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LIBRARY
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
SANTA BARBARA
PRESENTED BY
DOUWE STUURMAN
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
BY
ARTHUR COLLIER
EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES
BY
ETHEL BOWMAN
M. A. WELLESLEY COLLEGE
CHICAGO
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.
LONDON AGENTS
Regan Paul, French, Trubi^er & Co., Ltd.,
1909
jr
Copyright 1909
BY
Open Court Publishing Co.
Chicago
THE TORCH PRESS
CEDAR RAPIDS
IOWA
PREFATORY NOTE
By this edition of Collier's "Clavis Univer-
salis" it is hoped to call attention to a book other-
wise inaccessible, which, though curiously parallel
to Berkeley's contemporary works, has undoubted
independent value; and which anticipates Kant's
first two antinomies. The whole history of phi-
losophy perhaps presents no more striking example
of undeserved neglect, and no more curious coin-
cidence of thought than the eighteenth century in
England. By entirely different modes of ap-
proach and unknown to each other, Berkeley and
Collier reached the same conclusion, — that mat-
ter, as conceived by traditional philosophy, is non-
existent.
This edition of the "Clavis Universalis" is an
exact and verified copy of the essay as it appears
in Dr. Parr's "Metaphysical Tracts of the
Eighteenth Century," a book now out of print.
The Introduction and Notes are modified extracts
from a Master's thesis accepted by the faculty of
Wellesley College. They aim to show the direct
dependence of Collier upon Des Cartes, Male-
branche, and Norris, as well as the parallelism of
Collier and Berkeley.
The thanks of the editor are due to Professor
iv CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
Mary Whiton Calkins who suggested and directed
the work; to Dr. Benjamin Rand, of Harvard Uni-
versity, who has given counsel at several points;
and to Mr. James Van Allen Shields who consult-
ed the British Museum copy of Taylor's transla-
tion of Malebranche's "Recherche de la Verite."
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
PAGE
Introduction vii
Clavis Universalis
The Contents ------ 3
The Introduction ----- ^
Part I ------- - 14
Part II - - 55
The Conclusion of the Whole - - 118
Notes 133
Digitized by tine Internet Arciiive
in 2007 witii funding from
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littp://www.arcliive.org/details/clavisuniversaliOOcolliala
INTRODUCTION
In the early eighteenth century, metaphysical
speculation turned from the material world toward
the inner life of man. Des Cartes and Male-
branche in France, and Locke in England, had
stripped the external world of its warmth and light
and color and had left to it little save the character
of extension. The completely idealistic theory of
matter was formulated at nearly the same time,
and in apparent independence, by George Berkeley
and by Arthur Collier. And yet Berkeley alone
commonly has credit for the metaphysical discov-
ery, while Collier's little volume of scarce a
hundred pages remained practically unnoticed for
more than fifty years.
The book seems to have attracted little or no
attention even at the time of its publication. Had
not Dr. Reid chanced upon it in the library at
Glasgow, it might never have been known. Reid
appreciated the value of the book, and in his ''Es-
says on the Intellectual Powers of Man," published
in 1785, gives it brief notice. After a discussion
of Norris's "Essay toward the Theory of the Ideal
or Intelligible World," he says that he ought not
to omit mention of "an author of far inferior name,
Arthur Collier. . . . His arguments are the same
vin CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
in substance with Berkeley's; and he appears,"
Rcid adds, "to understand the whole strength of his
cause. Though he is not deficient in metaphysical
acuteness, his style is disagreeable, being full of
conceits, of new-coined words, scholastic terms, and
perplexed sentences." Reid ends by saying, "I
have taken the liberty to give this short account of
Collier's book, because I believe it is rare and
little known. I have only seen one copy of it,
which is in the University library of Glasgow." ^
This notice attracted Dugald Stuart to the
work, and in his "Dissertation: Ex:hibiting the
Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political
Philosophy" he compares Collier with Norris.
"Another very acute metaphysician," he says,
"has met with still greater injustice. His name
is not to be found in any of our Biographical
Dictionaries. In point of date, his publication is
some years posterior to that of Norris, and there-
fore it does not possess the same claims to original-
ity; but it is far superior to it in logical closeness
and precision, and is not obscured to the same de-
gree with the mystical theology which Norris
(after the example of Malebranche) connected
with the scheme of Idealism. Indeed, when com-
pared with the writings of Berkeley himself, it
1 Thomas Reid, Essay II, p. 287 of his works, edited by Sir
Win. Hamilton, 184$.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS ix
yields to them less in force of argument, than in
composition and variety of illustration." ^
These notices attracted the English philos-
phers of this time to Collier's writings, and fur-
ther traces of his life and works were sought. Sir
James Mackintosh and Dr. Parr corresponded on
the subject, ^ but their efforts met with no impor-
tant success. But interest in Collier had been
aroused; and when, some time before 1837, the
History of Modern Wiltshire was published, the
absence of his name from the history of the county,
in which his family had held a living for four
generations, called forth a remonstrance. This
finally resulted in the publication of the only book
which is a direct authority on Collier outside of
his own few published writings.
Robert Benson had inherited, with other docu-
ments, all that remained of the Collier papers.
Many of these papers had, to be sure, disappeared
before Robert Benson looked into them, for they
were, as Benson says, "so conveniently placed for
the housemaid who lighted an adjoining bed-room
fire, that it is not easy to guess how many of them
have been consumed." '* The bulk of those that re-
mained were the sermons of Arthur Collier and his
brother William, and a few manuscript essays and
2 Originally published in 1821. Collected Works of Dugald
Stuart, edited by Sir Wm. Hamilton, 1854, p. 349.
3 Robert Benson's "Memoirs of the Life and Writings of the Rev.
Arthur Collier, M. A.," London, 1837, Preface p. IX.
'♦ Benson's "Memoirs," Preface, page XIIL
X CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
letters. The letters and essays which pertained to
his metaphysical studies, as well as to the details
of his life, were collected and published by Benson.
The awakened interest in Collier evidenced
itself at the same time in a second edition of the
"Clavis." The copies numbered forty, and were
"exclusively bestowed as presents." ' The third
and last edition of the "Clavis Universalis," still
accessible in the large libraries, was brought out
in 1837 in a small volume prepared by Dr. Parr,
entitled "Metaphysical Tracts of the Eighteenth
Century." Dr. Parr had in his "remarkable libra-
ry" rare metaphysical tracts of English authorship.
Realizing their interest, he had thrown off a small
impression of five of them, with an abridgment of
the sixth. He intended to publish these, with an
introduction which should include "an historical
disquisition on Idealisnx, with special reference
to the philosophy of Collier." But his death inter-
rupted the work before it was completed. His
library was sold, and the impression of the six tracts
was purchased by a Mr. Lumley, a respectable
London bookseller, ^ who was about to publish the
"Memoirs of Arthur Collier" which Benson had
prepared.^ This collection of tracts, in which the
5 Benson's "Memoirs," Preface, page XIV.
6 "Idealism ; with Reference to the Scheme of Arthur Collier"
by Sir Wm. Hamilton (published originally in the Edinburgh Review
in April, 1839), in "Discussions on Philosophy and Literature," London,
1852, p. 187.
7 Dr. Parr's "Collection of Metaphysical Tracts" Advertisement.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS xi
"Clavis Universalis" holds first place, includes the
only other work of Collier which was ever printed
in full, "A Specimen of True Philosophy; in a
Discourse on Genesis ;" and also an abstract of the
Logology or "Treatise on the Logos." Through
this collection, the "Clavis Universalis" is known
to English speaking philosophers.
In Germany, Collier met with recognition
sooner than in his own country, through a full and
able abstract of the "Clavis Universalis" made in
the year 1717. This was published in the sixth
supplemental volume of the "Acta Eruditorum,"
a Leipzig publication devoted to general interests.
In concluding the article the reviewer says : "These
are the paradoxes of our Author, which doubtless
will be received with no more approbation than
those, which to the same import, though with dif-
ferent arguments, a contemporary of his, George
Berkeley, attempted to defend in 'Three Dialogues
between Hylas and Philonous.' " ^ Through this
notice Collier became known to German philo-
sophers, as is shown by the quotations from him
made by Wolff and Bilfinger, and by the full
translation which followed. But John Christ-
opher Eschenbach, Professor of Philosophy in Ros-
tock, was the first to make the full text of the
"Clavis" available for German scholars; and Sir
William Hamilton quotes him as saying, " If any
book ever cost me trouble to obtain it the Clavis
8 Translated from the original Latin.
xii CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
is that book." ' Eschenbach published this trans-
lation, in 1756, as part of a work entitled "A Col-
lection of the most distinguished Authors who
deny the existence of their own bodies, and of
the whole material world; containing the dia-
logues of Berkeley, between Hylas and Philonous,
and Collier's Universal Key translated, with Il-
lustrative Observations, and an Appendix, wherein
the Existence of Body is demonstrated, by John
Christopher Eschenbach, Professor of Philosophy
in Rostock." In this work, according to Hamil-
ton, the "remarks are numerous and show much
reading. The Appendix contains : — (i) An ex-
position of the opinions of the Idealists, with its
grounds and arguments. (2) A proof of the ex-
ternal existence of body." ^° This translation is
now itself rare and little known.
Of Collier himself even less is known than of
his writings, for the Wiltshire records and the
papers found by Benson are the only sources. The
family came from Bristol and settled in Wiltshire
where, in 1608, one Joseph Collier was presented
to the rectory of Langford Magna, commonly
called Steeple Langford, near Sarum or Salisbury,
and as he also owned the advowson, the benefice
was handed down to his descendants. His son,
Henry, who succeeded him, was ejected from his
9 "Discussions on Philosophy and Literature," p. 190.
10 Note S. 8., p. 584, Vol. I., "Collected works of Dugald Stuart,"
edited by Sir Wm. HamiltMi, 1854.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS xiii
parish during the Revolution and Protectorate, and
he and his family suffered many hardships. After
the Restoration, Henry Collier returned to Lang-
ford Magna, and remained there until his death
in 1672. His youngest son, Arthur, succeeded
him; and to him and his wife Anne, daughter of
Thomas and Joan Currey, of Misterton in Somer-
setshire, was born Arthur Collier. Of his early
youth and education we know little. He probably
attended the grammar-school of Salisbury, after
early studies at home. He entered Pembroke Col-
lege, Oxford, in July, 1697, but, upon the entrance
of his younger brother, William, to the Univer-
sity, left Pembroke to be entered at Baliol with his
brother on the twenty-second of October, 1698."
Of his studies and of his interests during
his college course, there is little indication.
In his manuscripts "there is no trace of his hav-
ing made any proficiency in mathematical studies,
nor even that the mathematics formed a part of his
education. [A] . . . letter ... in answer to a
scriptural objection then often urged against the
Copernican and Newtonian systems of the world,
shews that he was not indifferent to the progress of
natural philosophy." ^^ There are few indications
of an interest in literature; but as he says in the
opening page of the "Clavis" that he adopted his
theory of the universe in 1703, a year before he took
1^ Benson's "Memoirs," p. lo.
12 Benson's "Memoirs," p. 126.
XIV CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
up his residence at Langford Magna, his phil-
osophical studies must have occupied much of his
time and thought in college. With what systems
he was familiar, one can judge only from the refer-
ences in the "Clavis" and in the "Specimen of True
Philosophy." He evidently knew Aristotle only
through the Schoolmen, for his quotations are
never made directly. Plato he quotes but once,*^
although Norris's "Theory of the Ideal World,"
well-known to Collier, is filled with Platonic refer-
ences. But the scholasticism of the following cen-
turies was a far stronger influence on Collier, inter-
ested as he was in theological studies. His work
shows the influence of scholastic principles and
habits of thought; and to him, as to the Schoolmen,
the interest of metaphysics lay in its relation to
Scripture. St. Augustine, Porphyry, ApoUina-
ris, Cassian, Vincentius, Lirinensis, Suarez are
mentioned. Through the "books of Metaphysicks"
of Scheibler and Baronius, according to Sir Wm.
Hamilton,^'* he gained all his knowledge of the
Metaphysic of the Schools. The original thinkers
with whom he was directly familiar and whose
works formed the starting point of his own were
the French writers, Des Cartes and Malebranche,
and his own English neighbor, John Norris.
Six months after Arthur Collier had entered
13 "Clavis Universalis," p. 42. (This reference, and all which
follow are to this edition of the "Clavis").
14 Sir Wm. Hamilton's "Discussions on Philosophy and Litera-
ture," p. 192.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS xv
Pembroke College, his father died. During the
seven years that intervened before the son could
take upon himself the duties of the living, Francis
Eyre held the benefice, vs^hich finally in 1704,
passed to Arthur Collier, the fourth of his family
to hold the office. The years that followed seem
to have been uneventful. From the dates of his ser-
mons one may argue that, until his death in 1732, he
discharged the duties of his parish with regularity,
and the allusions in his brother William's diary,
give a hint of his daily life. This brother, who
had been his college mate and close friend, was
"rector of Baverstock, about two miles and a half
to the south of Langford; and his Ms. remains
form by far the greater portion of the Collier
papers." ^^ The brothers evidently were much to-
gether, and joined in the diversions of the neighbor-
hood, attending the races and country dances and
taking a hand at cards with their friends. Arthur,
at least, seems to have been "intimate at the palace
of Salisbury during Bishop Burnet's time; and we
learn that he occasionally filled the cathedral pul-
pit." ^^ There is no mention in either his brother's
papers or his own of travels, or even prolonged
absence from home ; so it is reasonable to conclude
that his outward life was bounded by the limits of
his parish. He was married to Margaret, daugh-
ter of Nicholas Johnson, a paymaster of the army,
and his wife, a sister of Stephen Fox. The parish
15 Benson's "Memoirs," pp. 140 and 141.
xvi CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
records give the birth of the eldest child as October
13, 1707. Of his children little is known. Two
sons and two daughters survived him; and one of
the latter, Jane Collier, is known as the w^riter of
a clever book called "The Art of Ingeniously Tor-
menting." *^ Owing to financial difficulties during
the latter part of his life, he finally sold the "rever-
sion of Langford Rectory to Corpus Christi Col-
lege, Oxford, for sixteen hundred guineas."
That Collier had little care for the practical
matters of everyday life can easily be believed, but
his intense interest in matters ecclesiastical and
theological is evidenced by his activity in church
politics and by the close union of his philosophical
and religious beliefs. His philosophical system
was to be the "universal key" by which to unlock
the secrets of the Scriptures. Yet his sermons have
no suggestion of his theory.^'' Indeed, at this period,
only his manuscript works and his letters contain
his exposition of the idealistic theory which so ab-
sorbed him. Among his papers there is an "outline
of an essay, in three chapters, on the question of the
visible world being without us or not," dated Janu-
ary, 1708. Dated 171 2, are "two essays, still in
manuscript, one on substance and accident, and the
other termed 'Clavis Philosophica.' " ^^ In 1713,
he published the "Clavis Universalis, or a new In-
16 Benson's "Memoirs," p. 162.
17 Benson's "Memoirs," p. 139.
18 Benson's "Memoirs," p. 18.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS xvii
quiry after Truth, being a Demonstration of the
Non-Existence, or Impossibility of an External
World," which gives his perfected theory of the
non-existence of matter. After this, a period of
almost twenty years elapsed, with only his corres-
pondence to show his interest in the application of
his theory until in 1730, he published the "Speci-
men of True Philosophy." This was followed in
1732 by his "Logology," which is the last of his
published writings. The monumental work of his
life, the explication of the Scriptures, of which the
"Genesis" and "Logology" were the beginnings,
was never completed, for he died in the year in
which the latter was printed. He was buried in
the Langford Church, September 9th, 1732.
But although Collier himself laid such stress
upon the theological bearing of his theory, the
treatises which discuss the interpretation of the
Scriptures have little value when compared with
the one philosophical essay, which seemed to him
to serve mainly as an introduction to what was to
follow. At most, the interest of these theological
treatises lies in the more definite suggestions of the
positive aspect of his philosophic thought. Disen-
tangled from its scholastic phraseology, his system
is a theistic spiritualism. It rests on two funda-
mental propositions: (i) "God made heaven and
earth, or the whole material world, 'Ev 'Apx^i^" and
(2) "the visible or material world exists in mind,
i. e., immediately in the mind of him that seeth or
xviii CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
perceiveth it," ^' and has no existence independent
of mind. The first of these propositions Collier
accepts "as an unquestionable axiom," ^' inasmuch
as it is the word of God. The second he has dem-
onstrated in the "Clavis Universalis." But,
though he has there proved that body must exist
in mind, he has not, beyond bare suggestions, shown
how this is possible. In the "Clavis," the quasi-
externeity of visible objects is spoken of as the
''effect of the will of God, — (as it is his will that
light and colours should seem to be without the
soul)."^° Also Collier speaks** of the "great
mundane idea of created (or rather twice created)
matter, by which all things are produced, or rather
.... by which the great God gives sensations to
all his thinking creatures." To the more careful
study of the implications of the doctrine that "the
material world exists in mind," Collier devotes the
"Specimen of True Philosophy." In brief, he
holds that matter is an accident or form of mind
and has no existence apart from mind; that the
sensible world of each individual exists by reason
of his perceiving it, and has the relation of simili-
tude, not of absolute identity, to that of every other
individual ; and, finally, that these individual minds
or spirits exist only in dependence on, and as far
as they participate in, the one original substance,
which is itself mind or spirit.
19 Specimen of True Philosophy, p. 115 in the Parr edition.
20 "Clavis Universalis," p. 9. ** Ibid., p. 12.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS xix
Collier's claim to recognition lies, however, in
the negative aspect of his teaching. Both he and
Berkeley opposed the theory current in the philos-
ophy of that time, that matter, though prac-
tically unknown to us, has an existence of its own,
and at least one property, extension, by which it
arouses in us the idea of the sensible world. Berk-
eley argues against the conception of matter as ''un-
known support" which Locke upholds in his "Es-
say on Human Understanding." Collier, on the
other hand, aims to prove the non-existence of mat-
ter as conceived by Des Cartes and Malebranche,
and by their English disciple, John Norris. Upon
the philosophy of Des Cartes, Malebranche had
made one important advance. With Des Cartes,
matter, though dependent upon the will of God,
has an existence of its own in its property, exten-
sion, by which it aflfects finite minds. Male-
branche likewise grants to matter an existence out-
side of its being in God; yet the material world
plays no part in his system. In the fact that he
does not discard this vague something, which he
has practically proved to be nothing, lies his great
inconsistency. His forward step is in the demon-
stration that not even by the Cartesian "unknown
motion of unknown parts" can body become known
to a finite mind; that this knowledge is only pos-
sible if both knower and known are taken up and
united in one spiritual substance. In criticism,
Collier points out that Malebranche himself claims
XX CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
that the external world cannot be an object of sense
since the idea which we perceive must be intimate-
ly united to the mind and hence cannot be of a dif-
ferent nature.^^ But whereas Malebranche still
clings to this vague unknown something as cause
of sensible ideas, Collier claims that the very exist-
ence of body lies in its being perceived.
But despite its close dependence upon the the-
ories of Des Cartes and Malebranche, the "Clavis"
refers much more closely to the system of Norris.
John Norris, rector of Bemerton, near Sarum, had
apparently received much the same philosophical
education as Collier, that is, he had a knowledge
of the early Greeks through the Schoolmen, and a
familiarity with the modern French philosophers.
His "Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World,"
is designed to complete the system of Malebranche,
who, as Norris thought, had not carried sufficiently
far his theory that "all things are seen in God."
To quote his own words, "Mr. Malebranche has
ventured the farthest of any that I know of upon
this Discovery [into the Ideal World.] . . . But
even this great Apelles has drawn the Celestial
Beauty but halfway." ^^ Although Norris in real-
ity only enlarges upon Malebranche's doctrines in-
stead of pressing this "Discovery" to its logical con-
clusion, his book is valuable to students of idealistic
21 "Recherche de la Verite," Livre 3"ie^ 2nde Partie, Chap. I.
^2 An Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible
World," by John Norris, Rector of Bemerton, London, 1701-1704, Part
I, p. \.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS xxi
thought. According both to Malebranche and to
Norris, reality is of two kinds, spiritual and ma-
terial; and God, the supreme spirit, contains both
the intelligible world of Ideas and the finite spirits,
who are thus in direct communion with him.
Since these two are, both alike, in him and of his
substance, the divine ideas are directly intelligible
to finite minds without proof or intervention.
These divine ideas are the representative forms of
material bodies in a natural world, which is some-
how caused by God, and inadequately represents
him, but is yet outside and apart from him. The
existence of this material world Norris practically
disproves, though he still clings to its reality on the
foundation of faith. Sir Wm. Hamilton remarks
that Malebranche as a Catholic was "obliged to
burden" his theory with the incumbrance of matter,
but that to Norris as a Protestant, little credit is
due for not rejecting this material world. It re-
mained for Collier and Berkeley to give up the ma-
terial world altogether as a sacrifice to the received
philosophy of ideas.^^
The fact that these two men, Collier and Berk-
eley, came to the same conclusion at precisely the
same time, seems to many critics a coincidence too
curious to be accidental ; and the reputation of
Berkeley, compared with the neglect of Collier,
seems hardly due to chance alone. Yet the facts
23 Sir Wm. Hamilton in "Discussions on Philosophy and Litera-
ture," pp. 199 ff.
xxii CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
of the case as we know them point to the indepen-
dence of Collier's thought. In point of time, the
promulgation of these doctrines is almost identical.
In 1709, George Berkeley published his "Essay
toward a New Theory of Vision," which contained
suggestions of his metaphysical theory. For the
purpose of his arguments he grants, in this work,
the external existence of tangible matter, but he
teaches, by implication, that visible matter exists
only in the mind of him who sees it. In 1710,
Berkeley published the "Principles of Human
Knowledge," which contains the exposition of
his doctrine in detailed form. This was followed,
in 1713, by the "Three Dialogues between Hylas
and Philonous," intended, as Berkeley says, "to in-
troduce the notions I advance into the mind in the
most easy and familiar manner." In this same
year, 1713, appeared Collier's little volume, the
"Clavis Universalis." The facts that Berkeley's
first suggestion of his theory was published four
years before Collier's theory was advanced, and
that his finished arguments were made public three
years before Collier's, seem at first glance to settle
in the negative the question of Collier's indepen-
dence. But two further considerations make the
conclusion doubtful. In the first place, we know
by Collier's own word ^^ that he had adopted his
own theory ten years before he put it into outward
form, which brings the date of its conception not
24 "Clavis Universalis," p. 5.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS xxiii
later than 1703. Berkeley gives no direct date of
the birth of his theories, but it can be supplied ap-
proximately from his "Commonplace Book." In
this book, according to Fraser, he "seems to have
set down . . . stray thoughts which occurred to
him in the course of his mathematical and meta-
physical studies at Trinity College, Dublin.
