped out.
The distant patrols, which are. to be in touch with
the enemy, might with advantage be despatched
by the directing stafiP, before the manoeuvre
commences, in time to procure quarters and
receive instruction as to the situation. The
troops should, of course, be informed of the
despatch of these patrols, and all further re-
connaissance will be furnished by the cavalry
commander. Every cavalry detachment must also
know exactly what area it is to reconnoitre,
and what reconnaissances have been, or are as-
sumed to have been, carried out by neighbouring
detachments.

It is a mistake to indicate the direction in
which a near reconnaissance should be made,
without limiting the distance of it. It is the
duty of the distant reconnaissance to locate an
opponent who is advancing from a distance. As
long as the enemy is under the observation of

TRAINING AT MANGE PYRES 295

the distant patrols, the close reconnaissance should
not be pushed forward to meet him, but should
be advanced from one position to the next, within
definite limits. When these limits have been
reached, the close patrols should be drawn in by
the squadrons furnishing them, and fresh patrols
be despatched to the next position.

It would also be well if the directing staff
were to lessen the work by stopping and sending
back to their units such patrols as, by reason of
their direction, cannot possibly come in contact
with the enemy ; or it may even suffice, for the
purposes of the manoeuvre, to assume the des-
patch of patrols in such directions. They might
also be given sealed orders, only to be opened
at a certain place, containing the data necessary
for negative reports and instructions regarding
their return to their unit.

I believe that if such methods were adopted,
and if the patrol leaders confined themselves to
sending such reports as would be sent in real
war, which would include a clear and concise
statement regarding the configuration of the
country, it would be possible to avoid the un-
warrantable weakening of the squadrons now in
vogue, which does not even produce a correspond-
ingly efficient service of communication. It is,
however, true that the art of sending a few,
but good reports, and of sending them at the
right time requires, in the lea4er of the patrol,

296 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

sound tactical judgment, and a training that is
nowadays but seldom obtained.

Senior officers also are often to blame for the
frequency of reports. Appointed to a command
at manoeuvres, they want to know every detail
about the enemy, and the exact minute in which
an advance or a movement is made. Every
little detachment must be reported, and the
slightest movement watched. The result is that
they encourage patrols, not only to send as many
detailed reports as possible, but, if necessary, to
obtain the information in a manner incompatible
with service conditions. This is a deep-seated
evil that is to be seen at all manoeuvres, and one
that commanders should consistently endeavour to
eradicate.

Such procedure reacts upon the commanding
officers themselves by exercising a harmful influ-
ence on their individual training. If everything
is known about the strength, the line of advance,
and the distance of the enemy, generalship
descends to the level of the solution of an
arithmetical problem, decisions of the command-
ing officers being based on complete and established
data. What a difference is there in actual war-
fare ! But meagre information is available
regarding the enemy, and decisions must, as a
rule, be based on a certain knowledge of one's
own plans and a rough idea of the numbers,
intentions, and fighting strength of the enemy.

TRAINING AT MANOEUVRES 297

In the former case, decisions of commanding
officers are the result of calculation ; in the latter
— i.e. in actual warfare — they are a matter for
military skill, or the intuition of genius, which is
a very difiFerent thing. These are the decisions
that officers should be encouraged and trained to
make ; but, unless the malpractices that have
crept into the reconnaissance work are rooted
out, this valuable training for actual warfare is
likely to be lost.

But all that is only by the way. We are now
discussing the cavalry and not the generals, and I
should like to point out the great importance of
training units themselves to report in a manner
suited to service conditions, i.e. to report only
important matters, and these at the right time,
so that the commanding officer may receive in-
formation regarding the enemy in time to make
the necessary dispositions, while at the same time
the reconnoitring detachments need not unduly
weaken themselves by the too frequent despatch
of messages. On the field of battle, reports could
be carried by individual horsemen instead of by
patrols, but of these only a limited number
should be drawn from the squadron, as it is not
possible to rely on their return. They must also
be taught only to take reports to such places as
they could actually reach in war. At manoeuvres
and other exercises they are often to be seen
riding about behind the firing-line in the most

298 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

exposed places, having apparently no idea of the
dangers which they would run in real warfare.
This habit, acquired in peace, may in time of war
entail the loss of many riders, horses, and reports.

The best means of counteracting these bad
habits is to tell the despatch-riders exactly
where to go, and to prevail on the officers
concerned to remain in certain fixed places, as
in real warfare, instead of moving about on the
field of battle, even within the zone of the
enemy's fire. It is true that, by moving about
and exposing themselves, commandei's can get a
better idea of the engagement, and can make dis-
positions more rapidly and better than they could
from the rear; but, at the same time, such procedure
spoils their own training by removing difficulties
that would exist in time of war. Making suitable
dispositions from the rear, with hardly anything
but reports to go by, is quite a different matter from
conducting the fight from the front, where a clear
view of the situation can be got.

As regards reconnaissance and screening, the
principles evolved in the chapter on these sub-
jects hold good for the conduct of cavalry at
manoeuvres.

First of all, we must see whether the cavalry
attached to the different divisions should, accord-
ing to its strength, be only classed as divisional
cavalry, or whether its total strength is such as
to entitle it to be considered as army cavalry.

TRAINING AT MANOEUVRES 299

tjnits detailed to act as divisional cavalry
should not move about independently in the
manoeuvre area, as this would be in opposition to
the essence of their duties, nor should they, on
the other hand, remain tied to the infantry, as
they unfortunately so often do. They must learn
to advance from point to point, to reconnoitre by
areas, to observe from a distance with glasses, to
judge correctly which flank is of most importance
for reconnaissance, and, finally, to occupy during
the engagement such ground that may be valuable
or essential for successful reconnaissance. Regi-
ments and squadrons detailed as army cavalry
should, on the other hand, act according to the
principles involved.

When army cavalry is taking part in manoeuvres,
the leaders should be recommended to include in
the exercises reconnaissance and screening pro-
blems on a large scale. This can generally be
done. Then the merging of the distant into the
close and battle reconnaissance should be prac-
tised, the gradual withdrawal of reconnoitring
squadrons on the approach of the enemy, the
evacuation of the areas allotted to them, and
the independent action necessitated by the fresh
conditions. This stage is instructive, not only for
the reconnoitring squadrons and patrols, but also
for the cavalry division itself. They will have to
decide on which flank of the troops in rear to
concentrate, and in this matter must act in

300 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

conjunction with any divisional cavalry there
may be ; at the same time, they must take into
account the ground and the general strategical
situation. The final decision will, as a rule, have
to be made after duly weighing many varied and
often conflicting considerations.

If a general engagement of all arms should
result, it is important, even though the ground
should not be suitable for a charge, that tlie best
use should, in any case, be made of the fighting
value of the troops. Nothing is more incorrect
and more opposed to the principles of warfare than
an attitude of inactivity in anticipation of the
possibility of an attack. If echeloned forward
on the flank of the force, the cavalry should
make every endeavour to develop an attack
against the flank or rear of the enemy by fire
or shock action, and to threaten and harass his
artillery. The heavy artillery of the field army
will often afford a suitable object of attack,
more so, perhaps, in manoeuvres than in actual
warfare. It is undoubtedly wrong, whatever the
conditions may be, to remain inactive and watch
the other arms struggling for the palm of victory.
^* Activity I activite! activity ! " cried Napoleon to
his generals, and this, too, should be our first
demand from our cavalry leaders.

It would also be a useful exercise if pursuits
could occasionally be arranged for at manoeuvres,
so that the cavalry may learn how to initiate

EECONNAISSANCE EXERCISES 301

them in good time, and to push them home with
energy. The difficulties of pursuits, and the
principles to be observed in their conduct, are
dealt with elsewhere.

If the cavalry endeavours to carry out the
tasks I have sketched above, and at the same
time effects the necessary economy of strength,
it will reap benefits from manoeuvres that will
materially assist its training for war, provided
the antiquated ideas that still prevail are dis-
carded.

3. Larger Beconnaisaance Exercises

With regard to the arrangement of larger re-
connaissance exercises, I would refer the reader
to the proposals that I have frequently brought
forward,^ and that have also been adopted, to some
extent, in practice.

I should like to supplement them by drawing
attention to the importance of frequent practice
in screening. In a war of operations,, which
includes the encounters resulting from strategical
concentration, the functions of screening are, in
my opinion, most important. The American War
of Secession showed in a surprising manner what
could be done in this respect. Stuart's screening
of the left wheel of the Confederate army, after
the battle of Chancellorsville, for instance, was a
masterpiece, and the reconnaissance carried out

* " Cavalry in Future Wars." .

302 TBAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

by Mosby's Scouts during the same period was
equally brilliant. I M'ould recommend the study
of these features of the war, as they are remark-
ably suited to the present day, in spite of the
great change in conditions.

Our cavalry keep, as a rule, but little in touch
with such matters. The new ** Field Service
Manual " introduces the idea of offensive and de-
fensive screens, but the cavalry lacks experience
in them. Offensive screening is usually accepted,
it appears, at all events, at the outset, as being
somewhat similar to reconnaissance duties. Real
screening is but seldom practised, as operations
only last a short time, and usually end with a
cavalry encounter, entailing a lapse into the
usual set piece.

With regard to these exercises, I would point
out that defensive screening, combined with
natural obstacles, and possibly with the assist-
ance of the other arms, is much more effective
than the offensive method, and therefore deserves
more attention, and, further, that there is a con-
siderable difference between a reconnaissance and
an offensive screen.

In a reconnaissance an advance is made in the
direction which the army commander considers
to be most important, and it is left to the enemy's
cavalry to oppose this advance. In offensive
screening, on the other hand, the enemy must
be found before he can be attacked and beaten.

RECONNAISSANCE EXERCISES 303

An advance would naturally not be risked in a
direction that would avoid the enemy's cavalry,
and thereby afiFord it the opportunity of approach
against the main army. This should be pre-
vented at all costs. An advance must con-
sequently not be made until information has
been obtained from patrols or scouts regarding
the position and the line of advance of the enemy's
cavalry. Then ar determined attack should be
made on the cavalry, the force being concentrated
as much as possible for this purpose. It is only
after this attack has been successfully carried
out that the real screening work begins.