These common-places seem to have been formed
gradually, apparently in 1705 and some following
years. . . . Considerable portions imply that he
was at the time maturing his thoughts with a view
to the publication of the Essay on Vision and the
Principles of Human Knowledge] but the form
which the projected work (or works) was to take
does not appear to have been finally settled in his
mind." ^^ It is not possible to compare definite
dates here. We can only say that in 1703 Collier
was convinced of his theory, and that in 1705 Berk-
eley was testing his doctrine by applying it to all
branches of knowledge. If these dates bear any
weight, we may conclude that the two men, while
they were both under the age of twenty-five and
while they were still continuing their college stud-
ies, independently conceived this new theory of
matter. From the references in the letters written
in the few years following the publication of the
"Clavis," it is evident that in the meantime Collier
had become acquainted with some one book of
Berkeley; and the further reference in the "Speci-
25 Note I by Fraser on p. 419 of the "Collected Works," Vol. IV.
xxiv CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
men of True Philosophy" identifies this book with
the "Dialogues." ''
Whatever one's conclusion about the relation
between Collier and Berkeley, there can be no
doubt that Collier's "third" and "fourth" argu-
ments anticipate Kant's first and second antino-
mies. Just as Kant argues that "the world is not a
whole existing in itself" from the fact that it can
be proved to be both finite and infinite in time and
in space, so Collier argues that "an external world
.... must be both finite and infinite," and that
"that which is both finite and infinite in extent is
absolutely non-existent."^^ And as Kant argues
that material substances are "nothing outside our
representations" from the fact that they can be
shown to be both infinitely divisible and ultimately
indivisible, so Collier affirms "in like manner as be-
fore, that external matter is both finitely and in-
finitely divisible, and, consequently, that there is
no such thing as external matter." ^*
It must be granted that the "Clavis Univer-
salis" is more than a "metaphysical curiosity."
26 As Leslie Stephen points out, in his article on Collier in the
Dictionary of National Biography, this reference (on p. 114 of the
"Specimen of True Philosophy" as given in the Parr edition) is the
only one in Collier's published writings. Stephen credits Collier with
entire independence in the conception of the theory.
27 "Clavis Universalis," p. 63.
28 Since this introduction was written, in its first form, the com-
parison has been made in more detail by Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy
in a paper on "Kant and the English Platonists" in "Essays Philosoph-
ical and Psychological in honor of William James" by "His Colleagues
at Columbia University." Longmans, Green & Co., 1908.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS xxv
Although the greater length and detail of Berk-
eley's arguments, combined with his grace of liter-
ary style, make his works more desirable for the
general introduction to idealism, Collier's book is
of real value to the student in connection with the
study of Berkeley. The "Clavis" gives in conclu-
sive form Berkeley's chief arguments. It adds,
moreover, two of the arguments which Kant later
made famous. More than this, the two systems
together show how an idealistic theory of the uni-
verse was an inevitable result of the thought of the
early eighteenth century.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS:
OR, A
New Inquiry after Truth.
BEING
A DEMONSTRATION
OF THE
Non-Existence, or Impossibility,
OF AN
EXTERNAL WORLD.
BY ARTH. COLLIER,
RECTOR OF LANGFORD MAGNA, NEAR SARUM.
Vulgi Assensus & Approbatio circa Materiam
Difficilem est cerium Argumentum Falsitatis istius
Opinionis cut Assentttur.
Mr. Maleb. De Inquir. Verit. Lib. iii. P. 194.
LONDON,
Printed for ROBERT GOSLING, at the Mitre and
Crown againft St. Dunftan's Church
in Fleet-ftreet. 1713.
The
CONTENTS.
THE INTRODUCTION.
Wherein the question in general is explained
and stated, and the whole subject divided
into two particular heads - - - 5
Part I.
Chap. I. Wherein the first question is con-
sidered, viz.. Whether the visible world
is external or not ------ 14
Sect. I. That the seeming Externeity of a
visible object, is no argument of its real
externeity 16
Sect. II. That a visible object, as such, is not
external -------- 2g
Chap. II. Objections answered - - - 43
4 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
Part II.
That there is no external world, and that an
external world is a being utterly impos-
stole -
- 55
Chap. I.
Argument I. - - ■
- 55
Chap. II.
Argument II. -
- 59
Chap. III.
Argument III.
- 63
Chap. IV.
Argument IV.
- 68
Chap. V.
Argument V. - - -
- 78
Chap. VI.
Argument VI.
- 83
Chap. VII.
Argument VII.
- 87
Chap. VIII.
Argument VIII. -
- 93
Chap. IX.
Argument IX.
- 95
Chap. X.
Objections answered
- lOI
The conclusion of the whole.
Of the use and consequences of the foregoing
treatise n8
The
INTRODUCTION,
Wherein the Question in general is explained and
stated, and the whole subject divided into
two particular heads.
Though I am verily persuaded, that in the
whole course of the following treatise, I shall or
can have no other adversary, but prejudice; yet,
having by me no mechanical engine proper to re-
move it; nor, being able to invent any other method
of attacking it, besides that of fair reason and argu-
ment; rather than the world should finish its course
without once offering to enquire in what manner
it exists, (and for one reason more, which I need
not name, unless the end desired were more hope-
ful;) I am at last, after a ten years pause and de-
liberation, content to put myself upon the trial of
the common reader, without pretending to any bet-
ter art of gaining him on my side, than that of dry
reason and metaphysical demonstration.
The question I am concerned about is in gen-
eral this, whether there be any such thing as an ex-
ternal world. And my title will suffice to inform
my reader, that the negative of this question is the
point I am to demonstrate.
In order to which, let us first explain the
6 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
terms. Accordingly, by worlds I mean whatso-
ever is usually understood by the terms, body, ex-
tension, space, matter, quantity, &c. if there be any
other word in our english tongue, which is synon-
imous with all or any of these terms. And now
nothing remains but the explication of the word
external.
By this, in general, I understand the same as
is usually understood by the words, absolute, self-
existent, independent, &c. and this is what I deny
of all matter, body, extension, &c.
If this, you will say, be all that I mean by the
word external, I am like to meet with no adversary
at all, for who has ever affirmed, that matter is self-
existent, absolute or independent?
To this I answer, what others hold, or have
held in times past, I shall not here inquire. On the
contrary, I should be glad to find by the event, that
all mankind were agreed in that which I contend
for as the truth, viz. that matter is not, cannot be
independent, absolute, or self-existent. In the
mean time, whether they are so or no, will be tried
by this.
Secondly, and more particularly, that by not
independent, not absolutely existent, not external,
I mean and contend for nothing less, than that all
matter, body, extension, &c. exists in, or in depend-
ence on mind, thought, or perception, and that it
is not capable of an existence, which is not thus
dependant.^
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 7
This perhaps may awaken another to demand
of me how? to which I as readily answer, just how
my reader pleases, provided it be somehow. As
for instance, we usually say, an accident exists in,
or in dependence on, its proper subject; and that its
very essence, or reality of its existence, is so to exist.
Will this pass for an explication of my assertion?
if so, I am content to stand by it, in this sense of
the words. Again, we usually say, (and fancy too
we know what we mean in saying,) that a body ex-
ists in, and also in dependance on, its proper place,
so as to exist necessarily in some place or other.
Will this description of dependance please my in-
quisitive reader? If so, I am content to join issue
with him, and contend that all matter exists in, or as
much dependantly on, mind, thought, or percep-
tion, to the full, as any body exists in place. Nay, I
hold the description to be so just and apposite, as
if a man should say, a thing is like itself : for I sup-
pose I need not tell my reader, that when I affirm
that all matter exists in mind, after the same man-
ner as body exists in place, I mean the very same
as if I had said, that mind itself is the place of
body, and so its place, as that it is not capable of
existing in any other place, or in place after any
other manner. Again, lastly, it is a common say-
ing, that an object of perception exists in, or in de-
pendance on, its respective faculty. And of these
objects, there are many who will reckon with me,
light, sounds, colours, and even some material
8 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
things, such as trees, houses, &c. which are seen,
as we say, in a looking-glass, but which are, or
ought to be owned to have no existence but in, or
respectively on, the minds or faculties of those who
perceive them. But to please all parties at once,
I affirm that I know of no manner, in which an
object of perception exists in, or on, its respective
faculty, which I will not admit in this place, to be
a just description of that manner of in-existence,
after which all matter that exists, is affirmed by me
to exist in mind. Nevertheless, were I to speak
my mind freely, I should chuse to compare it to
the in-existence of some, rather than some other
objects of perception, particularly such as are ob-
jects of the sense of vision ; and of these, those more
especially, which are allowed by others, to exist
wholly in the mind or visive faculty; such as ob-
jects seen in a looking glass, by men distempered,
light-headed, ecstatic, &c. where not only colours,
but intire bodies, are perceived or seen. For these
cases are exactly parallel, with that existence which
I affirm of all matter, body, or extension whatso-
ever.
Having endeavoured, in as distinct terms as
I can, to give my reader notice of what I mean by
the proposition I have undertaken the defence of,
it will be requisite in the next place, to declare in
as plain terms, what I do not mean by it.
Accordingly, I declare in the first place, that
in affirming that there is no external world, I make
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 9
no doubt or question of the existence of bodies, or
whether the bodies which are seen exist or not. It
is with me a first principle, that whatsoever is
seen, is. To deny, or doubt of this, is errant scepti-
cism, and at once unqualifies a man for any part
or office of a disputant, or philosopher; so that it
will be remembered from this time, that my en-
quiry is not concerning the existence, but altogether
concerning the extra-existence of certain things or
objects; or, in other words, what I affirm and con-
tend for, is not that bodies do not exist, or that the
external world does not exist, but that such and
such bodies, which are supposed to exist, do not
exist externally; or in universal terms, that there
is no such thing as an external world.
Secondly, I profess and declare, that notwith-
standing this my assertion, I am persuaded that I
see all bodies just as other folks do; that is, the vis-
ible world is seen by me, or, which is the same,
seems to me to be as much external or independant,
as to its existence, on my mind, self, or visive fac-
ulty, as any visible object does, or can be pretended
to do or be, to any other person. I have neither,
as I know of, another nature, nor another knack
of seeing objects, different from other persons, suit-
able to the hypothesis of their existence which I
here contend for. So far from this, that I believe,
and am very sure, that this seeming, or (as I shall
desire leave to call it) quasi externeity of visible ob-
jects, is not only the effect of the will of God, ^ (as it
lo CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
is his will that light and colours should seem to be
without the soul, that heat should seem to be in the
fire, pain in the hand, &c.) but also that it is a
natural and necessary condition of their visibility;
I would say, that though God should be supposed
to make a world, or any one visible object, which
is granted to be not external, yet by the condition
of its being seen, it would, and must be quasi exter-
nal to the perceptive faculty; as much so to the
full, as is any material object usually seen in this
visible world.
Moreover, thirdly, when I affirm that all mat-
ter exists dependantly on mind, I am sure my
reader will allow me to say, I do not mean by this,
that matter or bodies exist in bodies. As for in-
stance, when I affirm or say, that the world, which
I see exists in my mind, I cannot be supposed to
mean that one body exists in another, or that all
the bodies which I see exist in that, which common
use has taught me to call my body. I must needs
desire to have this remembered, because experience
has taught me how apt persons are, or will be, to
mistake me in this particular. ^
Fourthly, when I affirm that this or that visi-
ble object exists in, or dependantly on, my mind, or
perceptive faculty, I must desire to be understood
to mean no more than I say, by the words mind and
perceptive faculty. In like manner I would be
understood, when I affirm in general, that all mat-
ter or body exists in, or dependantly on, mind. I
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS ii
say this to acquit myself from the imputation of
holding, that the mind causes its own ideas, or
objects of perception ; or, lest any one by a mistake
should fancy that I affirm, that matter depends for
its existence on the will of man, or any creature
whatsoever. '* But now, if any such mistake should
arise in another's mind, he has wherewith to rectify
it; in as much as I assure him, that by mind, I
mean that part, or act, or faculty of the soul, which
is distinguished by the name intellective, or percep-
tive, as in exclusion of that other part which is dis-
tinguished by the term will.
Fifthly, when I affirm that all matter exists in
mind, or that no matter is external, I do not mean
that the world, or any visible object of it, which I
(for instance) see, is dependant on the mind of any
other person besides myself; or that the world, or
matter, which any other person sees, is dependant
on mine, or any other person's mind, or faculty of
perception. On the contrary, I contend as well as
grant, that the world which John sees is external to
Peter, and the world which Peter sees is external to
John. That is, I hold the thing to be the same in
this, as in any other case of sensation ; for instance,
that of sound. Here two or more persons, who are
present at a concert of music, may indeed in some
sense be said to hear the same notes or melody; but
yet the truth is, that the sound which one hears, is
not the very same with the sound which another
hears, because the souls or persons are supposed to
la CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
be different; and therefore, the sound which Peter
hears, is external to, or independant on the soul of
John, and that which John hears, is external to the
soul or person of Peter. ^
Lastly, when I affirm that no matter is alto-
gether external, but necessarily exists in some mind
or other, exemplified and distinguished by the
proper names of John, Peter, &c. I have no de-
sign to affirm, that every part or particle of matter,
which does or can exist, must needs exist in some
created mind or other. On the contrary, I believe
that infinite worlds might exist, though not one
single created, (or rather merely created,) mind
were ever in being. And as in fact there are thou-
sands and ten thousands, I believe, and I even con-
tend, that there is an universe, or material world in
being, which is, at least, numerically different from
every material world perceived by mere creatures.
By this, I mean the great mundane idea of created
(or rather twice created) matter, by which all
things are produced; or rather, (as my present sub-
ject leads me to speak,) by which the great God
gives sensations to all his thinking creatures, and
by which things that are not, are preserved, and
ordered in the same manner as if they were.
And now I presume and hope, that my mean-
ing is sufficiently understood, when I affirm, that
all matter which exists, exists in, or dependantly on,
mind; or, that there is no such thing as an external
world.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 13
Nevertheless, after all the simplicity to which
this question seems already to be reduced, I find
myself necessitated to divide it into two. For, in
order to prove that there is no external world, it
must needs be one article to shew that the visible
world is not external, and when this is done, though
in this all be indeed done, which relates to any
opinion yet maintained by men, yet something still
is wanting towards a full demonstration of the
point at large, and to come up to the universal
terms, in which the question is expressed.
Accordingly, I shall proceed in this order.
First to shew, that the visible world is not external.
Secondly, to demonstrate more at large, or simply,
that an external world is a being utterly impossible.
Which two shall be the subjects of two distinct
parts or books. ^
PART I.
CHAP. I.
Wherein the first question is considered, viz.
Whether the visible World is external or not.
First, then, I affirm that the visible world is
not external. By the visible world, I mean every
material object, which is, or has been, or can be
seen. I say can be seen, (which is the import of
the word visible,) in order to comprehend what-
ever worlds there are, or may be conceived to be,
(besides that which we see who live on this earth,)
whether planetary, celestial, or supercelestial
worlds. Be they what, or how many they will,
supposing they are visible, that is, actually seen by
some particular souls or other, they are all under-
stood and comprehended within the notion of the
visible world: for my subject leads me to affirm,
that a visible world, as visible, is not external. Some
perhaps will be apt to prevent my inquiry, by urg-
ing that it is not capable of being a question, wheth-
er the visible world be external or not; it being
self-evident, that a visible object, as visible or seen,
is and must be external ; that an object's being seen
as external, is a simple and direct proof of its
being really external ; and consequently that there
is no foundation for the distinction between the
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 15
quasi and real externeity of a visible object, which
I laid down in my introduction.
I answer, then indeed I am blown up at once,
if there be any truth or consequence in the objec-
tion. But the best of it is, that I had never any
design to palm this distinction upon my reader
gratis, foreseeing it might stick with him. Never-
theless, he must allow me the common benefit of
words, whereby to explain my meaning; and this
was all the liberty I presumed upon, in premising
that distinction. Whether the seeming externeity
of a visible object, be indeed an argument of its
real externeity, I leave to be proved by all those
who will affirm it. However, it cannot be denied,
but that it is capable of being a question. For
though the truth, (or fact) be against me, yet visi-
ble objects seem to be external; and herein we all
agree ; so that one member of the distinction is al-
lowed by all to be good. If so, what should hinder
it from being a fair question, whether this seeming
be an argument of its real externeity? For my own
part, I am far from taking it for granted, that this
distinction is good, or built upon real facts, (though
every one must allow the distinction to be good in
general between real and apparent,) for this would
be to take a main part of the last question for
granted. But then, on the other hand, it cannot
be expected that I should admit an adversary to
take it for granted, that this distinction (with re-
gard to visible objects) is not good; in other words,
l6 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
that there is no difference in the thing, between
seeming and real externetty, or between visible and
external. For this would be to grant away at once
the whole matter I am concerned for. If there-
fore another would have me grant or allow this,
let him fairly set himself to shew, wherein lies the
connection between these two different terms, or
prove what is affirmed in the objection, namely,
that a visible object, as visible or seen, is and must
be external. Here, the least thing to be expected
is, that he point or single out one visible object,
which is allowed, or may be plainly proved to be
external. In the mean time, or till something of
this kind be attempted by another, all must allow
me the liberty of doubting, whether there be any
such connection or not; at least bear with me,
whilst I am content to prove that there is no such
connection.
Let this then be the first step by which I rise
to my last conclusion; namely, to shew, that the
seeming externeity of a visible object, is no argu-
ment of its real externeity. Or, in other words, that
a visible object may exist in, or dependantly on, the
mind of him that seeth it, notwithstanding that it
is seen, and is allowed to seem to be external to, or
independant on it.
SECT. I.
That the seeming externeity of a visible object, is
no argument of its real externeity. '
To s'how this, I think the best way will be by
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 17
instances, or an induction of particular objects,
which, though they seem as much to be external,
as any objects whatsoever, yet are, or must needs
be granted, to be not external. * These, to speak as
orderly as I can, shall be divided into two sorts,
possibles and actuals.
By actuals are meant certain instances of per-
ception, which are ordinary and usual, or which,
at least, have been in fact. And by possibles are
meant certain instances of perception, which have
never indeed been fact, but which need nothing
but an increase of power, to make them so at any
time. And,
First, for the last of these, viz. of possible
instances of perception; where the object perceived
is allowed to be not external, though it appears
to be as much so as any objects whatsoever. ' Of
this sort I shall mention two, and that according
to their degrees of actuality. And,
First, for that which is the least actual of the
two, which shall be an instance of a man's perceiv-
ing a creature, which has not so much as in its
kind, existed externally; (supposing here for the
present that some things have so existed;) I mean,
one of those they usually call chimaera's. Of these
there are distinctions and names, of which one is
centaur.
A centaur, is an ens or being, partly horse,
and partly man : a mere fiction of poets or painters ;
that is, a creature which has never existed, or been
i8 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
seen, any otherwise than in imagination. But in
imagination it has, or is supposed to have been
seen, and as such it has existed, and does or may
continually exist.
Well now, let some particular person be sup-
posed, in whose mind or imagination, a centaur
does, this instant exist; and let his name be called
Apelles. Apelles then perceives a centaur, and
that vividly or distinctly enough to draw the pic-
ture of it, or describe its shape and proportions
with his pencil.
These things supposed, I demand how does
this centaur seem to Apelles? Either as within or
without him, whilst he fixes the eye of his mind
upon it, so as to describe it? For an answer to this
question, I appeal to every person living, whether
an object of imagination does not seem or appear
to be as much external to the mind, which sees it,
as any object whatsoever; that is as any of those
which are called objects of vision. If so, I might
here observe, that we have already one instance ot
an object perceived, which, as perceived, is seen as
without, yet is indeed not so, but altogether existent
in, or dependant on, the mind that perceives it.
But I am content to suppose that it will be urged
to me, that this is not an instance to the intended
purpose, which was not concerning imagination,
but sense, and particularly that of vision. Well,
I submit to the charge of fact, lest I should seem
too rigorous, and so overstrain my point: but then
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 19
my reader will agree with me in the conclusion I
contend for, if from this very instance I shew him
a like possible case of vision, wherein the object
perceived is not external.
In speaking of possibles, allowed to be such,
I have all power at my command, or the liberty
of supposing the power of God himself to produce
effects for me. Suppose then an almighty power
ready at hand to produce this imagined centaur
into an object of vision ; what is to be done in this
case, or to this end? Must an external centaur be
created that Apelles may see it? Perhaps so, but
is there no easier or shorter way than this for Ap-
elles to see a centaur? Nay, but he is supposed
already to see a centaur, only that we do not use
to call it seeing, but imagining, because of the
faint and languid manner after which he seeth it.
But if this be all the difference between what we
use to call seeing and imagining, they may easily
coincide, without any considerable difference in
the object perceived, or in any thing else with
which we are at present concerned. For what is
that which is perceived or seen, when an object
visible is before our eyes? Why nothing that I
can think of but figure and colour? Well, Apelles
imagines or perceives a centaur; he perceives then
a certain figure which we call a centaur; he per-
ceives it indeed in a certain languid manner, or
not so vividly as some objects are perceived, which
greater vividness we use to call colour, but still
ao CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
he is supposed to perceive a centaur. If so, add
colour of this perception, and the centaur which
was before only imagined, is now become a seen
or visible object, and yet still, as being the same
figure or extension, is as much in his mind, or as
little external, as it was before.
Perhaps my reader will not be content to
grant me, that the difference between imagination
and vision is only that of more and less, or, that
an object in one is perceived with or with such a
degree of colour, and in the other, either with fig-
ure only, or with a much less degree of colour.^"
Perhaps so; but he will doubtless grant this, that
whilst Apelles imagines a centaur, God may so
act upon his mind, as that by degrees he shall per-
ceive it more and more distinctly or vividly, till
he comes to perceive it to the full as vividly as any
object is or can be perceived or seen. If so, I leave
it with them to distinguish imagination from vis-
ion any otherwise than I have done, who allow not
my manner of doing it; and in the meantime must
demand of them one mark or sign whereby to dis-
tinguish the centaur thus vividly perceived, or
supposed to be perceived, from an object which
they would call truly visible, or seen.
The other instance which I promised to give
is indeed much like the former, only that the ob-
ject perceived, (or one like it,) is here supposed to
exist amongst the ordinary objects of the visible
world ; and it is this.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 21
When a man with his eyes shut, or at noon-
day, has a mind to think on the moon at full, it is
certain he may think on it. This moon, as being
truly perceived, truly exists: it exists also in the
mind of him that seeth it, and that so really and
entirely, that, though every external object were
supposed to be annihilated, or not one besides my-
self had ever been created, yet still I might see or
imagine a moon.
Well now, suppose as before, that whilst I
thus imagine a moon, God should so act upon my
mind by insensible degrees, or otherwise, as to
make this imagined moon appear brighter and
brighter to me, till it comes to be to the full as
vivid as the moon supposed to be in the heavens,
or as any moon whatsoever. In this case, I say,
we have an instance of a visible or seen object,
^^hich, to appearance, is as much external as any
object whatsoever, but is not indeed external:
which therefore is a demonstration that the visible
externeity of an object is no argument for any real
externeity of it.
II. And now from possible I come to actual
cases, or instances of the same thing. And here,
I. The first shall be of certain other sensa-
tions, or modes of sensible perception, wherein the
objects perceived exist only in the mind, though
they seem to exist externally to, or independant on,
it; such as sounds, smells, tastes, heat, pain, pleas-
ure, &c.
22 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
If any one doubts whether these things be
within or without the souls or perceptive faculties
of those who sense them, they must excuse me if I
am unwilling to digress so far as to undertake the
proof of what I here suppose; and that partly on
the account of its evidence ; but I am content to say
chiefly, because the thing has been already done
often to my hands, particularly by Mr. Des Cartes,
Mr. Maleb ranch, and Mr. Norris, in several parts
of their much celebrated writings, whither I chuse
to refer my inquisitive reader."