The two main points that should be observed
when carrying out such exercises are therefore :
(1) no advance should be made until the enemy's
line of advance has been discovered; and (2)
the forces should be distributed, after the defeat
of the enemy, on a broad front, in accordance
with the requirements of the screening duties,
while the enemy's beaten cavalry must be care-
fully watched, to prevent its further activity.

With regard to defensive screening, it is
necessary above all, first, to occupy with
sufficient strength all passages over the natural
obstacle that has been selected, and to effect a
tactical disposition of the forces that will enable
them to do a maximum of work with the expendi-
ture of a minimum of strength, making the
greatest possible use of field entrenchments ;

304 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

secondly, to so dispose the reserves that they
will be quickly available to strengthen any
threatened point ; and lastly, to arrange a system
of communication along the whole screening-line,
employing any suitable technical appliances in
such a manner that the system will continue to
operate even though the enemy's patrols should
break through the line. It must be possible
also to communicate quickly and safely to the
troops in rear, so that any detachments of the
enemy that might break through the line may be
intercepted. The cavalry telegraph, in fact any
kind of telegraph, is the least sure method of com-
munication, particularly in the enemy's country,
owing to the ease with which it can be cut.
There must, at any rate, be other means of
rapid communication besides the telegraph, such
as flag signals or the light-signal.

In screening work, balloons are often very
useful for discovering the direction in which the
enemy is advancing ; they are more suited to
stationary work, especially behind a protected
area, than to active operations. The reconnais-
sance and the action of the cavalry could then
be based on the information received from the
balloons. It will, unfortunately, seldom happen
during such manoeuvres that a balloon is avail-
able, but all the necessary technical appliances for
communication should certainly be at hand.

The value of all these exercises, especially

RECONNAISSANCE EXERCISES 305

in the case of reconnaissance, is largely de-
pendent on the manner in which the enemy is
represented. The best plan is, of course, to place
real troops at their full strength opposite to
one another, but this is scarcely practicable,
on account of the expense entailed. Even the
Imperial Manoeuvres do not faithfully represent
modern armies and distances, but only reproduce
portions of great operations on a reduced scale.
The fact of the matter is that it is impossible,
in time of peace, to set on foot anything ap-
proaching the numbers of men, or to cover any-
thing like the extent of country, necessary to
at all correspond with the conditions of modern
warfare. The only feasible plan is to indicate
columns of the army, and even large bodies of
cavalry, by flagged troops ; but it is well to place
real troops at the head of these columns, so that
they may form the vanguard, and may send
out the full number of patrols and outposts, at
all events to the front. The reconnoitring organs
would thus, at any rate to the front, be con-
fronted by an enemy disposed as in real warfare.
I need hardly say that both sides should send
out these reconnoitring detachments, as far as
possible, at full strength ; no advantage can
possibly be derived from the exercises if this is
not done.

It is also very important to. put the divisional
cavalry into the field, where possible at full

20

306 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

strength, as the difficulties that beset the recon-
noitring patrols will only then become apparent.
This divisional cavalry need only send out a
limited number of these patrols, as they are, as
a rule, not absolutely necessary in such exercises,
but the work of screening should receive careful
attention. The division should therefore be sur-
rounded by a screen of security patrols, and all
points from which the enemy's patrols might
observe the columns should be occupied. If
these columns are on the march, the security
patrols should advance in " bonds successifs," to-
gether with the divisional cavalry, from one line
of observation to the next, and thus prevent any
possible reconnaissance on the part of the enemy.
If the ground on the line of advance is suited
to defensive screening, this method should be
adopted, and all the enemy's patrols and despatch-
riders seen should be hunted down. When the
hostile reconnoitring patrols have been driven back
behind their own screens or outposts, measures
should be taken to prevent their re-issue. If the
enemy's patrols endeavour to remain for the night
in the vicinity of the troops they wish to keep
under observation, they should, if possible, be
attacked and captured. When operations are
being carried on in friendly country, it will
be well to ensure the co-operation of the in-
habitants in obtaining information regarding the
movements of the enemy's troops. There are

RECONNAISSANCE EXERCISES 307

always old soldiers to he found among the civil
population, who would interest themselves in the
matter if called upon by the local magistrates
to assist, and who would certainly do their utmost
to help their own countrymen and to hamper
the enemy. Care should, of course, be taken
not to go too far in this direction, as unfortunate
consequences might possibly result.

It will also be well to send numerous umpires
with the army columns and their vanguards, and
with the divisional cavalry, and also along the
main roads, whose task it will be to conduct
the mancBuvres as nearly as possible on the lines
of real warfare. Umpires should also be attached
to reconnoitring patrols and squadrons, at any
rate to those of one side, so that there may
be an impartial witness of any encounter. The
appointment of these umpires would have the
further advantage of providing work at the im-
portant points for a larger number of officers,
who would thus learn more than they Avould do
when simply marching with their units.

When the various portions of the army are to
be represented by flags, each flag should be made
to represent a company, a battery, or a squadron,
but the flags should be so disposed as to oblige
patrols to estimate the strength of the columns
by their length, as in Avar there would not often
be time or opportunity to count the separate
tactical groups of the enemy. Too few flags

308 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

should not, however, be used, but rather as many
as possible, so as to produce the eflFect of a con-
tinuous column on the move, infantry and artillery
being clearly indicated. The detachments of
cavalry that would in actual warfare be stationed
at different points along the column might with ad-
vantage be represented by real cavalry, who would
be able to pursue the enemy's horsemen. Artillery
patrols might also relieve the cavalry of this
duty, and, in difficult country, march on the flanks
of the column, thereby making matters more
difficult for the hostile scouts. All measures
of this description would greatly assist in giving
to manoeuvres the character of real warfare, and
in increasing the difficulties in the way of the
far-too-easy peace-time reconnaissance.

Umpires need not confine themselves to deciding
the results of engagements. They might very well
draw the attention of patrols that act in a manner
incompatible with service conditions to the hostile
spirit of the population, or, if necessary, bring
about real or assumed attacks that would iaflict
such losses or damage on the patrols as they
would probably have suffered in war. They can,
in short, do much to give the manoeuvres a
semblance of reality.

The r61e of umpire is also a useful training for
regimental officers. Regimental and squadron
commanders cannot form a correct idea of the
possibilities and functions of their reconnoitring

RECONNAISSANCE EXERCISES 309

detachments unless they have accompanied patrols
as umpires.

It is, in my opinion, impossible to go too far
in the direction of making conditions resemble
as much as possible those of actual warfare, as
one of the great diflBicultics to be faced consists
in sustaining the interest of the troops and the
semblance of reality.

Goethe, in his '*Wilhelm Meister," remarks
how rare it is to find among men " any kind of
creative imagination." Nothing, indeed, is more
difficult than to take a keen interest in hypo-
thetical conditions. This truth applies particu-
larly to soldiers, and the difficulty is one from
which most peace exercises suffer.

Some very powerful incentive is required to
induce troops to really enter into the conditions
presupposed by the general idea of the manoeuvres.
They must continually imagine the existence of
real warfare, with all its exactions and influences,
and they must act consistently according to the
spirit of purely imaginative conditions. It is
during the reconnoitring exercises of the cavalry
that the men's powers of imagination are most
heavily taxed, and that most mistakes and un-
natural situations result in consequence. Even
the officers display a lack of imagination in their
inability to conform to service conditions, to
appreciate the difficulties and dangers of any
situation, and to take them into account when

310 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

making their dispositions, and in their general
conduct.

During the last decade, reconnaissance at our
smaller field-training exercises and manoeuvres
has suffered greatly from red-tape methods and
the consciousness of peace conditions. I refer
mainly to the transmission service. Times without
number, single horsemen arrive with messages
from points behind the enemy or his outposts,
so that the messenger must ride right through
the enemy, thus entailing the certain loss of the
report. It should bo unnecessary to point out
that the best messages are quite useless if they
do not reach their destination.

It is a vital mistake in our army, and one to
which I have frequently drawn attention, that
these single orderlies are sent with messages, and
that even for long distances. Granting that the
improbable might happen, and they were success-
ful in finding their way without maps, often at
night and in foggy weather, through a strange
country, single horsemen would, in the enemy's
country, be often captured or fall a prey to the
hostile population. In spite of all this, every one
is opposed to sending a patrol with a message,
and, when it is done, the patrol's strength is cut
down most unwarrantably. I am afraid that only
bitter experience will teach us the folly of this
procedure.

It also frequently happens that technical appli-

RECONNAISSANCE EXERCISES 311

ances for transmission are used in a most ille-
gitimate manner. Telegraph-lines belonging to
both sides have before now actually been laid
peacefully side by side, and had their respective
termini within the cantonment area of the opposing
armies. Until quite lately, telegraphic messages
w^ere often sent through the enemy's lines.

In these exercises both sides, as a rule, find
considerable difficulty in remembering the assumed
hostility of the population, and in making corre-
sponding dispositions. When selecting quarters,
this point is frequently forgotten, and patrols
spend the night in villages iw hostile country,
and in close proximity to the enemy's canton-
ments, where escape, in time of war, would be
practically out of the question. On such occasions
the prospect of comfortable quarters, where the
horses can be w^ell cared for, has probably more
influence on the patrol leader's plans than mili-
tary exigencies, and the protective measures taken
would probably prove correspondingly inefficient.
The exercises should therefore be so arranged
that the patrols and, if possible, the reconnoitring
squadrons of both sides, advance into the enemy's
country, thus placing themselves in difficult
situations ; and the umpires should have instruc-
tions to interfere immediately if anything were
done that would entail serious consequences in
war time, as the lesson that should be learnt is
how to act in the enemy's country.

312 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

Particular stress should be laid on the method
of writing reports. If instruction in this direction
is to bear fruit, all the details as to contents, time
and place of despatch, and any other important
points must be thoroughly discussed. Our cavalry
still suffers from bad habits contracted during
peace training. It has not learnt to reconnoitre
on a large scale, and consequently pays too much
attention to details of the drill-ground, while
it is unable properly to distinguish between
strategical exploration and tactical reconnaissance.
Even in larger exercises, where stress should be
laid on ascertaining merely the strategical dis-
positions of the enemy, the tendency is always
to report in detail, and as often as possible, while
the relative importance of such reports is seldom
assessed at its right value.

The question of economising strength is often
entirely neglected, especially in the case of recon-
noitring squadrons, just as it is with forces of
all arms during manoeuvres. The force is un-
warrantably weakened by making too many de-
tachments, and is then called upon to perform
tactical evolutions which it cannot possibly carry
out satisfactorily. The commander must learn
to husband his force, even though his sphere of
reconnaissance may be large. He must arrange
the strength of his distant patrols according to
the importance of the mission upon which they
are despatched, and must reduce the number of

RECONNAISSANCE EXERCISES 313

close patrols to a minimum, while being par-
ticularly careful to draw in his patrols at the
right time. He must, on the other hand, realise
the value of fighting as a means to the attainment
of his object. It appears to me that there is
some confusion of thought as to the use of en-
gagements, particularly in reconnaissance work.

Formerly, the idea prevailed that cunning and
speed were the important features of reconnais-
sance, and that the enemy's scouts should, if
possible, be avoided. Now, however, the new
" Pield Service Manual " enunciates the principle
that even patrols should attack the enemy's
cavalry wherever met with. It is rightly repre-
sented that by pushing back the enemy's patrols
and other reconnoitring organs his reconnaissance
is hampered, whilst our own service of trans-
mission is assisted, and that only by a ubiquitous
offensive can an appreciable moral superiority be
attained.

I should certainly be the last to oppose the
idea of bold, self-confident, offensive tactics ; but
the question is whether such tactics would always
be sound policy. In reconnaissance work, the
first object of an engagement is to facilitate
scouting ; the second, to inflict losses on the
enemy. Although the ** Field Service Manual "
is undoubtedly correct in principle, it should not
be taken too literally, especially when the at-
tainment of the object in view — ^viz. to obtain

314 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

information regarding the enemy — might depend
on the result of a fight. If any douht exists
regarding the result, it may be better to abstain
from an attack ; while, if it is evident that a
victory can only be gained at so heavy a loss
as to adversely affect further reconnaissance, an
engagement should, if possible, be avoided. Every
effort should be made to render the tactical con-
ditions as favourable as possible. A fight on foot
is to be avoided as entailing waste of time and
considerable loss. A defensive action dismounted
should only be undertaken when there is a defile
to be held that cannot be turned. Mobility, on
the other hand, must be exploited in every
possible way, in order that, if a fight is to be
brought on, it may take place under the most
favourable circumstances. In such a case, if an
enemy is encountered Avho is either weaker or
only slightly superior in strength, and who is
known to be without support, he should always
be boldly attacked. Stratagems, or creeping up
to the enemy and avoiding his outposts and
patrols, should only be resorted to when it is
necessary to avoid discovery in order to attain
the object in view. During training great stress
should be laid on a proper appreciation of these
principles, as our cavalry still lacks sound tradi-
tions with regard to reconnaissance work.

Thus no greater error could be made during
reconnaissance exercises than to attach the most

RECONNAISSANCE EXERCISES 315

importance to encounters between the main bodies,
but this mistake is unfortunately frequently
committed. It is on the exercise grounds that
these mass engagements can and should be learnt.
During reconnaissance exercises, however, the
strategical conduct of detached columns, and,
above all, the handling of reconnaissance organs,
should receive most attention. These matters
would, of course, be largely influenced by the
result of the main action between the masses of
the cavalry on either side, and this should be
made clear to all concerned ; but the manner in
which such an engagement is actually conducted
by the main bodies is of lesser moment, and all
attention should not be centred in it.

It is, however, essential that the exercises
should be so planned that the mass of cavalry
does not advance in close formation in one group,
and that the reconnoitring organs are not obliged
to carry on the prescribed reconnaissances through-
out the manoeuvres within the area originally
allotted to them, as would usually be the case
where the armies, or their cavalry divisions,
advance directly towards one another. This en-
tails but a very elementary form of reconnaissance,
and is mainly of use as an exercise in co-operation
between the different units. The real diflBiculties
only commence when, during the coiu'se of the
manoeuvres, the detached columns of the cavalry
have to act in concert; when they endeavour to

316 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

co-operate after one of them has come into collision
with the enemy ; when', perhaps, the areas allotted
to reconnoitring squadrons havo been changed ;
or a success achieved by the cavalry of one side
or the other produces entirely new conditions, to
which the reconnaissance organs have to adapt
themselves independently. These are moments
that call for great powers of judgment on the part
of the officers, and for skill and resourcefulness on
the part of the men, and they are consequently
very valuable for instructional purposes. The
relief of the reconnaissance organs, hitherto never
practised, but highly important, also presents
many difficulties of a practical nature. An at-
tempt should be made when arranging exercises
to bring about situations of this nature, which
will be of great service to the troops, and afford
an opportunity of bringing to light cavalry talent
among the officers. Though such talent is often
to be found amongst the best horsemen or in-
structors, such is not always the case, and every
effort must be made to discover and foster it.

The cavalry service is no place for mediocrities,
and it is important that the directors of the
exercises should be fully qualified to carry out
their task, and be free from all dependence upon
Regulation or prejudice. The personal equation
plays a greater part in the cavalry than in any
other arm, yet in no other arm is it, as a rule, so
indifferently solved.

RECONNAISSANCE EXERCISES 317

I should like, in conclusion, to draw attention
to two more points.

First, I would insist on not more maps being
distributed among the troops at these exercises
than would actually be available in an enemy's
country. The fact of being the whole time in
one's own country, where the inhabitants are
ready to give any information required, renders
the work very much easier, and if, perhaps, in
addition every man has a map, the difficulties that
would crop up in time of war are not adequately
represented.

The second point is of equal importance, though
of quite a different nature. The movement of
large bodies of cavalry in time of war entails
considerable difficulties in the way of transport,
and it would be well if these could, somehow, be
made apparent during the exercises. The expense
might certainly be heavy, but would be well
justified, for it is in the cavalry, more than any
other troops, that the drag of a transport column
is most felt.

C. TACTICAL TRAINING

1. General Remarks

The squadron is the tactical unit when fighting
either with the arme blanche or the rifle. The
training of the squadron for the field and in the
use of these weapons forms, therefore, the basis on
which the efficiency of the cavalry rests.

318 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

The training of squadrons and of larger units
should be carried out without affecting the
general condition of the horses. The quality of
the forage must certainly not be allowed to de-
teriorate during the exercises. A mistaken idea
prevails that horses in hard condition must be
thin ; on the contrary, when they are in good
training and have been properly cared for, muscle
should take the place of fat. Grood condition
depends upon good horse-mastership and sufficient
individual training. Without these fundamental
essentials, drill will only make matters worse,
and as I stated above, the horses would have
to be broken in afresh according to a stricter
system. Thin horses always lead one to infer
great shortcomings, either in the individual
breaking, or in the methods adopted for drill or
training.

The demands that are made on the strength
of the horses should be increased gradually and
systematically, and on no account should the
drill gallop be undertaken too soon. The gallop
should be practised slowly at first, and the pace
gradually increased. At drill the horses should
occasionally be rested by alternating mounted
and dismounted exercises.

Tactical exercises under service conditions,
mounted and dismounted, should be carried out
as far as possible in new and broken country.
If this is impossible in the garrison, the squadrons

TACTICAL TRAINING 319

should spend at least a portion of the period
allotted to training on exercise grounds, even
though it may he necessary to alter the time for
training, so as to fit in M'ith the needs of other
units in the spring. The days should, of course,
be used alternately for drill and field-training.
It would be well if the same principle were
introduced in the regiments and brigades, whose
stay on the exercise grounds would then have to
be correspondingly lengthened.

At drill, ceremonial only excepted, and for all
practice in the use of weapons, all four reins
should be held in the left hand. It would also
be well to lay down, once for all, that in all drill
the men should sit down in the saddle at a trot,
and that rising in the stirrups should only be
permitted on the march, or during long evolutions
in column, and then only when especially ordered.
It is impossible to ride or to carry out evolutions
in close formation when the men rise in the
saddle, as this inevitably leads to a looseness
of formation dangerous in the presence of the
enemy.

When peace exercises are carried out without
any opponent, all cavalry formations should assume
the front to be where the commanding officer is.
This, of course, holds good in time of peace, as
in war the front is determined by the position
of the enemy ; but I consider there is an element
of danger in the application of peace instructions

320 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

to war conditions (13).^ The commanding officer
cannot always be on the side that, according to
the direction of the enemy, is the front, as he
may have to change his position in order to
observe the enemy and to follow the lie of the
ground. In such cases the Regulation in question,
however useful for the drill-ground, might lead
to serious misunderstandings.

2. Training of the Squadron

At the commencement of the real squadron
drill, exercises in files and in sections gradually
develop into troop drill, and here the men ride
at first in open order and gradually adopt a
closer formation. Everything should be practised
that the troop will be required to do when part
of the formed squadron.

Great attention should be paid to the training
for the attack against cavalry, first in single rank,
then in two ranks knee to knee. Long gallops,
such as would be necessary in the attack on
firing troops, also require careful preparation. It
is important that the men should learn to close in
for the charge, without disturbance or crowding.
If, however, there is to be a long gallop, they
should ride in quite loose order. Exercises en-
tailing prolonged advances and evolutions at full

***... The /ron< is that side on which the leader is.
*' The terms * right ' and ' left ' flank are used with reference to the
direction of the enemy. ..."

TRAINING OV THE SQUADRON 321

speed with closed ranks should not be carried
out more often than necessary, and should only
be commenced when the men have their horses
under complete control.