Supposing then that these objects of sense ex-
ist truly and really in their respective faculties, I
am sure no one will doubt whether they do not
seem to exist altogether without them. For this I
appeal to every one's experience, and to the dif-
ficulty which so many find in believing, that they
do not indeed exist without them. If so, we have
then several instances together of certain objects
of sense, which, notwithstanding that they seem as
much external as any objects whatsoever, yet really
and truly are not external.
"Moreover, there is of this sort a particular
instance often mentioned by philosophers,^^ which
is very home to this purpose ; and that is, of a man's
feeling pain in a member which he has lost. This
is usually said to depend on certain motions made
by certain humours or animal spirits on the nerves
or fibres of the remaining part; but of this I make
no other use or account at present, than only to col-
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 23
lect from hence, that the efifect would still be the
same though the absent member were as well an-
nihilated as lost. If so, I ask, where is this member
which the man is sensible of? Where, I say, is,
or can it be, but in the mind or soul of him that
feels it?""
2. The next instance shall be of light and
colours, which are allowed to be objects properly
visible. These appear or seem as much at a dis-
tance or external as any objects whatsoever, yet
scarce any thing is more evident than that they are
not so.
In this I speak more particularly to Cartes-
ians ; and on this occasion I desire to ask them, how
has it come to pass, that they, who all agree that
light and colours are not external, should yet hap-
pen to overlook the same conclusion, with relation
to the bodies, subjects, or extensions, which sus-
tain these accidents?^"* For can any thing be more
true or proper than to say, such a body is luminous,
or, of this or that colour? Or more evident than
that light and colour exist in, or are accidents of
matter? And shall we say that the subjects exist
without, and the accidents within the soul? Even
those very accidents whose totum esse is inesse in
their particular or respective subjects? ^^ But to
return: as for those who are not yet content so
much as to grant that light and colours exist in
the soul, I must refer them, as before, for their sat-
isfaction in this point. In the mean time this will
34 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
doubtless be admitted by all sides or parties, that
if light and colours are not external, I have given
them an instance of some visible objects, which are
very apparently, but yet are not really external,
which is all the labour I shall be at in this partic-
ular.
3. My next instance shall be of those who on
some occasions see many objects which no other
persons see, and which are unanimously granted
to have no existence, but in the minds or faculties
of those who see them. Such are those who see
men walking the streets with halters about their
necks, or with knives sticking in their bodies. Such
are those who see themselves or others in the fig-
ures of cocks, bulls, or wolves, or with the equipage
of sovereign princes. And such, lastly, are those
who see and converse with several persons, see
houses, trees, &c. which no other person seeth, or
perhaps hath ever seen.
These, you will say, are mad or light-headed.
Be it so, that they are mad, or drunk, or whatsoever
else you will, yet, unless we will be like them we
must needs grant the fact, viz. that they really
see the things or objects they pretend to see. They
see them also as external or without them; and yet
we all grant, and even contend, that they are not
without them, which is as much as I am here con-
cerned for.^^
4. Another instance of vision, which infers
the same conclusion, is of persons whose minds or
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 25
perceptive faculties are acted in an extraordinary
manner by the spirit of God: such was Ezekiel,
such was St. John, the author, to us, of the Apoca-
lypse, and such have been many others : these were
neither mad nor light-headed, and yet they tell us
of strange things which they have seen as evidently,
and as externally to appearance, as any objects
whatsoever; but yet such things as never really ex-
isted without the minds, or perceptive faculties of
those who are supposed to have seen them.
5. Another instance of vision which infers
the same conclusion, shall be one of which every
person may have the experience. Let a man, whilst
he looks upon any object, as suppose the moon,
press or distort one of his eyes with his finger; this
done, he will perceive or see two moons, at some
distance from each other; one, as it were, proceed-
ing or slid'ng off from the other.
Now both of these moons are equally external,
or seen by us as external; and yet one at least of
these is not external, there being but one moon sup-
posed to be in the heavens, or without us. There-
fore an object is seen by us as external, which is
not indeed external, which is again the thing to be
shewn. ^^
6. The last instance which I shall mention
to this purpose, shall be one likewise of which we
have every day's experience, but yet is little ob-
served; and that is, the usual act of seeing objects
in a looking-glass.
a6 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
Here I see sun, moon, and stars, even a whole
expanded world, as distinctly, as externally, as
any material objects are capable of being seen.
Now the question (if it can be any question)
is. Where are these things? Do they exist within
or without my soul, or perceptive faculty? If it
is said that they exist without, I must still ask
where? Are they numerically the same with that
sun, &c. which I see without a glass, and are here,
for a time, supposed to be external? This cannot
be, for several reasons: as first, I see them both
together; that is, I as evidently see two distinct
objects (suppose suns) as ever I saw two houses,
trees, &c. that is, I have the same simple evidence
of sense for their being two distinct suns, as I have,
or can have, that one object is not two, or two one,
or that one is not ten thousand. Secondly, I can,
and have often seen one of these suns, viz. either
of them singly, without seeing the other. Again,
thirdly, instead of two, I have sometimes seen at
least twenty or thirty suns, all equally seen, equally
seen as external. Moreover, fourthly, we often
see the object in the glass very different from that
which is like it, and goes by the same name, with-
out the glass. As for instance, one shall be in mo-
tion, whilst the other is at rest; one shall be of one
colour, nay also, figure and magnitude, and the
other shall be of another; to which may be added,
many other particular differences of which every
one's experience will prove a sufficient testimony.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS a?
If then an object seen as in a glass, be not the
same with any seen without a. glass; and if it be
still affirmed that it exists without the soul which
perceives it, I still proceed to demand. Where
does it exist? Shall we say that it exists in the
glass? Perhaps so, but this must be made at least
intelligible, before another can assent to it. What,
a whole expanded world in a piece of glass? Well,
let those who think so enjoy their own opinion.
For my part, I freely own I am not a match for
such reasoners; and so I grant, as to a superior
genius, whatsoever they shall be pleased to require
of me. As likewise to those who shall seriously
contend, that the objects seen as in the glass, are
not indeed in the glass, but in the e>e of him that
seeth them; not thinking it possible to urge any
thing to the contrary, which will be of the least
weight or moment to alter their opinion.
Nevertheless, I expect to find some, either of
the learned or unlearned part of the world, who,
upon the first suggestion, will very readily agree
with me, that the objects seen as in the glass, are
not external to the mind which sees them; and in-
deed this is to me so simply evident, that I cannot
induce my mind to set formally about the proof of
it, and do almost repent me that I have said so
much already on this head, or that I did not at
once lay it down as a thing universally taken for
granted, at least which would be granted upon the
first suggestion. However, till such time as I am
28 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
apprized of an adversary, I will now conclude
that the objects seen as in a glass, are not external
to the soul, or visive faculty of him that seeth
them; and consequently, that I have here again
given an instance of a visible object, as much ex-
ternal to appearance, as any object whatsoever,
but which is not indeed external.
Now from all and every of these instances it
follows, that the visible or apparent externeity of
an object, is no argument of its real externeity; and
consequently (if it be not the same thing again
in other words) that there is a true and real dif-
ference between the quasi and any real externeity
of an object; which justifies the distinction laid
down in my introduction.^®
This conclusion follows, with the same force
or evidence, from the possible as from the actual
instances ; and as much from one of either sort, as
from ten thousand. For if but one, and that a pos-
sible instance, be given and allowed of, wherein
an object may be seen, with all the visible marks
of being external, which attend any visible or seen
object whatsoever, but which yet is not indeed ex-
ternal; this one intirely destroys all connection
between apparent and real externeity; and so the
consequence will be, that an object's appearing to
be external, is no manner of argument that it is
really so.
Yet I have instanced in many things, for my
reader's sake, as well as my own. For my own in-
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 39
deed, in the first place, in as much as by this means
I have many strings to my bow, which must every
one be broken before the bow itself can be bent
the other way. But yet not forgetting my reader's
benefit, (if he will allow it to be any) inasmuch
as, amongst so many instances, he may meet with
one at least which will hit in with his way of
reasoning, and so dispose him to read what fol-
lows with the more pleasure.
SECT. II.
That a visible object, as such, is not external.
HAVING shewn that there is no consequence
from the visible or quasi externeity of an object to
any real externeity of it, I come in the next place
to shew, that a visible world is not, cannot be ex-
ternal.
But before I enter upon this task, what should
hinder me from asserting my privilege of standing
still in this place, and demanding to have some
other argument produced for the externeity of the
visible world, besides that of its seeming externe-
ity? This is that which convinces people of every
age, and sex, and degree, that the objects they be-
hold are really external; and this I am sure, with
far the greater part, is the only reason which in-
duces this persuasion. With such, and even with
all, till some other argument be produced, I may
30 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
be allowed to argue, as if this were the only argu-
ment: that is, to conclude outright, that no visible
object is indeed external. For to remove all the
pillars on which a building stands, is usually
thought to be as effectual a way to demolish it, as
any direct force or violence.
But not to insist on every point of property,
when so large a field is before me, I will here im-
mediately enter upon the work of proving it to
my reader, according to my promise. And here,
I. First of all, let him try once more the ex-
periment already mentioned, of pressing or dis-
torting his eye with his finger. In this case I ob-
served before, (with an appeal for the truth of it
to common experience,) that two like objects ap-
pear, or are seen. Hence I concluded, that only
one of these can be external; that is, that one of
them is not so. But here I argue from the same
fact, that neither of them is external.
Let an instance be put, as suppose the object
which we call the moon, by pressing my eye I see
two moons, equally vivid, equally external; if so,
they are both external, or neither. But we are
agreed already that they are not both so, therefore
neither of them is external.
If any one will affirm, that only one of these
moons is external, I must desire him to give me
one mark or sign of the externeity of one, which is
not in the other. In the mean time let him try this
experiment with himself.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 31
In the act of seeing two moons, let him call
one of them the true external moon, and the other
only an appearing or false, or by any other name
which he shall please to give it: this done, let him
(with his eyes or mind still intent upon these ob-
jects) remove his finger, and press the other eye
in like manner; or shut either one of his eyes, still
keeping the other intent on the same object, and
he will find by manifest experience, that the moon,
which he calls the true, will prove to be the false,
and that which he calls the false, will prove to be
the true. This, I think, is plain and palpable dem-
onstration, that they are both equally true, or (as
we here understand the word) both equally ex-
ternal. Since therefore no more than one can be
pretended to be external, to say that they are both
equally so, is the same as to say that they are neither
of them so.
Note I. That the same argument here pro-
ceeding on the instance of the moon, is the very
same with relation to any other visible object. So
that the conclusion comprehends the whole visible
world at once; or, in other words, every visible ob-
ject considered as visible or seen.
Note 2. The same conclusion likewise fol-
lows from every one of the instances mentioned in
the former section. Since, as on one hand it ap-
pears that there is no consequence from the appar-
ent to any real externeity of an object; so in the
very act of supposing certain objects, which are as
32 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
much apparently external as any objects whatso-
ever, but which indeed are not external, we must of
course suppose them to be as much indeed external
as any objects whatsoever. Since therefore some are
not external, we must conclude that none are so.
And this conclusion will and must hold good till
some mark or sign be given of the externeity of one
object, which is not also in the other; the very at-
tempt of which is contrary to the supposition. But
to proceed.
II. It is a maxim in philosophy that like is
not the same, and therefore much more one would
think should it be allowed that things vastly dif-
ferent are not the same. As for instance, that light
is not darkness, nor darkness light; that greater is
not less, nor less greater, &c. And yet on such
plain and simple principles as these it follows that
the visible world is not external.
Here then let us again single out an object
which will answer for the whole visible world, and
let it be the same as before, viz. the moon. The
question is, Whether the moon which I see is ex-
ternal or not? In this question there is not a word
but what is plain and simple, or which has been
explained already: let us then proceed to the trial
of it by the plain rule before-mentioned, viz., that
things different are not the same, which indeed is
the same thing in other words with the first princi-
ple of science, viz. Impossibile est idem esse &
non esse}^
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 33
I. First then I am content for a while to
grant that there is an external world, and in this
world an external moon in a place far distant from
us, which we call the heavens. Still the question
returns, whether the moon which I see be that ex-
ternal moon here supposed to be in the heavens?
Well now, the moon which I see is a luminous or
bright object. But is the moon supposed to be in
the heavens a luminous thing or body? No; but
a dark or opacious body, if there is any truth in
the unanimous assent of all philosophers. Again,
the moon which I see is a plain surface; but is
the moon in the heavens a plain surface? No; all
the world agree that the moon in the heavens is
rotund or spherical. Again, the moon which I
see is semicircular or cornuted; but is this the
figure of the moon supposed to be in the heavens?
No; we all affirm that the moon in the heavens
is round or dircular. Again, lastly, the moon
which I see is a little figure of light, no bigger
than a trencher, nay so little, as to be intirely cov-
erable by a shilling. But is this a just descrip-
tion of the moon supposed to be in the heavens?
No ; the moon in the heavens is by all allowed to
be a body of prodigious size, of some thousands of
miles in its diameter. Well then, what follows
from all this, but that the moon in the heavens is
not the moon which I see ; or, that the moon which
I see is not in the heavens, or external to my per-
ceptive or visive faculty?
34 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
2. Secondly, As we have seen that the moon
which I see, is not the same with any moon sup-
posed to be in the heavens, and consequently, that
the moon which I see is not external, by a compar-
ison of the visible or seen moon, with that which
is supposed to be external ; so, the same thing will
appear by a comparison of visible things with vis-
ible, or, of the same thing, (as I must here speak,
for want of more proper words,) with itself. But
to explain.
At this instant I see a little strip of light,
which common use has taught me to call the moon.
Now again I see a larger, which is still called by
the same name. At this instant I see a semicircle;
a while after I see a circle of light, and both these
are called the moon. Again, now I see a circle of
light of such or such a magnitude; a while after
I see a circle of light of a much greater magnitude ;
and both these, as before, I am taught to call the
moon. But really and truly, instead of one, I see
many moons, unless things different are the same.
How then can I believe that the moons which I
see are either one or all of them external? That
they are all so cannot be pretended, for no one ever
dreamt of more than one external moon; and I am
as confident on the other hand, that no one will
pretend that either one of them is external, as in
exclusion of the rest. I conclude then that they
are all alike external, that is, that neither of them
is so; and consequently, (there being nothing in
I
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 35
this but what is equally true of every other object
of the visible world,) that no visible object is, or
can be, external.
III. But why such long fetches to prove a
simple truth? It is no wonder that my reader
(who perhaps has never thought of this subject
before) should overlook the exact point of the
question, when I myself can scarce keep it in view.
I would beg leave therefore to remind myself and
him, that the question in hand does not any way
proceed upon, or so much as need the mention of
any bodies supposed to be external, and unknown
to us; but the question is, whether the extensions,
figures, bodies, (or whatever else you will call
them) which I see quasi without me, be indeed
without me or not.
But can the resolution of any case be more
plain and simple than of this? For is there any
other possible way of seeing a thing than by having
such or such a thing present to our minds? And
can an object be present to the mind, or visive fac-
ulty, which is affirmed to be external to it? Then
may we think, without thinking on any thing; or
perceive, without having any thing in our mind.
If then the presentialness of the object be necessary
to the act of vision, the object perceived cannot
possibly be external to, at a distance from, or inde-
pendent on, us: And consequently, the only sense
in which an object can be said to exist without us,
is its being not seen or perceived. But the objects
36 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
we speak of are supposed to be seen, and therefore
are not external to us, which is the point to be de-
monstrated. ^°
[To this I might add another, which (if pos-
sible) is a yet more simple manner of proceeding
to the same conclusion. And it is this. The ob-
jects we speak about are supposed to be visible;
and that they are visible or seen, is supposed to be
all that we know of them, or their existence. If
so, they exist as visible, or in other words, their
visibility is their existence. This therefore de-
stroys all, or any distinction between their being,
and their being seeUj by making them both the
same thing; and this evidently at the same time
destroys the externeity of them. But this argu-
ment has the misfortune of being too simple and
evident, for the generality of readers, who are apt
to fancy that light itself is not seen, but by the help
of darkness; and so, without insisting any farther
on this head, I proceed to some other points which
may seem to be more intelligible.]
IV. Surely, could the most extravagant
imagination of man have conceived a way, how an
object supposed to be external, could ever possibly
become visible, philosophers would never have
been at so great an expence of fruitless meditation,
as to forge the strange doctrine of the active and
passive intellect, impressed and expressed species,
&c. whereby to account for our manner of seeing
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 37
objects. This doctrine, as I remember, is as fol-
loweth.
It is supposed, that when a man stands oppo-
site to an object, there are certain scales or images,
(which proceed from this object representing it)
which fly in at the eye, where they meet with a
certain being, faculty, or power, called the active
intellect, which, in an instant, spiritualizes them
into ideas, and thence delivers them to the inmost
recess of the soul, called the passive intellect, which
perceives or sees them.
Now far be it from me to move the least objec-
tion against this account of vision. They are
doubtless all plain and simple ideas, or else Aris-
totle had not chosen, neither had the tribe of phil-
osophers since patronized them.^^
I only observe first, that this antient, and al-
most universal account of vision, supposes that the
object seen is this supposed scale or effluvium.
And consequently, secondly, that in order to the
act of vision, there is, and must be, an intimate
union between faculty and object.
For if the soul can see an object which is not
present with it, there had been no need of images
of the object to become present to the soul, by pass-
ing through the eye, &c. However, they need not
be images, but any other fashioned particles would
have done as well, if the objects seen were not those
very images thus spiritualized in the active, and
thence passing on to the passive, intellect.
38 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
Why then should not I conclude, even with
universal consent, that the objects seen are not ex-
ternal, but intimately present with, or existent in,
the soul?
Those who patronize this hypothesis of vision,
will, doubtless, tell me, that it is the least of their
thoughts thereby to affirm and conclude, that the
visible world is not external. On the contrary,
that the hypothesis itself supposes an external
world, or outward objects, from whence these
images or efifluviums proceed.
I answer, it does so; but it does not say or
suppose, that these external objects are visible or
seen, but only that they are or exist eternally. On
the contrary, the objects seen are supposed to be
these images, which, in order to be seen, must first
cease to be external ; that is, must pass into the soul,
and become ideally present with it. So that this
account of vision supposes the visible world, as
such, to be not external.
If, together with this, men will yet hold or
affirm that the visible world is external, I can only
shew them that their own account supposes the
direct contrary. But it is neither in mine, nor any
other person's power, to hinder another from hold-
ing contradictions.
V. From the old 1 proceed to the hypothesis
of vision, which is a part of the new philosophy.
Every one, I suppose, has heard of the doctrine
of seeing the divine ideas, or (as Mr. Malebranche
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 39
expresses it) seeing all things in God.^^ By this
every mode of pure or intellective perception is
accounted for ; but I am here concerned only with
that w^hich is distinguished by the name of vision.
With regard to this the hypothesis is as foUoweth.
In every act of vision they distinguish two
things, viz. sensation and idea^ in other words col-
our and figure. Colour, they say, is nothing dif-
ferent from the soul which seeth it, it being only
a modification of thought or mind. And as for
figure, viz. this or that particular figure which is
seen, they call it part of that intelligible extension
which God includes, or contemplates, thus and
thus exhibited to our minds.
Now I say, nothing is more evident than that
this account of vision supposes that external matter
is not visible ; and consequently, that visible matter
is not external. So evident, that I depend even on
my Aristotelian reader, (who neither approves,
nor so much as understands, what these new phil-
osophers mean,) that he will perceive at first sight
that this must needs be meant by it.
However, when I am apprized of any one
who doubts of it, I shall not only be ready to argue
this matter fairly with him, but will also undertake
to produce several express passages from the writ-
ers of this sort, which directly affirm and contend,
that external matter is not, cannot, become visible.
Nevertheless, I am sensible of the opposition
which may be made to this assertion, from several
40 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
other passages taken from the same writers. But
I cannot help it if men will speak inconsistently
with themselves; or explain their meaning so by
halves, as that the same thing shall appear to be
both affirmed and denied by them.
But the truth is, I fear but little opposition
as to this point: since no one will have zeal enough
to undertake it, but those who professedly patron-
ize this new pholosophy: and I have so good an
opinion of these, as to believe that they will rather
take the hint, and agree with me, upon due re-
flection, than set themselves to oppose, from any
partial regard to their own preconceived opinions.
VI. I shall therefore once more endeavour to
persuade my Aristotelian reader, that it is accord-
ing to the principles of his own philosophy to as-
sert, that visible matter is not external.^^
For this I would refer him to what he will
find in the first book of philosophy, he shall hap-
pen to light on, which has anything on the general
subject of matter. For instance, let him consult
Suarez,^"* Scheibler," or Baronius,^^ on this sub-
ject, which will be found in their books of meta-
physicks; which authors I mention more particu-
larly, because with these I myself have been most
acquainted; not but that I dare appeal to the first
philosopher on this subject which my reader shall
happen to lay his hands on: But to the point.
I do not here affirm, that any one philosopher
of this sort has ever once asserted, that visible mat-
1
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 41
ter is not external, or so much as ever moved the
question, whether it be so or not: on the contrary,
I verily believe, that if the question had been put
to every individual of them, they would unani-
mously have affirmed that it is certainly external.
Nevertheless, I still appeal to my impartial reader,
whether the questions which they move, and the
resolutions which they agree in, concerning the
thing which they call matter^ do not plainly sup-
pose that they are speaking of an object which they
do not see, and which is utterly invisible.
As for instance, it is usual for them to enquire
whether matter exists or not. Whether it has an
actus entitativus ; or whether it be only pura poten-
tia}^ How it is capable of being known, &c.
As to the first of these questions they use to
resolve it thus. That matter must needs exist, be-
cause it is supposed to be created, and also because
it is supposed to be a part of a compositum. And
here again they will tell you, that if it were alto-
gether nothing, it could do nothing in nature; it
could not be the subject of generation and cor-
ruption; it could not be true, that all things in
their corruption are reduced to matter; and be-
sides, if matter was nothing, there would be a con-
tinual creation and annihilation, which is absurd,
&c.
As to the second question, viz. whether it be
pura potentia, or not, they distinguish of a twofold
actus] actus physicus, and actus metaphysicus.
4a CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
Secundum actum physicum^ they say, matter is al-
lowed to be pura potentia^ but not secundum actum
metaphysicum^ &c.
And then lastly, as to the other question, viz.
quomodo materia possit cognosci/^ they resolve it
thus, That God and angels are supposed to know
it per propriam speciem ; but we are supposed to
know it only by consequence, or, as they say, per
proportionem seu analogiam ad materiam rerum
artificialium^ &c. whence Plato is quoted by them,
as saying, that matter is knowable only adulterina
cognitione.^^
Now I say, for what are all these, and several
other such like fetches which I could name, if the
matter they inquire about be that which is visible
or seen? Can it be doubted whether that exists or
not which is supposed to be seen? Whether such
an object as this be actus entitativus, or pura po-
tential And whether we know anything of the
existence of an object which we are supposed to
see?
If visible matter were the matter they are de-
bating about, can it possibly be accounted for, that
not the least mention is ever made of our seeing it?
Or, that for its existence, &c. they should never
think of rrferring us to our senses? And yet I defy
another to shew me but one word of this sort in
any philosophic disputation on this subject.
Nay, they plainly tell us, that the matter they
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 43
speak about is not by us seen, but is directly know-
able only by God and angels.
If then the inquiry they make about matter
be not about any matter supposed to be seen by us,
yet nothing is more evident, than that the matter
they speak about is supposed to be external. So
that what should hinder us from concluding, that
it is the unanimous opinion of these philosophers,
(though indeed they have never in express words
affirmed it,) that external matter is, at least to us,
invisible; and consequently, that visible or seen
matter is not external \ which is all that I am here
concerned for, leaving others to explain for them
what they mean when they affirm, that external
matter is visible to God and angels.
CHAP. II.
Objections answered.
HAVING proved my point after my own
manner, it may be expected that I now attend to
what another may offer on the contrary part. This,
I confess, is a piece of justice which I owe a fair
adversary, and accordingly I here profess I will
be ready at any time, either to answer his objec-
tions, or submit to the force of them. But how can
it be expected that I myself should oppose any-
thing to the point I have been contending for?
44 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
For my reader may remember, that I have already
declared, that I know of no one reason or argu-
ment, either in myself formerly, or from others,
for the externeity of the visible world, besides its
seeming externeity. But if I have not already
shewn the inconsequence of this argument, I con-
fess I have been very idly employed ; and if I have,
I have at once answered every objection that can
reasonably be expected from me, to be urged
against the point I am concerned for.
There may be cavils indeed enough, and of
these I expect my share from a certain quarter;
for having endeavoured, with a serious air, to
demonstrate a proposition which is so contrary to
common prejudice, and which some perhaps will
be resolved not to admit; nay, I myself am not so
abstracted from my former self, as not to be able
very easily to invent a set of arguments of this
sort. But what can in reason be expected that I
should do with an adversary of this sort? Shall I
study a means to convert those whom confessedly
it is not in my power to convince? But I have
said already that I know of no mechanical engine
proper to remove prejudices; and I must still pro-
fess the same, till this awakened age shall bless
the world with the discovery. Shall I then alto-
gether pretermit the mention of such objections,
affecting to despise them, as not worth the labour
of answering them? This indeed I would do if
I wrote on the side of a prevailing party; but a
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 45
whole world against one is too considerable an
adversary to be despised, though they were not
only in the wrong, but were little better than id-
eots. But I have reason to expect, that not only
such, but even the wise and learned, at least by far
the greater part, will be my adversaries in this
point, after all the endeavour which I have used
to justify it; and therefore, till I am apprised of
some other, I must suppose them to be so, in virtue
of such objections as I can think of at present, or
have by accident heard from others in conversa-
tion, which are these that follow.
Objection i.
First, I expect to be told, that in arguing
against the extra-existence of the visible world, I
oppose a known evidence of truth, viz. the uni-
versal consent of mankind, that it is external.^*^
Answer.
This now is one of the things which I just now
called cavils, which I think is the best name that
an argument deserves, which is nothing at all to
the purpose in that wherein it is true; at least such
a one as is false, both in principle and in conse-
quence, which will, I suppose, appear to be the
case of the present objection. For,
First, as to the fact or minor part of the argu-
46 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
ment, what should hinder me from denying it?
For, first, who can assure me that since the world
began, not one or two, or two hundred persons,
have not been of that opinion which I am here con-
cerned for? How many may have written on this
subject in former times, and we not hear of it in
the present? And how many more may have lived
and died of this opinion, and yet have never writ-
ten on it? But, secondly, what if we allow that
not one has ever written on this subject before?
This will but turn to the disadvantage of the ob-
jection. For where then is the universal consent
before spoken of? Do we mean the same by it as
universal silence? Silence in this case will amount
to but a very slender argument of consent; and in-
deed so slender, that the bare opinion or affirma-
tion of any one person to the contrary, who has
professedly considered and inquired about the
matter, will outweigh a silence ever so universal,
and may even justly challenge the evidence of con-
sent, be it more or less, on his side of the question.^^
If therefore the question about the externeity
of the visible world, has never, before this time,
been professedly considered, I may fairly plead
universal consent for that part which I defend;
since the consent of all that have ever considered
it, must needs be all that is meant by universal con-
sent. If therefore there be found on the contrary
part, any thing in mankind which is like consent,
it must lose its name, and be called prejudice or
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 47
inclination; which is an adversary (as I have ob-
served before) I have no arms to contend with.
But lastly, methinks it should weigh something
towards consent on my side, that I have shewn al-
ready^^ that it is consistent with, and even neces-
sary to the principles of philosophers of all sides,
to hold that which I contend for. And if this be
true, the utmost that can be said in answer to it
will be this only, that they have contradicted them-
selves, which I am as ready to admit of, as any one
can be to urge, since this will make the authority
of ten thousand of no value against the point I am
concerned for. But,
Secondly, What if it were true, or admitted,
that universal consent lay opposite to my conclu-
sion? Must it therefore be condemned without
trial, or hearing of anything in its defence? If not,
then it is allowed to be possible, that a proposition
may be true, though it happen to cross the consent
of all mankind. And if so, how can the contrary
be true too, namely, that a proposition is therefore
false, because contrary to consent? But now, if a
proposition may be true, which is against universal
consent, I immediately affirm that this is the case
of the proposition I am contending for. Well, and
how shall this be tried? How, I say, but by reason
and disputation? So that unless universal consent
be held to be an argument universally conclusive,
it concludes nothing at all, (there being a contra-
dictory distance between these two propositions,
48 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
viz. a thing may be true which is contrary to con-
senty and a thing may not be true which is contrary
to consent.) And therefore the mention of con-
sent is here altogether needless, at least, its intro-
duction serves only to convince us, that it is much
better it had not been introduced. But
Some perhaps will hold this argument to be
universally conclusive, viz. A proposition may not
be true which is contrary to universal consent; and
this, I suppose, must be the meaning of those who
will pretend to mean anything by the words of the
objection. But is there a man upon earth who will
join issue with me on this foot? Perhaps so, but
he must excuse me if I declare beforehand that I
will not do so with him whilst he continues to be
of this opinion. And I am fool enough to say this,
because I think I have reason for it. But this alone
unqualifies me to hold discourse with one who will
contend, that universal consent is a simple evidence
of truth. Whereas if this be true, then universal
consent is truth, and reason, or the common stand-
ard of every particular truth. Consequently, by
this rule, a proposition may become true which is
simply false, or false which is simply true ; that is,
all that which I have been used to call truth and
reason is destroyed at once. But now, whatsoever
proposition I defend or deny, I must take it for
granted that there is such a thing as truth, inde-
pendent and immutable, and that reason is reason,
though ever so many people dissent from me, or
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 49
deny it; that is, I must take the question between
us for granted, as my first step towards the dis-
putation of it. And therefore, as on one hand I can
do no otherwise than thus, and on the other I am
sure no adversary will allow me to take this meth-
od with him, we must even part fairly, as being
unqualified for each other's conversation. And
this is my best answer to the first objection.
Objection 2.
Does not the sense of feeling assure us of the
extra-existence of the visible world? To this I"
Answer.
First. If for instructions sake only you pro-
pose this question, you are doubtless disposed to
take my word for an answer; accordingly I answer.
No; the sense of feeling does not assure us of the
extra-existence of the visible world. If this does
not satisfy, you are desired, instead of questions,
to give me an argument, whereby it may appear
that the sense of feeling does assure us of the extra-
existence of the visible world. What makes this
the more necessary is, because I have proved al-
ready in great variety that the visible world is not
external; and amongst the rest, that the sense of
vision gives us evident assurance, that a visible ob-
ject, as such, is not, cannot be, external. And me-
so CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
thinks, if this is not false, it should be true; or if
false, yet should not be so called, till either the
arguments are answered by which it is defended,
or some other argument be produced, which con-
cludes against the truth of it: for till one of these
things be done I have but the objector's bare as-
sertion against me, whereas he has mine, and I
think something else on the other side. But,
Secondly, I am content to go on with the la-
bouring oar in my hand, and shew the contrary
to that which is affirmed in the objection. Accord-
ingly I affirm,
First, That be the object of the sense of feel-
ing what it will, or leaving the decision of this mat-
ter at large, feeling is no argument of the extra-
existence of this object. For the truth of this I will
only refer my reader back to what has been al-
ready observed on this subject; or rather I presume
that he remembers both that^ and hoiv I have pre-
vented the force of this part of the objection; so
that till I hear farther on this point I may save my-
self the pains of adding anything in this place.
But I affirm also,
Secondly, that the sense of feeling is so far
from assuring us of the extra-existence of the vis-
ible world, that it does not so much as say any-
thing of its existence simple. I say not here with
a certain Author,*^'* that we cannot feel existence^
it being the same thing to do so as to feel a propo-
•Mr. Norris's Theory of the Ideal World. Vol. 1, p. 198. §13.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 51
sition. This may be a good argument for aught
I know, but I profess it is too high or too low for
me, for I do not understand it. But what I affirm
is this, that whatever be the object of the sense of
feeling, and even admitting that it assures us of the
existence of its proper object; things visible are
not the object of this sense ;" and consequently we
can have no assurance this way of so much as the
existence simple of such objects. I know not how
it may sound to another, but to me to say, I can
feel a visible object, is just such another piece of
sense as to say, I can see the sound of a trumpet,
or hear the colours of a rainbow. One would
think it should be granted me that a visible object
is visible, and that a tangible object is tangible,
and that seeing and feeling are two different things
or sensations ; but it is the same thing to me though
they were one and the same; for if so, then as vis-
ion is feeling, so feeling is vision; and then I have
proved already that a visible object, as such, is not
external, whereas if they are different they must
have different objects, be the names of them what
they will; and then a visible object will be one
thing, and a tangible object another: and therefore
how the existence of a tangible object should be-
come an argument for the existence (much more
the extra-existence) of a visible object, is indeed
past my skill to understand, any farther than this,
that if I understand anything at all, I understand.
5a CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
and I think I have shewn, this to be a plain and
glaring contradiction. And so I proceed to
Objection 3.
Which is Mr. Des Cartes's;'*' and that ac-
cording to the best of my remembrance is this: he
concludes the being of an external world from the
truth and goodness of God, who is not to be sup-
posed to deceive us in our involuntary judgments
or inclinations. [This, I say, I take to be his
meaning, though my manner of expressing it be
very different from that of his two great followers,
Mr. Malebranche *^' and Mr. Norris,§^^ for which
I refer my reader to the places cited at the bottom.
Whether I have done him justice, or not, I leave
to be disputed by those who think I have not. In
the mean time, the reason which I give for dif-
fering from these great persons is, because as they
have represented his argument, it seems to be in-
consistent with itself, and has not so much as the
appearance of being an objection; whereas, as I
have here given it, it seems to have some appear-
ance, though how far it is from being a real ar-
gument against anything I am concerned for, will
appear by this that foUoweth.]
Answer.
I. If by the being of an external world, be
* Search's Illustrations, page 112. 37
§ Theory of the Ideal World, Vol. 1, p. 208.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 53
meant the being of a world, which, as external, is
supposed to be invisible, this is nothing to my pres-
ent purpose, but belongs wholly to my Second Part;
wherein I shall attempt to shew that an external
world is simply an impossibility, which external
world will be also there supposed to be invisible.
But if by the being of an external world be meant
the same as the external being, or (as I have hith-
erto called it) the extra-existence or externeity of
the visible or sensible world, it is then indeed an
objection against the point I am now upon. Ac-
cordingly,
2. I say, that in my opinion it is no imputa-
tion on the truth and goodness of God to affirm,
much less to attempt to prove, that the visible
world is not external. It is no business of mine to
prove this negative, though it be the easiest thing
in the world so to do. Let them prove the con-
trary who build their whole cause of an external
world upon the force of it. It is enough for me
that I have shewn by many arguments that the vis-
ible world is not external. These arguments either
conclude, or they do not; if not, let this be made
appear by a just and distinct answer to them ; but
if they do, the point is gained, and they must be
persons strangely disposed, who after this will ex-
pect I should take their word, when they say, that
the truth or goodness of God is concerned, that
that should be false, which is, and must be sup-
54 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
posed to be true. But to be something more par-
ticular I answer,
First, That I deny the supposition of the in-
voluntariness of our judgments for the externeity
of the visible world. For this it is enough that I
myself am one, who am so far from being invol-
untarily determined to this assent, that I can, and
have already demonstrated that it is not external.
Secondly, We should come to a fine pass of
reasoning indeed, if this manner of proceeding
were allowed to be good, viz. I am inclined to
judge such or such a thing to be so or so; ergo, //
is as I would have it, because God will not deceive
me?^ It is in vain in this case to appeal to reason
and argument; nay, though God himself should
supply us with reason against our inclination, nay,
and give us his word that our inclination is erron-
eous, yet still we are bound to stand by it, and even
plead the authority of God against himself. But,
lastly. Do I hear this from a Cartesian, even from
Des Cartes himself, who is for nothing more known
in the world than for giving us many instances
wherein a common inclination may be, and is er-
roneous; as in judging light to be in the sun, heat
in the fire, or in the hand, colours on external ob-
jects,"*" &c. In all these cases we are as much in-
clined as in judging the visible world to be ex-
ternal; and yet it is enough with him and his fol-
lowers for the confutation of these inclinations,
that they have good reason to the contrary: and
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 55
this methinks should be enough in any case, and
with any persons, unless we are resolved to be un-
reasonable, and even profess ourselves Sceptics,
and if so, I confess I am silenced/^
PART II.
That there is no external world, and, That an ex-
ternal world is a being utterly impossible.*^
INTRODUCTION.
HAVING shewn in my former part that the
visible world is not external, I come now to the
other thing proposed in the beginning, namely to
demonstrate more at large, or simply, that an ex-
ternal world is a being utterly impossible, or that
there is no such world. Now to this, as before, I
shall proceed by steps.
CHAP. I.
ARGUMENT I.
AND here I affirm, in the first place, that (ab-
stracting from any argument directly proving this
point) we are bound already so far to conclude
56 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
that there is no external world, as that it is against
all the laws of fair reason and argument to sup-
pose or make mention of any such world. For if
a visible world, as such, is not external, an external
world, as such, must be utterly invisible, and if in-
visible, unknowable, unless by revelation/^
For, first, an external world (if there be any
such thing) is, I suppose, allowed by all to be a
creature ;"* but the being of a creature is not to be
proved by reason, for reason converses only in
things necessary or eternal, whereas a creature, as
such, is contingent, and temporary; so that in vain
shall we seek to reason to assure us of the existence
of an external world.
Then, secondly, it is here supposed that we
should seek to as little purpose to the testimony of
sense, since an external world, as such, is here sup-
posed to be absolutely invisible. Whether we
have any notice from revelation of the being of
any such world shall be considered in its proper
place.''^ In the mean time I here suppose also,
Thirdly, that we have no such notice, so that, as
the case stands at present, an external world is a
being utterly unknown.
But now I have always received it as a law,
that we ought never to reason but upon known
ideas ; and if this be just and reasonable, an exter-
nal world, as being unknown^ ought to have as lit-
tle place in our reasonings as if we knew for certain
that there was no such world.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 57
Nay, on the supposition of its being unknown,
we are not only bound to omit the mention of it,
but also warranted to conclude that there is no such
world. This, I say, must be an allowed conse-
quence, till such time as some other pretends the
contrary; and he must prove too as well as pretend,
else the consequence stands good against him.
Here then is my advantage; we all know and
are agreed that there is such a thing as a visible
world, and that a visible object, as such, is not ex-
ternal: on the other hand, we are as much agreed,
at least it is here supposed that we are agreed, that
we know nothing at all of an external world, sup-
posed, as such, to be invisible : but it is a maxim in
science, that eadem est ratio non entis Gf non ap-
parentis. I conclude therefore outright that there
is no such world.
It is for this reason that we think it our duty
to reason only on the supposition of body and spirit^
thinking and extended beings, viz. because we have
no knowledge of the existence of any creature,
which is neither of these. Hence we think it a
very good and safe way of arguing, to make the
exclusion of the one, the consequence of the posi-
tion of the other, and so vice versa. Thus philos-
ophers use to prove that colour, light, heat, sound,
&c. belong to, or are affections, of spirits, because
they are not included in the idea which we have of
body. The principle or major proposition of
which argument is plainly this. There are but
58 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
two sorts of beings in the world, viz. spirit and
matter; then the minor is this, viz. light, &u:. do not
belong to matter, ergo, they belong to spirit. Now
if this way of arguing is good, it is so by virtue of
that principle, that we ought to reason only on
known ideas, and that things which appear not,
are but equal to things which are not; and it is in
virtue of the same that I here plead a right to con-
clude that there is no such thing as an external
world.
I pretend not this to be demonstration of the
point simply, as if I should say that a thing's being
unknown were a direct argument of its not being at
all ; but yet this is something so very near of kin to
a demonstration, and so every way serving all the
ends and purposes of a demonstration, that whoever
has the advantage of it on his side, has as little to
fear from an adversary, as he that can produce ten
thousand demonstrations. For this is an evident
principle or rule of reasoning, that a thing un-
known ought never to be supposed, and therefore
till it be supposed, it is the very same thing as to
us as if there were no such thing at all. To sup-
pose the being of a thing granted to be unknown,
with him who affirms that it is nothing at all, is to
beg the question ; whereas, to suppose it to be noth-
ing at all upon the same concession, is not to beg
the question; I mean any fair or legal one, because
on one hand, no one has any right to make that a
question which he professes that he knows nothing
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 59
of ; and on the other, every one has a right not only
to question the existence, but also to suppose the
non-existence of what is granted to be unknown.
So that whilst this is granted, in the case before us,
I have the same advantage against any one who
shall suppose an external world (viz. either in actu
formali, as in opposition to what I here contend
for, or in actu exercito,^^ in the resolution of any
philosophical or general question, which depends
on the yea or nay of this point,) as if I were girt
about with ever so many demonstrations,
I might therefore fairly rest here, and save
myself the labour of producing any direct or osten-
sive arguments against the being or possibility of
an external world : but to give my reader the best
satisfaction I can, and also to establish my conclu-
sion in some measure answerably to the good use
and moment of it, I am content to propose the fol-
lowing demonstrations.
CHAP. II.
ARGUMENT II.
AN external world is here supposed to be in-
visible, even utterly or absolutely so, absolutely
incapable of being an object of vision or percep-
tion ; insomuch, that though it were here supposed
that an external world were capable of existing, or
6o CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
that any power were sufficient to produce such a
thing or being, yet no power can be supposed to be
sufficient to make it visible or seen. For a visible
world, as such, is not external, as has been shewn
already: so that to say, that an external world may
(by any cause) become visible, is a contradiction in
terms.
Well now, an external world is supposed to be,
or to imply creature; so that if there be any such
thing in being, it is so, because God has willed,
made or created it.
But for what end, or use, or purpose, can we
suppose that God should create an invisible world?
A world, which, as invisible, is incapable of being
inhabited, incapable of being known? For my
part I can think of no use which such a world can
be of. And considering that such a world is here
granted to be unknown, it is not incumbent on me
to shew that it can be of no use, but on them to shew
the contrary, who are concerned for the being of
it. So that till this be done I have a right to sup-
pose that it is of no use at all, and consequently to
affirm that there is no such world.
For though the principle must take its chance
to be either admitted or denied, as men shall please
to judge (only that, as I observed just now, he must
prove his point, who will venture on the denial of
it,) still the consequence is good, and must pass
with all for demonstration, that a creature which is
not, cannot be of any use, is at best but a possibility^
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 6i
but such a possibility as neither will, nor can be
produced into act.
This, with certain wits, may appear to be a
contradiction ; and perhaps I should mend the mat-
ter but little by the answer I am most inclined to
make them, namely, that though it be so, yet it is
nevertheless true; nay, that I could easily shew
them a hundred such contradictions, which yet they
themselves will acknowledge to be true. But I am
content so far to favour the iniquity of words, as to
explain by a distinction this appearing difficulty.
I say then, that things are possible or impos-
sible, after a twofold manner. One is, when in the
idea or conception of the thing there is, or is not,
any repugnancy or contradiction.
This is what may be called an internal or in-
trinsic possibility, or impossibility; possibility
where there is not, impossibility where there is, this
supposed repugnancy.
The other is, when the repugnancy or impedi-
ment is, or is not, (not in the thing itself, but) in
the cause, or time, or some other circumstance or
affection of the thing. But in this place I am con-
cerned only with the first of these, viz. the cause.
A thing is possible in its cause, when there is,
in the idea of its cause, no impediment to be found,
forbidding its existence, or which is the same, with-
holding the efficient from producing it into act;
and when the contrary to this happens, then the
thing is impossible. For, since everything exists
6a CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
by its cause, it will as certainly not exist if the
cause does not produce it, as if in its own idea it
implied a contradiction. And if the supposed im-
pediment in the cause be invincible, the existence
of the thing supposed becomes properly impos-
sible. This I would therefore call an external or
extrinsic possibility or impossibility. A thing then
may be both possible and impossible in these dif-
ferent respects; that is, intrinsically possible, but
extrinsically impossible; and therefore of such a
thing it may be be said without any contradiction,
that though it be admitted to be possible, (viz.
intrinsically,) yet it is such a possibility, as neither
will, nor can, be produced into act, (viz. by reason
of an impediment found in its cause, which though
an extrinsic, is yet a real impossibility against the
being of it.)
But now this is the case before us, viz. of an
external or invisible world. Admitting it to be
possible with regard to the thing itself, that such a
world should exist; yet an useless creature cannot
possibly be made, when we regard its cause, viz.
God, who can do nothing to no purpose, by reason
of his wisdom.'*^ Here then lies the impediment
spoken of in the cause, which makes it extrinsically,
but yet really impossible, that there should be any
such world. I say really so, because the wisdom
by which God acts is necessary and immutable ; and
therefore if it be simply against the order of wis-
dom to do an useless act, the impediment against
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 63
the doing of it is to the full as invincible, as if a
repugnancy were found in the idea or conception
of the thing itself, here supposed to be done, or not
done; and consequently an useless effect is a real
impossibility.
But I have often found upon examination,
that where an extrinsic impossibility lies against
any point, we need but search to the bottom of it,
and we shall find an intrinsic repugnancy in the
thing itself. And this I think I have seen to be the
case of an external world, as I suppose will appear
from some of the following chapters.
CHAP. III.
ARGUMENT III.'*'
AS for instance. An external world, whose
extension is absolute, that is, not relatively depend-
ing on any faculty of perception, has (in my opin-
ion,) such a repugnancy in its extension, as actually
destroys the being of the subject world. The re-
pugnancy is this, that it is, or must be, both finite
and infinite.
Accordingly then I argue thus. That which is
both finite and infinite in extent, is absolutely non-
existent, or there is, or can be, no such world. Or
thus, an extent or expansion, which is both finite
and infinite, is neither finite nor infinite, that is, is
64 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
no expansion at all. But this is the case of an ex-
ternal expansion, ergo^ there is, or can be, no such
expansion.
I know not what will pass with some men for
argument, if both the matter and manner of this
be not approved of. For first, what can well be
more evident than both the premises? That a
thing, in the same respect, cannot be both finite and
infinite; or that a thing which in the idea of it im-
plies both finite and infinite, is in act neither finite
nor infinite; and that what is neither finite nor
infinite, is not at all, are (with me, and I suppose
with all pretenders to reason,) such prime princi-
ples of science, that I must needs depend that these
will never be called in question by any but pro-
fessed sceptics. Then as to the minor, its evidence
is to me so glaring, and (in the little conversation
I have had in the learned world) so universally
assented to, that I am rather inclined here also to
make my appeal for, than endeavour to shew the
truth of it. This of the extent of an external
world, is that which is called opprobrium philoso-
phorunij being a point owned by all to have an
invincible demonstration, both for and against it.