Jumping and scrambling over obstacles should
also be practised, at first in single rank and
extended. There should be opportunities for
practising scrambling near the garrisons. The
Regulations on this subject (46 and 104)^
should, in my opinion, be improved on, as they

' " . . . Should obstacles be met with, the squadron leader must
choose the best method (jumping or scrambling) and the most suit-
able formation for negotiating them. In the larger formations it
wiU be advisable to allow detachments to approach the obstacle at
several points. To this end the formation may for a time be broken
up. Scrambling will be used more frequently than jumping, and
is better adapted to tired horses."

"... Jumping and scrambling must iirst be practised extended
in single rank. The necessary obstacles (ditches— wet, if possible —
walls, logs, hurdles, sunk roads, or pits) must be available on the
drill ground. Places where horses can be taught to scramble must
be sought in the neighbourhood of the garrison and made use of.

** Jumping in single rank must be succeeded by jumping by troops,
in line, and finally in columns of troops.

*' The squadron leader gives the command ' Ditch ! — Jump ! ' or

* Ditch !— Scramble ! ' ('Wall!' * Hedge!' etc.) In column of
troops the leaders repeat the word of command.

" On the caution * Wall ! ' etc., the troop leaders and front rank
increase the pace, so as to give the rear rank room to jump, and for
their horses to see the obstacle. Immediately after jumping, the
front rank must take up the original pace, and the rear rank close
up to its proper distance.

**When jumping in line the squadron leader may increase the
distance between ranks by the command ' Hear rank take ten horses'
lengths' distance ! ' When jumping in column of troops, single rank
may be formed when necessary on the word of command * Hear rank
right and left deploy ! ' The troop is re-formed by the command

* Form two ranks ! ' .

** Files should be extended for jumping on the squadron leader's
caution, the flank guides giving ground outwards."

21

322 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

do not distinguish sufficiently clearly between
the peace exercises and those intended to represent
service conditions, so that, although the principle
of the teaching is quite correct, it is not made
quite clear how obstacles that are met with on
the field of battle should be negotiated.

It is very important, even in the troop, to
train not only all under-officers, but also a certain
number of lance-corporals in all the duties of
under-officers, in order that trained men may be
available to fill the gaps that must occur in
time of war. The senior under-officers should
often be required to command d troop. Such
exercises in replacing casualties should be fre-
quently practised during drill. The system of
retaining the same troop leaders and flank guides,
so useful for inspection purposes, should be finally
abolished.

As soon as the troop is sufficiently trained, the
squadron is formed. Troop exercises can still
be carried out concurrently with the general
training.

When drilling with a squadron in close for-
mation, strict attention should be paid to the
correct position of the horses, which should have
their noses down and backs arched ; the reins
should be quite loose, and turns or wheels effected
by the balance of the rider independently of
them. This is most important in all drill,
and is what inspecting officers should look for

TEAINING OF THE SQUADRON 323

in the first place. If this method of riding is
adopted, the leader always has his men in hand.
If horses are pulling op excited, with their noses
up and their backs hollowed, it is a matter of
pure luck if drill is successfully carried out. The
expert cannot, however, be deceived in this
matter. Men in the rear rank should never be
allowed to attempt to fill gaps in the front rank.
I consider this to be an extremely dangerous
proceeding. The secret of good drill is that the
horses should be correctly placed in line, facing
square to the front, that a steady advance should
be made in the required direction, and that this
direction and the prescribed pace should be
maintained.

The strictest and most unbending discipline
must prevail during drill, and the existing Regu-
lations and instructions should, under all cir-
cumstances, be closely observed. Only an iron
discipline in drill within the squadrons can
neutralise the distracting effects of the rush and
turmoil of a fight between large masses of cavalry.
Such discipline can only be attained by the
thorough training of every individual man and
horse, and is in no small degree dependent on
the personal influence and example of the
squadron leader.

In drill, more attention should, as a rule, be paid
to long advances, during which pace and direction
are carefully maintained, than on frequent changes

324 TRAINING OV CAVALRY IN PEACE

of formation, which are rarely required in war,
easily cause confusion, and upset the horses un-
necessarily. The squadron should also frequently
practise riding behind the squadron leader in
column and line, and quickly forming the single
rank line without word of command. It should
also be able, even in column, to cross country
at a gallop. Evolutions at a gallop may be
necessary in the face of the enemy, and they
are also useful tests of sound training. Tliis
latter consideration has given a certain value to
the wheel-about of troops at a gallop, which may
be practised on suitable ground.

The squadron should learn to adapt itself to
the ground in any formation, and to make the
best possible use of natural conditions for obtaining
cover from any particular direction; it should also
be frequently exercised in riding through woods
and defiles. I do not think much attention need
be paid to a rapid deployment from a defile, as
this manoeuvre is not as practical as it is generally
made out to be ; I regard it as a mere drill-ground
performance. Nobody would, in time of war,
voluntarilv traverse a defile when close to the
enemy, and risk being forced back into it. If it
is necessary to go through, the passage would be
secured in the manner which I have already
described. A too rapid deployment from a defile
usually results in confusion, and would conse-
quently render the tactical value of the manoeuvre

TRAINING OP THE SQUADRON 325

a doubtful quantity. On the contrary, a defile
should be passed as slowly as circumstances permit^
and the head of the column should halt at the far
end. This is the principle that should be adopted
at manoeuvres.

As a preliminary exercise for all attacks, and
one which should frequently be practised over
different kinds of country, a steady, collected
advance at the gallop is of great value. The
crowning-point of all drill, and of the whole
tactical training, is, however, the charge itself,
as on it depends the final result of the battle;
it should consequently be made the subject of
careful and continuous training. Whenever a
charge is practised, the objective and the
character of the supposed enemy should always
be clearly indicated, so that each horseman knows
whether he is attacking cavalry or firing troops,
for his individual conduct will vary considerably
according to the circumstances. All charges
should be made against a real objective, which
may be either stationary or in motion. The
squadron commander would learn most if, when
attacking cavalry, he could be confronted by real
troops. In this case the charge cannot be pushed
home, and the squadron must be halted before it
reaches the opposing cavalry. Horses, however,
quickly acquire this habit of pulling up before
they reach the enemy, and the men, who are
unconsciously thinking of the forming-up which

326 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

is to follow, do not urge their horses on. This
renders the value of the exercise somewhat doubt-
ful, and it would be advisable to vary it occa-
sionally by using flags to represent the enemy's
cavalry, when the charge can be carried out at
full speed.

When charging infantry, the opponent might
be indicated by ** head targets '* or by real troops,
as the actual shock can in this case be avoided.
The same applies to attacks made against artillery,
when real troops may also be used with advantage.
If flags have to be used to represent artillery that
is being attacked, the extent of the firing-line,
and also, if possible, the position of the guns,
should be clearly indicated.

In practising the charge against cavalry, stress
should be laid on the value of momentum and
close formation; it is also desirable that the
ranks should be clearly defined, but the latter
consideration should not receive too much atten-
tion, lest the weight of the charge, on which
everything depends, should suffer thereby. The
stiflFness of the parade-ground must be left behind.
When charging firing troops, the main feature
should be a long, free gallop, somewhat extended.
In all charges care should be taken that no rider
allows himself to be crowded out as long as his
horse is able to keep up with the rest ; the weight
and speed of the charge should, however, never
be reduced to suit the pace of the slower horses.

TRAINING OF THE SQUADRON 327

The troops should be trained to the conviction
that a really successful charge against cavalry
should never end in a mSUe^ but that the enemy
will be either scattered, or trampled underfoot
by the weight of the charge. When practising
the charge, therefore, it should not as a rule be
allowed to end in a m^l^e, but the squadron
should drop into a trot after encountering the
enemy. It will then generally conform to the
movements of the supposed enemy, who will
previously have received his instructions, or act
according to the decision of the umpires. If the
opponent gives way, the squadron commander
should act in accordance with the Regulations;
but if, on the other hand, the attack made by the
squadron is considered to have failed, it should
be made to retire at full speed along the line of
attack until the enemy relinquishes the pursuit.
As soon as the charge lapses into a trot, the men
should trail lances without further orders. If, as
an exception, a charge is to end in a m616e, the
directions laid down in Regulation 233^ should
be followed ; it will, however, be found advisable
to practise this exercise independently, and not
as part of an engagement.

In a pursuit those men who cannot keep in

* " . . . The m^lee, pursuit or retreat, must be carried out ac-
cording to the object of the exercise or the decision given. In the
m^lee, ranks break up on the command * Single combat ! — Engage ! '
and the men of either side ride through each other practising the
thrusts. . . ,"

328 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

touch with the enemy must form themselves
quickly into detachments. Troops must be trained
to do this, and all officers should see that it is
carried out.

When attacking infantry, the enemy's firing-
line, if represented by real troops, should be
passed at a foot pace, and the charge should
then be resumed against the hostile forces farther
in the rear. As soon as it may be assumed that
the fire-zone has been crossed, the troops should
rally, even without any trumpet-call being blown.
This requires continual practice. If there is
only one line of infantry, the squadron should
engage in single combat after the charge.

The squadron should be carefully trained to
rally quickly from the widest dispersion. The
*' Squadron Call " should be frequently used, so
that the men will recognise it easily. In con-
nection with th€ rallying of the squadron, exercises
should often be made with the squadron still
unformed (60),^ but a squadron that has just
been collected after a m616e should not im-
mediately be led against a fresh enemy. That
is a peace manoeuvre which, as I have already
pointed out, does not take into account the
moral factors of real war, and is only likely to
lead to a false idea of the necessity for reserves.

* *'The squadron should be able under all circumstances and in
any kind of country, even when unformed, to carry out quickly and
accurately any regulation movement, and must remain always under
the control of its leader, even when broken up."

TRAINING OF THE SQUADRON 329

In addition to the tactical training of the
squadron, the men should, during the drill period,
be perfected in the use of the lance. The best
way to do this is to give them plenty of practice
in tilting at objects while moving at varying paces,
and also to train them to ride independently.
The best foundation for single combat is sound
instruction in equitation, which enables the rider
to have his horse well collected under him, and
to turn it by the movements of his body without
using the reins, and to wield his lance with-
out affecting his control over the horse. Tilting-
yards should be arranged on the drill-grounds
and the men should practise moving about at
different speeds between the various objects and
thrusting at them from both sides. In this exer-
cise they should not always be on the same
rein, but should be able to alter the direction
by change of balance without touching the reins.
Single combat on the lines of the Regulations
laid down for the use of weapons should only
be practised very occasionally, if at all, as it
gives the men an absolutely false idea of mounted
combat, and accustoms them to avoid the ad-
versary, which should, of course, never be done
in reality.

During the period of squadron drill the whole
squadron should practise dismounted action with
mobile and immobile led horses, until it becomes
thoroughly efficient in the work of attack and

330 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

defence ; but the attack should always be regarded
as the more important of the two r61e8.

The exercises should be carried out in accord-
ance with some simple tactical situation, in order
that the commanding officer may be obliged to
direct the operations according to the principles
involved. The enemy can be best represented by
head targets or by real troops, so that the men may
at the same time get some practice in picking up
marks and aiming. The supposed enemy should
have a certain freedom of action, and he should
be able eventually to take the offensive ; he
should never consist only of targets, and the
engagement should never be conducted according
to hard-and-fast rules, but the under-officers and
men should be encouraged to adapt themselves
to fresh conditions, and to act on their own
initiative when necessary.

In dismounted action the officers should fre-
quently fall out. Dispositions as to the position
and security of led horses should be made with
due regard to the tactical situation, and accord-
ing to service conditions. The bringing-up of
the led horses should be practised at various
paces, especially at a gallop. The question of
carrying lances on such occasions has already
been discussed.^

The tactical training of squadrons should not
end on the drill-ground, and with the official

1 ^* Reflections on the new Cavalry Drill Regulations,"

TRAINING OF THE SQUAPRON 331

period of squadron drill, but should continue
throughout the year, and be perfected during
field-training in varying surroundings.

Judging distances should be made the subject
of continuous study, as it is absolutely essential
for successful shooting, and is almost more im-
portant than marksmanship. If the range has
been correctly estimated, the cone of fire will
still cover the ground occupied by the enemy,
even though the dispersion of bullets is great.
If, however, the sights are incorrectly adjusted,
the good shots, who would have correspondingly
less dispersion, would yield even worse results
than the bad.

Tlie belief should be fostered amongst the men
that they can defeat any opponent if they use
their rifles coolly and keep up a steady fire. A
general impression appears to exist that dis-
mounted cavalry is powerless against infantry ;
this idea should be discountenanced at every
opportunity. The troops should feel convinced
that the conditions are actually the reverse ; there
is no doubt that the cavalry is superior in morale
to the infantry, on account of its longer period
of service, the smaller proportion of reservists,
and the older men in the ranks, as well as the
larger number of officers. When it is opposed
to second or third line infantry, a well-trained
squadron need have no fear of the result of such
an engagement, even against heavy odds.

332 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

3. Regimental Training

Drill in the regiment has for its object the
instruction of the unit in those movements and
tactical formations which would be necessary in
the face of the enemy, the teaching of the
squadrons to co-operate as a homogeneous fight-
ing unit, and the training of all commanding
officers, and squadron commanders in particular,
to make independent decisions and act according
to them (116).^ Regimental exercises should
consequently not be limited to the period allotted
to them in the " Field Service Manual." Officers
and under-officers should be thoroughly conver-
sant with all the Regulation formations and
instructions, in so far as they apply to the regi-
ment, before the commencement of that period.
After the conclusion of the official period of
regimental training every effort should be made
to perfect their training, particularly with re-
gard to operations in fresh surroundings. It is
not necessary to rehearse, during the exercises,
all the evolutions and deployments mentioned
in the Regulations; they arc all based on the
same principles, so that any one who has once
grasped these principles can execute every one of

* ** Regimental exercises are held with a view : to form squadrons
into a cohate whole ; to train squsudron leaders, and teach them to
appreciate nituations; to prepare the regiment for its duties in
larger formations. Dismounted action must also be practised in
the regiment."

REGIMENTAL TRAINING 338

the regimental movements. On the other hand,
all such formations^ mancBUvres, and deployments
as are indispensable in the field should be
practised.

It would thus be superfluous to waste time
and energy in practising deployment from the
regimental mass, as this would, in practice, be
only necessary where dispositions had been so
faulty as to allow the enemy to attack the force
while in formation of assembly. These evolutions
were probably only included in the Regulations
with a view to their theoretical, and not to their
practical advantages. All deployments to the
attack formation, however, movements of columns,
manoeuvring under cover of the natural features
of the ground, flank marches protected by a van-
guard, deployments in unexpected directions, and,
lastly, the advance in extended order, are of
very great importance. The exercises should
culminate in charges against the different arms,
varying tactical situations being assumed.

At regimental training no more drill-book
exercises should be carried out than are necessary
for regulating the movements of the regiment.
The men should be trained to follow the regi-
mental commander without any orders or signals,
and to avail themselves of cover against any
given direction, as this is a useful preparation
for movement on the battle-field, and when the
regiment forms part of a larger formation^ When

334 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

practising the attack formation, on which, of
course, special stress should be laid, an enemy of
varying strength and disposition should always
be indicated, so as to avoid falling into hard-and-
fast methods. For the rest, tactical exercises,
under service conditions, and, if possible, with
an enemy, should alone be carried out. The
tasks should be allotted so as to necessitate
variation from the prescribed formations, and
so as to frequently alternate mounted and dis-
mounted work, equal value being attached to the
two methods of fighting. The hypothetical condi-
tions should be so chosen as to cover as much of
the sphere of cavalry action as possible. Most
attention, however, should be paid to the battle
of encounter in a campaign, as this would most
frequently occur in war, and offers the best field
for the all-round experience and tactical training
of leader and troops.

Only on rare occasions should exercises be
conducted by words of command and trumpet-
calls, but orders should be transmitted as in time
of war. The use of the trumpet and the word
of command are liable to produce parade move-
ments that are incompatible with service con-
ditions. Only such calls should repeatedly be
used as demand independent action on the^art
of the squadron leaders, while the *' Regimental
Call " must be familiar to the whole personnel
of the regiment.

REGIMENTAL TRAINING 336

In all exercises great stress should be laid on
the fact that the squadron forms a separate and
independent fighting unit, while its position in
the regiment is a matter of secondary considera-
tion. The squadron leaders should be made
personally responsible for the maintenance of
cohesion in their commands, but should, at the
same time, be granted all the freedom of move-
ment that is allowed by the Regulations, and
that is consistent with the squadrons maintaining
the necessary close formation. From the general
views to which I have given expression it will
be seen that, in my opinion, the new Regulations
have not gone far enough in the direction of
granting liberty of action to the squadron leader.
They have, on the contrary, restricted this liberty
within the regiment more than would appear
advisable when the ground and the enemy are
taken into consideration. At the same time, the
spirit of the Regulations demands tactical know-
ledge and thorough training from officers of all
degrees, and especially squadron leaders and their
appointed substitutes, so that they may learn to
act on their own initiative. All exercises that
entail judgment and decision on the part of the
squadron leaders are therefore of value for training
their minds quickly to appreciate situations and to
arrive at correct decisions. This object can be
furthered by practising, for instance, the rapid
assumption of the attack formation against a

336 TRAINING OP CAVALRY IN PEACE

marked enemy, without any special instructions
from the regimental commander.

Tactical exercises may he made particularly
realistic and instructive if the enemy, whether
marked or formed hy other troops, be given com-
plete liberty of action. Unexpected movement
on the part of the enemy would then provide the
best indication to the officer conmianding the
regiment as to whether his orders were quickly
and thoroughly understood, and as to whether the
subordinate officers had learnt to act independently
in accordance with his ideas. The commanding
officer indicates the general idea of the fight and
keeps the reserves at his disposal ; everything else
should be done independently by the squadron
leaders. The regimental commander would at the
same time be well advised to get others to set him
tasks, in order that he may test and perfect his
own knowledge.

I cannot say that I attach much importance
to rapid deployment from different formations
to meet an enemy that may suddenly appear ;
they are artificial manoeuvres only suited to
peace conditions. In time of war it is known
from which direction the enemy is approaching ;
he has already been discovered several miles
away, and the troops are disposed in the required
tactical formation surrounded by combat patrols.
A commander who allows the enemy to surprise
him deserves to be tried by court-martial, and

REGIMENTAL TRAINING 337

it is not necessary to rehearse matters which
lead to this end. I have never met with such a
situation during manoeuvres. Leaders must he
trained to acquire a correct appreciation of tactical
conditions, and to use their units to the hest
advantage, instead of wasting time over purely ^ro
forma evolutions that have no connection what-
ever with the true r61e of this arm on a modern
field of battle, and which may be characterised as
survivals of the dark ages.

Flank squadrons should reconnoitre towards the
flanks without any special instructions to that
effect. The regimental commander arranges for
the conduct of the advanced scouts, and it will
often be advisable to place them under command
of an officer or an under-officer. In time of war,
combat patrols should consist of smart, well-
mounted officers. In peace exercises, all young
officers should be trained to carry out these duties.

Squadron leaders should be given opportunities
of commanding a regiment of several squadrons,
while the senior lieutenants should be allowed the
command of squadrons forming part of a regi-
ment. To this end single-rank squadrons may
often be used with advantage, and the regiment
formed to represent a brigade. This provides, at
the same time, an opportunity for preliminary
training as part of a brigade, but the movements
undertaken should not be too ambitious. The
senior officers should also frequently fall out

22

338 TRAINING OP CAVALRY IN PEACE

during drill, in order that all officers may get as
much experience of command as possible.

Particular attention should be paid to dis-
mounted work, and the training of the cavalry-
man for the fight on foot should be carried to the
highest possible level. The regimental com-
mander should be continually schooling himself
to employ his fighting units in a correct tactical
manner, and to issue clear and connected orders
for the fight. This is an aptitude which most of
the present commanders of cavalry regiments do
not possess, owing to lack of training, although it
will be found an absolute necessity in time of war.
A clear plan should be the basis of all dispositions.
As in the case of the squadron, there should
always be an opponent indicated. The correct
tactical employment of single squadrons, and the
seizure by mounted troops of the most favourable
bases for attack when the ground allows of such
action, are matters of great importance. Every
dismounted fight should, on principle, be con-
tinued until the object of the engagement has been
attained, regardless of the led horses, which must,
of course, be suitably protected, and always dis-
posed as they would be in actual war. As in the
squadron, the bringing up of mobile led horses,- and
of immobile led horses by the mounted reserves,
should be frequently practised. Offensive tactics
in the fight should, of course, be the object of
particular attention.