Some indeed, by way of hypothesis, have held it
to be finitely, and some to be infinitely, extended,
according as either of these has best served the ends
of some other points they have been concerned for.
But I have never yet met with any one so hardy as,
in defence of one, to have endeavoured to dissolve
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 65
or answer the arguments lying on the other side of
the contradiction. For this reason I need not here
name either the one sort, or the other, but conclude
outright, even with universal consent, that an ex-
pansion external is both (that is neither) finite and
infinite. Then,
Secondly, as to the form or manner of this
argument, it has first evidently this to plead for
itself, that there is nothing in its conclusion but
what is in the premises which shews it to be no fal-
lacy, but a legal and just argument. And also this,
secondly, that it is exactly parallel with several
arguments which I could name, allowed by all to
be good, and even perfectly demonstrative.
As for instance, suppose a man should advance
the notion of a triangular square. Or suppose, two
persons contending about the attributes of this
strange idea: one arguing from the idea of tri-
angle, that it has but three angles; and the other
contending that it must have four, from the idea of
a square; what could any reasonable stander-by
conclude from this, but that the thing they are dis-
puting about is nothing at all, even an impossibility
or contradiction? Nay, the disputants themselves
must needs close in with this manner of arguing;
and that on two accounts.
First, in that this manner of arguing accommo-
dates the difference between them, and salves the
honour of both. For by this both appear to be in
the right in the precise points they are contending
66 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
for; and wrong only in something which they are
both equally concerned for, viz. the supposition of
the being of a triangular square, which is the thing
supposed by consent between them. But chiefly.
Secondly, in that the person who argues in this
manner must be allowed to have the law of reason
on his side, and may compel them, on their own
principles, to assent to his conclusion. This is
done by granting to each party his point, namely,
that a triangular square is both triangular and
square or quadrangular. This done, they have
nothing to do but to answer each other's arguments,
which it is here supposed they cannot do. By this
therefore each grants the other to be in the right.
So that for a stander-by to grant both to be in the
right, is, in this case, a demonstration that they are
both in the wrong; or in other words, that the
thing they are disputing about is nothing at all.
I have mentioned this possible^ rather than any
actual^ instance of this kind, because I would give
an instance wherein I may be sure to have every-
one of my side. For certainly no one can doubt
whether this be a good argument or not.
A figure which is both triangular and quad-
rangular, is not at all.
But this is the case of a triangular square.
Ergo^ there is no such figure.
The force of this argument has never been dis-
puted and I dare say never will : whereas to have
put a case, which has been actually a matter of dis-
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 67
pute, (of which sort I believe some might be
named,) though equally conclusive, had yet been
less plain and evident, because what has been, may
be again; and so to some I had seemed to prove a
notum by an ignotum.
But now, in the present case, which is granted
to be clear, I have nothing to do but to shew it to
be parallel with that which I before mentioned.
And this is an easy work. For (as in this possible
one about the attributes of a triangular square there
may be, so) there has actually been a dispute be-
tween philosophers concerning one attribute, viz.
the extent of an external world. One side, from
the idea of its being external, has proved it to be
infinite; the other, from the idea of its being cre-
ated, &c. has proved it to be finite. Both suppose
it to be external, both to be created. At the same
time neither of them so much as pretends to answer
the arguments on the side opposite to his own ; but
only to justify his own point directly. And yet
both will grant, that if an external world be both
finite and infinite, it is the same thing as to say there
is no such world.
Well then, here I interpose, as before, and say,
A world which is both finite and infinite, is
not at all.
But this is the case of an external world.
ErgOj there is no such world.
Here the honour of both is salved; here both
the major and minor are their own; here a
68 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
stander-by has the same advantage as before; so
that what should hinder an easy, and even uni-
versal, assent to the conclusion?
CHAP. IV.
ARGUMENT IV.
FROM the maximum^ 1 come next to the min-
imum naturale; or to the question about the divisi-
bility of matter, quantity or extension.
And here I affirm in like manner as before,
that external matter is both finitely and infinitely
divisible; and consequently, that there is no such
thing as external matter.
The argument in form stands thus.
Matter which is both finitely and infinitely
divisible, is not at all.
But this is the case of external matter.
Ergo, there is no such thing as external matter.
The major of this argument is the first prin-
ciple of science, it being the same in other words,
as to say, that what is, is, or that it is impossible for
a thing to be, and not be. For finite and infinite
are just so to each other, as being, and not being.
Finite is to be limited, infinite to be not limited.
Or rather thus, infinite is to be absolute, finite, to
be not absolute. So that it is as plainly impossible
for the same thing to be both, as both to be, and not
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 69
be at the same time, or in the same respect, &c.
For both the respect, and time, and everything else,
which is or can be made the condition of the truth
of this principle, is also found in the major of the
present argument; and consequently nothing can be
more evident, than that what is, or in its idea im-
plies both finite and infinite, is not at all.
But now this I say is the case or implication
of external matter, which is the minor or assump-
tion of the same argument.
External matter, as a creature, is evidently
finite, and yet as external is as evidently infinite, in
the number of its parts, or divisibility of its sub-
stance; and yet nothing can be more absurd than
such an infinite divisibility.
But I need not deduce these things to any
farther length, since no philosopher that I have
ever met with has ever doubted of this matter, it
being universally agreed that there is an invincible
demonstration on both sides of this question of the
divisibility of matter, so that I have nothing to do
but to conclude that the thing or matter concerning
which this question proceeds is a mere nothing, or
contradiction; yet I expect to be told, that it has
been the least of the thoughts of these philosophers
to conclude as I here do, since not one has ever
doubted of the existence of external matter. To
this I answer.
First, perhaps so; but who can help this? Is
it not enough for this conclusion, that we are all
70 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
agreed in the premises, and that there is nothing in
the conclusion but what is in the premises? If in
this case men will hold the premises, but deny the
conclusion, this, at best, can be no better than inad-
vertence; but to do this, after the conclusion is
formally deduced, or the whole syllogism is laid
before them, is no better than errant scepticism.
And I must be excused if I contend not with an
adversary of this sort. But secondly, one would
think by the descriptions which they themselves
are used to give of external matter, that all philoso-
phers should be very ready to subscribe to this con-
clusion for its own sake, as I have partly shewn
already, and shall make appear more fully before
I finish this work.
Again, I expect to be told that the matter
which I here speak of is conceived to be very dif-
ferent from that concerning which philosophers
have disputed, in the question about the divisibility
of extension, and also in that about the extent of the
world, (whether infinite or finite;) particularly
that the matter or extension which they speak of is
supposed to be visible, whereas that which I am
speaking of is supposed to be invisible. I answer,"*'
Perhaps so; I admit that the matter usually
spoken of by philosophers is supposed by them to
be visible, and that the matter which I am here
speaking of is supposed, and also proved, to be in-
visible. Nevertheless it must needs be granted that
the matter spoken of by philosophers is supposed
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 71
by them to be external ; if not, it must be because
they hold that visible mater is not external, or, that
there is no such thing as external matter; neither of
which will, I believe, be easily granted, much less
(which is necessary in this place) contended for
against me. If then the matter they speak about
is supposed by them to be external, this is all that I
am concerned for at present; the question between
us being only this simply, whether external matter
exists, or not? or, as usually expressed in latin. An
detur materia externa} No, say I; for it implies
such and such contradictions, which destroy the be-
ing of it, or render its existence impossible. Well ;
and what will an adversary say to this? Will he
deny that it implies these supposed contradictions?
No; it is here supposed that all philosophers agree
in affirming this point. Will he then deny the
conclusion, whilst he affirms the premises? No,
certainly; for this is formal scepticism, or no other
than a denial of all truth, and reason, and conse-
quence, at once. What remains then, but that we
all conclude that external matter is a thing abso-
lutely impossible?
But you will say, to conclude this with con-
sent, is to conclude the non-existence of visible mat-
ter, since philosophers pretend to speak of no mat-
ter but what they supposed to be visible. I an-
swer,
First, why then I must conclude the same
without consent; the damage one would think
72 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
should not be great, provided it be allowed that my
conclusion is true; and for this I appeal to the
arguments by which I prove it, and which I sup-
pose may be good, though they should happen to
want consent. But, secondly, I deny that the mat-
ter concerning the divisibility of which the ques-
tion usually proceeds, is supposed by philosophers
to be visible matter. This is evident from this,
that the matter of which they speak, is, and must
be, supposed to exist after ever so many divisions
of it, even when it is become invisible, by the fre-
quency of its being divided.
It is not therefore visible, but external, matter,
considered as external, of which philosophers have
disputed ; and of which they say that it is both infi-
nitely and finitely divisible and extended. And
this idea of its being external, or independent (as
to its existence simple) on any mind or perceptive
faculty, is so absolutely necessary to both these
questions, that neither of them has any appearance
of being a question, upon the removal of this idea,
and placing visible in its stead. For a visible
world, or visible matter, considered as not external,
exists plainly as visible, and consequently, as such,
is extended, as such, is divisible. So that after this
it carries a contradiction with it, so much as to en-
quire whether it be extended, farther than it is seen
to be extended, or divisible, farther than it is seen
to exist. So that however by accident philoso-
phers may have jumbled together the two ideas of
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 73
visible and external, external is the idea only they
are concerned with, and therefore it is external
matter alone whose existence is encumbered with
the forementioned contradictions; and so incum-
bered, I say, as to make it necessary for us to con-
clude that it is absolutely impossible there should
be any such thing. But yet so partial have I found
some towards an external world, that when nothing
has been found, which could with any appearance
be objected against the evidence of this and the
foregoing argument, they have even drest up for-
mal nothing into the shape of an objection: for I
have been sometimes told (and that with an air of
unusual gravity, as if the being of a real universe
depended on their concern for it; nay, as if religion
itself must fail if there be no external world,) that
a thing may be, and must sometimes be, judged by
us to be true, whose manner of existence we can-
not comprehend. That of this sort are several
articles of our christian faith, as for instance, the
trinity in unity, the incarnation of the son of God,
&c. which we believe to be true, though we ac-
knowledge them to be mysteries, nay, and are con-
tent to own, that with regard to our shallow rea-
sonings, they are attended also with contradictions.
Why then must we conclude that there is no exter-
nal world, because of the contradictions which
seem to attend the position of it? And to this pur-
pose I find it said by a very judicious author*,
•Art of thinking.SO
74 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
that it is good to tire and fatigue the mind with
such kind of difficulties (as the divisibility of mat-
ter, &c.) in order to tame its presumption, and to
make it less daring ever to oppose its feeble light
to the truths proposed to it in the gospel, &c. I an-
swer,
1. It is a sign indeed that our understandings
are very weak and shallow, when such stufif as this
shall not only pass for common sense, but even look
like argument; and herein I confess my own as
well as my neighbour's weakness. However,
2. If we will reason at all, we cannot well
have a more evident principle to go upon than this,
that being is not not-being] that what is, is; or that
it is impossible for the same thing both to be and
not be. If so, we must either say that humility
of judgment is no virtue, or that there is still room
enough left for the exercises of it, whilst we hold
this principle without the least doubt or wavering.
Nay,
3. It seems to me, that if we will reason at
all, we should freely judge of whatsoever we per-
ceive, so as first of all to agree in this, that whatso-
ever we perceive to be, is: for though it were true
indeed that there is no such thing as truth, or
though the light of our understandings were ever
so weak and feeble, yet till we have discovered this
to be the case, and whilst we all agree to reason one
with another, that must pass for the truth which we
perceive, and that must pass for perceiving which
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 75
at present we are capable of, be it what it will in
the eye of a superior judgment or understanding.
To boggle therefore at this, is not reasoning, but
refusing to reason at all ; is not humility of judg-
ment, but open and avowed scepticism? Is not an
acknowledgment of the infinity of truth, but an
evil, and profane, and atheistical, denial of it?
And yet,
4. Nothing more than this is requisite in the
case before us: nothing, I say, but to affirm that
being is, and not to deny our own evident percep-
tions. The first of these is the resolution of the
major, and the other of the minor, of both the fore-
going arguments, whereby I demonstrate the im-
possibility of an external world: for can anything
be more evident than that finite and infinite are
exclusive of each other; and that an idea which
implies both is an impossibility in fact? And can
we pretend to perceive any thing at all, when we
pretend to doubt whether this is not the fact or
implication of external matter? Should we doubt
in this manner, if the subject spoken of were a cir-
cular square, or triangular parallellogram? If not,
I would fain know where our ignorance lies, which
is the foundation of the objection? We are ig-
norant indeed that there is any such thing as ex-
ternal matter, (and one would think for this rea-
son we should be so far from having any partial-
ity towards the being of it, that we should conclude
of course that there is no such thing in being,)
76 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
but on the other hand we cannot so much as pre-
tend ignorance of the premises by which this con-
clusion is enforced. They are as evident as the
light, and also (as far as ever I could inform my-
self) universally acknowledged: where then is the
difficulty, supposed by the forementioned author,
in the question about the divisibility of matter, &c.
wherewith it is so good to fatigue our presumptu-
ous minds? Why, no where that I can think but
here, viz. to conceive how it is possible that such
a thing can exist, whose idea implies so manifest
a contradiction : and if this be all the difficulty, it
immediately vanishes, or loses its name, as soon as
we suppose that there is no such thing or matter,
or make this the question, whether there be any
such thing, or not? For then, instead of difficulty,
it becomes light and argument, and is no other
than a demonstration of the impossibility of its ex-
istence. But now,
5. This does not in the least affect so as to
become a parallel case with the doctrine of the
trinity, &c. and that for several reasons. As,
First, In that all who believe this doctrine are
very ready to acknowledge (and that with reason
too) that there is something incomprehensible in
it; whereas in the demonstrations by which ex-
ternal matter is proved to be both finite and in-
finite, (viz. in extent and divisibility,) I have
shewn already, no ignorance can be so much as
pretended. Then again,
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 77
Secondly, the articles of our faith concerning
the trinity, &c. are, by consent, allowed to be ex-
empt or particular cases, such as are not to be made
precedents for our believing any other points, not-
withstanding the difficulties which are seen to at-
I tend them. And this.
Thirdly, for a very good reason; namely, be-
I cause as to the truth or fact of these doctrines we
have an evidence irrefragable from another quar-
ter, (which is at least equal to the evidence of
reason,) viz. the word of God, which assures us of
these things," whereas we are, or are supposed to
be, wholly ignorant of the being or existence of an
external world. And after all,
Lastly, I utterly deny that there is any con-
tradiction in the doctrines of the trinity, &c. even
rationally considered, which circumstance makes
this and the case of an external world to the last
degree unparallel." But now, it is the parallell-
ism of these points which is the thing contended
for in the objection; and if so, where is the man
that with a serious face will argue this matter with
me? Who will say, I will not give up my judg-
ment for an external, invisible, unknown world,
notwithstanding the manifest contradictions which
attend the mention of it, on any other terms but
that of affirming or granting that there is a con-
tradiction in the doctrine of the ever-blessed trin-
ity? A socinian" or arian^* will not say this, it be-
ing evident that the objection is very nonsense in
78 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
their mouths; and sure I am that an orthodox per-
son would be ashamed to say so: and yet, if it be
not granted immediately that there is (as far as
our understandings can dive or penetrate) a con-
tradiction in the supposed articles of the trinity,
&c. the objection (even on this account alone) is
without all foundation, and is no other than an
ignoratio elenchi, in other words, talking of chalk
with those that talk of cheese.
CHAPTER V.
ARGUMENT V.
ANOTHER argument, whereby it is to be de-
monstrated that there is no external world, is, that
in such a world it is impossible there should be
any such thing as motion; or rather (lest this
should not seem absurdity enough to stop men's
judgments in favour of such a world) it may be
proved from the most simple and evident ideas,
both that there may, and also that there cannot be,
any motion in it.
That there may be motion ^n an external
world, is sufficiently evident from this, that it is
supposed to be a creature : if so, I have an almighty
power on my side to help forward the conclusion,
namely, that it is moveable. And the argument in
form will stand thus.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 79
The power of God is sufficient to move cre-
ated matter,
But external matter is supposed to be created ;
Ergo^ the power of God is sufficient to move
it.
On the other hand, nothing is more evident
than the impossibility of motion in an external
world, considered as external. And that, first, in
the whole; secondly, as to the several parts of it.
I. As to the whole I argue thus;
An infinite body or expansion is not capable
of being moved by any power whatsoever.
But an external world is infinite in expansion ;
Ergo, an external world is absolutely im-
moveable, or incapable of being moved by any
power whatsoever.
That an infinite expansion is absolutely im-
moveable is too evident to be proved, unless this
will be admitted as something more so; namely,
that motion supposes a place possessed, and after-
wards quitted for another, which yet is impossible
and contradictory, when affirmed of an expansion
or body actually infinite, which, as such, implies
the possession of all place already; which circum-
stance therefore makes the motion of such a body
or world a fact absolutely impossible. And then,
Secondly, that an external world, as such, is
infinite in expansion. I appeal to those argu-
ments whereby this proposition is usually proved
by philosophers, and which are allowed by all to
8o CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
be demonstrative. I shall not here fill my paper
with the mention of any one, because I suppose
my reader does not need my information, and also
because it will be time enough to do this, when I
am advertized of an adversary. I shall only ob-
serve this, (as believing it may be of some use to
those who shall be at the pains of considering this
matter,) namely, that whatever arguments have
been used to prove the world to be infinite in ex-
tent, will be found to have proceeded on the for-
mal notion of its being external; whereas those
which have been produced on the contradictory
part have been altogether silent as to this idea, and
have proceeded either on the idea of its being cre-
ated, or on the absurdities attending the supposi-
tion of infinite; by which proceeding it has still
been granted, that notwithstanding these argu-
ments and absurdities, an external world, as such,
must needs be infinite. Since therefore an infinite
world or expansion is not capable of being moved,
I conclude that an external world, considered in
the whole, is a being absolutely immoveable.
II. In like manner it seems to be impossible
that there should be any such thing as motion in an
external world, considered in the several parts of
it.
For motion is supposed to be a translation of
a body from one point or place to another. Now
in such translation the space or line through which
the body moved is supposed to pass, must be actu-
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 8i
ally divided into all its parts. This is supposed
in the very idea of motion : but this all is infinite,
and this infinite is absurd, and consequently it is
equally so, that there should be any motion in an
external world.
That an external line or space is compounded
of infinite parts or points, is evident by the same
argument by which any body or part of matter
(supposed to be external) is proved, and also al-
lowed to be so ; namely, from the idea of its being
quantity, body, or extension, and consequently di-
visible, and not annihilable by division, which last
is supposed in the idea of its being external. But
then, on the other hand, to affirm that a line by mo-
tion or otherwise is divided into infinite parts, is
in my opinion to say all the absurdities in the world
at once. For,
First, This supposes a number actually in-
finite, that is, a number to which no unit can be
added, which is a number of which there is no
sum total, that is, no number at all; consequently,
Secondly, By this means the shortest motion
becomes equal to the longest, since a motion to
which nothing can be added must needs be as long
as possible. This also,
Thirdly, will make all motions equal in swift-
ness, it being impossible for the swiftest in any
stated time to do more than pass through infinite
points, which yet the shortest is supposed to do.
To which may be added,
82 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
Lastly, That such motion as this, however
short in duration, must yet be supposed to be a
motion of all or infinite ages, since to every point
of space or line through which any body is sup-
posed to pass, there must be a point of time cor-
respondent: but infinite points of time make an
infinite time or duration, &c.
These are some of the absurdities which at-
tend the supposal of motion in an external world;
whence I might argue simply, that such a world
is impossible : but lest, as I said before, this should
not be thought absurdity enough, that is, lest any
one should admit such a world, notwithstanding
the impossibility of motion in it, I rather chuse
to defend and urge both parts of the contradiction,
and conclude the impossibility of the being of such
a world, from both the possibility and impossibil-
ity of motion in it. The argument in form stands
thus.
A world, in which it is both possible and im-
possible that there should be any such thing as
motion, is not at all ;
But this is the case of an external world;
Ergo, there is no such world.
I suppose I need not here remind my reader
that I have proved already, and that it is here sup-
posed, that a visible or sensible world is not ex-
ternal ; neither, if he has at all gone along with me
in this discourse, need I undertake to shew that
these absurdities about motion do not in the least
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 83
affect a sensible or visible world, but only an ex-
ternal world. Nevertheless, if upon a due perusal
of what I have here written, this seems yet to be
wanting, I s'hall be ready, as soon as called upon,
to give my reader the best satisfaction I am capa-
ble of as to this matter.
CHAP. VI.
ARGUMENT VI.
AGAIN, it is with me an argument against
the being of an external world, that there is no hy-
pothesis of vision, that I can imagine, or ever heard
of, on the supposition of such a world, but what
in the fact or act of it implies an impossibility.
I pretend not to have conversed with the writ-
ings of philosophers; I am sure not enough with
their persons, to know all the opinions there are or
may have been about the method of vision ; and so
must content myself with those that I have met
with, which are only these two that at this time I
can remember, or think worth the repeating.
One is the Aristotelian, or old account, which
supposes certain images to scale off from external
objects, and fly in at the eye," &c. and the other
is the Cartesian, or new hypothesis, which, instead
of images, or resemblances of objects, scaling off
from the objects themselves, accounts for vision
84 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
from the reflection of subtle matter, (viz. that
which proceeds in a direct line from the sun) from
the object to the eye, &c.
I stand not here to enquire which of these is
true, or the most probable account of vision, on
the supposition of an external world, being here
concerned not in physics, but metaphysics, or an
enquiry into simple, not hypothetical, truth.
Neither am I concerned to consider these two hy-
potheses apart, though they are so vastly different;
for as different as they are upon the whole, they
agree in all that which I am concerned to take
notice of, namely, that the act of vision is the ef-
fect of certain parts of matter, (whether images,
or not,) which proceeding from the objects, re-
spectively affect or act upon the optic nerve, &c.
This is that which I take to be an impossibil-
ity, or so attended with difficulties in the actu ex-
ercito of it, as to be the nearest to an impossibility
of any thing that we know of. For,
First, these parts, as being material or ex-
tended, must needs be impenetrable, that is, they
must each possess a space by itself, and cannot
(two or more, much more an infinite number of
them) be crouded into one point, or the place of
one. Nevertheless it is possible for a man's eye in
one and the same point to see a vast and almost
infinite number of objects which are in heaven and
on earth. There is then a necessity that from each
of these bodies there should be communicated or
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 85
sent a line or train of subtle parts or images upon
the one point of the eye, which, how it is possible
to be in fact, I leave to be considered by all those
who profess to know what they mean, when they
say, bodies are impenetrable.
Secondly, there is not any one point in the uni-
verse, wherein the eye supposed or fixed, cannot
perceive an innumerable company of objects.
There is not then any one point in the universe,
wherein lines of subtle matter, or images, from all
these supposed innumerable objects, do not actu-
ally concentre. If this is thought possible by any,
I must be content to leave it with them, since noth-
ing is more evident with me, than that the fact of
this is utterly impossible.
From these and such like absurdities, which
attend every hypothesis of vision in an external
world, I think I am bound to conclude that there
is no such world. For it seems to me at present,
that if there is an external world, one or other
of these accounts of vision must needs be the true,
that is fact. But as these appear to be impossible
in fact, they seem to derive their impossibility upon
the world which they belong to, or which supposes
them.