BRIGADE TRAINING 339

4, Brigade Training

The object of brigade training is to prepare
the brigade to act either independently or as part
of a cavalry division. In either capacity it should
be trained for independent missions, and for the
battle of all arms. All tactical problems should
clearly distinguish between these two rdles, and
should present as many typical situations as
possible. But in this case, also, most attention
should, of course, be paid to the situations arising
from the strategic operations of the army cavalry,
and, above all, to the battle of encounter develop-
ing from march formations. The brigadier would,
as a rule, himself set the tactical problems, so as
to ensure to the brigade a systematic and com-
prehensive training that would prepare it for any
eventuality. He would be well advised if he
occasionally got others to set him problems as
a test of his own knowledge, and a preparation
for his task of commanding the troops in battle.
Stereotyped evolutions should be suppressed in
the brigade, but the fundamental tactical principles
should be developed. This is the only manner in
which the full benefit can be derived from these
exercises, for which only a limited time is, as
a rule, available. Inspecting officers should
emphasise the advantages of this method of
trainino^.

Dismounted tactics should receive the same

340 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

amount of consideration as would undoubtedly
be their due in time of war. As a brigade, when
forming part of a division, is of sufficient strength
to undertake a dismounted attack on a fairly large
scale, such attacks should be frequently practised.
In the case of engagements carried out by in-
dependent brigades, the interest should, on the
other hand, be centered on the suitable grouping
of units, in accordance with the situation, judicious
employment of the force, the position and security
of the led horses, and offensive action on the part
of the mounted reserves. Our cavalry officers are
not, as a rule, well versed in this part of their
duties. In other respects the same principles
apply as for regimental exercises, dismounted and
mounted action being practised alternatively or
in combination, so as to give horses the rest they
require; care must be taken that the latter do
not get overworked, but are kept as fit and fresh
as possible. The object to be kept in view is the
quality of the tactical instruction afforded by each
separate exercise, and not the number of exercises
or the amount of riding about entailed.

This period of brigade training is intended
mainly for the purpose of perfecting the officers,
particularly the regimental commanders, in their
knowledge of tactics; and the work should con-
sequently be so arranged as to give them as much
freedom as possible in their tactical dispositions.
It is also well to allow the enemy considerable

DIVISIONAL AND CORPS TRAINING 341

latitude in the r61e assigned to him, so that the
conditions may be frequently changing, and situa-
tions may arise that call for rapid and decisive
action.

5.. Divisional and Corps Training

As I have already said in my book, '* Cavalry
in Future Wars,'* training should culminate every
year in exercises of the division, for we shall
certainly, in the future, have to count on battles
taking place in which large masses of troops are
engaged. In these exercises on a large scale it is
even more important than in brigade training that
all officers should be well versed in tactics, and
that the troops should be accustomed to adapt
themselves to any tactical conditions. Parade
manoeuvres'" should be absolutely prohibited dur-
ing the divisional training, as the time avail-
able is far too valuable to be so expended. It
would, on the other hand, be of great advantage
to occasionally carry out the exercises in fresh
localities instead of on the too familiar exercise
ground.

The tactical exercises selected should include
the different phases of cavalry work. Distinctions
should be drawn, as in the brigade exercises,
between strategic operations and battle disposi-
tions, and as many typical situations as possible
of these two kinds should be created. The junior
officers should frequently be called upon to take

342 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

independent action. The battle of encounter dur-
ing operations is a matter of more importance
at these exercises than at brigade and regimental
training and should receive more attention, but
attacks on an enemy in position should also be
repeatedly practised. I am of opinion that such
attacks would be very necessary in time of war,
and our cavalry leaders have not had much
experience of them. On the other hand, but
few lessons, either for strategic operations or battle,
can be learnt by pitting one formed division
against . another. Such operations generally dcr
scend to the level of formal encounters in which
the events of reconnaissance are, as a rule, dis-
regarded and the position of each unit is arranged
before the enemy has even been discovered, much
less observed. It is far more instructive to
let the battle develop naturally, as will often
happen in war, from the march, if possible in
detached colunms, or from a disposition of the
division by groups on the field of battle; in
the former case emphasis should be laid on the
strategic object which the fight is undertaken to
attain. There is not much to be learnt from
an engagement that has no connection with a
general situation. Such do not occur in real
operations, and are only calculated to convey a
false impression of war, and thus to defeat the
objects of training
Within the above limitations, close attention

DIVISIONAL AND CORPS TRAINING 343

should be paid to the proper use of mounted
and dismounted action, and to the correct employ-
ment of the other arms attached to the division.
In the case of an enemy in position, the dis-
mounted attack should be undertaken by divisions,
or even by corps, in order to practise such opera-
tions on a large scale, a matter which has, up to
now, been entirely neglected. When the division
acts as cavalry in the battle of all arms, the
required tactical conditions should be represented
as closely as possible, and troops of all arms,
especially infantry, should be included in the
manoeuvre. Such battle training should not con-
sist only of charges, but the employment of fire
action on the flanks and rear of the enemy should
be also studied, as such operations would fre-
quently be necessary in time of war. It will be
well to indicate, if only with flags, the reserves
and columns behind the enemy's fighting-line,
and the dispositions of his field and heavy artillery.
In all exercises the cavalry must take the enemy's
fire into consideration, especially during the ad-
vance and approach, and should not be considered
intact when it has been for some minutes under
artillery or machine-gun fire. We should learn
also to take long-range fire into account, and
not to expose ourselves to unnecessary loss, for
cavalry cannot be replaced in time of war.

In cavalry-division exercises the enemy should
be always capable of manoeuvring, and his

3U TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

strength should vary. He should also be allowed
a certain latitude of movement. To produce a
spectacular battle-piece by restricting the move-
ments of the enemy should not be allowed, but
any given situation must rather be allowed to
develop itself naturally on the lines of real
warfare. The directing stafiF should only interfere
where operations are likely to extend beyond the
available limits of ground, or where the object
of the exercise is likely to be defeated.

A cavalry corps is so large a body that no
exercise grounds are large enough to allow of
its combined action without the introduction of
unnatural conditions. At the most, a charge as
in a great battle, or a dismounted attack on a
position, can be carried out. It will then be im-
possible, as a rule, to reproduce more than single
phases of an action. I do not therefore attach
much value to these large corps exercises in
the limited areas available for them. The one
manoeuvre that is of great importance when
dealing with such large formations, viz. the co-
operation of two divisions advancing on diflFerent
lines towards a common battle-field, cannot be
practised unless the conditions are unusually
favourable. None of our exercise grounds are,
in my opinion, large enough for such a manoeuvre,
on account of the long range of artillery fire
and the breadth of front which the two divisions
would have to assume on entering the zone of

DIVISIONAL AND CORPS TRAINING 345

fire of an enemy of approximately equal strength.
If, on the other hand, considerations of limited
space were to be allowed to induce an advance
in close formation, this would produce conditions
entirely opposed to those of actual war.

I do not consider that exercises on so large
a scale are really necessary. Whoever is capable
of commanding a division under any conditions,
can also lead a corps into battle. It is merely
a matter of issuing instructions to the divisions
to carry out certain tasks according to the
general intentions of the commander, who will
himself maintain control of the reserve. Detailed
dispositions are a matter for the division com-
manders and can best be learnt during divisional
training.

If, however, a cavalry corps is concentrated, its
training should be conducted on the same lines
as that of a division. Dismounted attacks should
be practised on a large scale, so as to allow all
commanding officers to avail themselves of the
rare opportunity of handling a large number of
dismounted men in the field, and of dealing with
the various tactical groups, such as led horses,
artillery and engineers, reserves and reconnaissance
units, in connection with a strategical situation
on a large scale. An attack on a hostile force in
position, or a raid against hostile communications,
are the operations which will best lend themselves
to this end. The fight should, as far as possible,

346 TRAINING OF CAVALRY IN PEACE

develop from the march, and for this purpose all
available roads in the neighbourhood should be
made use of as far aa is consistent with judicious
marching.

Corps exercises should therefore be carried out,
if possible, in real country, where they can be
directed according to service conditions. It would
probably be M^ell to combine them with large
manoeuvres of all arms — in Germany, for instance,
with the Kaiser Manoeuvres — but it would be a
mistake to limit the action of the cavalry corps
to the decisive battle and to bind it too closely
to the infantry columns. It should rxxqve freely
on the flanks, in the rear and on the lines of
communication of the enemy, and should operate
regardless of all spectacular considerations in real
up-to-date cavalry style, in the spirit of a Seydlitz
or a Stuart. The directing staff of the manoeuvres
should also endeavour to allot tasks to the cavalry
that correspond to modern requirements, and should
give a free hand to the officer commanding the
cavalry, be it divisions or corps. For all cavalry
exercises, especially those carried out with the
larger formations, are intended, not only to further
the tactical training of leaders and troops, but
also to fulfil the higher purpose of arousing and
fostering courage, the spirit of enterprise, inde-
pendence, and self-reliance amongst all ranks of
our splendid service. This object must never
be lost sight of, although in time of peace

DIVISIONAL AND CORPS TRAINING 347

it should not be pursued at the expense of the
horses.

One of the main duties of all commanding
officers is to keep their horses fresh and in hard
condition, for sound, powerful horses, full of life
and strength, are absolutely essential to the
offensive action of cavalry, and in critical times
will allow of extraordinary demands being made
upon them.

Third Part.

ORGANISATION

"ITORE than once have I had occasion to repeat
•^^ that I do not consider the organisation of
our cavalry a particularly happy one.

In war, the cavalry will move in advance
of the army and on its flanks, concentrated for
the most part in large independent masses ; only
fractions of it will be attached to the infantry
divisions, and these, owing to their numerical
weakness, can hardly be counted as separate
units for tactical purposes. On the day of battle
alone, will all arms co-operate in the general
engagement.

In time of peace, on the other hand, the
cavalry, with its present organisation, must con-
fine itself almost entirely to carrying out the
duties of divisional cavalry. Once a year only,
are various detachments concentrated fdr the
purpose of practising the real r61e that cavalry
will have to play in war.

With a view to mitigating this evil, the
question has frequently been raised in certain

349

350 ORGANISATION

quarters as to whether it would not be advisable
to decide in peace the composition of those
cavalry divisions which are to be formed in
war. Such procedure M'ould, I fear, create a
gulf between army and divisional cavalry, besides
opening the way for a great deal of red-tapeism,
and cannot, on that account, be regarded as a
satisfactory solution of the problem.

In my book '* Cavalry in Future Wars " I
proposed that the cavalry regiments should be
completely detached from the rest of the army
corps and formed into " Inspektions " (corps)
and " Unter-Inspektions ** (divisions), which could
be exercised independently every year, and that
the divisional cavalry and, when necessary, the
army cavalry, required by the army corps, should
be provided by the dijfferent regiments annually
in rotation. There is no doubt that such an
organisation would correspond to the employment
of this arm in war more closely than our pre-
sent one, which is the survival of a time when
conditions and ideas prevailed which no longer
hold good.

It cannot, however, be denied that the practical
difficulties that stand in the way of such a
transformation of an existing organisation are
great, nor must the weight of objection which
would be raised against any attempt at a change
be under-estimated. Army Corps Commanders
would see in it a capitis diminutio, and on all

ORGANISATION 361

sides the fear would be entertained that the
cavalry might lose touch with the other branches
of the service. The case of the field artillery
would doubtless be cited, and the fact that in
that arm the conditions are the exact reverse of
what they are in the cavalry would be completely
overlooked ; for the latter are, practically, always
obliged to act independently, the former never.
No attention would be paid to the fact that,
during those years when the cavalry performed
its most glorious deeds and was most successful
in intervening in the combat of all arms, its
organisation was identical in principle with that
which I have proposed.

Be that as it may, I do not think that such
an organisation could now be introduced, in
spite of the fact that it would be an invaluable
adjunct to the training and strategical grouping
of the cavalry.

All the more, then, should it be insisted that
whatever organisation is to exist in time of war
should be made to correspond with the actual
r61e that the cavalry is expected to carry out.

At the present time we group our cavalry
into divisions, each containing three brigades of
two regiments. I do not know whether a similar
formation is provided for in time of war, but
the Regulations, at any rate, contemplate its use
as a general rule. I have repeatedly urged, and
my arguments have never been refuted, that

362 ORGANISATION

such a division Ls much too weak for the tasks
which would fall to its share on active service.

This is indirectly acknowledged by the author-
ities, for in the new Regulations they assume
the necessity of strengthening the cavalry divisions
by detachments of cyclists, and even of infantry
in carts.

If we consider the multifarious purposes for
which these already weak divisions would have
to supply men, e.g. for reconnaissance and
screening duties, escorts for signal stations,
reporting centres, and communications with the
rear, and at the same time take into account
the wastage inevitable on the march and in
battle, and then realise that such emasculated
divisions would doubtless be forced to attack an
enemy in position, who may consist not only of
cavalry, but also of strong companies of cyclists,
little doubt will remain that my contention is a
well-founded one.

The evil is accentuated by the fact that by
the new Regulations the number of men available
for the firing-line in dismounted action is con-
siderably reduced.

In further support of this view I shall
endeavour to show that weakness exists not
only in the division as a whole, but also in its
component parts. It will frequently be found
necessary to detach a brigade for some particular
mission, but what fighting strength has such a

ORGANISATION 353

brigade after the detachment of all the necessary
details? This question should be considered
from the point of view not only of the purely
cavalry fight, but also of dismounted actions,
such as the independent conduct of a battle of
encounter or an attack on an entrenched position
would generally entail. To ensure success in a dis-
mounted attack requires a twofold or even three-
fold superiority over the enemy, and, in addition
to this, the led horses have to be guarded and
reserves kept in hand. What, then, can be expected
of a weak brigade, such as we now employ,
except that its field of action should be reduced
to insignificant limits ? I am therefore convinced
that, if any real work is to be achieved by a
brigade, its war strength should be raised to three
regiments. A tripartite formation possesses un-
doubted advantages under any circumstances,
and would go far towards regenerating the some-
what antiquated system that still prevails, and
would facilitate the adoption of more up-to-date
tactical methods.

If, in spite of this, the authorities should still
adhere to the existing composition of cavalry
divisions, it would evidently be with the object
of surmounting the present difficulties by oc-
casionally forming cavalry corps. In my opinion
this solution of the question is not an entirely
happy one. It does not help towards strengthening
the very weak brigades, while one strong division

23

354 ORGANISATION

under a single command is of far more use than
two weak ones. The command of a corps, too, is
not such a simple matter as is usually supposed,
unless it has been practised in peace time. The
fact of appointing an officer to command two
divisions that have been linked together is not
enough. A very large staff is required, and the
Corps Head Quarters must be provided with
ammunition, supplies, and technical appliances
for communication, unless it wishes soon to find
itself absolutely dependent on the divisions, and
obliged to conform to the particular and possibly
quite unsuitable dispositions that they have made.
These difficulties do not appear so formidable
in peace time as they would on service, but the
military history of all ages teaches us that friction
in time of w^ar is always much greater than is
expected ; consequently every opportunity of
removing the possible causes of such friction
should be eagerly seized upon.

The question of supplies and reserve ammunition
will also be a more fruitful source of difficulty
than we are apt to suppose. It is my firm
conviction that cavalry can neither exist on the
supplies that can be requisitioned in the theatre
of war, nor obtain what it requires from the
supply columns and dep6ts in rear of the army;
nor, indeed, will it be able to replenish its
ammunition from the army reserve without inter-
rupting the course of its action. There can be

ORGANISATION 355

no two opinions on this matter. Unless the
cavalry is given the necessary transport organisa-
tion to correspond to the conditions of modern
war, it cannot be expected to justify the hopes of \
those who so confidently expect great performances
from it.

In the arrangements for concentration the
existence of a certain number of army cavalry
units is no doubt of great advantage, especially
if their supplies need only be arranged for during
the period of concentration, and not during
further operations. But, if these units prove
individually unequal to the task confided to them,
these advantages dwindle away to nothing, or
even develop into disadvantages.

The personal equation will play a very impor-
tant part in this matter, and, in my opinion, offers
another good reason for limiting the number of
divisions. Born cavalry leaders are rarae aveSy
and the same value cannot be attached to all
cavalry generals who may happen to be of equal
rank. The more force that can be concentrated
under the hand of one able man the better. All
the above considerations induce me to believe
that my frequently expressed views regarding
these desiderata still hold good. Por war, as well
as for the training of the larger formations,
brigades of three regiments should be formed,
and the strength of cavalry divisions should vary
according to the importance of the strategical

356 ORGANISATION

missions entrusted to them, while they should
be provided with the necessary supply and trans-
port service, consisting of fast and handy motor
and waggon columns. Cavalry divisions con-
sisting of nine regiments would probably be strong
enough for most purposes. Tripartite formation
facilitates tactical dispositions and the detach-
ment of reserves. If corps are to be formed for
a mission of a critical nature, they should be
equipped with everything necessary to enable
them to operate independently.

Training in time of peace should be based on
war conditions, and the six-regiment divisions
should be definitely abandoned. It will be found
that four-gun batteries are a necessity in war, and
the batteries with the army cavalry should be
so constituted, at all events, for manoeuvres.* I
do not, however, attach as much importance to
reducing the number of guns in the battery as
to the arrangement of batteries in groups of three,
with the divisions.

I have repeatedly stated that I consider our
cavalry to be, of itself, too weak. The more I
study modern warfare, the more convinced do I
feel that the value of the arm, when handled
according to modern ideas, has increased. In
view, however, of the strong prejudices that exist
against any appreciable increase in this arm, the
heavy cost entailed, and the lack of a proper

* The German batteries have at present six guns. — Trans.

ORGANISATION 357

education of public opinion in the matter, I am
obliged to assume that such an increase is, for the
moment, an impossibility. We are thus forced to
look around for other means of strengthening the
cavalry, or, at any rate, of increasing its tactical
value.

The employment of cyclists is, in my opinion,
the only means to this end. The weak divisional
cavalry will only be able to carry out its heavy
duties if a portion of its orderly and reporting
work can be undertaken by cyclists, and if cyclist
detachments can be used to form collecting stations
(cf. p. 32), and to assist in screening duties.
The question then arises whether it would not
be well to attach a cyclist battalion to every
army corps, or to supply the Jager battalions with
serviceable cycles and train them to these duties.
This would enable them to afford opportune
support to the divisional cavalry without losing
any of the peculiar value that these battalions
already possess.

Special detachments would have to be created,
it is true, for the cavalry divisions, but it might
be possible to provide the necessary means for
this. At any rate, it is certain that the cavalry
divisions require more fighting strength for dis-
mounted attacks, and, even though the establish-
ment of the division were to be raised, such
further support would still be very desirable.
The successes of our cavalry must be rapid and

358 ORGANISATION

decisive, and to this end the employment of
considerable fire power will be found necessary.

These cyclist detachments should take part
in all the tactical and reconnaissance exercises
of the cavalry, in open country as well as on
the exercise grounds, and their presence should
help to accelerate the adoption of more modem
ideas as to the employment of the arm. I
therefore hold — especially when we take the dis-
positions of our probable opponents into account
— that the formation of cyclist battalions is a
necessity to which we have too long been blind.

It is also very important that we should
provide an adequate reserve of horses for our
cavalry. In a future war we shall certainly
have to count on losing a very great number of
horses, and we should seriously consider the
question of providing suitable animals to replace
these losses. The number of riding-horses in
the country is decreasing every year, and I am
afraid that the growing use of the motor-car
will tend to still further deplete the supply of
good, active draught horses which are capable of
being ridden in time of need.