This, I say, will follow, till some other ac-
count of vision, in an external world, be produced
or named, which is not liable to these, or any like
absurdities; or which even on the concession of
86 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
an external world, may not plainly be demonstrat-
ed to be false.
In the mean time nothing of all this affects
a sensible or visible world, supposed and granted
to be not external. For then, any hypothesis of
vision, which has no other falsehood in it, but what
is derived upon it from the non-existence or im-
possibility of an external world, will be the true
hypothesis, or account of vision. For, by truth in
this case, will then be meant no other than the will
of God, the great author of nature, who giveth us
such and such sensations, by such and such laws.
And in this sense, a law or rule of vision, may be
possible and even true in its cause, though it has
no truth in itself, or is impossible in fact. And so,
with this explanation, I am very ready to say, that
the second, or Cartesian account is the true hy-
pothesis of vision. For, though there be indeed
no external world, yet such a world exists as far as
it is possible; and it has been granted in the begin-
ning, that it is according to the will of God, that
the visible world should carry in it every charac-
ter of being external, except the truth of fact,
which is absolutely impossible. But the discovery
of this last is within the province of metaphysics,
which has to do only with simple being or exist-
ence; whereas this about the method of vision is
a question of a grosser size, and a much lower de-
gree of abstraction; and its resolution is to be
sought for only in the will of God, by which he
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 87
willed his creatures, viz. material creatures. But
in this will we see an external world, even an ex-
ternal visible world, as I observed just now. So
that this being the first will, must be first supposed,
or taken for granted by consent. And then, I be-
lieve, it will be found that this account of vision
(as well as several parts of the same philosophy
which have been objected against) will have lost
all its difficulty, and must pass for true.
CHAP. VII.
ARGUMENT VII.
AGAIN, as by an external world we are sup-
posed to mean certain objects which do not exist
in, or in dependance on, any mind or faculty of
perception, at least of any creature ; so when I con-
template the idea of such a self-subsisting being,
I profess I am put hard to it to reconcile it with
the character of a creature, or to discover how it
can be understood to subsist at all on the mind, or
will, or power, of God, who is supposed to be the
creator of it.^^ For,
First, as to its being simply^ it is past my skill
to distinguish it from being simple, absolute, or
universal. We are taught indeed to say, that ev-
ery creature of God needs the same power to pre-
serve, which was necessary to the creation of it;"
88 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
and christian philosophers are generally agreed,
that this power of God is so necessary to the pres-
ervation, or continued being, of every creature as
such, that it must return to its primitive nothing,
merely from the abstraction or withdrawing of this
power.
But do we understand what we say, when we
apply this doctrine to an external world, either in
the whole, or in the several parts of it? We see it
indeed in the idea which we have of creature, and
in the absurdities which attend an absolute exist-
ence applied to anything but God alone; but do
we see any such dependance as to being or existence
in the idea, which we conceive of an external
world? Consider but this house, this tree, this any-
thing amongst the objects of an external world, or
of the visible world, supposed (as usual) to be
external, is there any sign of weakness or depend-
ance in any of these things considered by us in this
view? Will not an external house stand or be, un-
less a foreign power continue to support it? Or
does it seem to us to be any thing like those things
of which we speak, when we speak of certain be-
ings which have no subsistence of their own, no
truth of being but in relation or resemblance, and
which would cease to be, barely by an abstraction
of a supporting power, which is different from the
things themselves? A house indeed may be a good,
or useful, or convenient house, only as it stands
related to an idea in the mind, or intellect of its
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 89
maker, and may be said to stand in its present
form, only as supported by certain foreign causes;
but we are speaking here, not of the external form,
but of the simple truth or being of things; and
even in this respect we say that things subsist al-
together by a relation to the intellect, or in de-
pendance on the will of God. But I say, does this
seem to be the case of an external piece of matter?
Do we conceive this as having no absolute being,
or substance of its own? as a mere nothing, but by
resemblance, and what would cease to be on the
instant of the cessation of God's will to preserve
it? I know what another may answer to all these
questions, and I cannot help it, let men answer
what they will ; but still I must insist and say, that
if another will affirm, that he thus conceives of
external matter, he must teach me to do the same
from some other idea besides that of creature,
namely, from the consideration of the thing itself \
or else I must conclude that he affirms this, not be-
cause he understands any thing of the matter spok-
en of, but because the truth in general forces him to
say this. But this is the chief thing which makes
against his point. For to say that external matter
exists wholly on the will of God, because this is
the condition of a creaturely existence, is only to
say in general, that the existence of a creature is
necessarily thus dependant. But this is what I af-
firm; and hence arises the difficulty, viz. how we
can conceive external matter to exist by this rule,
90 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
or how to reconcile the absolute and stable exist-
ence of matter supposed to be external, with this
necessary and indispensable character of a creat-
ure's being. My business is to deny that there is
any such creature for this reason, because it carries
in the idea of it an absolute kind of existence,
which no creature is capable of; and for this I ap-
peal to the judgment of all others; so that if an-
other will yet contend that there is any such creat-
ure, he must not argue with me that it does and
must so exist because it is a creature, for this is
plainly begging the question; but must make an-
swer on the other hand, how a creature, which is
and must be understood to have a self-subsistence,
or a proper substance of its own, can be said to ex-
ist, whilst it is acknowledged, as before, that every
creature, as such, exists altogether in dependance
on the power or will of God. This is the difficulty
which attends an external world, considered in its
several parts. And this.
Secondly, is rather increased, if we consider
it in the whole; for then nothing but its expansion
comes under consideration. And this is plainly
infinite. And if not infinite nothing^ must be in-
finite something^ that is, being or substance. But
is there any thing in this idea which squares with
the indispensable character of a creature? For
this I appeal to every one's idea of an expanded
universe, particularly to theirs, who (if I may
guess,) are not a few, who from a consideration of
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 91
the firm and substantial existence of the visible
world, supposed by them to be external, think
themselves compelled to believe, that simple space
or extension is the very substance of God himself;
and therefore how to conceive it possible that such
a thing should exist, which on one hand we are
compelled to call a creature, and on the other can-
not forbear to understand as God, I leave to be
explained by those who yet retain any fondness for
such a thing. Thus much of the existence simple
of an external world; I come next to consider the
unity which it implies.
Here then I observe, that an external world
implies in it all the unity, which any being what-
soever, which universal being, which God himself
is capable of.
Consider it in its whole, and it has the unity
of infinity. It is one alone, and is absolutely in-
capable of being multiplied by any power what-
soever; which is as much as can be said of God,
and even more than they have a right to say, who
consider him, not as universal, but some particular
being. Consider it in its several parts, or bodies
included in it, and each particle of matter has such
a unity in, or identity with itself, as I think should
not be ascribed to any thing but God, who alone
is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. Again,
I consider, that an external world, is independent
on the will of God, considered in its expansion,
which will and must be infinite, whether God
91 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
pleases to make, or will it to be so or not, suppos-
ing only that he wills to produce or make any the
least extent, or that any the least part or extent is
made, or in being.
As for instance, let God be supposed to will
the being of a certain cubical part of matter or ex-
tension, about the bigness of a common die. This,
I say, is impossible in fact, and this draws another
impossibility after it, which is, that by this the will
of God is over-ruled or frustrated by the work of
his own hands. For what should bound this cub-
ical extent? It must be something, or nothing. If
nothing, it is plainly infinite ; if something, it must
be matter or extension ; and then the same question
returns, and will infinitely return, or be never sat-
isfied under an extent actually infinite. But this is
an independency of being, which I think can be-
long to no creature, it being the same with that
which we use to call necessary existence. I con-
clude therefore that there is no such creature as
an external world.
Lastly, much the same sort of difficulty occurs
if we consider it in not being, after it has been sup-
posed to exist. That God can annihilate every
creature which he has made, is, I think, a maxim
undisputed by any; if so, I think it plainly follows,
that that which in its idea implies an utter impos-
sibility of being annihilated, is a thing in fact im-
possible. But this, I say, is the case or implication
of an external world. This is evident from the
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 93
foregoing article, which shews the absolute neces-
sity of its being infinite, on the supposition of the
being of but the least part or particle of it: for
certainly if nothing less than infinite can exist, or
be made, no part of this infinite can be unmade, or
annihilated. And therefore though in words we
may say that God can annihilate any part of it,
yet we utter that in words, of which we can have
no conception, but rather the contrary to it. For
annihilate it in supposition as often as you will,
yet still it returns upon you ; and whilst you would
conceive it as nothing, it becomes something to
you against your will ; and it is impossible to think
otherwise, whatever we may say.
I believe I should lose my time and pains if
I should attempt in this place to shew, that the
supposition of a visible, which is not an external
world, is attended with none of these difficulties.
This would be a thankless office with all those who
are not yet convinced, but that an external world
may yet stand, notwithstanding these pretended
difficulties; and it would be an injury to those that
are, as preventing them in certain pleasant and
very easy considerations. And so I leave it to take
its chance with all my readers in common.
CHAP. VIII.
ARGUMENT VIII.
ANOTHER difficulty which siill attends the
notion of an external world, is, that if any such
94 „ CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
world exists, there seems to be no possibility of con-
ceiving, but that God himself must be extended
with it.
This I take to be absurdity enough in reason,
to hinder us from supposing any such world. But
so unfortunate are the stars of this idol of our ini-
agination, that it is as much impossible, on another
account, that it should exist, though this were no
absurdity, or though it were supposed and allowed
that God himself were extended.
I suppose then in the first place, that God is
not extended. If so, I say there can be no external
world. For if there be an external world, and if
it be a creature, we must suppose that God is every
where present in, and with it; for he is supposed
to preserve and do every thing that is done in it.
To deny this, is to shut him out of the universe,
even altogether to deny his being. On the con-
trary, to affirm that he is thus present with every
part and particle of it, is to make him co-extended,
which is contrary to the supposition.
Yes, it may be said, God is extended, and
consequently there may be an external world, not-
withstanding this dilemma. I answer,
Secondly, be it so that he is extended, (to
humour a corrupt and absurd itch of argumenta-
tion,) yet this avails nothing towards the being of
an external world, but directly towards the non-
existence of it. For if God be extended, and as we
must also say infinitely extended, where shall we
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 95
find room for an external world? Can two ex-
tensions, infinite extensions, coexist? This is ev-
idently impossible. So that all the choice we are
left to is to acknowledge God or an external world ;
which, I think, is a choice we need not long be de-
liberating upon. I conclude, therefore, that if
God is, there is no external world.
I know but one way of answering this argu-
ment, and that is, to affirm that an external world
is God himself, and not a creature of God. But
till some one shall be so hardy as to appear publicly
in defence of this, I shall think it but a loss of time
and pains to consider of or debate it.
CHAP. IX.
ARGUMENT IX.
I promised in some part of argument IV. that
I would consider farther of what philosophers say
of external matter'^ and here I intend to be as good
as my word.^^
I have shewn in my former part of this treat-
ise,* that the matter so much disputed of by phil-
osophers is not understood by them to be visible.
This of itself is an argument that they had, or
could pretend to have, but a very faint and imper-
fect idea of the thing they were speaking of. Ac-
•Chap. I. Sect ii. Argument 5.
96 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
cordingly, I shall here proceed to shew, that they
neither did, nor could, pretend to mean anything
at all by it. And,
First, for the definitions which they have de-
livered to us of matter, Aristotle defines it thus.
vAiy aiTiov cc ov yiverai Tt.
Materia est ex qua res, vel aliquod est. This, by
no inconsiderable philosopher, t is called optima
definitio materiae. And the same is by Baronius
(Metaph. page 172.) defined thus. Materia sub-
stantialis est substantia incompleta in qua forma
aliqua substantialis existit. And sometimes again
thus, Substantia incompleta capax formae.
These are all the definitions that I shall men-
tion, and these I suppose are sufficient to convince
us that they meant nothing at all by the matter
which they here speak of. For what is there in
either of these definitions besides the indeterminate
notion of being in general, that is, something, but
nobody knows what, or whether it be any thing at
all or no. This I say is all that I can make or
understand by it; and this amounts to the same, as
if they had told us in plain words, that they mean
nothing at all. But this.
Secondly, they tell us yet more expressly in
the descriptions and characters which they give of
matter.
As for instance Baronius* delivers it as the
common sense of all philosophers, that Materia
t Scheib. Met Cap. 22, 158.
•Met p. 189.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 97
non est in praeJicamento, and that non habet pro-
prie dictum genus. This is the same as if he had
told us in express words, that the most they mean
by it, is being indefinite, or something, but they
know not what. For that which is not in the pre-
dicaments, is allowed to be neither substance nor
accident, (unless it be God, or universal being,)
and what is neither of these is confessedly nothing
at all.
Again, St. Austin^" is always quoted by phil-
osophers for his description of matter, as an ex-
planation of the common meaning, and it is thus
expressed. t Materia est infima omnium rerum,
& prope nihil.
Much after the same manner it is described by
Porphyry,^^ X Materia prima ex se est incorporea,
neq; intellectus, neq; anima, neq; aliud secundum
se vivens, informis, immutabilis, infinita, impotens,
qua propter neque ens, sed verum non-ens. But
this is a little more than prope nihil, and I sup-
pose may be said to amount fully to the sense of
the English word, nothing.
In like manner Aristotle himself, who has
given almost all other philosophers their cue, is
for nothing better known than for his most intel-
ligible description of substantial matter. He calls
it nee quid, nee quale, nee quantum ;" to which I
think I may fairly add, nee aliquid, as the proper
f L. 12. Confess, cap. 7.
^ Lib. de Occasionib. c. 21.
98 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
sense and consequence of this description. Nay,
to confirm this as the true interpretation and de-
sign of his words, I have many times seen him
quoted by his followers, for saying positively that
materia est non ens; one instance of which I par-
ticularly remember, viz. Scheibl. Metaph. Cap.
22. 167.
Perhaps so, you will say, but yet all philoso-
phers are agreed in the being of it, and all argue
it to be, or to have a real existence. I answer.
First, If they will contradict their own po-
sitions, as it is not in my power to help, so it is hard
that I should sufiFer for it. But, secondly, how is it
that they argue the existence of matter? Do they
argue it with a supposed adversary, or only with
themselves? If with themselves only, this is noth-
ing at all ; for in this case they may have the ques-
tion for asking; and so this kind of arguing is only
grimace and banter. But if they argue it with an
adversary, who is supposed to doubt it, I am this
adversary, and let their reasons be produced.
In the mean time I affirm that they argue
only with themselves ; that is, they grant themselves
the question, upon all occasions, and whensoever
they please.
Their arguments are such as these, some of
which I have mentioned already.*
Matter is, or exists, say they, because it is, or
is supposed to be created. Here the adversary, if
• Part I. Chap. i. Sect II. Arg. VI.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 99
any, is supposed to grant that it is created, but yet
to doubt whether it is, or exists, or not. That is,
he is supposed to be a drivelling fool, or no adver-
sary at all, which is plainly the case.
Again, matter is, or exists, because it is sup-
posed to be part of a real compositum. This is the
very same case as before.
For surely whoever can be brought to grant
that its a real part of a compositum, cannot be
supposed to doubt whether it exists or not.
Again, if matter were nothing, it could do
nothing, it could not be the subject of generation
and corruption; but this last is supposed (thanks
to the kind opponent!) Ergo, matter is not noth-
ing.
Again, (saith Christopher Schiebler, Cap. 15,
45.) Materia habet essentiam, quia ens est. And
with the same ease you are told by all philosophers
together, that ens est quod habet essentiam. This
is round about our coal-fire, in other words, argu-
ing in a circle, or no arguing at all.
Again, (Cap. 22, 167.) he puts the question
simply, an materia sit ens. And this is the reso-
lution of it. If matter were not ens, it would be
the same thing to say, that any thing fit ex nihilo,
as ex materia. And again, it must be something,
because something is constituted of it.
These and such like (for I am tired with re-
peating them) are the mighty arguments by which
philosophers demonstrate the being of external
100 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
matter. If you will take their words you may; for
I think nothing is more evident than that this is all
you have to do in the case; unless (which I think
much more advisable) you will chuse to believe
with me, that they never designed any other than
to amuse the ignorant, but yet to give every intelli-
gent reader an item, by this procedure, that the
matter they are speaking about is nothing at all.
If so, I have a vast authority on my side:
which, if not sufficient to inforce the conclusion
simply with all readers, because some there may be
who have but little opinion of this kind of author-
ity, yet with all must have this effect, to remove the
prejudice which may lie on their minds against
this my conclusion, on the account of its appearing
strangeness and novelty. And though some authors
on certain subjects may have good reason rather to
cherish than lessen the opinion of their novelty, yet
considering all things, if I were certain to have re-
moved what these are supposed to desire by any-
thing I have said in the present chapter, I am per-
suaded it would avail me more in the event, than
ten thousand the most evident demonstrations with-
out it. And indeed it was the prospect of this ef-
fect alone, which induced me to number this chap-
ter amongst my arguments against the being of an
external world.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS loi
CHAP. X.
Objections answered.
BUT now it is time to attend to what may be
urged on the other size, viz. in favour of an ex-
ternal world.
But what favour can belong, or be due, to that
which is, or can be of no use, if it were in being,
which is all over contradiction, which is contrary
to the truth and being of God, and after all is sup-
posed to be utterly unknown? Who would ever
attempt to form an argument for the being of such
a thing as this? For as unknown, it must be sup-
posed to be nothing, even by those who are pre-
paring themselves to prove that it is something. So
that well may all particular objections be said to be
false or insufficient, when it is against the suppo-
sition of the question to suppose any objections at
all, or but the possibility of an objection.
Nevertheless, where men are thoroughly in-
clined to hold fast their point, notwithstanding all
the evidence in the world to the contrary, there is a
possible room for two or three things, which, for
aught I know, some persons may call objections.
And they are these that follow.
Objection I.
Does not the scripture assure us of the exist-
ence of an external world."
I02 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
Answer.
1. Not as I know of. If it does, you would
do well to name to me that text wherein this is re-
vealed to us; otherwise, I have no way to answer
this objection but that of taking into consideration
every sentence in the whole bible, which I am sure
you will believe is more than I need do. But,
2. To do this objection all the right I can, I
will suppose a passage or two in the word of God;
and I should think, if such a one is any where to be
found, it will be in the first chapter of Genesis,
where Moses speaks of the creation of the material
world.^'* Here it is said, that in the beginning God
created the heaven and the earthy and also that all
material things were made some days before the
first man, and so cannot be said to exist only rela-
tively on the mind of man.^^ To this I answer,
I. This objection from scripture is taken
from Mr. Malebranche,*^^ and is his last resort on
which to found the being of an external world.
But then the external world, which he contends
for, is proved by him before, and here supposed
to be no object of sense, and consequently invisible.
And it was for this reason (it being an objection
peculiar to this author) that I deferred the men-
tion of it to this place, where also an external world
is supposed to be invisible. Here then my answer
to the author is this, that the tendency of this pas-
• Search's Illustr. Tom. ii. p. 114. Taylor's Translation. Ed. 2.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 103
sage of scripture is not to prove the being of an
external (supposed to be an) invisible world, but
the external being or existence of the visible world :
for it is here supposed that the visible world existed
before the first man saw it. But this is as much
against himself as me, and therefore is no objection,
as coming from that quarter. But another may
think that there is an answer due, not only to the
author, but to the objection itself. Be it so, I an-
swer,
2. That it seems to me there is nothing in this
passage which affirms the visible world to be exter-
nal. And my reason for this is, because there is
nothing in it but what is very consistent with be-
lieving that the visible world is not external.
For first, is it said that God created the heaven
and earth? Meaning by it, that all those things
which either we or any other intelligent creatures
behold, are not their own causes of existence, or of
an existence necessary, but receive and derive their
whole being from another cause, viz. God. Is any
thing of this denied in consequence of affirming,
that a visible object, as such, is not external? Or,
does this make it to be of necessary existence, or to
be its own cause, or to be the effect of any thing but
the will of God, who after the counsel of his own
will gives or causes such and such sensations in us?
Or, secondly, is there (as some learned interpreters
have thought) a particular sense and meaning in
the words, in principto, 'Ev apx^i or n-tfKia **
I04 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
if one design of the text was to tell us, that God the
father made all things by and through, and in, his
Son, who is frequently in scripture characterized
by this, as by a proper name? If so, is it incon-
sistent with this doctrine to hold that a visible ob-
ject, as such, is not external to the mind or faculty
which perceives it? So far from this, that this
doctrine seems to be intelligible only on this hy-
pothesis; and I think I have shewn already, that
an external world, as such, (whether visible or in-
visible) is of too absolute an existence to exist only
in the mind or will of God, or the son of God, as
every creature is said to do in this text. So that if
this text, thus interpreted, proves any thing to the
present purpose, it proves the contrary to that
which it is alledged for. Or, thirdly, is it said, that
the visible world existed, or had its being, before
the first man Adam was created? And did it not
thus exist when Apx^ beheld it, when it had past
the Wisdom, and was come into the will of God?
Or might not the angels see and live in it, (who
knows how long) before the man whom we call
Adam was produced into being? Or, lastly, must
all this go for nothing because of the little syllable
the^ which is prefixed in the text to the words
heaven and earth? as if by this we were obliged
to understand an absolute and strict identity be-
tween the visible world, considered in the will of
God, or in the minds of the angels, and that which
was afterwards perceived by Adam? This is a
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 105
slender thread indeed, whereon to hang the whole
weight of an universe. But must I myself be for-
bid the use of this important word the^ because I
hold that a visible object is not external; and be-
cause in consequence of this position there will be
found only an identity of similitude between the
visible world which God made in the beginning,
and that which Adam had a sensation of; and con-
sequently between that which Peter and that which
John sees, at the same or different times? Must I
never say that I have seen the sun, because on my
hypothesis the sun which I am supposed to see, is
not the same strictly with that which God seeth, or
which is seen by another person? And must I
for this reason never use the expression of the vis-
ible world, the heaven and earth, &c.? ^^ But then,
will that be denied to God, which is and must be
allowed to me? Where then is there so much as
an appearance of an objection in the text before us?
For my part, I can see none, either in this, or any
other that I know of, in the word of God, but what
is fully answered in what I have replied to this;
and therefore cannot but believe that it would be
time ill spent to suppose or name any other. Yet,
thirdly, others I might very easily name, such as
those which speak of the apparition of angels, of
several miracles, particularly that of coming into a
room whilst the doors were shut, &c. which sup-
pose the visible world to be not external ; and this
would be turning the objector's cannon against
io6 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
himself. But I shall spare my reader, the objector
and myself, and so add no more particulars to my
answer in this place.
Objection 2.
Is there no allowance due or to be made to
that strong and natural inclination which all men
have to believe an external world?
Answer i.
You may remember the mention of this ob-
jection * before, where I told you it is the argu-
ment by which Mr. Des Cartes satisfied himself
of the existence of an external world.^*
In my answer to it I supposed two things,
either that by an external world was meant the
being of a world, which, as external, is supposed
to be invisible, or the external being of the visible
world. To the last of these meanings I have given
in my answer, which my reader either does or may
recollect at pleasure. I am now (according to my
promise in that place) to make answer to this
objection in the first of the forementioned mean-
ings.
This, in all right and reason, should be the
true intent and meaning of this great philosopher.
For my own part I think I could very easily shew,
that either he must mean this, or be inconsistent
with himself, which is to mean nothing at all ; and
• Part I. Chap. II. Objection 3.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 107
if so, the objection is answered before any part of
it is considered. But I need not be at the trouble
of entering into this inquiry, it being sufficient in
this place to shew, that in the sense supposed it has
not the reality, or so much as the pretence, of being
an argument. And that is done in a word, by de-
nying the supposition of it, which is, that we have
any the least inclination to believe the existence
of an external world, supposed to be invisible.
This is evident at first sight, and yet this alone
destroys the whole force of the objection. "Strange!
That a person of Mr. Des Cartes's sagacity should
be found in so plain and palpable an oversight;
and that the late ingenious Mr. Norris should
be found treading in the same track, and that too
upon a solemn and particular disquisition of this
matter.^' That whilst on one hand they contend
against the common inclination or prejudice of
mankind, that the visible world is not external,
they should yet appeal to this same common in-
clination for the truth or being of an external
world, which on their principles must be said to be
invisible, and for which therefore (they must needs
have known if they had considered it) there neither
is, nor can be, any kind of inclination."
Well, you will say, but is there no allowance
due to the natural inclination, which we all have
to believe that the visible world is external, and
consequently this way, that there is an external
world.
io8 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
Answer 2.
Yes certainly, provided you believe the truth,
viz. that there neither is, nor can be, any such thing
as an external world, you may freely make use
of the common language, (which is a creature of
God, and which by his messengers, and even in
his own person, he has sanctified to us the use of,
if we believe the truth,) notwithstanding that there
is scarce a word in it, but what supposes the being
of an external world, or that the visible world is
external. It is the truth which makes us free, and
they only are in bondage who are ignorant of the
truth, or refuse to admit it. If therefore it be true,
that there is no external world, common language
is indeed extremely corrupt; but they only are in-
volved in this corruption who know not this truth,
or deny the evidence of it. And the same argu-
ments by which it is demonstrated to be a truth,
prove the use of all language unclean to such as
these. For such are servants to the power of a
corrupt language, and know not their right of free-
dom from it; and this makes them guilty of all the
errors which it supposes. Whereas those who
know and believe this truth, are free to use any
language, or way of speaking, wherein this truth
is not formally or directly contradicted, without
being accountable for the corruption of human
language. Thus we believe the circumvolution of
the earth, and the central rest of the sun, according
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 109
to the Copernican system; but yet so much is due
to the natural inclination which we all find in our-
selves to believe the contrary, as to excuse and jus-
tify us in the use of a language altogether Ptole-
maic. Thus we know and can demonstrate, that
the light which we behold is not any property or
affection of the sun, supposed to be in the heavens ;
but an affection in, or belonging to ourselves; yet
we are altogether free from the error of supposing
the contrary, though we often say that the sun is
luminous, or words to that effect.
Thus again, when the sun shines full in our
face, though we know for certain that the pain we
feel is not in our eye, but only in our souls, yet so
much is due to the natural inclination, whereby we
judge that all sensations are in our bodies, that we
are free on a thousand occasions to suppose the con-
trary in words, as we always do when we say, that
the light of the sun affllicts our eyes, or makes them
sore, that our head or tooth aches, or other words
to this purpose. Thus lastly, (to go but one step
higher, even that one which mounts us into that
region of truth or abstraction which the present
theory supposes us to be in,) though we know (as
by this time I hope we know) that an external
world is a being absolutely impossible; yet^ or
rather because we know this, we are, on infinite
occasions, free from the error on the contrary side,
though we use a language which continually sup-
poses the visible world to be external. This I say
no CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
is the liberty of believing the truth, and this truth
thus believed, does so fully sanctify even a corrupt
and erroneous language to our use, as to make it
our duty^ as well as liberty^ (even a debt we owe
to the great Author of Nature and of language,)
to express our minds to each other in a way suitable
to our present state, though both our nature and
our language suggest and suppose the contrary
to this truth. And now I hope this objection is
fully answered. But I expect another in its place,
(which is near about the same as to force and con-
sequence,) and that is to be told.
Objection 3.
That the late judicious Mr. Norris, who (in
his Ideal World, vol. i. chap, iv.) purposely con-
sidered this question of an external world, was yet
so far from concluding as I have here done, that
he declares it to be no other than errant scepticism
to make a serious doubt or question of its existence.
Answer.
I have chosen to place this in the form of an
objection, that I may seem rather to defend my-
self, than voluntarily oppose this author, for whose
writings and memory I have a great esteem. But
what shall I say in this case? Must I give up all
the arguments by which I have shewn that there is
no external world, in complaisance to this cen-
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS iii
sure, because it is the great and excellent Mr. Nor-
ris's? But has he supported this saying by any
arguments in favour of that which he calls it scep-
ticism to doubt of? Has he proved an external
world to be of the number of those evident truths
which are of no reasonable doubt, nor to be seri-
ously questioned by any sober understanding? Or
so much as pretended to answer any argument al-
ledged for its non-existence? No, not a word of
this is to be found in the whole chapter, unless the
argument from inclination, which is the subject of
the former objection, will be here named against
me. Well then, and must this too pass for an ar-
gument, notwithstanding that I have shewn the
weakness of it? And so, must all that I have
hitherto contended for, submit to the power of this
great authority, on peril of my being thought a
sceptic?
But is not this the way to be betrayed into the
very dregs of scepticism, to make a doubt of one's
own most evident perceptions for fear of this im-
putation? Or can a man give better proof that
this does not belong to him, than by putting (as I
have all along done) his cause or assertion on the
issue of a fair debate on plain reason and argu-
ment? And can anything be a plainer mark of
scepticism than to refuse to stand, or be concluded
by this issue, appealing from thence to judgment
or authority? This is what I said from the begin-
ning, and I have shewed it, I think, in every in-
112 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS •
stance of an objection since, that my adversary all
along is no other than prejudice, which is formal
scepticism; and yet nothing has been so constantly
charged against myself as this very imputation.
And it is this alone which has made it so consider-
able with me, as to set formally about an answer
to it.
But to speak particularly to the author's cen-
sure, with which we are at present concerned.
Is it so much as true in fact that he has said
any such thing as is affirmed in the objection?
This perhaps even a sceptic will contend fairly
with me ; for facts are the things they are observed
to be most fond of. Well, let this be tried (as it
ought to be) by his own words.
There are two, and as I remember but two,
passages in this chapter which speak at all to this
purpose. One is page i88, the other 205. In the
first of these I immediately find these words.
"Much less would I be suspected of indulging a
sceptical humour, under colour of philosophical
doubting, to such an extravagance as to make any
serious question of that general and collective ob-
ject of sense a natural world:" the other is this;
"But as to the existence of bodies, though it be a
thing of no reasonable doubt, nor to be seriously
questioned by any sober understanding," &c.
Here the thing that is not to be doubted of,
(at the hazard of the sobriety of our understand-
ing, and upon peril of scepticism,) is the existence
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 113
of bodies, the existence of a natural world, which
is supposed to be the object of sense. Well, and
what is this to me? Have I been doubting of the
existence of bodies? Or of the natural or sensible
world? Let the meanest of my readers be my wit-
ness, that I have been so far from doubting of any
thing of this, that I have even contended on all oc-
casions that nothing is, or can be, more evident than
the existence of bodies, or of a sensible world.
Have I repeated the same thing some hundreds
of times, and yet still is there need to have it ob-
served, that an external world is the moot point
between us? That, not the existence^ but the extra-
existence of the sensible world, is the point I have
been arguing against? And that, not a natural,
supposed to be a sensible^ world, but an external
world, as such, is impossible? But there is not a
word of an external world in the two sentences
before-mentioned; and therefore nothing in the
least against the conclusion which I am concerned
for. ''
True, you will say, but this was only a mistake
in the manner of expressing it; for that the whole
drift and argument of this chapter supposes the
subject to be an external world. I answer.
Right; that is the thing I have been all this
while expecting, viz. a little of his argument in
the place of his authority; and you see this we must
come to before there can be any decision.
But alas! to what purpose? For I find these
114 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
words in the very title of his chapter, viz. That
the existence of the intelligible is more certain
than that of the natural and sensible world. This
destroys, and doubly destroys, all again. For,
first, here he speaks not of an external, but sensi-
ble, world; and of this, not of its external existence,
which is the point I have been arguing against;
but simply of its eixstence, which is the point I
have been arguing for. And yet,
Secondly, His end proposed is not to aggra-
vate, but lessen, its certainty: and this is the drift
and argument of the whole chapter, at least of
about thirty pages of it; the rest being employed
in a digression concerning the comparative cer-
tainty of faith and reason.
But is this the main design and purpose of
this chapter, to lessen the evidence of an external
world? To shew, (as he plainly does, and for
which I refer my reader, to shew, I say) that
neither reason, nor sense, nor revelation, is suffi-
cient to assure us of the existence of any such
things : nay, that the argument used by Des Cartes,
before mentioned, ^^ in which he places his last
resort, falls short, and is deficient, for which we
have his own express words in the 208th page?
And can that same author say, in the midst of all
this, that the existence of an external world is a
thing of no reasonable doubt, nor to be seriously
questioned by any sober understanding, &c. sure-
ly it could be no mistake that he omitted the word
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 115
external, unless he designed to question his own
understanding, and formally pronounce himself a
sceptic.
Well, you will say, but it is a matter of fact
that he has argued against something. I answer,
he has so, for it is evident to demonstration that he
has argued against himself; and not only so, but
also as sceptically as is possible.
For after all nothing is more evident, than that
his censure and arguments proceed upon the very
same subject; and that is, not the external exist-
ence, but the existence simple of the natural world.
This natural world is sometimes by him called
bodies^ sometimes the visible or sensible world:
being about to aggrandize the evidence, or ob-
jective certainty, as to us, of his intelligible or ideal
world, he endeavours to shew, that it is much more
certain to us than the existence of the natural, or
sensible^ world ; and that because we have,
1. More,
2. Better, reasons to assure us of its existence.
These are his very words, as may be seen in
the 1 88th page, even in that very page in which is
found the censure on all those who so much as offer
to question the existence of the natural world.
But now the fact is, that he does question its ex-
istence both here, and throughout the whole course
of this chapter. What can be more evidently in-
consistent, more evidently sceptical, than this man-
ner of proceeding? What! Doubt of the exist-
ii6 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
ence of bodies, sensible bodies? Well may this be
called indulging a sceptical humour under the
colour of philosophical doubting. And is this so
called too by the very person who does it? This
is not only to be guilty of scepticism himself, but
also to be self-condemned.
The sum of this whole matter is this: if, by the
existence of the sensible world, Mr. Norris, in this
censure, is said to mean not the existence simple,
but the extra-existence of it, his arguments direct-
ly contradict his censure, which is a full answer to
his authority in this matter. If on the other hand
he be said to mean as he himself speaks, this is,
first of all, nothing at all to me, who doubt not of
the existence, but only of the extra-existence, of the
sensible world: then, secondly, he is in this as much
contrary to himself, as on the other supposition,
in that he formally doubts of, and even argues
against, that which he calls it scepticism to doubt
of. And, thirdly, which is as bad as any of the
rest, he doubts formally of a point which is not
capable of being doubted of, viz. the simple exist-
ence of the visible world. To all which, lastly, I
may, and also must, add this, that this second sup-
position is something more than an //, it being evi-
dently the case in fact, that his whole discourse in
this place is only of the existence simple of the
sensible or visible world; and not a word of its
extra-existence, on the concession of its existence
simple, is so much as mentioned or implied.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 117
I doubt not but on sight of the title page many
of my readers will judge, and be ready to say, sure-
ly the whole world is full of arguments against so
strange an assertion, as that there is no external
world. And perhaps, in this place, some may
wonder that I end here with the mention of so few
objections : but let such as these try to add to their
number; they may possibly find it more difficult
than they imagine.
In the mean time I expect to be understood
by some, when I ask their pardon for the trouble
I have given them, in thus seriously considering
so many trifling objections: objections which for
the most part have been lame on both their legs,
the language of prejudice only, and having scarce
so much as an appearance to introduce them. But
indeed I thought I could do no less, considering
the dispositions of far the greatest part of those
whom I have conversed with; who will be so far
from blaming me on this account, that they will
be ready, even at this time, to take part with these
objections. Even such as these I would please,
if possible ; but being too sure of the event, I have
nothing left to do, but to acquit myself, by cutting
off all occasion of offence which might be taken
at my leaving unmentioned, or unanswered, any
objection which I have heard, or found, or which
may reasonably be judged I ought to have found:
And in this respect I profess I have done my best,
which, I think, is all that can be expected of me.
ii8 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
The Conclusion of the Whole.
Of the use and consequences of the foregoing
treatise.
Having demonstrated, as I think, my point
prefixed in the title page, viz. the utter impossibil-
ity of an external world; and supposing also that
this is here granted me by my reader; he has a
right to demand, of what use and consequence is
all this to men, or to the moral world.
Now in order to return as plain and distinct
an answer as I can, and as can well be expected
from me in this place, to this question, I would
chuse to split it into two, making the words use
and consequence to stand for two different things:
and I shall begin with the last, viz. the conse-
quences of this position, no external world. To
the question concerning which I have these two
things to answer.
First, I know not why my reader should not
take my word, (I mean till he himself has made
inquiry,) when I assure him that the consequences
of this position are exceeding many in number. If
this will pass, I again assure him, that I have
found by more than a ten years experience, or ap-
plication of it to divers purposes, that this is one
of the most fruitful principles that I have ever met
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 119
with, even of general and universal influence in
the field of knowledge : so that, if it be true, as is
here supposed, it will open the way to ten thou-
sand other truths, and also discover as many things
to be errors, which have hitherto passed for true.
But this.
Secondly, may in some measure appear to my
attentive reader, even before he has made inquiry,
and though he makes some scruple of believing
me on my word : for he cannot but have taken no-
tice, that all language not only supposes, but is
almost wholly built on the supposition of, an ex-
ternal world. With this is leavened all our com-
mon discourse, and almost every thing that is found
in the writings of philosophers: so that with half
an eye it must needs be seen, that were a man to
call all his former thoughts and opinions, all he
has read in books, or heard in conversation, to an
examination or review, in the light of this position,
he would find a mighty work upon his hands, in
correcting only former errors, setting aside the pos-
itive part of deducing truths in their room.
This, I think, is all that can be said in general,
in answer to the question concerning the conse-
quences of this position: and I believe my reasons
will be judged to be sufficient for not entering into
the particular deduction of these consequences: as
first, that this would be all over digression in this
place: and secondly, such a digression as would
swell the volume to more than ten times its present
120 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
size: but chiefly, thirdly, for that I know myself
to be unqualified for so great a work, which is no
less than the compiling a new system, at least of
general knowledge. Perhaps the little which I
have here supplied may move some more compre-
hensive genius to begin where I conclude, and
build something very considerable on the founda-
tion which is here laid. But I must be allowed to
be a proper judge even in my own case, when I
profess that I am far from being equal to so vast
an undertaking. However, secondly, I will add
a word or two concerning the use of the foregoing
treatise: by this, as distinct from the former head,
I would be understood to mean,
1. The subject matters with regard to which
it may be of use.
2. Its particular usefulness with regard to
religion.
3. The proper manner after which it should
be used.
4th and lastly, the particular use and advan-
tage which I myself propose by it.
First, as to the subject matter, it may possibly
be asked, whether every thing must pass for false
which does not square with this hypothesis, sup-
posing it to be true? Or, whether because it is
true, that there is no external world, we must there-
fore use this language in discourse, or writing on
ev^ry kind of subject? To this I answer.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 121
I. That I have in good measure prevented
this inquiry in my second answer to the second ob-
jection, Part II. where I have shewn that we are
at liberty, and also in some measure, obliged to
use the common language of the world, notwith-
standing that it proceeds almost wholly on the sup-
position of an external world: for, first, language
is a creature of God, and therefore good, viz. for
use, notwithstanding this essential vanity which be-
longs to it. By this God spake the world into be-
ing when he said, Let there be light, let there be
a firmament, a sun, moon, and stars, &c. and they
were : all these things were made in the beginning,
even in the word, and wisdom, and will of God;
and therefore in him they are true, even externally
true, according to the language by which they were
willed into being, though in themselves they carry
an impossibility of so existing. But this does not
justify the goodness of this language with regard
to us; or rather, justify us sinners in the use of
this language, without reflecting, secondly, that we
are redeemed or recreated by the same Word of
God, who has taken on himself the iniquity of all
things; who, as one of us, has used this common
language, and even bore it with him on his cross;
who, by his Spirit in his apostles, has spoken all
the languages of the world, making thereby ev-
ery tongue his own, and who, lastly, in a word,
has pronounced every thing to be clean to those
who believe. I answer therefore,
122 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
2. That there are certain subjects which re-
quire the use of this common language; and on
which, to speak in the language of this hypothesis,
would be both ridiculous and unjust; unjust to
the will, and to the word, of God, who has made
and sanctified common language to our use, and
consequently to the obligation of our christian lib-
erty; and ridiculous, in that on several subjects of
discourse the use of any other than the common
ways of expression would be altogether vain, non-
sensical and absurd. I might easily give a thou-
sand instances of the truth of this ; but it were pity
to prevent the many witlings of the present age,
who by this would lose their whole field of knowl-
edge, with relation to this subject, and would have
nothing left whereby to ridicule what they are in-
capable of understanding. I leave it therefore, to
pamphleteers, doggrel rhimers, and comedians, to
expose the language of this treatise, by applying
it to improper subjects: for since the only end of
this kind of wit is not so much as pretended to be
truth, but only laughter and diversion, I am content
to be the subject, and also to laugh for company, as
having no pretence to the moving of one smile by
any thing I have here said. Allowing therefore
all due advantage to little wits of all sorts and sizes,
I answer,
3. Thirdly, that whenever we are, or pretend
to be, serious, I would recommend the language of
this discourse to be used only on subjects the most
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 123
general, simple, or universal, I do not say, in phil-
osophy only in general, or in this or that particular
branch of it; for I profess to understand but very
little of either, as words and ideas have been usu-
ally linked together. I say therefore only, as before,
the most simple, general or universal subjects ; sub-
jects wherein the question is strictly about truth,
particularly such wherein the question supposed
receives any alteration from the supposition or
denial of an external world.
Well, you will say, but then it seems it has but
little to do with religion, which is a subject best
understood or treated of in the common ways of
speaking: by this I am led in the
Second place, to consider the particular use-
fulness of this position or hypothesis with regard
to religion. Accordingly I make answer;
First, It has been often my fortune, and may
be again, to have this question put to me by such
as have not been able to comprehend the reasons by
which I justify my point of no external world;
which, by a very natural progress, has given them
a mighty zeal against the conclusion. In this case,
their only refuge to avoid an utter silence, has been
to urge this question about its usefulness as to re-
ligion. The pretence of this is, that religion is
their only care, or the end of ail their inquiries;
so that if it does not immediately appear that this
hypothesis tends to the promotion of religion, they
124 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
are fairly excused from believing, or so much as
attending to it.
But now to such as these, surely nothing can
be easier than to return a sufficient answer. But I
think the best, in this case, is to make none at all.
For first, it is evident that the end or drift of this
question is not to urge any thing against the truth
of my conclusion, but only to excuse its authors
from so much as inquiring into it. But this cer-
tainly is a point I can never be supposed to contend
against, whilst I am suffered to live out of bedlam.
And therefore since this is all that is demanded by
this question, it must needs be very impertinent to
go about to answer it any otherwise than by saying,
Sir, you have free leave to think of what subjects
you please ; especially having chosen the better part
already, viz. religion, and nothing else, to employ
your meditations on, &c. But, secondly, it happens
well enough for the ends of my discourse at present,
that my reader is here supposed to have inquired
already into the truth of my conclusion, and also
to have discovered it to be true.
And this gives the question concerning its use-
fulness as to religion, a very different turn and
sense from what it had before. For now though
it may be the effect of curiosity only, yet it very
probably may be the effect of a serious desire of
farther knowledge, and of a true regard for re-
ligion, and therefore ought to be so reputed.
Whereas the same, as before proceeding, is even
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 125
designed as a bar to knowledge, and is plainly no
other than a religious disguise. But whatever be
the true cause or principle of this last, I must needs
acknowledge its right to an answer. Accordingly
I affirm,
Secondly, that I consider the present treatise,
as a matter of no little use, or good consequence,
with regard to religion; that I have found the
truth of this by a long or very considerable experi-
ence; and in a word, that (be it taken how it will
by certain vain pretenders) I will be bold to pre-
tend, even in my own behalf, such a real, and even
exclusive, regard for religion, that I would never
have troubled an unwilling world with this dis-
course, (notwithstanding the infinite use which I
conceive it to be of with respect to simple or uni-
versal truth,) had it not been for its particular
usefulness with respect to religion; and conse-
quently for the benefit of those few who I expect
will find the truth of what I here affirm.
I am sensible this will pass for very slender
authority with some, and perhaps too for an objec-
tion with others; unless for their satisfaction I
produce the points concerning which I affirm this
discourse to be of use. But I have proved my
point already, viz. all that is in my title page, and
I shall prove no more, till I am aware of the suc-
cess of this, or hear from my reader himself, what
farther demands he may have upon me. Never-
theless, that I may avoid the imputation of having
126 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
passed over but the name of an objection, without
an answer, I will go out of the track of my in-
tended method so far, as to charge myself with the
debt of one instance of this sort; and that is, the
point of the real presence of Christ's body in the
eucharist, on which the papists have grafted the
doctrine of transubstantiation.
Now nothing, I think, can be more evident,
than that both the sound and explication of this
important doctrine are founded altogether on the
supposition of external matter; so that if this be
removed, there is not any thing left, whereon to
build so much as the appearance of a question.
For if after this it be inquired whether the
substance of the bread in this sacrament be not
changed into the substance of the body of Christ,
the accidents or sensible appearances remaining as
before ; or suppose this should be affirmed to be the
fact, or at least possible, it may indeed be shewn
to be untrue or impossible, on the supposition of an
external world, from certain consequential absurdi-
ties which attend it; but to remove an external
world, is to prick it in its punctum saliens, or
quench its very vital flame. For if there is no
external matter, the very distinction is lost between
the substance and accidents, or sensible species of
bodies, and these last will become the sole essence
of material objects. So that if these are supposed
to remain as before, there is no possible room for
the supposal of any change, in that the thing sup-
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 127
posed to be changed is here shewn to be nothing
at all.
I have chosen to instance in this, rather than
any other point of divinity or religion, because this
of transubstantiation is one of the most important
doctrines of the Roman church; which church at
the same time happens to hold the insufficiency of
the scriptures. Now as these two opinions happen
to concur in the same persons, it may possibly prove
an umbrage to certain weak and tender spirits, as
if my affirming only without proof, that the pres-
ent treatise, is of such mighty use, with regard to
religion, were an intrenchment on the sufficiency
of the gospel revelation, and consequently an ap-
proach towards the error of popery. This is the
objection hinted at before, viz. the great and
mighty objection, for the sake of which I have
departed from my method, and broken my resolu-
tion. But it is high time however now to return
and proceed.