The home market should, in the first place, be
encouraged in every way, and remount premiums
should be offered by the State so that horse-
breeding may become a remunerative industry.
The question might also be considered of intro-
ducing a system similar, for instance, to that in

ORGANISATION 359

force in Switzerland, where the reservist belonging
to a country district receives, on completion of
his service with the colours, a trained riding-
horse for his own use, the State retaining the
right to inspect the horse and to use it when
required. Such a system would naturally entail
heavy expenditure and present many difficulties,
but I believe that it would be possible to find
a way in which it could be rendered feasible.
The Government could hardly refuse to do what
is necessary to make good the wastage of horses
that is inevitable in time of war. It is imperative
that some steps at all events should be taken to
prevent our already weak cavalry from falling
too far below its numbers in war.

Even now large purchases of horses would be
required to bring the cavalry up to war strength,
and, as such horses are usually unbroken to the
saddle, the cavalry would labour under dis-
advantages which would seriously affect its tactical
value. A remedy is urgently needed. The
best course would seem to be to allot, in the first
instance, the bulk of the purchased horses to the
army cavalry, and to provide the divisional
cavalry with as many trained riding-horses as
possible. I have already given reasons why the
duties of the latter must be regarded as particularly
important. To be of any use for service all these
horses must go by themselves, which only properly
trained and obedient horses will do. The weak-

360 ORGANISATION

ness of the divisional cavalry renders it scarcely-
able to fulfil all the demands made upon its
strength, and allows of no opportunity of relieving
some of its horses from independent work until
they have reached the necessary standard of
training. The army cavalry, on the other hand,
does not require so many horses for independent
duties; the purchased horses might therefore be
used at first for such work as would not require
a high standard of training, such as escort
duty with signal stations, supply columns, or
baggage, and similar duties of a more or less
defensive nature. At the same time, they could
gradually be trained to real cavalry work. If
placed in the squadron, they should be in the
rear rank in a charge. Though there are many
attendant difficulties, they can be more easily
surmounted in the large cavalry mass than in
the divisional cavalry.

In any case, the purchased horses will be a
burden to units, and the question should be
considered whether it might not be advisable to
prepare them to some extent in peace for the
duties they may be called upon to perform in
war. Specially selected remount riders might,
under proper supervision, give them a little
elementary training under the saddle. This plan
would indeed entail considerable expense and
would certainly be difficult to carry out. All
these questions must, however, be brought to

ORGANISATION 361

notice, as upon their solution will depend the
efficiency of the cavalry, and upon the efficiency
of the cavalry may hang the fate of armies.

The more difficult the conditions under which
the cavalry must lahour in war, the more impor-
tant is it that its training should be brought to the
highest possible pitch of perfection in peace. As
I have already emphasised, this cannot be fully
guaranteed under existing conditions. Every
effort should therefore be made to train the troops
strategically and tactically with the organisation
that they would actually have in war, and to con-
ceive and carry out exercises which will represent
service conditions as closely as possible. Care
should, on the other hand, be taken that the train-
ing is of a uniform and consistent nature. A single
mind and will must dominate the whole, both
as regards the training itself and also the methods
in which it is conducted. We can still see at every
turn, even in our latest BrCgulations, the divergence
between the old school of thought and the new,
and, in spite of all endeavours to bring about a
progressive development, we find several sections
in the Hegulations that betoken failure to adapt
existing principles to modem ideas and to realise
to the full the requirements of modern warfare.

I believe that these objects can only be
attained by extending the powers of the In-
spector-General of Cavalry and of the Inspectors,
and by allowing them to exercise more influence

362 ORGANISATION

at least upon the purely technical training of
the troops.

The sphere of activity of the Inspector-General
is at the present time very much restricted, and
is, in fact, limited to exercising control over the
cavalry division training and the reconnaissance
exercises. Should he desire reforms, he cannot
initiate them in the troops themselves, but must
begin by building the roof of the house, and
must leave the foundations to others, these others
being in many cases officers who have been
trained in old-fashioned schools and are unable
to throw off their antiquated ideas. It frequently
happens that they do not even belong to the
cavalry, and are consequently quite incapable
of fully grasping the technicalities of the arm,
while they naturally adhere to the views in
which they have grown up. The Inspector-
General should, in conjunction with the Army
Corps Commanders, undertake the conduct of
training on uniform lines, and only those officers
should be appointed as Inspectors who thoroughly
understand the arm and are modern cavalrymen
in the truest sense of the word.

The relations between the Inspector-General
and his assistants and the Army Corps Com-
manders should, however, be so regulated that,
while the responsibility of the latter as regards
the training of the three arms in conjunction
is in no wise restricted, the former are yet enabled

ORGANISATION 363

to exercise on the technical and purely cavalry
training that influence necessary to ensure uni-
formity of method throughout the service.

In order that instruction in equitation may be
standardized, new Regulations should be issued
determining the course of training to be followed,
and the methods to be adopted, as there is at
present no safe guide in this direction. The
riding-schools, which should be placed under the
jurisdiction of the Inspector-General, should see
to the establishment of such instructional methods
on a sound basis.

Army Corps Commanders, Division Commanders,
and Inspectors, acting in concert, would provide
for all tactical instruction in accordance with
principles which should be laid down in a separate
section of the Regulations.

Instructions for field-training might most
suitably be issued by the Supreme Command, and
could be elaborated by the Inspector-General,
working in conjunction with the Chief of the
General Stall. Such instructions would be binding
for all units, even for army corps, while the
Inspectors would see that they were properly
observed. The latter would also regulate, and
possibly direct, the staff tours and cavalry staff
rides. On the other hand. Army Corps Com-
manders would have the right to inspect all
these branches of training. Finally, the responsi-
bility for making all the necessary arrangements

364 ORGANISATION

for the larger cavalry reoonnaissanoes and tactical
exercises should rest solely with the Inspector-
General of Cavalry, whose single mind and will
must work towards establishing uniformity of
instruction.

It seems to me that there still remains, within
these limits, plenty of scope for individual
initiative.

It cannot be denied that the organisation I
have just described, which in a way places the
cavalry under two masters, is open to objections,
and may be the cause of some friction; but I
see no other way of obtaining the necessary
uniformity of training without making radical
alterations in our present peace organisation. I
believe also that the various authorities could
quite well work together harmoniously, if the
general instructions clearly stated the objects to
be aimed at, and indicated the methods whereby
leaders and troops might attain them. The
Inspector-General would, in any case, remain
the chief authority on cavalry training as regards
equitation and the use of weapons, a state of
affairs that can only be regarded as eminently
desirable.

One other duty would fall to the Inspector-
General — namely, that of keeping himself informed
of all contemporary events relating in any way to
cavalry work in other countries, and of drawing
the attention of the troops to important matters

ORGANISATION 365

in this direction. The General Staff, on the other
hand, acting in conjunction with the Inspector-
General, should place at the disposal of the
cavalry all the material of military history
necessary for its instruction.

At the present time our officers know but little
of foreign armies and their cavalry, and the
historical equipment of the officers' corps is but
a meagre one.

It is hardly necessary to mention that if the
Inspector-General of Cavalry is to carry out the
duties outlined above, he must be provided with
a much larger staff than is at present the case.
He requires, in my opinion, at least one Chief
of the Staff, one other General Staff Officer, two
aides-de-camp, a registrar, and the necessary
clerks. I believe that the expenditure here
incurred would be thoroughly justified.

Conclusion

TN the preceding pages I have presented , in a
•*■ collected form, those views on the organisation
and training of our cavalry which I have often
advanced before, and have further developed them
in the light of modern experience. It is true
that the authorities have lately issued a new
Field Service Manual and new Drill Regulations,
besides introducing the new carbine and increasing
the amount of ammunition carried, while several
new cavalry regiments have recently been created.
But here, it seems, the development in our branch
of the service has come to a standstill. All the
more necessary, then, is it for us to combat this
indolence, and to draw attention to those matters
where defects still exist, and where progress is
imperative, if we would place our army on a
sound footing and ensure success in war.

It is more than possible that my views may meet
with much opposition ; but I am convinced that
they will also receive much active support in the
ranks of the cavalry and in the service at large.
Developments now in progress guarantee me this
support. Slowly, indeed, but none the less surely,

366

CONCLUSION 367

have these views gained in popularity; many
changes that I suggested and planned have been

•

carried out, and I look hopefully to the future.
Now that I am about to take up other work I
have felt it my duty to point out once more the
goal towards which we should strive ; that is how
these chapters came to be written. It is for the
rising generation to judge of the correctness of
my views, and it is to them that I dedicate this
work, with every confidence in their verdict.

Let us, then, be neither dazzled nor spellbound
by the glamour of a past which can never be
recalled. Let us rather turn our eyes towards
the dawn : to the new era of fresh demands, new
resources, and wider spheres of action. Surely the
future will contain for us opportunities as glorious
as ever fell to the lot of our ancestors ! In
a certain sense, indeed, the brave days of Seydlitz
are gone for ever ; no battles of the future wdll
ever be won as he w^on his. But his spirit must
still inspire us to strive towards great ends, though
Ave work under changed conditions, and with the
resources of our own times.

The r61e of our day is a strategic one. In spite
of the great changes which have taken place in
the armaments and the armies of modern Europe,
we can still look to men like General Stuart for
brilliant examples of what cavalry should be
able to accomplish. Our cavalry is passing
through a period of ferment and confusion; the

368 CONCLUSION

past, indeed, with its thousand memories and
ideals, still lives, but a new horizon has opened
out and draws us onward with magnetic force.
Let us hope that the period of indecision will
soon come to an end, and that our young
cavalrymen, and those who are still young in
dash and spirit, may press forward resolutely
towards the new goal, remembering always that
great achievements are the reward only of hard
and faithful labour, and that great ends can only
be reached by strength and courage.

Let those who have at heart the development
of our cavalry on modern lines take as their
M^atchword :

" Per aspera ad astra."

THE END

PrinM and bovnd by UauU, WaUan d: Viney, U., Lo.iU<m and Aylabury

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