The third thing which I proposed to speak
to, is the proper manner after which I would de-
sire this treatise to be made use of. And here
Let the first thing be, to read it thoroughly
and attentively. It is not so long but it may be
read more than once without any very consider-
able expence of time. However, let it so be read
as to be perfectly understood to be either true or
false. If false, I would desire my reader to give
me notice of the discovery, that I may discharge
ia8 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
myself of the guilt of having published a falshood
in so confident a manner; and also such a falshood
as bids open defiance to so considerable part of
whatsoever men have hitherto pretended to know.
This I think is a fair request. But my reader is
here supposed to understand it in another light, or
to look upon it to be true.
If so, I must nevertheless desire him to employ
all his skill or attention for some time to make it as
familiar as possible to his understanding. If he
fails in this he will find his assent slide from him
he knows not how; and he will come* in a little
time to an effectual disbelief of it, whilst he con-
tinues to believe it. This is the manner of men,
with respect to truths, either very simple, or pecu-
liarly religious; there lying an equal prejudice or
opposition of sense against both these kinds of
truths. This, by the way, is some sort of argument
that there is a nearer affinity between these two
kinds of truth than is commonly imagined; but I
am content in this place to suppose them very dif-
ferent. And be they as different as they will, yet
sure I am, that the subject of this treatise is of the
number of those which make the least impression,
even after they are assented to; or against which
the strongest prejudices are found to lie. For noth-
ing can be more evident to the first or natural
apprehensions of men, than that even the sensible
or visible world is external. And I believe I shall
find enough of this from my experience with other
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 129
persons, to make it needless to attest the truth of it
upon my own. If so, and if it be true notwith-
standing that there is no external world, I must
again desire my reader to use his utmost diligence
and attention to render this truth as sensible to him-
self as possible; which he will find to be done only
by a very frequent meditation on, or exercise of
himself in it. And here, (if I may for decency
sake be allowed to press this matter any farther,)
I would advise him.
First, to exercise himself for a little time in
writing on, or rather against, it. Let him try to
add to the objections which I have already con-
sidered, or respond afresh to the answers which I
have given to them; and perhaps his surprise to
find the little effect of this experiment, may add
some grains to the firmness of his assent.
After this it would confirm him not a little to
make the same experiment in discourse with others,
whether learned or unlearned matters not much,
if I have rightly observed; unless it be that the
learned in this case, usually make the least pertin-
ent objections. This method will in some measure
engage even self love on the side of truth, which
will mightily help to overbear the force of common
prejudice against it.
But lastly, if after all this endeavour he yet
find it difficult (as I believe he certainly will) to
keep the edge of his attention fixed, so as not to
think it still more evident that the visible world is,
I30 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
than that it is not external, let him practise with
himself an easy, but a very useful, art, which is to
use himself to meditate on this subject with either
his eye or imagination fixed on a looking-glass.
This, he may remember, was one of the instances
given (Part I. Chap. I. Sect. I.) to shew, that the
seeming externeity of a visible object is no argu-
ment of its real externeity: and it has since ap-
peared that all visible objects are equally external ;
or that that which is usually called the visible
world, is indeed no more external than what is
usually called the reflection or image of it in a
looking glass. Nevertheless it is much easier to
apprehend or believe this, with respect to objects
seen in a glass, than to such as are seen out of a
glass ; and it is only my reader's ease that I am at
this time consulting.
Now by these and such like means, I suppose,
even my Aristotelian reader (who by his studies
has been long unqualified to receive or apprehend
pure unbodied truths) will become master of this
subject, as simple as it is, or understand it with the
same, or some degree of the same, ease or feeling,
wherewith he usually understands ideas that are
more complex. And if so, he is prepared for all
the ends and uses of it. The chief of which is this,
Secondly, to carry it about with him, and use
it as one would do a key, or mirror, or almost any
other kind of mechanical or useful instrument. To
carry, I say, not the body of the present treatise, or
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 131
SO much as one argument of it, in his memory, but
only the conclusion, viz. no external world, which
is just what is in the inscription or title page.
With this, as with a key, he will find an easy
solution of almost all the general questions which
he has been used to account very difficult, or per-
haps indissoluble.
And as a mirror, held, as it were, in his hand
before the writings of others, it will discover to
him many errors, where before he little expected
to find them; besides that it will open to him a
new scene of truths, which have not hitherto been
so much as inquired after.
In a word, let him read and think with this
one proposition always present in his mind, and I
am persuaded he will need no assistance of mine
to make it appear to him, that it is of the greatest
use and consequence in the inquiry after truth.
And now I have nothing to add, but a word
or two concerning the particular use or advantage,
which I myself propose from having written this
discourse. And that is,
First, the probability by this means, of having
the truth of it thoroughly examined: which is rare-
ly done to any purpose in discourse, and indeed
in any private way; besides that, I would consult
the common benefit as well as my own.
Secondly, and lastly, that by this means I have
freed myself from many difficulties; in case I
should live to appear in public on any subject.
I3a CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
which is either a consequence of this, or any way
depends on, or interferes with it."* I speak this
from an experience very often repeated. And this,
at last, has reduced me to this necessity, either
never to attempt to write on any but the most ordin-
ary and popular subjects, (which is a work I have
too good reason to leave to others,) or resolve in
the first place to set heartily about this, and estab-
lish it once for all; as I hope I have here done.
If so, I have no more to do for the time to
come, but only to refer to what I have here written
and published: which is a liberty I may possibly
reap the advantage of in discourse on some other
subject: but which I shall be sure to use, and make
the most of, in case this should be replied to by any
partial, unfair, or scoffing adversary.
THE END.
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 133
NOTES=^
» (p. 6) Compare "Principles of Human Knowledge" Sec. 3-
"To me it is . . . evident that the various sensations, or ideas im-
printed on the sense, however blended or combined together (that is,
whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind
perceiving them."
^ (P- 9) Collier conceives of God as will, or power, which has
brought into existence all created things. He accepts this doctrine on
Scriptural authority without proof, for, he says, "We are told, that
God made heaven and earth, or the whole material world — and for
as much as it is the word of God, it may well pass, with us christians,
for an unquestionable axiom." (Specimen of True Philosophy, p. 115
of the Parr edition). Des Cartes and Berkeley regard knowledge of
God as the "certitude and truth of all science" ("Meditations" V., p. 83
of the Open Court edition), but they present proof for His existence
and the knowledge of it.
3 (p. lo) This objection was indeed later brought forward by
one of Collier's correspondents, Mr. Shepherd. (Benson's "Memoirs"
pp. 48-49).
4 (p. II ) Malebranche opposes this conception in the "Recherche
de la Verite," Livre "i^^, znde Partie, Chap. HI.
5 (p. 12) Thus the natural world of every person exists in his
mind alone, and between the natural worlds of individual minds exists
the relation of similitude, not of numerical identity. See Pt. H, Chap.
X, Obj. I. Answer.
6 (p. 13) Cf. Collier's letter to Dr. Clarke (Benson's "Memoirs,"
p. 36), Berkeley uses practically this same division of the subject, since
in the "New Theory of Vision" he grants, for the sake of argument,
the external existence of tangible objects, while in the "Principles" he
denies the external existence of all matter.
7 (p. 16) Cf. Collier's letter to Dr. Low (Benson's "Memoirs," p.
21-22).
8 (p. 17) Cf. Malebranche, "Recherche de la Verit6," £claircisse-
ment to Livre L, Chap. X.
9 (p. 17) Cf. Collier's first letter to Solomon Low, (Benson's
"Memoirs," pp. 25-28).
»o (p. 20) Cf. Berkeley's "Principles," Sees. 18, 33, 41 ; Third
* Notes 15, 19 (in part), 21, 27, 28, 39, 59 and 62 have been
added by Miss Calkins; Notes 29, 46 and 50 by Dr. Rand.
134 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
"Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous," Open Court edition, pp. 97
ff. ; Des Cartes, "Meditations" VI., Open Court edition, p. 88.
" (p. 22) The "several parts" of the "much celebrated writings"
are as follows:
Des Cartes "Meditations" II, III, VI ; "Principles of Philosophy,"
Part I, Props. IV, LXVI, LXVII, LXVIII, LXX, Part II, Props. I, IV.
Malebranche's "Recherche de la Verite," Livre I, Chap. 10.
"An Essay Towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible
World," by John Norris, Rector of Bemerton, near Sarum. 2 vols.
London, 1701 and 1704. Vol. II, pp. 238 seq.
12 (p. 22) Cf. Des Cartes "Meditations," VI, Open Court edition,
p. loi, and "Principles," Part IV, Prop. CXCVI.
'3 (p. 23) I have not been able to trace this quotation.
14 (p. 23) Cf. Des Cartes, "Principles," Part II, Props. I-IV.
'S (p. 23) On the relation of accidents to substance, cf. Aristotle,
Analytica Post I. c. IV; and Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Theologica,"
I. II., Qu. 7, Art. I, Concl. ad 2: aliquid dicitur accidens — quia inest
ei, sicut album dicitur accidens Socratis.
16 (p. 24) Des Cartes uses this same instance of the uncertainty
of the evidences of the senses in "Meditations," I, and in "Principles,"
Part I, Prop. IV.
17 (p. 25) Cf. Low's objection and Collier's answer, Benson's
Memoirs," p. 24.
'8 (p. 28) With the teaching of these paragraphs, cf. Collier's
first letter to Solomon Low, Benson's "Memoirs," pp. 21-24.
19 (p. 32) The first formal statement of the principle of contra-
diction is that of Aristotle. Cf. Metaphysics III (r) 3, 1005 b;
rh -yhp a,iiTb S,fw, inrdpxeiv re Kal /xi) inrdpxfiv dd^varov rwt airrQi Kal Kard
r6 ainb. (Cf. also, IX (I.) 1057a, 34; X, (K) 1062,3, 22), Cf. Nor-
ris's use of this principle {op. cit., I, chap. IV, p. 195) where he quotes
from Suarez, in his proof that sense can not assure us of the existence
of an external world.
20 (p. 36) Cf. Berkeley, "Principles," 3-7, 22-25; "Dialogues,"
I, Open Court ed., pp. 11-12: "sensible things are those only which are
immedately perceived by sense."
^' (P- 37) Collier, who plainly reads Aristotle second-hand, here
credits him with the theory of sensible emanations which he never
held. (Cf. Psychology, II, 7, 418 b: rb cfxhs . . . oiS^ diroppor/ffdi/MTOi
oWev^s) "light is not — emanation of any body"). This doctrine, that
perception is mediated by small particles given off from the surface
of a body, dates back to Empedokles and Demokritos. Cf. J. I. Beare,
Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition (Oxford, 1906).
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 135
Collier's contrast between the active and the passive intellect is equally
un-Aristotelian.
^^ (P- 39) Cf. Malebranche, "Recherche de la Vcrite" Livre 3n>e
2nde Partie, Chap. VI, "Que nous voyons toutes choses en Dieu," and
Norris, "Theory of the Ideal World" : Vol. II, p. 441.
23 (p. 40) See Part II, chap. IV, Arg. IV and chap. IX, Arg.
IX for further discussion of this point.
24 (p. 40) Franciscus Suarez, (1548-1617), a Jesuit theologian
and philosopher of Granada, who made many original contributions to
scholastic philosophy. He was a follower of Thomas Aquinas, and
the author of "Disputatio Metaphysicae," (Paris 1619). It was prob-
ably this book with which Collier was familiar, for Norris refers to it:
"Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World," Vol. I, chap. IV, pp. 195,
205, etc. The British Museum Catalogue gives the book as published
at Moguntiae in 1605.
25 (p. 40) Christopher Scheibler is the author of "Opus Meta-
physicum", Greszen, 1617. The British Museum Catalogue gives the
full title as "Opus Metaphysicum, duobus libris universum hujus
scientiae systema comprehendens." Marpurgi, 1637.
26 (p. 40) The Scottish philosopher, Robert Baron, who was pro-
fessor of Divinity in Marischal College, Aberdeen. His "Metaphysica
generalis" was published in London at some time between 1657 and 1661.
The British Museum contains three copies of this book.
27 (p. 41) Actus (iv^pyeia) entitativus, "essential reality" (con-
trasted with potentia {56vafus) pura, "pure potentiality." The distinc-
tion is first made by Aristotle and is perpetuated by the Schoolmen.
Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book VIII. (O); Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theolog'tca, I.I., Qu. 41, Art. 4, Concl. ad 2. To Aristotle, verbally
followed by the Schoolmen, matter is mere potentiality.
28 (p. 42) This appears to refer to the doctrine of St. Thomas:
Angels, though created, are immaterial beings and therefore, like God,
they know corporeal things without being affected by them (though
God alone knows through his own essence). Compare Summa TheoL,
I, 14, v., Concl. ; also I., 57, I. concl. Sicut Deus per suam essentiam
materialia cognoscit, ita angeli ea cognoscunt per hos quod sunt in eis
per suas intelligibiles species. Human beings, on the other hand, in
whom mind is united with body, know material things in part through
the action of the external objects on the senses. Compare Summa
TheoL, I. I., Qu. 84, Art. 4, Concl.
29 (p. 42) The reference probably is to Plato's doctrine that sensi-
ble reality is object of opinion, or belief, not of knowledge. Cf. Repub-
lic, V, 477 seq., VI, 509 seq.\ and Timaios, 29.
136 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
30 (p. 45) Cf. Berkelej's "Principles," Section 54.
31 (p. 46) It seems incredible that Collier should not cite Berke-
ley at this point, were he familiar with the "Essay" or with the
"Principles."
3^ (p. 47) Part I, chap. I, Section II, IV, V, and VI.
33 (p. 49) This objection was brought forward later by Solomon
Low. Cf. Collier's answer, Benson's "Memoirs," pp. 28-30.
34 (p. 50) "He must have a very Metaphysical Sense that shall
feel Existence, but not a very Metaphysical Understanding that shall
think he does. For to feel that a thing Exists, is the same as to feel a
Proposition."
^5 (p. 51) This distinction between the objects of sense and of
touch is emphasized by Berkeley, whose "Theory of Vision" is written
in part to "consider the difference there is betwixt the ideas of Sight
and Touch." "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision," Section I.
36 (p. 52) "It cannot be doubted that every perception we have
comes to us from some object different from our mind ; for it is not
in our power to cause ourselves to experience one perception rather
than another — ... It may, indeed, be matter of inquiry whether that
object be God, or something different from God; but because we
perceive, or rather, stimulated by sense, clearly and distinctly appre-
hend, certain matter extended in length, breadth, and thickness. . . .
God would, without question, deserve to be regarded as a deceiver, if he
directly and of himself presented to our mind the idea of this extended
matter, or merely caused it to be presented to us by some object which
possessed neither extension, figure, nor motion. For we clearly con-
ceive this matter as entirely distinct from God, and from ourselves,
or our mind ; and appear even clearly to discern that the idea of it is
formed in us on occasion of objects existing out of our minds, to which
it is in every respect similar. But since God cannot deceive us, for
this is repugnant to his nature, . . . we must unhesitatingly conclude
that there exists a certain object extended in length, breadth, and thick-
ness, and possessing all those properties which we clearly apprehended to
belong to what is extended. And this extended substance is what we
call body or matter." "Principles", Part II, Prop. I. Cf. also "Prin-
ciples", Part. I, Props. XXIX, XXX, XLII, and "Meditations" IV and
VI. (Open Court ed. p. 104).
37 (p. 52) In Part II, chapter X, Collier refers to this transla-
tion of Malebranche as "Search's Illustr. Taylor's Translation." This
reference must be to the translation of "La Recherche de la Verite"
published in 1694 by Thomas Taylor, M. A. of Magdalen College,
Oxford. A copy is in the British Museum. The full title is; "Father
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 137
Malebranche's treatise concerning the Search after Truth. Trans-
lated by T. Taylor." 1694. This reference to the "Recherche" seems
to be to the £claircissement of Livre i, chap. 10: "II est done absolu-
ment necessaire, pour s'assurer positivement de I'existence des corps
de dehors, de connoitre Dieu qui nous en donne le sentiment et de
scavoir qu'etant infiniment parfait il ne peut nous tromper."
38 (p. 52) " 'Tis true indeed upon the appearances of Bodies, and
those regular and uniform Sensations which accompany those Appear-
ances, I find myself Naturally deterrnin'd to think that they Exist. But
before I can rationally conclude that they do so, or by a rtilex act of
my mind approve of that Natural Judgment, some other Considerations
must intervene, since neither my Sensation, nor my Judgment upon
that Sensation is of itself any direct Argument for it. And therefore
I cannot but think M. Descartes was much in the right, . . . when he
suspended the Certainty, at least of Sensible things, upon the Existence
of God. . . . And indeed those Considerations which are taken from
the Truth and Goodness of the excellent and most perfect Author of
our Natures, who there is no reason to suspect, would give us Senses
to abuse and deceive us in the due and Natural use of them, are
Sufficient to satisfie all sober and reasonable Understandings of the
real Existence of Bodies."
^' (P- 54) See Hume's criticism of this argument, "Inquiry,"
Sec. XII, Part I. (Open Court ed. p. 163): "To have recourse to the
veracity of the Supreme Being, in order to prove the veracity of our
senses, is surely making a very unexpected circuit. If his veracity were
at all concerned in this matter, our senses would be entirely infallible."
40 (p. 54) Cf. Des Cartes, "Principles," Part I. Prop. LIII, LIV,
LXIII, LXVI, LXVIII, LXIX, and Part II, Prop. I and "Meditations"
II and VI.
**' (P- 55 ) Collier does not discuss in any detail the point which
Berkeley emphasizes, i. e. that we know extension by means of the
senses, just as much as we know light, heat, and colour. See Berkeley's
"Principles," Sec. 9, 10, 11.
^' (P- 55) Cf, the letter to Solomon Low, Benson's "Memoirs," p.
24.
43 (p. 56) Norris admits that an external world is unknowable,
but does not conclude that therefore it cannot exist. "Theory of the
Ideal or Intelligible World," Vol. I, p. 205 and Vol. II, chap. VI,
Chap. XII, p. 442. Cf. Berkeley's use of this argument and the follow-
ing, Principles, 18-20.
44 (p. 56) The external world is either creature (created) or is
self-existent, i. e. God himself. The latter doctrine seems to Collier
138 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
untenable, so he holds, without further argument, that the world is a
"creature."
45 (p. 56) This point is not, however, later considered.
*^ (P- 59) "^^ <'^'" formali ... or in actu exercito": really or
actually existent Formal existence is opposed to merely representative
existence (existence in thought) ; "practised," or actual, existence is
opposed to potential existence.
47 (p. 62) Collier regards as axiomatic the perfect wisdom of
God. Bericeley argues to God's perfection from the "order — beauty
and perfection" of nature. Principles 146: Cf. Sec. 30-32, 36.
48 (p. 63) See Introduction, page xxiv, for comparison of Collier's
with Kant's antinomies.
49 (p. 70) See p. 40, VI, of this edition of the "Clavis" for Col-
lier's first references to this point, and Pt. II, Chap. IX, Arg. IX, for
further discussion. (References in the Notes, to the "Clavis" are to this
edition).
so (p. 73) The reference is to Part IV, chapter 1 of the Port
Royal "Logic or Art of Thinking," edited by A. Arnauld and P.
Nicole, (1662).
5' (p. 77) Collier's theological orthodoxy is evidenced in his
ready acceptance of the authority of the word of God, which he says,
"may well pass, with us Christians, for an unquestionable axiom,"
"Specimen of True Philosophy," Parr edition, p. 115.
5^ (P- 77) On page 125 of the "Clavis," Collier claims, indeed,
that he explains by his idealism the apparent contradictions in these
theological arguments.
S^ (P' 77) The Socinians were a sect founded in Italy in the
i6th century by Lelio and Fausto Sozzini. By their denial of the
divinity of Christ, and by their belief in the moral theory of the
Atonement and in man's power to attain his own salvation, they were
the forerunners of the modern Unitarians.
54 (p. 77) Arianism is the name given to the Christological
theory of Arius, who denied that Christ is "of the same substance"
with the Father. The controversy arose through the Alexandrian dis-
cussion of the Logos in the early fourth century. Arian doctrine was
revived in England in 1720 by Dr. Samuel Clarke, and Collier himself
inclined to the Arian theory. See Benson's "Memoirs," pp. 61, 62.
55 (p. 83) Cf. note 21. Here, and in the arguments which
follow. Collier evidently follows Malebranche, "Recherche de la Verite,"
Livre 3™^^ 2nde Partie, chap. II.
56 (p. 87) This argument is directed against the teaching of
CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS 139
Norris, who, throughout his Essay, represents the external world, as a
thing entirely apart from God, and yet as produced by him.
57 (p. 87) Des Cartes, "Meditations" III, Open Court ed. p. 58.
5^ (P- 95) In Pt. I, pp. 40-41, and Pt. II, Argument IV, Collier
argues that the matter of the early philosophers must be invisible ; here
he argues that the conception is utterly meaningless. Berkeley touches
lightly on these conceptions as already out of date, referring to the
"so much ridiculed notion of materia prima, to be met with in Aristotle
and his followers ("Principles" n). In formulating this conception
of matter, as a vague something or nothing, and as a supporting
medium of sensible qualities (Clavis p. 23), Collier closely approaches
Berkeley.
59 (p. 96) Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. IV, (A), c. 2, 1013a, 24.
Cf. Bk. I. (A), c. 3, 983a, 26.
60 (p. 97) St. Austin for St. Augustine is a contraction common
among the Schoolmen.
^' (P- 97) Porphyry {za-circa 303 A. D.), a follower of
Plotinus.
^^ (P- 97) The reference is to Metaphysics Bk. VI. (Z), c. 3,
1029a, 20: X^w 5' CXijc f) KaO'' axiT^v fi-fire rl H'fiTf iroabv fj.-fyre
dWo fXTiSiv Xiyerai oh &pu7Tai t6 6v. Cf. IX. (I), c. 8, 1058, a, 23. See
also, Berkeley, "Principles," 80, and "Dialogues between Hylas and
Philonous," II. (Open Court ed. p. 80) : "So matter comes to nothing";
and Hegel, "Logik," I, i, Kap. i : "Das reine Sein und das reine
Nichts ist also dasselbe."
63 (p. loi) Cf. Berkeley's treatment of this objection in "Prin-
ciples" 82.
64 (p. 102) Cf. Collier's "Specimen of True Philosophy." See
also Introduction, pp. XVII ff.
^S (p. 102) See p. 12 of the "Clavis" for Collier's first refer-
ence to this point. Also see Collier's letter to Mr. Shepherd, quoted
in Benson's "Memoirs," pp. 48 seq. ; and Berkeley's "Dialogues," III,
Open Court Edition, pp. 119 ff.
66 (p. 102) See Malebranche, "Recherche de la Verite," 6clair-
cissement to Livrc I., chap. X (near end) ; "Or dans I'apparence de
l'£criture sainte, et par les apparences des miracles, nous apprenons
que Dieu a cree un ciel et une terre — "
67 (p. 105) See the "Clavis" pp. 108 and 120; also see Berkeley,
"Principles," 38, 52.
68 (p. 106) See Note 36.
69 (p. 107) Norris's "Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World,"
vol. I, p. 205 ; Vol. II, pp. 320, 493, 563.
140 CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS
70 (p. 113) See "Clavis" pp. 8, 9. Collier answers this objection
again in his second letter to Mr. Low, Benson's "Memoirs," pp. 31, 33;
in the letter to Dr. Clarke, Benson, pp. 36 seq.\ and in the letter to
Mr. Mist, Benson, pp. 41 seq.
71 (p. 114) "Clavis," p. io6.
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